Al-Skeini i ostali protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva

Država na koju se presuda odnosi
Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo
Institucija
Evropski sud za ljudska prava
Broj predstavke
55721/07
Stepen važnosti
Referentni slučaj
Jezik
Srpski
Datum
07.07.2011
Članovi
1
2
2-1
34
41
Kršenje
2
Nekršenje
nije relevantno
Ključne reči po HUDOC/UN
(Čl. 1) Obaveza poštovanja ljudskih prava
(Čl. 1) Nadležnost država
(Čl. 2) Pravo na život
(Čl. 2-1) Efikasna istraga
(Čl. 2-1 / ICCPR-6) Život
(Čl. 34) Pojedinačne predstavke
(Čl. 41) Pravično zadovoljenje - opšte
Tematske ključne reči
nadležnost
VS deskriptori
1 Standardi zaštite ljudskih prava
1.1 Član 1. - obaveza poštovanja ljudskih prava nadležnost
1.2 Član 2. - pravo na život
1.2.7 Obaveza sprovođenja istrage
Zbirke
Sudska praksa
Presuda ESLJP
Veliko veće
Sažetak
Dana 20. marta 2003. godine oružane snage Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva i njihovih koalicionih partnera ušle su u Irak sa ciljem da smene režim Baas partije koja je u to vreme bila na vlasti. Dana 1. maja 2003. godine glavne borbene operacije proglašene su završenim. Sjedinjene Američke Države i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo su formirali Koalicionu privremenu vlast “sa zadatkom privremenog vršenja ovlašćenja vlade”. Ta ovlašćenja uključivala su i poslove bezbednosti u Iraku. Period ove vlasti trajao je do 28. juna 2004. godine, kada su sva ovlašćenja za upravljanje Irakom prešla na Iračku prelaznu vladu te kada je prestala da postoji Koaliciona privremena vlast.

Tokom ovog perioda, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo komandovalo je vojnom divizijom – Multinacionalna divizija (jugoistok) – koja je obuhvatala provinciju Al-Basra. Počevši od 1. maja 2003. godine, odgovornost za održavanje bezbednosti i podršku civilnoj upravi u pokrajini Al-Basra preuzele su britanske snage. Podnosioci predstavke bili su bliski srodnici šest iračkih državljana ubijenih u Basri 2003. godine, tokom ovog perioda.

Srodnici prvog, drugog i četvrtog podnosioca predstavke zadobili su smrtonosne povrede vatrenim oružjem kada su britanski vojnici otvorili vatru jer su navodno verovali da su sami napadnuti ili u neposrednoj opasnosti. Supruga trećeg podnosioca predstavke ubijena je nakon što je navodno upala u unakrsnu vatru tokom razmene vatre između britanske patrole i nepoznatih naoružanih lica. U svakom od ova četiri slučaja, bilo je odlučeno – u prva tri slučaja od strane starešina vojnika, a u slučaju četvrtog podnosioca predstavke od strane Specijalnog istražnog odeljenja Kraljevske vojne policije – da incident spada pod Pravila službe britanske vojske te da nije potrebna dalja istraga.

Sina petog podnosioca predstavke pretukli su britanski vojnici koji su ga osumnjičili za pljačkanje, te je bio primoran da uđe u reku u kojoj se utopio. Iako je Specijalno istražno odeljenje otvorilo istragu te je četvorici vojnika suđeno za ubistvo iz nehata na vojnom sudu, oni su oslobođeni nakon što ključni svedok optužbe nije bio u stanju da ih identifikuje.

Sin šestog podnosioca predstavke, Baha Mousa, preminuo je od gušenja u britanskoj vojnoj bazi, sa višestrukim povredama po telu. Specijalno istražno odeljenje odmah je pozvano da sprovede istragu. Šesti podnosilac predstavke pokrenuo je parnični postupak protiv Ministarstva odbrane, koji se završio u julu 2008. godine formalnim i javnim priznanjem odgovornosti i isplatom naknade u visini od 575.000 funti. Ministar je najavio da će se o smrti sina podnosioca predtsavke sprovesti javna istraga.

Međutim, 2004. godine Državni sekretar za odbranu odlučio je da se ne sprovode nezavisne istrage šest smrtnih slučajeva, i da se ne prihvati odgovornost odnosno da se ne isplati naknada. Podnosioci predstavke tražili su sudsko preispitivanje takve odluke. Slučaj je na kraju dospeo pred Gornji dom Britanskog parlamenta, koji je prihvatio da je slučaj Baha Mouse u nadležnosti Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva s obzirom na to da se zlostavljanje desilo u okviru britanske vojne baze. Taj predmet je stoga vraćen prvostepenom sudu na ponovno razmatranje pitanja da li je sprovedena adekvatna istraga njegove smrti. Kada su u pitanju ostali smrtni slučajevi, Gornji dom je smatrao da ga odluka Evropskog suda u predmetu Banković i drugi protiv Belgije i drugih ((odluka) [GC], br. 52207/99, 12. decembar 2001. godine) obavezuje da utvrdi da Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo nije nadležno.

Pravo – Član 1 (mesna nadležnost):
Obaveza države ugovornice da obezbedi prava i slobode iz Konvencije bila je ograničena na lica koja su u njenoj “nadležnosti”, što je primarno teritorijalni koncept. Radnje koje su izvršene ili koje proizvode dejstvo van teritorije države mogle su predstavljati vršenje nadležnosti samo u izuzetnim okolnostima. Sudska praksa Suda ukazuje na to da bi takve okolnosti mogle da postoje u slučaju kada lica koja deluju u ime države vrše vlast ili kontrolu nad pojedincem van predmetne teritorije. U ovu kategoriju spadaju radnje diplomatskih i konzularnih predstavnika, vršenje ekstrateritorijalnih javnih ovlašćenja uz agreman, po pozivu ili uz saglasnost predmetne strane vlade, ili na kraju, ekstrateritorijalna upotreba sile od strane lica koja deluju u ime države sa ciljem da pojedinca stave pod svoju kontrolu. Izuzetne okolnosti takođe bi mogle nastati kada bi, kao posljedica zakonite ili nezakonite vojne akcije, država ugovornica vršila delotvornu kontrolu nad područjem van nacionalne teritorije ili neposredno, sopstvenim oružanim snagama, ili posredstvom podređene lokalne uprave.

U predmetu podnosilaca predstavke, nakon odlaska sa vlasti režima Baas partije i do stupanja na vlast Iračke prelazne vlade, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo je (zajedno sa Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama) u Iraku preuzelo vršenje nekih javnih ovlašćenja koja inače vrši suverena vlast. Konkretno, preuzeta je vlast i odgovornost za održavanje bezbednosti u jugoistočnom Iraku. U ovim izuzetnim okolnostima, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo je, posredstvom svojih vojnika angažovanih u bezbednosnim operacijama u Basri tokom predmetnog perioda, vršilo vlast i kontrolu nad pojedincima koji su ubijeni tokom tih bezbednosnih operacija. Srodnici svih podnosilaca predstavke poginuli su tokom relevantnog perioda. Uz izuzetak supruge trećeg podnosioca predstavke, nije bilo osporeno da su njihove smrti uzrokovane radnjama britanskih vojnika u toku vršenja bezbednosnih operacija u gradu Basra ili u vezi sa njima. Stoga je postojala pravna povezanost u pogledu nadležnosti u njihovim slučajevima. Iako se nije znalo koja je strana ispalila metak koji je rezultovao smrću supruge trećeg podnosioca predstavke, ona je poginula u toku bezbednosnih operacija Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva dok su britanski vojnici vršili patrolu u blizini doma trećeg podnosioca predstavke, uključivši se u smrtonosnu razmenu vatre, tako da je i u njenom slučaju postojala pravna povezanost u pogledu nadležnosti.
Zaključak: u okviru nadležnosti (jednoglasno).

Član 2 (procesni aspekt):
Procesna obaveza po članu 2 morala se primeniti realistično kako bi se u obzir uzeli praktični problemi sa kojima su se suočavali istražitelji u stranom i neprijateljskom području u vreme neposredno nakon invazije i rata. Ipak, činjenicom da je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo učestvovalo u formiranju privremen vlasti podrazumevalo je da je, da bi istraga radnji koje su navodno počinili britanski vojnici bila delotvorna, naročito važno da je istražni organ bio operativno nezavisan, i da se tako doživljavao.

Bilo je jasno da istrage o pucnjavi u slučaju srodnika prvog, drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke nisu ispunile uslove iz člana 2, pošto je istražni postupak u celosti ostao unutar vojnog lanca komande, te bio ograničen na uzimanje izjava od vojnika koji su učestvovali u incidentima. Isto tako, iako je Specijalno istražno odeljenje sprovelo istragu o smrti brata četvrtog podnosioca predstavke i sina petog podnosioca predstavke, to nije bilo dovoljno da se ispune uslovi iz člana 2, s obzirom na to da Specijalno istražno odeljenje tokom relevantnog perioda nije bilo operativno nezavisno. Uz to, u slučaju četvrtog podnosioca predstavke postojao je visok rizik od kontaminiranih i nepouzdanih dokaza zbog dugih odugovlačenja u ispitivanju ključnih svjedoka od strane potpuno nezavisnog istražitelja. Štaviše, čini se da neki navodni očevici uopšte nisu bili ispitani od strane potpuno nezavisnog istražitelja. Delotvornost istrage u slučaju smrti sina petog podnosioca predstavke takođe izgleda da je bila ozbiljno narušena dugim odugovlačenjima koja su rezultovala time da se nekima od vojnika optuženim za učestvovanje više nije moglo ući u trag. Osim toga, uzak fokus krivičnog postupka bio je neadekvatan: u konkretnim okolnostima predmeta, u kojima je izgledalo da postoji makar prima facie dokaz da se maloletni sin podnosioca predstavke utopio kao rezultat zlostavljanja dok je bio u pritvoru britanskih vojnika koji su pomagali iračkoj policiji u borbi protiv pljačkanja, član 2 iziskivao je nezavisno ispitivanje, dostupno porodici žrtve i javnosti, širih pitanja odgovornosti države za smrt, uključujući i uputstva, obuku i nadzor nad vojnicima koji obavljaju zadatke kao što je ovaj neposredno nakon invazije. Suprotno tome, bližila se završetku puna, javna istraga o okolnostima Baha Mousine smrti. U svetlu te istrage, šesti podnosilac predstavke više nije bio žrtva bilo kakve povrede procesne obaveze po članu 2. Shodno tome, tužena država nije sprovela delotvornu istragu smrti rođaka prvih pet podnosilaca predstavke.
Zaključak: utvrđena je povreda (jednoglasno).

Preuzmite presudu u pdf formatu

 EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA   

VELIKO VIJEĆE

PREDMET AL-SKEINI I OSTALI PROTIV UJEDINJENOG KRALJEVSTVA

(Predstavka broj 55721/07)

PRESUDA

STRASBOURG

7. jula 2011. godine

Ova presuda je konačna, ali može biti predmet redakcijskih izmjena.

U predmetu Al-Skeini i ostali protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, Evropski sud za ljudska prava, zasjedajući u Velikom vijeću u sastavu:

Jean-Paul Costa, predsjednik,
Christos Rozakis,
Nicolas Bratza,
Françoise Tulkens,
Josep Casadevall,
Dean Spielmann,
Giovanni Bonello,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Lech Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
George Nicolaou,
Luis López Guerra,
Ledi Bianku,
Ann Power,
Mihai Poalelungi, sudije,
i Michael O’Boyle, zamjenik sekretara,

nakon vijećanja zatvorenog za javnost, koje je održano 9. i 16. juna 2010. godine i 15. juna 2011. godine, donosi sljedeću presudu koja je usvojena posljednjeg navedenog dana:

POSTUPAK

  1. Postupak u ovom predmetu je pokrenut predstavkom (broj 55721/07) koju je Sudu podnijelo šestero iračkih državljana, gosp. Mazin Jum’Aa Gatteh Al-Skeini, gđa Fattema Zabun Dahesh, gosp. Hameed Abdul Rida Awaid Kareem, gosp. Fadil Fayay Muzban, gosp. Jabbar Kareem Ali i pukovnik Daoud Mousa (podnosioci predstavke) protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva Velike Britanije i Sjeverne Irske na osnovu člana 34. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda 11. decembra 2007. godine.
  2. Podnosioce predstavke, kojima je dodijeljena pravna pomoć, je zastupao Public Interest Lawyers, ured solisitora sa sjedištem u Birmingemu. Vladu Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (Vlada) je zastupao njen zastupnik, gosp. D. Walton iz Ministarstva vanjskih poslova i Commonwealtha (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, u daljem tekstu: Foreign Office).
  3. Podnosioci predstavke su naveli da su njihovi srodnici potpadali pod jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva kada su bili ubijeni i da nije provedena djelotvorna istraga o njihovoj smrti, što je dovelo do kršenja člana 2. Konvencije.
  4. Predstavka je dodijeljena Četvrtom odjeljenju Suda (pravilo 52. stav 1. Pravila Suda). Dana 16. decembra 2008. godine, Sud je odlučio da obavijesti Vladu o predstavci. Sud je također odlučio da u isto vrijeme ispita meritum predstavke i njenu prihvatljivost (član 29. stav 1). Stranke u postupku su dostavile zapažanja u pisanoj formi o prihvatljivosti i meritumu predmeta. Dana 19. januara 2010. godine, Vijeće je odlučilo ustupi nadležnost Velikom vijeću.
  5. Sastav Velikog vijeća je određen u skladu sa članom 27. st. 2. i 3. Konvencije i pravilom 24. Pravila Suda. Sudija Peer Lorenzen, predsjednik Petog odjeljenja, se povukao, a sudija Luis López Guerra, zamjenik, ga je zamijenio.
  6. Podnosioci predstavke i Vlada su dostavili dodatni memorandum o prihvatljivosti i meritumu. Sljedeće organizacije, u svojstvu trećih licaumješača, su također dostavile zajednička zapažanja: Bar Human Rights Committee, European Human Rights Advocacy Centre, Human Rights Watch, Interights, Međunarodna federacija za ljudska prava, Law Society i Liberty.
  7. Javna rasprava je održana u Palati ljudskih prava u Strasbourgu 9. juna 2010. godine (pravilo 59. stav 3).

Pred Sudom su se pojavili:

(a) u ime Vlade:
Gosp. D. WALTON, zastupnik,
Gosp. J. EADIE QC,
Gđa C. IVIMY,
Gosp. S. WORDSWORTH, branitelji,
Gđa L. DANN,
Gđa H. AKIWUMI, savjetnici;

(b) u ime podnosilaca predstavke:
Gosp. RABINDER SINGH QC,
Gosp. R. HUSAIN QC,
Gđa S. FATIMA,
Gđa N. PATEL,
Gosp. T. TRIDIMAS,
Gđa H. LAW, branitelji,
Gosp. P. SHINER,
Gosp. D. CAREY,
Gđa T. GREGORY,
Gosp. J. DUFFY, savjetnici.

Sud je saslušao izjave gosp. Eadieja i gosp. Singha.

ČINJENICE

I     OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA

8.  Činjenice predmeta se mogu rezimirati kako slijedi.

A.  Okupacija Iraka od 1. maja 2003. godine do 28. juna 2004. godine

1.  Kontekst: Rezolucija 1441 Vijeća sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija

  1. Dana 8. novembra 2002. godine, Vijeće sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija, djelujući na osnovu poglavlja VII Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija, je usvojilo Rezoluciju 1441. Rezolucijom je odlučeno, inter alia, da je Irak počinio i da i dalje čini materijalnu povredu svojih obaveza iz prethodnih rezolucija Vijeća sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija da se razoruža i sarađuje sa inspektorima za oružje Ujedinjenih nacija i Međunarodne agencije za atomsku energiju. Rezolucijom 1441 je odlučeno da se Iraku pruži posljednja mogućnost da se povinuje svojim obavezama da se razoruža i da uspostavi pojačani režim inspekcije. Osim toga, Vijeće sigurnosti je zatražilo od generalnog sekretara da Iraku odmah priopći tu rezoluciju, te je zahtijevalo da Irak sarađuje bez odlaganja, bezuvjetno i aktivno sa inspektorima. Vijeće sigurnosti je donijelo zaključak podsjećanjem da je “više puta upozoravalo Irak da će se suočiti sa ozbiljnim posljedicama ako i dalje ne bude ispunjavao svoje obaveze”. Vijeće sigurnosti je odlučilo da i dalje aktivno prati situaciju.

2.  Glavne borbene operacije: od 20. marta do 1. maja 2003. godine

  1. Dana 20. marta 2003. godine, koalicija oružanih snaga pod jedinstvenom komandom, koju su vodile Sjedinjene Američke Države, u okviru koje je bio veliki broj britanskih vojnika i malih kontingenata iz Australije, Danske i Poljske, je započela invaziju na Irak. Britanski vojnici su zauzeli Basru 5. aprila 2003. godine, a trupe Sjedinjenih Država su preuzele kontrolu nad Bagdadom 9. aprila 2003. godine. Glavne borbene operacije u Iraku su proglašene okončanim 1. maja 2003. godine. Nakon toga, druge države su poslale svoje osoblje da bi pomoglo u procesu obnove.

3. Razvoj pravne i političke situacije u maju 2003. godine

  1. Dana 8. maja 2003. godine, stalni predstavnici Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva i Sjedinjenih Država u Ujedinjenim nacijama su uputili zajedničko pismo predsjedniku Vijeća sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija, koje glasi:

“Sjedinjene Američke Države, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo Velike Britanije i Sjeverne Irske i koalicioni partneri nastavljaju da djeluju zajedno da bi osigurali potpuno razoružanje Iraka od oružja za masovno uništenje i njegovih lansirnih sistema u skladu sa rezolucijama Vijeća sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija. Države koje čine koaliciju će se striktno povinovati svojim obvezama u skladu sa međunarodnim pravom, uključujući one koje se odnose na osnovne humanitarne potrebe iračkog naroda. Mi ćemo djelovati da bismo osigurali da iračka nafta bude zaštićena i upotrebljana u korist iračkog naroda.

Da bi ostvarili te ciljeve i obaveze u postkonfliktnom periodu u Iraku, Sjedinjene Države, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo i koalicioni partneri, djelujući u okviru postojećih rješenja u vezi sa komandom i kontrolom posredstvom komandanta koalicionih snaga, su stvorili Koalicijsku privremenu vlast (Coalition Provisional Authority), koja obuhvata Ured za obnovu i humanitarnu pomoć, kako bi vršila nadležnosti vlade privremeno a naročito, prema potrebi, obezbijedila sigurnost, omogućavala dostavljanje humanitarne pomoći i eliminirala oružje za masovno uništenje.

Sjedinjene Američke Države, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo i koalicioni partneri, djelujući posredstvom Koalicijske privremene vlasti, će osigurati, inter alia, sigurnost u Iraku i upravljati tom zemljom privremeno, naročito sljedećim sredstvima: prevencijom neprijateljstava, očuvanjem teritorijalnog integriteta Iraka i obezbjeđivanjem granica Iraka; osiguravanjem, i uklanjanjem, onesposobljavanjem, eliminiranjem i uništavanjem (a) kompletnog iračkog oružja za masovno uništenje, balističkih raketa, bespilotnih letjelica i ostalih sistema za pokretanje hemijskog, biološkog i nuklearnog oružja i (b) svih elemenata iračkog programa za istraživanje, razvoj, dizajn, izradu, proizvodnju, sklapanje i korištenje takvog oružja i sistema i podsistema za njihovo pokretanje, te njihovih komponenti, uključujući, ali ne ograničavajući se na, zalihe hemijskih i bioloških agensa, materijala koji mogu poslužiti u proizvodnji nuklearnog oružja, i ostale slične materijale, tehologije, opreme, instalacije i intelektualno vlasništvo koji su korišteni ili mogu materijalno doprinijeti tim programima; u konsultaciji sa relevantnim međunarodnim organizacijama, pomaganjem propisnog i dobrovoljnog povratka izbjeglica i raseljenih lica; održavanjem javnog reda, naročito podsticanjem međunarodnih napora da se ponovno osposobe iračke civilne policijske snage; eliminiranjem kompletne terorističke infrastrukture unutar Iraka i poduzimanjem mjera kako bi se onemogućilo da teroristi i terorističke grupe dobiju utočište; podržavanjem i koordiniranjem deminiranja i aktivnosti koje se odnose na deminiranje; promoviranjem odgovornosti za zločine i svirepa djela koja je počinio bivši irački režim; preuzimanjem neposredne kontrole nad iračkim institucijama koje su odgovorne za vojna i sigurnosna pitanja i djelovanjem, ako je potrebno, u svrhu demilitariziranja, demobiliziranja, kontroliranja, upravljanja, reformiranja, raspuštanja ili reorganiziranja tih institucija tako da ne mogu više predstavljati prijetnju iračkom narodu ili međunarodnom miru i sigurnosti, ali da budu u stanju da brane irački suverenitet i teritorijalni integritet.

Sjedinjene Države, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo i koalicioni partneri priznaju urgentnu potrebu za stvaranjem klime u kojoj će irački narod moći slobodno odrediti svoju političku budućnost. S tim ciljem, Sjedinjene Države, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo i koalicioni partneri podstiču napore iračkog naroda da poduzme prve korake prema formiranju predstavničke vlade zasnovane na vladavini prava, koja poštuje osnovne slobode i jednaku zaštitu i pravdu u skladu sa zakonom bez ozira na etničku pripadnost, religiju ili spol. Sjedinjene Države, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo i koalicioni partneri favoriziraju uspostavljanje vladinih predstavničkih institucija i omogućavaju odgovorno upravljanje iračkim finansijskim sektorom, humanitarnu pomoć, privrednu obnovu, transparentno djelovanje i obnovu iračke infrastrukture i prirodnih resursa, progresivno prenošenje upravnih odgovornosti na predstavničke institucije vlade, na odgovarajući način. Naš cilj je da se upravne nadležnosti prenesu na iračke predstavničke vlasti što je moguće brže.

 Ujedinjene nacije imaju vitalnu ulogu u domenu pružanja humanitarne pomoći, podržavanja obnove Iraka i pomaganja formiranja privremene iračke vlasti. Sjedinjene Države, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo i koalicioni partneri su spremni da rade u uskoj saradnji sa predstavnicima Ujedinjenih nacija i njenih specijaliziranih agencija, očekujući sa nestrpeljenjem da generalni sekretar imenuje specijalnog koordinatora. Mi također pozdravljamo podršku i doprinos država članica, međunarodnih i regionalnih organizacija i ostalih subjekata u okviru odgovarajućih sporazuma o saradnji sa Koalicijskom privremenom vlašću.

Bili bismo Vam zahvali ako biste ovo pismo proslijedili kao dokument Vijeća sigurnosti,.

(Potpis) Jeremy Greenstock, Stalni zastupnik Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva

(Potpis) John D. Negroponte, Stalni zastupnik Sjedinjenih Država

  1. Kao što je naznačeno u navedenom pismu, okupacione države, posredstvom komandanta koalicionih snaga, su stvorile Koalicijsku privremenu vlast kako bi “vršila nadležnosti vlade privremeno” dok iračka vlada ne bude mogla biti uspostavljena. Taj organ je naročito imao ovlast da, inter alia, donosi propise. Dana 13. maja 2003. godine, sekretar odbrane Sjedinjenih Država, Donald Rumsfeld, je izdao memornadum kojim je formalno odredio ambasadora Paula Bremera za upravitelja Koalicijske privremene vlasti, koji je imao odgovornost da privremeno upravlja Irakom. Propisom broj 1 Koalicijske privremene vlasti (Regulation No. 1) od 16. maja 2003. godine, ambasador Bremer je propisao sljedeće:

“U skladu sa ovlastima koje su mi dodijeljene kao upravitelju Koalicijske privremene vlasti relevantnim rezolucijama Ujedinjenih nacija, uključujući Rezoluciju 1483 (2003), te zakonima i običajima ratovanja, proglašavam sljedeće:

Član 1.

Koalicijska privremena vlast

1) Koalicijska privremena vlast će vršiti nadležnosti vlade privremeno da bi osigurala djelotvorno upravljanje Irakom za vrijeme perioda prelazne uprave, da bi ponovo stvorila uvjete za stabilnost i sigurnost, stvorila uvjete u kojima irački narod može slobodno odrediti svoju sopstvenu političku budućnost, naročito favoriziranjem napora za ponovno uspostavljanje i stvaranje nacionalnih i lokalnih predstavničkih institucija i potpomaganjem privrednog oporavka i održive obnove i razvoja.

2) Koalicijska privremena vlast preuzima sve izvršne, zakonodavne i sudske nadležnosti koje su potrebne da bi ostvarila svoje ciljeve, koje će se vršiti u skladu sa relevantnim rezolucijama Vijeća sigurnosti Ujedinjenih Nacija, uključujući Rezoluciju 1483 (2003), i zakonima i običajima ratovanja. Te nadležnosti će imati upravitelj Koalicijske privremene vlasti.

3) U svojstvu komandanta koalicijskih snaga, komandant Centralne komande Sjedinjenih Država će pružati direktnu podršku Koalicijskoj privremenoj vlasti sprečavanjem neprijateljstava; održavanjem teritorijalnog integriteta Iraka i sigurnosti u zemlji; traženjem, neutraliziranjem i uništavanjem oružja za masovno uništenje i, generalno, pomaganjem provođenja koalicione politike.

Član 2.

Primjenjivo pravo

Osim ako ih Koalicijska privremena vlast privremeno stavi van dejstva ili zamijeni, ili ih demokratske institucije Iraka zamijene drugim zakonodavstvom, zakoni na snazi u Iraku na dan 16. aprila 2003. godine će se i dalje primjenjivati pod uvjetom da ne sprečavaju Koalicijsku privremenu vlast da ostvaruje svoja prava i ispunjava svoje obaveze, i pod uvjetom da nisu u suprotnosti sa ovim ili bilo kojim drugim propisom ili nalogom koji izda Kolicijska privremena vlast. (...)”

  1. Uprava Koalicijske privremene vlasti je podijeljena u regionalne zone. Južna zona je bila pod odgovornošću i kontrolom Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, sa regionalnim koordinatorom Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva. Ona je obuhvatala četiri najjužnije provincije od osamnaest iračkih provincija od kojih je svaka imala guvernera-koordinatora. Trupe Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva su bile raspoređene u istoj zoni. Ured specijalnog zastupnika Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva je zastupao Ujedinjeno Kraljevsto u sjedištu Koalicijske privremene vlasti. Prema Vladi, premda su specijalni zastupnik i njegov ured nastojali uticati na politiku i odluke Koalicijske privremene vlasti, osoblje Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva nije imalo nikakvu formalnu moć odlučivanja u okviru Koalicijske privremene vlasti. Sve upravne i zakonodavne odluke Koalicijske privremene vlasti je donosio ambasador Bremer.
  2. Rezolucija 1483 Vijeća sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija, na koju se ambasador Bremer pozvao u Propisu broj 1 Koalicijske privremene vlasti, je zapravo usvojena šest dana kasnije, 22. maja 2003. godine. Njeni relevantni dijelovi glase:

Vijeće sigurnosti,

Podsjećajući na sve prethodne relevantne rezolucije,

Reafirmirajući suverenitet i teritorijalni integritet Iraka,

Reafirmirajući također važnost razoružanja Iraka od oružja za masovno uništenje i konačno potvrđivanje razoružanja Iraka,

Ističući pravo iračkog naroda da slobodno odluči o svojoj političkoj budućnosti i kontroli sopstvenh prirodnih resursa, pozdravljajući angažiranje svih strana u podržavanju stvaranja uvjeta koji će mu omogućiti da to uradi što je moguće ranije, i izražavajući odlučnost da dan kada će Iračani sami vladati mora doći brzo,

Podstičući naporeiračkog naroda da oformi predstavničku vladu zasnovanu na vladavini prava kojom se dodjeljuju jednaka prava i garantira pravda svim iračkim građanima bez obzira na etničku pripadnot, religiju ili spol, i podsjećajući, u vezi s tim, na Rezoluciju 1325 (2000) od 31. oktobra 2000. godine,

(...)

Pozdravljajući prve korake iračkog naroda u tom pogledu, i ističući, u vezi s tim, deklaraciju iz Nasiriyaha od 15. aprila 2003. godine i Bagdadsku deklaraciju od 28. aprila 2003. godine,

Odlučan da Ujedinjene nacije imaju vitalnu uloguu humanitarnoj pomoći, obnovi Iraka i ponovnom uspostavljanju i stvaranju nacionalnih i lokalnih institucija koje će omogućiti uspostavljanje predstavničke vlade;

 (...)

Ističući pismo koje su stalni predstavnici Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva Velike Britanije i Sjeverne Irske uputili predsjedniku Vijeća sigurnosti 8. maja 2003. godine (S/2003/538), te priznavajući posebne nadležnosti, odgovornosti i obaveze tih država kao okupacionih sila pod jedinstvenom komandom na osnovu primjenjivog međunarodnog prava (Vlast),

Ističući dalje da druge države koje nisu okupacione sile sada rade ili će u budućnosti moći raditi pod okriljem Vlasti,

Pozdravljajući dalje spremnost država članica da doprinesu stabilnosti i sigurnosti u Iraku doprinoseći u osoblju, opremi i ostalim resursima pod okriljem Vlasti,

Zabrinut sudbinom velikog broja Kuvajćana i državljana trećih zemelja koji se smatraju nestalim od 2. augusta 1990. godine,

Smatrajući da situacija u Iraku, iako se poboljšala, i dalje predstavlja prijetnju međunarodnom miru i sigurnosti,

Djelujući na osnovu poglavlja VII Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija,

1. Apelira na države članice i organizacije da pomognu iračkom narodu u njegovim naporima da reformira svoje institucije i obnovi svoju zemlju, te da doprinesu u osiguravanju stabilnosti i sigurnosti u Iraku u skladu sa ovom rezolucijom;

2. Podstiće sve države članice, koje su u situaciji da to urade, da reagiraju odmah na apele Ujedinjenih nacija i ostalih međunarodnih organizacija za humanitarnu pomoć Iraku i da pomognu da se udovolji humanitarnim i ostalim potrebama iračkog naroda osiguravanjem hrane, lijekova i resursa potrebnih za obnovu i oporavak privredne infrastrukture Iraka;

3. Apelira nadržave članice da ne pružaju utočište pripadnicima bivšeg iračkog režima za koje se navodi da su odgovorni za zločine i svireposti i da podrže sve akcije da oni budu izvedeni pred lice pravde;

4. Zahtijeva od Vlasti, u skladu sa Poveljom Ujedinjenih nacija i relevantnim odredbama međunarodnog prava, da promovira dobrobit iračkog naroda osiguravanjem djelotvornog upravljanja teritorijom, trudeći se posebno da ponovo uspostavi sigurnost i stabilnost i da stvori uvjete koji omogućavaju iračkom narodu da slobodno odluči o svojoj sopstvenoj političkoj budućnosti;

5. Zahtijeva od svih relevantnih strana da u potpunosti ispune svoje obaveze na osnovu međunarodnog prava, naročito Ženeveske konvencije iz 1949. godine i

Haškog pravilnika iz 1907. godine;

(...)

8. Zahtijeva od generalnog sekretarada odredi specijalnog predstavnika za Irak koji će imati, na neovisan način, odgovornost da podnosi redovne izvještaje Vijeću o svojim aktivnostima na osnovu ove rezolucije, da koordinira aktivnosti Ujedinjenih nacija u postkonfliktnom procesu u Iraku, da osigura koordiniranje aktivnosti agencija Ujedinjenih nacija i međunarodnih agencija koje pružaju humanitarnu pomoć i pomažu u obnovi Iraka i da, u saradnji sa Vlašću, pomaže iračkom narodu putem:

(a) koordiranja humanitarne pomoći i pomoći u obnovi koju pružaju agencije Ujedinjenih nacija, i koordiniranja agencija Ujedinjenih nacija i nevladinih organizacija;

(b) promoviranja sigurnog, propisnog i dobrovoljnog povratka izbjeglica i raseljenih lica;

(c) intenzivnog rada sa Vlašću, narodom Iraka i ostalim relevantnim stranama na ponovnom uspostavljanju i stvaranju nacionalnih i lokalnih institucija koje će omogućiti uspostavljanje predstavničke vlade, te zajedničkog rada kako bi se potpomogao proces realiziranja međunarodno priznate predstavničke vlade Iraka;

(d) pomaganja u obnovi ključne infrastrukture u saradnji sa ostalim međunarodnim organizacijama;

(e) promoviranja privredne obnove i uvjeta održivog razvoja, uključujući osiguranje koordinacije sa nacionalnim i regionalnim organizacijama i, na odgovarajući način, civilnim društvom, donatorima i međunarodnim finansijskim organizacijama;

(f) podsticanja međunarodnih napora da bi se obezbijedile osnovne funkcije civilne uprave;

(g) promoviranja zaštite ljudskih prava;

(h) podsticanja međunarodnih napora kako bi iračka civilna policija bila ponovo operativna; i

(i) podsticanja međunarodnih napora da bi se promovirala pravna i sudska reforma;

9. Podržava formiranje, od strane iračkog naroda uz pomoć Vlasti i u saradnji sa specijalnim predstavnikom, privremene iračke uprave kao prelazne uprave kojom će rukovoditi Iračani, dok narod Iraka ne uspostavi međunarodno priznatu predstavničku vladu i ne preuzme odgovornosti Vlasti;

(...)

24. Zahtijeva od generalnog sekretara da podnosi Vijeću redovne izvještaje o radu specijalnog predstavnika s ciljem primjene ove rezolucije i o radu Međunarodnog savjetodavnog i nadzornog odbora (International Advisory and Monitoring Board) i podstiče Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo Velike Britanije i Sjerverne Irske i Sjedinjene Američke Države da redovno informiraju Vijeće o naporima uloženim u okviru ove rezolucije;

25. Odlučuje da preispita implementiranje ove rezolucije u roku od 12 mjeseci od njenog usvajanja i da razmotri daljnje mjere koje bi mogle biti potrebne;

26. Zahtijeva od država članica i međunarodnih i regionalnih organizacija da doprinesu implementiranju ove rezolucije;

27. Odlučuje da će i dalje aktivno pratiti situaciju.”

5. Razvoj situacije između jula 2003. godine i juna 2004. godine

  1. U julu 2003. godine, uspostavljeno je Vladajuće vijeće Iraka. Koalicijska privremena vlast je morala konsultirati Vijeće u vezi sa svim pitanjima koja su se odnosila na privremeno upravljanje Irakom.
  2. Dana 16. oktobra 2003. godine, Vijeće sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija je donijelo Rezoluciju 1511, čiji relevantni dijelovi glase:

Vijeće sigurnosti

(...)

Ističući da suverenitet Iraka počiva na iračkoj državi i reafirmirajući pravo iračkog naroda da slobodno odluči o svojoj političkoj budućnosti i da kontrolira svoje vlastite prirodne resurse, ističući ponovo svoju odlučnost da dan kada će Iračani sami vladati mora doći brzo, i priznajući važnost međunarodne podrške, naročito zemalja u regiji, susjeda Iraka i regionalnih organizacija, da bi taj proces napredovao brzo,

Smatrajući da je međunarodna podrška za ponovno uspostavljanje uvjeta stabilnosti i sigurnosti osnovna za dobrobit naroda Iraka te za mogućnost svih relevantnih strana da obave svoj zadatak u interesu iračkog naroda, te pozdravljajući doprinos država članica u ovom pogledu na osnovu Rezolucije 1483 (2003),

Pozdravljajući odluku Vladajućeg vijeća Iraka da formira pripremnu ustavnu komisiju za ustavnu konferenciju kako bi izradila nacrt ustava koji će obuhvatiti težnje iračkog naroda i urgirajići kod njega da obavi taj zadatak brzo,

(...)

Konstatirajući da situacija u Iraku, iako je poboljšana, i dalje predstavlja prijetnju međunarodnom miru i sigurnosti,

Djelujući na osnovu poglavlja VII Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija,

1. Reafirmira suverenitet i teritorijalni integritet Iraka i ističe u tom kontekstu da Koalicijska privremena vlast (Vlast) ima privremene nadležnosti, odgovornosti i obaveze na osnovu primjenjivog međunarodnog prava, koje su priznate i izražene u Rezoluciji 1483 (2003), dok narod Iraka ne uspostavi međunarodno priznatu predstavničku vladu i ne preuzme odgovornosti Vlasti, putem, inter alia, koraka predviđenih stavovima od 4. do 7. niže;

(...)

4. Smatra da su Vladajuće vijeće i njegovi ministri glavni organi privremene iračke uprave koja, bez dovođenja u pitanje njenog daljeg razvoja, otjelotvoruje suverenitet iračke države za vrijeme prelaznog perioda dok ne bude uspostavljena međunarodno priznata predstavnička vlada i ne preuzme odgovornosti od Vlasti;

5. Potvrđuje da će upravu Iraka postepeno osigurati buduće institucije privremene iračke uprave;

6. Zahtijeva od Vlasti, u tom kontekstu, da vrati vladajuće nadležnosti i ovlasti narodu Iraka čim to bude moguće i zahtijeva od Vlasti, u odgovarajućoj saradnji sa Vladajućim vijećem i generalnim sekretarom, da podnese izvještaj Vijeću o realiziranom napretku;

7. Poziva Vladajuće vijeće da mu saopći, najkasnije do 15. decembra 2003. godine, u saradnji sa Vlašću i, ako okolnosti to omogućavaju, specijalnim predstavnikom generalnog sekretara, plan i program izrade novog ustava za Irak i održavanja demokratskih izbora na osnovu tog ustava;

8. Odlučuje da Ujedinjene nacije, djelujući putem generalnog sekretara, njegovog specijalnog predstavnika i Misije pomoći Ujedinjenih nacija Iraku, trebaju ojačati svoju vitalnu ulogu u Iraku, naročito pružanjem humanitarne pomoći, promoviranjem privredne obnove i uvjeta za održivi razvoj u Iraku, i unapređivanjem napora za ponovno uspostavljanje i stvaranje nacionalnih i lokalnih institucija koje će omogućiti uspostavljanje predstavničke vlade;

(...)

13. Smatra da su sigurnost i stabilnost osnovni za uspješno okončanje političkog procesa iz stava 7. gore i sposobnosti Ujedinjenih nacija da djelotvorno doprinesu tom procesu i implementaciji Rezolucije 1483 (2003), i ovlašćuje multinacionalne snage pod jedinstvenom komandom da poduzmu sve potrebne mjere da bi doprinijele održavanju sigurnosti i stabilnosti u Iraku, naročito u svrhu osiguranja potrebnih uvjeta za implementiranje plana i programa, te da bi doprinijele sigurnosti Misije pomoći Ujedinjenih nacija Iraku, Vladajućem vijeću Iraka i ostalim institucijama privremene iračke uprave i ključnoj humanitarnoj i privrednoj infrastrukturi;

14. Urgira kod država članica da pruže pomoć na osnovu mandata Ujedinjenih nacija, uključujući vojne snage, multinacionalnim snagama iz stava 13. gore;

15. Odlučuje da će Vijeće preispitati potrebe i misiju multinacionalnih snaga iz stava 13. gore najkasnije jednu godinu od dana ove rezolucije i da će u svakom slučaju mandat snaga isteći po okončanju političkog procesa opisanog u stavovima 4. do 7. i 10. gore, te izražava spremnost da razmotri tom prilikom bilo koju buduću potrebu da se zadrže multinacionane snage, vodeći računa o mišljenju međunarodno priznate predstavničke vlade Iraka;

(...)

25. Zahtijeva da Ujedinjenje nacije, u ime multinacionalnih snaga iz stava 13. gore, podnose izvještaje Vijeću sigurnosti o naporima i napretku snaga, na odgovarajući način, najmanje svakih šest mjeseci;

26. Odlučuje da će i dalje aktivno pratiti situaciju.”

  1. Dana 8. marta 2004. godine, Vladajuće vijeće je proglasilo Zakon o prelaznoj upravi iračke države za prelazni period (poznat kao “Upravni tranzicioni zakon”). On je obezbijedio privremeni pravni okvir za upravu zemlje za vrijeme prelaznog perioda koji je trebao početi 30. juna 2004. godine uspostavljenjm Privremene iračke vlade (“Privremena vlada”) i raspuštanjem Koalicijske privremene vlasti.
  2. Odredbe koje se odnose na novi režim su predviđene Rezolucijom Vijeća sigurnosti, koja je usvojena 8. juna 2004. godine i koja predviđa, inter alia, da Vijeće sigurnosti, djelujući na osnovu poglavlja VII Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija:

“1. Odobrava formiranje suverene Privremene vlade Iraka, kao što je predočena 1. juna 2004. godine, koja će preuzeti punu odgovornost i vlast do 30. june 2004. godine kako bi vladala Irakom, uzdržavajući se od poduzimanja bilo kakvih radnji koje bi ugrozile sudbinu Iraka nakon organičenog privremenog perioda dok izabrana Prelazna vlada Iraka ne preuzme funkciju kao što je predviđeno četvrtim stavom dole;

2. Pozdravlja da će se okupacija okončati do 30. juna 2004. godine, da će Koalicijska privremena vlast prestati postojati i da će Irak ponovo imati potpuni suverenitet;

(...)

8. Pozdravlja aktuelne napore Privremene vlade Iraka u razvijanju iračkih sigurnosnih snaga, naročito iračkih oružanih snaga (u daljem tekstu: iračke sigurnosne snage), koje djeluju pod vlašću Privremene vlade Iraka i njenih sljedbenika, koje će postepeno imati veću ulogu te konačno preuzeti punu odgovornost za održanje sigurnosti i stabilnosti u Iraku;

9. Ističe da su multinacionalne snage u Iraku prisutne na zahtjev nove Privremene vlade Iraka te, prema tome, reafirmira ovlaštenje koje je ona dala multinacionalnim snagama pod jedinstvenom komadom uspostavljenom Rezolucijom 1511 (2003), vodeći računa o dopisima u prilogu ove rezolucije;

10. Odlučuje da će mulinacionalne snage imati ovlast da poduzmu sve potrebne mjere da bi doprinijele održavanju sigurnosti i stabilnosti u Iraku u skladu sa dopisima u prilogu ove rezolucije, gdje se nalazi zahtjev Iraka za, inter alia, kontinuirano prisustvo multinacionalnih snaga i definiranje njihovih zadataka, uključujući prevenciju i odvraćanje od terorizma da bi, inter alia, Ujedinjene nacije mogle obaviti svoju ulogu u pomaganju iračkom narodu kao što je definirano u sedmom stavu gore i da bi irački narod mogao implementirati, slobodno i bez straha, plan i program političkog procesa i imati korist od aktivnosti u vezi sa obnovom i oporavkom; (...)”

6.  Prenos vlasti na Privremenu vladu

  1. Dana 28. juna 2004. godine, vlast je u potpunosti prenesena sa Koalicijske privremene vlasti na Privremenu vladu, te je Koalicijska privremena vlast prestala postojati. Multinacionalne snage, uključujući britanske snage, koje su činile dio multinacionalnih snaga, su nakon toga ostale u Iraku u skladu za zahtjevima iračke vlade i na osnovu ovlaštenja koje je dalo Vijeće sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija.

B.  Oružane snage Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva u Iraku od maja 2003. godine do juna 2004. godine

  1. Koalicijske snage su se za vrijeme tog perioda sastojale od šest divizija koje su bile pod vrhovnom komandom generala Sjedinjenih Država. Četiri od tih divizija su bile američke, a dvije multinacionalne. Svaka od divizija je imala odgovornost za određeno geografsko područje u Iraku. Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo je imalo komandu nad Multinacionalnom divizijom Jugoistok koja je bila odgovorna za provincije Al-Basrah, Maysan, Thi Qar i Al-Muthanna, koje su obuhvatale područje od 96 000 kvadratnih kilometara sa 4,6 miliona stanovnika. Oko 14 500 vojnika koalicije, od kojih je bilo 8150 britanskih vojnika, je bilo u Multinacionalnoj diviziji Jugoistok. Provincije Al-Basrah i Maysan, sa ukupnim brojem stanovnika od 2,75 miliona, su bile glavno mjesto operacija britanskih snaga u okviru te divizije. Nešto više od 8000 britanskih vojnika je bilo raspoređeni tamo; od tog broja, nešto malo više od 5000 vojnika je imalo operativne odgovornosti.
  2. Britanske snage u Iraku su od 1. maja 2003. godine imale dvije glavne misije. Prva je bila održavanje sigurnosti na teritoriji Multinacionalne divizije Jugoistok, naročito u provincijama Al-Basrah i Maysan. Glavni zadatak u domenu sigurnosti je bio da se ponovo uspostave iračke sigurnosne snage, uključujući iračku policiju. Drugi zadaci su obuhvatali patrole, hapšenja, antiterorističke operacije, osiguravanje javnog reda prilikom građanskih demonstracija, zaštita osnovnih resursa i infrastrukture i zaštita policijskih stanica. Druga osnovna misija se sastojala u pružanju podrške civilnoj upravi u Iraku na razne načine, od osiguranja veze između Koalicijske privremene vlasti i Vladajućeg vijeća Iraka. s jedne strane, i lokalne vlade, s druge strane, do pomaganja u obnovi infrastrukture.
  3. U izvještaju Aitken (stav 69. dole), koji je pripremeljen u ime načelnika generalštaba, postkonfliktna situacija u Iraku je opisana kako slijedi:

“Kontekst operacija koje se vode u Iraku je izuzetno kompleksan. Nije na autoru ovog izvještaja da iznese zapažanja o aspektima jus ad bellum operacije, a ni mišljenje javnosti o invaziji. Ipak je važno istaći da su postkonfliktni planovi Koalicije koncentrirani više na pomoć, kako bi se izbjegla humanitarna katastrofa (koja, konačno, nema uopšte očekivani opseg), a manje na kriminalnu djelatnost i pobunu koje su aktuelne. Jedna od posljedica toga je bila da nismo imali dovoljno vojnika na terenu da bismo se djelotvorno suočili da situacijom u kojoj smo se našli. U okviru operacije održanja mira, potrebno je znatno više vojnika da bi se poštovao javni red, nego što je potrebno za vođenje rata: naši su jako rasuti na terenu. Za vrijeme ispitivanja (u aprilu 2005. godine) o incidentu zvanom Korpa za hljeb [navodno zlostavljanje iračkih zatvorenika koji su osumnjičeni da su pljačkali skladište humanitarne pomoći], brigadni general Carter je opisao uvjete u Iraku kako slijedi:

‘(...) U maju 2003. godine, neke četiri sedmice nakon što su britanske snage započele prelazak sa intenzivnih operacija na stabiliziranje, situacija je bila promjenjiva. Borbenim grupama su dodjeljivana geografska područja odgovornosti koja su generalno odgovarala njihovim početnim taktičkim ciljevima. Borbene operacije su zvanično okončane i pravila otvaranja vatre su se prema tome mijenjala. Međutim, postojao je trend rasta incidentnog otvaranja vatre. Iako su se puškaranja prvenstveno dešavala između Iračana, koji su nastojali da poravnaju stare račune i koji su se odavali kriminalnim aktivnostima, izvjesne naznake su pokazivale od samog početka da su britanski vojnici sve više ugroženi (...) Struktura britanskih snaga se mijenjala. Većina teškog oružja koje je bilo potrebno za invaziju je poslano kući. Neke jedinice su bile dodijeljene drugim operacijama izvan zemlje te je vršen pritisak iz Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva da se brzo smanje snage na prihvatljiviji broj. (...) Stav lokalnog stanovništva se također mijenjao. Entuzijazam, koji je na početku manifestiralo šitsko stanovništvo Basre i njene okoline, koje je ranije bilo ugnjetavano, je zamijenjen nepovjerenjem, a potom, do sredine maja, razočarenjem. Težnje i očekivanja nisu bili ispunjena. Uprava i iračke javne vlasti nisu postojale. Snabdijevanje gorivom i vodom za piće je bilo slabo, snabdijevanje strujom je bilo isprekidano, bolnice su bile pune osoba koje su bile ranjene u fazi borbenih operacija. Mostovi i ključni putevi su bili uništeni bombardovanjem Kolicije. Zakon i red su bilu u potpunom kolapsu. Iračka policija se rasplinula; nekoliko zaštitara koji su ostali su bili stari i nesposobni; irački vojnici su bili zarobljeni, razišli su se ili su dezertirali. Kriminalci su bili pušteni na ulice, a zatvori ispražnjeni. Predstavnici pravosuđa su se krili. Sve vladine zgrade su bile opustošene i sve što je moglo biti odneseno je odneseno. Nezaštićene zgrade su zauzeli bespravni stanari. Kriminal je bio prevladavajća pojava, a situacija u nekim dijelovima Basre je bila skoro anarhična. Oružani prepadi, kidnapovanje djece, ubistva iz osvete, krađa automobila i provalne krađe su bile uobičajene. Bogatstvo je bilo raspodijeljeno u veoma kratkom vremenskom periodu.’

U takvom okruženju, britanska armija je bila jedini predstavnik reda i zakona u okviru svog područja djelovanja. Za vrijeme svoje posjete Iraku u maju 2003. godine, gosp. Paul Kernaghan, šef za međunarodne poslove Asocijacije policijskih komesara, je rekao da ne bi preporučio raspoređivanje pripadnika civilne policije u zonu operacija zbog loše sigurnosne situacije. Posljednji put kada je britanska vojska obavljala funkcije okupacione vojske je bio 1945. godine, a trebalo joj je više mjeseci da se pripremi za tu ulogu; u maju 2003. godine, od istih onih vojnika koji su se borili u konvencionalnom ratu visokog intenziteta se očekivalo da se skoro preko noći pretvore u jedine osobe sposobne da osiguraju funkcioniranje vladinih službi i pružanje humanitarne pomoći narodu južnog dijela Iraka. Borbene grupe (koje su se sastojale od oko 500 vojnika kojima je komandovao jedan potporučnik) su bile raspodjeljene u zone odgovornosti koje su obuhvatale površinu od više stotina kvadratnih kilometara, a čete (koje su se se sastojale od oko 100 vojnika pod komandom majora) su upravljale cijelim gradovima. Britanski planovi invazije su oprezno predvidjeli da nanošenje moguće štete materijalnoj infrastrukturi bude što je moguće manje; međutim, budući da su samo vojnici bili na raspolaganju da bi funkcionirala ta infrastruktura, a pomoć je pružalo lokalno osoblje čiji je broj bio ograničen, zadatak je predstavljao ogromnu poteškoću za vojsku.

Jedna od posljedica nedostatka civilne infrastrukture je bila dilema sa kojom su se suočili britanski vojnici suočeni sa svakodnevnim kriminalom. Naše iskustvo u Sjevernoj Irskoj i u okviru operacija održanja mira svuda u svijetu je dovelo do usađivanja jasnog principa prvenstva policije u domenu suzbijanja kriminala u operativnim zonama. Vojnici prihvataju da će se suočiti sa kriminalcima i da će se od njih povremeno zahtijevati da hapse te kriminalce; međutim (uprkos našem iskustvu tog tipa na Kosovu 1999. godine), naša doktrina i praksa nas nije pripremila da se suočimo sa kriminalcima kada ne postoje snage civilne policije, ni pravosudni sistem koji bi se suočio sa prestupnicima, a ni zatvori u koje bi bili zatvoreni. Čak i kada su početne iračke policijske snage ponovo uspostavljene 2003. godine, vojnici na terenu su imali malo povjerenja u svoju sposobnost da se pravično i razumno suoče sa kriminalcima koji su im predati. Sa ove vremenske distance znamo da su neki vojnici djelovali protuzakonito u pogledu lokalnih kriminalaca. Koliko god da su bili pažljivi, komandanti nisu bili u stanju da budu svugdje tako da nisu fizički mogli nadgledati svoje trupe do stepena do kojeg su trebali; iz toga proizilazi da je teže bilo otkriti i spriječiti te iregularnosti.”

  1. Vojne evidencije Velike Britanije pokazuju da je između 1. maja 2003. godine i 30. juna 2004. godine bilo oko 178 demonstracija i 1050 nasilnih napada protiv koalicijskih snaga u okviru Multinacionalne divizije Jugoistok. Nasilni napadi su se sastojali od 5 protuavionskih napada, 12 napada bombama, 101 napad upotrebom improviziranih eksplozivnih naprava, 52 pokušaja napada upotrebom improviziranih eksplozivnih naprava, 145 minobacačkih napada, 147 raketnih napada, 535 korištenja vatrenog oružja i 53 ostalih nasilnih napada. Prema istoj evidenciji, između maja 2003. godine i marta 2004. godine, ustanovljeno je da je 49 Iračana ubijeno u incidentima u kojima su britanske trupe koristile silu.

C.  Pravila o otvaranju vatre

  1. Upotreba sile britanskih trupa za vrijeme operacija je regulirana relevantnim Pravilama o otvaranju vatre. Pravila o otvaranju vatre koja su regulirala upotrebu smrtonosne sile britanskih trupa u Iraku za vrijeme relevantnog perioda su naznačena na jednoj karti koja je izdata svakom vojniku, a koja je poznata kao karta Alfa. Pravila o otvaranju vatre, kako su naznačena na karti Alfa, glase:

“KARTA A – UPUTE O OTVARANJU VATRE ZA OSOBLJE KOJEM JE DOZVOLJENO DA NOSI ORUŽJE I MUNICIJU PRILIKOM VRŠENJA SVOJE DUŽNOSTI

OPĆE UPUTE

1. Ove upute ne utiču na vaše prirodno pravo na samoodbranu. Međutim, bez obzira na situaciju, silu ne smijete koristiti više nego što je apsolutno potrebno.

VATRENO ORUŽJE MORA BITI KORIŠTENO SAMO KAO KRAJNJA MJERA

2. Prilikom čuvanja imovine, smijete koristiti smrtonosnu silu samo u svrhu zaštite ljudskog života.

ZAŠTITA LJUDSKOG ŽIVOTA

3. Protiv neke osobe smijete otvoriti vatru samo ako ona čini ili tek što nije počinila djelo koje ugrožava život, te ako nema nikakvog drugog načina da se spriječi opasnost.

UPOZORENJE

4. Upozorenje se MORA dati prije otvaranja vatre, osim:

a) ako biste vi ili druge osobe koje nisu napadač/i bili izloženi većem riziku od smrti ili teške ozljede,

   ILI

b) ako ste vi ili druge osobe u neposrednoj blizini predmet oružanog napada.

5. Upozorenje dajte uzvikujući:

MORNARICA, VOJSKA,VAZDUHOPLOVNE SNAGE, STANITE ILI PUCAM !’

Ili druge riječi s tim ciljem.

OTVARANJE VATRE

6. Ako ste prinuđeni otvoriti vatru, dužni ste:

a) pucati samo u određene ciljeve;

I

b) izbjegavati ispaljivanje više metaka nego što je potrebno,

I

c) poduzeti sve razumne mjere opreza da biste izbjegli ranjavanje bilo koga drugog ko nije vaša meta.”

D. Istrage o smrtnim sučajevima iračkih civila u koje su umiješani britanski vojnici

1.  Odluka o upućivanju slučaja jednog incidenta Kraljevskoj vojnoj policiji radi istrage

  1. Dana 21. juna 2003. godine, brigadni general Moore (koji je komandovao 19. mehaniziranom brigadom u Iraku od juna do novembra 2003. godine) je izdao formalne upute o istragama incidenata u vezi sa otvaranjem vatre. Te upute su predviđale da bilo koji incident u vezi sa otvaranjem vatre mora biti prijavljen, te da divizioni načelnik vojne policije (Divisional Provost Marshall) mora biti informiran o njemu. Podoficiri Kraljevske vojne policije su potom morali ispitati incident i odlučiti da li on potpada pod Pravila o otvaranju vatre. Ako se odluči da incident potpada pod Pravila o otvaranju vatre, bilo je potrebno uzeti izjave i ispunjeni izvještaj proslijediti putem zapovijednog lanca. Ako se pokazalo da incident ne potpada pod Pravila o otvaranju vatre, ali je u njemu došlo smrti ili teškog ranjavanja, divizioni načelnik vojne policije je morao, u najkraćem roku, povjeriti istragu Specijalnom odjeljenju za istrage Kraljevske vojne policije (vidi, stav 28. dole).
  2. Međutim, brigadni general Moore je odlučio da izmijeni upute 28. jula 2003. godine. Prema novim uputama, svaki vojnik koji je bio umiješan u pucanje je morao odmah prijaviti takve incidente Multinacionalnoj diviziji Jugoistok putem izvještaja o teškom incidentu. Njegov komandir čete ili komandujući oficir je zatim morao istražiti činjenice o incidentu. U svojoj izjavi pred domaćim sudovima, general Moore je objasnio sljedeće:

“Forma istraživanja incidenta bi varirala u ovisnosti o sigurnosnoj situaciji na terenu i okolnostima svakog pojedinačnog predmeta. Generalno, komandir čete ili komandujući oficir je uzimao izjave od pripadnika predmetne patrole i preslušavao komunikacioni radio-žurnal. Mogle su biti uključene i fotografije sa mjesta događaja. Ponekad bi se istraga nastavila ispitivanjem porodice/plemena ubijene osobe. Međutim, na nivou vojne jedinice, istraga nije obuhvatala kompletnu kriminalističku ekspertizu budući da brigada nije raspolagala adekvatnim materijalom.”

Ako je komandujući oficir bio ubijeđen, na osnovu informacija koje su mu bile na raspolaganju, da je vojnik djelovao u skladu sa zakonom i Pravilima o otvaranju vatre, on se nije morao obraćati Specijalom odjeljenju za istrage radi pokretanja istrage. Komandujući oficir bi morao saopćiti svoju odluku u pismenoj formi generalu Mooru. Ako komandujući oficir nije bio ubijeđen da je vojnik djelovao u skladu sa zakonom i Pravilima o otvaranju vatre ili nije imao dovoljno informacija da bi donio odluku, on se morao obratiti Specijalnom odjeljenju za istrage radi pokretanja istrage.

  1. U periodu između januara i aprila 2004. godine, te upute su dalje razmatrane zbog činjenice da situacija nije više bila tako neprijateljska a i zbog znatnog interesa medija i parlamenta za incidente u kojima su poginuli Iračani, a u koje su bile upletene snage Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva. Dana 24. aprila 2004. godine, komandant Multionacionalne divizije Jugoistok je usvojio nove upute prema kojima je Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage moralo ispitati sve incidente u vezi sa otvaranjem vatre u kojima su ubijeni ili ranjeni civili, a koji su uključivali djelovanje snaga Ujedinjenog Kraljvstva. U izuzetnim slučajevima, komandir brigade je mogao odlučiti da istraga nije potrebna. Bilo koja takva odluka je morala biti priopćena u pisanoj formi komandantu Multinacionalne divizije Jugoistok.

2.  Istraga Kraljevske vojne policije (Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage)

  1. Kraljevska vojna policija čini dio armije i prati armiju u operacijama u inostranstvu, ali ima sopstveni zapovjedni lanac. Vojni policijski oficiri su podređeni načelniku vojne policije (Provost Marshall) koji je podređen generalu-ađutantu (Adjutant General). U okviru Kraljevske vojne policije, Specijalno odjeljene za istrage je odgovorno za istrage teških zločina koje su počinili pripadnici britanskih snaga prilikom vršenja dužnosti, incidenata koji uključuju kontakte između vojnika i civila te bilo koju specijalnu istragu, uključujući incidente koji se odnose na smrtne slučajeve civila koje su uzrokovali britanski vojnici. Da bi osiguralo svoju praktičnu neovisnost za vrijeme operacija, Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage je podijeljeno na potpuno autonomne jedinice koje imaju sopstveni zapovjedni lanac na čijem čelu se nalaze oficiri vojne policije (Provost Officers) koji se raspoređuju u tu svrhu u okviru operacija.
  2. U Iraku, Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage je pokretalo istrage o smrtnim slučajevima iračkih civila u koje su umiješani britanski vojnici na zahtjev komandujućeg oficira relevantne jedinice ili ex officio po saznanju o takvim indicidentima drugim sredstvima. Međutim, ono je moralo okončati istragu koju je započelo na sopstvenu inicijativu ako je Provost Marshall ili komandujući oficir jedinice dao upute da se ona obustavi.
  3. U pogledu istraga Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage u Iraku, postojalo je više poteškoća kao što su sigurnosni problemi, nedostatk prevodilaca, kulturološka pitanja (na primjer, islamska praksa je iziskivala sahranjivanje tijela u roku od 24 sata te se tijelo nije smjelo dirati 40 dana), nedostatak patologa i materijala potrbnih za sudsku medicinu, nedostatak službenih dokumenata, problemi u vezi a logistikom te klima i generalni uvjeti za rad. U izvještaju Aitken (vidi stav 69. dole), situacija je opisana kako slijedi:

“Borbene trupe nisu bile jedine koje su bile preopterećene u tim okolnostima. Takav kakav je, naš vojni krivični sistem je koristan, neovisan i adaptiran da posluži misiji; međutim, čak i sa najdjelotvornijim sistemom krivičnog pravosuđa je teško voditi istragu, ispitati dosje i pokrenuti postupak ako civilna infrastruktura ne postoji. Tako, odmah nakon rata na terenu, vojna policija se suočila sa posebnim poteškoćama pri sakupljanju dokaza koji bi zadovoljili veoma visoke standarde koje iziskuje englesko pravo. Nacionalne službene evidencije – koje obično predstavljaju referentnu tačku za krivične istrage – uveliko nedostaju; različite percepcije prava koje ima irački narod i britanska policija podstiču atmosferu neprijateljstva i sumnjičavosti; osim toga, vojska se nalazi u operativnom okruženju koje je sve više opasno. Tako je 24. juna 2003. godine, šestero pripadnika Kraljevske vojne policije ubijeno u Al Amarahu. Lokalni običaji na sličan način predstavljaju prepreku primjeni britanskih standarda pravosuđa: u predmetu Nadhem Abdullah, na primjer, porodica preminulog je odbila da preda tijelo u svrhu forenzičkog ispitivanja – što je znatno naškodilo kvalitetu dokaza koji se odnose na okolnosti njegove smrti.”

U izvještaju Aitken se također ističu problemi sa kojima se suočilo Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage pri pokušajima da istraži navode o ozbiljnim zloupotrebama usljed odluke vojnika da budu lojalni prema drugovima vojnicima, što je dovelo do nedostatka saradnje sa njima, što je sudija u postupku vojnog suda u vezi a smrću šestog podnosioca predstavke nazvao “zid šutnje” nekog od svjedoka vojnika koji su pozvani da predoče dokaze.

  1. Svaki član zadužen za istrage Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage je morao, po okončanju istrage, podnijeti izvještaj u pisanoj formi komandujućem oficiru predmetne jedinice. Takav izvještaj je obuhvatao pismo obrazloženja i kratak ekspoze činjenica, te kopiju svakog dokaza relevantnog za istragu u formi izjava svjedoka i istražitelja. Izvještaj nije sadržavao nikakvu odluku o činjenicama, niti zaključke o onome što se desilo. Na komandujućem oficiru je potom bilo da odluči da li će proslijediti predmet ili neće tužiteljstvu u svrhu eventualnog postupka pred vojnim sudom.
  2. U izvještaju Aitken (od 25. januara 2008. godine, vidi, stav 69. dole), u vezi sa krivičnim gonjenjem pripadnika oružanih snaga umiješanih u smrtne slučajeve iračkih civila, je navedeno sljedeće:

“Četiri smrtna slučaja Iračana do kojih je došlo namjernom zloupotrebom su istražena, a potom proslijeđena Vojnom tužiteljstvu (Army Prosecuting Authority, u daljem tekstu: APA) budući da su izvjesni dokazi naznačavali da su žrtve ubile britanske trupe na nezakonit način. U tri od tih slučajeva, APA je pokrenula postupak krivičnog gonjenja uz obrazloženje da, prema APA-i, postoje stvarni izgledi u osuđujuću presudu i da je postupak u interesu javnosti i službe. Ipak, nije zabilježena nijedna osuđujuća presuda za ubistvo iz nehata ili s predumišljajem.

Stav armije u pogledu krivičnog gonjenja je jasan. Pravni savjeti su na raspolaganju komandujućim oficirima i njihovim nadređenim kada je potrebno da donesu odluke o prosljeđivanju predmeta APA-i. Direktora pravne službe armije (Director Army Legal Services, u daljem tekstu DALS), koji je odgovoran Adjutant Generalu za pružanje pravnih usluga armiji, dodatno postavlja Kraljica na funkcije APA-e. U tom svojstvu, on ima odgovornost da odlučuje o pokretanju postupka u vezi sa svim predmetima koje mu proslijedi zapovijedni lanac i o procesuiranju svih predmeta pred vojnim sudovima, tj. Standing Civilian Court i Summary Appeal Court, te žalbama pred Vojnim žalbenim sudom (Court-Martial Appeal Court) i Domom lordova. DALS delegira te funkcije članovima svoje službe koji su određeni za tužitelje u okviru APA-e, a brigadni tužitelj (Brigadier Prosecutions) vodi svakodnveno tekuće predmete APA-e. APA je pod generalnom nadležnošću Attorney-Generala te je, kako i odgovara, neovisna o zapovjednom lancu armije: APA sama odlučuje da li će se obratiti vojnom sudu i ustrajati u tačkama optužnice, te ni armijski zapovijedni lanac, ni ministri, zvaničnici, niti bilo koja druga osoba ne može donijeti takve odluke. Međutim, koliko god da je kompleksna situacija u kojoj se našla, armija mora djelovati u okviru zakona u svakom momentu; kada APA donese svoju odluku (na osnovu dokaza i zakona), armija mora prihvatiti posljedice krivičnog gonjenja pojedinaca ili optužbi koje mogu naškoditi njenoj reputaciji.

Izostanak bilo kakve krivične osude za ubistvo s namjerom ili iz nehata koja su prouzrokovana namjernim zloupotrebama počinjenim u Iraku može biti zabrinjavajuće, ali se može objasniti. Dokazi se moraju prikupiti (i, kao što je već naznačeno, to nije lak postupak); ti dokazi moraju biti predočeni sudu; branjenici se smatraju nevinim dok tužiteljstvo ne predoči dokaze van svake razumne sumnje. Kriteriji su dakle striktni onoliko koliko su strikni kriteriji koji se primjenjuju pred našim civilnim sudovima. U širem kontekstu, podaci koj se odnose na ishod postupaka pred vojnim sudovima koje je pokrenula APA su skoro identični podacima o ishodima postupaka pred civilnim sudovima: na primjer, krajem 2006. godine, stopa osuđujućih presuda pred vojnim sudom je bila 12%, a 13% pred kraljevskim sudovima (Crown Courts). Neizbježno je da se neka krivična gonjenja neće okončati; međutim, to ne znači da ona nisu trebala biti pokrenuta. Konačno, sudovi su ti koji odlučuju o krivici, ne tužioci. Uistinu, činjenica da je samo mali broj od nekih 200 predmeta koje je istražila vojna policija u Iraku doveo do krivičnog gonjenja se može tumačiti i kao pozitivan, a i kao negativan znak: pozitivan jer dokazi i kontekst nisu bili u korist pokretanja postupka krivičnog gonjenja; a negativan jer znamo da je vojnoj policiji u nekim slučajevima bilo uveliko onemogućeno da sakupi dovoljno čvrstih dokaza kako bi predmeti bili uspješno procesuirani.

Važno je istaći da ništa od svega toga ne upućuje na fundamentalni propust koji bi naškodio efikasnosti sistema vojnog krivičnog pravosuđa. I Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage Kraljevske vojne policije (RMP(SIB)) i APA su bili predmet neovisne kontrole u toku 2007. godine. U svom izvještaju, policijska inspekcija je naznačila da ‘Inspekcija službe za krivično gonjenje Krune je procijenila da Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage Kraljevske vojne policije ima sposobost i resurse da vodi reaktivnu istragu nivoa 36 (teška krivična djela)’, a kontrola APA-e, koju je u februaru i martu 2007. godine obavila ‘Inspekcija službe za krivične progone, je pokazala sljedeće: ‘(...) APA ispunjava svoje obaveze na sveobuhvatan i profesionalan način, često u teškim okolnostima’, dodajući da je 95,7% odluka da se predmet proslijedi na suđenje osnovano u pogledu dokaza i da je 100% tih istih odluka da se predmet proslijedi na suđenje bilo opravdano razlozima u vojnom ili javnom interesu.”

E.  Smrt srodnika podnosilaca predstavke

  1. Sljedeći prikazi su zasnovani na svjedočenjima podnosilaca predstavke i britanskih vojnika koji su bili umiješani u incidente. Te izjave su dostavljene domaćim sudovima koji su ih, u pogledu svih podnosilaca predstavke osim petog, saželi u svojim presudama (naročito presudi koju je donio Divisional Court)

1.  Prvi podnosilac predstavke

  1. Prvi podnosilac predstavke je brat Hazima Jum’aa Gatteha AlSkeinija (Hazim Al-Skeini) koji je preminuo u dobi od 23 godine. Hazim Al-Skeini je jedan od dvojice Iračana iz plemena Beini Skein koje je ubio narednik A, komandir jedne britanske patrole, u Basri, kvartu Al-Majidiyah, malo prije ponoći 4. augusta 2003. godine.
  2. U svojoj izjavi datoj u svojstvu svjedoka, prvi podnosilac predstavke je objasnio da se više članova njegove porodice sastalo zbog pogrebne ceremonije u jednoj kući u kvartu Al-Majidiyah relevantne večeri. U Iraku je običaj da se ispali počasna paljba na sahrani. Prvi podnosilac predstavke je izjavio da je primao goste u kući koji su dolazili na ceremoniju i da je vidio kako su britanski vojnici pogodili njegovog brata dok je hodao ulicom prema kući. Prema prvom podnosiocu predstavke, njegov brat nije bio naoružan te se nalazio na udaljenosti od samo desetak metara od vojnika kad je pogođen i ubijen. Drugi muškarac koji je bio s njim je također ubijen. Prvi podnosilac predstavke nema pojma zašto su vojnici otvorili vatru.
  3. Prema britanskoj verziji incidenta, patrola, koja se približavala pješke u veoma tamnoj noći, je čula snažnu pucnjavu koja dolazila sa više različitih mjesta kvarta Al-Majidiyah. Kada je patrola zašla dublje u kvart, naišla je na dvojicu Iračana koji su bili na ulici. Jedan od njih se nalazio na udaljenosti od oko pet metara od narednika A. koji je komandovao patrolom. Narednik A. je vidio da je on naoružan te je usmjerio oružje prema njemu. Budući da je bila tama, nije bilo moguće reći gdje se nalazio drugi čovjek. Smatrajući da je njegov život i život drugih vojnika patrole u direktnoj opasnosti, narednik A. je otvorio vatru na dvojicu muškaraca bez upozorenja.
  4. Narednik A. je sutradan dao izjavu u pisanoj formi u kojoj je opisao incident. Izjava je proslijeđena komandujućem oficiru njegovog bataljona, pukovniku G, koji je smatrao da nikakvo pravilo o otvaranju vatre nije prekršeno u toku incidenta te je propisno napisao izvještaj u tu svrhu. Pukovnik G. je poslao izvještaj brigadi. Izvještaj je razmotrio brigadni general Moore koji je ispitao da li je drugi muškarac usmjerio svoje oružje prema patroli. Narednik G. je sastavio dodatni izvještaj. Prvobitni izvještaj nije sačuvan u arhivi brigade. Nakon što je razmotrio dodatni izvještaj narednika G, što su uradili i njegov zamjenik načelnika štaba i njegov pravni savjetnik, general Moore je smatrao da je narednik A. djelovao u skladu sa Pravilima o otvaranju vatre tako da nije naredio bilo kakvu dalju istragu.
  5. Pukovnik G. je razgovarao sa članovima plemena preminule osobe 11, 13. i 16. augusta 2003. godine. On je objasnio zašto je narednik A. otvorio vatru te je plemenu dao donaciju iz fonda Komiteta za naknade britanske armije (Goodwill Payment Committee) u iznosu od 2500 američkih dolara (USD) zajedno sa pismom u kojem se objašnjavaju okolnosti smrti i priznaje da preminula osoba nije namjeravala nikoga ubiti.

2.  Druga podnositeljica predstavke

  1. Druga podnositeljica predstavke je udovica Muhammada Salima, kojeg je pogodio i smrtno ranio narednik C. dana 6. novembra 2003. godine ubrzo nakon ponoći.
  2. Druga podnositeljica predstavke nije bila prisutna kada je njen muž pogođen te su njeni dokazi zasnovani na onome što su joj rekli oni koji su bili prisutni. Ona je izjavila da je, 5. novembra 2003. godine, za vrijeme ramazana, Muhammad Salim otišao da posjeti šogora u Basri. Oko 23h30, britanski vojnici su provalili u kuću. Jedan od britanskih vojnika se našao licem u lice sa mužem od druge podnositeljice predstavke u hodniku kuće, te je pucao i pogodio ga u stomak. Britanski vojnici su ga odveli u Češku vojnu bolnicu gdje je preminuo 7. novembra 2003. godine.
  3. Prema britanskoj verziji incidenta, patrola je dobila informaciju od poznanika jednog od prevodilaca da je grupa muškaraca, koji su bili naoružani oružjem dugih cijevi, bombama i ručnim raketnim bacačima, viđena kako ulazi u kuću. Izdat je nalog za operaciju brzog pretresa i hapšenja. Patrola nije uspjela da uđe u kuću nakon kucanja tako da je provalila vrata. Narednik C. je ušao u kuću kroz ulazna vrata sa dvojicom vojnika i pregledao prvu prostoriju. U momentu kada je ušao u drugu prostoriju čuo je pucnjeve iz automatskog oružja koji su dolazili iz unutrašnjosti kuće. Kada je narednik C. krenuo prema sljedećoj prostoriji stepenicama, ugledao je dvojicu muškaraca koji su bili naoružani oružjem dugih cijevi koji su trčali niz stepenice prema njemu. Nije bilo dovoljno vremena za usmeno upozorenje. Narednik C. je mislio da mu je život u neposrednoj opasnosti, ispalio je jedan metak u smjeru prvog čovjeka, muža druge podnositeljice predstavke, i pogodio ga u stomak. Potom je uperio svoje oružje u drugog muškarca koji je bacio svoje oružje. Članovi porodice druge podnositeljice predstavke su nakon toga obavijestili patrolu da su advokati i da su u sporu sa jednom drugom porodicom advokata u vezi sa vlasništvom poslovnih prostorija, zbog kojeg su bili predmet dva oružana napada koje su prijavili policiji, od kojih jedan tri dana, a drugi samo trideset minuta prije provale patrole u kuću.
  4. Dana 6. novembra 2003. godine, komandir čete je sastavio izvještaj o incidentu u kojem je zaključio da je druga stranka u navedenom sporu namjerno dostavila patroli lažne informacije. Nakon što je razmotrio izvještaj i razgovarao sa komandirom čete, pukovnik G. je došao do zaključka da Pravila o otvaranju vatre nisu prekršena u toku incidenta te da ne iziskuje dalju istragu Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage. Dakle, istog dana je sastavio izvješaj u tom smislu i proslijedio ga brigadi gdje ga je razmotrio brigadni general Jones. Brigadni general Jones je razmotrio predmet sa svojim zamjenikom načelnika štaba i svojim pravnim savjetnikom. On je također razmotrio predmet sa svojim političkim savjetnikom. Brigadni general Jones je iz toga zaključio da se radi o jasnom predmetu u kojem Pravila o otvaranju vatre nisu prekršena te je sastavio izvještaj u tom smislu. Druga podnositeljica predstavke, koja je morala izdržavati troje djece i svekrvu, je dobila 2000 USD iz fonda Komiteta za naknade britanske armije (Goodwill Payment Committee) zajedno sa pismom u kojem su naznačene okolnosti smrti.

3.  Treći podnosilac predstavke

  1. Treći podnosilac predstavke je udovac Hannan Mahaibas Sadde Shmailawi, koja je bila pogođena i smrtno ranjena 10. novembra 2003. godine unutar Instituta za obrazovanje u kvartu Al-Maaqal u Basri, gdje je treći podnositelj perdstavke radio kao noćni čuvar i gdje je bio smještena sa svojom ženom i porodicom.
  2. Prema izjavi trećeg podnosioca predstavke kao svjedoka, oko 20h00, kada je cijela porodica sjedila za stolom i večerala, iznenadni rafal iz automatskog oružja je ispaljen izvan zgrade. Njegova supruga je pogođena u glavu i nožne zglobove, a jedno od djece u ruku. Supruga i dijete trećeg podnosioca predstavke su odvedeni u bolnicu gdje se dijete oporavilo, ali je supruga umrla.
  3. Prema britanskoj verziji incidenta, supruga trećeg podnosioca predstavke je pogođena u toku razmjene vatre između jedne britanske patrole i više naoružanih muškaraca. Kada je područje osvijetljeno signalnom raketom s padobranom, zapažena su najmanje tri muškarca naoružana oružjem dugih cijevi, od kojih su dvojica pucali direktno na britanske vojnike. Jedan od naoružanih ljudi je ubijen u toku razmjene vatre sa patrolom. Pucnjava je prestala nakon otprilike sedam do deset minuta te su naoružani ljudi počeli bježati. Prilikom pretraživanja zgrada, vojnici su našli jednu ženu (suprugu trećeg podnosioca predstavke) koja je bila pogođena u glavu i dijete ranjeno u ruku. Oboje su odvedeni u bolnicu.
  4. Komandir čete je sljedeće jutro podnio izvještaj u vezi sa incidentom, zajedno sa izjavama vojnika umiješanih u incident. Nakon što je razmotrio izvještaj i izjave, pukovnik G. je zaključio da Pravila o otvaranju vatre nisu prekršena u toku incidenta te da nije potrebna dalja istraga Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage. On je propisno sastavio izvještaj u tom smislu te ga potom proslijedio brigadi. Izvještaj je razmotrio brigadni general Jones, koji je razmotrio incident sa svojim zamjenikom načelnika štaba i svojim pravnim savjetnikom, te sa narednikom G. General Jones je zaključio da su Pravila o otvaranju vatre ispoštovana u toku incidenta i da nema osnova za dalju istragu.

4.  Četvrti podnosilac predstavke

  1. Četvrti podnosilac predstavke je brat Waleeda Sayaya Muzbana, kojeg je razvodnik S. pogodio i smrtno ranio u dobi od 43 godine u toku noći 24. augusta 2003. godine u kvartu Al-Maqaal u Basri.
  2. Četvrti podnosilac predstavke nije bio prisutan kad je njegov brat ubijen, ali tvrdi da su susjedi svjedoci incidenta. U svom svjedočenju, on je izjavio da prema onome kako je on razumio, njegov brat se vraćao kući s posla oko 20h30 relevantne večeri. On je vozio minibus ulicom Souq Hitteen, blizu mjesta gdje su on i četvrti podnosilac predstavke živjeli. Iz nepoznatih razloga, prema izjavi podnosioca predstavke, minibus “je izrešetan mecima” usljed čega je Waleed smrtno ranjen u vrat i stomak.
  3. Razvodnik S. je bio član patrole koja je nadgledala zonu jedne koalicijske vojne baze (Fort Apache) gdje su ubijena trojica pripadnika Kraljevske vojne policije iz vatrenog oružja iz jednog vozila prethodnog dana. Prema iskazu britanskog vojnika o incidentu, razvodnik S. je imao sumnje u pogledu minibusa, jer su zavjese na prozorima bile navučene, kretao se sporo prema patroli, sa kratkim svjetlima. Kada je dao znak vozilu da stane, vozilo je pokušalo da izbjegne vojnike tako da je razvodnik S. usmjerio svoje oružje u u vozača i naredio mu da stane. Vozilo se zaustavilo te se razvodnik približio vozačevim vratima (brat četvrtog podnosioca predstavke) i pozdravio ga. Vozač je reagirao na agresivan način te se činilo da viče nešto preko ramena ljudima u stražnjem dijelu minibusa koji je bio sakriven zavjesama. Kada je razvodnik S. pokušao da pogleda prema stražnjem dijelu vozila, vozač ga je odgurnuo tako što ga je udario šakom u prsa. Vozač je potom nešto uzviknuo prema stražnjem dijelu vozila i napravio pokret da bi se dočepao oružja razvodnika S. Razvodnik S. je morao upotrijebiti silu da bi se oslobodio. Vozač je potom krenuo ubrzavajući i psujući u pravcu drugih članova patrole. Razvodnik S. je pucao u gume vozila koje se zaustavilo stotinjak metara od patrole. Vozač se okrenuo te ponovo nešto viknuo prema stražnjem dijelu minibusa. Činilo se da nastoji da se dočepa nekog oružja. Misleći da će vozač i ostali u vozilu pucati po njegovom timu, razvodnik S. je ispalio oko pet metaka prema cilju. Kako se vozilo udaljavalo, razvodnik S. je ispalio druga dva metka u pravcu stražnjeg dijela vozila. Nakon kratkog intervala, vozilo je naglo stalo. Vozač je izašao i vikao na britanske vojnike. Naređeno mu je da legne na tlo. Patrola se potom pribiližila vozilu da bi provjerila da li ima naoružanih ljudi u vozilu. Ispostavilo se da je vozilo bilo prazno. Vozač je bio pogođen sa tri metka u leđa i u kuk. Prva pomoć mu je ukazana na licu mjesta, a potom su ga odvezli u Češku vojnu bolnicu gdje je preminuo kasnije tog dana ili narednog dana.
  4. Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage je pokrenulo istragu 29. augusta 2003. godine. Istražitelji su pokupili djeliće metaka i prazne čahure te su fotografisali mjesto incidenta. Vozilo je pokupljeno, zatim prebačeno u Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo. Budući da je tijelo preminulog vraćeno porodici da bi bilo sahranjeno i da nikakva autopsija nije obavljena, Specijalnom odjeljenju za istrage su dali izjave dvojica iračkih hirurga koji su ga operirali. Ugovoren je sastanak sa porodicom kako bi se dobila njihova saglasnost za ekshumaciju i autopsiju, ali je on bio odgođen. Devetorica vojnih svjedoka koji su bili umiješani u incident su bili ispitani te su dali izjave, i četiri druge osobe su bile ispitane, ali se na kraju ispostavilo da nemaju ništa korisno reći. Međutim, razvodnik S. nije ispitan. Budući da ga je Specijalno odjeljene za istrage osumnjičilo da je djelovao suprotno Pravilima o otvaranju vatre, praksa tog odjeljenja je bila da ga ne ispita dok nema dovoljno dokaza da bi ga optužila. Forenzičko ispitivanje je obavljeno na mjestu incidenta 6. septembra 2003. godine.
  5. Dana 29. augusta 2009. godine, pukovnik G. je poslao svoj prvobitni izvještaj koji se odnosio na incident brigadnom generalu Mooreu. U izvještaju je izjavio da je ubijeđen da je razvodnik S. djelovao u uvjerenju da poštuje Pravila o otvaranju vatre. Međutim, pukovnik G. je dodao da se, prema njemu, radi o kompleksnom predmetu za koji je potrebna istraga Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage. Nakon što je brigadni general Moore ispitao izvještaj pukovnika G, razmotrio predmet sa svojim zamjenikom načelnika štaba i svojim pravnim savjetnikom, odlučio je da bi predmet mogao biti riješen istragom na nivou jedinice, pod uvjetom da se dobije zadovoljavajući odgovor na izvjestan broj pitanja. Rezultat toga je bio da je pukovnik G. predočio novi izvještaj, od 12. septembra 2003. godine, u kojem je odgovorio na određena pitanja i zaključio da istraga Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage nije više potrebna. Nakon što je ponovo razmotrio predmet sa svojim zamjenikom načelnika štaba i dobio pravni savjet, brigadni general Moore je konačno zaključio da su Pravila o otvaranju vatre ispoštovana.
  6. U toj fazi, brigadni general Moore je bio informiran da je Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage započelo istragu o incidentu. Dana 17. septembra 2003. godine, pukovnik G. je pismeno zatražio od Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage da okonča istragu. Isti zahtjev je uputio brigadni general Moore putem svog načelnika štaba za vrijeme jednog sastanka sa višim istražnim oficirom Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage. Istraga Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage je okončana 23. septembra 2003. godine. Porodica preminulog je dobila 1400 USD od Komiteta za naknade britanske armije (Goodwill Payment Committee) i 3000 USD za minibus.
  7. Nakon što je četvrti podnosilac predstavke podnio zahtjev za sudsko preispitivanje (vidi, stav 73. dole), predmet su ponovo razmotrili viši istražni oficiri Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage, te je donesena odluka da se istraga ponovo pokrene. Istraga je ponovo otvorena 7. juna 2004. godine, a okončana je 3. decembra 2004. godine uprkos poteškoćama koje su prouzrokovane opasnim uvjetima u Iraku u to vrijeme.
  8. Po okončanju istrage, Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage je predalo svoj izvještaj komandujućem oficiru koji je proslijedio predmet Vojnom tužiteljstvu u februaru 2005. godine. Vojno tužiteljstvo je odlučilo da je potrebno održati formalno preliminarno ispitivanje svjedoka da bi se otklonile nejasnoće i dvosmislenosti u pogledu dokaza. Vojno tužiteljstvo je uzelo izjave od vojnika koji su bili prisutni prilikom pucanja i koji su bili jedini poznati svjedoci. Konsultiran je i neovisni branitelj. Prema njemu, materijalna nemogućnost da se ustanovi da razvodnik S. nije pucao u samoodbrani otklanja svaku stvarnu mogućnost da se on osudi. Spis je proslijeđen državnom pravobranitelju (Attorney General) koji je odlučio da ne koristi svoje ovlasti u smislu krivičnog gonjenja.

5.  Peti podnosilac predstavke

  1. Peti podnosilac predstavke je otac Ahmeda Jabbara Kareema Alija koji je umro 8. maja 2003. godine u dobi od 15. godina.
  2. Prema izjavama koje je dao peti podnosilac predstavke u svrhu postupka pred britanskim pravosudnim organima, dana 8. maja 2003. godine, njegov sin se nije vratio kući u 13h30 kako je bilo predviđeno. Peti podnosilac predstavke je otišao do trga Al-Saad da ga traži, gdje mu je rečeno da su britanski vojnici uhapsili neke mlade Iračane ranije tog dana. Podnosilac predstavke je nastavio da traži svog sina, a sljedeće jutro ga je kontaktiralo lice A, jedan drugi irački mladić koji mu je saopćio da su njega, sina podnosioca predstavke i drugu dvojicu uhapsili britanski vojnici dan ranije, pretukli ih, a zatim ih prisilili da se bace u rijeku Šat al-Arab. Kasnije 9. maja 2003. godine, brat podnosioca predstavke je informirao “britansku policiju” o incidentu, te je od njega zatraženo da preda Ahmedovi ličnu kartu. Dana 10. maja 2003. godine, nakon nekoliko dana čekanja i potrage, podnosilac predstavke je našao tijelo svog sina u rijeci.
  3. Podnosilac predstavke je odmah odnio tijelo svog sina u “stanicu britanske policije” gdje mu je rečeno da odnese tijelo u lokalnu bolnicu. Irački ljekar na dužnosti je rekao podnosiocu predstavke da nije kvalificiran da obavi autopsiju i da nijedan patolog nije na raspolaganju. Buduću da se prema islamskoj praksi ukop treba obaviti u roku od 24 sata od smrti, podnosilac predstavke je odlučio da sahrani svog sina.
  4. Oko 10 do 15 dana nakon sahrane svog sina, podnosilac predstavke se vratio u “stanicu britanske policije” da zahtijeva istragu, ali je informiran da nije na “britanskoj policiji”da intervenira u takvim stvarima. On je ponovo došao u “policijsku stanicu” nekoliko dana kasnije te je bio obaviješten da Kraljevska vojna policija želi da ga kontaktira i da bi trebao otići u Predsjedničku palatu. Podnosilac predstavke se naredni dan sastao sa oficirima Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage u Predsjedničkoj palati te je bio informiran da će se voditi istraga.
  5. Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage je ispitalo osobu A. i uzelo izjavu od nje. Ono je uzelo izjave od podnosioca predstavke i članova njegove porodice. Najmanje jedan mjesec nakon incidenta, istražitelji su otišli do trga Al-Saad i tamo pronašli odjeću koja je pripadala sinu podnosioca predstavke i drugom mladiću koji je bio uhapšen u isto vrijeme. Na kraju perioda žalosti od četrdeset dana, podnosilac predstavke je pristao da tijelo njegovog sina bude ekshumirano u svrhu autopsije. Međutim, u toj fazi se nije više moglo ustanoviti ustanoviti da li je Ahmed bio pretučen prije smrti, a nije se mogao ustanoviti ni uzrok smrti. Podnosilac predstavke je istakao da nikada nije dobio objašnjenje u pogledu nalaza autopsije i da nije u potpunosti informiran o napredovanju istrage generalno, budući da su mnogi dokumenti koje je dobio bili na engleskom ili su loše prevedeni na arapski.
  6. Podnosilac predstavke tvrdi da je prošlo osamnaest mjeseci nakon ekshumacije tijela njegovog sina i da za to vrijeme nije imao kontakt sa istražiteljima. U augustu 2005. godine, on je informiran da su četvorica vojnika optužena za ubistvo i da će suđenje biti organizirano u Engleskoj. Postupak pred vojnim sudom je vođen između septembra 2005. godine i maja 2006. godine. U međuvremenu su trojica od sedmorice vojnika, koji su bili optuženi za njegovo ubistvo, napustili armiju, a druga dvojica su bila odsutna bez dozvole. Prema tužiteljstvu, vojnici su pomagali iračkoj policiji da uhapsi četvoricu adolescenata pod sumnjom pljačkanja, te su ih odveli u automobilu do rijeke gdje su ih prisilili da skoče u vodu prijeteći oružjem da bi im “dali lekciji”. Podnosilac predstavke i osoba A. su predočili dokaze pred vojnim sudom u aprilu 2006. godine. Podnosilac predstavke je smatrao da je suđenje bilo konfuzno i prijeteće te je imao utisak da je vojni sud bio pristrasan u korist optuženih. Osoba A. je izjavila da, premda je sin podnosioca predstavke bio u opasnosti u vodi, vojnici su otišli u svom vozilu, a da mu nisu pomogli. Međutim, on nije bio u stanju da identificira optužene kao vojnike koji su bili umiješani u incident. Optuženi su negirali bilo kakvu odgovornost za smrt te su oslobođeni jer je iskaz osobe A. bio nedosljedan i nepouzdan.
  7. Predmet u vezi sa sinom petog podnosioca predstavke je bio jedan od šest predmeta ispitanih u izvještaju Aitken (stav 69. dole). U dijelu tog izvještaja pod naslovom “Učenje lekcija iz disciplinskih predmeta”, navedeno je sljedeće:

“(...) znamo da su dva preliminarna policijska izvještaja predočena u maju 2003. godine, koji se odnose na navode, prema kojima su u dva različita navrata, ali iste noći, britanski vojnici izazvali utapanje iračkh državljana u rijeci Šat al-Arab. Irelevantno je da jedan od tih slučajeva nije nakon toga procesuiran; zapravo, navedeno je da se u to vrijeme desio jedan očigledno neobičan događaj, dva puta u kratkom vremenskom razmaku. Imajući u vidu sve ostale odgovornosti koje su imali na terenu, komandirima se ne može razumno prebacivati što se nisu zapitali da li predmetne činjenice ukazuju na jednu novu praksu; međutim, brži i djelotvorniji sistem za signaliziranje takve vrste informacija drugim instancama koje ih mogu analizirati, bi omogućio da se identificira, ako je potrebno, početak takve prakse. Naime, dokazi pokazuju da su to bili izolirani incidenti; ali, da su bili simptom fundamentalnijeg propusta, moglo se desiti da te slučajeve nadležne vlasti previde. Poređenja radi, da su u vremenskom periodu od jedne noći prijavljena dva slučaja upotrebe novog oružja od strane pobunjenika kako bi napali britansko blindirano vozilo, sigurno je da bi proces “učenja lekcije” omogućio da se identificira značaj tog oružja, da se odrede protumjere potrebne za njegovu neutralizaciju i da se brzo rašire novi postupci da bi se ublažio rizik. Činjenica da se taj isti proces ne primjenjuje na disciplinske stvari se može samo djelomično objasniti potrebom za povjerljivošću i očuvanje dokaza; ipak, radi se o nedostatku u sistemu koji bi mogao biti lako ispravljen a da se ne ugrozi fundamentalni princip presumpcije nevinosti .”

U dijelu izvještaja pod naslovom “Kašnjenje” navodi se sljedeće:

“Vrijeme koje je bilo potrebno da bi se riješili neki od predmeta koji su ispitani u ovom izvještaju je neprihvatljivo. (...) Bilo je potrebno čekati septembar 2005. godine, tj. 28 mjeseci nakon smrti Ahmeda Jabbera Kareema da bi zasijedao vojni sud kojem je dostavljen spis. U međuvremenu, trojica od sedmorice vojnika koji su optuženi za njegovu smrt su napustili armiju, a druga dvojica su bila odsutna bez dozvole.

U većini slučajeva, neodgovarajuće je da armija poduzima administrativne mjere protiv bilo kojeg oficira ili vojnika dok se ne okonča disciplinski postupak zbog rizika od uticaja na postupak. Kada taj disciplinski traje dugo, kao što je to slučaj u većini predmeta, dejstvo eventualne administrativne sankcije je znatno reducirano – zapravo, takve sankcije će vjerovatno biti kontraproduktivne. Osim toga, što disciplinski postupak duže traje, to je manja je vjerovatnoća da će zapovijedni lanac poduzeti proaktivne mjere da bi ispravio situaciju koja prvobitno doprinijela da se počine zločini.”

  1. Peti podnosilac predstavke je pokrenuo građanski postupak protiv Ministarstva odbrane zbog nanošenja štete uzrokovane smrću njegovog sina. Spor je riješen u preliminarnom stadiju isplatom iznosa od 115 000 funti sterlinga (GBP) 15. decembra 2008. godine. Osim toga, 20. februara 2009. godine, general divizije Cubitt je uputio petom podnosiocu predstavke formalno izvinjenje u ime britanske armije zbog uloge koju je ona imala u smrti njegovog sina.

6.  Šesti podnosilac predstavke

  1. Šesti podnosilac predstavke je pukovnik policijskih snaga Basre. Njegov sin, Baha Mousa, je imao 26 godina kada je preminuo dok je bio u rukama britanske armije, tri dana nakon što su ga uhapsili vojnici 14.septembra 2003. godine.
  2. Prema šestom podnosiocu predstavke, u noći između 13. i 14. septembra 2003. godine, njegov sin je radio kao recepcionista u hotelu Ibn Al-Haitham u Basri. U rano jutro 14. septembra, podnosilac predstavke je otišao u hotel po svog sina. Po dolasku je primijetio da je jedna britanska jedinica opkolila hotel. Sin podnosioca predstavke i šestero drugih uposlenika su ležali na podu hotelskog lobija, sa rukama na potiljku. Podnosilac predstavke je izrazio svoju zabrinutost poručniku koji je bio zadužen za operaciju, ali ga je on razuvjerio rekavši da se radi o rutinskoj istrazi koja će se završiti za jedan ili dva sata. Treći dan nakon što je njegov sin uhapšen, šestog podnosioca predstavke je posjetila jedinica Kraljevske vojne policije. Rečeno mu je da je njegov sin ubijen u pritvoru u britanskoj vojnoj bazi u Basri. Od njega se tražilo da identificira tijelo. Tijelo sina podnosioca predstavke i njegovo lice su bili prekriveni krvlju i modricama; njegov nos je bio slomljen, a dijelovi kože na licu su bili zguljeni.
  3. Jedan od ostalih uposlenika hotela koji su uhapšeni 14. septembra 2003. godine je izjavio u svojstvu svjedoka u svrhu sudskog postupka u Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu da se po dolasku u bazu zatvorenicima stavlja kapuljača preko glave, prisiljavaju ih da budu u umarajućim položajima, uskraćuje im se hrana i udaraju ih šakama i nogama. Za vrijeme pritvora, Baha Mousa je odveden u drugu prostoriju tako da se čulo kako vrišti i stenje.
  4. Kasnog poslijepodneva 15. septembra 2003. godine, brigadni general Moore, koji je učestvovao u operaciji u kojoj su hotelski uposlenici bili uhapšeni, je bio informiran da je Baha Mousa mrtav i da su ostali pritvorenici bili zlostavljani. Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage je odmah pozvano da istraži smrt. Budući da su lokalne bolnice štrajkovale, pozvan je patolog iz Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva koji je na tijelu Bahe Mouse identificirao 93 povrede te je zaključio da je uzrok smrti asfiksija. Prema osmero ostalih Iračana se također postupalo na nečovječan način, a dvojici od njih je bila potrebna hospitalizacija. Istraga je okončana početkom aprila 2004. godine, a izvještaj je proslijeđen zapovjednom lancu jedinice.
  5. Dana 14. decembra 2004. godine, Divisional Court je zaključio da istraga o smrti sina šestog podnosioca predstavke nije bila djelotvorna (vidi, stav 77. dole). Dana 21. decembra 2005. godine, Apelacioni sud, konstatirajući da situacija nije napredovala, je odlučio da uputi pitanje Divisional Courtu (vidi, stav 81. dole).
  6. Dana 19. jula 2005. godine, sedmorica britanskih vojnika su optuženi za krivična djela u vezi sa smrću Bahe Mouse. Dana 19. septembra 2006. godine, na početku postupka pred vojnim sudom, jedan od vojnika je izjavio da se osjeća krivim za ratni zločin nečovječnog postupanja, ali ne i za ubistvo. Dana 14. februara 2007. godine, optužbe protiv četvorice od sedmorice vojnika su povučene, a 13. marta 2007. godine, dvojica ostalih vojnika su bili oslobođeni. Dana 30. aprila 2007. godine, vojnik proglašen krivim za nečovječno postupanje je osuđen na zatvorsku kaznu od jedne godine i otpust iz armije.
  7. Dana 25. januara 2008. godine, Ministarstvo odbrane je objavilo izvještaj koji je napisao brigadni general Robert Aitken u vezi sa šest predmeta o navodenoj namjernoj zloupotrebi i smrtnim slučajevima iračkih civila, uključujući smrt sinova petog i šestog podnosioca predstavke (izvještaj Aitken).
  8. Podnosilac predstavke je pokrenuo građanski postupak protiv Ministarstva odbrane, koji se okončao u julu 2008. godine formalnim i javnim priznanjem odgovornosti i isplatom odštete u iznosu od 575 000 GBP.
  9. U izjavi u pisnoj formi predočenoj Parlamentu 14. maja 2008. godine, ministar odbrane je najavio otvaranje javne istrage o smrt Bahe Mouse. Istražnoj komisiji, na čijem čelu je penzionisani sudija Apelacionog suda, je povjeren sljedeći zadatak:

“Da provede istragu i podnese izvještaj o okolnostima smrti Bahe Mouse i postupanja prema onima koji su bili pritvoreni s njim, vodeći računa o istrazi koja je već vođena, naročito o pitanju ko je odgovoran za odobravanje prakse kondicioniranja pritvorenika koju su mogli usvojiti izvjesni pripadnici 1. bataljona Kraljevske regimente Lankašir u Iraku 2003. godine, te da donese preporuke.”

U vrijeme usvajanja ove presude, usmena saslušanja u okviru istrage su okončana, ali izvještaj još uvijek nije podnesen.

F.  Domaći postupci na osnovu Zakona o ljudskim pravima

1.  Divisional Court

  1. Dana 26. marta 2004. godine, ministar odbrane je odlučio, u vezi sa smrtnim slučajevima 13 iračkih civila, uključujući srodnike šestero podnosilaca predstavke: (1) da se ne vodi neovisna istraga o smrti; (2) da se ne prihvati odgovornost za smrt; (3) da se ne plati pravična odšteta.
  2. Trinaestero podnosilaca zahtjeva je zatražilo sudsko preispitivanje tih odluka tražeći da se ustanovi da su predmetni smrtni slučajevi i odbijanje ministra da pokrene istragu o njima doveli do neispunjavanja proceduralnih i materijalnih obaveza Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva iz člana 2 (i člana 3. u predmetu šestog podnosioca zahtjeva). Dana 11. maja 2004.godine, sudija Divisional Courta je naložio saslušanje šest pilot-predmeta (uključujući predmete prvog, drugog, trećeg, četvrtog i šestog podnosioca predstavke), te je odlučio da će postupak u sedam drugih predmeta (uključujući predmet petog podnosioca predstavke) biti obustavljen do rješavanja prethodnih pitanja.
  3. Dana 14. decembra 2004. godine, Divisional Court je odbio zahtjeve prva četiri podnosioca predstavke, ali je usvojio zahtjev šestog podnosioca predstavke ([2004] EWHC 2911 (Admin)). Nakon što je preispitao sudsku praksu, naročito odluku u predmetu Banković i ostali protiv Beligije [VV] (odluka), no. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII, Divisional Court je odlučio da je jurisdikcija u smislu člana 1. Konvencije u osnovi teritorijalna premda postoje izuzeci. Jedan izuzetak se primjenjuje kada država strana u ugovoru ima efektivnu kontrolu nad nekim područjem van svoje teritorije. Sud je dodao da se takav osnov jurisdikcije može primijeniti samo u slučaju kada neka država ugovornica kontrolira teritoriju druge države ugovornice budući da Konvencija u osnovi djeluje u okviru sopstvene regionalne sfere i ne omogućava u tom pogledu nikakvu prazninu. Sud je, prema tome, zaključio da se taj osnov jurisdikcije ne može primijeniti u Iraku.
  4. Divisional Court je istakao jedan drugi izuzetak, koji proizilazi iz vršenja vlasti od strane predstavnika države ugovornice bilo gdje u svijetu, ali koji je ograničen na posebne slučajeve koji su priznati međunarodnim pravom i naznačeni u djelićima u sudskoj praksi Suda. Sud je dodao da nikakva opća logika u pogledu te grupe izuzetaka ne proizilazi iz sudske prakse Suda, ali da slučajevi priznati do sada proizilaze iz vršenja državne vlasti u mjestu ili sa mjesta koje je po prirodi autonomno, kvaziteritorijalno, ili kada je prisustvo državnog predstavnika u stranoj državi odobrila ta država i kada je zaštićeno međunarodnim pravom, kao što su ambasade, konzulati, plovila i zrakoplovi registrirani u tuženoj državi. Prema Divisional Courtu, britanski vojni zatvor, koji je djelovao u Iraku uz saglasnost iračkih suverenih vlasti i u kojem su se nalazile uhapšene osumnjičene osobe, je mogao biti obuhvaćen tim uskim opsegom. Može se smatrati da je presuda Öcalan protiv Turske,broj 46221/99, od 12. marta 2003, također obuhvaćena tim izuzetkom budući da je podnosilac predstavke uhapšen u turskom avionu, a odmah zatim odveden u Tursku. Međutim, Divisional Court nije smatrao da ta presuda “baca novo svjetlo” budući da Turska nije podnijela nikakav prigovor o nedostatku jurisdikcije u fazi prihvatljivosti predmeta.
  5. Divisional Court je zaključio da smrtni slučajevi koji su rezultirali iz vojnih operacija na terenu, kao što su one na koje se žale prva četiri podnosioca predstavke, ne potpadaju pod opseg jurisdikcije Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva na osnovu član 1. Konvencije, ali da smrt sina šestog podnosioca predstavke, u britanskom vojnom zatvoru, potpada. Divisional Court je dalje odlučio da je opseg Zakona o ljudskim pravima iz 1998. godine identičan opsegu Konvencije u tom pogledu.
  6. Sud je zaključio da je došlo do povrede obaveze da se provede istraga iz članova 2. i 3. Konvencije u pogledu sina šestog podnosioca predstavke budući da su rezultati istrage do jula 2004. godine, nekih deset mjeseci nakon ubistva, bili nepoznati. Sud je dodao:

“329. (...) Premda postoje dokazi opće prirode o poteškoćama vođenja istrage u Iraku u to vrijeme – osnovni sigurnosni problemi u vezi sa odlaskom u iračke domove da bi se obavili razgovori sa ljudima, nedostatak prevodilaca, kulturološke razlike, problemi u vezi sa logistikom, nedostatak službenih dokumenata, itd. – nemoguće je razumijeti, bez većeg razumijevanja zaključaka u izvještaju [Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage], zbog čega je relevantan, ako je uopšte, bilo koji od tih elemenata za smrt koja se nije desila na javnim putevima u Iraku, nego u vojnom zatvoru pod kontrolom britanskig snaga. (...)

330. Premda je kapetan Logan objasnila da je vrlo teško organizirati prepoznavanja u vrsti sa logističke tačke gledišta, da se pritvorenici prebacuju s jednog mjesta na drugo i da su se neki vojni svjedoci vratili u Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, ona također kaže da ti problemi samo usporavaju postupak, ali ne onemogućavaju da se on odvija na ‘zadovoljavajući način’ (...). Ne postoji ništa pred nama što bi omogućilo da se objasne kašnjenja u istražnom postupku: što bi se eventualno moglo biti uporediti sa progresom, i ispitivanjem otvorenim za javnost, do kojeg se došlo, kako smo primijetili, u ostalim istragama koje su proizašle iz mogućih prestupa u zatvorima pod kontrolom snaga Sjedinjenih Država. U pogledu samog izvještaja [Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage], imajući u vidu dosje (...) on nije sadržavao nikakvu odluku u pogledu činjenica, a ni najmanji zaključak o onome što se desilo ili što se moglo desiti.

331.Imajući u vidu te okolnosti, ne možemo prihvatiti tvrdnju [branitelja Vlade] da je istraga adekvatna u smislu proceduralne obaveze iz člana 2. Konvencije. Čak i da se može reći da je istraga isključivo u rukama [Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage] neovisna, uz obrazloženje da je [Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage] hijerarhijski i praktično neovisno o vojnim jedinicama pod istragom, u pogledu čega sumnjamo imajući posebno u vidu da [Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage] podnosi izvještaj zapovjednom lancu same jedinice, ne može se reći da je istraga u ovom predmetu pravovremena, otvorena ili djelotvorna.”

U pogledu ostalih pet smrtnih slučajeva, sud je smatrao da, ako je pogriješio u pogledu pitanja jurisdikcije i ako zahtjevi ne potpadaju pod opseg Konvencije, obaveza da se provede istraga iz člana 2. nije ispunjena iz sljedećih razloga:

“337. (...) u svim ovim slučajevima, kao u slučaju gosp. Mouse, vlasti Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva su kao polaznu tačku uzeli princip da se Konvencija ne primjenjuje. To je razlog zašto su, u skladu sa praksom, prve istrage svaki put vodile predmetne jedinice: samo je u u četvrtom predmetu, koji se odnosi na gosp. Waleeda Muzbana, interveniralo [Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage], koje je uostalom prekinulo istragu prije nego što je ona opet pokrenuta (nepreciziranog dana) nakon preispitivanja dosjea koji je poslan u Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo. Prema tome, istrage nisu bile neovisne. Nisu bile ni djelotvorne jer su se u suštini sastojale samo od relativno površnih mjera zasnovanih na svjedočenjima vojnika koji su sami bili umiješani, pa čak i tada na nedovoljnim ispitivanjima ili svjedočenjima, unilateralnim mjerama u toku kojih je zanemarena upotreba forenzičkih dokaza koji bi omogućili balističku ili medicinsku ekspertizu.

(...)

339. U vezi sa ovim predmetima, glavni argument [branitelja Vlade] je da su vlada i vlasti, u krajnje teškim situacijama, sa stanovišta operacija vođenih na terenu i u smislu istraga nakon događaja, učinili najbolje što su mogli. On je posebno istakao sljedeće aspekte u vezi sa dosjeima. U Iraku nije postojala vladavina prava; policijske snage nisu uopšte postojale na početku okupacije ili, u najboljem slučaju, bile su potpuno neefikasne jer su bile pod stalnim napadima; iako su irački sudovi funkcionirali, oni su podvrgavani zastrašivanju; nije postojao sistem domaće građanske istrage, a ni sredstva za to; domaći komunikacioni sistemi nisu funkcionirali; nije bilo ni mrtvačnica, ni sredstava za autopcsju, a ni pouzdanih patologa; sigurnosna situacija koju su ikada iskusili iskusni vojnici nikada nije bila gora; borbe između plemenskih i kriminalnih bandi su bile svakodnevne; broj raspoloživih vojnika je bio mali; i kulturološke razlike su otežavale sve poteškoće.

340. Ne uzimamo s rezervom ove poteškoće, koje su u cjelini morale predstavljati ozbiljne prepreke za svakga ko se brine da na najbolji način provede istragu. Međutim, neovisno o tvrdnji [branitelja podnosilaca zahtjeva], koja je zasnovana na turskim predmetima, prema kojoj se neispunjavanje obaveza da se provede istraga iz člana 2. ne može opravdati sigurnosnim problemima, zaključujemo da se ne može smatrati da su istrage zadovoljile potrebne zahtjeve. Nisu bile neovisne; bile su jednostrane; i predmetni komandiri nisu pokušali da daju sve od sebe u smislu člana 2.

341. Međutim, to ne znači da bismo u drugim okolnostima ignorirali strateške poteškoće situacije. Svi turski predmeti se odnose na smrtne slučajeve koji su se desili na sopstvenoj teritoriji države ugovornice. U tom kontekstu, Sud ima pravo da bude krajnje skeptičan u pogledu poteškoća koje država navodi da je imala na putu provođenja istrage za koji se u svakom slučaju ne može reći da je izabrala (...). Čini nam se i da taj skepticizam nije lako prenosiv na vanteritorijalni okvir. (...)”

2.  Apelacioni sud

  1. Prva četiri podnosioca predstavke su podnijeli apelacije protiv zaključka Divisional Courta da njihovi srodnici nisu potpadali pod jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva. Ministar odbrane je također podnio protuapelaciju protiv zaključka u pogledu sina šestog podnosioca predstavke; premda je priznao pred Apelacionim sudom da je svaki Iračanin u rukama britanskih vojnika u pritvorskom vojnom centru u Iraku potpadao pod jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva u skladu sa članom 1. Konvencije, on je smatrao da Zakon o ljudskim pravima nema vanteritorijalno dejstvo i da domaći sudovi zbog toga ne mogu rješavati zahtjev šestog podnosioca predstavke.
  2. Dana 21. decembra 2005. godine, Apelacioni sud je odbio apelacije i protuapelaciju ([2005] EWCA Civ 1609). Nakon što je preispitao sudsku praksu Suda koja se odnosi na član 1. Konvencije, sudija Brooke, koji je donio vodeću presudu, je presudio da država može imati vanteritorijalnu jurisdikciju kada nad nekim podnosiocem zahtjeva ima kontrolu i vlast (što on naziva vlast koju vrše predstavnici države, u daljem tekstu: SAA) ili kada efektivno kontrolira teritoriju van svojih granica (efektivna kontrola teritorije, u daljem tekstu: ECA). U tom pogledu, on je istakao sljedeće u stavu 80:

“80. Zbog toga bih bio oprezniji od Divisional Courta u pogledu svog pristupa presudi Bankovic. Čini mi se da se u toj odluci ne izjašnjava o pitanju da li je vanteritorijalna jurisdikcija u tom predmetu bila zasnovana na pristupu SAA ili na pristupu ECA, premda je u stavu 60. odluke je naznačeno da se tom putu bilo kojeg priznavanja vršenja vanteritorijalne jurisdikcije, u smislu Konvencije, mora pristupiti sa oprezom zbog toga što bi pristup SAA mogao predstavljati povredu suvereniteta druge države (na primjer, kada predstavnici neke države kidnapuju neku osobu na teritoriji druge države bez poziva ili pristanka te druge države).”

On je razmotrio, inter alia, predmete Öcalan protiv Turske [VV], broj 46221/99, ECHR 2005-IV; Freda protiv Italije (odluka), broj 8916/80, odluka Komisije od 7. oktobra 1980, Decisions and Reports (DR) 21, str. 250; i Sánchez Ramirez protiv Francuske, (odluka), broj 28780/95, odluka Komisije od 24. juna 1996, DR 86-A, str. 155, i zapazio da ti predmeti nemaju veze sa principom javnog međunarodnog prava koji se odnosi na aktivnosti unutar nekog zrakoplova koji je registriran u jednoj državi, a prelijeće preko teritorije druge države. Umjesto toga, zaključci u vezi sa jurisdikcijom u tim predmetima su primjeri doktrine vlasti koju vrše predstavnici države koja se primjenjuje kada se neka osoba nalazi pod kontrolom i vlašću države ugovornice, čak izvan espace juridique (pravnog prostora) Vijeća Evrope, i bez obzira da li je država prihvata pristala ili nije na vršenje kontrole i vlasti na svom tlu. Primjenjujući relevantne principe na činjenice ovog predmeta, on je zaključio da je sin šestog podnosioca predstavke bio pod kontrolm i vlašću Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, te, prema tome, njegovom jurisdikcijom od momenta njegovog hapšenja u hotelu. Srodinici ostalih podnosilaca žalbi nisu bili pod kontrolom i vlašću britanskih vojnika u vrijeme kada su ubijeni te, prema tome, nisu bili pod jurisdikcijom Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva. U vezi s tim, on je zaključio:

“110. (...) Osnovno je, prema meni, da se odrede pravila koja su lako razumljiva. Ako su vojnici namjerno i efektivno ograničili slobodu neke osobe, ona se nalazi pod njihovom kontrolom. To se nije desilo u bilo kojem od ovih pet predmeta.”

  1. On je zatim razmotrao pitanje da li se moglo reći, imajući u vidu spis, da su britanski vojnici efektivno kontrolirali grad Basru u relevantnom periodu na način da je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo tamo vršilo svoju vanteritorijalnu jurisdikciju na osnovu doktrine efektivne kontrole teritorije. U vezi sa tim pitanjem, sudiija Brooke je zaključio sljedeće:

“119. Grad Basra je bila smještena u regionalnoj zoni [Koalicijske privremene vlasti] zvanoj KPV Jug (CPA South). Za vrijeme vojne okupacije, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo je imalo značajne odgovornosti i vlast u zoni KPV Jug iako je raspoloživo osoblje dolazilo iz pet različitih zemalja, a regionalni koordinator do kraja jula 2003. godine je bio Danac. Zapravo, samo jedan od četiri guvernerska tima u zoni KPV Jug je bio predvođen britanskim koordinatorom. Međutim, premda je zapovijedni lanac britanskih snaga prisutnih u Iraku vodio ka generalu Sjedinjenih Država, provincije Al Basra i Maysan su predstavljale zonu pod direktnom britanskom vojnom odgovornošću. Kao što sam već rekao (...), ministar priznaje da je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo bila okupaciona sila u smislu člana 42. Haškog pravilnika (...), barem u južnom području Iraka, a naročito u gradu Basri u kojem su britanski vojnici imali dovoljno vlasti u tu svrhu.

120. Međutim, kakav god da je status Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva na osnovu Haškog pravilnika, pitanje koje ovaj sud mora riješti je da li su britanski vojnici efektivno kontrolirali grad Basru u smislu ECA. Situacija u u Iraku između augusta i novembra 2003. godine se jasno razlikuje od situacija u sjevernom dijelu Kipra i dijelu moldavske teritorije koju je okupirala Rusija koje su prikazane u strazburškoj sudskoj praksi. U svakom od ova dva posljednja predmeta, dio teritorije države ugovornice je okupirala druga država ugovornica koja imala odlučnu namjera da tamo dugoročno vrši kontrolu. Civilna uprava tih teritorija je bila pod kontrolom okupacijske države.

121. [Izjava brigadnog generala Moorea, pod čijom komandom su bile britanske snage u području Basre između maja i novembra 2003. godine] nam govori sasvim nešto drugo. On nije imao na raspolaganju dovoljno vojnika i ostalih resursa kako bi omogućio svojoj brigadi da vrši efektivnu kontrolu nad gradom Basrom. (...) [O]n je naznačio da lokalna policija nije podržavala poštivanje zakona. Ako bi britanski vojnici uhapsili neku osobu i predali je iračkoj policiji, ta policija bi je predavala pravosudnim organima koji su bili izloženi zastrašivanju lokalnih plemena, a osumnjičeni kriminalci su vraćani na ulice u roku od jednog ili dva dana. Takvo stanje stvari nije ulijevalo Britancima povjerenje u sistem lokalnog krivičnog pravosuđa. To je također oslabilo njihvo kredibilitet kod lokalnog stanovništva. Zaštita koju su britanski vojnici osiguravali sudijama na lokalnom nivou nije bila ništa drugačija. U vezi sa zatvorima, oni jedva da su funkcionirali.

122. Nakon što je opisao druge aspekte krajnje eksplozive situacije u kojoj je relativno malobrojno britansko vojno osoblje pokušavalo da održava redi i mir kako je najbolje moglo u velikom gradu, brigadni general Moore je rekao (...):

‘Zbog kombinacije terorističkih aktivnosti, eksplozivne situacije i nedjelotvornosti iračkih sigurnosnih snaga, sigurnosna situacija za vrijeme većeg dijala naše misije je ostala vrlo nestabilna. Uprkos našem revnosnom radu i svim našim naporima, osjećao sam, na kraju mjeseca augusta 2003. godine, da smo na rubu ambisa. Tek kada smo dobili pojačanje (...) i kada smo počeli dobijati informacije od nekih od islamskih stranaka, ja sam počeo ponovo preuzimati inicijativu.’

123. Za razliku od turske armije na sjeveru Kipra, britanske vojne snage nisu vršile nikakvu kontrolu nad civilnom upravom Iraka. (...)

124. Prema meni, nije moguće reći da je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, iako okupaciona sila u smislu Haškog pravilnika i Ženevske konvencije (IV), efektivno kontroliralo grad Basru u smislu sudske prakse Evropskog suda za ljudska prava u relevantno vrijeme. Da je to bilo tako, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo bi bilo obavezno, prema presudi Bankovic, osigurati svakome u gradu Basri prava i slobode zagarantirane Konvencijom. Iskazivanje te hipoteze je dovoljno da bi se pokazalo do koje mjere je ona u potpunosti nerealna. Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo nije imalo nikakve druge izvršne, zakonodavne ili sudske vlasti u gradu Basri osim ograničene vlasti koja je bila dodijeljena vojnim snagama, a kao okupaciona sila, ono je bila obavezno da poštuje zakone na snazi u Iraku, osim u slučaju apsolutne zabrane (vidi, član 143. Haškog pravilnika (...)). Ona se ne može izjednačiti sa civilnom vlašću: ona je tamo jednostavno bila da održava sigurnost i da podrži civilnu upravu u Iraku na više načina (...).”

U vezi sa tim pitanjem, sudija Sedley je rekao:

 “194. S jedne strane, ne priliči uopšte jednoj državi, koja je pomogla da se ukloni i silom skine civilna vlast u nekoj drugoj državi, da tvrdi da je kontrola koju tamo vrši kao okupaciona sila toliko ograničena da ne može preuzeti odgovornost za zaštitu osnovnih prava stanovnika. (...) [Međutim, s druge strane], činjenica je da ona to ne može: invazija je prouzrokovala prazninu i smislu postojanja civilne vlasti koju britanske vlasti nisu mogle i još uvijek ne mogu popuniti. Iz dokaza predočenih Apelacionom sudu proizilazi da su te snage uspijevale sa velikom mukom da izbjegnu anarhiju najmanje u periodu između sredine 2003. godine i sredine 2004. godine.”

  1. Apelacioni sud je jednoglasno zaključio da Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo nije imalo jurisdikciju u smislu člana 1. Konvencije, osim u slučaju smrti sina šestog podnosioca predstavke, koji je potpada pod izuzetak “vlasti koju vrše predstavnici države”. Sud je odlučio da zahtjev šestog podnosioca predstavke također potpada pod opseg Zakona o ljudskim pravima iz 1998. godine. Od vremena kada je Divisional Court ispitivao predmet, nove informacije su se pojavile u vezi sa istragom o smrti sina šestog podnosioca predstavke, naročito u vezi sa pokretanjem vojnog postupka protiv izvjesnog broja vojnika. Apelacioni sud je zbog toga vratio predmet Divisional Courtu da bi preispitao pitanje, čim se okonča postupak pred vojnim sudom, da li je vođena adekvatna istraga.
  2. Uprkos njegovom zaključku o jurisdikciji, sudija Brooke, na izričit poziv Vlade, je predočio sljedeće komentare o adekvatnosti istrage koja je vođena o smrtnim slučjevima:

“139. Konačno, dva prva člana [Konvencije] izražavaju samo sadašnju brigu kompletne Evropske zajednice o važnosti koju uvijek treba pridati svakom ljudskom životu (...) Nepotrebno je reći da bi poštivanje obaveze povinovanja tim čvrsto uspostavljenim međunarodnim normama o ljudskim pravima iziskivalo, između ostalog, daleko veće investiranje u resurse na raspolaganju Kraljevskoj vojnoj policiji od onih koji su joj bili na raspolaganju u Iraku i potpunu neovisnost istrage od vojnog zapovjednog lanca.

140. Drugim riječima, ako se međunarodne norme moraju poštivati, istrage o incidentima u kojima su ljudski život oduzele britanske snage moraju biti u potpunosti odvojene od vojnog zapovjednog lanca i biti povjerene [Kraljevskoj vojnoj policiji]. Ona ima potrebnu neovisnost sve dok ima slobodu da sama odlučuje kada će pokrenuti i kada će okončati istragu, i sve dok podnosi izvještaje, prije svega, [Vojnom tužiteljstvu], a ne vojnom zapovjednom lancu. Ona potom mora voditi djelotvornu istragu i trebali bi joj u tom zadatku pomoći izvodi iz sudske prakse Evropskog suda koje sam citirao. Mnogi nedostaci predočeni u dokazima u ovom predmetu će biti otklonjeni ako [Kraljevska vojna policija] obavlja tu ulogu i ako raspolaže osobljem koje je propisno edukovano i zadovoljavajućim resursima da vodi svoje istrage sa potrebnim stepenom temeljitosti.”

3.  Dom lordova

  1. Prva četiri podnosioca predstavke su uložili žalbe, a ministar odbrane protužalbu Domu lordova, koji je donio presudu 13. juna 2007. godine ([2007] UKHL 26). Većina u Domu lordova (lord Rodger of Earlsferry, baronica Hale of Richmond, lord Carswell i lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood) je smatrala da je opći cilj Zakona o ljudskim pravima iz 1998. godine da obezbijedi lijek u domaćem pravu da bi se poštivala prava zagarantirana Konvencijom te da se, prema tome, Zakon iz 1998. godine treba tumačiti na način da se primjenjuje gdje god Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo ima jurisdikciju na osnovu člana 1. Konvencije. Lord Bingham of Cornhill, koji se nije složio, je smatrao da Zakon o ljudskim pravima nema vanteritorijalnu primjenu.
  2. U pogledu žalbenih navoda prva četiri podnosioca predstavke, većina u Domu lordova je zaključila da srodinici umrlih osoba nisu potpadali pod jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva u momentu njihove smrti. Budući da, prema njegovom mišljenju, Zakon iz 1998. godine nema vanteritorijalnu primjenu, lord Bingham nije smatrao korisnim da se izjašnjava o pitanju da li je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo vršilo jurisdikciju u smislu člana 1. Konvencije.
  3. Lord Brown, sa kojim se složila većina, je prvo zapazio da je konačno na Evropskom sudu da kaže kako se član 1. treba tumačiti i primjenjivati budući da domaći sud ima samo zadatak da ide u korak sa sudskom praksom Suda; činjenica da neki nacionalni sud tumači Konvenciju preširoko u korist podnosioca predstavke može predstavljati problem budući da tužena država onda nema sredstava da se obrati Sudu. Lord Brown je kao polaznu tačku uzeo odluku Velikog vijeća u u predmetu Banković (citirana gore), koju je opisao kao “prekretnicu u svjetlu koje strazburška jurisprudencija mora biti u cjelini preispitana”. On je smatrao da sljedeći principi priozilaze iz odluke Banković (stav 109, presude Doma lordova):

“(1) Član 1. reflektira ‘u osnovi teritorijalno poimanje jurisdikcije’ (izraz koji je ponovljen više puta u presudi Suda), a ‘ostali osnovi jurisdikcije su izuzetni i iziskuju specijalno opravdanje u određenim okolnostima svakog predmeta (stav 61). Konvencija djeluje, pod uvjetima iz člana 56, ‘u kontekstu koji je u osnovi regionalan, a naročito u pravnom prostoru (espace juridique) država ugovornica’ (stav 80) (tj. u okviru teritorija država članica Vijeća Evrope);

(2) Sud priznaje da jurisdikcija u smislu člana 1. mora omogućiti izbjegavanje ‘vakuuma u zaštiti ljudskih prava’ u slučajevima u kojima bi predmetna teritorija ‘normalno bila obuhvaćena Konvencijom’ (stav 80) (tj. u zemlji Vijeća Evrope) i u kojima bi se, usljed efektivne kontrole koju ima treća država (kao u Sjevernom Kipru), stanovnici našli “isključeni iz korištenja garancija iz sistema Konvencije koje su ranije uživali’ (stav 80);

(3) Prava i slobode definirane u Konvenciji se ne mogu ‘dijeliti ni adaptirati’ (stav 75).

(4) Slučajevi u kojima je Sud izuzetno priznao vršenje vanteritorijalne jurisdikcije države uključuju:

(i) kada država ‘putem efektivne kontrole koju vrši na teritorijom izvan svojih granica i stanovnicima, usljed vojne okupacije ili putem saglasnosti, poziva ili prećutnog prihvatanja vlade te teritorije, vrši sve ili neke od javnih ovlasti koje bi normalno trebala vršiti [vlada te teritorije]’ (stav 71) (tj. kada bi inače postojao vakuum u okviru zemlje Vijeća Evrope, jer vlada te zemlje smatra da nije u stanju da ‘ispuni obaveze na koje se obavezala na osnovu Konvencije’ (stav 80) (kao u Sjevernom Kipru);

(ii) ‘predmete koji se odnose na aktivnosti diplomatskih i konzularnih predstavnika u inostranstvu, ili u zrakoplovima i plovilima koji su registrirani u toj državi, ili plove pod zastovom te države [kada] su običajno međunarodno pravo i odredbe ugovora priznali vanteritorijalno vršenje jurisdikcije’ (stav 73);

(iii) neki druge slučajeve u kojima bi odgovornost države ‘mogla, u principu, postojati zbog aktivnosti (...) koje su proizvele djestva ili su obavljene van njene teritorije’ (stav 69). Presuda Drozd protiv Francuske (1992) 14 EHRR 745 (stav 91) je jedini precedent koji je izričito citiran u odluci Bankovic kao primjer te kategorije izuzetka od općeg pravila. Međutim, u presudi Drozd, Sud je samo istakao da, ako bi neki francuski sudija vršio jurisdikciju vanteritorijalno u Andori u svojstvu francuskog sudije, onda bi se smatralo da svako ko se žali da je taj sudija povrijedio njegova prava iz Konvencije potpada pod francusku jurisdikciju;

(iv) predmete tipa Soering protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (1989) 11 EHRR 439, koji se odnose, kao što je Sud istakao, na radnje koje obavlja država a koje se odnose na osobe koje se nalaze na ‘njenoj teritoriji, jasno u okviru njene jurisdikcije’ (stav 68), a ne, prema tome, na vršenje državne jurisdikcije u inostranstvu.”

Lord Brown se pozvao na predmete tipa Öcalan, Freda i Sánchez Ramirez (citirani gore), u kojima su podnosioci predstavke silom protjerani iz zemlje koja nije članica Vijeća Evrope, uz punu saradnju inostranih vlasti, da bi im bilo suđeno na teritoriji tužene države. On je istakao da se taj tip predmeta odnosi na “iregularne ekstradicije” koji pripadaju kategoriji “izuzetnih” slučajeva koji su izričito predočeni u odluci Banković predstavljajući “posebno opravdanje” za priznanje vanteritorijalne jurisdikcije na osnovu člana 1. On nije smatrao da su predmeti prva četiri podnosioca predstavke obuhvaćeni izuzecima od teritorijalnog principa koje je do sada priznao Sud.

  1. Lord Brown je potom razmotrio presudu Suda u predmetu Issa i ostali protiv Turske, broj 31821/96, stav 71, od 16. novembra 2004, na koji su se pozvali podnosioci predstavke. On je istakao sljedeće:

“127. Ako i u mjeri u kojoj apelanti u ovoj apelaciji smatraju da presuda Issa u potpunosti podržava šire tumačenje jurisdikcije u smislu člana 1, ja ne mogu prihvatiti tu hipotezu. Prije svega, dijelovi na koje su se pozvali se moraju smatrati obiter dicta. Drugo, kao što je upravo objašnjeno, citirani precedenti (u svakom slučaju, oni koje Veliko vijeće smatra relevantnim u svojoj odluci Bankovic) ne podržavaju takav širi koncept jurisidkcije. Treće, takav širi koncept jurisdikcije bi jasno bio nesuglasan obrazloženju u presudi Bankovic a, naročito, dispozitivu presude. Ili bi on vodio proširenju principa efektivne kontrole na Irak, zemlju koja, poput SRJ u predmetu Bankovic, nije članica Vijeća Evrope i koja se nalazi izvan njegovog prostora (dok se navedeni princip ranije primjenjivao samu u okviru tog prostora, tj, kao što smo vidjeli, na sjeverni dio Kipra, Autonomnu Republiku Adžariju u Gruziji i na Transnistriju), što bi uostalom bilo u suprotnosti sa neizbježnom logikom sudske prakse Suda o članu 56. Ili bi on vodio prekidu širenja koncepta vanteritorijalne jurisdikcije na osobe podvrgnute ‘vlasti i kontroli’ države. Jedna je stvar priznati specifične uske kategorije predmeta izuzetnim, koje sam pokušao rezimirati gore; sasvim druga stvar bi bila prihvatiti da, kad god neka država ugovornica djeluje (vojno ili na drugi način) putem svojih predstavnika u inostranstvu, oni koji su pogođeni takvim djelatnostima budu obuhvaćeni jurisdikcijom na osnovu člana 1. Takva tvrdnja bi išla mnogo dalje. Ona bi lišila smisla veliki dio onog što je rečeno u odluci Bankovic, a naročito ideju da je Konvencija ‘ustavni intrument Evropskog javnog reda’ koji djeluje ‘u kontekstu koji je u osnovi regionalan’, i ‘nije zamišljena da se primjenjuje svuda u svijetu, čak u pogledu ponašanja država ugovornica’ (stav 80). Ona bi uostalom učinila suvišnim princip efektivne kontrole neke teritorije: zašto bi on bio potreban ako bi jurisdikcija proizilazila, u svakom slučaju, iz generalnog principa ‘vlasti i kontrole’ neovisno o tome da li se područje (a) efektivno kontrolira ili je (b) smješteno u prostor Vijeća Evrope?

128. Postoji jedan drugi osnovni prigovor na stvaranje šireg osnova za jurisdikciju koja počiva na konceptu ‘kontrola i vlast’, koji su istakli appelanti u ovom predmetu, a koji je širi od osnova koji proizilaze iz usko priznatih kategorija o kojima se već raspravljalo gore, ali ipak manje širok od osnova efektivne kontrole neke teritorije u okviru područja Vijeća Evrope. U odluci Bankovic (i kasnije Assanidze), branjena je nedjeljiva priroda jurisdikcije u smislu člana 1, koja se ne može ‘dijeliti ni adaptirati’. Kao što je već naznačeno u odluci Bankovic (stav 40), ‘tumačenje pojma jurisdikcija od strane podnosilaca predstavke bi izvrnula pozitivnu obavezu država ugovornica da osiguraju materijalnaa prav definirana u Konvenciji na način koji nikada nije bio predviđen članom 1. Konvencije.’ Pored toga, kada se primjenjuje, Konvencija djeluje kao ‘živi instrument.’ Presuda Öcalan je primjer toga, priznanje da je tumačenje člana 2. promijenjeno zbog toga što su ‘teritorije koje potpadaju pod jurisdikciju država članica Vijeća Evrope sada postale zona u kojoj ne postoji smrtna kazna’ (stav 163). (Mogu primijetiti da se u stavovima 64. i 65. odluke Bankovic pravi kontrast između, s jedne strane, ‘materijalnih odredbi Konvencije’ i ‘nadležnosti organa Konvencije’, u pogledu kojih se ona mora interpretirati kao ‘živi instrumentt’ i, s druge strane, opsega člana 1—’opsega a i dometa cijele Konvencije ‘—koji se ne mora interpretirati na taj način). Potrebno je imati u vidu strogoću sa kojom Sud primjenjuje Konvenciju, koja je ilustrirana serijom predmeta koji se odnose na zonu sukoba na jugoistoku Turske gdje, uprokos poteškoćama sa kojima se suočava država, nije dozvoljno umanjivanje istražnih obaveza koje proizilaze iz čl. 2. i 3.

129. Dakle, suština je sljedeća: država se ne može nadati, osim ako uistinu vrši efektivnu kontrolu, da će se na nekoj teritoriji koja nije njena priznati prava definirana Konvencijom te rizikuje u svakom slučaju, osim ako je ta teritorija smještena u prostor Vijeća Evrope, da se tamo utvrdi nesuglasnost izvjesnih prava iz Konvencije koje ona mora priznati običajima lokalnog stanovništva. Ići ću još dalje. Niko ne osporava da je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, u toku relevantnog perioda u ovom predmetu, bilo okupaciona sila u Južnom Iraku te je bilo obavezano IV ženevskom konvencijom i Haškim pravilnikom. Član 43. Haškog pravilnika propisuje da ‘će okupator poduzeti sve mjere koje u njegovoj moći da bi ponovo uspostavio i osigurao javni red i sigurnost, uz poštivanje, osim u slučaju apsolutne zabrane, zakona u zemlji.’ Apelanti tvrde da okupacija u smislu Haškog pravilnika nužno uključuje da okupator ima efektivnu kontrolu nad teritorijom te, prema tome, da je odgovoran da tamo osigura prava i slobode iz Konvencije. Pretpostavljajući da je taj argument osnovan, okupator ima obavezu da poštuje ‘zakone na snazi’, ne da ih usvaja ili da uvodi sredstva za njihovu provedbu (na primjer, sudove i pravosudni sistem) na način da zadovolji zahtjeve iz Konvencije. Često bi (na primjer, gdje sje Šerijat na snazi) prava iz Konvencije jasno bila nesukladna zakonima okupirane teritorije.”

  1. Lord Rodger (vidi, stav 83), sa kojim se baronica Hale složila, i lord Carswell (stav 97) su izričito smatrali da u relevantno vrijeme Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo nije vršilo efektivnu kontrolu nad gradom Basrom i njenom okolinom u smislu jurisdikcije na osnovu člana 1.
  2. Ministar odbrane je prihvatio da činjenice u vezi šestog podnosioca predstavke potpadaju pod jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog kraljevstva u smislu člana 1. Konvencije. Prema tome, stranke su se složile da, pretpostavljajući da su polje primjene Zakona o ljudskim pravima iz 1998. godine i Konvencije isti (kao što je većina smatrala), predmet bi trebao biti vraćen Divisional Courtu, kao što je naložio Apelacioni sud. Prema tome, nepotrebno je da Dom lorodova ispituje pitanje jurisdikcije koje se odnosi na smrt sina šestog podnosioca predstavke. Međutim, lord Brown, sa kojim se većina složila, je zaključio:

“132. (...) U pogledu šestog podnosioca predstavke, ja bih priznao jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva nad gosp. Mousom samo na uskom osnovu koji je priznao Divisional Court, u osnovi analogijom sa vanteritorijalnim izuzetkom koji je stvoren za ambasade (analogija koja je priznata u odluci Komisije u predmetu Hess protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljvestva (1975) 2 DR 72, u kontekstu stranih zatvora, a u kojoj je citiran predmet X protiv Savezne Republike Njemačke koji se odnosi na jednu amabasadu.”

II    RELEVANTNI MEĐUNARODNI PRAVNI DOKUMENTI

A.  Međunarodno humanitarno pravo o vojnoj okupaciji

  1. Obaveze okupacione sile su prije svega izražene u članovima 42. do 56. Pravilnika o zakonima i običajima ratovanja na kopnu (Hag, 18. oktobra 1907. godine, u daljem tekstu: Haški pravilnik) i članovima 27. do 34. i 47. do 78. Konvencije (IV) koja se odnosi na zaštitu građanskih osoba za vrijeme rata (Ženeva, 12. augusta 1949. godine, u daljem tektsu: Četvrta ženevska konvencija), te nekim odredbama Dopunskog protokola uz ženevske konvencije od 12. augusta 1949. godine, koji se odnosi na zaštitu žrtava međunarodnih oružanih sukoba (Protokol I), od 8. juna 1977. godine (u daljem tekstu: Dopusnki protokol I). Članovi 42. i 43. Haškog pravilnika propisuju sljedeće:

“42. Teritorija se smatra okupiranom kada je stvarno stavljena pod vlast neprijatljeske vojske. Okupacija obuhvata samo teritoriju na kojoj je uspostavljenja takva vlast i na kojoj može biti vršena.

43. Budući da je legitimna vlast faktički prešla u ruke okupatora, on je dužan da poduzme sve mjere koje u njegovoj moći da bi ponovo uspostavio i osigurao, koliko je to moguće, javni red i sigurnost, uz poštivanje, osim u slučaju apsolutne zabrane, zakona u zemlji.”

Član 64. Četvrte ženevske konvencije propisuje da okupaciona sila može ukinuti ili obustaviti krivično zakonodavsto samo ako ono predstavlja opasnost po sigurnost ili prepreku za primjenu Četvrte ženevske konvencije. Njim se preciziraju tipovi mjera zakonodavnog reda koje okupaciona sila može poduzeti. To su:

“odredbe koje su neophodne da bi ona mogla izvršavati svoje obaveze koje proističu iz ove konvencije, i obezbijediti redovnu upravu tom teritorijom kao i bezbjednost bilo okupacione sile, bilo članova i imovine okupacionih snaga ili okupacione uprave, te ustanova i saobraćajnih linija koje ona koristi”.

Sporazumi zaključeni između okupacione sile i lokalnih vlasti ne mogu lišiti stanovništvo okupirane teritorije zaštite koju dodjeljuje međunarodno humanitarno pravo, a same zaštićene osobe ne mogu se ni u kojem slučaju odreći svojih prava (članovi 8. i 47. Četvrte ženevske konvencije). Okupacija ne utiče na status teritorije (vidi, član 4. Dopunskog protokola I) koji se može izmijeniti samo mirovnim ugovorom ili aneksijom iza koje slijedi priznanje. Bivši suveren ostaje suveren, a državljanstvo stanovnika se ne mijenja.

B.  Sudska praksa Međunarodnog suda pravde koja se odnosi na međuodnos između međunarodnog humanitarnog prava i međunarodnog prava koje se odnosi na ljudska prava i vanteritorijalne obaveze država koje proizilaze iz međunarodnog prava koje se odnosi na ljudska prava

  1. U okviru postupka koji se odnosi na konsultativno mišljenje Međunarodnog suda pravde koje je od njega zatraženo u vezi sa Pravnim posljedicama izgradnje zida na okupiranoj palestinskoj teritoriji (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory)(od 9. jula 2004), Izrael je osporio primjenjivost na okupiranoj palestinskoj teritoriji instrumenata za zaštitu ljudskih prava u kojma je Izral strana u ugovoru, uključujući Međunarodni pakt i građanskim i političkim pravima, te je istakao (stav 102) da

“humanitarno pravo je tip zaštite koje se dodjeljuje u konfliktima kao što je onaj u Cisjordaniji i u pojasu Gaze, dok je cilj ugovora o ljudskim pravima da zaštiti građane od njihove vlastite vlade za vrijeme mira.”

Da bi odredio da li su ti instrumenti bili primjenjivi na okupiranu palestinsku teritoriju, Međunarodni sud pravde je prvo razmotrio pitanje odnosa između međunarodnog humanitarnog prava i međunarodnog prava koje se odnosi na ljudska prava, ističući sljedeće:

“106. (...) Sud smatra da zaštita koju pružaju konvencije o ljudskim pravima ne prestaje u slučaju oružanog konflikta, osim putem dejstva derogativnih odredbi tipa onih koje su predviđene člaanom 4 [Međunarodnog pakta o građanskim i političkim pravima]. U pogledu odnosa između međunarodnog humanitarnog i međunarodnog prava koje se odnosi na ljudska prava, proizilazi da postoje tri moguće situacije: neka prava mogu proizilaziti isključivo iz međunarodnog humanitarnog prava; druga mogu proizilaziti isključivo iz prava koje se odnosi na ljudska prava; dok opet neka druga mogu proizilaziti iz te dvije grane međunarodnog prava. Da bi odgovorio na pitanje koje mu je postavljeno, sud će uzeti u obzir obje grane međunarodnog prava, naime pravo koje se odnosi na ljudska prava i, kao lex specialis, međunarodno humanitarno pravo.”

Međunarodni sud pravde je potom razmatrao pitanje da li se Međunarodni pakt o građanskim i političkim pravima može primjenjivati izvan teritorije države članice i da li se primjenjuje na okupiranoj palestinskoj teritoriji. Sud je istakao sljedeće (reference i citati su izostavljeni:

“108. Opseg primjene [Međunarodnog pakta o građanskim i političkim pravima] je definiran članom 2. stav 1, koji glasi:

‘Države članice ovog pakta obavezuju se da poštuju i da jamče prava priznata u ovom paktu svim pojedincima koji se nalaze na njihovoj teritoriji i potpadaju pod njihovu vlast bez ikakvog razlikovanja, naročito u pogledu rase, boje kože, spola, jezika, veroispovijesti, političkog ili svakog drugog ubjeđenja, nacionalnog ili društvenog porijekla, imovine, rođenja ili drugog statusa. ‘

Ta odredba se može tumačiti na način da se samo odnosi na osobe koje se nalaze na teritoriji jedne države i podliježu jurisdikciji te države. Ona može biti shvaćena i na način da se odnosi istovremeno na osobe koje se nalaze na teritoriji jedne države i one koje se nalaze izvan njene teritorije, ali podliježu jurisdikciji te države. Sud će prema tome ispitati smisao koji treba dati tom tekstu.

109. Sud primjećuje da se jurisdikcijas država, koja je prije svega teritorijalna, može ponekad vršiti van nacionalne teritorije. Razmatrajući predmet i cilj [Međunarodnog pakta o građanskim i političkim pravima], čini se prirodnim da, čak i kada je to slučaj, države strane u Paktu budu obavezane da se povinuju njegovim odredbama.

Konstantna praksa Komiteta za ljudska prava je u skladu sa ovim. Prema tome, Komitet je zaključio da je Pakt primjenjiv kada država vrši svoju jurisdikciju na stranoj teritoriji. On se izjasnio o legalnosti djelovanja Urugvaja u predmetima hapšenja koja su obavili urugvajski agenti u Brazilu ili u Argentini (...). Komitet je odlučio u istom smislu u predmetu koji se odnosio na konfiskaciju pasoša u urgvajskom konzulatu u Njemačkoj (...).

110. U tom pogledu, Sud ističe stav koji je zauzeo Izrael, u vezi sa primjenjivošću Pakta, u saopćenjima Komitetu za ljudska prava, te stavove Komiteta. Izrael je izjavio 1998. godine da se prilikom pripremanja svog izvještaja Komitetu morao suočiti sa pitanjem ‘da li osobe koje stanuju na okupiranim teritorijama efektivno potpadaju pod jurisdikciju Izraela u smislu primjene Pakta (...). Izrael je zauzeo stanovište da ‘se Pakt i slični instrumenti ne primjenjuju direktno na trenutnu situaciju u okupiranim teritorijama’ (...) Komitet je, u svojim zaključnim zapažanjima koja je formulirao nakon ispitivanja izvještaja, izrazio zabrinutost zbog stava Izraela te je istakao ‘dugotrajno prisustvo Izraela na [okupiranim] teritorijama, dvosmislen stav Izraela prema njegovom budućem statusu te vršenje efektivne jurisdikcije sigurnosnih snaga Izraela tamo’ (...). Suočen sa nepromijenjenim stavom Izraela 2003. godine, koji je smatrao da se ‘Pakt ne primjenjuje van njegove teritorije, naročito na Zapadnoj obali i Gazi (...)’, Komitet je došao do sljedećeg zaključka:

‘imajući u vidu sadašnje okolnosti, odredbe Pakta se primjenjuju u korist stanovništva okupiranih teritorija, u pogledu svih djelovanja vlasti ili predstavnika države članice na tim teritorijama, koja ugrožavaju uživanje prava obuhvaćenih Paktom i potpadaju pod opseg državne odgovornosti Izraela na osnovu principa javnog međunarodnog prava’ (...).

111. In conclusio, Sud smatra da je [Međunarodni pakt o građanskim i političkim pravima] primjenjiv u pogledu djela države koja je djelovala u vršenju svoje jurisdikcije van svoje sopstvene teritorije.”

Pored toga, Međunarodni sud pravde je smatrao da bi čak i u pogledu vanteritorijalnih akata u principu bilo moguće da država odstupi od svojih obaveza koje proizilaze iz Međunarodnog pakta o građanskim i političkim pravima, čiji član 4. stav 1. glasi:

“U slučaju da izuzetna opća opasnost ugrozi opstanak nacije i da je to objavljeno službenim aktom, države članice ovog pakta mogu da poduzmu, u onom strogom obimu u kojem to stanje zahtijeva, mjere koje odstupaju od obaveza predviđenih ovim paktom, pod uvjetom da te mjere ne budu u nesuglasnosti sa ostalim obavezama koje im nameće međunarodno pravo i da nemaju za posljedicu diskriminaciju zasnovanu samo na rasi, boji, spolu, jeziku, vjeri ili društvenom porijeklu.”

Tako je Međunarodni sud pravde, u stavu 136. svog konsulativnog mišljenja, razmotrio da li su predmetni akti opravdani prema međunarodnom humanitarnom pravu na osnovu vojnih imperativa, te je zaključio:

“136. Sud dalje zapaža da neke konvencije koje se odnose na ljudska prava, a naročito Međunarodni pakt o građanskim i političkim pravima, sadrže odredbe na koje se države strane u konvencijama mogu pozvati da bi odstupile, po raznim osnovama, od nekih od svojih obaveza koje proizilaze iz konvencija. U tom pogledu, Sud će ipak podsjetiti da se saopćenje Izraela, koje je dostavljeno generalnom sekretaru Ujedinjenih nacija na osnovu člana 4. Međunarodnog pakta o građanskim i političkim pravima, odnosi samo na član 9. Pakta, koji se odnosi na pravo na slobodu i sigurnost ličnosti (vidi, stav 127. gore); prema tome, Izrael je obavezan da poštuje sve ostale odredbe tog instrumenta.”

  1. U svojoj presudi Vojne aktivnosti na teritoriji Konga (Demokratska Republika Kongo (DRC) (od 19. decembra 2005), Međunarodni sud pravde je razmatrao da li je Uganda, za vrijeme relevantnog perioda, bila okupaciona sila na jedom dijelu teritorije Demokratske Republike Kongo u smislu običajnog međunarodnog prava, kao što to reflektira član 42. Haškog pravilnika (st. 172-173). Međunarodni sud pravde je zaključio da su ugandske snage stacionirane u distriktu Ituri i da vrše vlast umjesto kongoanske vlade (st. 174-176). Međunarodni sud pravde je dalje istakao:

“178. Prema tome, Sud zaključuje da je Uganda bila okupaciona sila u distriktu Ituri u relevantno vrijeme. Kao takva, ona je imala obavezu, prema članu 43. Haškog pravilnika iz 1907. godine, da poduzme sve mjere u njenoj moći da bi ponovo uspostavila i osigurala, koliko je to moguće, javni red i sigurnost na okupiranoj teritoriji poštujući, osim u slučaju apsolutne zabrane, zakone na snazi u Demokratskoj Republici Kongo. Ta obaveza je obuhvatala dužnost da se osigura poštivanje primjenjivih pravila međunarodnog prava koje se odnosi na ljudska prava i međunarodnog humanitarnog prava da bi zaštitila stanovništvo okuprane teritorije od djela nasilja i da ne tolerira takvo nasilje koje čini treća strana.

179. Nakon što je zaključio da je Uganda bila okupaciona sila u distriktu Ituri u relevantno vrijeme, Sud je ustanovio odgovornost Ugande i za djela njenih oružanih snaga koje su prekrišile svoje međunarodne obaveze a i za izostanak opreznosti koja je bila potrebna da bi se spriječile povrede ljudskih prava i međunarodnog humanitarnog prava ostalih aktera prisutnih na okupiranoj teritoriji, uključujući pobunjeničke grupe koje su djelovale u njeno ime.

180. Sud ističe da je Uganda odgovorna za sva djela i propuste svojih oružanih snaga na teritoriji Demokratske Republike Kongo koje krše svoje obaveze koje proizilaze iz pravila međunarodnog prava koje se odnosi na ljudska prava i međunarodnog humanitarnog prava, koja su relevantna i primjeniva na ovu specifičnu situaciju.”

Međunarodni sud pravde je zatim ustanovio činjenice koje se odnose na teške povrede ljudskih prava, koje se navodno pripisuju Ugandi, u okupiranoj regiji Ituri i i na drugim mjestima (st. 205-212). Da bi odredio da li je predmetno postupanje predstavljalo kršenje međunarodnih obaveza Ugande, Međunarodni sud pravde je podsjetio na svoj zaključak u navedenom konsultativnom mišljenju o Pravnim posljedicama izgradnje zida u okupiranoj palestinskoj teritoriji (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory), prema kojem se i međunarodno humanitarno pravo i međunarodno pravo koje se odnosi na ljudska prava moraju uzeti u obzirm te se međunarodni instrumenti za zaštitu ljudskih prava mogu primjenjivati vanteritorijalno, “naročito u okupiranim teritorijama” (stav 216). Međunarodni sud pravde je zatim odredio “primjenjiva pravila međunarodnog prava koje se odnosi na ljudska prava i međunarodnog humanitarnog prava”, nabrajajući ugovore u kojima su i Uganda i Demokratska Republika Kongo strane u tim ugovorima, te relevantne principe običajnog međunaronog prava (st. 217-219).

C.  Obaveza da se provede istraga o navodnim povredama prava na život u situacijama oružanog sukoba i okupacije u skladu sa međunarodnim humanitarnim pravom i međunarodnim pravom koje se odnosi na ljudska prava

  1. Član 121. Treće ženevske konvencije propisuje da sila koja drži ratne zatvorenike mora provesti zvaničnu istragu o smrti ratnog zarobljenika kada postoji sumnja da je taj zarobljenik ubijen. Član 131. Četvrte ženevske konvencije glasi:

“Svaka smrt ili ozbiljna rana internirane osobe koju je prouzrokovao ili za koje postoji sumnja da ih je prouzrokovao neki stražar, druga internirana osoba ili ma koja druga osoba, kao i svi smrtni slučajevi čiji je uzrok nepoznat biće odmah predmet zvanične istrage od strane Sile koja drži internirane osobe. O tome slučaju će odmah biti poslan izveštaj Sili zaštitnici. Prikupiće se izjave svjedoka; o njima će se sastaviti izveštaj i dostaviti pomenutoj Sili. Ako istraga ustanovi krivicu jedne ili više osoba, Sila koja drži internirane osobe će poduzeti sve mjere za sudsko gonjenje odgovorne ili odgovornih osoba.”

Ženevske konvencije nameću i obavezu Visokoj strani ugovornici da pokrene istragu i krivično gonjenje u slučaju navodnih teških kršenja konvencija, uključujući namjerna ubistva zaštićenih osoba (čl. 49. i 50. Prve ženevske konvencije; čl. 50-51 Druge ženevske konvencije; čl. 129. i 130. Treće ženevske konvencije; čl. 146. i 147. Četvrte ženevske konvencije).

  1. U svom izvještaju broj E/CN.4/2006/53 o vansudskim, samovoljnim pogubljenjima i pogubljenjima po kratkom postupku (od 8. marta 2006. godine), specijalni izvjestitelj Ujedinjenih nacija, Philip Alston, je zapazio sljedeće u vezi sa pravom na žvot iz člana 6. Međunarodnog pakta o građanskim i političkim pravima u situacijama oružanog sukoba i okupacije (fusnote izostavljene):

“36. Oružani sukob i okupacija ne oslobađaju državu obaveze da istraži povrede ljudskih prava i da krivično goni počinioce. Pravo na život nije podložno odstupanju bez obzira na okolnosti. Dakle, bilo koja praksa koja se sastoji od neprovođenja istrage o navodnim povredama za vrijeme oružanog sukoba ili okupacije je zabranjena. Kao što je Komitet za ljudska prava istakao, ‘element svojstven zaštiti prava za koja je eksplicitno priznato da nisu podložna odstupanju (...) je da ona moraju biti osigrana proceduralnim garancijama (...). Odredbe [Međunarodnog pakata o građanskim i političkim pravima] koje se odnose na proceduralne garancije ne mogu biti predmet mjera kojima bi se zaobišla zaštita prava koja ne podliježu odstupanju.’ Neosporno je da će okolnosti za vrijeme oružanih sukoba ponekad predstavljati prepreku istrazi. Takve okolnosti ne oslobađaju nikada od obaveze da se provede istraga – pravo na život bi tim bilo lišeno svog karaktera da ne podliježe odstupanjima – ali one mogu uticati na modalitete ili karakteristike istrage. Pored činjenice da su u potpunosti odgovorne za postupke svojih predstavnika, države su i obavezne da se drže, u pogledu djela privatnih subjekata, određenog standarda dužne opreznosti, kako za vrijeme oružanog sukoba, tako i za vrijeme mira. Od slučaja do slučaja, država može koristiti manje djelotvorne mjere istrage da bi vodila računa o konkretnim ograničenjima. Na primjer, kada neprijateljske snage kontroliraju mjesto ubistva, realiziranje autopsije se može pokazati nemogućim. Međutim, bez obzira na okolnosti, istraga se uvijek mora voditi kako je moguće djelotvorno i ne smije nikada biti svedena na puku formalnost.”

  1. U svojoj presudi u predmetu Masakr Mapiripán protiv Kolumbije (Case of Mapiripán Massacre v. Columbia), od 15. septembra 2005. godine, u vezi sa propustom tužene države da provede istragu o masakru civila koji je počinila jedna paramilitarna grupa uz navodnu pomoć državnih vlasti, Međuamerički sud za ljudska prava je istakao, inter alia, sljedeće:

“238. U tom pogledu, Sud priznaje teške okolnosti u Kolumbiji, gdje se stanovništvo i javne vlasti bore da bi uspostavile mir. Međutim, koliko god da je situacija teška, ona ne oslobađa državu stranu u Američkoj konvenciji obaveze koja proizilazi iz tog ugovora, za koju ostaje odgovorna naročito u predmetu kao što je ovaj. Sud je već istakao da država koja, nakon što je vodila ili tolerirala akcije koje su vodile pogubljenima van svakog pravnog okvira, ne provede adekvatnu istragu o takvim djelima i ne kazni one koji su odgovorni na odgovoarajući način, krši obavezu da se poštuju prava priznata Konvencijom i da osigura njihovo slobodno i potpuno ostvarivanje, ne samo u pogledu navodne žrtve nego i njenih bližnjih; ona ne dozvoljava društvu da sazna šta se desilo i ponovo stvara uvjete nekažnjivosti koji omogućavaju da se ponovo dese činjenice tog tipa.”

PRAVO

I.  NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 2. KONVENCIJE

  1. Podnosioci predstavke tvrde da su njihovi srodnici potpadali pod jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva u smislu člana 1. Konvencije u momentu smrti i da, osim u pogledu šestog podnosioca predstavke, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo nije ispunilo svoju obavezu da provede istragu koja proizilazi iz člana 2. Konvencije.
  2. Vlada prihvata da je sin šestog podnosioca predstavke bio pod jurisdikcijom Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, ali ne prihvata da je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo imalo jurisdikciju nad bilo kojim od ostalih preminulih. Vlada je istakla da se djela koja su vodila njihovoj smrti mogu pripisati Ujedinjenim nacijama, ne Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu budući da su srodnici drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke bili ubijeni nakon usvajanja Rezolucije 1511 Vijeća sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija (vidi, stav 16. gore). Pored toga, Vlada je istakla da bi predmet petog podnosioca predstavke trebao biti proglašen neprihvatljivim zbog neiscrpljivanja domaćih pravnih lijekova, te da peti i šesti podnosilac predstavke nemaju više status žrtve.

A.  Prihvatljivost

1.  U vezi sa pripisivanjem činjenica

  1. Vlada je istakla da su se operacije koje su dovele do smrti srodnika drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke desile 16. oktobra 2003. godine, kada je Vijeće sigurnosti usvojilo Rezoluciju 1511. Stav 13. te rezolucije je ovlastio multinacionalne snage da poduzmu “sve potrebne mjere da bi doprinijele održanju sigurnosti i stabilnosti u Iraku” (vidi, stav 16. gore). Iz toga slijedi da vojnici Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva nisu vodili relevantne operacije u kojima su srodinci drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke ubijeni na osnovu suverene vlasti Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, nego na osnovu međunarodne vlasti Multinacionalnih snaga koje su djelovale u skladu sa obavezujućom odlukom Vijeće sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija.
  2. Podnosioci predstavke su istakli da Vlada nije istakla taj argument ni u jednoj fazi domaćeg postupka. Osim toga, Vlada je istakla identičan argument u jednom drugom predmetu R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v. Secretary of State for Defence (Respondent) [2007] UKHL 58, koji je Dom lordova odbacio.
  3. Sud podsjeća da je pozvan da ima supsidijarnu ulogu u odnosu na nacionalne sisteme za zaštitu ljudskih prava. Prema tome, poželjno je da nacionalni sudovi imaju na početku mogućnost da odluče o pitanjima sukladnosti domaćeg prava Konvenciji i da Sudu, ako se predstavka ipak poslije podnese Sudu, mišljenja nacionalnih sudova budu od koristi, koji su u direktnom i stalnom kontaktu sa snagama svojih zemalja. Prema tome, važno je da argumenti koje je Vlada iznijela pred domaće sudove budu u skladu sa argumentima koje iznosi pred Sudom. Naime, Vlada ne može predočiti Sudu argumente koji su nisu u skladu da stavom koji je predočila pred domaćim sudovima (A. i ostali protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [VV], broj 3455/05, stav 154, ECHR 2009-...).
  4. Vlada nije tvrdila pred domaćim sudovima da se bilo koje od ubistava srodnika podnosilaca predstavke ne moće pripisati Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu. Sud, zbog toga, smatra da Vlada ne može podnijeti takav prigovor u ovom postupku.

2.  Jurisdikcija

  1. Vlada je dalje istakla da su se predmetna djela desila u južnom dijelu Iraka, dakle izvan jurisdikcije Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva u smislu člana 1. Konvencije. Jedini izuzetak je ubistvo sina šestog podnosioca predstavke, koje se desilo u britanskoj vojnoj bazi nad kojom je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo zaista imalo jurisdikciju.
  2. Sud smatra da je pitanje da li predmeti podnosilaca predstavke potpadaju pod jursidikciju tužene države usko vezano za meritum njihovih žalbenih navoda. Sud zbog toga pridružuje prethodno pitanje meritumu.

3.  Iscrpljivanje domaćih pravnih lijekova

  1. Vlada je istakla da bi predmet petog podnosioca predstavke trebao biti progašen neprihvatljivim zbog neiscrpljivanja domaćih pravnih lijekova. Ona je istakla da je on podnio zahtjev za sudsko preispitivanje žaleći se na povrede svojih proceduralnih i materijalnih prava iz članova 2. i 3, ali je njegov postupak bio obustavljen dok se ne riješi pet pilot-predmeta (vidi, stav 73. gore). Nakon što su ti zahtjevi riješeni, podnosilac predstavke se mogao obratiti Divisional Courtu da bi se mogao nastaviti postupak, ali on to nije učinio. Njegov predmet se nije odnosio na otvaranje vatre tako da domaći sudovi nisu imali mogućnost da razmotre činjenice koje su relevantne za njegovu tvrdnju da je njegov sin potpadao pod jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva i da je došlo do kršenja proceduralnih obaveza.
  2. Podnosioci predstavke su pozvali Sud da odbaci taj prigovor. Peti podnosilac predstavke je podnio zahtjev za sudsko preispitivanje 5. maja 2005. godine. Postupak je obustavljen dogovorom do ishoda šest pilotpredmeta (vidi, stav 73. gore). Za petog podnosioca predstavke ne bi bilo razumnog izgleda u uspjeh da je, nakon što je Dom lordova donio presudu u predmetu Al-Skeini, tražio nastavak postupka. Niži sudovi bi bili vezani tumačenjem člana 1. koje je dao Dom lordova i slijedili bi to tumačenje da kako zaključili da preminuli sin podnosioca predstavke nije potpadao pod jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva.
  3. Sud zapaža da je, prema petom podnosiocu predstavke, njegov sin umro kada je, nakon što su ga uhapsili vojnici Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva pod sumnjom pljačkanja, odvezen u vozilu armije do rijeke i te je bio prisiljen da skoči u nju. Imajući u vidu navedene činjenice, njegov predmet se razlikuje od predmeta prvog, drugog i četvrtog podnosioca predstavke, čije su srodinike ubili britanski vojnici; trećeg podnosioca predstavke, čija je supruga ubijena za vrijeme razmjene vatre između britanskih vojnika i nepoznatih naoružanih lica; i šestog podnosioca predstavke čiji je sin ubijen dok je bio pritvoren u britanskoj vojnoj bazi. Istina je da Dom lordova, u postupku Al-Skeini, nije imao pred sobom predmet sličan predmetu petog podnosioca predstavke, u kojem je irački civil preminuo dok je bio u rukama britanskih vojnika, a ne pritvoren u britanskom vojnom zatvoru. Ipak, Sud smatra da podnosioci predstavke osnovano tvrde da peti podnosilac predstavke ne bi imao izgleda u uspjeh da je poslije tražio nastavak sudskog preispitivanja pred domaćim sudovima. Lord Brown, sa kojim se većina u Domu lordova složila, je jasno naznačio da on, u vezi sa pitanjem jurisdikcije u slučaju šestog podnosioca predstavke, daje prednost obrazloženju Divisional Courta, prema kojem jurisdikcija u pogledu Bahe Mouse može biti prihvaćena samo na osnovu činjenice da je umro dok je bio pritvoren u britanskom vojnom zatvoru (vidi stav 88. gore). Imajući u vidu te okolnosti, Sud ne smatra da se peti podnosilac predstavke može kritizirati zbog toga što nije pokušao da traži obnovu postupka pred Divisional Courtom. Slijedi da prethodni prigovor Vlade zasnovan na neiscrpljivanju domaćih lijekova mora biti odbačen.

4.  Status žrtve

  1. Vlada je istakla da peti i šest podnosilac predstavke ne mogu više tvrditi da su žrtve bilo kakve povrede prava zagrantiranih članom 2. budući da su domaće vlasti u potpunosti istražile smrtne slučajeve njihovih sinova i isplatile odštetu podnosiocima predstavke.
  2. Sud smatra da je to pitanje također usko vezano za meritum te ga treba ispitati u okviru merituma žalbenih navoda u vezi sa članom 2.

5.  Zaključak o prihvatljivosti

  1. Sud smatra da predstavka pokreće ozbiljna činjenična i pravna pitanja koja su toliko kompleksna da se o njima treba odlučiti ispitivanjem u meritumu. Prema tome, ona se ne može smatrati očigledno neosnovanom u smislu člana 35. stav 3. Konvencije, a nije ustanovljeni nijedan drugi razlog zbog kojeg vi bila proglašena neprihvatljivom. Dakle, ona se mora proglasiti prihvatljivom.

B.  Meritum

1.  Jurisdikcija

(a)  Argumenti stranaka

(i)  Vlada

  1. Vlada je istakla da je vodeća doktrina o konceptu “jurisdikcije” u smislu člana 1. Konvencije izražena u odluci Suda Banković i ostali protiv Belgije i ostalih [VV] (odluka), broj 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII). Sud je u odluci Banković ustanovio da činjenica da je neki pojedinan pretrpio štetu zbog djela koje je počinila država ugovornica ili njeni predstavnici nije dovoljna da bi se ustanovilo da je on potpadao pod jurisdikciju države. Jurisdikcija na osnovu člana 1. je “prvenstveno” ili “u osnovi” teritorijalna te je njeno protezanje van teritorije države ugovornice “izuzetno” i iziskuje “posebno opravdanje u ovisnosti od okolnosti svakog predmeta”. Sud je istakao u odluci Banković da se prava zagarantirana Konvencijom ne mogu “dijeliti i adaptirati”. U okviru svoje jurisdikcije, država ugovornica ima obavezu da osigura sva prava i slobode definirane Konvencijom. Sud je također istakao u odluci Banković da je Konvencija “instrument evropskog javnog reda” i “multilateralni ugovor koji djeluje, pod uvjetima iz člana 56. Konvencije, u kontekstu koji je u osnovi regionalan, a naročito na pravnom prostoru (espace juridique) država ugovornica”. Priroda jurisdikcije koja je u osnovi teritorijalna reflektira principe međunarodnog prava i uzima u obzir praktične i pravne poteškoće sa kojima se suočava država koja djeluje na teritoriji druge države, naročito u regijama koje ne dijele vrijednosti država članica Vijeća Evrope.
  2. Prema tvrdnji Vlade, Veliko vijeće je, u odluci Banković, obavilo sveobuhvatno preispitivanje sudske prakse te identificiralo izvjestan broj izuzetaka od teritorijalnog principa. Glavni izuzetak je sudska praksa o sjevernom dijelu Kipra i primjenjuje se kada neka država, usljed vojne akcije, ima efektivnu kontrolu nad nekim područjem koje je izvan njene državne teritorije. U slučajevima u kojima je Sud zaključio da se taj izuzetni osnov jurisdikcije primjenjuje, on je istakao da država koja vrši efektivnu kontrolu zbog toga odgovorna za osiguravanje kompletnog spektra materijalnih prava zagarantiranih Konvencijom na kontroliranoj teritoriji (vidi, Loizidou protiv Turske (prethodni prigovori), od 23. marta 1995, stav 62, Serija A broj 310; Kipar protiv Turske [VV], broj 25781/94, st. 75-80, ECHR 2001-IV; Banković, citirana gore, st. 70-71; Ilaşcu i ostali protiv Moldavije i Rusije [VV], broj 48787/99, st. 314-316, ECHR 2004-VII). Osim toga, uprkos činjenici da je Sud formulirao izvjesne obiter dicta u suprotnom smislu u presudi koje je donijelo Vijeće u predmetu Issa i ostali protiv Turske, broj 31821/96, od 16. novembra 2004, Veliko vijeće je u odluci Banković jasno naznačilo da se osnov jurisdikcije utemeljen na “efektivnoj kontroli neke teritorije” primjenjuje samo u okviru pravnog prostora Konvencije. Pored kontrole koju vrši Turska u sjevernom dijelu Kipra, Sud je primijenio taj izuzetak još samo na jednu regiju, Transnistriju, koja se nalazi na teritoriji druge države ugovornice. Bilo koje drugo stajalište bi dovelo do rizika da se od države zahtijeva da nameće strane kulturološke standarde, što krši pravo naroda na samoopredjeljenje.
  3. Prema Vladi, u sudskoj praksi Suda o članu 56. Konvencije je dalje naznačeno da se ne može smatrati da neka država ima jurisdikciju u smislu člana 1. na nekoj prekomorskoj teritoriji isključivo na osnovu vršenja efektivne kontrole na toj teritoriji: vidi, Quark Fishing Ltd protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (odluka), broj 15305/06, ECHR 2006-XIV. Primjena izuzetka zasnovanog na efektivnoj kontroli teritorije van teritorije država ugovornica bi vodilo zaključku da država ima mogućnost da izabere da li će ili neće proširiti Konvenciju i njene protokole na teritoriju koja nije matična teritorija te zemlje, izvan “espace juridique” Konvencije, koju bi mogla kontrolirati decenijama, ali da nema mogućnost da proširi Konvenciju na teritorije van tog prostora nad kojim vrši samo privremeno efektivnu kontrolu kao rezultat vojne akcije, na primjer dok se mir i sigurnost ponovo ne uspostave.
  4. Vlada je istakla da se izuzetna jurisdikcija utemeljena na “efektivnoj kontroli teritorije” ne može primijeniti budući da Irak ne potpada pod pravni prostor Konvencije. U svakom slučaju, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo nije nikada imalo “efektivnu kontrolu” na bilo kojim dijelom Iraka u relevantno vrijeme. To je bio zaključak domaćih sudova, koji su raspolagali svim raspoloživim dokazima. Broj snaga koalicije, uključujući snage Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, je bio mali: u jugoistočnom dijelu Iraka, području čija je površina 96 000 km² i sa 4,6 miliona stanovnika, je bilo 14 500 vojnika koalicije, uključujući 8150 vojnika Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva. Vojnici Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva su djelovali u provincijama Al-Basrah i Maysan, koje imaju 2,76 miliona stanovnika, gdje je raspoređeno 8119 vojnika. Snage Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva u Iraku su se suočile sa stvarnim praktičnim poteškoćama pri uspostavljanju uvjeta sigurnosti i stabilnosti da bi omogućile iračkom narodu da slobodno odluči o svojoj političkoj budućnosti. Osnovni razlog za to je da na početku okupacije nije postojao efikasan lokalni sistem za održavanje reda, dok je, u isto vrijeme, bio naširoko raširen kriminal, terorizam i borbe plemena uz upotrebu lakog i teškog oružja.
  5. Vlada ističe da je Koalicijska privremena vlast, koju je predvodio ambasador Sjedinjenh Država i koja nije bila subordinirajuća vlast Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu, vršila javne ovlasti za vrijeme okupacije u Iraku. Pored toga, od jula 2003. godine je postojalo centralno Vladajuće vijeće i izvjetan broj lokalnih iračkih vijeća. Status Koalicijske privremene vlasti i iračke uprave se u potpunosti razlikovao od Turske Republike Sjeverni Kipar (u daljem tekstu: TRSK) na Kipru i Pridnjestrovske Moldavske Republike (u daljem tekstu: PMR) u Transnistriji, koje je Sud okvalificirao kao “samoproklamirane vlasti koje je priznala međunarodna zajednica”. Međunarodna zajednica je priznala vlast Koalicijske privremene vlasti i iračku upravu putem Vijeća sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija. Osim toga, cilj zajedničke okupacije Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva u Iraku je bilo prenošenje vlasti, što je moguće ranije, na predstavničku iračku upravu. U skladu sa tim ciljem, okupacija je trajala nešto malo više od jedne godine.
  6. Prema tvrdnji Vlade, činjenica da je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo bilo okupaciona sila u smislu Haškog pravilnika (vidi, stav 89. gore) između maja 2003. godine i juna 2004. godine nije, po sebi, stvarala obavezu da se osiguraju prava i slobode zagarantirane Konvencijom stanovnicima jugoističnog dijela Iraka. Kao okupaciona sila, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo nije imalo suverenitet na Irakom, te nije imalo pravo da tretira područje koje je okupiralo kao svoju teritoriju ili kao koloniju podčinjenu svojoj kompletnoj vlasti. Haški pravilnik ne dodjeljuje Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu ovlasti da mijenja iračke zakone i ustav da bi bili u skladu sa domaćim pravom Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva ili regionalnim multilateralnim međunarodnim obavezama kao što je Konvencija. Sasvim suprotno, Haški pravilnik nameće ograničenja vlastima Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, naročito obavezu da poštuju zakone na snazi u Iraku, osim u slučaju “apsolutne zabrane”. Osim toga, rezolucije koje je donijelo Vijeće sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija su priznale da Koalicijska privremena vlast vrši javne ovlasti za vrijeme okupacije u Iraku i da je cilj okupacije da se prenese vlast, što je moguće ranije, na predstavničku iračku upravu. Prema tome, daleko od toga da je uspostavljao obavezu da Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo osigura prava zagarantirana Konvencijom u Iraku, međunarodni pravni okvir je naznačavao da bi Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo djelovalo suprotno međunarodnim obavezama da je zahtijevalo da se izmijeni irački ustav tako da bude u skladu sa Konvencijom. U svakom slučaju, sudska praksa Suda pokazuje da Sud pristupa pitanju, da li država ima vanteritorijalnu jurisdikciju, kao činjeničnom pitanju u svjetlu posebne prirode i istorije Konvencije. Obaveze koje nameće Četvrta ženevska konvencija i Haški pravilnik su pažljivo adaptirane okolnostima okupacije i ne mogu po sebi imati uticaj na pitanje, koje je veoma različito, jurisdikcije na osnovu Konvencije.
  7. Vlada je prihvatila da je u sudskoj praksi moguće identificirati izvjestan broj drugih izuzetnih slučajeva za koje se može smatrati da država ima jurisdikciju van svoje teritorije i van prostora Konvencije. U odluci Banković (citirana gore), Veliko vijeće se pozvalo na ostale predmete koji se odnose na aktivnosti diplomatskih i konzularnih predstavnika u inostranstvu, ili u zrakoplovima i plovilima koji su registrirani ili lete pod zastavom države. U odluci Banković, Sud je također citirao, kao primjer, presudu Drozd i Janousek protiv Francuske i Španije, od 26. juna 1992, Serija A broj 240, koja je pokazala da država može imati jurisdikciju ako je pojedinca izvela pred sopstveni sud, van svoje teritorije, da bi primijenila sopstveno krivično pravo. U presudi Öcalan protiv Turske [VV], broj 46221/99, ECHR 2005-IV, Veliko vijeće je smatralo da je Turska imala jurisdikciju nad podnosiocem predstavke kada “su ga uhapsili pripadnici turskih sigurnosnih snaga izvan zrakoplova koji je registriran u Turskoj u međunarodnoj zoni aerordroma Najrobi”, a zatim “turska službena lica fizički prisilila da se vrati u Tursku, te je bio pod njihovom kontrolom i vlašću nakon hapšenja u vraćanja u Tursku”. Prema tvrdnji Vlade, nijedan od tih izuzetaka se ne bi primijenio na predmete prvog, drugog, trećeg i četvrtog podnosioca predstavke.
  8. Vlada je istakla da je tvrdnja podnosilaca predstavke, prema kojoj su vojnici Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, pri pucanju na njihove srodnike, vršili “vlast i kontrolu” nad preminulim osobama na način da su iz stavili pod jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, direktno u suprotnosti sa odlukom Banković (citirana gore). U odluci Banković, Veliko vijeće je ispitalo primjenjivost Konvencije na vanteritorijalne vojne operacije općenito, imajući naročito u vidu, inter alia,državnu praksu i član 15. Konvencije, te je zaključilo da se Konvencija ne primjenjuje na vojne akcije tuženih država koje su rezultirale smrću bližnjih podnosilaca predstavke u ovom predmetu. Isto tako, u ovom predmetu, vojna akcija vojnika Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva prilikom pucanja na srodnike podnosilaca predstavke u okviru njihovih sigurnosnih operacija u Iraku ne bi predstavljala vršenje jurisdikcije nad preminulim osobama. Ne može se napraviti razlika u tom pogledu između smrti koja je uzrokovana bombardovanjem od smrti uzrokovane pucanjem u toku operacije na terenu.
  9. Vlada je odbacila argument podnosilaca predstavke da postoji jurisdikcijska veza zbog toga što su vojnici Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva imali “pravnu vlast” nad preminulim osobama, koja proizilazi iz obaveze propisane Haškim pravilnikom da se osigura “javni red i sigurnost” na okupiranoj teritoriji. Značenje člana 1. Konvencije je autonomno i ne može biti određeno pozivanjem na potpuno različita pravila međunarodnog humanitarnog prava. Osim toga, navedena obaveza bi trebala biti od koristi svakom iračkom građaninu u okviru okupirane teritorije te bi se, ako je hipoteza podnosilaca predstavke tačna, od Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva zahtijevalo da osigura prava zagarantirana Konvencijom svima njima. Ne može se reći ni da su vojnici Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva vršili “javne funkcije” u skladu sa odredbama Konvencije u relevantno vrijeme (vidi, Banković, citirana gore, stav 73). Naime, vojnici Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva su vršili vojne ovlasti da bi stvorili situaciju u kojoj bi se mogle obavljati funkcije vlade i u kojoj bi vladavina prava mogla propisno djelovati. Ne bi se mogla napraviti jasna razlika između različitih tipova vojnih operacija koje su oni poduzimali. Ne postoji osnov da se zaključi da bi primjenjivost Konvencije trebala ovisiti o prirodi aktivnosti koju je neki vojnik obavljao u vrijeme navedene povrede, tj. ulične patrole, kopnene ofanzive ili zračnog bombardovanja.
  10. In conclusio, Vlada je istakla da su domaći sudovi ispravno zaključili da Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo nije vršilo nikakvu jurisdikciju u smislu člana 1. nad srodnicima prvog, drugog, trećeg i četvrtog podnosioca predstavke u vrijeme njihove smrti. Prema Vladi, ovi slučajevi se ne mogu razlikovati od smrtnih slučajeva u odluci Banković (citirana gore). Nisu dovoljne ni činjenice u predmetu petog podnosioca predstavke da bi se on razlikovao u tom pogledu od predmeta prva četiri podnosioca predstavke. Sin petog podnosioca predstavke nije bio uhapšen pod okolnostima koje su slične onima na kojima počiva jurisdikcija u predmetu Öcalan (citiran gore). Zbog toga što je bio osumnjičen za pljačkanje u situaciji ekstremnog javnog nereda neposredno nakon prestanka glavnih borbenih aktivnosti, vojnici Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva su ga silom odveli sa mjesta pljačkanja na drugu lokaciju. Mjere vojnika Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva su iziskivale korištenje vojnih ovlasti u pogledu sina petog podnosioca predstavke, ali ne više. Vlada prihvata da je sin šestog podnosioca predstavke bio pod jurisdikcijom Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva kada je umro, ali samo na osnovi koju je ustanovio Divisional Court, a zatim lord Brown, sa kojim su se složili lordovi Rodger i Carswell i baronica Hale, tj. da je ta jurisdikcija ustanovljena kada je preminuli pritoren u britanskom pritvorskom vojnom centru koji se nalazio u britanskoj bazi, u osnovi analogijom sa izuzetkom o vanteritorijalnosti koji se odnosi na ambasade. Na raspravi pred Sudom, braniitelj Vlade je potvrdio stav Vlade, prema kojem, na primjer, pojedinac koji je odveden u britanski pritvorski centar na stranom tlu u britanskom vojnom vozilu ne potpada pod jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva do momenta ulaska vozila sa pojedincem u zonu centra.
  11. Prema Vladi, to ne znači da britanski vojnici mogu nekažnjeno da djeluju u Iraku. Kao što je lord Bingham zapazio u presudi Doma lordova, djelovanje snaga Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva podliježe i regulirano je međunarodnim humanitarnim pravom. Vojnici Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva u Iraku podliježu i domaćem krivičnom pravu Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva te mogu biti predmet krivičnog gonjenja pred domaćim sudovima. Međunarodni krivični sud ima jurisdikciju da procesuira ratne zločine ako država nije voljna ili ne može da ih procesuira. Građanski postupci za naknadu štete također mogu biti pokrenuti pred sudovima Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva protiv službenih lica i vlasti koji su navodno uzrokovali štetu osobama u Iraku.

 (ii)  Podnocioci predstavke

  1. Podnosioci predstavke prihvataju da je jurisdikcija u smislu člana 1. u osnovi teritorijalna. Međutim, oni ističu da to nije isključivo tako i da je moguće da država ugovornica ima vanteritorijalnu jurisdikciju. Postupak na osnovu člana 56. omogućava državama da prošire opseg Konvencije na druge teritorije, uz poštivanje lokalnih zahtjeva, sredstvima saopćenih izjava. Međutim, iz sudske prakse jasno proizilazi da vanteritorijalna primjenjivost Konvencije može proizilaziti ne samo iz člana 56. nego i iz drugih mehanizama.
  2. Podnosioci predstavke su istakli da sudska praksa Suda i Komisije priznaje državama vršenje vanteritorijalne jurisdikcije i putem principa “SAA” i putem principa “ECA”. Komisija je bila prva ta koja je ustanovila jurisidikciju utemeljenu na principu SAA u dijelu svoje odluke o prihvatljivosti u predmetu Kipar protiv Turske (br. 6780/74 i 6950/75, odluka Komisije o prihvatljivosti od 26. maja 1975. godine, vol. 2 Decisions and Reports (DR)) str. 125), stav 136, gdje je ona istakla da: “(...) predstavnici države (...), ne samo da ostaju pod njenom jurisdikcijom u inostranstvu nego i stavljaju bilo koju drugu osobu ili imovnu ‘pod jurisdikcijom u mjeri u kojoj ti predstavnici imaju vlast nad takvim osobama i imovinom”. Taj princip je zatim primijenjen u istom predmetu Kipar protiv Turske, br. 6780/74 i 6950/75, Izvještaj komisije od 10. jula 1976. godine, u kojem je Komisija zaključila da je Turska vršila jurisdikciju prilikom akcija turskih vojnika na Kipru. Te akcije su obuhvatale ubijanje civila, od kojih su neki pogubljeni po nalogu jednog oficira, drugi su ubijeni dok su pokušavali da vrate svoju imovinu koja je bila pod turskom kontrolom; silovanje žena u praznim kućama i na ulici; samovoljno pritvarnje civila; okrutni postupci prema pritvorenicima; raseljavanje civila; i vojna konfiskacija imovine. Budući da Turska nije prihvatila jurisdikciju Suda do 1990. godine, Sud nikada nije ispitao predmet. Međutim, u izvještaju Komisije se ne podržava tvrdnja da samo vojna pritvorska vlast koju su vršili vojnici predstavlja vezu koja je dovoljna za vlast i kontrolu.
  3. Podnosioci predstavke su istakli da je u naknadnim predmetima protiv Turske, koji se odnose na sjeverni dio Kipra, a koje su ispitali Komsija i Sud 1990. godine, Turska prihvatila da je vršila jurisdikciju u smislu člana 1. u pogledu akcija koje su direktno vodili njeni vojnici. Međutim, Vlada Turske je istakla argument, na jednom drugom osnovu, da se ne može smatrati da je imala jurisdikciju jer predmetna djela nisu počinili njeni vlastiti predstavnici, nego predstavnici TRNC-a, kao lokalne autonomne uprave koja je uspostavljena 1983. godine. Sud je u presudama Loizidou protiv Turske (prethodni prigovori) i Kipar protiv Turske, obje citirane gore, odbacio taj argument ističući primjenu principa ECA (vidi, Loizidou (prethodni prigovori) stav 62):

“kada, usljed vojne akcije – zakonite ili nezakonite – [država ugovornica] vrši efektivnu kontrolu nad nekom teritorijom van državne teritorije. Obaveza da se osiguraju, na takvom području, prava i slobode zagarantirane Konvencijom, proizilazi iz činjenice takve kontrole, bilo da se ona vrši direktno, putem oružanih snaga, ili putem subordinirane lokalne uprave”.

U tim predmetima, Sud nije nigdje naznačio da je princip SAA istisnut. Naime, u presudi Loizidou protiv Turske (prethodni prigovori), prije isticanja jurisdikcije utemeljene na principu ECA, Sud je istakao (stav 62):

“Osim toga, odgovornost strana ugovornica može postojati zbog djelovanja njenih organa, unutar ili van državnih granica, koji proizvode dejstva van svoje sopstvene teritorije (vidi, Drozd i Janousek protiv Francuske i Španije, presuda od 26. juna 1992. godine, Serija A broj 240 str. 29, stav 9)”.

Osim toga, zaključak Suda o pitanju da li je jurisdikcija Turske, u pogledu navodne povrede, utemeljna na oba principa u isto vrijeme (stav 63):

“U tom smislu, tužena Vlada je priznala da je gubitak kontrole podnosioca predstavke nad njegovom imovinom rezultat okupacije sjevernog dijela Kipra od strane turskih trupa i stvaranje TRSK-a. Osim toga, nije sporno da su podnosioca predstavke spriječile turske trupe da pristupi svojoj imovini.”

U sudskoj praksi nakon toga je nastavljeno istovremeno pozivanje na oba principa: (vidi, odluka Banković st. 69-73; Issa st. 69-71(obje citirane gore); Andreou protiv Turske (odluka), broj 45653/99, od 2. juna 2008. godine; Solomou i ostali protiv Turske, broj 36832/97, st. 44-45, od 24. juna 2008). Ne postoji precedent u sudskoj praksi Suda koji omogućava da se kaže da jurisdikcija zasnovana na principu SAA ne omogućava analiziranje direktnih aktivnosti vojnih predstavnika države koji vrše vlast.

  1. Podnosioci predstavke tvrde da su njihovi članovi porodice potpadali pod jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva na osnovu principa SAA u trenutku smrti. Vlada je prihvatila, u pogledu sina šestog podnosioca predstavke, da su vlast i kontrola, koje je vršilo britansko vojno osoblje u Iraku, mogli potpadati pod vanteritorijalnu jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva. Međutim, jurisdikcija u slučajevima vanteritorijalnog pritvora ne počiva na ideji o vojnom zatvoru kao kvaziteritorijalnoj enklavi. Jurisdikcija u pogledu sina šestog podnosioca predstavke bi postojala i da je on bio mučen i ubijen kada je uhapšen u hotelu u kojem je radio ili u zaključanom vojnom vozilu koje je bilo parkirano napolju. Osim toga, vlast i kontrola koje je vršilo vojno osoblje nisu u principu ograničeni na djela lišavanja slobode, čak i ako se hapšenje i pritvaranje osoba van državne teritorije može smatrati klasičnim slučajem vršenja vlasti javnih službenika (kao što su tvrdile tužene države u odluci Banković, koja je citirana gore, stav 37).
  2. Podnosioci predstavke su istakli da su preminuli srodnici šestorice podnosilaca predstavke potpadali pod jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva na osnovu vlasti i kontrole koju su nad njima vršili predstavnici države Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva. Oni su istakli da su britanske oružane snage bile odgovorne za javni red u Iraku, održanje sigurnosti lokalnog civilnog stanovništva i podržavanje civilne uprave. Prilikom obavljanja tih funkcija, britanske oružane snage su djelovale u širem kontekstu okupacije jugoistočnog dijela Iraka od strane Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva. Kontrola i vlast je vršena u putem regionalnog ureda Koalicijske privremene vlasti Jug, gdje je bilo uglavnom britansko osoblje. Ubijene osobe su bili civili kojima su britanske oružane snage trebale osigurati sigurnost. Prema tome, postojala je posebna veza vlasti i kontrole između vojnika i ubijenih civila. Da bi se zaključilo da su se umrle osobe nalazile pod vlašću britanskih oružanih snaga, nije potrebno prihvatiti princip jurisdikcije utemeljen na posljedicama nekog djela, koji je odbačen u odluci Banković (citirana gore), nego postojanje posebne veze vlasti i kontrole. Alternativno, podnosioci predstavke su istakli da su, barem u vezi sa preminulim srodnicima drugog, četvrtog, petog i šestog podnosioca predstavke, britanski vojnici imali dovoljno vlasti i kontrole da bi stavili žrtve pod jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva.
  3. Podnosioci predstavke su dalje istakli da su njihovi preminuli srodnici potpadali pod jurisdikciju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva jer je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, u relevantno vrijeme, imalo efektivnu kontrolu nad jugoistočnim dijelom Iraka. Prema njima, sa stanovišta međunarodnog prava, kada je neka teritorija okupirana od strane neke države kao okupacione sile, to je dovoljno da bi predstavljalo vanteritorijalnu jurisdikciju u smislu člana 1. Konvencije jer je ta teritorija faktički stavljena pod vlast neprijateljske armije te države (vidi, član 42. Haškog pravilnika, stav 89. gore), Ta posljedica vojne okupacije odražava pristup u međunarodnom pravu u pogledu vanteritorijalne jurisdikcije i u pogledu vanteritorijlne primjene ljudskih prava zasnovane na “jurisdikciji”.
  4. Podnosioci predstavke su odbacili ideju da se konstatovanje jurisdikcije na principu SAA može primjenjivati samo u okviru pravnog prostora Konvencije. Dalje, oni su istakli da bi iziskivanje od države da ima kompletnu kontrolu, sličnu onoj koju vrši u okviru svoje teritorije, vodilo čudnoj situaciji u kojoj bi činjenice koje ukazuju na kršenje Konvencije, umjesto da omoguće žrtvi pravo na pravni lijek, formirale dokazni osnov za zaključak da država nije imala jurisdikciju. Slično tome, određivanje da li se postoji kontrola nad nekim područjem pozivanjem samo na broj vojnika koji su tamo stacionirani bi predstavljalo usvajanje jednog nesigurnog kriterija, kojim bi se omogućilo izbjegavanje odgovornosti i promoviranje samovoljnosti. Primjena Konvencije bi trebala uticati na djelovanje država ugovornica te ih poticati da zrelo razmisle o bilo kojoj vojnoj intervenciji i da osiguraju dovoljan broj vojnika da bi se ispoštovale međunarodne obaveze. Podnosoci predstavke su podržali stajalište sudije Apelacionog suda, Sedleyja (vidi, stav 80. gore), prema kojem država ugovornica prilikom vojne okupacije ima obavezu da učini sve što je u njenoj moći da bi održala red i zaštitila osnovna prava civila. Detaljni podaci u sudskoj praksi Suda (predmeti koji se odnose na sjeverni dio Kipra i presuda Ilaşcu, citirani gore) koji se odnose na broj raspoređenih vojnika su poslužili samo da se ustanovi da li je određena teritorija faktički bila pod vlašću neprijateljske armije, u slučajevima u kojima su tužene države (Turska i Rusija) negirale okupaciju. Proizilazi da je, zbog toga što je, kao u ovom predmetu, tužena država priznala okupaciju predmetne teritorije, takvo ispitivanje nepotrebno.
  5. Podnosioci predstavke tvrde da obaveza okupacione države, prema međunarodnom pravu, da primjenjuje domaće pravo okupirane zemlje i da ne nameće svoje sopstveno pravo, ne može biti korištena da bi se izbjelga jurisdikcija u smislu Konvencije, budući da se osnov SAA za jurisdikciju primjenjuje i na nezakonitu okupaciju. Oni su se pozvali na presudu koju je donio Međunarodni sud pravde u predmetu Vojne aktivnosti na teritoriji Konga (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo) i u svom konsultativnom mišljenju Pravne posljedice izgradnje zidana na okupiranoj palestinskoj teritoriji (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory)(vidi, st. 90-91 gore), u kojima je on zaključio da okupaciona država ima obavezu da primjenjuje međunaordno pravo koje se odnosi na ljudska prava. Jasan princip koji proizilazi iz ovih predmeta je da je vojna okupacija u međunarodnom pravu osnov za priznanje vanteritorijalne jurisdikcije u domenu ljudskih prava.

iii. Treće stranke

  1. Umješači (vidi, stav 6. gore) su istakli da je konvencija usvojena neposredno nakon događaja u Evropi koji su se desili 1930-tih i 1940-tih godina kada su vojne snage na okupiranim teritorijama počinile strašne povrede ljudskih prava. Bilo bi neshvatljivo da su autori Konvencije trebali smatrati da bi se odgovornosti država trebale ograničiti na povrede počinjene na njihovim sopstvenim teritorijama. Osim toga, javno međunaroodno pravo iziskuje da se koncept “jurisdikcije” tumači u svjetlu predmeta i cilja određenog ugovora. Sud je u više navrata vodio računa o posebnom karakteru Konvencije kao instrumentu za zaštitu ljudskih prava. Umješači su dodali da je jedan od vodećih principa međunarodnog prava koji se odnosi na ljudska prava, koji primjenjuje Komitet za ljudska prava Ujedinjenih nacija i Međunarodni sud pravde pri razmatranju postupanja država van svoje teritorije, nužnost da bi se izbjeglo postojanje neprihvatljivih duplih standarda te da bi se izbjegla mogućnost da država počini na stranoj teritoriji povrede koje ne bi bile dozvoljene na njenom sopstvenom tlu.
  2. Prema umješačima, organi za zaštitu ljudskih prava, te međunarodni i regionalni sudovi se slažu da se, pri određivanju da li djelovanje i propusti pripadnika države u inostranstvu potpadaju pod “jurisdikciju”, mora voditi računa o postojanju kontrole, vlasti ili moći te države nad predmetnim osobama. Kada predstavnici države vrše takvu kontrolu, vlast ili moć nad nekom osobom van svoje teritorije, obaveza države da poštuje ljudska prava se nastavlja. Radi se o činjeničnom pitanju o kojem treba odlučiti u vezi sa okolnostima određenog djela ili propusta pripadnika države. Izvjesne situacije, kao što su vojne okupacije, stvaraju snažnu pretpostavku da su pojedinci pod kontrolom, vlašću ili moći okupacione države. Jedan od principa koji proizilazi iz sudske prakse Međunarodnog suda pravde (st. 90-91 gore) bi zapravo bio da postoji snažna presumpcija “jurisdikcije” u smislu primjene prava koje se odnosi na ljudska prava onda kada je situacija okvalificirana kao okupacija u smislu međunarodnog humanitarnog prava.

(b)  Ocjena Suda

(i)  Opći principi koji su relevantni za jurisdikciju u smislu člana 1. Konvencije

130. Član 1. Konvencije glasi:

“ Visoke strane ugovornice jamče svim licima pod svojom jurisdikcijom prava i slobode utvrđene u Dijelu I ove konvencije.”

Kao što predviđa taj član, obaveza koju preuzima država ugovornica je ograničena na “jamčenje” (“reconnaître” u tekstu na francuskom) nabrojanih prava i sloboda osobama pod njenom “jurisdikcijom” (vidi, Soering protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, od 7. jula 1989, stav 86, Serija A broj 161; Banković i ostali protiv Belgije [VV] (odluka), broj 52207/99, stav 66, ECHR 2001- XII). “Jurisdikcija” u smislu člana 1. je uvjet sine qua non. Vršenje jurisdikcije je uvjet koji je potreban da bi se država ugovornica mogla smatrati odgovornom za djela ili propuste koji joj se mogu pripisati, a koji proizilaze iz žalbenih navoda o povredama prava i sloboda iz Konvencije (vidi, Ilaşcu i ostali protiv Moldavije i Rusije [VV], broj 48787/99, stav 311, ECHR 2004-VII).

(α)  Teritorijalni princip

  1. Jurisdikcija neke države u smislu člana 1. je prvenstveno teritorijalna (vidi, Soering, citirana gore, stav 86; Banković, citirana gore, st. 61. i 67; Ilaşcu, citirana gore, stav 312). Pretpostavlja se da se jurisdikcija normalno vrši na cijeloj teritoriji države (Ilaşcu, citirana gore, stav 312; Assanidze protiv Gruzije [VV], broj 71503/01, stav 139, ECHR 2004-II). Obrnuto, djela koja države ugovorniice izvrše ili proizvedena dejstva van njene teritorije mogu predstavljati vršenje jurisdikcije u smislu člana 1. samo u izuzetnim slučajevima (Banković, citirana gore, stav 67).
  2. Do danas, Sud je u svojoj sudskoj praksi ustanovio izvjestan broj izuzetnih okolonosti koje su dovele do priznanja jurisdikcije države ugovornice van njenih teritorijalnih granica. U svakom slučaju, o pitanju da li postoje izuzetne okolnosti koje iziskuju i opravdavaju zaključak Suda da je država vršila juridikciju van svoje teritorije se mora odlučiti pozivanjem na posebne činjenice.

 (β)   Vlast i kontrola državnih službenih lica

  1. Sud je u svojoj sudskoj praksi priznao da se, kao izuzetak od principa teritorijalnosti, juridsikcija države ugovornice u smislu člana 1. može proširiti na djela njenih organa koji proizvode dejstva van njene sopstvene teritorije (vidi, Drozd i Janousek protiv Francuske i Španije, presuda od 26. juna 1992. godine, Serija A broj 240, stav 91; Loizidou protiv Turske (prethodni prigovori), od 23. marta 1995, stav 62, Serija A broj 310; Loizidou protiv Turske (meritum), od 18. decembra 1996, stav 52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI; i Banković, citirana gore,stav69). Taj izuzetak, kao što proizilazi iz presude Drozd i Janousek i ostalih predmeta koji su citirani, je veoma širok: Sud se zadovoljio da kaže da odgovornost strane ugovornice “može proizilaziti” iz tih okolnosti. Potrebno je ispitati sudsku praksu Suda da bi se identificirali vodeći principi.
  2. Prvo, jasno je da djelovanje diplomatskih i konzularnih predstavnika, koji su prisutni na stranoj teritoriji u skladu sa odredbama međunarodnog prava, može dovesti do vršenja juridiskcije kada ti predstavnici vrše vlast i kontrolu nad nekim drugim (Banković, citirana gore,stav 73; vidi također, X protiv Savezne Republike Njemačke, broj 1611/62, odluka Komisije od 25. septembra 1965. godine, Godišnjak Evropske konvencije o ljuskim pravima, str. 158 i 169; X protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, broj 7547/76, odluka Komisije od 15. decembra 1977. godine; WM protiv Danske, broj 17392/90, odluka Komisije od 14. oktobra 1993. godine).
  3. Drugo, Sud je priznao da država ugovornica vrši vanteritorijalnu jurisdikciju kada, putem saglasnosti, poziva ili prećutne saglasnosti Vlade te teritorije, preuzme neke ili sve javne ovlasti koje bi u normalnim uvjetima vršila ta Vlada (Banković, citirana gore, stav 71). Prema tome, kada, u skladu sa običajem, ugovorom ili drugim sporazumom, vlasti države ugovornice vrše izvršne ili sudske funckije na teritoriji druge države, država ugovornica može biti odgovorna za kršenje Konvencije koje je počinjeno pri vršenju tih funkcija sve dok se predmetna djela pripisuju njoj, a ne teritorijalnoj državi (vidi, Drozd i Janousek, citirana gore; Gentilhomme i ostali protiv Francuske, br. 48205/99, 48207/99 i 48209/99, presuda od 14. maja 2002. godine;i X i Y protiv Švicarske, br. 7289/75 i 7349/76, odluka o prihvatljivosti Komisije od 14. jula 1977, DR 9, str. 57).
  4. Osim toga, sudska praksa Suda pokazuje da, u izvjesnim okolnostima, korištenje sile službenih lica države koji djeluju van svoje teritorije može staviti pod jurisdikciju države, u smislu člana 1, bilo koju osobu koja je stavljena pod kontrolu državnih vlasti. Taj princip je primijenjen kada su se osobe našle u rukama službenih lica države van njenih granica. Na primjer, u presudi Öcalan protiv Turske [VV], broj 46221/99, stav 91, ECHR 2005-IV, Sud je odlučio da “je podnosilac predstavke bio pod efektivnom turskom vlašću te, prema tome, pod ‘jurisdikcijom’ te države u smislu člana 1. čim su ga kenijska službena lica predala turskim službenim licima, premda je Turska, u tom slučaju, vršila vlast izvan svoje teritorije”. U presudi Issa i ostali protiv Turske, broj 31821/96, od 16. novembra 2004, Sud je istakao da bi se moralo zaključiti da su žrtve bile pod jurisdikcijom Turske na osnovu vlasti i kontrole vojnika nad njima da je ustanovljeno da su turski vojnici uhapsili srodnike podnosilaca predstavke u sjevernom dijelu Iraka, prije nego što su ih odveli u obližnju pećinu i pogubili ih. U odluci Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (odluka), broj 61498/08, st. 86-89, od 30. juna 2009, Sud je odlučio da su dva iračka državljanina pritvorena u vojnim zatvorima pod britanskom kontrolom bila pod jurisdikcijom Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva budući da je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo vršilo potpunu i isključivu kontrolu na zatvorima i osobama koje su tamo bile pritvorene. Konačno, u presudi Medvedyev i ostali protiv Francuske [VV], broj 3394/03, stav 67, ECHR 2010-..., Sud je odlučio da su podnosioci predstavke bili pod jurisdikcijom Francuske budući da je su francuska službena lica imala isključivu i potpunu kontrolu nad brodom i njegovom posadom od momenta presretanja u međunarodnim vodama. Sud ne smatra da je jurisdikcija u navedenim predmetima proizilazila samo iz kontrole koju je vršila država ugovornica nad zgradama, zrakoplovom ili brodom u kojima su osobe bile pritvorene. Ono što je odlučujuće u takvim predmetima je vršenje vlasti i fizička kontrola nad osobama u tim predmetima.
  5. Jasno je da kad god država ima vlast i kontrolu nad nekim pojedincem te, prema tome, juridsikciju, posredstvom svojih službenih lica, ona ima obavezu u smislu člana 1. da jamči tom pojedincu prava i slobode na osnovu Dijela I Konvencije koji su relevantni za situaciju te osobe. Prema tome, u tom smislu, prava koja proizilaze iz Konvencije se mogu “dijeliti i adaptirati” (vidi, u svrhu poređenja, Banković, citirana gore, stav 75).

(γ)  Efektivna kontrola nad nekom teritorijom

  1. Drugi izuzetak od principa, da je jurisdikcija u smislu člana 1. ograničena na sopstevnu teritoriju države, se pojavljuje kada, usljed zakonite ili nezakonite vojne akcije, država ugovornica ima efektivnu kontrolu nad nekim područjem van njene državne teritorije. Obaveza da se jamče prava i slobode iz Konvencije na tom području proizilazi iz činjenice o toj kontroli, bilo da se vrši direktno, putem vlastitih oružanih snaga države ugovornice ili putem subordinirane lokalne uprave (Loizidou (prethodni prigovori), citirana gore, stav 62; Kipar protiv Turske [VV], broj 25781/94, stav 76, ECHR 2001-IV, Banković, citirana gore, stav 70; Ilaşcu, citirana gore,st. 314-316; Loizidou (meritum), citirana gore, stav 52). Ako je činjenica o takvoj dominaciji nad teritorijom ustanovljena, nije potrebno određivati da li država ugovornica vrši preciznu kontrolu nad politikom i djelovanjem subordinirane lokalne uprave. Činjenica da je osiguran nastavak postojanja te uprave kao rezultat vojne podrške i podrške u drugim domenima dovodi do odgovornosti države za njenu politiku i aktivnosti. Država koja vrši kontrolu ima odgovornost prema članu 1. da jamči, u okviru područja pod njenom kontrolom, kompletan spektar materijalnih prava iz Konvencije i njenih protokola koje je ratificirala. Ona će se smatrati odgovornom za bilo koju povredu tih prava (Kipar protiv Turske, citirana gore, st. 76-77).
  2. Pitanje da li neka država ugovornica vrši ili ne vrši efektivnu kontrolu nad nekom teritorijom van svojih granica je činjenično pitanje. Da bi odlučio da li postoji efektivna kontrola, Sud se prevenstveno poziva na broj vojnika koje je rasporedila država na određenom području (vidi, Loizidou (meritum), citirana gore, st. 16 i 56; Ilaşcu, citirana gore, stav 387). Drugi indikatori također mogu biti relevantni, kao što je stepen do kojeg vojna, ekonomska i politička pomoć, koju je država obezbijedila lokalnoj subordiniranoj upravi, osigurava državi uticaj i kontrolu u regiji (vidi, Ilaşcu, citirana gore, st 388-394).
  3. Princip “efektivne kontrole” na kojem je zasnovana jurisdikcija, koja je opisna gore, ne zamjenjuje sistem notifikacije iz člana 56. Konvencije (ranije član 63), u pogledu kojeg su države odlučile, prilikom izrade Konvencije, da će se primjenjivati na prekomorske teritorije u pogledu kojih one osiguravaju međuanarodne odnose. Član 56. stav 1. obezbjeđuje mehanizam koji tim državama omogućava da prošire primjenu Konvencije, “s dužnom pažnjom u odnosu na lokalne potrebe,” na sve ili bilo koju od teritorija čiji su međunarodni odnosi u njenoj nadležnosti. Postojanje tog mehanizma, koji je integriran u Konvenciji iz historijskih razloga, se ne može tumačiti u sadašnjim uvjetima na način da ograničava opseg termina “jurisdikcija” u članu 1. Situacije predviđene principom “efektivne kontrole” su jasno odvojene i razlikuju se od okolnosti u kojima država ugovornica nije, putem izjave predviđene članom 56, proširila Konvenciju ili bilo koji od njenih protokola na prekomorsku teritoriju čiji su međunarodni odnosi u njenoj nadležnosti (vidi, Loizidou (prethodni prigovori), citirana gore, st. 86-89 i Quark Fishing Ltd protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (odluka), broj 15305/06, ECHR 2006-...).

(δ)  Pravni prostor Konvencije (espace juridique)

  1. Konvencija je ustavni instrument evropskog javnog reda (vidi, Loizidou protiv Turske (prethodni prigovori), citirana gore, stav 75). Ona ne regulira djelovanje država koje nisu strane ugovornice u Konvenciji, niti je njena namjera da bude sredstvo kojim bi se zahtijevalo od država ugovornica da nameću standarde iz Konvencije drugim državama (vidi, Soering, citirana gore, stav 86).
  2. Sud je istakao da se država ugovornica, koja okupira teritoriju druge države putem svojih oružanih snaga, mora u principu smatrati odgovornom na osnovu Konvencije za povrede ljudskih prava koje su počinjene na okupiranoj teritoriji, inače bi stanovnici te teritorije bili lišeni prava i sloboda koje su uživali do tada, te bi to dovelo do “vakuuma” u zaštiti tih prava i sloboda u okviru “pravnog prostora Konvencije” (vidi, Loizidou (meritum), citirana gore, stav 78; Banković, citirana gore, stav 80). Međutim, ako je važno ustanoviti jurisdikciju okupacione države u takvim predmetima, to ne znači, a contrario, da jurisdikcija u smislu člana 1. Konvencije ne može nikada postojati van teritorije država članica Vijeća Evrope. Sud nije nikada primijenio slično ograničenje u svojoj sudskoj praksi (vidi, među ostalim primjerima, Öcalan, Issa, Al-Saadoon i Mufdhi, Medvedyev, sve citirane gore).

(ii)     Primjena tih principa na činjenice u ovom predmetu

  1. Prilikom odlučivanja o pitanju da li je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo imalo jurisdikciju nad bilo kojim od srodnika podnosilaca predstavke u momentu njihove smrti, početna tačka od koje je Sud krenuo je da je, 20. marta 2003. godine, Ujedinjenog Kraljevstvo, zajedno sa Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama i koalicionim partnerima, putem svojih oružanih snaga, ušlo u Irak s ciljem uklanjanja baasističkog režima u Iraku koji je tada bio na vlasti. Taj cilj je postignut 1. maja 2003. godine, kada su glavne borbene operacije proglašene okončanim, te su Sjedinjene Države i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo postale okupacione sile u smislu člana 42. Haškog pravilnika (vidi, stav 89. gore).
  2. Kao što je objašnjeno u pismu od 8. maja 2003. godine, koje su zajedno poslali zajednički predstavnici Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva i Sjedinjenih Država predsjedniku Vijeća sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija (vidi, stav 11. gore), Sjedinjene Države i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo su skinule prethodni režim i zatim stvorile Koalicijsku privremenu vlasti “kako bi vršila nadležnosti vlade privremeno”. Jedna od nadležnosti vlade koja je izričito spomenuta u pismu od 8. maja 2003. godine, koju su Sjedinjene Države i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo trebale vršiti posredstvom Koalicijske privremene vlasti je osiguranje sigurnosti u Iraku, naročito održavanje javnog reda i mira. U pismu se dalje navodi: “Sjedinjene Američke Države, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo i koalicioni partneri, djelujući posredstvom Koalicijske privremene vlasti, će osigurati, inter alia, sigurnost u Iraku i upravljati tom zemljom privremeno, naročito sljedećim sredstvima (...) preuzimanjem neposredne kontrole nad iračkim institucijama odgovornim za vojna i sigurnosna pitanja.”
  3. U svom Propisu broj 1 od 16. maja 2003. godine, Koalicijska privremena vlast je izjavila da će “vršiti nadležnosti vlade privremeno da bi osigurala djelotvorno upravljanje Irakom za vrijeme perioda prelazne uprave, da bi ponovo stvorila uvjete za stabilnost i sigurnost (...)” (vidi, stav 12 gore).
  4. Sadržaj pisma od 8. maja 2003. godine je naznačen u Rezoluciji 1483 Vijeća sigurnosti koja je usvojena 22. maja 2003. godine. U toj rezoluciji je dalje priznata sigurnosna uloga koju su preuzele Sjedinjene Države i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo kada se, u stavu 4, pozivaju okupacione sile da “da promoviraju dobrobit iračkog naroda osiguravanjem djelotvornog upravljanja teritorijom, trudeći se posebno da ponovo uspostave sigurnost i stabilnost (...)” (vidi, stav 14. gore).
  5. Za vrijeme tog perioda, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo je komadovalo jednom vojnom divizijom, Multinacionalnom divizijom Jugoistok, čiji je resor bio privincija Al-Basra, gdje su preminuli srodnici podnosilaca predstavke. Počevši od 1. maja 2003. godine pa nadalje, britanske snage u Al-Basri su preuzele odgovornost za održavanje sigurnosti i podršku civilnoj upravi. Sigurnosni zadaci Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva su obuhvatali patrole, hapšenja, antiterorističe operacije, osiguravanje javnog reda prilikom građanskih demonstracija, zaštita osnovnih resursa i infrastrukture i zaštita policijskih stanica (vidi, stav 21. gore).
  6. U julu 2003. godine je uspostavljeno Vladajuće vijeće Iraka. Koalicijska privremena vlast je ostala na vlasti premda se od nje zahtijevalo da se konsultira sa Vladajućim vijećem (vidi, stav 15. gore). U Rezoluciji 1511, koja je usvojena 16. oktobra 2003. godine, Vijeće sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija je istaklo privremenu prirodu vršenja nadležnosti i odgovornosti Koalicijske privremene vlasti iz Rezolucije 1483. Vijeće sigurnosti je također ovlastilo “multinacionalne snage pod jedinstvenom komandom da poduzmu sve potrebne mjere da bi doprinijele održavanju sigurnosti i stabilnosti u Iraku” (vidi, stav 16. gore). U Rezoluciji 1546 Vijeća sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija, koja je usvojena 8. juna 2004. godine, odobrava se “formiranje suverene privremene vlade Iraka (...), koja će preuzeti punu odgovornost i vlast do 30. juna 2004. godine kako bi vladala Irakom” (vidi, stav 18. gore). U svakom slučaju, okupacija se okončala 28. juna 2004. godine, kada je puna vlast za vladanje Irakom prešla na Privremenu vladu Iraka sa Koalicijske privremene vlasti koja je prestala da postoji (vidi, stav 19. gore).

(iii)   Zaključak o jurisdikciji

  1. Prema tome, vidi se da je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo (zajedno sa Sjedinjenim Državama), nakon uklanjanja baasističkog režima i do uspostavljanja privremene vlade, preuzelo neke od javnih ovlasti koje normalno vrši suverena vlada. Naime, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo je preuzelo vlast i odgovornost za održavanje sigurnosti u jugoistočnom dijelu Iraka. Imajući u vidu te izuzetne okolnosti, Sud smatra da je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, putem svojih vojnika angažovanih u sigurnosnim operacijama u Basri u relevantnom periodu, vršilo vlast i kontrolu nad osobama koje su ubijene u toku takvih sigurnosnih operacija, koje su takve da se može ustanoviti jurisdikcijska veza između preminulih i Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva u smislu člana 1. Konvencije.
  2. Imajući u vidu navedeni istorijat, Sud podsjeća da su se smrtni slučajevi u ovom predmetu desili za vrijeme relevantnog perioda: sin petog podnosoca predstavke je preminuo 8. maja 2003. godine; braća prvog i četvrtog podnosioca predstavke su preminuli u augustu 2003. godine; sin šestog podnosioca predstavke je preminuo u septembru 2003. godine; i supruge drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke su preminule u novembru 2003. godine. Nije sporno da su smrti srodnika prvog, drugog, četvrtog, petog i šestog podnosioca predstavke uzrokovane djelima britanskih vojnika u toku ili u kontekstu sigurnosnih operacija koje su vodile britanske snage u raznim dijelovima grada Basre. Slijedi da je u svim tim predmetima postojala jurisdikcijska veza u smislu člana 1. Konvencije između Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva i preminulih osoba. Supruga trećeg podnosioca predstavke je ubijena za vrijeme razmjene vatre između patrole britanskih vojnika i neidentificiranih naoružanih lica te da nije poznato koja strana je ispalila fatalni metak. Sud smatra da, budući da se smrt desila u toku sigurnosne operacije Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, kada su britanski vojnici patrolirali u blizini doma podnosioca predstavke te intervenirali u smrtonosnoj razmjeni vatre, postoji također jurisdikcijska veza između Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva i te žrtve.

2.  Navodna povreda obaveze da se provede istraga koja proizilazi iz člana 2

  1. Podnosioci predstavke se nisu žalili pred Sudom ni na kakvu materijalnu povredu prava na život iz člana 2. Umjesto toga, oni su se žalili da Vlada nije ispunila proceduralnu obavezu provođenja djelotvorne istrage o smrtnim slučajevima njihovih srodnika. Član 2. Konvencije propisuje:

“1. Pravo na život svakog čovjeka zaštićeno je zakonom. Niko ne može biti namjerno lišen života, osim kod izvršenja smrtne kazne po presudi suda, kojom je proglašen krivim za zločin za koji je ova kazna predviđena zakonom.

2. Lišenje života nije u suprotnosti sa ovim članom ako proizilazi iz upotrebe sile koja je apsolutno neophodna:

(a)   u odbrani svakog pojedinca od nezakonitog nasilja;

(b)  prilikom zakonitog lišenja slobode ili sprječavanja bjekstva osobe koja je zakonito lišena slobode;

(c)   u akciji poduzetoj, u skladu sa zakonom, radi gušenja nemira ili pobune.”

 (a)  Argumenti stranaka u postupku

(i)   Vlada

  1. Vlada je istakla da proceduralnu obavezu iz člana 2. treba tumačiti u skladu sa principima međunarodnog prava. Osim toga, bilo koja implicitna obaveza bi se trebala tumačiti na način da se izbjegava nametanje nemogućeg i disproporcionalnog tereta državi ugovornici. Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo nije imalo potpunu kontrolu nad teritorijom Iraka, a naročito nije imalo zakonodavnu, upravnu ili sudsku vlast. Pretpostavljajući da se obaveza da se provede istraga mogla primijeniti vanteritorijalno, bilo bi potrebno voditi računa o tim okolnostima i o veoma lošim uvjetima sigurnosti u kojima je britansko osoblje djelovalo.
  2. Vlada je prihvatila da istrage o smrtnim slučajevima srodnika prvog, drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke nisu bile dovoljno neovisne u smislu člana 2. budući da su u svakom predmetu istragu vodili isključivo komandujući oficiri vojnika koji su navodno odgovorni. Međutim, Vlada je istakla da su istrage vođene u pogledu četvrtog i petog podnosioca predstavke u skladu sa članom 2. Vlada je dalje istakla da ne postoji ni povreda obaveze da se provede istraga u pogledu šestog podnosioca predstavke; zapravo, on nije naveo da istraga u njegovom predmetu nije bila u skladu sa članom 2.
  3. Vlada je generalno naglasila da su istražitelji Kraljevske vojne policije institucionalno neovisni o oružanim snagama. Ona je istakla da je Apelacioni sud ispravno zaključio je Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage Kraljevske vojne policije sposobno da vodi neovisne istrage (vidi, stav 82. gore) premda je sudija Brooke izrazio mišljenje da istrage o oduzimanju ljudskog života “moraju biti u potpunosti odvojene od vojnog zapovjednog lanca i biti povjerene [Kraljevskoj vojnoj policiji]”. Međutim, uloga vojnog zapovjednog lanca prilikom slanja službenog saopćenja o incidentu Specijalnom odjeljenju za istrage, u kojem se zahtijeva provođenje istrage, te njegova uloga kasnije kada je Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage proslijedilo istraženi predmet Vojnom tužiteljstvu armije, ne znači da je tim istragama nedostajala neovisnost koju iziskuju članovi 2. i 3. (vidi, Cooper protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [VV], st. 108-115, broj 48843/99, ECHR 2003-XII; McKerr protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, broj 28883/95, ECHR 2001-III; Paul i Audrey Edwards protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, broj 46477/99, ECHR 2002-II). Vojno tužiteljstvo je raspolagalo oficirima koji su imali potrebne pravne kvalifikacije. Ono je u potpunosti neovisno o vojnom zapovjednom lancu u vršenju svoje tužiteljske funkcije. Sud je priznao njegovu neovisnost u presudi Cooper (citirana gore).
  4. Vlada je istakla da je Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage pokrenulo istragu o smrtnom slučaju brata četvrtog podnosioca predstavke 29. augusta 2003. godine, pet dana nakon otvaranja vatre koje se desilo 14. augusta. Specijalno odjeljnje za istrage je pokupilo fragmente metaka, prazne čahure, vozilo te fotografiralo lice mjesta. Ono je ispitalo ljekare koji su pregledali preminulog i uzelo izjave od njih. Devetorica vojnika koji su bili umiješani u incident su ispitani i dali su izjave u svojstvu svjedoka, a četvorica ostalih svjedoka su bili ispitani, ali nisu pružili nikakve dokaze. Istraga je prekinuta 17. septembra 2003. godine, nakon što je komandir brigade izrazo mišljenje da pucanjem nisu prekršena Pravila o otvaranju vatre i da je ono bilo zakonito. Mađutim, odluku o prekidu je donio viši istražni oficir Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage, koji je bio neovisan o vojnom zapovjednom lancu. Istraga je ponovo otvorena 7. juna 2004. godine i okončana 3. decembra 2004. godine uprkos teškim sigurnosnim uvjetima u Iraku u to vrijeme. Predmet je zatim proslijeđen Vojnom tužiteljstvu, koje je odlučilo da ne podnosi krivičnu optužbu zbog toga što nije bilo stvarne mogućnosti da se ustanovi da je vojnik koji je ubio brata četvrtog podnosioca predstavke djelovao u samoodbrani. Attorney-General je o tome bio obaviješten te je odlučio da ne korisiti svoje ovlasti za pokretanje postupka krivičnog gonjenja. Prema tvrdnji Vlade, istraga je bila djelotvorna budući da je njom identificirana osoba odgovorna za smrt i da je ustanovljeno da su propisi koj reguliraju upotrebu sile bili ispoštovani. Istraga je provedena u razumnom roku, imajući u vidu ekstremne poteškoće za vođenje istrage u vanteritorijalnom okviru. Bilo koji nedostatak neovisnosti koji je mogao proizaći iz obustavljanja istrage je ispravljen kasnijom istragom i uključivanjem Vojnog tužiteljstva i Attorney-Generala (vidi, Gül protiv Turske, st. 92-95, broj 22676/93, od 14. decembra 2000; vidi također, McCann i ostali protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, od 27. septembra 1995, st. 157 i 162-164, Serija A broj 324).
  5. Vlada je istakla da ne postoje dokazi u predmetu petog podnosioca predstavke da se vojni zapovjedni lanac umiješao u istragu Specijalnog odjeljnja za istrage da bi ugrozio njegovu istragu. Sasvim suprotno, nakon što je primio izvještaj o istrazi, vojni zapovjedni lanac je proslijedio predmet Vojnom tužiteljstvu koje je proslijedilo predmet krivičnom sudiji u svrhu neovisnog suđenja. Nije bilo nepropisng kašnjenja u istrazi, imajući u vidu poteškoće sa kojima su se suočavali istražitelji Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva dok su istraživali incident koji se desio u Iraku osam dana nakon prestanka glavnih borbenih operacija. Peti podnosilac predstavke je bio u potpunosti uključen u istragu. Njegovo učešće je kuliminiralo organizovanjem prebacivanja u Englesku da bi mogao da prisustvuje u vojnom postupku i da predoči dokaze. Osim istrage Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage i krivičnog postupka protiv četiri vojnika, peti podnosilac predstavke je pokrenuo građanski postupak pred domaćim sudovima Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva tražeći odštetu za nanošenje fizičkih povreda, zanemarivanje profesionalne dužnosti i zloupotrebu službenog položaja. U tom postupku, on je predočio svoju verziju činjenica koje se odnose na smrt njegovog sina, a zatim i istragu. Spor je riješen kada je Ministarstvo odbrane priznalo odgovornost i pristalo da plati odštetu u iznosu od 115 000 GBP. Osim toga, 20. februara 2009. godine, general divizije Cubitt je uputio pismo petom podnosiocu predstavk te mu se formalo izvinio u ime britanske armije zbog uloge koju je imala u smrtnom slučaju njegovog sina. Imajući u vidu navedene okolnosti, peti podnosilac predstavke ne može više tvrditi da je žrtva kršenja Konvencije u smislu čalan 34. Pored toga, ili alternativno, nastavak ispitivanja predstavke nije više opravdan (član 37. stav 1. tačka (c)).
  6. Vlada je dalje istakla da je šesti podnosilac predstavke izričito potvrdio da nije tvrdio pred Sudom da je Vlada povrijedila prava zagarantirana Konvencijom. To odražava činjenicu da je u pogledu smrti njegovog sina postojalo sljedeće: (1) puna istraga Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage, koja je vodila podnošenju optužbi protiv šest vojnika, od kojih je jedan bio osuđen; (2) građanski postupak koji je pokrenuo podnosilac predstavke koji je okončan kada je Vlada priznala odgovornost za zlostavljanje i smrt sina podnosioca predstavke te platila odštetu u iznosu od 575 000 GBP; (3) formalno javno priznanje, od strane Vlade, povrede prava sina podnosioca predstavke iz članova 2. i 3; (4) sudsko preispitivanje postupka u kojem se podnosilac predstavke žalio na povredu proceduralnih prava iz članova 2. i 3. u kojem su se strane dogovorile i u kojem je Dom lordova naložio da pitanje, da li je došlo do povrede proceduralne obaveze, treba biti vraćeno Divisional Courtu; (5) javna istraga koja je u toku. Imajući u vidu te okolnosti, podnosilac predstavke ne tvrdi više da je žrtva u smislu člana 34. Konvencije.

 (ii) Podnosioci predstavke

  1. Podnosioci predstavke su istakli da sudska praksa Suda u pogledu jugoistočnog dijela Turske pokazuje da se proceduralna obaveza na osnovu 2. ne mijenja pozivanjem na sigurnosne probleme u konfliktnoj zoni. Isti princip se mora primijeniti u pogledu pokušaja Vlade da se pozove na sigurnosnu situaciju ili nedostatak infrastrukture u Iraku. Prema podnosiocima predstavke, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo je bilo svjesno ili je trebalo biti svjesno prije invazije i za vrijeme okupacije, koja je uslijedila nakon toga, poteškoća sa kojima će se susresti. Nedostatak mjera da bi se otklonile te poteškoće ne mogu ga opravdati za neizvršavanje obaveze da se provede istraga.
  2. Podnosioci predstavke su istakli da Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo nije izvršilo svoju proceduralnu obavezu u pogledu prvog, drugog, trećeg, četvrtog i petog podnosioca predstavke. Kraljevska vojna policija je element britanske armije te nije, bilo u institucionalnom ili praktičnom smislu, ovisna o vojnom zapovjednom lancu. Jedinice armije vrše kontrolu nad njom u smislu sigurnosti i logistike u domenu operacije. Podnosioci predstavke tvrde da je Kraljevska vojna policija intervenirala u incidentima u potpunosti po zahtjevu predmetne vojne jedinice, kao što je to pokazao slučaj četvrtog podnosioca predstavke u kojem je Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage okončalo intervenciju po upustvu komandujućeg oficira. Kraljevska vojna policija je u potpunosti ovisila o vojnom zapovjednom lancu da bi dobila informacije u vezi sa indicidentima. Oni ističu da su izvještaji koje je ona sastavila podneseni vojnom zapovjednom lancu, koji je odlučivao da li će se on ili neće proslijediti Vojnom tužiteljstvu. Neadekvatnosti u okviru Kraljevske vojne policije, u pogledu nedostatka resursa i neovisnosti, je naznačio Apelacioni sud te su one naznačene i u izvještaju Aitken.
  3. Podnosioci predstavke su istakli da je istraga Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage o predmetu četvrtog podnosioca predstavke prekinuta na zahtjev vojnog zapovjednog lanca. Nova istražna faza, obnovljena nakon ishoda spora pred domaćim sudovima, je imala slične nedostatke, imajući u vidu nedostatak neovisnosti Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage i ekstremno kašnjenje ispitivanja autora otvaranja vatre i osiguranja ostalih ključnih dokaza. U predmetu petog podnosioca predstavke, istraga je pokrenuta nakon što je porodica urgirala u više navrata, nakon poprilično velike opstrukcije i kašnjenja britanskih vlasti. Istražitelji nisu bili neovisni o vojnom zapovjednom lancu, a porodica žrtve nije bila dovoljno uključena u istragu. Podnosioci predstavke tvrde da je prigovor Vlade, da petom podnosiocu predstavke nedostaje status žrtve, treba biti odbačen. Vojni postupak i naknada koju je primio nakon okončanja građanskog spora su neadekvatni da bi zadovoljili proceduralni zahtjev iz člana 2. Nasuprot tome, šesti podnosilac predstavke više ne smatra da je žrtva povrede proceduralnih prava iz članova 2. i 3.

 (b)  Ocjena Suda

(i)  Opći principi

  1. Sud je svjestan da su se smrtni slučajevi u ovom predmetu desili u gradu Basri u jugoistočnom dijelu Iraka neposredno nakon invazije, u periodu kada su kriminal i nasilje bili rasprostranjeni. Premda su se glavne bormene operacije okončale 1. maja 2003. godine, koalicijske snage u jugoističnom dijelu Iraka, uključujući britanske vojnike i vojnu policiju, su bile meta preko hiljadu nasilnih napada u narednih 13 mjeseci. Zajedno sa sigurnosnim problemima, civilna struktura je imala imala ozbiljne nedostatke, uključujući policiju i krivično pravosuđe (vidi, st. 22-23 gore; vidi također, zaključak Apelacionog suda u stavu 80. gore).
  2. Dok je u potpunosti svjestan ovog konteksta, pristup Suda mora biti vođen znanjem da predmet i cilj Konvencije, koja je instrumenta za zaštitu ljudskih bića, iziskuju da se njene odrebe tumače i primjenjuju na način da njene garancije budu praktične i djelotvorne. Član 2, koji štiti pravo na život i predočava okolnosti u kojima lišavanje života može biti opravdano, je smješten među najfundamentalije odrebe Konvencije. Član 15. ne omogućava odstupanja od člana 2, “osim u pogledu smrti prouzrokovane zakonitim ratnim postupcima”. Članom 2. su obuhvaćeni ne samo slučajevi ubistava s namjerom nego i situacije u kojima je dozvoljena upotreba sile koja može dovesti do nenamjernog lišavanja života. Bilo koja upotreba sile ne smije više od “apsolutno nužne” da bi se postigao jedan ili više ciljeba iz tačaka (a) do (c) (vidi, McCann i ostali protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, od 27. septembra 1995, st. 146-148, Serija A broj 324).
  3. Da bi se opća pravna zabrana samovoljnog ubijanja koja se odnosi na predstavnike države pokazala efikasnom u praksi, potrebno je da postoji postupak za preispitivanje zakonitosti upotrebe smrtonosne sile koju su koristile državne vlasti. Obaveza da se zaštiti pravo na život na osnovu te odredbe, u vezi sa općom obavezom države u smislu člana 1. Konvencije da “jamči svim licima pod svojom jurisdikcijom prava i slobode utvrđene u (...) Konvenciji”, implicitno zahtijeva postojanje oblika djelotvorne službene istrage kada su pojedinci ubijeni usljed upotrebe sile, inter alios, službenih lica države (vidi, McCann, citirana gore, stav 161). Osnovna svrha takve istrage je da se osigura djelotvorna primjena domaćih zakona koji štite pravo na život i, u predmetima u koje su umiješana državna službena lica ili organi, da garantira da će oni odgovarati za smrtne slučajeve koji su se desili pod njihovom odgovornošću (vidi, Nachova i ostali protiv Bugarske [VV], br. 43577/98 i 43579/98, stav 110, ECHR 2005-VII). Međutim, istraga mora biti i dovoljno široka da bi omogućila istražnim vlastima da uzmu u razmatranje ne samo djela službenih lica države koji su direktno upotrijebili smrtonosnu silu nego i ukupne okolnosti, uključujući pitanja kao što je planiranje i kontrola predmetnih operacija, kada je to potrebno da bi se odlučilo da li se država povinovala obavezama iz člana 2. da bi zaštitila život (vidi, implicitno, McCann i ostali, citirana gore, st. 150 i 162; Hugh Jordan protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, broj 24746/94, stav 128, ECHR2001-III (izvodi); McKerr, citirana gore, st. 143. i 151; Shanaghan protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, broj 37715/97, st. 100125, od 4. maja 2001; Finucane protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva,br. 29178/95, st. 77-78, ECHR 2003-VIII; Nachova, citirana gore, st. 114-115; i također, mutatis mutandis, Tzekov protiv Bugarske, broj 45500/99, stav 71, od 23. februara 2006).
  4. Sud je već presudio da se proceduralna obaveza koja proizilazi iz člana 2. i dalje primjenjuje u teškim sigurnosim uvjetima, uključujući kontekst oružanog sukoba (vidi, među ostalim primjerima, Güleç protiv Turske, od 27. jula 1998, stav 81, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV; Ergi protiv Turske, od 28. jula 1998, st. 79 i 82, Reports 1998-IV; Ahmet Özkan i ostali protiv Turske, broj 21689/93, st. 85-90 i 309-320 i 326-330, od 6. aprila 2004; Isayeva protiv Rusije, broj 57950/00, st. 180. i 210, od 24. februara 2005; Kanlibaş protiv Turske, broj 32444/96, st. 39-51, od 8. decembra 2005). Jasno je da, ako se smrtni slučaj u pogledu kojeg član 2. nameće istragu desio u okolnostima općeg nasilja, oružanog sukoba ili pobune, istražitelji mogu naići na prepreke i, kao što je zapazio specijalni izvjestitelj Ujedinjenih nacija (vidi, stav 93. gore), precizna ograničenja mogu nametati upotrebu istražnih mjera koje su manje efikasne ili uzrokuju kašnjenje istrage (vidi, na primjer, Bazorkina protiv Rusije, broj  69481/01, stav 121, od 27. jula 2006). Ipak, obaveza iz člana 2. da se zaštiti život implicira usvajanje, čak i u teškim sigurnosnim uvjetima, svih razumnih mjera da bi se osigurala djelotvorna, neovisna istraga o navodnim povredama prava na život (vidi, između ostalih primjera, Kaya protiv Turske, od 19. februara 1998, st. 86-92, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I; Ergi, citirana gore, st. 82-85; Tanrıkulu protiv Turske [VV], broj 23763/94, st. 101-110, ECHR 1999-IV; Khashiyev i Akayeva protiv Rusije, br. 57942/00 i 57945/00, st. 156-166, od 24. februara 2005; Isayeva, citirana gore, st. 215-224; Musayev i ostali protiv Rusije, br. 57941/00, 58699/00 i 60403/00, st. 158-165, od 26. jula 2007).
  5. Pitanje, kojom formom će istraga postići cilj člana 2, može varirati u ovisnosti od okolnosti. Međutim, kakvi god bili modaliteti koji se upotrijebe, vlasti moraju djelovati ex officio čim im predmet bude predočen. Vlasti ne mogu ostaviti najbližim srodnicima preminule osobe inicijativu da dostave formalnu prijavu ili da preuzumu odgovornost za pokretanje istražnog postupka (vidi, Ahmet Özkan i ostali, citirana gore, stav 310; Isayeva, citirana gore, stav 210). Građanski postupak, koji se pokreće na inicijativu najbližeg srodnika, ne vlasti, i koji ne obuhvata identifikaciju ili kažnjavanje bilo kojeg navodnog počinitelja, se ne može uzeti u obzir prilikom procjene da li je država poštivala svoju proceduralnu obavezu u smislu člana 2. Konvencije (vidi, na primjer, Hugh Jordan, citirana gore, stav 141). Osim toga, proceduralna obaveza države, u smislu člana 2, ne može biti ispunjena samom dodjelom odštete (vidi, McKerr, citirana gore,stav 121; Bazorkina, citirana gore, stav 117).
  6. Kao što je navedeno gore, istraga mora biti djelotvorna u smislu da se može odrediti da li je upotrijebljena sila bila opravdana ili nije u okolnostima, te identificirati i sankcionirati one koji su odgovorni. Ne radi se o obavezi koja se odnosi na rezultat, nego na sredstva. Vlasti moraju poduzeti razumne mjere koje su im na raspolaganju da bi osigurale dokaze koji se odnose na incident, uključujuči, inter alia, izjave svjedoka očevidaca, forenzičke dokaze te, ako je potrebno, autopsiju koja pruža kompletan i precizan nalaz o povredama i objektivnu analizu kliničkih nalaza, uključujući uzrok smrti. Bilo koji nedostatak u istrazi koji ugrožava njen kapacitet u smislu ustanovljavanja uzroka smrti, ili osobe ili osoba koje su odgovorne, dovodi do rizika da se zaključi da ona ne odgovara standardima iziskivane djelotvornosti (vidi, Ahmet Özkan i ostali, citirana gore, stav 312; Isayeva, citirana gore, stav 212. i predmeti koji su tu citirani).
  7. Da bi istraga o nezakonitim ubistvima koja su navodno počinila državna službena lica bila djelotvorna, potrebno je da osobe koje su odgovorne za istragu i koje vode istragu bude neovisne o osobama koje su umiješane u događaje. To znači ne samo da ne postoji hijerarhijska ili institucionalna veza nego i praktična neovisnost (vidi, na primjer, Shanaghan, citirana gore, stav 104). Zahtijevanje brzine i razumne revnosti je implicitno u ovom kontekstu. Iako mogu postojati prepreke ili poteškoće koje onemogućavaju napredovanje istrage u nekim situacijama, brzo reagiranje vlasti pri istraživanju upotrebe smrtonosne sile se generalno može smatrati osnovnim u održanju povjerenja javnosti u poštivanje principa vladavine prava i sprečavanju pojave saučesništva ili toleriranja nezakonitih djela. Zbog istih razloga, javnost mora imati dovoljno uvida u istragu ili njene rezultate kako bi se osigurala odgovornost u praksi a i u teoriji. Iziskivani stepen uvida javnosti može varirati od predmeta do predmeta. Međutim, u svakom predmetu, najbliži srodnik žrtve mora biti uključen u postupak do stepena koji je potreban da bi njegovi legitimni interesi bili zaštićeni (vidi, Ahmet Özkan i ostali, citirana gore, st. 311-314; Isayeva, citirana gore, st. 211-214 i predmeti citirani u tom predmetu).

(ii)  Primjena tih principa na činjenice u ovom predmetu

  1. Početna tačka od koje je Sud krenuo su praktični problemi sa kojima su se istražne vlasti suočile zbog činjenice da je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo bila okupaciona sila u jednoj stranoj i neprijateljskoj regiji neposredno nakon invazije i rata. Ti praktični problemi su uključivali rušenje civilne infrastrukture, što je dovelo do, inter alia, nedostatka lokalnih patologa i resursa za autopsiju; opseg jezičkog i kulturološkog nerazumijevanja između okupatora i lokalnog stanovništva; i opasnost koja je svojstvena bilo kojoj aktivnosti u Iraku u to vrijeme. Kao što je rečeno gore, Sud smatra da se proceduralna obaveza u smislu člana 2, u okolnostima kao što su navedene okolnosti, mora primijeniti realistično da bi se vodilo računa o specifičnim problemima sa kojima su se suočili istražitelji.
  2. Ipak, činjenica da je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo bilo okupator čini posebno važnim, s ciljem garantiranja bilo koje istrage o činjenicama koje se pripisuju britanskim vojnicima, to da je istražna vlast bila, i da je percipirana kao takva, operativno neovisna o vojnom zapovjednom lancu.
  3. Nije sporno da su srodnike prvog, drugog i četvrtog podnosioca predstavke ubili britanski vojnici čiji je identitet poznat. Pitanje koje je trebalo istražiti je da li u svakom predmetu vojnik pucao u skladu sa Pravilima o otvaranju vatre. U vezi sa trećim podnosiocem predstavke, član 2. iziskuje istragu o okolnostima otvaranja vatre, uključujući istragu o pitanju da li su poduzete odgovarajuće mjere da bi se zaštitili civili u neposrednoj blizini. U vezi sa sinom petog podnosioca predstavke, premda Sudu nisu dostavljeni dokumenti koji se odnose na postupak pred vojnim sudom, čini se da je prihvaćeno da je on umro tako što se utopio. Bilo je potrebno odrediti da li su britanski vojnici, kao što je navedeno, pretukli dječaka i prisilili ga da skoči u vodu. Svjedočenje očevidaca je bilo krucijalno u svakom predmetu. Prema tome, osnovno je bilo da ekspert i potpuno neovisan istražitelj ispita, što je moguće brže nakon događaja, vojnike svjedoke, a naročito navodne počinioce. Slično tome, sve mjere su trebale biti poduzete da bi se identificirali irački očevici koje bi trebalo ubijediti da neće biti izloženi riziku ako se pojave i pruže informacije, te da će njihovi dokazi biti tretairani ozbiljno i da će se djelovati u vezi sa njima bez odlaganja.
  4. Jasno je da istrage o smrtnim slučajevima srodnika prvog, drugog i trećeg srodnika nisu bile u skladu sa zahtjevima iz člana 2. budući da je istražni postupak u potpunosti ostao pod kontrolom vojnog zapovjednog lanca i da je bio ograničen na uzimanje izjava od umiješanih vojnika. Osim toga, Vlada prihvata taj zaključak.
  5. U vezi sa ostalim podnosiocima predstavke, premda je Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage provelo istragu o smrtnim slučajevima brata četvrtog podnosioca predstavke i sina petog podnosioca predstavke, Sud ne smatra da je ona bila dovoljna da bi ispoštovala zahtjeve iz člana 2. Tačno je da je Kraljevska vojna policija, uključujući Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage, imala odvojen zapovjedni lanac od vojnika na borbenoj dužnosti u pogledu kojih ja zatražena istraga. Međutim, kao što je zapazio domaći sud (vidi, st. 77. i 82. gore), Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage nije bilo, u relevantnom periodu, neovisno o vojnom zapovjednom lancu. Općenito je na komandujućem oficiru jedinice koji je umiješan u incident da odluči da li bi se trebalo obratiti Specijalnom odjeljenju za istrage. Ako Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage odluči, na sopstvenu incijativu, da če pokrenuti istragu, ta istraga može biti obustavljena na zahtjev vojong zapovjednog lanca, kao što je to pokazao predmet četvrtog podnosioca predstavke. Po zaključku Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage, izvještaj se šalje komandujućem oficiru koji odlučuje da li će se predmet proslijediti tužiteljstvu. Sud smatra, poput sudije Brooka (vidi, stav 82. gore), da Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage nije imalo “slobodu da samo odlučuje kada će pokrenuti i kada će okončati istragu” i da ne podnosi izvještaj “prije svega, [Vojnom tužiteljstvu] ”, nego vojnom zapovjednom lancu, te se može smatrati dovoljno neovisnim o vojnicima koji su umiješani u događaje i da ne može zadovoljiti uvjete iz člana 2.
  6. Slijedi da je prvobitnoj istrazi o smrtnom slučaju brata četvrtog podnosioca predstavke nedostajala neovisnost oficira Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage. Za vrijeme početne faze istrage, prikupljeni su dokazi sa lica mjesta smrtnog slučaja i izjave koje su dali vojnici koji su bili prisutni za vrijeme incidenta. Međutim, u toj početnoj fazi istrage, istražitelji Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage nisu ispitali razvodnika S, vojnika koji je ubio brata podnosioca predstavke. Čini se da je Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage ispitalo četiri iračka svjedoka, od kojih su neki možda bili susjedi koji su, prema podnosiocu predstavke, bili svjedoci otvaranja vatre, ali Specijalno odjeljenje za istrage nije uzelo njihove izjave. U svakom slučaju, rezultat nedostatka neovisnosti je bio taj da se istraga okončala, a da nije bila dovršena. Nekoliko mjeseci kasnije, istraga je ponovo otvorena i čini se da je kriminalistička ekspertiza obavljena na osnovu materijala prikupljenog na licu mjesta, uključujući djeliće metka i vozilo. Izvještaj Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage je poslan komandujućem oficiru, koji je odlučio da predmet proslijedi Vojnom tužiteljstvu. Tužioci su uzeli izjave od vojnika koji su bili svjedoci incidenta i odlučili, nakon što su dobili neovisan pravni savjet, da nema dokaza da razvodnik S. nije djelovao u granicama legitimne samoodbrane. Kao što je već rečeno, svjedočenje očevidaca je bilo osnovno u ovom predmetu budući da uzrok smrti nije sporan. Sud smatra da je dugotrajan period prije nego što je razvodnik S. ispitan o incidentu, zajedno sa dugotrajnim periodom koji je bio potreban da bi potpuno neovisan istražitelj ispitao druge vojnike svjedoke, doveo do visokog rizika da dokazi budu nepouzdani zbog proteka vremena do momenta kada je Vojno tužiteljstvo trebalo da ih ispita. Osim toga, čini se da nijedan neovisan istražitelj nije prikupio dokaze od susjeda Iračana koji su bili, prema tvrdnji četvrtog podnosioca predstavke, svjedoci otvaranja vatre.
  7. Dok ne postoje dokazi da je vojni zapovjedni lanac pokušao da intervenira u istrazi o smrti sina petog podnosioca predstavke, Sud smatra da istražitelji Specijalnog odjeljenja za istrage nisu bili neovisni zbog razloga koji su navedeni gore. Osim toga, Vlada nije pružila objašnjenje o velikom vremenskom razmaku između smrtnog slučaja i postupka pred vojnim sudom. Čini se da je to kašnjenje ozbiljno ugrozilo djelotvornost istrage, povrg svega zbog toga što je svaki trag nekih od vojnika optuženih za umješanost u incident potpuno izbgubljen (vidi, u tom pogledu, komentare u izvještaju Aitken, stav 61. gore). Osim toga, Sud smatra da uzak okvir krivičnog postupka protiv optuženih vojnika nije mogao adekvatno zadovoljiti zahtjeve iz člana 2, imajući u vidu posebne okolnosti ovog predmeta. Čini se da da su postojali barem prima facie dokazi da su britanski vojnici, koji su pomagali iračkoj policiji u borbi protiv pljačkanja, uhapsili sina petog podnosioca predstavke, koji je bio maloljetan, i da se on utopio nakon što su ga oni maltetirali. Imajući u vidu te okolnosti, Sud smatra da član 2. iziskuje neovisno ispitivanje, koje je pristupačno porodici žrtve i javnosti, širih pitanja u vezi sa odgovornošću države za smrt, naročito u vezi sa uputstvima koja su data vojnicima zaduženim za misiju kao što je bila ona neposredno nakon invazije, te edukacijom i supervizijom.
  8. U svjetlu navedenog, Sud smatra da proceduralna obaveza koja proizilazi iz člana 2. nije ispunjena u pogledu petog podnosioca predstavke. Premda je primio visoki iznos po okončanju građanskog postupka koji je pokrenuo, uključujući prihvatanje odgovornosti armije, istrage o okolnostima smrti njegovog sina (vidi, stav 165. gore) nikada nije bilo. Slijedi da peti podnosilac predstavke još uvijek može tvrditi da je žrtva u smislu člana 34. i da prethodni prigovor Vlade u pogledu nedostatka njegovog statusa žrtve mora biti odbačen.
  9. Nasuprot tome, Sud ističe da je javna i potpuna istraga o okolnostima smrti sina šestog podnosioca predstavke blizu okončanja. U svjetlu te istrage, Sud ističe da šesti podnosilac predstavke prihvata da nije više žrtva povrede proceduralne obaveze u smislu člana 2. Prema tome, Sud prihvata prigovor Vlade u pogledu šestog podnosioca predstavke.
  10. In conclusio, Sud zaključuje da je proceduralna obaveza koja proizilazi iz člana 2. Konvencije u pogledu prvog, drugog, trećeg, četvrtog i petog podnosioca predstavke prekršena.

II  PRIMJENA ČLANA 41. KONVENCIJE

178.  Član 41. Konvencije glasi:

“Kada Sud utvrdi prekršaj Konvencije ili Protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo dijelomičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj stranci.”

A.  Šteta

  1. Prvi, drugi, treći, četvrti i peti podnosilac predstavke su zatražili od Suda da naloži Vladi da provede istragu o smrtnim slučajevima njihovih srodnika u skladu sa članom 2. Oni su također tražili isplatu iznosa od 15 000 GBP svakom od njih po osnovu naknade za patnju koju su pretrpili zbog toga što je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo propustilo da provede istragu o navedenim smrtnim slučajevima u skladu sa Konvencijom.
  2. Vlada je istakla da je praksa Suda da izričito odbija da nalaže Vladi da pokrene novu istragu u predmetima u kojima ustanovi povredu proceduralne obaveze koja proizilazi iz člana 2 (vidi, na primjer, Varnava i ostali protiv Turske [VV], br. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, § 222, ECHR 2009-...; Ülkü Ekinci protiv Turske, broj 27602/95, stav 179, od 16. jula 2002; Finucane, citirana gore, stav 89). Vlada je dalje istakla da bi, imajući u vidu okolnosti, zaključak o postojanju povrede bio dovoljno pravično zadovoljenje. Alternativno, ako bi Sud odlučio da dodijeli odštetu, Vlada ističe da je iznos koji su zahtijevali podnosioci predstavke viši od iznosa koji se generalno dodjeljuje. Međutim, Vlada nije predložila iznos, ostavljajući Sudu da o njemu odluči na pravičnoj osnovi.
  3. U vezi sa zahtjevom podnosilaca predstavke koji se odnosi na obezbjeđivanje djelotvorne istrage, Sud je ponovo ističe generalni princip da tužena Vlada ima slobodu izbora sredstava pomoću kojih će ispuniti svoju obavezu iz člana 46. Konvencije, pod uvjetom da su ta sredstva u skladu sa zaključcima iznesenim u presudi Suda. Prema tome, Sud smatra da je, u ovom predmetu, na Komitetu ministara, u skladu sa članom 46 Konvencije, da odluči o mjerama koje će se nametnuti okviru izvršenja ove presude koju je donio Sud (vidi, Varnava, citirana gore, stav 222. i predmeti koji su citirani u njoj).
  4. U pogledu zahtjeva za materijalnu odštetu, Sud podsjeća da on nema ulogu, prema članu 41, da funkcionira kao domaći sud koji je pozvan da u građanskim stvarima određuje odgovornost i dodjeljuje odštetu. Njegov vodeći princip je pravičnost, koji prije svega implicira fleksibilnost i objektivno razmatranje onoga što je opravdano, pravično i razumno, imajući u vidu sve okolnosti predmeta, uključujući ne samo situaciju podnosioca predstavke nego i generalni kontekst u okviru kojeg je počinjena povreda. Cilj odštete koju Sud dodjeljuje po osnovu nematerijane štete je priznavanje činjenice da je nematerijalna šteta posljedica povrede osnovnog ljudskog prava, te u širem smislu odražava težinu štete (vidi, Varnava, citirana gore, stav 224. i predmeti koji su citirani u toj presudi). U svjetlu okolnosti ovog predmeta, Sud smatra da je ukupan traženi iznos, koji nakon konverzije iznosi oko 17 000 eura (EUR) svakom od pet prvih podnosilaca predstavke, predstavlja opravdan i pravičan iznos naknade za patnju koju je mogao prouzrokovati izostanak potpuno neovisne istrage o smrtnim slučajevima njihovih srodnika.

B.  Troškovi i izdaci

  1. Podnosioci predstavke, ističući kompleksnost i važnost predmeta, su tražili ukupan iznos u visini od 119 928 GBP, koji odgovara više od 580 sati pravnog posla njihovih solisitora i njihova četiri branitelja u okviru postupka pred Sudom.
  2. Vlada je priznala da su pitanja bila kompleksna, ali ipak tvrdi da je iznos previsok budući da su pravni savjetnici podnosilca predstavke upućeni u sve aspekte zahtjeva jer su djelovali u ime podnosilaca predstavke u postupcima pred domaćim sudovima, koji su bili plaćeni iz javnih sredstava za pravnu pomoć. Osim toga, iznosi koje su podnosioci predstavke tražili za satnice branitelja, koji se kreću od 500 GBP i 235 GBP, te iznosi koje su podnosioci predstavke tražili za satnice solisitora (180 GBP i 130 GBP), su neopravdano visoki. Vlada je dodala da nije bilo potrebno da se podnosioci predstavke obraćaju Queen’s Counsel i dvojici junior counsel.
  3. Prema sudskoj praksi Suda, podnosilac predstavke ima pravo na isplatu troškova i izdataka samo pod uvjetom da je ustanovljeno da su oni bili stvarni i potrebni, i da je njihov iznos razuman. U ovom predmetu, imajući u vidu dokumentaciju predočenu Sudu i navedene kriterije, Sud smatra razumnim da dodijeli iznos od 50 000 EUR za izdatke koje su podnosioci predstavke imali u okviru postupka pred Sudom.

C.  Zatezna kamata

  1. Sud smatra odgovarajućim da se zatezne kamate računaju na bazi najniže kreditne stope Evropske centralne banke uvećane za tri procentna boda.

IZ TIH RAZLOGA, SUD, JEDNOGLASNO,

1. Odbacuje prethodne prigovore Vlade u pogledu pripisivanja činjenica i neiscrpljivanja domaćih pravnih lijekova;

2. Pridružuje meritumu pitanje da li su podnosioci predstavke bili pod jurisdikcijom tužene države i da li su peti i šesti podnosilac predstavke zadržali status žrtve;

3. Proglašava predstavku prihvatljivom;

4. Odlučuje da su preminuli srodnici podnosilaca predstavke bili pod jurisdikcijom tužene države i odbacuje prethodni prigovor Vlade u pogledu jurisdikcije;

5. Odlučuje da šesti podnosilac predstavke ne može više tvrditi da je žrtva povrede proceduralne obaveze koja proizilazi iz člana 2. Konvencije;

6. Odlučuje da je proceduralna obaveza, koja proizilazi iz člana 2. Konvencije, da se provede adekvatna i djelotvorna istraga o smrtnim slučajevima srodnika prvog, drugog, trećeg, četvrtog i petog podnosioca predstavke, prekršena, i odbacuje prethodni prigovor Vlade u pogledu statusa žrtve petog podnosioca predstavke;

7. Odlučuje

(a)   da je tužena država dužna da isplati svakom od prvih pet podnosilaca predstavke, u roku od tri mjeseca, iznos od 17 000 EUR (sedamnaest hiljada eura), plus bili koji iznos koji bi se mogao iziskivati kao porez na taj iznos, po osnovu nematerijalne štete, koji će se promijeniti u funte sterling po kursu primjenjivom na dan isplate;

(b)   da je tužena država dužna da isplati prvoj petorici podnosilaca predstavke zajedno, u roku od tri mjeseca, iznos od 50 000 EUR (pedeset hiljada eura), plus bili koji iznos koji bi se mogao iziskivati kao porez na taj iznos, po osnovu troškova i izdataka, koji će se promijeniti u funte sterling po kursu primjenjivom na dan isplate;

(c)   da će se, od dana isteka navedenog roka od tri mjeseca do isplate, plaćati obična kamata na navedeni iznos po stopi koja je jednaka najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke, koja je primjenjiva za vrijeme tog perioda, uvećanoj za tri procentna boda;

8. Odbija  ostatak  zahtjeva podnosilaca predstavke za pravično zadovoljenje.

 

Sastavljena na engleskom i francuskom jeziku, zatim saopćena na javnoj raspravi 7. jula 2011. godine skladu sa pravilom 77. st. 2. i 3. Pravila Suda.

Michael O’Boyle

Jean-Paul Costa

Zamjenik sekretara

Predsjednik

U skladu sa članom 45. stav 2. Konvencije i pravilom 74. stav 2. Pravila Suda, izdvojena mišljenja o slaganju sudije Rozakisa i sudije Bonello se nalaze u prilogu ove presude.

J.-P.C. M.O.B.

Izdvojena mišljenja nisu prevedena, ali ih sadrži presuda na engleskom i/ili francuskom jeziku, kao službenim jezicima, te se mogu pročitati u bazi podataka o sudskoj praksi Suda,

 

 

___________________________________
Prevod presude preuzet sa https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/

 

Ovaj prevod je realiziran zahvaljujući pomoći Fonda povjerenja Vijeća Evrope (www.coe.int/humanrightstrustfund).

 

 

 

GRAND CHAMBER

CASE OF AL-SKEINI AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

(Application no. 55721/07)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

7 July 2011

In the case of Al-Skeini and Others v. the United KingdomThe European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:

Jean-Paul Costa, President,
Christos Rozakis,
Nicolas Bratza,
Françoise Tulkens,
Josep Casadevall,
Dean Spielmann,
Giovanni Bonello,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Lech Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
Davíd Thór Björgvinsson,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
George Nicolaou,
Luis López Guerra,
Ledi Bianku,
Ann Power,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and Michael O’Boyle, Deputy Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 9 and 16 June 2010 and 15 June 2011Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 55721/07) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by six Iraqi nationals, Mr Mazin Jumaa Gatteh Al-Skeini, Ms Fattema Zabun Dahesh, Mr Hameed Abdul Rida Awaid Kareem, Mr Fadil Fayay Muzban, Mr Jabbar Kareem Ali and Colonel Daoud Mousa (“the applicants”), on 11 December 2007.

2.  The applicantswho had been granted legal aid, were represented by Public Interest Lawyers, solicitors based in Birmingham. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr D. Walton, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

3.  The applicants alleged that their relatives fell within United Kingdom jurisdiction when killed and that there had been no effective investigation into their deaths, in breach of Article 2 of the Convention.

4.  The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 16 December 2008 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It also decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29 § 1 of the Convention). The parties took turns to file observations on the admissibility and merits of the case. On 19 January 2010 the Chamber decided to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72).

5.  The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24. Judge Peer Lorenzen, President of the Fifth Section, withdrew and was replaced by Judge Luis López Guerra, substitute judge.

6.  The applicants and the Government each filed a further memorial on the admissibility and merits, and joint third-party comments were received from the Bar Human Rights Committee, the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre, Human Rights Watch, Interightsthe International Federation for Human Rights, the Law Society, and Liberty (“the third-party interveners”).

7.  A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 9 June 2010 (Rule 59 § 3).

There appeared before the Court:

(a)  for the Government 

Mr    D. Walton   Agent,

MrJ. Eadie QC, 

MsC. Ivimy,

MrS. WordsworthCounsel,

MsL. Dann, 

MsH. Akiwumi, Advisers;

(b)  for the applicants

MrR. Singh QC,

MrR. Husain QC,

MsS. Fatima,

MsN. Patel,

MrT. Tridimas,

MsH. LawCounsel,

MrP. Shiner,

MrD. Carey,

MsT. Gregory,

MrJ. Duffy,Advisers.

The Court heard addresses by Mr Eadie and Mr Singh.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

8.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

A.  The occupation of Iraq from May 2003 to 28 June 2004

1.  Background: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441

9.  On 8 November 2002 the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted Resolution 1441. The Resolution decided, inter alia, that Iraq had been and remained in material breach of its obligations under previous United Nations Security Council resolutions to disarm and to cooperate with United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency weapons inspectors. Resolution 1441 decided to afford Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations and set up an enhanced inspection regime. It requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations immediately to notify Iraq of the Resolution and demanded that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with the inspectors. Resolution 1441 concluded by recalling that the Security Council had “repeatedly warned Iraq that it w[ould] face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations”. The Security Council decided to remain seised of the matter.

2.  Major combat operations: 20 March to 1 May 2003              

10.  On 20 March 2003 a Coalition of armed forces under unified command, led by the United States of America with a large force from the United Kingdom and small contingents from Australia, Denmark and Poland, commenced the invasion of Iraq. By 5 April 2003 the British had captured Basra and by 9 April 2003 United States troops had gained control of Baghdad. Major combat operations in Iraq were declared complete on 1 May 2003. Thereafter, other States sent personnel to help with the reconstruction effort.

3.  Legal and political developments in May 2003

11.  On 8 May 2003 the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States of America at the United Nations addressed a joint letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council, which read as follows:

“The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Coalition partners continue to act together to ensure the complete disarmament of Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions. The States participating in the Coalition will strictly abide by their obligations under international law, including those relating to the essential humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq. We will act to ensure that Iraqs oil is protected and used for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

In order to meet these objectives and obligations in the post-conflict period in Iraq, the United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners, acting under existing command and control arrangements through the Commander of Coalition Forces, have created the Coalition Provisional Authority, which includes the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, to exercise powers of government temporarily, and, as necessary, especially to provide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction.

The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners, working through the Coalition Provisional Authority, shall, inter alia, provide for security in and for the provisional administration of Iraq, including by: deterring hostilities; maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq and securing Iraqs borders; securing, and removing, disabling, rendering harmless, eliminating or destroying (a) all of Iraqs weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and all other chemical, biological and nuclear delivery systems; and (b) all elements of Iraqs programme to research, develop, design, manufacture, produce, support, assemble and employ such weapons and delivery systems and subsystems and components thereof, including but not limited to stocks of chemical and biological agents, nuclear-weapon-usable material, and other related materials, technology, equipment, facilities and intellectual property that have been used in or can materially contribute to these programmes; in consultation with relevant international organisations, facilitating the orderly and voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons; maintaining civil law and order, including through encouraging international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police force; eliminating all terrorist infrastructure and resources within Iraq and working to ensure that terrorists and terrorist groups are denied safe haven; supporting and coordinating de-mining and related activities; promoting accountability for crimes and atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi regime; and assuming immediate control of Iraqi institutions responsible for military and security matters and providing, as appropriate, for the demilitarisation, demobilisation, control, command, reformation, disestablishment, or reorganisation of those institutions so that they no longer pose a threat to the Iraqi people or international peace and security but will be capable of defending Iraqs sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners recognise the urgent need to create an environment in which the Iraqi people may freely determine their own political future. To this end, the United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners are facilitating the efforts of the Iraqi people to take the first steps towards forming a representative government, based on the rule of law, that affords fundamental freedoms and equal protection and justice under law to the people of Iraq without regard to ethnicity, religion or gender. The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners are facilitating the establishment of representative institutions of government, and providing for the responsible administration of the Iraqi financial sector, for humanitarian relief, for economic reconstruction, for the transparent operation and repair of Iraqs infrastructure and natural resources, and for the progressive transfer of administrative responsibilities to such representative institutions of government, as appropriate. Our goal is to transfer responsibility for administration to representative Iraqi authorities as early as possible.

The United Nations has a vital role to play in providing humanitarian relief, in supporting the reconstruction of Iraq, and in helping in the formation of an Iraqi interim authority. The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners are ready to work closely with representatives of the United Nations and its specialised agencies and look forward to the appointment of a special coordinator by the Secretary-General. We also welcome the support and contributions of member States, international and regional organisations, and other entities, under appropriate coordination arrangements with the Coalition Provisional Authority.

We would be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jeremy Greenstock
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom

(Signed) John D. Negroponte
Permanent Representative of the United States”

12.  As mentioned in the above letter, the occupying States, acting through the Commander of Coalition Forces, created the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to act as a “caretaker administration” until an Iraqi government could be established. It had power, inter alia, to issue legislation. On 13 May 2003 the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, issued a memorandum formally appointing Ambassador Paul Bremer as Administrator of the CPA with responsibility for the temporary governance of IraqIn CPA Regulation No. 1, dated 16 May 2003, Ambassador Bremer provided as follows:

Pursuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war,

I hereby promulgate the following:

Section 1

The Coalition Provisional Authority

(1)  The CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional administration, to restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future, including by advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance and facilitating economic recovery and sustainable reconstruction and development.

(2)  The CPA is vested with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives, to be exercised under relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war. This authority shall be exercised by the CPA Administrator.

(3)  As the Commander of Coalition Forces, the Commander of US Central Command shall directly support the CPA by deterring hostilities; maintaining Iraqs territorial integrity and security; searching for, securing and destroying weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in carrying out Coalition policy generally.

Section 2

The Applicable Law

Unless suspended or replaced by the CPA or superseded by legislation issued by democratic institutions of Iraq, laws in force in Iraq as of 16 April 2003 shall continue to apply in Iraq in so far as the laws do not prevent the CPA from exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations, or conflict with the present or any other Regulation or Order issued by the CPA.

...

13.  The CPA administration was divided into regional areas. CPA South was placed under United Kingdom responsibility and control, with a United Kingdom Regional Coordinator. It covered the southernmost four of Iraqs eighteen provinces, each having a governorate coordinator. United Kingdom troops were deployed in the same area. The United Kingdom was represented at CPA headquarters through the Office of the United Kingdom Special Representative. According to the Government, although the United Kingdom Special Representative and his Office sought to influence CPA policy and decisions, United Kingdom personnel had no formal decision-making power within the Authority. All the CPAs administrative and legislative decisions were taken by Ambassador Bremer.

14.  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 referred to by Ambassador Bremer in CPA Regulation No. 1 was actually adopted six days later, on 22 May 2003. It provided as follows:

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions,

Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq,

Reaffirming also the importance of the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and of eventual confirmation of the disarmament of Iraq,

Stressing the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources, welcoming the commitment of all parties concerned to support the creation of an environment in which they may do so as soon as possible, and expressing resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly,

Encouraging efforts by the people of Iraq to form a representative government based on the rule of law that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi citizens without regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender, and, in this connection, recalls Resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000,

Welcoming the first steps of the Iraqi people in this regard, and noting in this connection the 15 April 2003 Nasiriyah statement and the 28 April 2003 Baghdad statement,

Resolved that the United Nations should play a vital role in humanitarian relief, the reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration and establishment of national and local institutions for representative governance,

...

Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/538) and recognising the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these States as Occupying Powers under unified command (the Authority),

Noting further that other States that are not Occupying Powers are working now or in the future may work under the Authority,

Welcoming further the willingness of member States to contribute to stability and security in Iraq by contributing personnel, equipment, and other resources under the Authority,

Concerned that many Kuwaitis and Third-State Nationals still are not accounted for since 2 August 1990,

Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1.  Appeals to member States and concerned organisations to assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country, and to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq in accordance with this Resolution;

2.  Calls upon all member States in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organisations for Iraq and to help meet the humanitarian and other needs of the Iraqi people by providing food, medical supplies, and resources necessary for reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraqs economic infrastructure;

3.  Appeals to member States to deny safe haven to those members of the previous Iraqi regime who are alleged to be responsible for crimes and atrocities and to support actions to bring them to justice;

4.  Calls upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future;

5.  Calls upon all concerned to comply fully with their obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907;

...

8.  Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq whose independent responsibilities shall involve reporting regularly to the Council on his activities under this Resolution, coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq, coordinating among United Nations and international agencies engaged in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in Iraq, and, in coordination with the Authority, assisting the people of Iraq through:

(a)  coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction assistance by United Nations agencies and between United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations;

(b)  promoting the safe, orderly, and voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons;

(c)  working intensively with the Authority, the people of Iraq, and others concerned to advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance, including by working together to facilitate a process leading to an internationally recognised, representative government of Iraq;

(d)  facilitating the reconstruction of key infrastructure, in cooperation with other international organisations;

(e)  promoting economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development, including through coordination with national and regional organisations, as appropriate, civil society, donors, and the international financial institutions;

(f)  encouraging international efforts to contribute to basic civilian administration functions;

(g)  promoting the protection of human rights;

(h)  encouraging international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police force; and

(i)  encouraging international efforts to promote legal and judicial reform;

9.  Supports the formation, by the people of Iraq with the help of the Authority and working with the Special Representative, of an Iraqi interim administration as a transitional administration run by Iraqis, until an internationally recognised, representative government is established by the people of Iraq and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority;

...

24.  Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the work of the Special Representative with respect to the implementation of this Resolution and on the work of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board and encourages the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to inform the Council at regular intervals of their efforts under this Resolution;

25.  Decides to review the implementation of this Resolution within twelve months of adoption and to consider further steps that might be necessary.

26.  Calls upon member States and international and regional organisations to contribute to the implementation of this Resolution;

27.  Decides to remain seised of this matter.”

5.  Developments between July 2003 and June 2004

15.  In July 2003 the Governing Council of Iraq was established. The CPA was required to consult with it on all matters concerning the temporary governance of Iraq.

16.  On 16 October 2003 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1511, which provided, inter alia, as follows:

The Security Council

...

Underscoring that the sovereignty of Iraq resides in the State of Iraq, reaffirming the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources, reiterating its resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly, and recognising the importance of international support, particularly that of countries in the region, Iraqs neighbours, and regional organisations, in taking forward this process expeditiously,

Recognising that international support for restoration of conditions of stability and security is essential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as to the ability of all concerned to carry out their work on behalf of the people of Iraq, and welcoming member State contributions in this regard under Resolution 1483 (2003),

Welcoming the decision of the Governing Council of Iraq to form a preparatory constitutional committee to prepare for a constitutional conference that will draft a Constitution to embody the aspirations of the Iraqi people, and urging it to complete this process quickly,

...

Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1.  Reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, and underscores, in that context, the temporary nature of the exercise by the Coalition Provisional Authority (Authority) of the specific responsibilities, authorities, and obligations under applicable international law recognised and set forth in Resolution 1483 (2003), which will cease when an internationally recognised, representative government established by the people of Iraq is sworn in and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority, inter alia, through steps envisaged in paragraphs 4 through 7 and 10 below;

...

4.  Determines that the Governing Council and its ministers are the principal bodies of the Iraqi interim administration, which, without prejudice to its further evolution, embodies the sovereignty of the State of Iraq during the transitional period until an internationally recognised, representative government is established and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority;

5.  Affirms that the administration of Iraq will be progressively undertaken by the evolving structures of the Iraqi interim administration;

6.  Calls upon the Authority, in this context, to return governing responsibilities and authorities to the people of Iraq as soon as practicable and requests the Authority, in cooperation as appropriate with the Governing Council and the Secretary-General, to report to the Council on the progress being made;

7.  Invites the Governing Council to provide to the Security Council, for its review, no later than 15 December 2003, in cooperation with the Authority and, as circumstances permit, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, a timetable and a programme for the drafting of a new Constitution for Iraq and for the holding of democratic elections under that Constitution;

8.  Resolves that the United Nations, acting through the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, should strengthen its vital role in Iraq, including by providing humanitarian relief, promoting the economic reconstruction of and conditions for sustainable development in Iraq, and advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative government;

...

13.  Determines that the provision of security and stability is essential to the successful completion of the political process as outlined in paragraph 7 above and to the ability of the United Nations to contribute effectively to that process and the implementation of Resolution 1483 (2003), and authorises a Multinational Force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the implementation of the timetable and programme as well as to contribute to the security of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, the Governing Council of Iraq and other institutions of the Iraqi interim administration, and key humanitarian and economic infrastructure;

14.  Urges member States to contribute assistance under this United Nations mandate, including military forces, to the Multinational Force referred to in paragraph 13 above;

15.  Decides that the Council shall review the requirements and mission of the Multinational Force referred to in paragraph 13 above not later than one year from the date of this Resolution, and that in any case the mandate of the Force shall expire upon the completion of the political process as described in paragraphs 4 through 7 and 10 above, and expresses readiness to consider on that occasion any future need for the continuation of the Multinational Force, taking into account the views of an internationally recognised, representative government of Iraq;

...

25.  Requests that the United States, on behalf of the Multinational Force as outlined in paragraph 13 above, report to the Security Council on the efforts and progress of this Force as appropriate and not less than every six months;

26.  Decides to remain seised of the matter.

17.  On 8 March 2004 the Governing Council of Iraq promulgated the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (known as the “Transitional Administrative Law”). This provided a temporary legal framework for the administration of Iraq for the transitional period which was due to commence by 30 June 2004 with the establishment of an interim Iraqi government and the dissolution of the CPA.

18.  Provision for the new regime was made in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, adopted on 8 June 2004, which provided, inter alia, that the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

1.  Endorses the formation of a sovereign interim government of Iraq, as presented on 1 June 2004, which will assume full responsibility and authority by 30 June 2004 for governing Iraq while refraining from taking any actions affecting Iraqs destiny beyond the limited interim period until an elected transitional government of Iraq assumes office as envisaged in paragraph 4 below;

2.  Welcomes that, also by 30 June 2004, the occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to exist, and that Iraq will reassert its full sovereignty;

...

8.  Welcomes ongoing efforts by the incoming interim government of Iraq to develop Iraqi security forces including the Iraqi armed forces (hereinafter referred to as Iraqi security forces), operating under the authority of the interim government of Iraq and its successors, which will progressively play a greater role and ultimately assume full responsibility for the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq;

9.  Notes that the presence of the Multinational Force in Iraq is at the request of the incoming interim government of Iraq and therefore reaffirms the authorisation for the Multinational Force under unified command established under Resolution 1511 (2003), having regard to the letters annexed to this Resolution;

10.  Decides that the Multinational Force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this Resolution expressinginter alia, the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the Multinational Force and setting out its tasks, including by preventing and deterring terrorism, so that, inter alia, the United Nations can fulfil its role in assisting the Iraqi people as outlined in paragraph 7 above and the Iraqi people can implement freely and without intimidation the timetable and programme for the political process and benefit from reconstruction and rehabilitation activities;

...

6.  The transfer of authority to the Iraqi interim government

19.  On 28 June 2004 full authority was transferred from the CPA to the Iraqi interim government and the CPA ceased to exist. Subsequently, the Multinational Force, including the British forces forming part of it, remained in Iraq pursuant to requests by the Iraqi government and authorisations from the United Nations Security Council.

B.  United Kingdom armed forces in Iraq from May 2003 to June 2004

20.  During this period, the Coalition Forces consisted of six divisions that were under the overall command of US generals. Four were US divisions and two were multinational. Each division was given responsibility for a particular geographical area of Iraq. The United Kingdom was given command of the Multinational Division (South-East), which comprised the provinces of Basra, Maysan, Thi Qar and AlMuthanna, an area of 96,000 square kilometres with a population of 4.6 million. There were 14,500 Coalition troops, including 8,150 United Kingdom troops, stationed in the Multinational Division (South-East). The main theatre for operations by United Kingdom forces in the Multinational Division (South-East) were the Basra and Maysan provinces, with a total population of about 2.75 million people. Just over 8,000 British troops were deployed there, of whom just over 5,000 had operational responsibilities.

21.  From 1 May 2003 onwards British forces in Iraq carried out two main functions. The first was to maintain security in the Multinational Division (South-East) area, in particular in the Basra and Maysan provinces. The principal security task was the effort to re-establish the Iraqi security forces, including the Iraqi police. Other tasks included patrols, arrests, anti-terrorist operations, policing of civil demonstrations, protection of essential utilities and infrastructure and protecting police stations. The second main function of the British troops was the support of the civil administration in Iraq in a variety of ways, from liaison with the CPA and Governing Council of Iraq and local government, to assisting with the rebuilding of the infrastructure.

22.  In the Aitken Report (see paragraph 69 below), prepared on behalf of the Army Chief of General Staff, the post-conflict situation in Iraq was described as follows:

“The context in which operations have been conducted in Iraq has been exceptionally complex. It is not for this report to comment on the jus ad bellum aspects of the operation, nor of the publics opinions of the invasion. It is, however, important to note that the Alliances post-invasion plans concentrated more on the relief of a humanitarian disaster (which did not, in the event, occur on anything like the scale that had been anticipated), and less on the criminal activity and subsequent insurgency that actually took place. One consequence of that was that we had insufficient troops in theatre to deal effectively with the situation in which we found ourselves. Peace support operations require significantly larger numbers of troops to impose law and order than are required for prosecuting a war: ours were very thinly spread on the ground. In his investigation (in April 2005) of the Breadbasket incident [alleged abuse of Iraqis detained on suspicion of looting humanitarian aid stores], Brigadier Carter described conditions in Iraq thus:

... May 2003, some four weeks or so after British forces had started to begin the transition from offensive operations to stabilisation. The situation was fluid. Battlegroups had been given geographic areas of responsibility based generally around their initial tactical objectives. Combat operations had officially ended, and [the] rules of engagement had changed to reflect this, but there was a rising trend of shooting incidents. Although these were principally between Iraqis, seeking to settle old scores or involved in criminal activity, there were early indications that the threat to British soldiers was developing ... The structure of the British forces was changing. Many of the heavier capabilities that had been required for the invasion were now being sent home. Some force elements were required for operations elsewhere, and there was pressure from the UK to downsize quickly to more sustainable numbers ... Local attitudes were also changing. Initially ecstatic with happiness, the formerly downtrodden Shia population in and around Basra had become suspicious, and by the middle of May people were frustrated. Aspirations and expectations were not being met. There was no Iraqi administration or governance. Fuel and potable water were in short supply, electricity was intermittent, and the hospitals were full of wounded from the combat operations phase. Bridges and key routes had been destroyed by Coalition bombing. Law and order had completely collapsed. The Iraqi police service had melted away; the few security guards who remained were old and incapable; and the Iraqi armed forces had been captured, disbanded or deserted. Criminals had been turned out onto the streets and the prisons had been stripped. The judiciary were in hiding. Every government facility had been raided and all loose items had been removed. Insecure buildings had been occupied by squatters. Crime was endemic and in parts of Basra a state of virtual anarchy prevailed. Hijackings, child kidnappings, revenge killings, car theft and burglary were rife. In a very short space of time wealth was being comprehensively redistributed.

In this environment, the British army was the sole agent of law and order within its area of operations. When the Association of Chief Police Officers Lead for International Affairs, Mr Paul Kernaghan, visited Iraq in May 2003, he said that he would not recommend the deployment of civilian police officers to the theatre of operations due to the poor security situation. The last time the army had exercised the powers of an army of occupation was in 1945 – and it had spent many months preparing for that role; in May 2003, the same soldiers who had just fought a highintensity, conventional war were expected to convert, almost overnight, into the only people capable of providing the agencies of government and humanitarian relief for the people of southern Iraq. Battlegroups (comprising a Lieutenant Colonel and about 500 soldiers) were allocated areas of responsibilities comprising hundreds of square miles; companies (a Major with about 100 men under command) were given whole towns to run. The British invasion plans had wisely limited damaging as much of the physical infrastructure as possible; but with only military personnel available to run that infrastructure, and very limited local staff support, the task placed huge strains on the army.

One of the effects of this lack of civil infrastructure was the conundrum British soldiers faced when dealing with routine crime. Our experience in Northern Ireland, and in peace support operations around the world, has inculcated the clear principle of police primacy when dealing with criminals in operational environments. Soldiers accept that they will encounter crime, and that they will occasionally be required to arrest those criminals; but (despite some experience of this syndrome in Kosovo in 1999) our doctrine and practice had not prepared us for dealing with those criminals when there was no civil police force, no judicial system to deal with offenders, and no prisons to detain them in. Even when a nascent Iraqi police force was re-established in 2003, troops on the ground had little confidence in its ability to deal fairly or reasonably with any criminals handed over to it. In hindsight, we now know that some soldiers acted outside the law in the way they dealt with local criminals. However diligent they were, commanders were unable to be everywhere, and so were physically unable to supervise their troops to the extent that they should; as a result, when those instances did occur, they were less likely to be spotted and prevented.

23.  United Kingdom military records show that, as at 30 June 2004, there had been approximately 178 demonstrations and 1,050 violent attacks against Coalition Forces in the Multinational Division (South-East) since 1 May 2003. The violent attacks consisted of 5 anti-aircraft attacks, 12 grenade attacks, 101 attacks using improvised explosive devices, 52 attempted attacks using improvised explosive devices, 145 mortar attacks, 147 rocket-propelled grenade attacks, 535 shootings and 53 others. The same records show that, between May 2003 and March 2004, 49 Iraqis were known to have been killed in incidents in which British troops used force.

C.  The rules of engagement

24.  The use of force by British troops during operations is covered by the appropriate rules of engagement. The rules of engagement governing the use of lethal force by British troops in Iraq during the relevant period were the subject of guidance contained in a card issued to every soldier, known as Card Alpha. Card Alpha set out the rules of engagement in the following terms:

“CARD A – GUIDANCE FOR OPENING FIRE FOR SERVICE PERSONNEL AUTHORISED TO CARRY ARMS AND AMMUNITION ON DUTY

GENERAL GUIDANCE

1.  This guidance does not affect your inherent right to self-defence. However, in all situations you are to use no more force than absolutely necessary.

FIREARMS MUST ONLY BE USED AS A LAST RESORT

2.  When guarding property, you must not use lethal force other than for the protection of human life.

PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIFE

3.  You may only open fire against a person if he/she is committing or about to commit an act likely to endanger life and there is no other way to prevent the danger.

CHALLENGING

4.  A challenge MUST be given before opening fire unless:

(a)  to do this would be to increase the risk of death or grave injury to you or any other persons other than the attacker(s);

OR

(b)  you or others in the immediate vicinity are under armed attack.

5.  You are to challenge by shouting: NAVY, ARMY, AIR FORCE, STOP OR I FIRE or words to that effect.

OPENING FIRE

6.  If you have to open fire you are to:

(a)  fire only aimed shots;

AND

(b)  fire no more rounds than are necessary;

AND

(c)  take all reasonable precautions not to injure anyone other than your target.”

D.  Investigations into Iraqi civilian deaths involving British soldiers

1.  The decision to refer an incident for investigation by the Royal Military Police

25.  On 21 June 2003 Brigadier Moore (Commander of the 19 Mechanised Brigade in Iraq from June to November 2003) issued a formal policy on the investigation of shooting incidents. This policy provided that all shooting incidents were to be reported and the Divisional Provost Marshal was to be informed. Non-commissioned officers from the Royal Military Police were then to evaluate the incident and decide whether it fell within the rules of engagement. If it was decided that the incident did come within the rules of engagement, statements were to be recorded and a completed bulletin submitted through the chain of command. If the incident appeared to fall outside the rules of engagement and involved death or serious injury, the investigation was to be handed to the Special Investigation Branch of the Royal Military Police (see paragraph 28 below) by the Divisional Provost Marshal at the earliest opportunity.

26.  However, Brigadier Moore decided that from 28 July 2003 this policy should be revisedThe new policy required that all such incidents should be reported immediately by the soldier involved to the Multinational Division (South-East) by means of a “serious incident reportThere would then be an investigation into the incident by the Company Commander or the soldiers Commanding Officer. In his evidence to the domestic courts, Brigadier Moore explained that:

“The form of an investigation into an incident would vary according to the security situation on the ground and the circumstances of the individual case. Generally, it would involve the Company Commander or Commanding Officer taking statements from the members of the patrol involved, and reviewing radio logs. It might also include taking photographs of the scene. Sometimes there would be further investigation through a meeting with the family/tribe of the person killed. Investigations at unit-level, however, would not include a full forensic examination. Within the Brigade, we had no forensic capability.”

If the Commanding Officer was satisfied, on the basis of the information available to him, that the soldier had acted lawfully and within the rules of engagement, there was no requirement to initiate an investigation by the Special Investigation Branch. The Commanding Officer would record his decision in writing to Brigadier Moore. If the Commanding Officer was not so satisfied, or if he had insufficient information to arrive at a decision, he was required to initiate a Special Investigation Branch investigation.

27.  Between January and April 2004 there was a further reconsideration of this policy, prompted by the fact that the environment had become less hostile and also by the considerable media and parliamentary interest in incidents involving United Kingdom forces in which Iraqis had died. On 24 April 2004 a new policy was adopted by the Commander of the Multinational Division (South-East), requiring all shooting incidents involving United Kingdom forces which resulted in a civilian being killed or injured to be investigated by the Special Investigation Branch. In exceptional cases, the Brigade Commander could decide that an investigation was not necessary. Any such decision had to be notified to the Commander of the Multinational Division (South-East) in writing.

2.  Investigation by the Royal Military Police (Special Investigation Branch)

28.  The Royal Military Police form part of the army and deploy with the army on operations abroad, but have a separate chain of command. Military police officers report to the Provost Marshal, who reports to the Adjutant General. Within the Royal Military Police, the Special Investigation Branch is responsible for the investigation of serious crimes committed by members of the British forces while on service, incidents involving contact between the military and civilians and any special investigations tasked to it, including incidents involving civilian deaths caused by British soldiers. To secure their practical independence on operations, the Special Investigation Branch deploy as entirely discrete units and are subject to their own chain of command, headed by provost officers who are deployed on operations for this purpose.

29.  Investigations into Iraqi civilian deaths involving British soldiers were triggered either by the Special Investigation Branch being asked to investigate by the Commanding Officer of the units concerned or by the Special Investigation Branch of its own initiative, when it became aware of an incident by other means. However, the latter type of investigation could be terminated if the Special Investigation Branch was instructed to stop by the Provost Marshal or the Commanding Officer of the unit involved.

30.  Special Investigation Branch investigations in Iraq were hampered by a number of difficulties, such as security problems, lack of interpreters, cultural considerations (for example, the Islamic practice requiring a body to be buried within twenty-four hours and left undisturbed for forty days), the lack of pathologists and post-mortem facilities, the lack of records, problems with logistics, the climate and general working conditions. The Aitken Report (see paragraph 69 below) summarised the position as follows:

“It was not only the combat troops who were overstretched in these circumstances. The current military criminal justice system is relevant, independent, and fit for purpose; but even the most effective criminal justice system will struggle to investigate, advise on and prosecute cases where the civil infrastructure is effectively absent. And so, in the immediate aftermath of the ground war, the Service Police faced particular challenges in gathering evidence of a quality that would meet the very high standards required under English law. National records – usually an integral reference point for criminal investigations – were largely absent; a different understanding of the law between Iraqi people and British police added to an atmosphere of hostility and suspicion; and the army was facing an increasingly dangerous operational environment – indeed, on 24 June 2003, six members of the Royal Military Police were killed in Al Amarah. Local customs similarly hampered the execution of British standards of justice: in the case of Nadhem Abdullah, for instance, the family of the deceased refused to hand over the body for forensic examination – significantly reducing the quality of evidence surrounding his death.

The Aitken Report also referred to the problems caused to the Special Investigation Branch, when attempting to investigate serious allegations of abuse, by the sense of loyalty to fellow soldiers which could lead to a lack of cooperation from army personnel and to what the judge in the court martial concerning the killing of the sixth applicants son had described as a “wall of silence” from some of the military witnesses called to give evidence.

31.  On conclusion of a Special Investigation Branch investigation, the Special Investigation Branch officer would report in writing to the Commanding Officer of the unit involved. Such a report would include a covering letter and a summary of the evidence, together with copies of any documentary evidence relevant to the investigation in the form of statements from witnesses and investigators. The report would not contain any decision as to the facts or conclusions as to what had happened. It was then for the Commanding Officer to decide whether or not to refer the case to the Army Prosecuting Authority for possible trial by court martial.

32.  The Aitken Report, dated 25 January 2008 (see paragraph 69 below), commented on the prosecution of armed forces personnel in connection with the death of Iraqi civilians, as follows:

“Four cases involving Iraqi deaths as a result of deliberate abuse have been investigated, and subsequently referred to the Army Prosecuting Authority (APA) on the basis there was a prima facie case that the victims had been killed unlawfully by British troops. The APA preferred charges on three of these cases on the basis that it considered there was a realistic prospect of conviction, and that trial was in the public and service interest; and yet not one conviction for murder or manslaughter has been recorded.

The armys position is straightforward on the issue of prosecution. Legal advice is available for commanding officers and higher authorities to assist with decisions on referring appropriate cases to the APA. The Director Army Legal Services (DALS), who is responsible to the Adjutant General for the provision of legal services to the army, is additionally appointed by the Queen as the APA. In that capacity, he has responsibility for decisions on whether to direct trial for all cases referred by the military chain of command, and for the prosecution of all cases tried before courts martial, the Standing Civilian Court and the Summary Appeal Court and for appeals before the Courts-Martial Appeal Court and the House of Lords. DALS delegates these functions to ALS [(Army Legal Services)] officers appointed as prosecutors in the APA, and Brigadier Prosecutions has day-to-day responsibility for the APA. The APA is under the general superintendence of the Attorney General and is, rightly, independent of the army chain of command: the APA alone decides whether to direct court-martial trial and the appropriate charges, and neither the army chain of command, nor ministers, officials nor anyone else can make those decisions. However complex the situation in which it finds itself, the army must operate within the law at all times; once the APA has made its decision (based on the evidence and the law), the army has to accept that the consequences of prosecuting particular individuals or of particular charges may have a negative impact on its reputation.

The absence of a single conviction for murder or manslaughter as a result of deliberate abuse in Iraq may appear worrying, but it is explicable. Evidence has to be gathered (and, as already mentioned, this was not an easy process); that evidence has to be presented in court; and defendants are presumed innocent unless the prosecution can prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. That is a stiff test – no different to the one that applies in our civilian courts. In the broader context, the outcome from prosecutions brought to court martial by the APA is almost exactly comparable with the equivalent civilian courts: for example, as at the end of 2006, the conviction rates after trial in the court-martial system stood at 12% as compared with 13% in the Crown Courts. It is inevitable that some prosecutions will fail; but this does not mean that they should not have been brought in the first place. It is the courts, after all, that determine guilt, not the prosecutors. Indeed, the fact that only a small number of all the 200-odd cases investigated by Service Police in Iraq resulted in prosecution could be interpreted as both a positive and a negative indicator: positive, in that the evidence and the context did not support the preferring of criminal charges; but negative, in that we know that the Service Police were hugely hampered, in some cases, in their ability to collect evidence of a high enough standard for charges to be preferred or for cases to be successfully prosecuted.

It is important to note that none of this implies any fundamental flaws in the effectiveness of the key elements of the military criminal justice system. Both the Special Investigation Branch of the Royal Military Police (RMP(SIB)) and the APA were independently inspected during 2007. The police inspection reported that ‘... Her Majestys Inspectorate of Constabulary assess the RMP(SIB) as having the capability and capacity to run a competent level 3 (serious criminal) reactive investigation; and the inspection of the APA in February and March 2007 by Her Majestys Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate concluded that: ... the APA undertakes its responsibilities in a thorough and professional manner, often in difficult circumstances, adding that 95.7% of decisions to proceed to trial were correct on evidential grounds, and 100% of decisions to proceed to trial were properly based on public or service interest grounds.

E.  The deaths of the applicants relatives

33.  The following accounts are based on the witness statements of the applicants and the British soldiers involved in each incident. These statements were also submitted to the domestic courts and, as regards all but the fifth applicant, summarised in their judgments (particularly the judgment of the Divisional Court).

1.  The first applicant

34.  The first applicant is the brother of Hazim Jumaa Gatteh Al-Skeini (“Hazim Al-Skeini”), who was 23 years old at the time of his death. Hazim Al-Skeini was one of two Iraqis from the Beini Skein tribe who were shot dead in the Al-Majidiyah area of Basra just before midnight on 4 August 2003 by Sergeant A.the Commander of a British patrol.

35.  In his witness statement, the first applicant explained that, during the evening in question, various members of his family had been gathering at a house in Al-Majidiyah for a funeral ceremony. In Iraq it is customary for guns to be discharged at a funeral. The first applicant stated that he was engaged in receiving guests at the house, as they arrived for the ceremony, and saw his brother fired upon by British soldiers as he was walking along the street towards the house. According to the first applicant, his brother was unarmed and only about ten metres away from the soldiers when he was shot and killed. Another man with him was also killed. He had no idea why the soldiers opened fire.

36.  According to the British account of the incident, the patrol, approaching on foot and on a very dark night, heard heavy gunfire from a number of different points in Al-Majidiyah. As the patrol got deeper into the village they came upon two Iraqi men in the street. One was about five metres from Sergeant A., who was leading the patrol. Sergeant A. saw that he was armed and pointing the gun in his direction. In the dark, it was impossible to tell the position of the second man. Believing that his life and those of the other soldiers in the patrol were at immediate risk, Sergeant A. opened fire on the two men without giving any verbal warning.

37.  The following day, Sergeant A. produced a written statement describing the incident. This was passed to the Commanding Officer of his battalion, Colonel G.who took the view that the incident fell within the rules of engagement and duly wrote a report to that effect. Colonel G. sent the report to the Brigade, where it was considered by Brigadier Moore. Brigadier Moore queried whether the other man had been pointing his gun at the patrol. Colonel G. wrote a further report that dealt with this query to Brigadier Moores satisfaction. The original report was not retained in the Brigade records. Having considered Colonel G.s further report, as did his Deputy Chief of Staff and his legal adviser, Brigadier Moore was satisfied that the actions of Sergeant A. fell within the rules of engagement and so he did not order any further investigation.

38.  On 11, 13 and 16 August 2003 Colonel G. met with members of the dead mens tribe. He explained why Sergeant A. had opened fire and gave the tribe a charitable donation of 2,500 United States dollars (USD) from the British Army Goodwill Payment Committee, together with a letter explaining the circumstances of the deaths and acknowledging that the deceased had not intended to attack anyone.

2.  The second applicant

39.  The second applicant is the widow of Muhammad Salim, who was shot and fatally wounded by Sergeant C. shortly after midnight on 6 November 2003.

40.  The second applicant was not present when her husband was shot and her evidence was based on what she was told by those who were present. She stated that on 5 November 2003, during Ramadan, Muhammad Salim went to visit his brother-in-law at his home in Basra. At about 11.30 p.m. British soldiers raided the house. They broke down the front door. One of the British soldiers came face-to-face with the second applicants husband in the hall of the house and fired a shot at him, hitting him in the stomach. The British soldiers took him to the Czech military hospital, where he died on 7 November 2003.

41.  According to the British account of the incident, the patrol had received information from an acquaintance of one of their interpreters that a group of men armed with long-barrelled weapons, grenades and rocket- propelled grenades had been seen entering the house. The order was given for a quick search-and-arrest operation. After the patrol failed to gain entry by knocking, the door was broken down. Sergeant C. entered the house through the front door with two other soldiers and cleared the first room. As he entered the second room, he heard automatic gunfire from within the house. When Sergeant C. moved forward into the next room by the bottom of the stairs, two men armed with long-barrelled weapons rushed down the stairs towards him. There was no time to give a verbal warning. Sergeant C. believed that his life was in immediate danger. He fired one shot at the leading man, the second applicants husband, and hit him in the stomach. He then trained his weapon on the second man who dropped his gun. The applicants family subsequently informed the patrol that they were lawyers and were in dispute with another family of lawyers over the ownership of office premises, which had led to their being subjected to two armed attacks which they had reported to the police, one three days before and one only thirty minutes before the patrols forced entry.

42.  On 6 November 2003 the Company Commander produced a report of the incident. He concluded that the patrol had deliberately been provided with false intelligence by the other side in the feud. Having considered the report and spoken to the Company Commander, Colonel G. came to the conclusion that the incident fell within the rules of engagement and did not require any further Special Investigation Branch investigation. He therefore produced a report to that effect the same day and forwarded it to the Brigade, where it was considered by Brigadier General Jones. Brigadier Jones discussed the matter with his Deputy Chief of Staff and his legal adviser. He also discussed the case with his political adviser. As a result, Brigadier Jones also concluded that it was a straightforward case that fell within the rules of engagement and duly issued a report to that effect. The applicant, who had three young children and an elderly mother-in-law to support, received USD 2,000 from the British Army Goodwill Payment Committee, together with a letter setting out the circumstances of the killing.

3.  The third applicant

43.  The third applicant is the widower of Hannan Mahaibas Sadde Shmailawi, who was shot and fatally wounded on 10 November 2003 at the Institute of Education in the Al-Maqaal area of Basra, where the third applicant worked as a night porter and lived with his wife and family.

44.  According to the third applicants witness statement, at about 8 p.m. on the evening in question, he and his family were sitting round the dinner table when there was a sudden burst of machine-gunfire from outside the buildingBullets struck his wife in the head and ankles and one of his children on the arm. The applicants wife and child were taken to hospital, where his child recovered but his wife died.

45.  According to the British account of the incident, the third applicants wife was shot during a firefight between a British patrol and a number of unknown gunmen. When the area was illuminated by parachute flares, at least three men with long-barrelled weapons were seen in open ground, two of whom were firing directly at the British soldiers. One of the gunmen was shot dead during this exchange of fire with the patrol. After about seven to ten minutes, the firing ceased and armed people were seen running away. A woman (the third applicants wife) with a head injury and a child with an arm injury were found when the buildings were searched. Both were taken to hospital.

46.  The following morning, the Company Commander produced a report concerning the incident, together with statements from the soldiers involved. After he had considered the report and statements, Colonel G. came to the conclusion that the incident fell within the rules of engagement and did not require any further Special Investigation Branch investigation. He duly produced a report to that effect, which he then forwarded to the Brigade. The report was considered by Brigadier Jones, who also discussed the matter with his Deputy Chief of Staff, his legal adviser and Colonel G. As a result, Brigadier Jones came to the conclusion that the incident fell within the rules of engagement and required no further investigation.

4.  The fourth applicant

47.  The fourth applicant is the brother of Waleed Fayay Muzban, aged 43, who was shot and fatally injured on the night of 24 August 2003 by Lance Corporal S. in the Al-Maqaal area of Basra.

48.  The fourth applicant was not present when his brother was shot, but he claims that the incident was witnessed by his neighboursIn his witness statement he stated that his understanding was that his brother was returning home from work at about 8.30 p.m. on the evening in question. He was driving minibus along a street called Souq Hitteen, near where he and the fourth applicant lived. For no apparent reason, according to the applicants statement, the minibus “came under a barrage of bullets”, as a result of which Waleed was mortally wounded in the chest and stomach.

49.  Lance Corporal S. was a member of a patrol carrying out a check around the perimeter of a Coalition military base (Fort Apache), where three Royal Military Police officers had been killed by gunfire from a vehicle the previous day. According to the British soldieraccount of the incident, Lance Corporal S. became suspicious of a minibus, with curtains over its windows, that was being driven towards the patrol at slow speed with its headlights dipped. When the vehicle was signalled to stop, it appeared to be trying to evade the soldiers so Lance Corporal S. pointed his weapon at the driver and ordered him to stop. The vehicle then stopped and Lance Corporal S. approached the drivers door and greeted the driver (the fourth applicants brother). The driver reacted in an aggressive manner and appeared to be shouting over his shoulder to people in the curtained-off area in the back of the vehicle. When Lance Corporal S. tried to look into the back of the vehicle, the driver pushed him away by punching him in the chest. The driver then shouted into the back of the vehicle and made a grab for Lance Corporal S.weapon. Lance Corporal S. had to use force to pull himself free. The driver then accelerated away, swerving in the direction of various other members of the patrol as he did so. Lance Corporal S. fired at the vehicles tyres and it came to a halt about 100 metres from the patrol. The driver turned and again shouted into the rear of the vehicle. He appeared to be reaching for a weapon. Lance Corporal S. believed that his team was about to be fired on by the driver and others in the vehicle. He therefore fired about five aimed shots. As the vehicle sped off, Lance Corporal S. fired another two shots at the rear of the vehicle. After a short interval, the vehicle screeched to a halt. The driver got out and shouted at the British soldiers. He was ordered to lie on the ground. The patrol then approached the vehicle to check for other armed men. The vehicle proved to be empty. The driver was found to have three bullet wounds in his back and hip. He was given first aid and then taken to the Czech military hospital where he died later that day or the following day.

50.  The Special Investigation Branch commenced an investigation on 29 August 2003. The investigators recovered fragments of bullets, empty bullet cases and took digital photographs of the scene. The vehicle was recovered and transported to the United Kingdom. The deceaseds body had been returned to the family for burial and no post mortem had been carried out, so the Special Investigation Branch took statements from the two Iraqi surgeons who had operated on him. A meeting was arranged with the family to seek their consent for an exhumation and post mortem, but this was delayed. Nine military witnesses involved in the incident were interviewed and had statements taken and a further four individuals were interviewed but found to have no evidence to offer. Lance Corporal S. was not, however, questioned. Since he was suspected by the Special Investigation Branch of having acted contrary to the rules of engagement, it was Special Investigation Branch practice not to interview him until there was enough evidence to charge him. A forensic examination was carried out at the scene on 6 September 2003.

51.  On 29 August 2003 Colonel G. sent his initial report concerning the incident to Brigadier Moore. In it he stated that he was satisfied that Lance Corporal S. believed that he was acting lawfully within the rules of engagement. However, Colonel G. went on to express the view that it was a complex case that would benefit from a Special Investigation Branch investigation. After Brigadier Moore had considered Colonel G.s report, discussed the matter with his Deputy Chief of Staff and taken legal advice, it was decided that the matter could be resolved with a unit-level investigation, subject to a number of queries being satisfactorily answered. As a result, Colonel G. produced a further report dated 12 September 2003, in which he dealt with the various queries and concluded that a Special Investigation Branch investigation was no longer required. After discussing the matter again with his Deputy Chief of Staff and having taken further legal advice, Brigadier Moore concluded that the case fell within the rules of engagement.

52.  By this stage, Brigadier Moore had been informed that the Special Investigation Branch had commenced an investigation into the incident. On 17 September 2003 Colonel G. wrote to the Special Investigation Branch asking them to terminate the investigation. The same request was made by Brigadier Moore through his Chief of Staff during a meeting with the Senior Investigating Officer from the Special Investigation Branch. The Special Investigation Branch investigation was terminated on 23 September 2003. The deceaseds family received USD 1,400 from the British Army Goodwill Payment Committee and a further USD 3,000 in compensation for the minibus.

53.  Following the fourth applicants application for judicial review (see paragraph 73 below), the case was reviewed by senior investigation officers in the Special Investigation Branch and the decision was taken to reopen the investigation. The investigation was reopened on 7 June 2004 and completed on 3 December 2004, despite difficulties caused by the very dangerous conditions in Iraq at that time.

54.  On completing the investigation, the Special Investigation Branch reported to the soldiers Commanding Officer, who referred the case to the Army Prosecuting Authority in February 2005. The Army Prosecuting Authority decided that a formal preliminary examination of the witnesses should be held, in order to clarify any uncertainties and ambiguities in the evidence. Depositions were taken by the Army Prosecuting Authority from the soldiers who had witnessed the shooting, and who were the only known witnesses. Advice was obtained from an independent senior counsel, who advised that there was no realistic prospect of conviction, since there was no realistic prospect of establishing that Lance Corporal S. had not fired in selfdefence. The file was sent to the Attorney General, who decided not to exercise his jurisdiction to order a criminal prosecution.

5.  The fifth applicant

55.  The fifth applicant is the father of Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali, who died on 8 May 2003, aged 15.

56.  According to the statements made by the fifth applicant for the purpose of United Kingdom court proceedings, on 8 May 2003 his son did not return home at 1.30 p.m. as expected. The fifth applicant went to look for him at Al-Saad Square, where he was told that British soldiers had arrested some Iraqi youths earlier in the day. The applicant continued to search for his son and was contacted the following morning by A., another young Iraqi, who told the applicant that he, the applicants son and two others had been arrested by British soldiers the previous day, beaten up and forced into the waters of the Shatt Al-ArabLater, on 9 May 2003, the applicants brother informed the British police about the incident and was requested to surrender Ahmeds identity card. Having spent several days waiting and searching, the applicant found his sons body in the water on 10 May 2003.

57.  The applicant immediately took his sons body to the British police station, where he was told to take the body to the local hospital. The Iraqi doctor on duty told the applicant that he was not qualified to carry out a post mortem and that there were no pathologists available. The applicant decided to bury his son, since in accordance with Islamic practice burial should take place within twenty-four hours of death.

58.  About ten to fifteen days after his sons funeral, the applicant returned to the British police station to ask for an investigation, but he was informed that it was not the business of “the British police” to deal with such matters. He returned to the police station some days later, and was informed that the Royal Military Police wished to contact him and that he should go to the presidential palace. The following day, the applicant met with Special Investigation Branch officers at the presidential palace and was informed that an investigation would be commenced.

59.  The Special Investigation Branch interviewed A. and took a statement from him. They took statements from the applicant and other family members. At least a month after the incident, the investigators went to Al-Saad Square and retrieved clothing belonging to the applicants son and to the other young men who had been arrested at the same time. At the end of the forty-day mourning period, the applicant consented to his sons body being exhumed for post-mortem examination, but it was not possible at that point to establish either whether Ahmed had been beaten prior to death or what had been the cause of death. The applicant contends that he was never given an explanation as to the post-mortem findings and that he was not kept fully informed of the progress of the investigation in general, since many of the documents he was given were in English or had been badly translated into Arabic.

60.  The applicant claims that eighteen months elapsed after the exhumation of his sons body during which time he had no contact with the investigators. In August 2005 he was informed that four soldiers had been charged with manslaughter and that a trial would take place in England. The court martial was held between September 2005 and May 2006. By that time, three of the seven soldiers who had been accused of his homicide had left the army, and a further two were absent without leave. It was the prosecution case that the soldiers had assisted Iraqi police officers to arrest the four youths on suspicion of looting and that they had driven them to the river and forced them in at gunpoint “to teach them a lesson”. The applicant and A. gave evidence to the court martial in April 2006. The applicant found the trial process confusing and intimidating and he was left with the impression that the court was biased in favour of the accused. A. gave evidence that the applicants son had appeared to be in distress in the water, but that the soldiers had driven away without helping him. However, he was not able to identify the defendants as the soldiers involved. The defendants denied any responsibility for the death and were acquitted because A.s evidence was found to be inconsistent and unreliable.

61.  The applicants sons case was one of the six cases investigated in the Aitken Report (see paragraph 69 below). Under the heading “Learning lessons from discipline cases” the report stated:

... we know that two initial police reports were produced in May 2003 relating to allegations that, on two separate occasions but within the space of just over a fortnight, Iraqis had drowned in the Shat al-Arab at the hands of British soldiers. That one of those cases did not subsequently proceed to trial is irrelevant: at the time, an ostensibly unusual event was alleged to have occurred twice in a short space of time. With all their other duties, the commanders on the ground cannot reasonably be blamed for failing to identify what may or may not have been a trend; but a more immediate, effective system for referring that sort of information to others with the capacity to analyse it might have identified such a trend. In fact, the evidence suggests that these were two isolated incidents; but had they been a symptom of a more fundamental failing, they might have been overlooked. By comparison, if there had been two reports of a new weapon being used by insurgents to attack British armoured vehicles within a fortnight, it is certain that the lessons learned process would have identified its significance, determined the counter-measures needed to combat it, and quickly disseminated new procedures to mitigate the risk. The fact that this process does not apply to disciplinary matters is only partly explained by the need for confidentiality and the preservation of evidence; but it is a failure in the process that could be fairly easily rectified without compromising the fundamental principle of innocence until proven guilty.

The report continued, under the heading “Delay”:

“The amount of time taken to resolve some of the cases with which this report is concerned has been unacceptable. ... The court martial in connection with the death of Ahmed Jabbar Kareem did not convene until September 2005, twenty-eight months after he died; by that time, three of the seven soldiers who had been accused of his murder had left the army, and a further two were absent without leave.

In most cases, it is inappropriate for the army to take administrative action against any officer or soldier until the disciplinary process has been completed, because of the risk of prejudicing the trial. When that disciplinary process takes as long as it has taken in most of these cases, then the impact of any subsequent administrative sanctions is significantly reduced – indeed, such sanctions are likely to be counterproductive. Moreover, the longer the disciplinary process takes, the less likely it is that the chain of command will take proactive measures to rectify the matters that contributed to the commission of the crimes in the first place.”

62.  The fifth applicant brought civil proceedings against the Ministry of Defence for damages in respect of his sons death. The claim was settled without going to hearing, by the payment of 115,000 pounds sterling (GBP) on 15 December 2008. In addition, on 20 February 2009 Major General Cubbitt wrote to the fifth applicant and formally apologised on behalf of the British army for its role in his sons death.

6.  The sixth applicant

63.  The sixth applicant is a Colonel in the Basra police force. His son, Baha Mousa, was aged 26 when he died while in the custody of the British army, three days after having been arrested by soldiers on 14 September 2003.

64.  According to the sixth applicant, on the night of 13 to 14 September 2003 his son had been working as a receptionist at the Ibn Al-Haitham Hotel in Basra. Early in the morning of 14 September, the applicant went to the hotel to pick his son up from work. On his arrival he noticed that a British unit had surrounded the hotel. The applicants son and six other hotel employees were lying on the floor of the hotel lobby with their hands behind their heads. The applicant expressed his concern to the lieutenant in charge of the operation, who reassured him that it was a routine investigation that would be over in a couple of hours. On the third day after his son had been detained, the sixth applicant was visited by a Royal Military Police unit. He was told that his son had been killed in custody at a British military base in Basra. He was asked to identify the corpse. The applicants sons body and face were covered in blood and bruises; his nose was broken and part of the skin of his face had been torn away.

65.  One of the other hotel employees who was arrested on 14 September 2003 stated in a witness statement prepared for the United Kingdom domestic court proceedings that, once the prisoners had arrived at the base, the Iraqi detainees were hooded, forced to maintain stress positions, denied food and water and kicked and beaten. During the detention, Baha Mousa was taken into another room, where he could be heard screaming and moaning.

66.  Late on 15 September 2003 Brigadier Moore, who had taken part in the operation in which the hotel employees had been arrested, was informed that Baha Mousa was dead and that other detainees had been ill-treatedThe Special Investigation Branch was immediately called in to investigate the death. Since local hospitals were on strike, a pathologist was flown in from the United Kingdom. Baha Mousa was found to have ninety-three identifiable injuries on his body and to have died of asphyxiation. Eight other Iraqis had also been inhumanely treated, with two requiring hospital treatment. The investigation was concluded in early April 2004 and the report distributed to the units chain of command.

67.  On 14 December 2004 the Divisional Court held that the inquiry into the applicants sons death had not been effective (see paragraph 77 below). On 21 December 2005 the Court of Appeal decided to remit the question to the Divisional Court since there had been further developments (see paragraph 81 below).

68.  On 19 July 2005 seven British soldiers were charged with criminal offences in connection with Baha Mousas death. On 19 September 2006, at the start of the court martial, one of the soldiers pleaded guilty to the war crime of inhumane treatment but not guilty to manslaughter. On 14 February 2007 charges were dropped against four of the seven soldiers and on 13 March 2007 the other two soldiers were acquitted. On 30 April 2007 the soldier convicted of inhumane treatment was sentenced to one years imprisonment and dismissal from the army.

69.  On 25 January 2008 the Ministry of Defence published a report written by Brigadier Robert Aitken concerning six cases of alleged deliberate abuse and killing of Iraqi civilians, including the deaths of the fifth and sixth applicants sons (“the Aitken Report”).

70.  The applicant brought civil proceedings against the Ministry of Defence, which concluded in July 2008 by the formal and public acknowledgement of liability and the payment of GBP 575,000 in compensation.

71.  In a written statement given in Parliament on 14 May 2008, the Secretary of State for Defence announced that there would be a public inquiry into the death of Baha Mousa. The inquiry is chaired by a retired Court of Appeal judge, with the following terms of reference:

“To investigate and report on the circumstances surrounding the death of Baha Mousa and the treatment of those detained with him, taking account of the investigations which have already taken place, in particular where responsibility lay for approving the practice of conditioning detainees by any members of the 1st Battalion, The Queens Lancashire Regiment in Iraq in 2003, and to make recommendations.”

At the time of adoption of the present judgment, the inquiry had concluded the oral hearings but had not yet delivered its report.

F.  The domestic proceedings under the Human Rights Act

1.  The Divisional Court

72.  On 26 March 2004 the Secretary of State for Defence decided, in connection with the deaths of thirteen Iraqi civilians including the relatives of the six applicants, (1) not to conduct independent inquiries into the deaths; (2) not to accept liability for the deaths; and (3) not to pay just satisfaction.

73.  The thirteen claimants applied for judicial review of these decisions, seeking declarations that both the procedural and the substantive obligations of Article 2 (and, in the case of the sixth applicant, Article 3) of the Convention had been violated as a result of the deaths and the Secretary of States refusal to order any investigation. On 11 May 2004 a judge of the Divisional Court directed that six test cases would proceed to hearing (including the cases of the first, second, third, fourth and sixth applicants) and that the other seven cases (including that of the fifth applicant) would be stayed pending the resolution of the preliminary issues.

74.  On 14 December 2004 the Divisional Court rejected the claims of the first four applicants but accepted the claim of the sixth applicant ([2004] EWHC 2911 (Admin)). Having reviewed this Courts case-law, in particular Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others ((dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII)it held that, essentially, jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention was territorial, although there were exceptions. One exception applied where a State Party had effective control of an area outside its own territory. This basis of jurisdiction applied only where the territory of one Contracting State was controlled by another Contracting State, since the Convention operated essentially within its own regional sphere and permitted no vacuum within that space. This basis of jurisdiction could not, therefore, apply in Iraq.

75.  There was an additional exception, which arose from the exercise of authority by a Contracting States agents anywhere in the world, but this was limited to specific cases recognised by international law and identified piecemeal in the Courts case-lawNo general rationale in respect of this group of exceptions was discernable from the Courtcase-law. However, the instances recognised so far arose out of the exercise of State authority in or from a location which had a discrete quasi-territorial quality, or where the State agents presence in the foreign State was consented to by that State and protected by international law, such as embassies, consulates, vessels and aircraft registered in the respondent StateA British military prison, operating in Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi sovereign authorities and containing arrested suspects, could be covered by this narrow exception. It was arguable that Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 46221/99, 12 March 2003), also fell into this category, since the applicant was arrested in a Turkish aircraft and taken immediately to Turkey. However, the Divisional Court did not consider that the Chamber judgment in Öcalan should be treated as “illuminating”, since Turkey had not raised any objection based on lack of jurisdiction at the admissibility stage.

76.  It followed that the deaths as a result of military operations in the field, such as those complained of by the first four applicants, did not fall within the United Kingdoms jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention, but that the death of the sixth applicants son, in a British military prison, did. The Divisional Court further held that the scope of the Human Rights Act 1998 was identical to that of the Convention for these purposes.

77.  The Divisional Court found that there had been a breach of the investigative duty under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention in respect of the sixth applicants son since, by July 2004, some ten months after the killing, the results of the investigation were unknown and inconclusive. The judge commented that:

329.  ... Although there has been evidence of a rather general nature about the difficulties of conducting investigations in Iraq at that time – about basic security problems involved in going to Iraqi homes to interview people, about lack of interpreters, cultural differences, logistic problems, lack of records, and so forth – without any further understanding of the outcome of the [Special Investigation Branchs] report, it is impossible to understand what, if any, relevance any of this has to a death which occurred not in the highways or byways of Iraq, but in a military prison under the control of British forces. ...

330.  Although Captain Logan says that identity parades were logistically very difficult, detainees were moved to a different location, and some military witnesses had returned to the UK, she also says that these problems only delayed the process but did not prevent it taking place satisfactorily ... There is nothing else before us to explain the dilatoriness of the investigative process: which might possibly be compared with the progress, and open public scrutiny, which we have noted seems to have been achieved with other investigations arising out of possible offences in prisons under the control of US forces. As for the [Special Investigation Branchs] report itself, on the evidence before us ... that would not contain any decision as to the facts or any conclusions as to what has or might have happened.

331.  In these circumstances we cannot accept [counsel for the Governments] submission that the investigation has been adequate in terms of the procedural obligation arising out of Article 2 of the Convention. Even if an investigation solely in the hands of the [Special Investigation Branch] might be said to be independent, on the grounds that the [Special Investigation Branch] are hierarchically and practically independent of the military units under investigation, as to which we have doubts in part because the report of the [Special Investigation Branch] is to the unit chain of command itself, it is difficult to say that the investigation which has occurred has been timely, open or effective.

In respect of the other five deaths, the judge considered that, if he were wrong on the jurisdiction issue and the claims did fall within the scope of the Convention, the investigative duty under Article 2 had not been met, for the following reasons:

337.  ... in all these cases, as in the case of Mr Mousa, the United Kingdom authorities were proceeding on the basis that the Convention did not apply. Thus the immediate investigations were in each case conducted, as a matter of policy, by the unit involved: only in case 4, that concerning Mr Waleed Muzban, was there any involvement of the [Special Investigation Branch], and that was stood down, at any rate before being reopened (at some uncertain time) upon a review of the file back in the UK. The investigations were therefore not independent. Nor were they effective, for they essentially consisted only in a comparatively superficial exercise, based on the evidence of the soldiers involved themselves, and even then on a paucity of interviews or witness statements, an exercise which was one-sided and omitted the assistance of forensic evidence such as might have become available from ballistic or medical expertise.

...

339.  In connection with these cases, [counsel for the Governments] main submission was that, in extremely difficult situations, both in operational terms in the field and in terms of post-event investigations, the army and the authorities had done their best. He particularly emphasised the following aspects of the evidence. There was no rule of law in Iraq; at the start of the occupation there was no police force at all, and at best the force was totally inadequate, as well as being under constant attack; although the Iraqi courts were functioning, they were subject to intimidation; there was no local civil inquest system or capability; the local communications systems were not functioning; there were no mortuaries, no post-mortem system, no reliable pathologists; the security situation was the worst ever experienced by seasoned soldiers; there was daily fighting between tribal and criminal gangs; the number of troops available were small; and cultural differences exacerbated all these difficulties.

340.  We would not discount these difficulties, which cumulatively must have amounted to grave impediments for anyone concerned to conduct investigations as they might have liked to have carried them out. However, irrespective of [counsel for the applicants] submission, in reliance on the Turkish cases, that security problems provide no excuse for a failure in the Article 2 investigative duty, we would conclude that, on the hypothesis stated, the investigations would still not pass muster. They were not independent; they were one-sided; and the commanders concerned were not trying to do their best according to the dictates of Article 2.

341.  That is not to say, however, that, in other circumstances, we would ignore the strategic difficulties of the situation. The Turkish cases are all concerned with deaths within the State Partys own territory. In that context, the Court was entitled to be highly sceptical about the States own professions of difficulties in an investigative path which it in any event may hardly have chosen to follow. It seems to us that this scepticism cannot be so easily transplanted in the extraterritorial setting. ...

2.  The Court of Appeal

78.  The first four applicants appealed against the Divisional Courtfinding that their relatives did not fall within the United Kingdoms jurisdiction. The Secretary of State also crossappealed against the finding in relation to the sixth applicants son; although he accepted before the Court of Appeal that an Iraqi in the actual custody of British soldiers in a military detention centre in Iraq was within the United Kingdoms jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention, he contended that the Human Rights Act had no extraterritorial effect and that the sixth applicants claim was not, therefore, enforceable in the national courts.

79.  On 21 December 2005 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and the cross-appeal ([2005] EWCA Civ 1609). Having reviewed the Courts case-law on jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention, Brooke LJ, who gave the leading judgment, held that a State could exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction when it applied control and authority over a complainant (which he termed “State agent authority”, abbreviated to “SAA”) and when it held effective control of an area outside its borders (“effective control of an area” or “ECA”), observing as follows:

“80.  I would therefore be more cautious than the Divisional Court in my approach to the Banković [and Others] judgment. It seems to me that it left open both the ECA and SAA approaches to extraterritorial jurisdiction, while at the same time emphasising (in paragraph 60) that because an SAA approach might constitute a violation of another States sovereignty (for example, when someone is kidnapped by the agents of a State on the territory of another State without that States invitation or consent), this route to any recognition that extraterritorial jurisdiction has been exercised within the meaning of an international treaty should be approached with caution.”

He consideredinter alia, the cases of Öcalan v. Turkey ([GC], no. 46221/99, ECHR 2005-IV)Freda v. Italy ((dec.), no. 8916/80, Commission decision of 7 October 1980, Decisions and Reports (DR) 21, p. 250); and Sánchez Ramirez v. France ((dec.), no. 28780/95, Commission decision of 24 June 1996, DR 86-A, p. 155); and observed that these cases had nothing to do with the principle of public international law relating to activities within aircraft registered with a State flying over the territory of another State. Instead, the findings of jurisdiction in these cases were examples of the State agent authority” doctrine applying when someone was within the control and authority of agents of a Contracting State, even outside the espace juridique of the Council of Europe, and whether or not the host State consented to the exercise of control and authority on its soil. Applying the relevant principles to the facts of the case, he concluded that the sixth applicants son came within the control and authority of the United Kingdom, and therefore its jurisdiction, from the time he was arrested at the hotel. The relatives of the other claimants had not been under the control and authority of British troops at the time when they were killed, and were not therefore within the United Kingdoms jurisdictionHe concluded in this connection that:

“110.  ... It is essential, in my judgment, to set rules which are readily intelligible. If troops deliberately and effectively restrict someones liberty he is under their control. This did not happen in any of these five cases.

80.  He then examined whether, on the facts, it could be said that British troops were in effective control of Basra City during the period in question, such as to fix the United Kingdom with jurisdiction under the “effective control of an area” doctrine. On this point, Brooke LJ concluded as follows:

“119.  Basra City was in the [Coalition Provisional Authority] regional area called CPA South. During the period of military occupation there was a significant degree of British responsibility and authority in CPA South, although its staff were drawn from five different countries and until the end of July 2003 the regional coordinator was a Dane. Indeed, only one of the four governorate teams in CPA South was headed by a British coordinator. However, although the chain of command for the British military presence in Iraq led ultimately to a US general, the Al-Basra and Maysan provinces were an area of direct British military responsibility. As I have already said ..., the Secretary of State accepts that the UK was an Occupying Power within the meaning of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations ..., at least in those areas of southern Iraq, and particularly Basra City, where British troops exercised sufficient authority for this purpose.

120.  But whatever may have been the position under the Hague Regulations, the question this court has to address is whether British troops were in effective control of Basra City for ECA purposes. The situation in August to November 2003 contrasts starkly with the situations in northern Cyprus and in the Russian-occupied part of Moldova which feature in Strasbourg case-law. In each of those cases part of the territory of a Contracting State was occupied by another Contracting State which had every intention of exercising its control on a long-term basis. The civilian administration of those territories was under the control of the Occupying State, and it deployed sufficient troops to ensure that its control of the area was effective.

121.  [The statement of Brigadier Moore, whose command included the British forces in the Basra area between May and November 2003] tells a very different story. He was not provided with nearly enough troops and other resources to enable his brigade to exercise effective control of Basra City. ... [H]e described how the local police would not uphold the law. If British troops arrested somebody and gave them to the Iraqi police, the police would hand them over to the judiciary, who were themselves intimidated by the local tribes, and the suspected criminals were back on the streets within a day or two. This state of affairs gave the British no confidence in the local criminal justice system. It also diluted their credibility with local people. Although British troops arranged local protection for the judges, this made little difference. The prisons, for their part, were barely functioning.

122.  After describing other aspects of the highly volatile situation in which a relatively small number of British military personnel were trying to police a large city as best they could, Brig[adier] Moore said ...:

The combination of terrorist activity, the volatile situation and the ineffectiveness of Iraqi security forces meant that the security situation remained on a knife-edge for much of our tour. Despite our high work rate and best efforts, I felt that at the end of August 2003 we were standing on the edge of an abyss. It was only when subsequent reinforcements arrived ... and we started to receive intelligence from some of the Islamic parties that I started to regain the initiative.

123.  Unlike the Turkish army in northern Cyprus, the British military forces had no control over the civil administration of Iraq. ...

124.  In my judgment it is quite impossible to hold that the UK, although an Occupying Power for the purposes of the Hague Regulations and [the] Geneva IV [Convention], was in effective control of Basra City for the purposes of [the European Courts] jurisprudence at the material time. If it had been, it would have been obliged, pursuant to the Banković [and Othersjudgment, to secure to everyone in Basra City the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the [Convention]. One only has to state that proposition to see how utterly unreal it is. The UK possessed no executive, legislative or judicial authority in Basra City, other than the limited authority given to its military forces, and as an Occupying Power it was bound to respect the laws in force in Iraq unless absolutely prevented (see Article 43 of the Hague Regulations ...). It could not be equated with a civil power: it was simply there to maintain security, and to support the civil administration in Iraq in a number of different ways ...

Sedley LJ observed, in connection with this issue:

“194.  On the one hand, it sits ill in the mouth of a State which has helped to displace and dismantle by force another nations civil authority to plead that, as an Occupying Power, it has so little control that it cannot be responsible for securing the populations basic rights. ... [However,] the fact is that it cannot: the invasion brought in its wake a vacuum of civil authority which British forces were and still are unable to fill. On the evidence before the Court they were, at least between mid-2003 and mid-2004, holding a fragile line against anarchy.”

81.  The Court of Appeal unanimously concluded that, save for the death of the sixth applicants son, which fell within the State agent authority” exception, the United Kingdom did not have jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention. It decided that the sixth applicants claim also fell within the scope of the Human Rights Act 1998. Since the Divisional Courts examination of the case, additional information had emerged about the investigation into the death of the sixth applicants son, including that courtmartial proceedings were pending against a number of soldiers. The Court of Appeal therefore remitted the question whether there had been an adequate investigation to the Divisional Court for reconsideration following the completion of the court-martial proceedings.

82.  Despite his conclusion on jurisdiction, Brooke LJ, at the express invitation of the Government, commented on the adequacy of the investigations carried out into the deaths, as follows:

“139.  After all, the first two Articles of the [Convention] merely articulate the contemporary concern of the entire European community about the importance that must always be attached to every human life. ... Needless to say, the obligation to comply with these well-established international human rights standards would require, among other things, a far greater investment in the resources available to the Royal Military Police than was available to them in Iraq, and a complete severance of their investigations from the military chain of command.

140.  In other words, if international standards are to be observed, the task of investigating incidents in which a human life is taken by British forces must be completely taken away from the military chain of command and vested in the [Royal Military Police]. It contains the requisite independence so long as it is free to decide for itself when to start and when to cease an investigation, and so long as it reports in the first instance to the [Army Prosecuting Authority] and not to the military chain of command. It must then conduct an effective investigation, and it will be helped in this regard by the passages from [the European Courts] case-law I have quoted. Many of the deficiencies highlighted by the evidence in this case will be remedied if the [Royal Military Police] perform this role, and if they are also properly trained and properly resourced to conduct their investigations with the requisite degree of thoroughness.

3.  The House of Lords

83.  The first four applicants appealed and the Secretary of State crossappealed to the House of Lords, which gave judgment on 13 June 2007 ([2007] UKHL 26). The majority of the House of Lords (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Carswell and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood) held that the general purpose of the Human Rights Act 1998 was to provide a remedial structure in domestic law for the rights guaranteed by the Convention, and that the 1998 Act should therefore be interpreted as applying wherever the United Kingdom had jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention. Lord Bingham of Cornhill, dissenting, held that the Human Rights Act had no extraterritorial application.

84.  In relation to the first four applicants complaints, the majority of the House of Lords found that the United Kingdom did not have jurisdiction over the deaths. Because of his opinion that the Human Rights Act had no extraterritorial application, Lord Bingham did not consider it useful to express a view as to whether the United Kingdom exercised jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention.

85.  Lord Brown, with whom the majority agreed, began by observing that ultimately the decision about how Article 1 of the Convention should be interpreted and applied was for the European Court of Human Rights, since the duty of the national court was only to keep pace with the Courts case-law; there was a danger in a national court construing the Convention too generously in favour of an applicant, since the respondent State had no means of referring such a case to the Court. Lord Brown took as his starting-point the decision of the Grand Chamber in Banković and Others (cited above), which he described as “a watershed authority in the light of which the Strasbourg jurisprudence as a whole has to be re-evaluatedHe considered that the following propositions could be derived from the decision in Banković and Others (paragraph 109 of the House of Lords judgment):

1.  Article 1 reflects an essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction (a phrase repeated several times in the Courts judgment), other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case (§ 61). The Convention operates, subject to Article 56, in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space (espace juridique) of the Contracting States (§ 80) (i.e. within the area of the Council of Europe countries).

2.  The Court recognises Article 1 jurisdiction to avoid a vacuum in human rights protection when the territory would normally be covered by the Convention (§ 80) (i.e. in a Council of Europe country) where otherwise (as in northern Cyprus) the inhabitants would have found themselves excluded from the benefits of the Convention safeguards and system which they had previously enjoyed (§ 80).

3.  The rights and freedoms defined in the Convention cannot be divided and tailored (§ 75).

4.  The circumstances in which the Court has exceptionally recognised the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction by a State include:

(i)  Where the State through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by [the government of that territory] (§ 71) (i.e. when otherwise there would be a vacuum within a Council of Europe country, the government of that country itself being unable to fulfil the obligations it had undertaken under the Convention (§ 80) (as in northern Cyprus)).

(ii)  [C]ases involving the activities of its diplomatic or consular agents abroad and on board craft and vessels registered in, or flying the flag of, that State [where] customary international law and treaty provisions have recognised the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction (§ 73).

(iii)  Certain other cases where a States responsibility could, in principle, be engaged because of acts ... which produced effects or were performed outside their own territory (§ 69). Drozd [and Janousekv. France [and Spain([26 June] 1992[, Series A no. 240]) 14 EHRR 745 (at § 91) is the only authority specifically referred to in Banković [and Othersas exemplifying this class of exception to the general rule. Drozd [and Janousek], however, contemplated no more than that, if a French judge exercised jurisdiction extraterritorially in Andorra in his capacity as a French judge, then anyone complaining of a violation of his Convention rights by that judge would be regarded as being within Frances jurisdiction.

(iv)  The Soering v. [the] United Kingdom ([7 July] 1989[, Series A no. 161]) 11 EHRR 439 line of cases, the Court pointed out, involves action by the State whilst the person concerned is on its territory, clearly within its jurisdiction ([Banković and Others,] § 68) and not, therefore, the exercise of the States jurisdiction abroad.

Lord Brown referred to the ÖcalanFreda and Sánchez Ramirez line of cases (cited above), in each of which the applicant was forcibly removed from a country outside the Council of Europe, with the full cooperation of the foreign authorities, to stand trial in the respondent State. He observed that this line of cases concerning “irregular extraditions” constituted one category of “exceptional” cases expressly contemplated by Banković and Others (cited above), as having “special justification for extraterritorial jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention. He did not consider that the first four applicants cases fell into any of the exceptions to the territorial principle so far recognised by the Court.

86.  Lord Brown next considered the Courts judgment in Issa and Others v. Turkey (no. 31821/96§ 71, 16 November 2004), on which the applicants relied, and held as follows:

127.  If and in so far as Issa [and Othersis said to support the altogether wider notions of Article 1 jurisdiction contended for by the appellants on this appeal, I cannot accept it. In the first place, the statements relied upon must be regarded as obiter dicta. Secondly, as just explained, such wider assertions of jurisdiction are not supported by the authorities cited (at any rate, those authorities accepted as relevant by the Grand Chamber in Banković [and Others]). Thirdly, such wider view of jurisdiction would clearly be inconsistent both with the reasoning in Banković [and Othersand, indeed, with its result. Either it would extend the effective control principle beyond the Council of Europe area (where alone it had previously been applied, as has been seen, to northern Cyprus, to the Ajarian Autonomous Republic in Georgia and to Transdniestria) to Iraq, an area (like the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] considered in Banković [and Others]) outside the Council of Europe – and, indeed, would do so contrary to the inescapable logic of the Courts case-law on Article 56. Alternatively it would stretch to breaking point the concept of jurisdiction extending extraterritorially to those subject to a Stateauthority and control. It is one thing to recognise as exceptional the specific narrow categories of cases I have sought to summarise above; it would be quite another to accept that whenever a Contracting State acts (militarily or otherwise) through its agents abroad, those affected by such activities fall within its Article 1 jurisdiction. Such a contention would prove altogether too much. It would make a nonsense of much that was said in Banković [and Others], not least as to the Convention being a constitutional instrument of European public order, operating in an essentially regional contextnot designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of Contracting States (§ 80). It would, indeed, make redundant the principle of effective control of an area: what need for that if jurisdiction arises in any event under a general principle of authority and control irrespective of whether the area is (a) effectively controlled or (b) within the Council of Europe?

128.  There is one other central objection to the creation of the wide basis of jurisdiction here contended for by the appellants under the rubric control and authority, going beyond that arising in any of the narrowly recognised categories already discussed and yet short of that arising from the effective control of territory within the Council of Europe area. Banković [and Others(and later Assanidze [v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, ECHR 2004II]) stands, as stated, for the indivisible nature of Article 1 jurisdiction: it cannot be divided and tailored. As Banković [and Othershad earlier pointed out (at § 40) the applicants interpretation of jurisdiction would invert and divide the positive obligation on Contracting States to secure the substantive rights in a manner never contemplated by Article 1 of the Convention. When, moreover, the Convention applies, it operates as a living instrumentÖcalan provides an example of this, a recognition that the interpretation of Article 2 has been modified consequent on the territories encompassed by the member States of the Council of Europe [having] become a zone free of capital punishment (§ 163). (Paragraphs 64 and 65 of Banković [and Others], I may note, contrast on the one hand the Conventions substantive provisions and the competence of the Convention organs, to both of which the living instrument approach applies and, on the other hand, the scope of Article 1 – the scope and reach of the entire Convention – to which it does not.) Bear in mind too the rigour with which the Court applies the Convention, well exemplified by the series of cases from the conflict zone of south-eastern Turkey in which, the States difficulties notwithstanding, no dilution has been permitted of the investigative obligations arising under Articles 2 and 3.

129.  The point is this: except where a State really does have effective control of territory, it cannot hope to secure Convention rights within that territory and, unless it is within the area of the Council of Europe, it is unlikely in any event to find certain of the Convention rights it is bound to secure reconcilable with the customs of the resident population. Indeed it goes further than that. During the period in question here it is common ground that the UK was an Occupying Power in southern Iraq and bound as such by [the] Geneva IV [Convention] and by the Hague Regulations. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides that the occupant shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. The appellants argue that occupation within the meaning of the Hague Regulations necessarily involves the occupant having effective control of the area and so being responsible for securing there all Convention rights and freedoms. So far as this being the case, however, the occupants obligation is to respect the laws in force, not to introduce laws and the means to enforce them (for example, courts and a justice system) such as to satisfy the requirements of the Convention. Often (for example where Sharia law is in force) Convention rights would clearly be incompatible with the laws of the territory occupied.

87.  Lord Rodger (at paragraph 83), with whom Baroness Hale agreed, and Lord Carswell (paragraph 97) expressly held that the United Kingdom was not in effective control of Basra City and the surrounding area for purposes of jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention at the relevant time.

88.  The Secretary of State accepted that the facts of the sixth applicants case fell within the United Kingdoms jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention. The parties therefore agreed that if (as the majority held) the jurisdictional scope of the Human Rights Act was the same as that of the Convention, the sixth applicants case should be remitted to the Divisional Court, as the Court of Appeal had ordered. In consequence, it was unnecessary for the House of Lords to examine the jurisdictional issue in relation to the death of the sixth applicants son. However, Lord Brown, with whom the majority agreed, concluded:

“132.  ... As for the sixth case, I for my part would recognise the UKs jurisdiction over Mr Mousa only on the narrow basis found established by the Divisional Court, essentially by analogy with the extraterritorial exception made for embassies (an analogy recognised too in Hess v. [theUnited Kingdom ([no. 6231/73, Commission decision of 28 May] 1975[, Decisions and Reports 2, p. ]72, a Commission decision in the context of a foreign prison which had itself referred to the embassy case of X. v. [Germanyno. 1611/62, Commission decision of 25 September 1965, Yearbook 8, p. 158]). ...

II.  RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW MATERIALS

A.  International humanitarian law on belligerent occupation

89.  The duties of an Occupying Power can be found primarily in Articles 42 to 56 of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, 18 October 1907) (“the Hague Regulations”) and Articles 27 to 34 and 47 to 78 of the Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (of 12 August 1949) (the Fourth Geneva Convention”), as well as in certain provisions of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977 (“Additional Protocol I”).

Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Regulations provide as follows:

Article 42

Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.

Article 43

The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”

Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that penal laws may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power only where they constitute a threat to the security or an obstacle to the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention. It also details the situations in which the Occupying Power is entitled to introduce legislative measures. These are specifically:

... provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them.”

Agreements concluded between the Occupying Power and the local authorities cannot deprive the population of the occupied territory of the protection afforded by international humanitarian law and protected persons themselves can in no circumstances renounce their rights (Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 8 and 47). Occupation does not create any change in the status of the territory (see Article 4 of Additional Protocol I), which can only be effected by a peace treaty or by annexation followed by recognition. The former sovereign remains sovereign and there is no change in the nationality of the inhabitants.

B.  Case-law of the International Court of Justice concerning the interrelationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law and the extraterritorial obligations of States under international human rights law

90.  In the proceedings concerning the International Court of JusticeAdvisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (9 July 2004)Israel denied that the human rights instruments to which it was a party, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rightswere applicable to the Occupied Palestinian Territory and asserted (at paragraph 102) that:

“humanitarian law is the protection granted in a conflict situation such as the one in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, whereas human rights treaties were intended for the protection of citizens from their own government in times of peace.”

In order to determine whether the instruments were applicable in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the International Court of Justice first addressed the issue of the relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, holding as follows:

“106.  ... the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.”

The International Court of Justice next considered the question whether the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was capable of applying outside the States national territory and whether it applied in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It held as follows (references and citations omitted):

108.  The scope of application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is defined by Article 2, paragraph 1, thereof, which provides:

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

This provision can be interpreted as covering only individuals who are both present within a States territory and subject to that States jurisdiction. It can also be construed as covering both individuals present within a States territory and those outside that territory but subject to that States jurisdiction. The Court will thus seek to determine the meaning to be given to this text.

109.  The Court would observe that, while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory. Considering the object and purpose of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would seem natural that, even when such is the case, States Parties to the Covenant should be bound to comply with its provisions.

The constant practice of the Human Rights Committee is consistent with this. Thus, the Committee has found the Covenant applicable where the State exercises its jurisdiction on foreign territory. It has ruled on the legality of acts by Uruguay in cases of arrests carried out by Uruguayan agents in Brazil or Argentina ... It decided to the same effect in the case of the confiscation of a passport by a Uruguayan consulate in Germany ...

110.  The Court takes note in this connection of the position taken by Israel, in relation to the applicability of the Covenant, in its communications to the Human Rights Committee, and of the view of the Committee.

In 1998, Israel stated that, when preparing its report to the Committee, it had had to face the question whether individuals resident in the occupied territories were indeed subject to Israels jurisdiction for purposes of the application of the Covenant ... Israel took the position that the Covenant and similar instruments did not apply directly to the current situation in the occupied territories ...

The Committee, in its concluding observations after examination of the report, expressed concern at Israels attitude and pointed to the long-standing presence of Israel in [the occupied] territories, Israels ambiguous attitude towards their future status, as well as the exercise of effective jurisdiction by Israeli security forces therein ... In 2003 in face of Israels consistent position, to the effect that the Covenant does not apply beyond its own territory, notably in the West Bank and Gaza ..., the Committee reached the following conclusion:

in the current circumstances, the provisions of the Covenant apply to the benefit of the population of the occupied territories, for all conduct by the State Partys authorities or agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant and fall within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the principles of public international law ...

111.  In conclusion, the Court considers that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.”

In addition, the International Court of Justice appeared to assume that, even in respect of extraterritorial acts, it would in principle be possible for a State to derogate from its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 4 § 1 of which provides:

“In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.”

Thus, in paragraph 136 of its Advisory Opinion, having considered whether the acts in question were justified under international humanitarian law on grounds of military exigency, the International Court of Justice held:

“136.  The Court would further observe that some human rights conventions, and in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, contain provisions which States Parties may invoke in order to derogate, under various conditions, from certain of their conventional obligations. In this respect, the Court would however recall that the communication notified by Israel to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concerns only Article 9 of the Covenant, relating to the right to freedom and security of person (see paragraph 127 above); Israel is accordingly bound to respect all the other provisions of that instrument.”

91.  In its judgment Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) v. Ugandaof 19 December 2005, the International Court of Justice considered whether, during the relevant period, Uganda was an “Occupying Power” of any part of the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, within the meaning of customary international law, as reflected in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations (§§ 172-73 of the judgment). The International Court of Justice found that Ugandan forces were stationed in the province of Ituri and exercised authority there, in the sense that they had substituted their own authority for that of the Congolese government (§§ 174-76). The International Court of Justice continued:

“178.  The Court thus concludes that Uganda was the Occupying Power in Ituri at the relevant time. As such it was under an obligation, according to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, to take all the measures in its power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety in the occupied area, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the DRC. This obligation comprised the duty to secure respect for the applicable rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such violence by any third party.

179.  The Court, having concluded that Uganda was an Occupying Power in Ituri at the relevant time, finds that Ugandas responsibility is engaged both for any acts of its military that violated its international obligations and for any lack of vigilance in preventing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by other actors present in the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own account.

180.  The Court notes that Uganda at all times has responsibility for all actions and omissions of its own military forces in the territory of the DRC in breach of its obligations under the rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law which are relevant and applicable in the specific situation.

The International Court of Justice established the facts relating to the serious breaches of human rights allegedly attributable to Uganda, in the occupied Ituri region and elsewhere (§§ 205-12). In order to determine whether the conduct in question constituted a breach of Ugandas international obligations, the International Court of Justice recalled its finding in the above-cited Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion that both international humanitarian law and international human rights law would have to be taken into consideration and that international human rights instruments were capable of having an extraterritorial application, “particularly in occupied territories” (§ 216). The International Court of Justice next determined which were “the applicable rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law”, by listing the international humanitarian and international human rights treaties to which both Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were party, together with the relevant principles of customary international law (§§ 21719).

C.  The duty to investigate alleged violations of the right to life in situations of armed conflict and occupation under international humanitarian law and international human rights law

92.  Article 121 of the Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (of 12 August 1949) (“the Third Geneva Convention”) provides that an official enquiry must be held by the Detaining Power following the suspected homicide of a prisoner of war. Article 131 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides:

“Every death or serious injury of an internee, caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, another internee or any other person, as well as any death the cause of which is unknown, shall be immediately followed by an official enquiry by the Detaining Power. A communication on this subject shall be sent immediately to the Protecting Power. The evidence of any witnesses shall be taken, and a report including such evidence shall be prepared and forwarded to the said Protecting Power. If the enquiry indicates the guilt of one or more persons, the Detaining Power shall take all necessary steps to ensure the prosecution of the person or persons responsible.”

The Geneva Conventions also place an obligation on each High Contracting Party to investigate and prosecute alleged grave breaches of the Conventions, including the wilful killing of protected persons (Articles 49 and 50 of the Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and Wounded in the Field (of 12 August 1949) (“the First Geneva Convention”); Articles 50 and 51 of the Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (of 12 August 1949) (“the Second Geneva Convention”); Articles 129 and 130 of the Third Geneva Convention; and Articles 146 and 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).

93.  In his report of 8 March 2006 on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions (E/CN.4/2006/53), the United Nations Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston, observed in connection with the right to life under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in situations of armed conflict and occupation (footnotes omitted):

36.  Armed conflict and occupation do not discharge the States duty to investigate and prosecute human rights abuses. The right to life is non-derogable regardless of circumstance. This prohibits any practice of not investigating alleged violations during armed conflict or occupation. As the Human Rights Committee has held, It is inherent in the protection of rights explicitly recognised as non-derogable ... that they must be secured by procedural guarantees ... The provisions of the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] relating to procedural safeguards may never be made subject to measures that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights. It is undeniable that during armed conflicts circumstances will sometimes impede investigation. Such circumstances will never discharge the obligation to investigate  this would eviscerate the non-derogable character of the right to life  but they may affect the modalities or particulars of the investigation. In addition to being fully responsible for the conduct of their agents, in relation to the acts of private actors States are also held to a standard of due diligence in armed conflicts as well as peace. On a case-by-case basis a State might utilise less effective measures of investigation in response to concrete constraints. For example, when hostile forces control the scene of a shooting, conducting an autopsy may prove impossible. Regardless of the circumstances, however, investigations must always be conducted as effectively as possible and never be reduced to mere formality. ...

94.  In its judgment in the Case of the Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia of 15 September 2005, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held, inter alia, in connection with the respondent States failure fully to investigate the massacre of civilians carried out by a paramilitary group with the alleged assistance of the State authorities:

238.  In this regard, the Court recognises the difficult circumstances of Colombia, where its population and its institutions strive to attain peace. However, the countrys conditions, no matter how difficult, do not release a State Party to the American Convention of its obligations set forth in this treaty, which specifically continue in cases such as the instant one. The Court has argued that when the State conducts or tolerates actions leading to extra-legal executions, not investigating them adequately and not punishing those responsible, as appropriate, it breaches the duties to respect rights set forth in the Convention and to ensure their free and full exercise, both by the alleged victim and by his or her next of kin, it does not allow society to learn what happened, and it reproduces the conditions of impunity for this type of facts to happen once again.”

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION

95.  The applicants contended that their relatives were within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom under Article 1 of the Convention at the moment of death and that, except in relation to the sixth applicant, the United Kingdom had not complied with its investigative duty under Article 2.

96.  The Government accepted that the sixth applicants son had been within United Kingdom jurisdiction but denied that the United Kingdom had jurisdiction over any of the other deceased. They contended that, since the second and third applicants relatives had been killed after the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (see paragraph 16 above), the acts which led to their deaths were attributable to the United Nations and not to the United Kingdom. In addition, the Government contended that the fifth applicants case should be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and that the fifth and sixth applicants no longer had victim status.

A.  Admissibility

1.  Attribution

97.  The Government pointed out that the operations that led to the deaths of the second and third applicants relatives occurred after 16 October 2003, when the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1511. Paragraph 13 of that Resolution authorised a Multinational Force to take “all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq” (see paragraph 16 above). It followed that, in conducting the relevant operations in which the second and third applicants relatives were shot, United Kingdom troops were not exercising the sovereign authority of the United Kingdom but the international authority of the Multinational Force acting pursuant to the binding decision of the United Nations Security Council.

98.  The applicants stressed that the Government had not raised this argument at any stage during the domestic proceedings. Moreover, an identical argument had been advanced by the Government and rejected by the House of Lords in R. (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v. Secretary of State for Defence (Respondent) [2007] UKHL 58.

99.  The Court recalls that it is intended to be subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights. It is, therefore, appropriate that the national courts should initially have the opportunity to determine questions of the compatibility of domestic law with the Convention and that, if an application is nonetheless subsequently brought before the Court, it should have the benefit of the views of the national courts, as being in direct and continuous contact with the forces of their countries. It is thus of importance that the arguments put by the Government before the national courts should be on the same lines as those put before this Court. In particular, it is not open to a Government to put to the Court arguments which are inconsistent with the position they adopted before the national courts (see A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, § 154, ECHR 2009).

100.  The Government did not contend before the national courts that any of the killings of the applicants relatives were not attributable to United Kingdom armed forces. The Court considers, therefore, that the Government are estopped from raising this objection in the present proceedings.

2.  Jurisdiction

101.  The Government further contended that the acts in question took place in southern Iraq and outside the United Kingdoms jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention. The sole exception was the killing of the sixth applicants son, which occurred in a British military prison over which the United Kingdom did have jurisdiction.

102.  The Court considers that the question whether the applicants cases fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State is closely linked to the merits of their complaints. It therefore joins this preliminary question to the merits.

3.  Exhaustion of domestic remedies

103.  The Government contended that the fifth applicants case should be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They pointed out that although he brought judicial review proceedings alleging breaches of his substantive and procedural rights under Articles 2 and 3, his claim was stayed pending resolution of the six test cases (see paragraph 73 above). After those claims had been resolved, it would have been open to the applicant to apply to the Divisional Court to lift the stay, but he did not do so. His case was not a shooting incident, and the domestic courts had not had the opportunity to consider the facts relevant to his claims that his son was within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom and that there had been a breach of the procedural obligation.

104.  The applicants invited the Court to reject this submission. A judicial-review claim had been lodged by the fifth applicant on 5 May 2004. It was, by agreement, stayed pending the outcome of the six test cases (see paragraph 73 above). The fifth applicant would have had no reasonable prospects of success if, after the House of Lords gave judgment in Al-Skeini and Others (Respondents) v. Secretary of State for Defence (Appellant) Al-Skeini and Others (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for Defence (Respondent) (Consolidated Appeals) [2007] UKHL 26, he had sought to revive and pursue his stayed judicial-review claim. The lower courts would have been bound by the House of Lords interpretation of Article 1 and would have applied it so as to find that the applicants deceased son had not been within United Kingdom jurisdiction.

105.  The Court observes that, according to the fifth applicant, his son died when, having been arrested by United Kingdom soldiers on suspicion of looting, he was driven in an army vehicle to the river and forced to jump in. His case is, therefore, distinguishable on its alleged facts from those of the first, second and fourth applicants, whose relatives were shot by British soldiers; the third applicant, whose wife was shot during exchange of fire between British troops and unknown gunmen; and the sixth applicant, whose son was killed while detained in a British military detention facility. It is true that the House of Lords in the Al-Skeini proceedings did not have before it a case similar to the fifth applicants, where an Iraqi civilian met his death having been taken into British military custody, but without being detained in a military prison. Nonetheless, the Court considers that the applicants are correct in their assessment that the fifth applicant would have had no prospects of success had he subsequently sought to pursue his judicial-review application in the domestic courts. Lord Brown, with whom the majority of the House of Lords agreed, made it clear that he preferred the approach to jurisdiction in the sixth applicants case taken by the Divisional Court, namely that jurisdiction arose in respect of Baha Mousa only because he died while detained in a British military prison (see paragraph 88 above). In these circumstances, the Court does not consider that the fifth applicant can be criticised for failing to attempt to revive his claim before the Divisional Court. It follows that the Governments preliminary objection based on non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be rejected.

4.  Victim status

106.  The Government submitted that the fifth and sixth applicants could no longer claim to be victims of any violations of their rights under Article 2, since the death of each of their sons had been fully investigated by the national authorities and compensation paid to the applicants.

107.  The Court considers that this question is also closely linked and should be joined to the merits of the complaint under Article 2.

5.  Conclusion on admissibility

108.  The Court considers that the application raises serious questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination on the merits. It cannot, therefore, be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention, and no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

1.  Jurisdiction

(a)  The parties submissions

(i)  The Government

109.  The Government submitted that the leading authority on the concept of “jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention was the Courts decision in Banković and Others (cited above). Banković and Others established that the fact that an individual had been affected by an act committed by a Contracting State or its agents was not sufficient to establish that he was within that States jurisdictionJurisdiction under Article 1 was “primarily” or “essentially” territorial and any extension of jurisdiction outside the territory of the Contracting State was “exceptional” and required “special justification in the particular circumstances of each case”. The Court had held in Banković and Others that the Convention rights could not be “divided and tailored”. Within its jurisdiction, a Contracting State was under an obligation to secure all the Convention rights and freedoms. The Court had also held in Banković and Others that the Convention was “an instrument of European public order” and multilateral treaty operating, subject to Article 56 of the Convention, in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space (espace juridique) of the Contracting States”. The essentially territorial basis of jurisdiction reflected principles of international law and took account of the practical and legal difficulties faced by a State operating on another Stateterritory, particularly in regions which did not share the values of the Council of Europe member States.

110.  In the Governments submission, the Grand Chamber in Banković and Others, having conducted a comprehensive review of the case-law, identified a limited number of exceptions to the territorial principle. The principal exception derived from the case-law on northern Cyprus and applied when State, as a consequence of military action, exercised effective control of an area outside its national territory. Where the Court had found this exceptional basis of jurisdiction to apply, it had stressed that the State exercising effective control was thereby responsible for securing the entire range of substantive Convention rights in the territory in question (see Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, § 62, Series A no. 310; Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, §§ 75-80, ECHR 2001IV; Banković and Others, cited above, §§ 70-71; and Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 314-16, ECHR 2004VII). Moreover, despite dicta to the contrary in the subsequent Chamber judgment in Issa and Others (cited above), the Grand Chamber in Banković and Others made it clear that the “effective control of an area” basis of jurisdiction could apply only within the legal space of the Convention. In addition to the control exercised by Turkey in northern Cyprus, the Court had applied this exception in relation to only one other area, Transdniestria, which also fell within the territory of another Contracting State. Any other approach would risk requiring the State to impose culturally alien standards, in breach of the principle of sovereign selfdetermination.

111.  According to the Government, the Courts case-law on Article 56 of the Convention further indicated that a State would not be held to exercise Article 1 jurisdiction over an overseas territory merely by virtue of exercising effective control there (see Quark Fishing Ltd v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 15305/06ECHR 2006XIV)If the effective control of territory exception were held to apply outside the territories of the Contracting States, this would lead to the conclusion that a State was free to choose whether or not to extend the Convention and its Protocols to a nonmetropolitan territory outside the Convention “espace juridique” over which it might in fact have exercised control for decades, but was not free to choose whether to extend the Convention to territories outside that space over which it exercised effective control as a result of military action only temporarily, for example only until peace and security could be restored.

112.  The Government submitted that, since Iraq fell outside the legal space of the Convention, the “effective control of an area” exceptional basis of jurisdiction could not apply. In any event, the United Kingdom did not have “effective control” over any part of Iraq during the relevant time. This was the conclusion of the domestic courts, which had all the available evidence before them. The number of Coalition Forces, including United Kingdom forces, was small: in south-east Iraq, an area of 96,000 square kilometres with a population of 4.6 million, there were 14,500 Coalition troops, including 8,150 United Kingdom troops. United Kingdom troops operated in the Al-Basra and Maysan provinces, which had a population of 2.76 million for 8,119 troops. United Kingdom forces in Iraq were faced with real practical difficulties in restoring conditions of security and stability so as to enable the Iraqi people freely to determine their political future. The principal reason for this was that at the start of the occupation there was no competent system of local law enforcement in place, while at the same time there was widespread violent crime, terrorism and tribal fighting involving the use of light and heavy weapons.

113.  Governing authority in Iraq during the occupation was exercised by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was governed by United States Ambassador Paul Bremer and which was not a subordinate authority of the United Kingdom. In addition, from July 2003 there was a central Iraqi Governing Council and a number of local Iraqi councils. The status of the CPA and Iraqi administration was wholly different from that of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (the TRNC) in Cyprus or the “Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria” (the MRT) in Transdniestria, which were both characterised by the Court as “selfproclaimed authorities which are not recognised by the international community”. The authority of the CPA and the Iraqi administration was recognised by the international community, through the United Nations Security CouncilMoreover, the purpose of the United Kingdoms joint occupation of Iraq was to transfer authority as soon as possible to a representative Iraqi administration. In keeping with this purpose, the occupation lasted for only just over a year.

114.  In the Governments submission, the fact that between May 2003 and June 2004 the United Kingdom was an Occupying Power within the meaning of the Hague Regulations (see paragraph 89 above) did not, in itself, give rise to an obligation to secure the Convention rights and freedoms to the inhabitants of south-east Iraq. As an Occupying Power the United Kingdom did not have sovereignty over Iraq and was not entitled to treat the area under its occupation as its own territory or as a colony subject to its complete power and authority. The Hague Regulations did not confer on the United Kingdom the power to amend the laws and Constitution of Iraq so as to conform to the United Kingdoms own domestic law or regional multilateral international obligations such as the Convention. On the contrary, the Hague Regulations set limits on the United Kingdoms powers, notably the obligation to respect the laws in force in Iraq unless absolutely prevented”. Moreover, the resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council recognised that governing authority in Iraq during the occupation was to be exercised by the CPA and that the aim of the occupation was to transfer authority as soon as possible to a representative Iraqi administration. It followed that the international legal framework, far from establishing that the United Kingdom was obliged to secure Convention rights in Iraq, established instead that the United Kingdom would have been acting contrary to its international obligations if it had sought to modify the Constitution of Iraq so as to comply with the Convention. In any event, the Courts case-law demonstrated that it approached the question whether a State exercised jurisdiction extraterritorially as one of fact, informed by the particular nature and history of the Convention. The obligations imposed by the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations were carefully tailored to the circumstances of occupation and could not in themselves have consequences for the very different issue of jurisdiction under the Convention.

115.  The Government accepted that it was possible to identify from the case-law a number of other exceptional categories where jurisdiction could be exercised by a State outside its territory and outside the Convention region. In Banković and Others (cited above) the Grand Chamber referred to other cases involving the activities of diplomatic or consular agents abroad and on board craft and vessels registered in or flying the flag of the State. In Banković and Others, the Court also cited as an example Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain (26 June 1992, Series A no. 240), which demonstrated that jurisdiction could be exercised by a State if it brought an individual before its own court, sitting outside its territory, to apply its own criminal law. In its judgment in Öcalan (cited above, § 91), the Grand Chamber held that Turkey had exercised jurisdiction over the applicant when he was “arrested by members of the Turkish security forces inside an aircraft registered in Turkey in the international zone of Nairobi Airport” and “physically forced to return to Turkey by Turkish officials and was under their authority and control following his arrest and return to Turkey”. In the Governments submission, none of these exceptions applied in the first, second, third and fourth applicants cases.

116.  The Government contended that the applicants submission that, in shooting their relatives, the United Kingdom soldiers exercised “authority and control” over the deceased, so as to bring them within the United Kingdoms jurisdiction, was directly contrary to the decision in Banković and Others (cited above). In Banković and Others, the Grand Chamber considered the applicability of the Convention to extraterritorial military operations generally, having regard, inter alia, to State practice and Article 15 of the Convention, and concluded that the Convention did not apply to the military action of the respondent States which resulted in those applicants relatives deaths. Equally, in the present case, the military action of United Kingdom soldiers in shooting the applicants relatives while carrying out military security operations in Iraq did not constitute an exercise of jurisdiction over them. No distinction could be drawn in this respect between a death resulting from a bombing and one resulting from a shooting in the course of a ground operation.

117.  The Government rejected the applicants argument that a jurisdictional link existed because the United Kingdom soldiers were exercising “legal authority” over the deceased, derived from the obligation under the Hague Regulations to ensure “public order and safety” in the occupied territory. The meaning of Article 1 of the Convention was autonomous and could not be determined by reference to wholly distinct provisions of international humanitarian law. Moreover, the duty relied on was owed to every Iraqi citizen within the occupied territory and, if the applicants were correct, the United Kingdom would have been required to secure Convention rights to them all. Nor could it be said that United Kingdom troops at the relevant time were exercising “public powers” pursuant to treaty arrangements (see Banković and Otherscited above, § 73). In fact, United Kingdom troops were exercising military power in an effort to create a situation in which governmental functions could be exercised and the rule of law could properly operate. No sensible distinction could be drawn between the different types of military operation undertaken by them. There was no basis for concluding that the applicability of the Convention should turn upon the particular activity that a soldier was engaged in at the time of the alleged violation, whether street patrol, ground offensive or aerial bombardment.

118.  In conclusion, the Government submitted that the domestic courts were correct that the United Kingdom did not exercise any Article 1 jurisdiction over the relatives of the first to fourth applicants at the time of their deaths. The cases could not be distinguished from that of the deceased in Banković and Others (cited above). Nor were the facts of the fifth applicants case sufficient to distinguish it in this respect from those of the first to fourth applicants. The fifth applicants son was not arrested in circumstances similar to those which founded jurisdiction in Öcalan (cited above). As a suspected looter, in the situation of extreme public disorder in the immediate aftermath of the cessation of major combat activities, he was physically required by United Kingdom soldiers to move from the place of looting to another location. The acts of the United Kingdom soldiers involved an assertion of military power over the fifth applicants son, but no more. The Government accepted that the sixth applicants son was within United Kingdom jurisdiction when he died, but only on the basis found by the Divisional Court and subsequently by Lord Brown, with whom Lords Rodger and Carswell and Baroness Hale agreed, namely that jurisdiction was established when the deceased was detained in a United Kingdom-run military detention facility located in a United Kingdom base, essentially by analogy with the extraterritorial exception made for embassies. At the hearing before the Court, counsel for the Government confirmed that it was the Governments position that, for example, an individual being taken to a British detention facility on foreign soil in a British military vehicle would not fall within the United Kingdoms jurisdiction until the moment the vehicle and individual passed within the perimeter of the facility.

119.  This did not mean that United Kingdom troops were free to act with impunity in Iraq. As Lord Bingham observed in his opinion in the House of Lords, the acts of the United Kingdom forces were subject to and regulated by international humanitarian law. United Kingdom soldiers in Iraq were also subject to United Kingdom domestic criminal law and could be prosecuted in the national courts. The International Criminal Court had jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes where the State was unwilling or unable to prosecute. Civil claims in tort could also be brought in the United Kingdom courts against United Kingdom agents and authorities alleged to have caused injury to individuals in Iraq.

(ii)  The applicants

120.  The applicants accepted that jurisdiction under Article 1 was essentially territorial. However, they underlined that it was not exclusively so and that it was possible for a Contracting State to exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially. The procedure under Article 56 allowed States to extend the reach of the Convention to other territories, with due regard to local requirements, by means of a notified declaration. However, it was clear from the case-law that Article 56 was not an exclusive mechanism for extraterritorial applicability.

121.  The applicants submitted that the case-law of the Court and Commission recognised the exercise by States of jurisdiction extraterritorially through the principles of both “State agent authority” and “effective control of an area”. The first reference to “State agent authority” jurisdiction was in the Commissionadmissibility decision in Cyprus v. Turkey (nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, Commission decision of 26 May 1975, DR 2, p125, at p. 136)when the Commission observed that “authorised agents of the State ... not only remain under its jurisdiction when abroad but bring any other persons or property within the jurisdiction of that State, to the extent that they exercise authority over such persons or property”. This principle was subsequently applied in Cyprus v. Turkey (nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, Commissions report of 10 July 1976), when the Commission found that the actions of Turkish soldiers in Cyprus involved the exercise of Turkish jurisdiction. These actions comprised the killing of civilians, including individuals subject to the order of an officer and others shot while attempting to recover possessions from property under Turkish control; the rape of women in empty houses and on the street; the arbitrary detention of civilians; cruelty to detainees; the displacement of civilians; and the military confiscation of property. Since Turkey did not accept the Courts jurisdiction until 1990, the case was never examined by the Court. The Commissions report, however, did not support the suggestion that military custodial authority alone constituted a relationship of sufficient authority and control.

122.  The applicants pointed out that in the later cases against Turkey concerning northern Cyprus which were examined by the Commission and the Court during the 1990s, Turkey accepted that its jurisdiction under Article would be engaged in respect of the direct acts of Turkish military personnel. However, the Turkish Government shifted ground and argued that it did not have jurisdiction because the acts in question were not committed by Turkish agents but were instead attributable to an autonomous local administration installed in 1983, the “TRNC”. The Court, in Loizidou (preliminary objections) and in Cyprus v. Turkey (both cited above), countered this argument by elaborating the principle of “effective control of an area”, which applied (see Loizidou (preliminary objections), § 62):

“when as a consequence of military action  whether lawful or unlawful – [a Contracting State] exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration.

In these cases, the Court did not give any indication that the “State agent authority” principle had been supplanted. In fact, in Loizidou (preliminary objections), before setting out the principle of “effective control of an area” jurisdiction, the Court observed (§ 62) that:

“In addition, the responsibility of Contracting Parties can be involved because of acts of their authorities, whether performed within or outside national boundaries, which produce effects outside their own territory (see the Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain judgment of 26 June 1992, Series A no. 240, p. 29, § 91).

Furthermore, its conclusion on the question whether the alleged violation was capable of falling within Turkish jurisdiction relied on both grounds equally (§ 63):

“In this connection the respondent Government have acknowledged that the applicants loss of control of her property stems from the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus by Turkish troops and the establishment there of the TRNC. Furthermore, it has not been disputed that the applicant was prevented by Turkish troops from gaining access to her property.”

In the Courts subsequent case-law, the two principles had continued to be placed side by side (see Banković and Others, cited above, §§ 69-73; Issa and Others, cited above, §§ 69-71; Andreou v. Turkey (dec.), no. 45653/993 June 2008; and Solomou and Others v. Turkey, no. 36832/97, §§ 44-45, 24 June 2008). There was no precedent of the Court to suggest that State agent authority jurisdiction was inapt as a means of analysing direct actions by military State agents exercising authority.

123.  The applicants argued that their dead family members fell within the United Kingdoms jurisdiction under the State agent authority principle. The Government had accepted, in respect of the sixth applicants son, that the exercise of authority and control by British military personnel in Iraq was capable of engaging the United Kingdoms extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, jurisdiction in extraterritorial detention cases did not rest on the idea of a military prison as a quasi-territorial enclave. Jurisdiction in respect of the sixth applicants son would equally have arisen had he been tortured and killed while under arrest at the hotel where he worked or in a locked army vehicle parked outside. Moreover, the authority and control exercised by military personnel was not limited in principle to actions as custodians, even if the arrest and detention of persons outside State territory could be seen as a classic instance of State agent authority (as was argued by the respondent Governments in Banković and Others, cited above, § 37).

124.  The applicants submitted that the deceased relatives of all six applicants fell within United Kingdom jurisdiction by virtue of the authority and control exercised over them by United Kingdom State agents. They emphasised that British armed forces had responsibility for public order in Iraq, maintaining the safety and security of local civilians and supporting the civil administration. In performing these functions, the British armed forces were operating within the wider context of the United Kingdoms occupation of south-east Iraq. The control and authority was also exercised through the CPA South Regional Office, which was staffed primarily by British personnel. The individuals killed were civilians to whom the British armed forces owed the duty of safety and security. There was thus a particular relationship of authority and control between the soldiers and the civilians killed. To find that these individuals fell within the authority of the United Kingdom armed forces would not require the acceptance of the impactbased approach to jurisdiction which was rejected in Banković and Others (cited above), but would instead rest on a particular relationship of authority and control. In the alternative, the applicants argued that, at least in respect of the deceased relatives of the second, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants, the British soldiers exercised sufficient authority and control to bring the victims within the United Kingdoms jurisdiction.

125.  The applicants further contended that their dead relatives fell within United Kingdom jurisdiction because, at the relevant time, the United Kingdom was in effective control of south-east Iraq. It was their case that where, as a matter of international law, territory was occupied by a State as an Occupying Power, because that territory was actually placed under the authority of that States hostile army (see Article 42 of the Hague Regulations; paragraph 89 above), that was sufficient to constitute extraterritorial jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention. This consequence of belligerent occupation reflected the approach in international law, both as regards extraterritorial jurisdiction and extraterritorial application of human rights based on “jurisdiction”.

126.  Therejected the idea that the “effective control of an area” basis of jurisdiction could apply only within the legal space of the Convention. Furthermore, they reasoned that to require a State to exert complete control, similar to that exercised within its own territory, would lead to the perverse position whereby facts disclosing a violation of the Convention would, instead of entitling the victim to a remedy, form the evidential basis for a finding that the State did not exercise jurisdiction. Similarly, defining the existence of control over an area by reference to troop numbers alone would be uncertain, allow evasion of responsibility and promote arbitrariness. The application of the Convention should influence the actions of the Contracting States, prompting careful consideration of military intervention and ensuring sufficient troop numbers to meet their international obligations. The applicants endorsed the approach suggested by Sedley LJ in the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 80 above), that a Contracting State in military occupation was under a duty to do everything possible to keep order and protect essential civil rights. While the Courts case-law (the northern Cyprus cases and Ilaşcu and Others, cited above) included details of numbers of military personnel deployed, this was relevant to establishing whether a territory had actually been placed under the authority of a hostile army, in cases where the respondent States (Turkey and Russia) denied being in occupation. Where, as in the present case, the respondent State accepted that it was in occupation of the territory, such an assessment was unnecessary.

127.  The applicants argued that the duty of an occupying State under international humanitarian law to apply the domestic law of the territorial State and not to impose its own law could not be used to evade jurisdiction under the Convention, since the “effective control of an area” basis of jurisdiction applied also to unlawful occupation. They referred to the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo and its Advisory Opinion Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (see paragraphs 90-91 above), where it found that the occupying State was under a duty to apply international human rights law. The clear principle emerging from these cases was that belligerent occupation in international law was a basis for the recognition of extraterritorial human rights jurisdiction.

(iii)  The third-party interveners

128.  The third-party interveners (see paragraph 6 above) emphasised that the Convention was adopted in the aftermath of the events in Europe of the 1930s and 1940s, when appalling human rights abuses were carried out by military forces in occupied territories. It was inconceivable that the drafters of the Convention should have considered that the prospective responsibilities of States should be confined to violations perpetrated on their own territories. Moreover, public international law required that the concept of “jurisdiction” be interpreted in the light of the object and purpose of the particular treaty. The Court had repeatedly had regard to the Conventions special character as an instrument for human rights protection. It was relevant that one of the guiding principles under international human rights law, which had been applied by the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the International Court of Justice when considering the conduct of States outside their territory, was the need to avoid unconscionable double standards, by allowing a State to perpetrate violations on foreign territory which would not be permitted on its own territory.

129.  The third-party interveners further emphasised that it was common ground between the international and regional courts and human rights bodies that, when determining whether the acts or omissions of a States agents abroad fall within its “jurisdiction”, regard must be had to the existence of control, authority or power of that State over the individual in question. When the agents of the State exercised such control, authority or power over an individual outside its territory, that States obligation to respect human rights continued. This was a factual test, to be determined with regard to the circumstances of the particular act or omission of the State agents. Certain situations, such as military occupations, created a strong presumption that individuals were under the control, authority or power of the occupying State. Indeed, one principle which emerged from the case-law of the International Court of Justice, inter alia (see paragraphs 90-91 above), was that once a situation was qualified as an occupation within the meaning of international humanitarian law, there was a strong presumption of “jurisdiction” for the purposes of the application of human rights law.

(b)  The Courts assessment

(i)  General principles relevant to jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention

130.  Article 1 of the Convention reads as follows:

“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of [the] Convention.”

As provided by this Article, the engagement undertaken by a Contracting State is confined to “securing” (“reconnaître” in the French text) the listed rights and freedoms to persons within its own “jurisdiction” (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 86, Series A no. 161, and Banković and Others, cited above, § 66). “Jurisdiction” under Article 1 is a threshold criterion. The exercise of jurisdiction is a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it which give rise to an allegation of the infringement of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention (see Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, § 311).

(α)  The territorial principle

131.  A States jurisdictional competence under Article 1 is primarily territorial (see Soering, cited above, § 86Banković and Others, cited above, §§ 61 and 67; and Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, § 312). Jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the States territory (see Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, § 312, and Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, § 139, ECHR 2004II). Conversely, acts of the Contracting States performed, or producing effects, outside their territories can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 only in exceptional cases (see Banković and Others, cited above, § 67).

132.  To date, the Court in its case-law has recognised a number of exceptional circumstances capable of giving rise to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Contracting State outside its own territorial boundaries. In each case, the question whether exceptional circumstances exist which require and justify a finding by the Court that the State was exercising jurisdiction extraterritorially must be determined with reference to the particular facts.

(β)  State agent authority and control

133.  The Court has recognised in its case-law that, as an exception to the principle of territoriality, a Contracting States jurisdiction under Article 1 may extend to acts of its authorities which produce effects outside its own territory (see Drozd and Janousek, cited above, § 91; Loizidou (preliminary objections), cited above, § 62; Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 18 December 1996, § 52Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996VIand Banković and Others, cited above, § 69). The statement of principle, as it appears in Drozd and Janousek and the other cases just cited, is very broad: the Court states merely that the Contracting Partys responsibility “can be involved” in these circumstances. It is necessary to examine the Courts case-law to identify the defining principles.

134.  Firstly, it is clear that the acts of diplomatic and consular agents, who are present on foreign territory in accordance with provisions of international law, may amount to an exercise of jurisdiction when these agents exert authority and control over others (see Banković and Others, cited above, § 73; see also X. v. Germany, no. 1611/62, Commission decision of 25 September 1965, Yearbook 8, p. 158; X. v. the United Kingdom, no. 7547/76, Commission decision of 15 December 1977, DR 12, p. 73and M. v. Denmark, no. 17392/90, Commission decision of 14 October 1992, DR 73, p. 193).

135.  Secondly, the Court has recognised the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State when, through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, it exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government (see Banković and Others, cited above, § 71). Thus, where, in accordance with custom, treaty or other agreement, authorities of the Contracting State carry out executive or judicial functions on the territory of another State, the Contracting State may be responsible for breaches of the Convention thereby incurred, as long as the acts in question are attributable to it rather than to the territorial State (see Drozd and Janousek, cited above; Gentilhomme and Others v. France, nos. 48205/9948207/99 and 48209/99, 14 May 2002; and X. and Y. v. Switzerland, nos. 7289/75 and 7349/76, Commission decision of 14 July 1977, DR 9, p. 57).

136.  In addition, the Courtcase-law demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, the use of force by a States agents operating outside its territory may bring the individual thereby brought under the control of the States authorities into the States Article 1 jurisdiction. This principle has been applied where an individual is taken into the custody of State agents abroad. For example, in Öcalan (cited above, § 91)the Court held that “directly after being handed over to the Turkish officials by the Kenyan officials, the applicant was effectively under Turkish authority and therefore within the jurisdiction of that State for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, even though in this instance Turkey exercised its authority outside its territory”. In Issa and Others (cited above), the Court indicated that, had it been established that Turkish soldiers had taken the applicants relatives into custody in northern Iraq, taken them to a nearby cave and executed them, the deceased would have been within Turkish jurisdiction by virtue of the soldiers authority and control over them. In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no. 61498/08, §§ 86-89, 30 June 2009), the Court held that two Iraqi nationals detained in British-controlled military prisons in Iraq fell within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, since the United Kingdom exercised total and exclusive control over the prisons and the individuals detained in them. Finally, in Medvedyev and Others v. France ([GC], no. 3394/03§ 67, ECHR 2010), the Court held that the applicants were within French jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention by virtue of the exercise by French agents of full and exclusive control over a ship and its crew from the time of its interception in international waters. The Court does not consider that jurisdiction in the above cases arose solely from the control exercised by the Contracting State over the buildings, aircraft or ship in which the individuals were held. What is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and control over the person in question.

137.  It is clear that, whenever the State, through its agents, exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms under Section I of the Convention that are relevant to the situation of that individual. In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be “divided and tailored” (compare Banković and Others, cited above, § 75).

(γ)  Effective control over an area

138.  Another exception to the principle that jurisdiction under Article 1 is limited to a States own territory occurs when, as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action, a Contracting State exercises effective control of an area outside that national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control, whether it be exercised directly, through the Contracting States own armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration (see Loizidou (preliminary objections), cited above, § 62; Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, § 76; Banković and Others, cited above, § 70; Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, §§ 314-16; and Loizidou (merits), cited above, § 52). Where the fact of such domination over the territory is established, it is not necessary to determine whether the Contracting State exercises detailed control over the policies and actions of the subordinate local administration. The fact that the local administration survives as a result of the Contracting States military and other support entails that States responsibility for its policies and actions. The controlling State has the responsibility under Article 1 to secure, within the area under its control, the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional Protocols which it has ratified. It will be liable for any violations of those rights (see Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, §§ 76-77).

139.  It is a question of fact whether a Contracting State exercises effective control over an area outside its own territory. In determining whether effective control exists, the Court will primarily have reference to the strength of the States military presence in the area (see Loizidou (merits), cited above, §§ 16 and 56, and Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, § 387). Other indicators may also be relevant, such as the extent to which its military, economic and political support for the local subordinate administration provides it with influence and control over the region (see Ilaşcu and Otherscited above, §§ 388-94).

140.  The “effective control” principle of jurisdiction set out above does not replace the system of declarations under Article 56 of the Convention (formerly Article 63) which the States decided, when drafting the Convention, to apply to territories overseas for whose international relations they were responsible. Article 56 § 1 provides a mechanism whereby any State may decide to extend the application of the Convention, “with due regard ... to local requirements, to all or any of the territories for whose international relations it is responsible. The existence of this mechanism, which was included in the Convention for historical reasons, cannot be interpreted in present conditions as limiting the scope of the term “jurisdiction” in Article 1. The situations covered by the “effective control” principle are clearly separate and distinct from circumstances where a Contracting State has not, through a declaration under Article 56, extended the Convention or any of its Protocols to an overseas territory for whose international relations it is responsible (see Loizidou (preliminary objections), cited above, §§ 86-89, and Quark Fishing Ltd, cited above).

(δ)  The legal space (“espace juridique”) of the Convention

141.  The Convention is a constitutional instrument of European public order (see Loizidou (preliminary objections), cited above, § 75). It does not govern the actions of States not Parties to it, nor does it purport to be a means of requiring the Contracting States to impose Convention standards on other States (see Soering, cited above, § 86).

142.  The Court has emphasised that, where the territory of one Convention State is occupied by the armed forces of another, the occupying State should in principle be held accountable under the Convention for breaches of human rights within the occupied territory, because to hold otherwise would be to deprive the population of that territory of the rights and freedoms hitherto enjoyed and would result in a “vacuum” of protection within the “legal space of the Convention” (see Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, § 78, and Banković and Others, cited above, § 80). However, the importance of establishing the occupying States jurisdiction in such cases does not imply, a contrario, that jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention can never exist outside the territory covered by the Council of Europe member States. The Court has not in its case-law applied any such restriction (see, among other examples, Öcalan; Issa and Others; AlSaadoon and Mufdhi; and Medvedyev and Others, all cited above).

(ii)  Application of these principles to the facts of the case

143.  In determining whether the United Kingdom had jurisdiction over any of the applicants relatives when they died, the Court takes as its starting-point that, on 20 March 2003, the United Kingdom together with the United States of America and their Coalition partners, through their armed forces, entered Iraq with the aim of displacing the Baath regime then in power. This aim was achieved by 1 May 2003, when major combat operations were declared to be complete and the United States of America and the United Kingdom became Occupying Powers within the meaning of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations (see paragraph 89 above).

144.  As explained in the letter dated 8 May 2003 sent jointly by the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States of America to the President of the United Nations Security Council (see paragraph 11 above), the United States of America and the United Kingdom, having displaced the previous regime, created the CPA “to exercise powers of government temporarily”. One of the powers of government specifically referred to in the letter of 8 May 2003 to be exercised by the United States of America and the United Kingdom through the CPA was the provision of security in Iraq, including the maintenance of civil law and order. The letter further stated that [t]he United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners, working through the Coalition Provisional Authority, shall, inter alia, provide for security in and for the provisional administration of Iraq, including by ... assuming immediate control of Iraqi institutions responsible for military and security matters”.

145.  In its first legislative act, CPA Regulation No. 1 of 16 May 2003, the CPA declared that it would exercise powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional administration, to restore conditions of security and stability (see paragraph 12 above).

146.  The contents of the letter of 8 May 2003 were noted by the Security Council in Resolution 1483, adopted on 22 May 2003. This Resolution gave further recognition to the security role which had been assumed by the United States of America and the United Kingdom when, in paragraph 4, it called upon the Occupying Powers “to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability (see paragraph 14 above).

147.  During this period, the United Kingdom had command of the military division Multinational Division (South-East), which included the province of Al-Basra, where the applicants relatives died. From 1 May 2003 onwards the British forces in Al-Basra took responsibility for maintaining security and supporting the civil administration. Among the United Kingdoms security tasks were patrols, arrests, anti-terrorist operations, policing of civil demonstrations, protection of essential utilities and infrastructure and protecting police stations (see paragraph 21 above).

148.  In July 2003 the Governing Council of Iraq was established. The CPA remained in power, although it was required to consult with the Governing Council (see paragraph 15 above). In Resolution 1511, adopted on 16 October 2003, the United Nations Security Council underscored the temporary nature of the exercise by the CPA of the authorities and responsibilities set out in Resolution 1483. It also authorised “a Multinational Force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq” (see paragraph 16 above). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, adopted on 8 June 2004, endorsed “the formation of a sovereign interim government of Iraq ... which will assume full responsibility and authority by 30 June 2004 for governing Iraq” (see paragraph 18 above). In the event, the occupation came to an end on 28 June 2004, when full authority for governing Iraq passed to the interim Iraqi government from the CPA, which then ceased to exist (see paragraph 19 above).

(iii)  Conclusion as regards jurisdiction

149.  It can be seen, therefore, that following the removal from power of the Baath regime and until the accession of the interim Iraqi government, the United Kingdom (together with the United States of America) assumed in Iraq the exercise of some of the public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government. In particular, the United Kingdom assumed authority and responsibility for the maintenance of security in south-east Iraq. In these exceptional circumstances, the Court considers that the United Kingdom, through its soldiers engaged in security operations in Basra during the period in question, exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.

150.  Against this background, the Court recalls that the deaths at issue in the present case occurred during the relevant period: the fifth applicants son died on 8 May 2003; the first and fourth applicants brothers died in August 2003; the sixth applicants son died in September 2003; and the spouses of the second and third applicants died in November 2003. It is not disputed that the deaths of the first, second, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants relatives were caused by the acts of British soldiers during the course of or contiguous to security operations carried out by British forces in various parts of Basra City. It follows that in all these cases there was a jurisdictional link for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention between the United Kingdom and the deceased. The third applicants wife was killed during an exchange of fire between a patrol of British soldiers and unidentified gunmen and it is not known which side fired the fatal bullet. The Court considers that, since the death occurred in the course of a United Kingdom security operation, when British soldiers carried out a patrol in the vicinity of the applicants home and joined in the fatal exchange of fire, there was a jurisdictional link between the United Kingdom and this deceased also.

2.  Alleged breach of the investigative duty under Article 2 of the Convention

151.  The applicants did not complain before the Court of any substantive breach of the right to life under Article 2. Instead they complained that the Government had not fulfilled its procedural duty to carry out an effective investigation into the killings.

Article 2 of the Convention provides as follows:

“1.  Everyones right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

2.  Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a)  in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b)  in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c)  in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”

(a)  The parties submissions

(i)  The Government

152.  The Government reasoned that the procedural duty under Article 2 had to be interpreted in harmony with the relevant principles of international law. Moreover, any implied duty should not be interpreted in such a way as to place an impossible or disproportionate burden on a Contracting State. The United Kingdom did not have full control over the territory of Iraq and, in particular, did not have legislative, administrative or judicial competence. If the investigative duty were to apply extraterritorially, it had to take account of these circumstances, and also of the very difficult security conditions in which British personnel were operating.

153.  The Government accepted that the investigations into the deaths of the first, second and third applicants relatives were not sufficiently independent for the purposes of Article 2, since in each case the investigation was carried out solely by the Commanding Officers of the soldiers alleged to be responsible. However, they submitted that the investigations carried out in respect of the deaths of the fourth and fifth applicants relatives complied with Article 2. Nor had there been any violation of the investigative duty in respect of the sixth applicant; indeed, he did not allege that the investigation in his case had failed to comply with Article 2.

154.  The Government emphasised, generally, that the Royal Military Police investigators were institutionally independent of the armed forces. They submitted that the Court of Appeal had been correct in concluding that the Special Investigation Branch of the Royal Military Police was capable of conducting independent investigations (see paragraph 82 above), although Brooke LJ had also commented that the task of investigating loss of life “must be completely taken away from the military chain of command and vested in the [Royal Military Police]”. The role of the military chain of command in notifying the Special Investigation Branch of an incident requiring investigation, and its subsequent role in referring cases investigated by the Special Investigation Branch to the Army Prosecuting Authority did not, however, mean that those investigations lacked independence as required by Articles 2 or 3 (see Cooper v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48843/99§§ 108-15, ECHR 2003XII; McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, ECHR 2001III; and Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, ECHR 2002II). The Army Prosecuting Authority was staffed by legally qualified officers. It was wholly independent from the military chain of command in relation to its prosecuting function. Its independence had been recognised by the Court in Cooper (cited above).

155.  The Government pointed out that an investigation into the fourth applicants brothers death was commenced by the Special Investigation Branch on 29 August 2003, five days after the shooting on 14 August. The Special Investigation Branch recovered fragments of bullets, empty bullet cases and the vehicle, and took digital photographs of the scene. They interviewed the doctors who treated the deceased and took statements. Nine military witnesses involved in the incident were interviewed and had statements taken and four further witnesses were interviewed but had no evidence to offer. The investigation was discontinued on 17 September 2003 after the Brigade Commander expressed the view that the shooting fell within the rules of engagement and was lawful. However, the decision to discontinue was taken by a Special Investigation Branch senior investigating officer, who was independent of the military chain of command. The investigation was reopened on 7 June 2004 and completed on 3 December 2004, despite the difficult security conditions in Iraq at that time. The case was then referred to the Army Prosecuting Authority, which decided not to bring criminal charges as there was no realistic prospect of proving that the soldier who shot the fourth applicants brother had not been acting in selfdefence. The Attorney General was notified and he decided not to exercise his jurisdiction to order a prosecution. In the Governments submission, the investigation was effective, in that it identified the person responsible for the death and established that the laws governing the use of force had been followed. The investigation was reasonably prompt, in particular when regard was had to the extreme difficulty of investigating in the extraterritorial context. If the halting of the initial investigation gave rise to any lack of independence, this was cured by the subsequent investigation and the involvement of the Army Prosecuting Authority and the Attorney General (see Gül v. Turkeyno. 22676/93, §§ 92-95, 14 December 2000; see also McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, §§ 157 and 162-64, Series A no. 324).

156.  The Government submitted that there was no evidence, in the fifth applicants case, that the military chain of command interfered with the Special Investigation Branch investigation so as to compromise its independence. On the contrary, after receiving the investigation report the military chain of command referred the case to the Army Prosecuting Authority who in turn referred it for independent criminal trial. There was no undue delay in the investigation, in particular having regard to the difficulties faced by United Kingdom investigators investigating an incident which took place in Iraq eight days after the cessation of major combat operations. The fifth applicant was fully and sufficiently involved in the investigation. His participation culminated in the United Kingdom authorities flying him to England so that he could attend the court martial and give evidence. In addition to the Special Investigation Branch investigation and the criminal proceedings against the four soldiers, the fifth applicant brought civil proceedings in the United Kingdom domestic courts, claiming damages for battery and assault, negligence and misfeasance in public office. In those proceedings, he gave an account of his sons death and the investigation which followed it. The proceedings were settled when the Ministry of Defence admitted liability and agreed to pay GBP 115,000 by way of compensation. Moreover, on 20 February 2009 Major General Cubitt wrote to the fifth applicant and formally apologised on behalf of the British army for its role in the death of his son. In these circumstances, the fifth applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention within the meaning of Article 34. Further, or in the alternative, it was no longer justified to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention).

157.  The Government further emphasised that the sixth applicant had expressly confirmed that he did not claim before the Court that the Government had violated his Convention rights. This reflected the fact that, in relation to his sons death, there had been

(a) a full investigation by the Special Investigation Branch, leading to the bringing of criminal charges against six soldiers, one of whom was convicted;

(b) civil proceedings brought by the applicant, which were settled when the Government admitted liability for the mistreatment and death of the applicants son and paid damages of GBP 575,000;

(c) a formal public acknowledgement by the Government of the breach of the applicants sons rights under Articles 2 and 3;

(d) judicial review proceedings, in which the applicant complained of a breach of his procedural rights under Articles 2 and 3 and in which it was agreed by the parties and ordered by the House of Lords that the question whether there had been a breach of the procedural obligation should be remitted to the Divisional Court; and

(e) a public inquiry, which was ongoing.

In these circumstances, the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention.

(ii)  The applicants

158.  The applicants emphasised that the Courts case-law regarding south-eastern Turkey demonstrated that the procedural duty under Article 2 was not modified by reference to security problems in a conflict zone. The same principle had to apply in relation to any attempt by the Government to rely on either the security situation or the lack of infrastructure and facilities in Iraq. The United Kingdom was aware, or should have been aware, prior to the invasion and during the subsequent occupation, of the difficulties it would encounter. Its shortcomings in making provision for those difficulties could not exonerate it from the failure to comply with the investigative duty.

159.  They submitted that the United Kingdom had failed in its procedural duty as regards the first, second, third, fourth and fifth applicants. The Royal Military Police was an element of the British army and was not, in either institutional or practical terms, independent from the military chain of command. The army units exercised control over it in matters relating to safety and logistical support while in theatre. Its involvement in incidents was wholly dependent on a request from the military unit in question, as was illustrated by the fourth applicants case, where the Special Investigation Branch response was stood down upon the instruction of the Commanding Officer. The Royal Military Police appeared to have been wholly dependent on the military chain of command for information about incidents. If it produced a report, this was given to the military chain of command, which decided whether to forward it to the Army Prosecuting Authority. The inadequacies within the Royal Military Police, regarding both lack of resources and independence, were noted by the Court of Appeal and by the Aitken Report.

160.  The applicants pointed out that the Special Investigation Branch investigation into the fourth applicants case had been discontinued at the request of the military chain of command. The further investigatory phase, reopened as a result of litigation in the domestic courts, was similarly deficient, given the lack of independence of the Special Investigation Branch and the extreme delay in interviewing the person responsible for firing the shots and securing other key evidence. In the fifth applicants case, the investigation was initiated at the repeated urging of the family, after considerable obstruction and delay on the part of the British authorities. The investigators were not independent from the military chain of command and the victims family were not sufficiently involved. The applicants contended that the Governments objection that the fifth applicant lacked victim status should be rejected. The court-martial proceedings and the compensation he had received in settlement of the civil proceedings were inadequate to satisfy the procedural requirement under Article 2. In contrast, the sixth applicant did not claim still to be a victim of the violation of his procedural rights under Articles 2 and 3.

(b)  The Courts assessment

(i)  General principles

161.  The Court is conscious that the deaths in the present case occurred in Basra City in south-east Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion, during a period when crime and violence were endemicAlthough major combat operations had ceased on 1 May 2003, the Coalition Forces in south-east Iraq, including British soldiers and military police, were the target of over a thousand violent attacks in the subsequent thirteen months. In tandem with the security problems, there were serious breakdowns in the civilian infrastructure, including the law enforcement and criminal justice systems (see paragraphs 22-23 above; see also the findings of the Court of Appeal at paragraph 80 above).

162.  While remaining fully aware of this context, the Courts approach must be guided by the knowledge that the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective. Article 2, which protects the right to life and sets out the circumstances when deprivation of life may be justified, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions of the Convention. No derogation from it is permitted under Article 15, “except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war”. Article 2 covers both intentional killing and also the situations in which it is permitted to use force which may result, as an unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life. Any use of force must be no more than “absolutely necessary” for the achievement of one or more of the purposes set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) (see McCann and Others, cited above§§ 14648).

163.  The general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing by agents of the State would be ineffective in practice if there existed no procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of the use of lethal force by State authorities. The obligation to protect the right to life under this provision, read in conjunction with the States general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State (see McCann and Others, cited above, § 161). The essential purpose of such an investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws safeguarding the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 110, ECHR 2005-VII). However, the investigation should also be broad enough to permit the investigating authorities to take into consideration not only the actions of the State agents who directly used lethal force but also all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the operations in question, where this is necessary in order to determine whether the State complied with its obligation under Article 2 to protect life (see, by implication, McCann and Others, cited above, §§ 150 and 162; Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746/94, § 128, 4 May 2001; McKerr, cited above, §§ 143 and 151; Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom, no. 37715/97, §§ 100-25, 4 May 2001; Finucane v. the United Kingdom, no. 29178/95, §§ 77-78, ECHR 2003VIII; Nachova and Others, cited above, §§ 114-15; and, mutatis mutandis, Tzekov v. Bulgaria, no. 45500/99, § 71, 23 February 2006).

164.  The Court has held that the procedural obligation under Article 2 continues to apply in difficult security conditions, including in a context of armed conflict (see, among other examples, Güleç v. Turkey, 27 July 1998, § 81, Reports 1998IV; Ergi v. Turkey, 28 July 1998, §§ 79 and 82, Reports 1998IV; Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey, no. 21689/93, §§ 85-90, 309-20 and 326-30, 6 April 2004; Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00, §§ 180 and 210, 24 February 2005; and Kanlibaş v. Turkey, no. 32444/96, §§ 39-51, 8 December 2005)It is clear that where the death to be investigated under Article 2 occurs in circumstances of generalised violence, armed conflict or insurgency, obstacles may be placed in the way of investigators and, as the United Nations Special Rapporteur has also observed (see paragraph 93 above), concrete constraints may compel the use of less effective measures of investigation or may cause an investigation to be delayed (see, for example, Bazorkina v. Russia, no. 69481/01, § 121, 27 July 2006). Nonetheless, the obligation under Article 2 to safeguard life entails that, even in difficult security conditions, all reasonable steps must be taken to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is conducted into alleged breaches of the right to life (see, among many other examples, Kaya v. Turkey, 19 February 1998, §§ 8692, Reports 1998I; Ergi, cited above, §§ 82-85; Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763/94, §§ 101-10, ECHR 1999IV; Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, §§ 156-66, 24 February 2005; Isayeva, cited above, §§ 21524; and Musayev and Others v. Russia, nos. 57941/0058699/00 and 60403/00, §§ 158-65, 26 July 2007).

165.  What form of investigation will achieve the purposes of Article 2 may vary depending on the circumstances. However, whatever mode is employed, the authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention. They cannot leave it to the initiative of the next of kin either to lodge a formal complaint or to take responsibility for the conduct of any investigative procedures (see Ahmet Özkan and Others, cited above, § 310, and Isayeva, cited above, § 210). Civil proceedings, which are undertaken on the initiative of the next of kin, not the authorities, and which do not involve the identification or punishment of any alleged perpetrator, cannot be taken into account in the assessment of the States compliance with its procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention (see, for example, Hugh Jordan, cited above, § 141). Moreover, the procedural obligation of the State under Article 2 cannot be satisfied merely by awarding damages (see McKerrcited above, § 121, and Bazorkina, cited above, § 117).

166.  As stated above, the investigation must be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to a determination of whether the force used was or was not justified in the circumstances and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but of means. The authorities must take the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of clinical findings, including the cause of death. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person or persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see Ahmet Özkan and Others, cited above, § 312, and Isayeva, cited above, § 212 and the cases cited therein).

167.  For an investigation into alleged unlawful killing by State agents to be effective, it is necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events. This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence (see, for example, Shanaghan, cited above, § 104)A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. While there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, a prompt response by the authorities in investigating a use of lethal force may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts. For the same reasons, there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory. The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case. In all cases, however, the victims next of kin must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests (see Ahmet Özkan and Others, cited above, §§ 31114, and Isayeva, cited above, §§ 211-14 and the cases cited therein).

(ii)  Application of these principles to the facts of the case

168.  The Court takes as its starting-point the practical problems caused to the investigating authorities by the fact that the United Kingdom was an Occupying Power in a foreign and hostile region in the immediate aftermath of invasion and war. These practical problems included the breakdown in the civil infrastructure, leading, inter alia, to shortages of local pathologists and facilities for autopsies; the scope for linguistic and cultural misunderstandings between the occupiers and the local population; and the danger inherent in any activity in Iraq at that time. As stated above, the Court considers that in circumstances such as these the procedural duty under Article 2 must be applied realistically, to take account of specific problems faced by investigators.

169.  Nonetheless, the fact that the United Kingdom was in occupation also entailed that, if any investigation into acts allegedly committed by British soldiers was to be effective, it was particularly important that the investigating authority was, and was seen to be, operationally independent of the military chain of command.

170.  It was not in issue in the firstsecond and fourth applicants cases that their relatives were shot by British soldiers, whose identities were known. The question for investigation was whether in each case the soldier fired in conformity with the rules of engagementIn respect of the third applicant, Article 2 required an investigation to determine the circumstances of the shooting, including whether appropriate steps were taken to safeguard civilians in the vicinity. As regards the fifth applicants son, although the Court has not been provided with the documents relating to the court martialit appears to have been accepted that he died of drowning. It needed to be determined whether British soldiers had, as alleged, beaten the boy and forced him into the water. In each case, eyewitness testimony was crucial. It was therefore essential that, as quickly after the event as possible, the military witnesses, and in particular the alleged perpetrators, should have been questioned by an expert and fully independent investigator. Similarly, every effort should have been taken to identify Iraqi eyewitnesses and to persuade them that they would not place themselves at risk by coming forward and giving information and that their evidence would be treated seriously and acted upon without delay.

171.  It is clear that the investigations into the shooting of the first, second and third applicants relatives fell short of the requirements of Article 2, since the investigation process remained entirely within the military chain of command and was limited to taking statements from the soldiers involved. Moreover, the Government accept this conclusion.

172.  As regards the other applicants, although there was an investigation by the Special Investigation Branch into the death of the fourth applicants brother and the fifth applicants son, the Court does not consider that this was sufficient to comply with the requirements of Article 2. It is true that the Royal Military Police, including its Special Investigation Branch, had a separate chain of command from the soldiers on combat duty whom it was required to investigate. However, as the domestic courts observed (see paragraphs 77 and 82 above), the Special Investigation Branch was not, during the relevant period, operationally independent from the military chain of command. It was generally for the Commanding Officer of the unit involved in the incident to decide whether the Special Investigation Branch should be called in. If the Special Investigation Branch decided on its own initiative to commence an investigation, this investigation could be closed at the request of the military chain of command, as demonstrated in the fourth applicants case. On conclusion of a Special Investigation Branch investigation, the report was sent to the Commanding Officer, who was responsible for deciding whether or not the case should be referred to the Army Prosecuting Authority. The Court considers, in agreement with Brooke LJ (see paragraph 82 above), that the fact that the Special Investigation Branch was not “free to decide for itself when to start and cease an investigation” and did not report “in the first instance to the [Army Prosecuting Authority]” rather than to the military chain of command, meant that it could not be seen as sufficiently independent from the soldiers implicated in the events to satisfy the requirements of Article 2.

173.  It follows that the initial investigation into the shooting of the fourth applicants brother was flawed by the lack of independence of the Special Investigation Branch officers. During the initial phase of the investigation, material was collected from the scene of the shooting and statements were taken from the soldiers present. However, Lance Corporal S., the soldier who shot the applicants brother, was not questioned by Special Investigation Branch investigators during this initial phase. It appears that the Special Investigation Branch interviewed four Iraqi witnesses, who may have included the neighbours the applicant believes to have witnessed the shooting, but did not take statements from them. In any event, as a result of the lack of independence, the investigation was terminated while still incomplete. It was subsequently reopened, some nine months later, and it would appear that forensic tests were carried out at that stage on the material collected from the scene, including the bullet fragments and the vehicle. The Special Investigation Branch report was sent to the Commanding Officer, who decided to refer the case to the Army Prosecuting AuthorityThe prosecutors took depositions from the soldiers who witnessed the incident and decided, having taken further independent legal advice, that there was no evidence that Lance Corporal S. had not acted in legitimate self-defence. As previously stated, eyewitness testimony was central in this case, since the cause of the death was not in dispute. The Court considers that the long period of time that was allowed to elapse before Lance Corporal S. was questioned about the incident, combined with the delay in having a fully independent investigator interview the other military witnesses, entailed a high risk that the evidence was contaminated and unreliable by the time the Army Prosecuting Authority came to consider it. Moreover, it does not appear that any fully independent investigator took evidence from the Iraqi neighbours who the applicant claims witnessed the shooting.

174.  While there is no evidence that the military chain of command attempted to intervene in the investigation into the fifth applicants sons death, the Court considers that the Special Investigation Branch investigators lacked independence for the reasons set out above. In addition, no explanation has been provided by the Government in respect of the long delay between the death and the court martial. It appears that the delay seriously undermined the effectiveness of the investigation, not least because some of the soldiers accused of involvement in the incident were by then untraceable (see, in this respect, the comments in the Aitken Report, paragraph 61 above). Moreover, the Court considers that the narrow focus of the criminal proceedings against the accused soldiers was inadequate to satisfy the requirements of Article 2 in the particular circumstances of this case. There appears to be at least prima facie evidence that the applicants son, a minor, was taken into the custody of British soldiers who were assisting the Iraqi police to take measures to combat looting and that, as a result of his mistreatment by the soldiers, he drowned. In these circumstances, the Court considers that Article 2 required an independent examination, accessible to the victims family and to the public, of the broader issues of State responsibility for the death, including the instructions, training and supervision given to soldiers undertaking tasks such as this in the aftermath of the invasion.

175.  In the light of the foregoing, the Court does not consider that the procedural duty under Article 2 has been satisfied in respect of the fifth applicant. Although he has received a substantial sum in settlement of his civil claim, together with an admission of liability on behalf of the army, there has never been a full and independent investigation into the circumstances of his sons death (see paragraph 165 above). It follows that the fifth applicant can still claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 34 and that the Governments preliminary objection regarding his lack of victim status must be rejected.

176.  In contrast, the Court notes that a full, public inquiry is nearing completion into the circumstances of the sixth applicantsondeath. In the light of this inquiry, the Court notes that the sixth applicant accepts that he is no longer a victim of any breach of the procedural obligation under Article 2. The Court therefore accepts the Governments objection in respect of the sixth applicant.

177.  In conclusion, the Court finds a violation of the procedural duty under Article 2 of the Convention in respect of the firstsecond, third, fourth and fifth applicants.

II.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

178.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

179.  The first, second, third, fourth and fifth applicants asked the Court to order the Government to carry out an Article 2-compliant investigation into their relatives deathsThey also claimed 15,000 pounds sterling (GBP) each in compensation for the distress they had suffered because of the United Kingdoms failure to conduct a Convention-compliant investigation into the deaths.

180.  The Government pointed out that the Court had repeatedly and expressly refused to direct the State to carry out a fresh investigation in cases in which it had found a breach of the procedural duty under Article 2 (see, for example, Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/9016065/9016066/9016068/9016069/9016070/9016071/9016072/90 and 16073/90, § 222, ECHR 2009; Ülkü Ekinci v. Turkey, no. 27602/95, § 179, 16 July 2002; and Finucane, cited above, § 89). They further submitted that a finding of a violation would be sufficient just satisfaction in the circumstances. In the alternative, if the Court decided to make an award, the Government noted that the sum claimed by the applicants was higher than generally awarded. They did not, however, propose a sum, leaving it to the Court to decide on an equitable basis.

181.  As regards the applicants request concerning the provision of an effective investigation, the Court reiterates the general principle that the respondent State remains free to choose the means by which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Courts judgment. Consequently, it considers that in these applications it falls to the Committee of Ministers acting under Article 46 of the Convention to address the issues as to what may be required in practical terms by way of compliance (see Varnava and Others, cited above, § 222, and the cases cited therein).

182.  As regards the claim for monetary compensation, the Court recalls that it is not its role under Article 41 to function akin to a domestic tort mechanism court in apportioning fault and compensatory damages between civil parties. Its guiding principle is equity, which above all involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what is just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred. Its nonpecuniary awards serve to give recognition to the fact that moral damage occurred as a result of a breach of a fundamental human right and reflect in the broadest of terms the severity of the damage (see Varnava and Others, cited above, § 224, and the cases cited therein). In the light of all the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that, to compensate each of the first five applicants for the distress caused by the lack of a fully independent investigation into the deaths of their relatives, it would be just and equitable to award the full amount claimed, which, when converted into euros, comes to approximately 17,000 euros (EUR) each.

B.  Costs and expenses

183.  The applicantsemphasising the complexity and importance of the case, claimed for over 580 hours legal work by their solicitors and four counsel in respect of the proceedings before the Court, at a total cost of GBP 119,928.

184.  The Government acknowledged that the issues were complex, but nonetheless submitted that the claim was excessive, given that the applicants legal advisers were familiar with all aspects of the claim since they had acted for the applicants in the domestic legal proceedings, which had been publicly funded. Furthermore, the hourly rates claimed by the applicants counsel, ranging between GBP 500 and GBP 235, and the hourly rates claimed by the applicants solicitors, ranging between GBP 180 and GBP 130, were unreasonably high. Nor had it been necessary to engage two Queens Counsel and two junior counsel.

185.  According to the Courts case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteriathe Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 50,000 for the proceedings before the Court.

C.  Default interest

186.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

 

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1.  Rejects the Governments preliminary objections regarding attribution and non-exhaustion of domestic remedies;

2.  Joins to the merits the questions whether the applicants fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether the fifth and sixth applicants retained victim status;

3.  Declares the application admissible;

4.  Holds that the applicants deceased relatives fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and dismisses the Governments preliminary objection as regards jurisdiction;

5.  Holds that the sixth applicant can no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention;

6.  Holds that there has been a breach of the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to carry out an adequate and effective investigation into the deaths of the relatives of the first, second, third, fourth and fifth applicants and dismisses the Governments preliminary objection as regards the victim status of the fifth applicant;

7.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay each of the first five applicants, within three months, EUR 17,000 (seventeen thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable on this sumin respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into pounds sterling at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b)  that the respondent State is to pay jointly to the first five applicants, within three months, EUR 50,000 (fifty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants on this sum, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into pounds sterling at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(c)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

8.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicants claim for just satisfaction.

 

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 7 July 2011.

Michael OBoyle           Jean-Paul Costa
Deputy Registrar            President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:

(a)  concurring opinion of Judge Rozakis;

(b)  concurring opinion of Judge Bonello.

J.-P.C.
M.OB.


CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE ROZAKIS

When citing the general principles relevant to a State Partys jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention (see paragraphs 130 et seq. of the Grand Chamber judgment), the Court reiterates its established case-law that apart from the territorial aspect determining the jurisdictional competence of a State Party to the Convention, there are “exceptional circumstances capable of giving rise to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Contracting State outside its own territorial boundaries” (see paragraph 132). It then proceeds to discuss such exceptional circumstances. In paragraphs 133 to 137, under the title “State agent authority and control”, it refers to situations where State agents operating extraterritorially, and exercising control and authority over individuals, create a jurisdictional link with their State and its obligations under the Convention, making that State responsible for the acts or omissions of its agents, in cases where they affect the rights or freedoms of individuals protected by the Convention. Characteristic examples of such exceptional circumstances of extraterritorial jurisdiction are mentioned in the judgment (see paragraphs 134-36), and concern the acts of diplomatic and consular agents, the exercise of authority and control over foreign territory by individuals which is allowed by a third State through its consent, invitation or acquiescence, and the use of force by State agents operating outside its territory.

So far so good, but then, under the title “Effective control over an area”, the Court refers to “[a]nother exception to the principle [of] jurisdiction”, when “as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action, a Contracting State exercises effective control of an area outside [its] national territory” (see paragraph 138). I regret to say that I cannot agree that this ground of jurisdiction constitutes a separate (“another”) ground of jurisdiction, which differs from the “State authority and control” jurisdictional link. It is part and parcel, to my mind, of that latter jurisdictional link, and concerns a particular aspect of it. The differing elements, which distinguish that particular aspect from the jurisdictional categories mentioned by the Court, can be presented cumulatively or in isolation as the following: (a) the usually large-scale use of force; (b) the occupation of a territory for a prolonged period of time; and/or (c) in the case of occupation, the exercise of power by a subordinate local administration, whose acts do not exonerate the occupying State from its responsibility under the Convention.

As a consequence, I consider that the right approach to the matter would have been for the Court to have included that aspect of jurisdiction in the exercise of the “State authority and control” test, and to have simply determined that “effective” control is a condition for the exercise of jurisdiction which brings a State within the boundaries of the Convention, as delimited by its Article 1.

 

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE BONELLO

1.  These six cases deal primarily with the issue of whether Iraqi civilians who allegedly lost their lives at the hands of United Kingdom soldiers, in non-combat situations in the United Kingdom-occupied Basra region of Iraq, were “within the jurisdiction” of the United Kingdom when those killings took place.

2.  When, in March 2003, the United Kingdom, together with the other Coalition Forces, invaded Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) conferred upon members of that Authority the fullest jurisdictional powers over Iraq: “The CPA is vested with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives.” This included the “power to issue legislation”: “The CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily.[1]

3.  I fully agreed with the findings of the Court, but I would have employed a different test (a functional jurisdiction test) to establish whether or not the victims fell within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. Though the present judgment has placed the doctrines of extraterritorial jurisdiction on a sounder footing than ever before, I still do not consider wholly satisfactory the re-elaboration of the traditional tests to which the Court has resorted.

Extraterritorial jurisdiction or functional jurisdiction?

4.  The Courts case-law on Article 1 of the Convention (the jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties) has, so far, been bedevilled by an inability or an unwillingness to establish a coherent and axiomatic regime, grounded in essential basics and even-handedly applicable across the widest spectrum of jurisdictional controversies.

5.  Up until now, the Court has, in matters concerning the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Contracting Parties, spawned a number of “leading” judgments based on a need-to-decide basis, patchwork case-law at best. Inevitably, the doctrines established seem to go too far to some, and not far enough to others. As the Court has, in these cases, always tailored its tenets to sets of specific facts, it is hardly surprising that those tenets then seem to limp when applied to sets of different facts. Principles settled in one judgment may appear more or less justifiable in themselves, but they then betray an awkward fit when measured against principles established in another. Issa and Others v. Turkey (no. 31821/96, 16 November 2004flies in the face of Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others ([GC] (dec.), no. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII) and the cohabitation of Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway ((dec.) [GC], nos. 71412/01 and 78166/012 May 2007with Berić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina ((dec.)nos. 36357/04 and others, 16 October 2007) is, overall, quite problematic.

6.  The late Lord Rodger of Earlsferry in the House of Lords had my full sympathy when he lamented that, in its application of extraterritorial jurisdiction “the judgments and decisions of the European Court do not speak with one voice”. The differences, he rightly noted, are not merely ones of emphasis. Some “appear much more serious”[2].

7.  The truth seems to be that Article 1 case-law has, before the present judgment, enshrined everything and the opposite of everything. In consequence, the judicial decision-making process in Strasbourg has, so far, squandered more energy in attempting to reconcile the barely reconcilable than in trying to erect intellectual constructs of more universal application. A considerable number of different approaches to extraterritorial jurisdiction have so far been experimented with by the Court on a case-by-case basis, some not completely exempt from internal contradiction.

8.  My guileless plea is to return to the drawing board. To stop fashioning doctrines which somehow seem to accommodate the facts, but rather, to appraise the facts against the immutable principles which underlie the fundamental functions of the Convention.

9.  The founding members of the Convention, and each subsequent Contracting Party, strove to achieve one aim, at once infinitesimal and infinite: the supremacy of the rule of human rights law. In Article 1 they undertook to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention. This was, and remains, the cornerstone of the Convention. That was, and remains, the agenda heralded in its Preamble: “the universal and effective recognition and observance” of fundamental human rights. “Universal” hardly suggests an observance parcelled off by territory on the checkerboard of geography.

10.  States ensure the observance of human rights in five primordial ways: firstly, by not violating (through their agents) human rights; secondly, by having in place systems which prevent breaches of human rights; thirdly, by investigating complaints of human rights abuses; fourthly, by scourging those of their agents who infringe human rights; and, finally, by compensating the victims of breaches of human rights. These constitute the basic minimum functions assumed by every State by virtue of its having contracted into the Convention.

11.  A “functional” test would see a State effectively exercising “jurisdiction” whenever it falls within its power to perform, or not to perform, any of these five functions. Very simply put, a State has jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 whenever the observance or the breach of any of these functions is within its authority and control.

12.  Jurisdiction means no less and no more than “authority over” and “control of”. In relation to Convention obligations, jurisdiction is neither territorial nor extraterritorial: it ought to be functional  in the sense that when it is within a States authority and control whether a breach of human rights is, or is not, committed, whether its perpetrators are, or are not, identified and punished, whether the victims of violations are, or are not, compensated, it would be an imposture to claim that, ah yes, that State had authority and control, but, ah no, it had no jurisdiction.

13.  The duties assumed through ratifying the Convention go hand in hand with the duty to perform and observe them. Jurisdiction arises from the mere fact of having assumed those obligations and from having the capability to fulfil them (or not to fulfil them).

14.  If the perpetrators of an alleged human rights violation are within the authority and control of one of the Contracting Parties, it is to me totally consequential that their actions by virtue of that States authority engage the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party. I resist any helpful schizophrenia by which a nervous sniper is within the jurisdiction, his act of shooting is within the jurisdiction, but then the victims of that nervous sniper happily choke in blood outside it. Any hiatus between what logical superglue has inexorably bonded appears defiantly meretricious, one of those infelicitous legal fictions a court of human rights can well do without.

15.  Adhering to doctrines other than this may lead in practice to some riotous absurdities in their effects. If two civilian Iraqis are together in a street in Basra, and a United Kingdom soldier kills the first before arrest and the second after arrest, the first dies desolate, deprived of the comforts of United Kingdom jurisdiction, the second delighted that his life was evicted from his body within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. Same United Kingdom soldier, same gun, same ammunition, same patch of street  same inept distinctions. I find these pseudo-differentials spurious and designed to promote a culture of law that perverts, rather than fosters, the cause of human rights justice.

16.  In my view, the one honest test, in all circumstances (including extraterritoriality), is the following: did it depend on the agents of the State whether the alleged violation would be committed or would not be committed? Was it within the power of the State to punish the perpetrators and to compensate the victims? If the answer is yes, self-evidently the facts fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the State. All the rest seems to me clumsy, self-serving alibi-hunting, unworthy of any State that has grandiosely undertaken to secure the “universal” observance of human rights whenever and wherever it is within its power to secure them, and, may I add, of courts whose only raison dêtre should be to ensure that those obligations are not avoided or evaded. The Court has, in the present judgment, thankfully placed a sanitary cordon between itself and some of these approaches.

17.  The failure to espouse an obvious functional test, based exclusively on the programmatic agenda of the Convention, has, in the past, led to the adoption of a handful of sub-tests, some of which may have served defilers of Convention values far better than they have the Convention itself. Some of these tests have empowered the abusers and short-changed their victims. For me the primary questions to be answered boil down to these: when a State ratifies the Convention, does it undertake to promote human rights wherever it can, or does it undertake to promote human rights inside its own confines and to breach them everywhere else? Did the Contracting Party ratify the Convention with the deliberate intent of discriminating between the sanctity of human rights within its own territory and their paltry insignificance everywhere else?

18.  I am unwilling to endorse à la carte respect for human rights. I think poorly of an esteem for human rights that turns casual and approximate depending on geographical coordinates. Any State that worships fundamental rights on its own territory but then feels free to make a mockery of them anywhere else does not, as far as I am concerned, belong to that comity of nations for which the supremacy of human rights is both mission and clarion call. In substance the United Kingdom is arguing, sadly, I believe, that it ratified the Convention with the deliberate intent of regulating the conduct of its armed forces according to latitude: gentlemen at home, hoodlums elsewhere.

19.  The functional test I propose would also cater for the more rarefied reaches of human rights protection, like respect for the positive obligations imposed on Contracting Parties: was it within the States authority and control to see that those positive obligations would be respected? If it was, then the functional jurisdiction of the State would come into play, with all its natural consequences. If, in the circumstances, the State is not in such a position of authority and control as to be able to ensure extraterritorially the fulfilment of any or all of its positive obligations, that lack of functional authority and control excludes jurisdiction, limitedly to those specific rights the State is not in a position to enforce.

20.  This would be my universal vision of what this Court is all about – a bright-line approach rather than case-by-case improvisations, more or less inspired, more or less insipid, cluttering the case-law with doctrines which are, at best, barely compatible and at worst blatantly contradictory – and none measured against the essential yardstick of the supremacy and universality of human rights anytime, anywhere.

Exceptions?

21.  I consider the doctrine of functional jurisdiction to be so linear and compelling that I would be unwilling to acquiesce to any exceptions, even more so in the realm of the near-absolute rights to life and to freedom from torture and degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment. Without ever reneging on the principle of the inherent jurisdiction of the Occupying Power that usually flows from military conquest, at most the Court could consider very limited exceptions to the way in which Articles 2 and 3 are applied in extreme cases of clear and present threats to national security that would otherwise significantly endanger the war effort. I would not, personally, subscribe to any exceptions at all.

Conclusion

22.  Applying the functional test to the specifics of these cases, I arrive at the manifest and inescapable conclusion that all the facts and all the victims of the alleged killings said to have been committed by United Kingdom servicemen fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, which had, in Basra and its surroundings, an obligation to ensure the observance of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. It is uncontested that the servicemen who allegedly committed the acts that led to the deaths of the victims were under United Kingdom authority and control; that it was within the United Kingdoms authority and control whether to investigate those deaths or not; that it was within the United Kingdoms authority and control whether to punish any human rights violations, if established; and that it was within the United Kingdoms authority and control whether to compensate the victims of those alleged violations or their heirs. Concluding that the United Kingdom had all this within its full authority and control, but still had no jurisdiction, would for me amount to a finding as consequential as a good fairy tale and as persuasive as a bad one.

23.  The test adopted by the Court in this case has led to a unanimous finding of jurisdiction. Though I believe the functional test I endorse would better suit any dispute relating to extraterritorial jurisdiction, I would still have found that, whatever the test adopted, all the six killings before the Court engaged United Kingdom jurisdiction. I attach to this opinion a few random observations to buttress my conclusions.

Presumption of jurisdiction

24.  I would propose a different test from that espoused by the domestic courts to establish or dismiss extraterritorial jurisdiction in terms of Article 1, in cases concerning military occupation, when a State becomes the recognised “Occupying Power” according to the Geneva and The Hague instruments. Once a State is acknowledged by international law to be “an Occupying Power”, a rebuttable presumption ought to arise that the Occupying Power has “authority and control” over the occupied territory, over what goes on there and over those who happen to be in it – with all the consequences that flow from a legal presumption. It will then be incumbent on the Occupying Power to prove that such was the state of anarchy and impotence prevailing, that it suffered a deficit of effective authority and control. It will no longer be for the victim of wartime atrocities to prove that the Occupying Power actually exercised authority and control. It will be for the Occupying Power to rebut it.

25.  I was puzzled to read in the domestic proceedings that “the applicants had failed to make a case” for United Kingdom authority and control in the Basra region. I believe that the mere fact of a formally acknowledged military occupation ought to shift any burden of proof from the applicants to the respondent Government.

26.  And it will, in my view, be quite arduous for an officially recognised “Occupying Power” to disprove authority and control over impugned acts, their victims and their perpetrators. The Occupying Power could only do that successfully in the case of infamies committed by forces other than its own, during a state of total breakdown of law and order. I find it bizarre, not to say offensive, that an Occupying Power can plead that it had no authority and control over acts committed by its own armed forces well under its own chain of command, claiming with one voice its authority and control over the perpetrators of those atrocities, but with the other, disowning any authority and control over atrocities committed by them and over their victims.

27.  It is my view that jurisdiction is established when authority and control over others are established. For me, in the present cases, it is well beyond surreal to claim that a military colossus which waltzed into Iraq when it chose, settled there for as long as it cared to and only left when it no longer suited its interests to remain, can persuasively claim not to have exercised authority and control over an area specifically assigned to it in the geography of the war games played by the victorious. I find it uncaring to the intellect for a State to disclaim accountability for what its officers, wearing its uniforms, wielding its weapons, sallying forth from its encampments and returning there, are alleged to have done. The six victims are said to have lost their lives as a result of the unlawful actions of United Kingdom soldiers in non-combat situations  but no one answers for their death. I guess we are expected to blame it on the evil eye.

28.  Jurisdiction flows not only from the exercise of democratic governance, not only from ruthless tyranny, not only from colonial usurpation. It also hangs from the mouth of a firearm. In non-combat situations, everyone in the line of fire of a gun is within the authority and control of whoever is wielding it.

Futility of the case-law

29.  The undeniable fact is that this Court has never, before today, had to deal with any case in which the factual profiles were in any way similar to those of the present applications. This Court has, so far, had several occasions to determine complaints which raised issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction, but all of a markedly different nature. Endeavouring to export doctrines of jurisdiction hammered out in a case of a solitary air strike over a radio station abroad (see Banković and Others, cited above) to allegations of atrocities committed by the forces of an Occupying Power, which has assumed and kept armed control of a foreign territory for well over three years, is anything but consequent. I find the jurisdictional guidelines established by the Court to regulate the capture by France of a Cambodian drug-running ship on the high seas, for the specific purpose of intercepting her cargo and bringing the crew to justice (see Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394/03, ECHR 2010), to be quite distracting and time-wasting when the issue relates to a large territory outside the United Kingdom, conquered and held for over three years by the force of arms of a mighty foreign military set-up, recognised officially by international law as an “Occupying Power”, and which had established itself indefinitely there.

30.  In my view, this relentless search for eminently tangential case-law is as fruitful and fulfilling as trying to solve one crossword puzzle with the clues of another. The Court could, in my view, have started the exercise by accepting that this was judicial terra incognita, and could have worked out an organic doctrine of extraterritorial jurisdiction, untrammelled by the irrelevant and indifferent to the obfuscating.

Indivisibility of human rights

31.  The foregoing analysis is not at all invalidated by what is termed the “indivisibility of human rights” argument which runs thus: as human rights are indivisible, once a State is considered to have extraterritorial “jurisdiction”, then that State is held to be bound to enforce all the human rights enshrined in the Convention. Conversely, if that State is not in a position to enforce the whole range of Convention human rights, it does not have jurisdiction.

32.  Hardly so. Extraterritorially, a Contracting State is obliged to ensure the observance of all those human rights which it is in a position to ensure. It is quite possible to envisage situations in which a Contracting State, in its role as an Occupying Power, has well within its authority the power not to commit torture or extrajudicial killings, to punish those who commit them and to compensate the victims – but at the same time that Contracting State does not have the extent of authority and control required to ensure to all persons the right to education or the right to free and fair elections: those fundamental rights it can enforce would fall squarely within its jurisdiction, those it cannot, on the wrong side of the bright line. If the “indivisibility of human rights” is to have any meaning at all, I would prefer that meaning to run hand in hand with that of the “universality of human rights”.

33.  I believe that it ill suits the respondent Government to argue, as they have, that their inability to secure respect for all fundamental rights in Basra gave them the right not to respect any at all.

A vacuum of jurisdiction?

34.  In spite of the fact that, as a leading partner in the Coalition Provisional Authority, the United Kingdom Government were “vested with all executive, legislative and judicial authority”[3] over that part of vanquished Iraq assigned to them, the United Kingdom went a long and eloquent way in its attempt to establish that it did not exercise jurisdiction over the area assigned to it. It just stopped short of sharing with the Court who did. Who was the mysterious, faceless rival which, instead of it, exercised executive, legislative and judicial authority for three years and more over the area delegated to the United Kingdom? There unquestionably existed a highly volatile situation on the ground, pockets of violent insurgency and a pervasive, sullen resistance to the military presence.

35.  However, in the Basra region, some authority was still giving orders, laying down the law (juris dicere  defining what the binding norm of law is), running the correctional facilities, delivering the mail, establishing and maintaining communications, providing health services, supplying food and water, restraining military contraband and controlling criminality and terrorism as best it could. This authority, full and complete over the United Kingdom military, harassed and maimed over the rest, was the United Kingdoms.

36.  The alternative would be to claim that Basra and the region under the United Kingdoms executive, legislative and judicial responsibility hovered in an implacable legal void, sucked inside that legendary black hole, whose utter repulsion of any authority lasted well over three years – proposition unlikely to find many takers on the legal market.

Human rights imperialism

37.  I confess to be quite unimpressed by the pleadings of the United Kingdom Government to the effect that exporting the European Convention on Human Rights to Iraq would have amounted to “human rights imperialism”. It ill behoves a State that imposed its military imperialism over another sovereign State without the frailest imprimatur from the international community, to resent the charge of having exported human rights imperialism to the vanquished enemy. It is like wearing with conceit your badge of international law banditry, but then recoiling in shock at being suspected of human rights promotion.

38.  Personally, I would have respected better these virginal blushes of some statesmen had they worn them the other way round. Being bountiful with military imperialism but bashful of the stigma of human rights imperialism, sounds to me like not resisting sufficiently the urge to frequent the lower neighbourhoods of political inconstancy. For my part, I believe that those who export war ought to see to the parallel export of guarantees against the atrocities of war. And then, if necessary, bear with some fortitude the opprobrium of being labelled human rights imperialists.

39.  I, for one, advertise my diversity. At my age, it may no longer be elegant to have dreams. But that of being branded in perpetuity a human rights imperialist sounds to meI acknowledge, particularly seductive.


[1].  Paragraph 12 of the Grand Chamber judgment.

[2].  Paragraph 67, House of Lords opinion in Al-Skeini and Others (Respondents) v. Secretary of State for Defence (Appellant) Al-Skeini and Others (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for Defence (Respondent) (Consolidated Appeals), [2007] UKHL 26.

[3].  See paragraph 12 of the Grand Chamber judgment.

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