Analiza slučaja pred Evropskim sudom za ljudska prava
Evropska Konvencija o ljudskim pravima
Praktični vodič za primenu Evropske konvencije o ljudskim pravima
Priručnici i vodiči kroz praksu Evropskog suda za ljudska prava
Evropski sud za ljudska prava u 50 pitanja
Glosar Evropske Konvencije o ljudskim pravima
Nacionalna mreža sudija i tužilaca za primenu standarda Evropskog suda za ljudska prava
Preuzmite presudu u pdf formatu
Presuda je objavljena u "Službenom glasniku RS", br. 54/2009 od 17.7.2009. godine.
"SAVET EVROPE
EVROPSKI SUD ZA LjUDSKA PRAVA
DRUGO ODELjENjE
PREDMET STOJANOVIĆ protiv SRBIJE
(Predstavka broj 34425/04)
PRESUDA
STRAZBUR
19. maj 2009. godine
Ova presuda će postati pravosnažna u okolnostima predviđenim članom 44. stav 2. Konvencije. Moguće su redaktorske promene.
U predmetu Stojanović protiv Srbije,
Evropski sud za ljudska prava (Drugo odeljenje), na sednici veća u sastavu:
Françoise Tulkens, predsednik,
Ireneu Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,
Danute Jočiene,
András Sajó,
Nona Tsotssoria, sudije,
Milenko Kreća, ad hoc sudija,
i gđa Sally Dollé, sekretar Odeljenja,
Posle razmatranja na zatvorenoj sednici 7. aprila 2009. godine,
Izriče sledeću presudu, koja je doneta tog dana:
POSTUPAK
1. Predmet je formiran na osnovu predstavke (broj 34425/04) protiv državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora, koju je Sudu podneo po članu 34. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: "Konvencija"), u to vreme, državljanin državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora, g. Ljubiša Stojanović (u daljem tekstu: "podnosilac predstavke"), dana 10. avgusta 2004. godine.
2. Od 3. juna 2006. godine, posle Deklaracije Crne Gore o nezavisnosti, Srbija je isključiva Visoka strana ugovornica u ovom postupku pred Sudom.
3. Podnosioca predstavke je zastupao Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, organizacija za ljudska prava iz Beograda. Vladu državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora a, kasnije, Vladu Srbije (u daljem tekstu: "Vlada") zastupao je njen zastupnik, g. S. Carić.
4. Podnosilac predstavke, osuđen na zatvorsku kaznu, posebno se žalio zbog odbijanja Tužene države da mu besplatno obezbedi zubnu protezu, kao i zbog otvaranja njegove prepiske od strane zatvorskih organa.
5. Sud je 6. septembra 2005. godine odlučio da Vladu obavesti o ovim pritužbama i proglasio ostali deo predstavke nedopuštenim. Primenjujući član 29. stav 3. Konvencije, takođe, je odlučeno da se osnovanost predstavke razmatra istovremeno sa njenom dopuštenošću.
ČINjENICE
6. Podnosilac predstavke je rođen 1956. godine.
7. Činjenice predmeta, kako su ih dostavile strane, mogu se sumirati na sledeći način.
A. Zubna proteza podnosioca predstavke
8. Pošto ga je sud osudio, podnosilac predstavke je između 20. juna 1999. godine i 28. avgusta 2002. godine služio svoju prvu kaznu u Kazneno-popravnom zavodu u Nišu (u daljem tekstu: "zatvor").
9. U tom periodu je zatvorski zubar dao dijagnozu da je on bolovao od paradentoze (tj. "klimavih zuba i njihovog spontanog ispadanja"). Posebno su mu u dva navrata izvađeni zubi, a treći put se podnosilac predstavke žalio na facijalnu parezu, za koju je utvrđeno da nema veze sa njegovim problemima sa zubima.
10. Posle puštanja na slobodu, podnosilac predstavke je navodno 17. marta 2003. godine pritvoren, kao deo posebnog krivičnog predmeta.
11. Posle još jedne osude, podnosilac predstavke je 5. januara 2004. godine počeo da služi svoju drugu zatvorsku kaznu u Kazneno-popravnom zavodu u Nišu.
12. Istog dana mu je otvoren zdravstveni karton. Ustanovljeno je nekoliko zdravstvenih problema, uključujući probleme sa kolenima i facijalnu parezu, ali izgleda da stomatološki pregled nije obavljen.
13. Zatvorski zubar je prvi put pregledao podnosioca predstavke 13. februara 2004. godine, koji je potvrdio njegovu terminalnu krezubost.
14. Zubar je 5. marta 2004. godine predložio da se podnosiocu predstavke obezbedi proteza.
15. Podnosilac predstavke je 4. maja 2004. godine uputio dopis Ministarstvu zdravlja, tražeći protezu.
16. Sektor za zdravstveni nadzor je 25. juna 2004. godine obavestio podnosioca predstavke da osuđena lica moraju da ostvaruju svoja prava preko Ministarstva pravde, a ne preko Ministarstva zdravlja.
17. Dopisom od 21. jula 2004. godine Zdravstvena inspekcija Ministarstva zdravlja - odsek Niš je primetila da, u skladu sa članom 4. Odluke o učešću osiguranih lica u troškovima zdravstvene zaštite (videti st. 46. i 47. u daljem tekstu), davaoci krvi, kao što je podnosilac predstavke, nisu izuzeti od obaveze da pokriju 60% pokretne stomatološke nadoknade od akrilata.
18. Podnosilac predstavke je 21. oktobra 2004. godine primljen u zatvorsku bolnicu, gde je primećeno da je izgubio apetit, dok se 2. decembra 2004. godine žalio na uznemirenost.
19. Podnosilac predstavke je 23. decembra 2004. godine izgubio svest prilikom prebrojavanja i pretrpeo povredu iznad levog oka.
20. Neodređenog datuma u toku 2004. godine zatvorski organi su obavestili podnosioca predstavke da mora da plati 10.000 dinara (u to vreme otprilike 110 evra) na ime ukupnih troškova njegove proteze. Podnosilac predstavke je umesto toga predložio da mu se omogući da ovaj iznos plati u ratama u iznosima jednakim njegovoj mesečnoj zatvorskoj plati.
21. Podnosilac predstavke je 1. februara 2005. godine ponovo izgubio svest i pretrpeo povredu leve jagodične kosti, koja je zahtevala maksilofacijalnu operaciju, što je urađeno 4. februara 2005. godine.
22. Sve to vreme podnosilac predstavke tvrdi da je stalno imao problema sa uzimanjem hrane. On posebno nije mogao da jede čvrstu hranu, uključujući meso pa čak i voće. Zatvorski organi su, međutim, pokušali da olakšaju stanje podnosioca predstavke tako što su mu davali dodatni mek hleb za svaki obrok.
23. Podnosilac predstavke je 7. juna 2006. godine ponovio svoj zahtev u vezi sa plaćanjem proteze u mesečnim ratama.
24. Upravnik zatvora je 30. januara 2007. godine obavestio podnosioca predstavke da će zatvor u potpunosti pokriti troškove njegove proteze. On je tada primetio da je razlog za to humanitaran i da relevantno domaće zakonodavstvo organima ne nameće takvu obavezu. Najzad, upravnik je naglasio da je cena proteze u zatvoru, u svakom slučaju, 50% manja od normalne cene zato što je i sam prihod zatvora ispod prosečne mesečne plate u Srbiji.
25. Podnosilac predstavke je 25. juna 2007. godine dobio protezu o kojoj je reč.
B. Prepiska podnosioca predstavke
26. Kao što je rečeno u gornjem tekstu, dopisom od 21. jula 2004. godine Zdravstvena inspekcija je obavestila podnosioca predstavke o pokriću njegovog zdravstvenog osiguranja. Ovaj dopis je imao pečat zatvora od 22. jula 2004. godine i registarski broj 713/9033.
27. Na dopisu podnosioca predstavke od 10. avgusta 2004. godine, koji je uputio Sudu, takođe, se nalazio pečat zatvora od 10. avgusta 2004. godine, kao i registarski broj 24/9684.
28. Dopisom od 21. decembra 2004. godine, između ostalog, Sekretarijat Suda je na srpskom jeziku obavestio podnosioca predstavke o navedenom pečatu, pretpostavljajući da on možda ne zna za to.
29. U kasnijem dopisu od 11. januara 2005. godine, podnosilac predstavke je naveo da je sva njegova prepiska sa Sudom, kao i sa drugim telima, morala da prođe kroz zatvorsku upravu, gde je otvarana, i da je navodno to bila standardna praksa na osnovu odredbi važećih zakonskih propisa. Ovaj dopis je, takođe, imao pečat zatvora od 11. januara 2005. godine i registarski broj 24/267.
30. Podnosilac predstavke je u junu 2006. godine dostavio Sudu izjavu koju je potpisalo 78 zatvorenika kojom se potvrđuje, između ostalog, da su zatvorski organi rutinski otvarali njihovu prepisku.
V. Ostale relevantne činjenice
31. Počev od 2002. godine podnosilac predstavke je imao preduzeće sa ograničenom odgovornošću registrovano na njegovo ime. Ispostavilo se, međutim, da ovo preduzeće nije nikada radilo.
32. Izgleda da je do oktobra 2005. godine podnosilac predstavke nasledio 25% jednosobnog stana od majke.
33. Podnosilac predstavke je 12. februara 2006. godine, odnosno 16. maja 2006. godine poslao dva dopisa upravniku zatvora, tražeći da ga primi.
34. Ministarstvo pravde je 26. oktobra 2006. godine pritužbu podnosioca predstavke prosledilo upravniku zatvora na razmatranje.
35. Centar za socijalni rad iz Jagodine je 24. novembra 2006. godine potvrdio, između ostalog, da je podnosilac predstavke primao naknadu na ime nezaposlenosti od 1. decembra 1994. godine do 31. maja 1999. godine.
36. Izgleda da je podnosilac predstavke, dok je bio u zatvoru, dobio platu u ukupnom iznosu od 19.000 dinara u mesečnim ratama. Međutim, počev od jula 2006. godine, na njegovom ličnom zatvorskom računu ostalo je 3.537 dinara kao deo "plana obavezne štednje".
A. Povelja o ljudskim i manjinskim pravima i građanskim slobodama državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora (objavljena u Službenom listu Srbije i Crne Gore - "Službeni list SCG", broj 6/03)
37. Relevantne odredbe ove povelje predviđale su sledeće:
"Svako ima pravo na poštovanje privatnog i porodičnog života, doma i tajnosti prepiske.
...
Tajnost pisama i drugih sredstava opštenja je nepovrediva. Odstupanja su dozvoljena na određeno vreme samo na osnovu odluke suda, ako je to neophodno radi vođenja krivičnog postupka ili odbrane zemlje, na način predviđen zakonom."
B. Ustav Republike Srbije (objavljen u Službenom glasniku Socijalističke Republike Srbije - "Službeni list SRS", broj 1/90)
38. Relevantne odredbe ovog ustava predviđale su sledeće:
"Tajna pisma i drugih sredstava opštenja je nepovrediva.
Zakonom se može propisati da se, na osnovu odluke suda, može odstupiti od načela nepovredivosti tajne pisma i drugih sredstava opštenja, ako je neophodno za vođenje krivičnog postupka ili za odbranu Republike Srbije."
"Svako ima pravo na zaštitu zdravlja.
Deca, trudnice i stara lica imaju pravo na zdravstvenu zaštitu iz javnih prihoda, kad to pravo ne ostvaruju po nekom drugom osnovu, a druga lica pod uslovima utvrđenim zakonom."
"Obaveznim osiguranjem, u skladu sa zakonom, zaposleni ... [obezbeđuju] ... pravo na zdravstvenu zaštitu i druga prava za slučaj bolesti, ...trudnoće, porođaja, smanjenja ili gubitka radne sposobnosti, nezaposlenosti i starosti ..., kao i druga prava po osnovu socijalnog osiguranja ...
Prava iz socijalnog osiguranja za građane koji nisu obuhvaćeni obaveznim socijalnim osiguranjem uređuju se zakonom."
V. Zakon o izvršenju krivičnih sankcija iz 1997 (objavljen u "Službenom glasniku RS", br. 16/97 i 34/01)
39. Relevantne odredbe ovog zakona glase kako sledi:
"Protiv pojedinačnih akata kojima se rešava o pravima i obavezama lica prema kojima se izvršava sankcija ne može se voditi upravni spor."
"Služba za zdravstvenu zaštitu vrši zdravstvenu prevenciju, leči osuđena i pritvorena lica i nadzire higijenu i kvalitet hrane i vode."
"Način života i rada osuđenih bliže se uređuje aktom o kućnom redu zavoda.
Akt o kućnom redu zavoda donosi ministar pravde."
"Svako mora poštovati dostojanstvo osuđenog.
Niko ne sme ugroziti telesno i duševno zdravlje osuđenog."
"Osuđeni ima pravo na ishranu podobnu da održi njegovo dobro zdravlje i snagu ..."
"Osuđeni ima pravo da nadležnim organima upućuje podneske.
...
Osuđeni podneske prima i upućuje preko zavoda."
"Osuđeni ima neograničeno pravo na dopisivanje."
"Osuđeni uživa besplatnu zdravstvenu zaštitu.
Osuđeni kome se u zavodu ne može pružiti odgovarajuća zdravstvena zaštita upućuje se u zatvorsku bolnicu, psihijatrijski zavod i drugu zdravstvenu ustanovu."
"Osuđeni ima pravo pritužbe upravniku zbog povrede prava ili drugih nepravilnosti koje su u zavodu učinjene prema njemu.
Pritužbu je upravnik dužan da pažljivo ispita i da o njoj donese rešenje.
Osuđeni koji ne dobije odgovor na pritužbu ili nije zadovoljan donetim rešenjem ima pravo da podnese pismenu predstavku direktoru uprave [za izvršenje krivičnih sankcija].
Osuđeni ima pravo da bez prisustva zaposlenih i postavljenih lica u zavodu prituži ovlašćenom licu koje nadzire rad zavoda.
Sadržina pritužbe predstavke predstavlja tajnu."
40. Osim toga, prema čl. 346-352, Uprava za izvršenje krivičnih sankcija (u daljem tekstu: "Uprava"), kao sastavni deo Ministarstva pravde, je imala nadležnost da prati sprovođenje relevantnog zakonodavstva u vezi sa izvršenjem krivičnih sankcija. Uprava je postupala po službenoj dužnosti. Ona je mogla da razgovara sa osuđenim licima bez prisustva zatvorskog osoblja i na kraju da usvoji obavezujuće preporuke upućene odgovarajućim upravnicima na koje su se upravnici mogli kasnije žaliti ministru pravde. Osim toga, član 353. je predviđao, između ostalog, da Ministarstvo zdravlja mora da nadzire kvalitet zdravstvene zaštite u zatvorima.
G. Zakon o izvršenju krivičnih sankcija iz 2005 (objavljen u "Službenom glasniku RS", broj 85/05)
41. Ovaj zakon je stupio na snagu 1. januara 2006. godine, čime je Zakon o izvršenju krivičnih sankcija iz 1977. godine stavljen van snage.
D. Pravilnik o kućnom redu u zavodima zatvorenog i strogo zatvorenog tipa iz 2001 (objavljen u "Službenom glasniku RS", broj 5/01)
42. Relevantne odredbe ovog pravilnika glase kako sledi:
"Osuđena lica imaju neograničeno pravo na dopisivanje u skladu sa zakonom.
Oni će primati i slati svoju prepisku preko zatvorskih organa."
Đ. Pravilnik o kućnom redu u kazneno popravnim zavodima i okružnim zatvorima iz 2006 (objavljen u "Službenom glasniku RS", broj 27/06)
43. Ovaj pravilnik je stupio na snagu 8. aprila 2006. godine, čime je Pravilnik o kućnom redu u kazneno popravnim zavodima iz 2001. godine stavljen van snage.
Ž. Zakonik o krivičnom postupku (objavljen u Službenom listu Savezne Republike Jugoslavije - "Službeni list SRJ", br. 70/01 i 68/02 kao i "Službenom glasniku RS", br. 58/04, 85/05 i 115/05)
44. Članovi 148-153. utvrđuju načela postupanja sa pritvorenicima, a ne primenjuju se na one koje služe zatvorske kazne.
Z. Zakon o zdravstvenom osiguranju (objavljen u "Službenom glasniku RS", br. 18/92, 26/93, 53/93, 67/93, 48/94, 25/96, 46/98, 54/99, 29/01, 18/02, 80/02, 84/04 i 45/05)
45. Član 28. stav 1. ovog Zakona predviđao je sledeće: "U vezi sa određenim vrstama zdravstvene zaštite, može se predvideti da osigurana lica moraju da učestvuju u troškovima ... [nastalim] ... uzimajući u obzir da ovo učešće ne sme da ih odvraća od upotrebe njihovog zdravstvenog osiguranja."
I. Odluka o učešću osiguranih lica u troškovima zdravstvene zaštite iz 2001 (objavljena u "Službenom glasniku RS", broj 31/01)
46. Relevantne odredbe ove odluke glase kako sledi:
"Ovom odlukom utvrđuju se vidovi i iznosi učešća osiguranih lica u troškovima zdravstvene zaštite (u daljem tekstu: učešće), oslobađanje od plaćanja učešća, kao i mesto i način naplate."
"Učešće se plaća za ... izradu ili nabavku protetičkog sredstva ... [kako sledi:] ...
16. [za] zubnu protetiku...
16.2. pokretnu zubnu protetiku ... 60% ... [cene koju utvrdi odbor za zdravstveno osiguranje]."
"Dobrovoljni davaoci krvi oslobođeni su plaćanja učešća u roku od 12 meseci posle svakog davanja krvi, osim učešća iz [člana 3] stavovi 15, 16, 17, 19 i 20 ..."
J. Odluka o učešću osiguranih lica u troškovima zdravstvene zaštite iz 2004 (objavljena u "Službenom glasniku RS", br. 83/04, 118/04, 71/05 i 18/06)
47. Ova odluka stavila je van snage gore navedenu odluku iz 2004. godine, ali je relevantno učešće ostalo isto.
K. Krivični zakon Republike Srbije iz 1977 (Krivični zakon Republike Srbije; objavljen u "Službenom glasniku SRS", br. 26/77, 28/77, 43/77, 20/79, 24/84, 39/86, 51/87, 6/89, 42/89, 21/90, 16/90, 49/92, 23/93, 67/93, 47/94, 17/95, 44/98, 10/02, 11/02, 80/02, 39/03 i 67/03)
48. Relevantne odredbe ovog zakona glase kako sledi:
"1. Ko neovlašćeno otvori tuđe pismo ili telegram ili kakvo drugo zatvoreno pismo ili pošiljku, ili na drugi način povredi njihovu tajnost, ili ko neovlašćeno zadrži, prikrije, uništi ili drugom preda tuđe pismo, telegram, zatvoreno pismeno ili pošiljku, kazniće se zatvorom do jedne godine.
...
3. Ako delo iz stava 1 ... ovog člana učini službeno lice u vršenju službe, kazniće se zatvorom od šest meseci do pet godine."
L. Zakon o obligacionim odnosima (Zakon o obligacionim odnosima; objavljen u Službenom listu Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije - "Službeni list SFRJ", br. 29/78, 39/85, 45/89, 57/89 i "Službenom listu SRJ", broj 31/93)
49. Prema čl. 199. i 200. Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, između ostalog, svako ko je pretrpeo strah ili fizičku bol ili, zapravo, duševnu patnju kao posledicu kršenja "prava ličnosti" ili je bio izložen štetnim okolnostima koje ozbiljno umanjuju životne aktivnosti, može, u zavisnosti od njihovog trajanja i jačine, da pokrene postupak za finansijsku naknadu kod parničnih sudova, kao i da traži druge oblike naknade "koji mogu" omogućiti odgovarajuće nematerijalno zadovoljenje.
PRAVO
I. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 8. KONVENCIJE U VEZI SA PREPISKOM PODNOSIOCA PREDSTAVKE
50. Podnosilac predstavke se žalio zbog mešanja u njegovu prepisku sa Sudom, kao i sa raznim domaćim telima, od strane zatvorskih organa.
51. Sud smatra da ovu pritužbu treba razmatrati prema članu 8. Konvencije, pre nego prema članu 34, pošto ne postoji dokaz da je prepiska između Suda i podnosioca predstavke neopravdano kasnila, ometana ili na drugi način "zadržavana" (videti Manoussos protiv Češke Republike i Nemačke (odluka), broj 46468/99, 9. juli 2002. godine).
52. Član 8, kao relevantan, predviđa sledeće:
"1. Svako ima pravo na poštovanje ... prepiske.
2. državni organi se neće mešati u ostvarivanje ovog prava sem kao što je predviđeno zakonom i kao što je neophodno u demokratskom društvu... radi sprečavanja nereda ili kriminala..."
1. Kompatibilnost ratione temporis
53. Vlada je tvrdila da je pritužba podnosioca predstavke nekompatibilna ratione temporis sa odredbama Konvencije pošto su sporne radnje koje su preduzeli zatvorski organi zasnovane na zakonodavstvu koje je i samo usvojeno pre nego što je Srbija ratifikovala Konvenciju 3. marta 2004. godine.
54. Podnosilac predstavke je osporio ovu tvrdnju.
55. Sud primećuje da se navodno mešanje u prepisku podnosioca predstavke desilo posle 3. marta 2004. godine (videti st. 26-29. u gornjem tekstu). Bez obzira na činjenicu da se to desilo na osnovu zakona usvojenih pre tog datuma, pritužba podnosioca predstavke, prema tome, jasno spada u nadležnost Suda ratione temporis (videti, među mnogim drugim autoritetima, Yagci i Sargin protiv Turske, 8. jun 1995. godine, stav 40, serija A broj 319-A).
56. S obzirom na gore navedeno, primedba Vlade se mora odbiti.
2. Iscrpljenost domaćih pravnih sredstava
(a) Argumenti koje su strane iznele
57. Vlada je navela da podnosilac predstavke nije iscrpeo sva delotvorna domaća pravna sredstva, u smislu člana 35. stav 1. Konvencije, On je posebno propustio da:
- podnese krivičnu prijavu na osnovu člana 72. Krivičnog zakonika iz 1977. godine (videti stav 48. u gornjem tekstu),
- podnese parničnu tužbu u skladu sa čl. 199. i 200. Zakona o obligacionim odnosima (videti stav 49. u gornjem tekstu) ili, zapravo, u skladu sa samom Konvencijom (na ime podrške gore navedenoj parničnoj tužbi, Vlada je Sudu podnela nekoliko presuda kojima su domaći sudovi tužiocima dodelili naknadu, u raznim kontekstima i gde su se oslonili na Konvenciju),
- iskoristi pravna sredstva predviđena Zakonom o sprovođenju krivičnih sankcija iz 1977. godine (videti st. 39. i 40. u gornjem tekstu, čl. 103. i 347. posebno), ili
- podnese posebnu žalbu Sudu Srbije i Crne Gore u vezi sa navodnim povredama.
58. Podnosilac predstavke je objasnio da nijedno od gore navedenih pravnih sredstava nije moglo biti delotvorno u posebnim okolnostima ovog predmeta.
(b) Relevantna načela
59. Sud primećuje da pravilo iscrpljenosti domaćih pravnih sredstava sadržano u članu 35. stav 1. Konvencije zahteva da podnosilac predstavke treba da se normalno poziva na pravna sredstva koja su raspoloživa i dovoljna da omoguće naknadu u vezi sa navodnim povredama (videti, među mnogim drugim autoritetima, Akdivar i ostali protiv Turske, presuda od 16. septembra 1996. godine, Izveštaji o presudama i odlukama 1996-IV, str. 1210, stav 65). Postojanje pravnih sredstava o kojima je reč mora biti dovoljno sigurno ne samo teoretski već i praktično, a ako nije tako, ne postoji potrebna dostupnost i delotvornost (isto).
60. On podseća da u oblasti iscrpljenosti domaćih pravnih sredstava postoji raspodela tereta dokaza. Obaveza je države kada tvrdi da pravna sredstva nisu iscrpljena, da uveri Sud da su ta sredstva delotvorna, da su i teorijski i praktično bila na raspolaganju u relevantnom vremenu, drugim rečima, da je ono bilo dostupno, da je moglo da obezbedi naknadu u vezi sa pritužbama podnosioca predstavke i nudilo opravdane izglede za uspeh. Međutim, kada je uslov tog tereta dokazivanja ispunjen, podnosilac predstavke je dužan da dokaže da je pravno sredstvo na koje se država pozvala zapravo bilo iscrpljeno, ili da je zbog nekog razloga bilo neadekvatno ili nedelotvorno u konkretnim okolnostima predmeta, ili da su postojale posebne okolnosti koje su podnosioca odnosno podnositeljku predstavke oslobađale tog zahteva (isto, str. 1211, stav 68).
61. Sud je priznao da se član 35. stav 1. (raniji član 26) mora primenjivati uz određeni stepen elastičnosti i bez preteranog formalizma (videti, na primer, Cardot protiv Francuske, presuda od 19. marta 1991. godine, serija A broj 200, str. 18, stav 34). On je dalje utvrdio da pravilo iscrpljenosti nije ni apsolutno niti se može primenjivati automatski. Prilikom razmatranja da li je ispoštovano, od suštinskog je značaja da se uzmu u obzir posebne okolnosti svakog pojedinačnog slučaja (videti, na primer, Van Oosterwijk protiv Belgije, presuda od 6. novembra 1980. godine, serija A broj 40, str. 18, stav 35). To znači, između ostalog, da on mora realistično uzeti u obzir ne samo postojanje formalnih pravnih sredstava u pravnom sistemu Visoke strane ugovornice o kojoj je reč već i opšti kontekst u kom se ona primenjuju kao i lične okolnosti podnosilaca predstavke (videti presudu u predmetu Akdivar citiranu u gornjem tekstu, str. 1211, stav 69).
(v) Ocena Suda u predmetnom slučaju
62. Iako se obraćanje upravnim organima ne može isključiti kao delotvoran pravni lek u vezi sa pritužbama koje se tiču sprovođenja zatvorskih propisa (videti, među drugim autoritetima, Boyle i Rice protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva od 27. aprila 1988. godine, serija A broj 131, str. 26, stav 65), Sud smatra da Vlada nije dostavila relevantnu sudsku praksu koja bi pokazala da je neko administrativno sredstvo na koje se ona oslonila moglo obezbediti podnosiocu predstavke odgovarajuću naknadu za navodnu povredu. Osim toga, Vlada je sama priznala da je navodno mešanje proisteklo iz administrativne prakse (videti stav 69. u donjem tekstu), što bi, po mišljenju Suda, veoma ukazalo da pravna sredstva o kojima je reč zaista nisu verovatan način naknade.
63. Drugo, srpski zakon ne predviđa mogućnost pokretanja krivičnog postupka protiv same države. Krivična tužba ne bi, prema tome, mogla da omogući podnosiocu predstavke odgovarajuću naknadu (o ovoj tački videti upravo Cenbauer protiv Hrvatske (odluka), broj 73786/01, 5. februar 2004. godine).
64. Treće, čak i pod pretpostavkom da je podnosilac predstavke mogao dobiti naknadu putem posebnog parničnog postupka, Vlada nije pokazala da je parnična tužba mogla imati bilo kakvog uticaja na postupanje sa njegovom prepiskom. Drugim rečima, dok je parnični postupak mogao imati uticaja na posledice navodne povrede, ne postoji dokaz da bi on mogao da se bavi osnovnim uzrokom iste (isto, videti, takođe, Rodić i drugi protiv Bosne i Hercegovine, broj 22893/05, st. 59. i 60, 27. maj 2008. godine).
65. Najzad, Sud podseća da je već utvrdio da je žalba Sudu Srbije i Crne Gore bila nedostupna do 15. jula 2005. godine i da je, dalje, ostala nedelotvorna do samog raspada državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora (videti Matijašević protiv Srbije, broj 23037/04, st. 34-37, ECHR 2006-...). Sud ne vidi nijedan razlog da u ovom predmetu odstupi od ovog mišljenja.
66. U vezi sa gore navedenim, primedba Vlade se mora odbiti.
3. Zaključak
67. Sud smatra da pritužba podnosioca predstavke nije očigledno neosnovana u smislu značenja člana 35. stav 3. Konvencije i ne nalazi drugi osnov da je proglasi nedopuštenom. Pritužba se, prema tome, mora proglasiti dopuštenom.
1. Argumenti koje su strane iznele
68. Vlada je tvrdila da nije bilo povrede člana 8. Konvencije. Posebno, sistem je funkcionisao na sledeći način: (i) zatvorenici bi dostavljali svoju prepisku u dva primerka, (ii) na drugi primerak bi se zatim stavljao pečat i datum, kao odgovor na njihove zahteve, i vraćao bi im se, i (iii) prvi primerak bi se stavljao u koverat i prosleđivao na naznačenu adresu. Prepisku zatvorenika na taj način nisu ni otvarali ni čitali zatvorski organi.
69. Vlada je tvrdila da se ovaj sistem zasniva na članu 65. stav 3. Zakona o izvršenju zatvorskih sankcija iz 1997. godine (videti stav 39. u gornjem tekstu), koji se iako možda nedovoljno precizan nije mogao tumačiti tako da znači da se sva prepiska zatvorenika mora automatski nadgledati. Moguće kršenje Konvencije nije, prema tome, bilo posledica namere zakonodavca, već posledica administrativne prakse koja je utvrđena pre nego što je Konvencija stupila na snagu u odnosu na Srbiju. Vlada je dalje tvrdila da je podnosilac predstavke, posebno, dostavljao otvorene dopise zatvorskim organima i nije tražio da mu se da koverat.
70. Najzad, Vlada je istakla da se mešanje u prepisku podnosioca predstavke preduzimalo kako bi se sačuvala javna bezbednost i sprečio kriminal i potvrdila da, u relevantnom trenutku, sudsko razmatranje ovog mešanja nije bilo moguće (videti stav 39. u gornjem tekstu). Međutim, novo zatvorsko zakonodavstvo, u skladu sa standardima Saveta Evrope, je kasnije usvojeno (videti stav 41. u gornjem tekstu).
71. Podnosilac predstavke je tvrdio, na prvom mestu, da nije tražio da mu se da primerak sa pečatom njegove odlazne pošte, ali da svakako to nije mogao da traži kada je reč o njegovoj dolaznoj pošti, koja je, takođe, cenzurisana. Drugo, samo postojanje obaveze da se zatvorskim organima dostavljaju otvorena pisma u svim situacijama je jasno mešanje u pravo zatvorenika na poštovanje njihovog prava na prepisku pošto ne postoji garancija da ta pisma neće biti izložena nekoj vrsti cenzure i/ili praćenja. Treće, domaće zakonodavstvo na snazi je bilo previše neodređeno, zbog čega navedeno mešanje nije moglo biti "u skladu sa zakonom", kako se to traži drugim stavom člana 8. Četvrto, Vlada nije dala obrazloženje zašto je njeno mešanje u prepisku podnosioca predstavke zaista neophodno u jednom demokratskom društvu. Najzad, podnosilac predstavke je primetio da nedavno usvojeno zakonodavstvo na koje se Vlada poziva nije značajno popravilo stanje, kao što, takođe, nije navela sa dovoljno jasnoće obim diskrecionog prava koje uživaju javni organi.
2. Ocena Suda
72. Pošto ne postoji dokaz da je podnosilac predstavke ikada pristao na praksu po kojoj su zatvorenici obavezni da dostavljaju svoja otvorena pisma zatvorskim organima (videti stav 68. u gornjem tekstu) i s obzirom na činjenicu da su oni, takođe, otvarali i stavljali pečat na njegovu dolaznu prepisku (videti stav 26. u gornjem tekstu), Sud smatra da je jasno došlo do "mešanja javnog organa" u ostvarivanje prava podnosioca predstavke na poštovanje prava na prepisku zajamčenog članom 8. stav 1. Konvencije. Takvo mešanje će povrediti član 8. sem ako je "u skladu sa zakonom", teži jednom ili više zakonitih ciljeva o kojima je reč u stavu 2. istog i, štaviše, ako je "neophodno u demokratskom društvu" (videti sledeće presude: Niedbala protiv Poljske, broj 27915/95, stav 78, 4. jul 2000. godine, Silver i drugi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 25. mart 1983. godine, serija A broj 61, str. 32, stav 84, Cambell protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 25. mart 1992. godine, serija A broj 233, str. 16, stav 34, Calogero Diana protiv Italije, 15. novembar 1996. godine, Izveštaji 1996-V, str. 1775, stav 28, Petra protiv Rumunije, 23. septembar 1998. godine, Izveštaji 1998-VII, str. 2853, stav 36). Izraz "u skladu sa zakonom", međutim, ne zahteva samo usklađenost sa domaćim pravom, već se, takođe, odnosi i na kvalitet prava (videti Niedbala protiv Poljske, citiran u gornjem tekstu, stav 79). Domaće pravo mora da naznači sa dovoljnom jasnoćom obim i način ostvarivanja relevantnog diskrecionog prava koje imaju javni organi kako bi se pojedincima obezbedio minimalni nivo zaštite na koju imaju pravo u jednom demokratskom društvu (videti Domenichini protiv Italije, presuda od 15. novembra 1996. godine, Izveštaji 1996-V, str. 1800, stav 33).
73. U vezi sa predmetnim slučajem, Sud primećuje da su i član 19. Ustava Srbije iz 1990. godine i član 24. st. 1. i 2. Povelje o ljudskim i manjinskim pravima i građanskim slobodama, koji su bili na snazi u relevantnom trenutku, predviđali da se niko ne može mešati u nečiju prepisku u odsustvu određene sudske odluke u tom smislu (videti st. 37. i 38. u gornjem tekstu). Pošto takva odluka nikada nije doneta u vezi sa podnosiocem predstavke, a zatvorski propisi na snazi su i sami bili nejasni u tom smislu (videti stav 39. u gornjem tekstu, čl. 65. i 66. posebno, kao i stav 42. u gornjem tekstu), proizlazi da mešanje na koje se žali nije bilo "u skladu sa zakonom" u materijalnom trenutku.
74. S obzirom na prethodni zaključak, Sud ne smatra da je neophodno da se utvrdi da li su poštovani ostali zahtevi stava 2. člana 8.
75. Shodno tome, Sud zaključuje da je došlo do povrede člana 8. Konvencije.
II. NAVODNE POVREDE ČL. 3. I 8. KONVENCIJE KAO I ČLANA 1. PROTOKOLA BROJ 12 U VEZI SA PROTEZOM PODNOSIOCA PREDSTAVKE
76. Podnosilac predstavke se žalio što su srpski organi odbili da mu besplatno ovezbede protezu, što je njemu, navodno prouzrokovalo razne zdravstvene probleme. Sud je ovu pritužbu prosledio Vladi prema čl. 3. i 8. Konvencije.
77. Štaviše, podnosilac predstavke se žalio prema članu 1. Protokola broj 12, objasnivši da je u skladu sa srpskim zakonom morao da plati 60% cene proteze, što znači da između njega kao očigledno platežno nesposobnog zatvorenika, sa jedne strane, i stanovnika na slobodi, s druge strane, nije napravljena nikakva razlika, uprkos činjenici da je njegova situacija veoma različita.
78. Vlada je odbacila ove navode, tvrdeći da podnosilac predstavke nije iscrpeo razna domaća pravna sredstva, da je pritužbu prema članu 1. Protokola broj 12 pokrenuo kasno i/ili da je nekompatibilna ratione personae. U svakom slučaju, on je izgubio status žrtve time što mu je proteza obezbeđena o trošku države.
79. Sud ne smatra da je neophodno da se razmatraju bilo koje primedbe Vlade na ove pritužbe pošto se one sada mogu smatrati "rešenim" u smislu člana 37. stav 1. Konvencije (videti, Sisojeva i drugi protiv Letonije [VV], broj 60654/00, stav 96, ECHR 2007-...).
80. S tim u vezi, Sud podseća da, prema članu 37. stav 1. (b), on može "... u bilo kojoj fazi postupka odlučiti da predstavku skine sa svog spiska predmeta gde okolnosti dovode do zaključka da ... je stvar rešena..." Kako bi se utvrdilo da li se ta odredba može primeniti na ovaj slučaj, Sud mora da odgovori na dva pitanja: prvo, da li okolnosti na koje se podnosilac predstavke direktno žalio još postoje; i, drugo, da li su posledice moguće povrede Konvencije i/ili Protokola broj 12 nadoknađene (isto). S tim na umu i uprkos nekim činjeničnim nejasnoćama, Sud primećuje da je podnosilac predstavke besplatno dobio protezu 25. juna 2007. godine. Štaviše, ne postoje naznake da je on posle toga imao neke zdravstvene probleme u vezi sa tim. Ne postoje ni medicinski dokazi da je gladovao ili da na drugi način nije bio u stanju da prima dovoljno hrane pre navedenog datuma. Pitanje koje pokreće pritužbu podnosioca predstavke se, prema tome, sada može smatrati "rešenim" u smislu člana 37. stav 1. (b). Osim toga, ne postoje posebni razlozi u vezi sa poštovanjem ljudskih prava kako su ona definisana Konvencijom koji bi zahtevali da Sud nastavi da razmatra ovu pritužbu prema članu 37. stav 1. in fine.
81. Prema tome, ovaj deo predstavke treba isključiti iz predmeta.
III. PRIMENA ČLANA 41. KONVENCIJE
82. Relevantne odredbe ovog člana glase kako sledi:
"Kada Sud utvrdi prekršaj Konvencije ili protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo Visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo delimičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj stranci."
83. Podnosilac predstavke je tražio 1.000 evra (EUR) na ime nematerijalne štete koju je pretrpeo zbog povrede njegovog prava na poštovanje prepiske i zatražio garancije da se isto neđe ponoviti.
84. Vlada je osporila ovaj zahtev.
85. U okolnostima predmeta, Sud smatra da samo utvrđivanje povrede člana 8. Konvencije predstavlja odgovarajuće pravično zadovoljenje u vezi sa naknadom traženom u ovom delu (videti, mutatis mutandis, Campbell i Fell protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva; 28. jun 1984. godine, stav 141, serija A broj 80; Calogero Diana protiv Italije, 15. novembar 1996. godine, stav 44, Izveštaji o presudama i odlukama 1996-V; Salapa protiv Poljske, broj 35489/97, st. 100-102. i 107, 19. decembar 2002. godine; i Savenkovas protiv Litvanije, broj 871/02, 18. novembar 2008. godine).
86. Podnosilac predstavke je, takođe, tražio 1.700 evra na ime troškova koje je imao pred Sudom. On je posebno tražio 1.550 evra za pripremu predmeta i obimne pisane podneske svog zastupnika, plus još 150 evra za sekretarske troškove, uključujući i poštarinu.
87. Vlada je smatrala da zahtev podnosioca predstavke nije potkrepljen dokazima.
88. Prema sudskoj praksi Suda, podnosilac predstavke ima pravo na naknadu troškova samo u onoj meri u kojoj je pokazano da su oni zaista i neophodno nastali i da su, takođe, opravdani u pogledu iznosa (videti, na primer, Iatridis protiv Grčke (pravično zadovoljenje) [VV], broj 31107/96, stav 54, ECHR 2000-XI).
89. U konkretnom slučaju, s obzirom na gore navedene kriterijume, kao i na 850 evra koji su već dodeljeni podnosiocu predstavke u okviru pravne pomoći Saveta Evrope, Sud odbija ovaj zahtev u vezi sa troškovima.
90. Sud smatra da je primereno da zatezna kamata bude zasnovana na najnižoj kamatnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke uz dodatak od tri procentna poena.
IZ TIH RAZLOGA, SUD
1. Proglašava većinom glasova pritužbu prema članu 8. Konvencije u vezi sa mešanjem u prepisku podnosioca predstavke dopuštenom;
2. Utvrđuje jednoglasno da je došlo do povrede člana 8. Konvencije s tim u vezi;
3. Utvrđuje glasovima 6 prema 1 da je pritužba u vezi sa protezom podnosioca predstavke rešena i, prema tome, odlučuje da je isključi iz predmeta;
4. Utvrđuje jednoglasno da samo utvrđivanje povrede člana 8. predstavlja dovoljno pravično zadovoljenje za svu nematerijalnu štetu koju je podnosilac predstavke pretrpeo;
5. Odbija jednoglasno preostali deo zahteva podnosioca predstavke za pravično zadovoljenje.
Sastavljeno na engleskom i dostavljeno u pisanoj formi 19. maja 2009. godine, prema Pravilu 77 st. 2. i 3. Poslovnika Suda.
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S. Dollé |
F. TULKENS |
U skladu sa članom 45. stav 2. Konvencije i Pravilom 74 stav 2. Poslovnika Suda,
uz ovu presudu prilažu se sledeća posebna mišljenja:
(a) delimično saglasno mišljenje sudije Kreća,
(b) delimično izdvojeno mišljenje sudije Zagrebelskog.
DELIMIČNO SAGLASNO MIŠLjENjE SUDIJE KREĆE
Slažem se sa mišljenjem da pravo Tužene države ne obezbeđuje osnove da se smatra da bi krivična tužba podnosiocu predstavke mogla omogućiti odgovarajuću naknadu.
Mogao bih, takođe, da se složim sa mišljenjem - iako je ono osetljivije prirode - da parnični postupci kao takvi ne moraju da se bave osnovnim uzrokom problema, kao i sa mišljenjem u vezi sa posebnom žalbom Sudu Srbije i Crne Gore.
Moje rezerve se suštinski tiču tretmana administrativnog pravnog sredstva u vezi sa sprovođenjem zatvorskih propisa. One u osnovi potiču iz svojstvenih zahteva načela sudske doslednosti.
Sudska doslednost shvaćena kao doslednost sa sopstvenom sudskom praksom iz prošlosti "je suština pravosudnog rezonovanja" (Predmet u vezi sa zakonitošću upotrebe sile (Srbija i Crna Gora protiv Belgije), presuda od 15. decembra 2004. godine, Izveštaji MSP iz 2004. godine, zajednička deklaracija potpredsednika Ranjeva i sudija Guillaume, Higgins, Koojimans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal i Elaraby, stav 3).
To je posebno tačno za ovaj Sud, imajući u vidu da u njegovoj sudskoj delatnosti načelo sudske doslednosti poseduje ne samo idealno značenje stabilnosti i predvidljivosti nadležnosti Suda, već i praktično značenje time što, s obzirom na veliki broj predmeta dostavljenih Sudu, omogućava ispravno postupanje.
U predmetu Novak protiv Hrvatske (predstavka broj 8883/04, presuda od 14. juna 2007. godine), podnosilac predstavke je tvrdio da su zatvorski organi otvarali njegovu prepisku sa Sudom, čime je povređeno njegovo pravo utvrđeno prema članu 8. Konvencije.
Vlada je stavila primedbu da "podnosilac predstavke nije iscrpeo domaća pravna sredstva, jer svoju pritužbu nije uputio domaćim organima, kao što je Uprava zatvora u Varaždinu ili sudiji zaduženom za izvršenje kazni" (stav 49. presude).
Sud je u presudi utvrdio da:
"... podnosilac predstavke nije uputio pritužbu u vezi sa otvaranjem njegove prepiske nijednom domaćem organu, iako je prema odeljku 15(2) Zakona o sprovođenju zatvorskih kazni mogao da podnese takvu pritužbu ili upravniku Zatvora u Varaždinu, sudiji nadležnom za sprovođenje kazni ili Upravi tog zatvora" (stav 51. presude, naglasak dodat).
Iz ovog posebnog mišljenja sledi zaključak da:
"... u vezi sa ovom pritužbom podnosilac predstavke nije iscrpeo domaća pravna sredstva i da se, zbog toga, ova pritužba mora odbaciti u skladu sa članom 35. st. 1. i 4. Konvencije (stav 51. presude).
4. Podrazumeva se da Sud ima ovlašćenje da odstupi od svoje prethodne odluke, ali Sud ovo ovlašćenje treba da ostvaruje iz dobrog razloga. Pretpostavljeno ovlašćenje prethodne odluke ne postoji kada se predmeti, zasnovani na različitim načelima, razlikuju.
U vezi sa ovim predmetima - Horvat protiv Hrvatske i Stojanović protiv Srbije - izgleda da postoji skoro isti identitet relevantnih elemenata i činjeničnog i zakonskog okvira.
U oba slučaja, podnosioci predstavke tvrde da je njihovo pravo na poverljivost zajamčeno prema članu 8. Konvencije povređeno postupcima zatvorskih organa. Interni zakoni obe Vlade predviđaju, inter alia, administrativna sredstva za zaštitu relevantnog prava u vidu pritužbe "upravniku kaznenog zavoda" (odeljak 103. Zakona o izvršenju krivičnih sankcija) ili "pravo da se podnese pisana predstavka upravniku Uprave za izvršenje krivičnih sankcija" prema zakonima Srbije, i pritužba upravniku zatvora ili Upravi zatvora (odeljak 15(2) Zakona o izvršenju zatvorskih kazni) prema zakonima Hrvatske. Ni podnosilac predstavke Novak ni podnosilac predstavke Stojanović nisu uputili pritužbu nijednom gore navedenom organu u vezi sa otvaranjem njihovih prepiski.
Tačno je, međutim, da postoje dve razlike u okolnostima ova dva slučaja.
Prvo, zakoni Hrvatske, takođe, predviđaju, u Zakonu o izvršenju zatvorskih kazni, pritužbu sudiji nadležnom za izvršenje kazni, pored pritužbe upravniku zatvora i Upravi zatvora, i
Drugo, "Vlada nije dostavila relevantnu sudsku praksu koja bi pokazala da bi neko od administrativnih sredstava na koje se ona oslonila moglo da obezbedi podnosiocu predstavke adekvatnu naknadu za navodnu povredu" (stav 62. presude), uz zapažanje da je "sama Vlada [Srbije] priznala da je navodno mešanje proisteklo iz administrativne prakse" (isto).
Izgleda da nijedna od navedenih razlika ne čini ova dva predmeta različitim, što je objektivno neodgovarajuće da se opravda odstupanje od presedana utvrđenog u predmetu Novak protiv Hrvatske.
6.1. Činjenica da prema zakonima Hrvatske, osim upravniku zatvora i Upravi zatvora podnosilac predstavke može, takođe, da se obrati sudiji nadležnom za izvršenje kazni, ovde je irelevantna. U presudi Horvat protiv Hrvatske, Sud je alternativno naznačio moguće adrese na koje je podnosilac predstavke mogao podneti pritužbu. To jasno i nedvosmisleno znači da je pritužba podneta na jednu od gore navedenih adresa naznačenih u stavu 51. presude, delotvorno pravno sredstvo u svrhu člana 35. Konvencije. Ili, da su, ako primenimo precedentno ovlašćenje u presudi Suda u predmetu Horvat protiv Hrvatske na ovaj konkretan slučaj, administrativna sredstva, kako je predviđeno Zakonom o izvršenju krivičnih sankcija, delotvorna pravna sredstva u svrhu člana 35. Konvencije.
6.2. Vredi napomenuti da u predmetu Horvat protiv Hrvatske Sud nije tražio dostavljanje sudske prakse koja bi pokazala da bi neko administrativno sredstvo na koje se Vlada oslonila moglo obezbediti podnosiocu predstavke odgovarajuću naknadu za navodnu povredu.
Takav pristup izgleda pravilan u svetlu dobro utvrđenog načela u praksi Suda da "pravilo iscrpljenja domaćih pravnih sredstava mora da se primenjuje uz određeni stepen elastičnosti i bez preteranog formalizma" (Azinas protiv Kipra, predstavka broj 56679/00, stav 38.; Ilhan protiv Turske, predstavka broj 22277/93, stav 59.). Propust da se dostavi relevantna sudska praksa, posebno kada visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju, kao Hrvatska i Srbija, pripadaju kontinentalnom pravnom sistemu, teško da bi mogao, sam po sebi, da predstavlja osnovu za diskvalifikaciju određenog pravnog sredstva kao delotvornog. Sa tačke gledišta pitanja da li je određeno pravno sredstvo delotvorno, ponekad pozivanje na ispitivanje na empirijskoj osnovi, kao što je naznačeno u izreci Veća Međunarodnog suda pravde u predmetu ELSI, može da bude najprikladniji odgovor.
"da bi jedna međunarodna pritužba bila dopuštena, dovoljno je da je suština pritužbe izneta pred nadležne tribunale i da joj se težilo u onoj meri u kojoj to dozvoljava lokalno pravo i procedure, a bez uspeha". (Izveštaji MSP iz 1989. godine, str. 15 u stavu 42, stav 50, naglasak dodat).
Zaista, izgleda preterano da se određeno pravno sredstvo diskvalifikuje kao nedelotvorno isključivo na osnovu formalno utvrđenih standarda u vezi sa raspodelom tereta dokaza, a da se pri tom zanemari njegova bitna sposobnost da pruža naknadu u vezi sa navodnim povredama.
6.3. Ni dodatna tvrdnja većine da je "sama Vlada priznala da je navodno mešanje proisteklo iz administrativne prakse" ne čini se od odlučujuće važnosti u ovom konkretnom kontekstu.
Priznanje je prvenstveno izraženo na apstraktan način, kao odbrana, a ne kao dokazima potkrepljeno i zvanično priznanje.
Štaviše, čak i pod pretpostavkom da je otvaranje prepiske bila administrativna praksa, sama ta činjenica nije razlog da se pritužba višim administrativnom strukturama diskvalifikuje kao delotvorna. Praksa nižih administrativnih struktura da otvaraju prepisku je jedno, pri čemu je praksa, bilo da je utvrđena ili opravdano moguća, viših struktura, koje imaju ovlašćenje da cenzurišu poštu zasnovana na posebnim pravilima, nešto sasvim drugo.
Pošto je utvrdio da je pritužba podnosioca predstavke u vezi sa protezom, na osnovu, između ostalog, Protokola broj 12, rešena u smislu člana 37., stav 1. (b) Konvencije, Sud više nije bio u mogućnosti da razmatra normativni potencijal Protokola broj 12.
Taj potencijal je neograničen. On obuhvata skoro revolucionarnu mogućnost približavanja građanskih i političkih prava, sa jedne strane, i privrednih, društvenih i kulturnih prava, sa druge strane. Konačno, on može biti koristan za utvrđivanje prava na dostojanstven život (divina vitae) kao oličenja večnog cilja u vezi sa svrhom i prirodom ljudskog postojanja.
Sigurno je, s tim u vezi, da buduća nadležnost Suda mora obezbediti smernice o tome kako treba razumeti normativni potencijal Protokola broj 12.
DELIMIČNO IZDVOJENO MIŠLjENjE SUDIJE ZAGREBELSKY
Ja sam glasao protiv brisanja pritužbe u vezi sa protezom podnosioca predstavke iz sledećih razloga, koji se isključivo odnose na uticaj ove presude na praksu Suda prema članu 37. Konvencije. Osnovanost pritužbe podnosioca predstavke (koju Veće nije proglasilo nedopuštenom kao očigledno neosnovanu) ni na koji način nije bila predmet mog drugačijeg mišljenja, ništa više nego sama presuda.
Po mom mišljenju pitanje koje pokreće pritužbu podnosioca predstavke prema članu 3. Konvencije ne može se smatrati rešenim.
U skladu sa praksom Suda, "[i] da bi se zaključilo da je neko pitanje rešeno u smislu člana 37. stav 1. (b) i da, prema tome, više ne postoji objektivno opravdanje da podnosilac predstavke dalje nastavi sa predstavkom, Sud smatra da on, prvo, mora razmotriti da li okolnosti na koje se podnosilac predstavke žali još postoje i, drugo, i da li su posledice eventualne povrede Konvencije na račun tih okolnosti, takođe, nadoknađene. Ovaj pristup odražava strukturu mašinerije nadzora prema Konvenciji, koji predviđa i obrazloženje u presudi da li su činjenice o kojima je reč kompatibilne sa zahtevima Konvencije (član 45), i, ako nisu, i za dodelu pravičnog zadovoljenja (član 41)" (videti, Pisano protiv Italije[VV] (brisanje sa spiska), broj 36732/97, stav 42, 24. oktobar 2002. godine).
Sud je, u jednom broju svojih presuda u vezi sa proterivanjem stranaca prihvatio, kako bi prestao rizik njihovog odstranjivanja iz zemlje, da izdavanje (jedne od raznih vrsta) dozvola boravka može predstavljati odgovarajući i dovoljan oblik naknade, a time i razlog za utvrđivanje da su ispunjena oba gore navedena razloga u predmetima u vezi sa članom 8. (videti, među mnogim drugim autoritetima, Sisojeva i drugi protiv Letonije [VV], broj 60654/00, stav 97, ECHR 2007-..., i Ibrahim Mohamed protiv Holandije (brisanje sa spiska), broj 1872/04, st. 19-24, 10. mart 2009. godine). Sud je istu praksu usvojio prema članu 3. Konvencije u predmetima u vezi sa proterivanjima ili ekstradicijama čije izvršenje više nije moguće (videti, Bilasi-Ashri protiv Austrije (odluka), broj 3314/02, ECHR 2002-X; Abraham Lunguli protiv Švedske (odluka), broj 3369/02, 1. jul 2003. godine; Laleh Mir Isfahani protiv Holandije (odluka), broj 31252/03, 31. januar 2008. godine; Bari protiv Švedske (odluka), broj 56726/00, 5. mart 2002. godine; Hesam Safawi Bayat protiv Holandije (odluka), broj 7233/02, 8. jul 2003. godine; R. N. protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (odluka), broj 28242/02, 2. septembar 2003. godine; Q protiv Finske (odluka), broj 42640/04, 22. maj 2007. godine; Azzedine Chelghoum protiv Francuske (odluka), broj 54654/00, 10. oktobar 2000. godine; i Tony Chidobe protiv Italije (odluka), broj 30978/04, 9. septembar 2004. godine). Očigledno, Sud je utvrdio da je to pitanje rešeno u slučaju gde je dozvola za ostanak u zemlji konačno odobrena podnosiocu predstavke (videti, Mostafa Kordoghliazar protiv Rumunije (odluka), broj 8776/05, 20. maj 2008. godine). U predmetu El Majjaoui i Stichting Touba Moskee protiv Holandije (skidanje sa spiska) [VV], broj 25525/03, st. 30-34, 20. decembar 2007. godine), Sud je došao do sličnog zaključka u veoma specifičnom slučaju, pokrenutom prema članu 9. Konvencije, u vezi sa odbijanjem, a zatim, izdavanjem dozvole za boravak i radne dozvole stranom imamu.
Sud, koliko ja znam, nikada nije utvrdio da je ovo pitanje rešeno u nekom predmetu prema članu 3. Konvencije, kao što je predmetni slučaj. Podnosilac predstavke je doživeo da su organi odbili da mu obezbede protezu koja mu je trebala najmanje od februara 2004. godine (videti stav 13) do 26. juna 2007. godine (videti belešku od 27. juna 2007. godine od zastupnika podnosioca predstavke, Beogradskog centra za ljudska prava). Vlada je preduzela mere posle dugog roka od tri godine i četiri meseca (skoro tri godine posle podnošenja predstavke). U vezi sa povredom na koju se podnosilac predstavke žali nije dodeljena naknada (a još manje je Vlada preduzela mere da ispuni svoju proceduralnu obavezu prema članu 3. Konvencije).
Ne mogu da vidim kako se može reći da je pitanje ovog slučaja rešeno samom činjenicom da se eventualna povreda člana 3. konačno završila i veoma sam zabrinut zbog presude koja utvrđuje takav presedan u praksi Suda prema članu 3. Štaviše, svako može lako da shvati eventualne posledice i primene ovog novog presedana, koji može da se proširi na mnoge povrede Konvencije, kao što su ozbiljne povrede člana 3. ili člana 5. itd.
S dužnim poštovanjem sugerišem da ova presuda ne bi trebalo da uspostavi presedan u praksi Suda."
COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
SECOND SECTION
CASE OF STOJANOVIĆ v. SERBIA
(Application no. 34425/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19 May 2009
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Stojanović v. Serbia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Françoise Tulkens, President,
Ireneu Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,
Danute Jočiene,
András Sajó,
Nona Tsotsoria, judges,
Milenko Kreća, ad hoc judge,
and Mrs S. DOLLÉ, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 7 April 2009,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 34425/04) against the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") by, at that time, a citizen of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, Mr Ljubiša Stojanović ("the applicant"), on 10 August 2004.
2. As of 3 June 2006, following the Montenegrin declaration of independence, Serbia remained the sole respondent in the proceedings before the Court.
3. The applicant was represented by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, a human rights organisation based in Serbia. The Government of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and, subsequently, the Government of Serbia ("the Government") were represented by their Agent, Mr S. Carić.
4. The applicant, a convicted prisoner, complained in particular about the refusal of the respondent State to provide him with dentures free of charge, as well as the opening of his correspondence by the prison authorities.
5. On 6 September 2005 the Court decided to communicate these complaints to the Government and declared the remainder of the application inadmissible. Under Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it was also decided that the merits of the communicated complaints would be examined together with their admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
6. The applicant was born in 1956.
7. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
8. Following his conviction by a court of law, between 20 June 1999 and 28 August 2002, the applicant served his first term in the Niš Penitentiary (Kazneno-poravni zavod u Nišu; hereinafter "the prison").
9. During this time the prison dentist diagnosed that he had been suffering from paradontosis (i.e. "shaky teeth and their spontaneous falling out"). On two separate occasions extractions were carried out and on a third occasion the applicant complained about facial paresis, which was determined to be unrelated to his dental problems.
10. After his release, on 17 March 2003 the applicant was apparently placed in detention on remand, as part of a separate criminal case.
11. Following yet another conviction, on 5 January 2004 the applicant started serving his second prison term in the Niš Penitentiary.
12. On the same date his medical file was opened. Several medical problems, involving his knees and facial paresis were apparently identified, but no dental examination appears to have been carried out.
13. On 13 February 2004 the applicant was first examined by the prison dentist, who confirmed his complete toothlessness (terminalna krezubost).
14. On 5 March 2004 the dentist proposed that the applicant be provided with dentures.
15. On 4 May 2004 the applicant sent a letter to the Ministry of Health (Ministarstvo zdravlja), requesting dentures.
16. On 25 June 2004 the said Ministry’s inspectorate (Sektor za zdravstveni nadzor) informed the applicant that convicted persons had to exercise their rights through the Ministry of Justice (Ministarstvo pravde) rather than the Ministry of Health.
17. By letter of 21 July 2004 the Health Inspection (Zdravstvena inspekcija Ministarstva zdravlja - odsek Niš) observed that, in accordance with Article 4 of the Decision on the Participation of Insured Persons in the Costs of Health Care (Odluka o učešću osiguranih lica u troškovima zdravstvene zaštite; see paragraphs 46 and 47 below), blood donors, such as the applicant, were not exempted from the obligation to cover 60% of the cost of obtaining dentures (pokretne stomatološke nadoknade od akrilata.)
18. On 21 October 2004 the applicant was admitted to the prison hospital, where his loss of appetite was noted, while on 2 December 2004 he complained of anxiety.
19. On 23 December 2004 the applicant fainted during a head count and sustained an injury above his left eye.
20. On an unspecified date in 2004 the applicant was informed by the prison authorities that he had to pay 10,000 dinars (at that time approximately 110 euros) towards meeting the total cost of his dentures. The applicant instead proposed that he be allowed to pay this amount in instalments corresponding to his monthly prison salary.
21. On 1 February 2005 the applicant again fainted and sustained an injury to his left cheekbone, requiring maxillofacial surgery, which was performed on 4 February 2005.
22. The applicant alleges that throughout this time he had continued having problems with his eating. In particular, he could eat no solid foods, including meat or even fruit. The prison authorities, however, attempted to alleviate the applicant’s plight by providing him with additional soft bread at each meal.
23. On 7 June 2006 the applicant repeated his request concerning the payment of his dentures through monthly instalments.
24. On 30 January 2007 the prison governor informed the applicant that the prison would cover the full costs of his dentures. In so doing, he noted that the reason for this was humanitarian and that the relevant domestic legislation imposed no such obligation on the authorities. Lastly, the governor emphasised that the price of the dentures in prison was, in any event, 50% less than the normal price since the prisoner’s income was itself below the average monthly salary in Serbia.
25. On 25 June 2007 the applicant was provided with the dentures in question.
B. The applicant’s correspondence
26. As noted above, by letter of 21 July 2004 the Health Inspection informed the applicant about his health insurance coverage. This letter bore the prison stamp dated 22 July 2004 and registration number 713/9033.
27. The applicant’s letter of 10 August 2004, sent to the Court, also bore the prison stamp dated 10 August 2004, as well as registration number 24/9684.
28. In its own letter of 21 December 2004, inter alia, the Court’s Registry therefore informed the applicant in Serbian of the said stamp, assuming that he may not have been aware of it.
29. In his subsequent letter of 11 January 2005, the applicant stated that all his mail addressed to the Court, as well as to other bodies, had to go through the prison administration, where it was opened, and alleged that this was standard practice based on the provisions of the applicable prison regulations. This letter also bore the prison stamp dated 11 January 2005 and registration number 24/267.
30. In June 2006 the applicant provided the Court with a statement signed by 78 prisoners confirming, inter alia, that their correspondence had been routinely opened by the prison authorities.
31. As of 2002 the applicant had a limited liability company registered in his name. It would appear, however, that this company never became operational.
32. By October 2005 the applicant seems to have inherited 25% of a one-bedroom flat from his mother.
33. On 12 February 2006 and 16 May 2006, respectively, the applicant apparently sent two separate letters to the prison governor, seeking an audience.
34. On 26 October 2006 the Ministry of Justice forwarded a complaint of the applicant to the prison governor for consideration.
35. On 24 November 2006 the Social Care Centre (Centar za socijalni rad) in Jagodina confirmed, inter alia, that the applicant had been receiving unemployment benefits between 1 December 1994 and 31 May 1999.
36. Whilst in prison the applicant appears to have received a salary in the total amount of 19,000 dinars, through monthly instalments. As of July 2006, however, 3,537 dinars remained on his personal prison account as part a "compulsory savings scheme".
A. Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civic Freedoms of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (Povelja o ljudskim i manjinskim pravima i građanskim slobodama državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora; published in the Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro - OG SCG - no. 6/03)
37. The relevant provisions of this Charter provided as follows:
"Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
...
The confidentiality of letters and other means of communication shall be inviolable. Exceptions shall be permitted for a limited period of time and only on the basis of a court decision, if necessary for the purposes of conducting criminal proceedings or the defence of the country, in a manner prescribed by law."
B. Constitution of the Republic of Serbia 1990 (Ustav Republike Srbije; published in the Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Serbia - OG SRS - no. 1/90)
38. The relevant provisions of this Constitution provided as follows:
"The confidentiality of letters and other means of communication shall be inviolable.
Laws may provide that, on the basis of a court decision, ... [this principle] ... may be departed from, if it is indispensable for the conduct of criminal proceedings or the defence of the Republic of Serbia."
"Everyone is entitled to the protection of his health.
Children, pregnant women and the elderly shall have the right to health care financed from public funds, if this right is not secured on some other ground, while other persons shall enjoy such care under the conditions provided by law."
"Under the obligatory insurance scheme, in accordance with the law, employed persons ...[enjoy] ... the right to health care and other rights in the event of sickness, ... pregnancy, childbirth, impairment or loss of the ability to work, unemployment and old age ... , as well as rights to other forms of social security ...
Social security rights for those citizens who are not covered by the obligatory social insurance scheme shall be regulated by law."
C. Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions Act 1997 (Zakon o izvršenju krivičnih sankcija; published in OG RS nos. 16/97 and 34/01)
39. The relevant provisions of this Act read as follows:
"Individual decisions concerning the rights and obligations of persons subjected to criminal sanctions may not be challenged through the judicial review procedure."
"The health care unit [of the penitentiary] shall provide preventive assistance, treat convicted persons and persons detained on remand, and supervise the hygiene and quality of the food and water."
"Details concerning the life and work of convicted persons shall be further regulated in the Prison Rules.
Prison Rules shall be adopted by the Minister of Justice"
"Everyone shall respect the dignity of a convicted person.
No one may endanger the physical and mental health of a convicted person."
"Convicted persons shall have the right to nutrition capable of sustaining their good health and strength ..."
"Convicted persons shall have the right to send written communications to competent State bodies.
...
Convicted persons shall receive and send written communications through the prison authorities."
"Convicted persons shall have an unrestricted right to correspond."
"Convicted persons shall enjoy free health care.
Convicted persons who cannot receive adequate medical treatment in the penitentiary shall be transferred to the prison hospital, a psychiatric ward or another medical institution."
"Convicted persons shall have the right to complain to the governor [of the penitentiary] concerning a violation of their rights or other irregularities which they have suffered.
The governor is obliged to examine such complaints carefully and take a decision.
Convicted persons who do not receive a response to their complaints or are not satisfied with the decision adopted shall have the right to submit a written application to the head of the Directorate [for the Enforcement of Institutional Sanctions].
Convicted persons shall have the right to complain to the official authorised to supervise the operation of the penitentiary, without the prison staff or the officials appointed to serve in the institution being present.
The substance of the complaint as well as the application shall be confidential."
40. In addition, according to Articles 346-352, the Directorate for the Enforcement of Institutional Sanctions ("the Directorate"), as a constituent part of the Ministry of Justice, had the competence to monitor the implementation of the relevant legislation concerning the enforcement of criminal sanctions. The Directorate proceeded ex officio. It could interview convicted persons without the prison staff being present and ultimately adopt binding recommendations addressed to respective governors which the governors themselves could subsequently appeal to the Minister of Justice. In addition, Article 353 provided, inter alia, that the quality of health care in prisons had to be monitored by the Ministry of Health.
D. Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions Act 2005 (Zakon o izvršenju krivičnih sankcija; published in OG RS no. 85/05)
41. This Act entered into force on 1 January 2006, thereby repealing the Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions Act 1997.
E. Prison Rules 2001 (Pravilnik o kućnom redu u zavodima zatvorenog i strogo zatvorenog tipa; published in OG RS no. 5/01)
42. The relevant provisions of these Rules read as follows:
"Convicted persons shall have an unrestricted right to correspond, in accordance with the law.
Their mail shall be received and dispatched through the prison authorities."
F. Prison Rules 2006 (Pravilnik o kućnom redu u kazneno popravnim zavodima i okružnim zatvorima; published in OG RS no. 27/06)
43. These Rules entered into force on 8 April 2006, thereby repealing the Prison Rules 2001.
G. Code of Criminal Procedure (Zakonik o krivičnom postupku; published in the Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - OG FRY - nos. 70/01 and 68/02, as well as OG RS no. 58/04, 85/05 and 115/05)
44. Articles 148-153 set out the principles for the treatment of persons detained on remand (pritvorenici) and do not apply to those serving their prison sentences.
H. Health Care Insurance Act (Zakon o zdravstvenom osiguranju; published in OG RS nos. 18/92, 26/93, 53/93, 67/93, 48/94, 25/96, 46/98, 54/99, 29/01, 18/02, 80/02, 84/04 and 45/05)
45. Article 28 § 1 of this Act provided as follows: "With respect to certain kinds of health care, it may be provided that insured persons have to contribute towards the costs ... [incurred,] ... while taking into account that this contribution must not deter them from making use of their health coverage."
I. Decision on the Participation of Insured Persons in the Costs of Health Care 2001 (Odluka o učešću osiguranih lica u troškovima zdravstvene zaštite; published in the OG RS no. 31/01)
46. The relevant provisions of this Decision read as follows:
"This decision sets out the modalities and the level of contributions by insured persons to the costs of health care ..., any exemptions from paying such contributions, as well as the location and manner of payment."
"A contribution is to be made for ... the production or procurement of prosthetics ... [as follows:] ...
16. [for] dental prosthetics ...
16.2. removable dental prosthetics ... 60% ... [of the price set by the health insurance board]"
"Blood donors are exempt from paying contributions within a period of 12 months following each blood donation, except the contribution referred to in [Article 3] paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19 and 20 ..."
J. Decision on the Participation of Insured Persons in the Costs of Health Care 2004 (Odluka o učešću osiguranih lica u troškovima zdravstvene zaštite; published in the OG RS no. 83/04, 118/04, 71/05 and 18/06)
47. This Decision repealed the above decision in 2004 but the relevant participation remained the same.
K. Criminal Code 1977 (Krivični zakon Republike Srbije; published in OG RS nos. 26/77, 28/77, 43/77, 20/79, 24/84, 39/86, 51/87, 6/89, 42/89, 21/90, 16/90, 49/92, 23/93, 67/93, 47/94, 17/95, 44/98, 10/02, 11/02, 80/02, 39/03 and 67/03)
48. The relevant provisions of this Code read as follows:
"1. Whoever, without authorisation, opens a letter or a telegram or any other closed communication or item of mail of another person, or in some other way violates their privacy, or without authorisation, keeps, conceals, destroys or delivers to another a person’s letter, telegram, closed communication or item of mail shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding one year.
...
3. If the offence referred to in paragraph 1 ... of this Article is committed by an official in the performance of his public duties, that person shall be punished by imprisonment from six months to five years."
L. Obligations Act (Zakon o obligacionim odnosima; published in the Official Gazette of the Socialist FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia - OG SFRY - nos. 29/78, 39/85, 45/89, 57/89 and OG FRY no. 31/93)
49. Under Articles 199 and 200, inter alia, anyone who has suffered fear or physical pain or, indeed, mental anguish as a consequence of a breach of his or her "personal rights" (prava ličnosti) or has been subjected to adverse circumstances seriously affecting health (umanjenje životne aktivnosti) may, depending on their duration and intensity, sue for financial compensation before the civil courts and, in addition, request other forms of redress which may be capable of affording adequate non-pecuniary satisfaction.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION AS REGARDS THE APPLICANT’S CORRESPONDENCE
50. The applicant complained about the interference with his correspondence with the Court, as well as with various domestic bodies, by the prison authorities.
51. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention, rather than Article 34, there being no evidence that the correspondence between the Court and the applicant was unduly delayed, tampered with, or otherwise "hindered" (see Manoussos v. the Czech Republic and Germany (dec.), no. 46468/99, 9 July 2002).
52. Article 8, as relevant, provides as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his ... correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society ... for the prevention of disorder or crime ..."
1. Compatibility ratione temporis
53. The Government argued that the applicant’s complaint was incompatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention since the impugned actions undertaken by the prison authorities were based on legislation which had itself been adopted prior to the Serbian ratification of the Convention on 3 March 2004.
54. The applicant contested this argument.
55. The Court notes that the alleged interference with the applicant’s correspondence took place after 3 March 2004 (see paragraphs 26-29 above). Irrespective of the fact that this occurred on the basis of legislation adopted before that date, the applicant’s complaint therefore clearly falls within the Court’s competence ratione temporis (see, among other authorities, Yagci and Sargin v. Turkey, 8 June 1995, § 40, Series A no. 319 A).
56. In view of the above, the Government’s objection must be dismissed.
2. Exhaustion of domestic remedies
(a) Arguments of the parties
57. The Government stated that the applicant had not exhausted all effective domestic remedies, within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, he had failed to:
- file a criminal complaint based on Article 72 of the Criminal Code 1977 (see paragraph 48 above);
- bring a civil claim in accordance with Articles 199 and 200 of the Obligations Act (see paragraph 49 above) or, indeed, the Convention itself (in support of the said civil claim, the Government provided the Court with several judgments whereby the domestic courts had awarded compensation to plaintiffs, in various contexts and had, in so doing, relied on the Convention);
- make use of the remedies provided for in the Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions Act 1997 (see paragraphs 39 and 40 above, Articles 103 and 347 in particular); or
- lodge a specific complaint with the Court of Serbia and Montenegro in respect of the violations alleged.
58. The applicant explained that none of the above remedies could have been effective in the particular circumstances of his case.
(b) Relevant principles
59. The Court observes that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies contained in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention requires that normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged (see, among other authorities, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, p. 1210, § 65). The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (ibid.).
60. It recalls that in the area of the exhaustion of domestic remedies there is a distribution of the burden of proof. It is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available in theory and practice at the relevant time, that is to say, that it was accessible, was one which was capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant’s complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success. However, once this burden has been satisfied it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from the requirement (ibid., p. 1211, § 68).
61. The Court has recognised that Article 35 § 1 (formerly Article 26) must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (see, for example, Cardot v. France, judgment of 19 March 1991, Series A no. 200, p. 18, § 34). It has further held that the rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically; in reviewing whether it has been observed it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of each individual case (see, for example, Van Oosterwijk v. Belgium, judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A no. 40, p. 18, § 35). This means, amongst other things, that it must take realistic account not only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting Party concerned but also of the general context in which they operate as well as the personal circumstances of the applicants (see the Akdivar judgment cited above, p. 1211, § 69).
(c) The Court’s assessment in the present case
62. Although recourse to administrative bodies cannot be ruled out as an effective remedy in respect of complaints concerning the implementation of prison regulations (see, among other authorities, the Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 26, § 65), the Court considers that the Government have failed to produce relevant case-law which would demonstrate that any of the administrative remedies on which they relied could have provided the applicant with adequate redress for the violation alleged. In addition, the Government themselves acknowledged that the alleged interference stemmed from an administrative practice (see paragraph 69 below), which would, in the Court’s view, strongly suggest that the remedies in question were indeed an unlikely avenue of redress.
63. Secondly, Serbian law does not provide for a possibility to bring a criminal case against the State itself. A criminal complaint could not therefore have afforded the applicant with adequate redress (see on this point exactly Cenbauer v. Croatia (dec.), no. 73786/01, 5 February 2004).
64. Thirdly, even assuming that the applicant could have obtained compensation by means of a separate civil suit, the Government have failed to show that a civil claim could have had any impact on the handling of his correspondence. In other words, whilst civil proceedings might have had an effect upon the consequences of the violation alleged, there is no evidence that they could have addressed the root cause thereof (ibid., see also Rodić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 22893/05, §§ 59 and 60, 27 May 2008).
65. Lastly, the Court recalls that it has already held that a complaint filed with the Court of Serbia and Montenegro was unavailable until 15 July 2005 and, further, that it had remained ineffective until the very break up of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (see Matijašević v. Serbia, no. 23037/04, §§ 34-37, ECHR 2006-...). The Court sees no reason to depart from this finding in the present case.
66. In view of the above, the Government’s objection must be dismissed.
3. Conclusion
67. The Court considers that the applicant’s complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and finds no other ground to declare it inadmissible. The complaint must therefore be declared admissible.
1. Arguments of the parties
68. The Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, the system operated as follows: (i) prisoners would submit their correspondence in two copies; (ii) the second copy would then be stamped and dated, in response to their own requests, and returned to them; and (iii) the first copy would be placed in an envelope and forwarded to the designated address. Prisoner’s correspondence was thus neither opened nor read by the prison authorities.
69. The Government argued that this system was based on Article 65 § 3 of the Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions Act 1997 (see paragraph 39 above), which although perhaps not sufficiently precise could not have been interpreted to mean that all the correspondence of prisoners automatically had to be supervised. A possible breach of the Convention was not therefore a result of the legislator’s intent, but rather a consequence of an administrative practice which had been established before the Convention had entered into force in respect of Serbia. The Government further contended that the applicant, in particular, had submitted open letters to the prison authorities and had not asked to be provided with an envelope.
70. Finally, the Government pointed out that the interference with the applicant’s correspondence was undertaken in order to preserve public safety and prevent crime and acknowledged that, at the relevant time, judicial review of this interference was not possible (see paragraph 39 above). However, new prison legislation, in accordance with Council of Europe standards, had subsequently been enacted (see paragraph 41 above).
71. The applicant argued, in the first place, that he had not requested to be provided with a stamped copy of his outgoing mail, while he certainly could not have made such a request in respect of his incoming correspondence, which was also censored. Secondly, the mere existence of an obligation to submit opened letters to the prison authorities in all situations was a clear interference with the prisoners’ right to respect for their correspondence since there was no guarantee that these letters would not be subjected to some sort of censorship and/or monitoring. Thirdly, the applicable domestic legislation was overly vague, which is why the said interference could not have been "in accordance with the law", as required by the second paragraph of Article 8. Fourthly, the Government provided no substantiation as to why their interference with the applicant’s correspondence was indeed necessary in a democratic society. Finally, the applicant noted that the recently adopted legislation referred to by the Government had not significantly improved the situation, as it had also failed to indicate with reasonable clarity the scope of the discretion conferred on the public authorities.
2. The Court’s assessment
72. There being no evidence that the applicant had ever consented to the practice whereby prisoners were obliged to submit their open letters to the prison authorities (see paragraph 68 above) and in view of the fact that his incoming correspondence was also opened and stamped by them (see paragraph 26 above), the Court considers that there was clearly an "interference by a public authority" with the exercise of the applicant’s right to respect for his correspondence guaranteed by Article 8 paragraph 1 of the Convention. Such an interference shall contravene Article 8 unless it is "in accordance with the law", pursues one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 thereof and furthermore is "necessary in a democratic society" (see the following judgments: Niedbala v. Poland, no. 27915/95, § 78, 4 July 2000; Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61, p. 32, § 84; Campbell v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1992, Series A no. 233, p. 16, § 34; Calogero Diana v. Italy, 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V, p. 1775, § 28; Petra v. Romania, 23 September 1998, Reports 1998-VII, p. 2853, § 36). The expression "in accordance with the law", however, does not only require compliance with domestic law, but also relates to the quality of that law (see Niedbala v. Poland, cited above, § 79). Domestic law must indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities so as to ensure to individuals the minimum degree of protection to which they are entitled in a democratic society (see the Domenichini v. Italy judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V, p. 1800, § 33).
73. As regards the present case, the Court observes that Article 19 of the Serbian Constitution 1990 and Article 24 §§ 1 and 3 of the Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civic Freedoms, which were in force at the relevant time, both provided that no one’s correspondence could be interfered with in the absence of a specific court decision to this effect (see paragraphs 37 and 38 above). Since no such decision was ever issued in respect of the applicant and the applicable prison rules and regulations were themselves vague in this regard (see paragraph 39 above, Articles 65 and 66 in particular, as well as paragraph 42 above), it follows that the interference complained of was not "in accordance with the law" at the material time.
74. Having regard to the foregoing conclusion, the Court does not consider it necessary to ascertain whether the other requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 were complied with.
75. Consequently, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION AS WELL AS OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 12 IN RESPECT OF THE APPLICANT’S DENTURES
76. The applicant complained about the refusal of the Serbian authorities to provide him with dentures free of charge, which, in turn, had allegedly caused him various health problems. The Court communicated this complaint to the Government under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.
77. Furthermore, the applicant subsequently complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12, explaining that in accordance with Serbian law he had to pay 60% of the price of his dentures, which meant that no distinction was being made between him as an obviously impecunious prisoner, on the one hand, and the population at large, on the other, despite the fact that his situation was profoundly different.
78. The Government rejected those allegations, submitting that the applicant had failed to exhaust various domestic remedies, that his complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 was brought out of time and/or was incompatible ratione personae. In any event, he had lost his victim status by virtue of the provision of dentures for him at the respondent State’s expense.
79. The Court does not consider it necessary to examine any of the Government’s objections to these complaints since they can now be considered to have been "resolved" within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (b) of the Convention (see Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia [GC], no. 60654/00, § 96, ECHR 2007-...).
80. In this respect, the Court reiterates that, under Article 37 § 1 (b), it may "... at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that ... the matter has been resolved ..." In order to ascertain whether that provision applies to the present case, the Court must answer two questions: first, whether the circumstances complained of directly by the applicant still obtain; and, secondly, whether the effects of a possible violation of the Convention and/or of Protocol No. 12 have been redressed (ibid.). With this in mind and despite some factual uncertainties, the Court notes that the applicant has been provided with dentures free of charge on 25 June 2007. Moreover, there is no indication that he has suffered any related health problems thereafter. Nor is there any medical evidence that he had been starved or otherwise unable to receive sufficient sustenance before the said date. The matter giving rise to the applicant’s complaint can therefore now be considered to have been "resolved" within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (b). In addition, there are no particular reasons relating to respect for human rights as defined in the Convention which would require the Court to continue its examination of this complaint under Article 37 § 1 in fine.
81. Accordingly, this part of the application should be struck out of the case.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
82. The relevant provisions of this Article read as follows:
"If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."
83. The applicant claimed 1,000 euros (EUR) for the non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of the violation of the right to respect for his correspondence and requested guarantees of non-repetition thereof.
84. The Government contested that claim.
85. In the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the finding of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention alone constitutes adequate just satisfaction in respect of the compensation claimed under that head (see, mutatis mutandis, Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, § 141, Series A no. 80; Calogero Diana v. Italy, 15 November 1996, § 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 V; Salapa v. Poland, no. 35489/97, §§ 100-102 and 107, 19 December 2002; and Savenkovas v. Lithuania, no. 871/02, 18 November 2008).
86. The applicant also claimed EUR 1,700 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. In particular, he sought EUR 1,550 for the preparation of the case and his representative’s extensive written pleadings, plus another EUR 150 for secretarial expenses, including postage.
87. The Government considered the applicant’s claim to be unsubstantiated.
88. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were also reasonable as to their quantum (see, for example, Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, § 54, ECHR 2000-XI).
89. In the present case, regard being had to the above criteria, as well as the EUR 850 already granted to the applicant under the Council of Europe’s legal aid scheme, the Court rejects this claim for costs.
90. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
1. Declares by a majority the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention concerning the interference with the applicant’s correspondence admissible;
2. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in this respect;
3. Holds by 6 votes to 1 that the complaint concerning the applicant’s dentures has been resolved and therefore decides to strike it out of the case;
4. Holds unanimously that the finding of a violation of Article 8 in itself constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant;
5. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 May 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
| S. DOLLÉ Registrar |
F. TULKENS President |
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) partly concurring opinion of Judge Mr Kreća,
(b) partly dissenting opinion of Judge MR Zagrebelsky.
|
F.T. |
PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KREĆA
I agree with the finding that the Respondent’s law does not provide grounds for considering that a criminal complaint could afford the applicant adequate redress.
I could also go along with the finding - although it is one of a more delicate nature - that civil proceedings as such do not necessarily address the root cause of the matter, as well as that regarding a specific complaint with the Court of Serbia and Montenegro.
My reservations essentially have to do with the treatment of the administrative remedy concerning the implementation of prison regulations. They are basically derived from the intrinsic requirements of the principle of judicial consistency.
Judicial consistency understood as consistency with its own past case-law "is the essence of judicial reasoning" [Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), judgment of 15 December 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, Joint Declaration of Vice-President Ranjeva and Judges Guillaume, Higgins, Koojimans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elaraby, paragraph 3].
This is particularly true of this Court, having in mind that in its judicial activity the principle of judicial consistency possesses not only the ideal meaning of stability and predictability of the jurisprudence of the Court, but also a practical meaning in that, considering the large number of cases submitted to the Court, it enables proper administration of justice.
In the Novak v. Croatia Case (application no. 8883/04, judgment of 14 June 2007), the applicant alleged that the prison authorities had opened his correspondence with the Court, thus violating his right established under Article 8 of the Convention.
The Government objected that "the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies because he had not addressed this complaint to the domestic authorities, such as the Varaždin Prison Administration or the judge responsible for the execution of sentences" (paragraph 49 of the judgment).
In its judgment the Court found that:
"... the applicant did not address a complaint concerning the opening of his correspondence with it to any domestic authorities, although under section 15(2) of the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act he was able to lodge such a complaint with either the Varaždin Prison governor, a judge responsible for the execution of sentences or the Head Office of the Prison Administration" (paragraph 51 of the judgment; emphasis added).
From this specific finding follows the conclusion that:
"... in respect of this complaint the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies and that therefore this complaint must be rejected in accordance with Article 35, §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention" (paragraph 52 of the judgment).
4. It goes without saying that the Court has the power to depart from its previous decision, but the Court should exercise this power with good reason. Precedential authority of a previous decision is non-existent where cases, resting on different principles, are distinguishable.
As regards these cases - Horvat v. Croatia and Stojanović v. Serbia - it appears that there exists almost complete identity of the relevant elements of both the factual and the legal framework.
In both cases, the applicants allege that their right to confidentiality guaranteed under Article 8 of the Convention was violated by the acts of the prison authorities. The internal laws of both Governments provide for, inter alia, administrative remedies for the protection of the relevant right in the form of a complaint "to the governor of the penitentiary" (section 103 of the Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions Act) or "the right to submit a written application to the Head of the Directorate for the Enforcement of Institutional Sanctions" according to the law of Serbia, and a complaint to the prison governor or the Head Office of the Prison Administration (section 15(2) of the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act) according to the law of Croatia. Neither of the applicants Novak and Stojanović addressed a complaint to any of the above-mentioned authorities concerning the opening of their correspondence.
It is true, however, that there are two differences in the circumstances surrounding these two cases.
Firstly, Croatia’s law also provides, in the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act, for a complaint to a judge responsible for the execution of sentences, in addition to a complaint to the prison governor and the Head Office of the Prison Administration; and
Secondly, "the Government have failed to produce relevant case-law which would demonstrate that any of the administrative remedies on which they relied could have provided the applicant with adequate redress for the violation alleged" (paragraph 62 of the judgment), followed by the observation that "the Government [of Serbia] themselves acknowledged that the alleged interference stemmed from an administrative practice" (ibid.).
It appears that neither of the said differences makes these two cases distinguishable, being objectively inadequate to justify departure from the precedent established by the Novak v. Croatia case.
6.1. The fact that under Croatia’s law, in addition to the governor of the prison and the Head Office of the Prison Administration the applicant could also have addressed the judge responsible for the execution of sentences is irrelevant here. In its Judgment in the Horvat v. Croatia case, the Court indicated as alternatives the possible addressees with whom the applicant could have lodged a complaint. This means, clearly and unambiguously, that a complaint lodged with any of the addressees indicated in paragraph 51 of the judgment is an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 35 of the Convention. Or, if we apply the precedential authority of the Court’s judgment in the Horvat v. Croatia Case to this particular case, that the administrative remedies as provided for by the Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions Act are effective remedies for the purposes of Article 35 of the Convention.
6.2. It is worth mentioning that in the Horvat v. Croatia case the Court did not demand the production of relevant case-law demonstrating that any of the administrative remedies on which the Government relied could have provided the applicant with adequate redress for the violation alleged.
Such an approach seems a proper one in the light of the well-established principle in the jurisprudence of the Court that "the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism" (Azinas v. Cyprus, application no. 56679/00, § 38; Ilhan v. Turkey, application no. 22277/93, §59). Failure to produce relevant case-law, in particular when Contracting Parties are concerned which, like Croatia and Serbia, belong to the continental system of law, could hardly, in itself, constitute a basis for disqualifying a particular remedy as an effective one. From the standpoint of the question whether a particular remedy is an effective one, sometimes recourse to testing on an empirical basis, as indicated by the dictum of the Chamber of the International Court of Justice in the ELSI case, may be the most appropriate answer:
"for an international claim to be admissible, it is sufficient if the essence of the claim has been brought before the competent tribunals and pursued as far as permitted by local law and procedures, and without success". (ICJ Reports 1989, p. 15 at p. 42, paragraph 50; emphasis added).
Indeed, it seems exaggerated to disqualify a particular remedy as effective exclusively on the basis of formalistically established standards relating to the distribution of the burden of proof while neglecting its substantive capability of affording redress in respect of the breaches alleged.
6.3. An additional argument of the majority that "the Government themselves acknowledged that the alleged interference stemmed from an administrative practice" does not seem to be of decisive importance in this particular context either.
The acknowledgment was expressed, in the first place, in an abstract form, as a defence, rather than as a substantiated and formal acknowledgment.
Moreover, even assuming that opening correspondence was an administrative practice, that circumstance is not in itself reason for disqualifying the complaint to higher administrative structures as an effective one. The practice of lower administrative structures opening correspondence is one thing, whereas the practice, whether established or reasonably possible, of higher structures vested with the power to censor mail based on specific rules is quite another.
Having found that the applicant’s complaint concerning the dentures, based, inter alia, on Protocol No. 12, had been resolved within the meaning of Article 37, § 1 (b) of the Convention, the Court was no longer in a position to address the normative potential of Protocol No. 12.
That potential is unfathomable; it encompasses the almost revolutionary perspective of the convergence of civil and political rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights, on the other. Ultimately, it could be conducive to the establishment of the right to dignified life (divina vitae) as the embodiment of the eternal goal relating to the purpose and nature of human existence.
It is certain, in this connection, that the Court’s future jurisprudence must provide guidelines as to how the normative potential of Protocol No. 12 should be perceived.
PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ZAGREBELSKY
I voted against striking out the complaint concerning the applicant’s dentures for the following reasons, which relate solely to the impact of this judgment for the Court’s case-law on Article 37 of the Convention. The merits of the applicant’s complaint (which was not declared inadmissible by the Chamber as manifestly ill-founded) are in no way the subject-matter of my dissent, any more than of the judgment itself.
In my view the matter giving rise to the applicant’s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention cannot be considered resolved.
According to the Court’s case-law, "[i]n order to conclude that the matter has been resolved within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (b) and that there is therefore no longer any objective justification for the applicant to pursue his application, the Court considers that it must examine, firstly, whether the circumstances complained of directly by the applicant still obtain and, secondly, whether the effects of a possible violation of the Convention on account of those circumstances have also been redressed. This approach reflects the structure of the Convention’s supervisory machinery, which provides both for a reasoned decision of judgment as to whether the facts in issue are compatible with the requirements of the Convention (Article 45), and, if they are not, for the award of just satisfaction (Article 41)" (see Pisano v. Italy [GC] (striking out), no. 36732/97, § 42, 24 October 2002).
The Court, in a number of its judgments concerning the expulsion of aliens has accepted that to put an end to the risk of their being removed from the country by way of the delivery of (one of the various kinds of) residence permits can constitute an adequate and sufficient form of redress and thus a reason for finding that both of the above-mentioned conditions are met in cases concerning Article 8 (see, among other authorities, Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia [GC], no. 60654/00, § 97, ECHR 2007-..., and Ibrahim Mohamed v. the Netherlands (striking out), no. 1872/04, §§ 19-24, 10 March 2009). The same case-law has been adopted by the Court under Article 3 of the Convention in cases concerning expulsions or extraditions whose execution was no longer possible (see Bilasi-Ashri v. Austria (dec.), no. 3314/02, ECHR 2002-X; Abraham Lunguli v. Sweden (dec.), no. 33692/02, 1 July 2003; Laleh Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 31252/03, 31 January 2008; Bari v. Sweden (dec.), no. 56726/00, 5 March 2002; Hesam Safawi Bayat v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 7233/02, 8 July 2003; R.N. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28242/02, 2 September 2003; Q v. Finland (dec.), no. 42640/04, 22 May 2007; Azzedine Chelghoum v. France (dec.), no. 54654/00, 10 October 2000; and Tony Chidobe v. Italy (dec.), no. 30978/04, 9 September 2004). Apparently, the Court found that the matter had been resolved in a case where leave to remain in the country had finally been granted to the applicant (see Mostafa Kordoghliazar v. Romania (dec.), no. 8776/05, 20 May 2008). In El Majjaoui and Stichting Touba Moskee v. the Netherlands ((striking out) [GC], no. 25525/03, §§ 30-34, 20 December 2007), the Court reached similar findings in a very specific case, brought under Article 9 of the Convention, concerning the denial and then the delivery of a residence and work permit to a foreign imam.
The Court, to my knowledge, has never found the matter to have been resolved in a case under Article 3 of the Convention such as the present one. The applicant suffered from the refusal of the authorities to provide him with the dentures he needed from at least February 2004 (see paragraph 13) to 26 June 2007 (see the note of 27 June 2007 from the applicant’s representative, the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights). The Government’s action was taken after a long period of three years and four months (nearly three years after the application had been lodged). No redress has been granted in respect of the violation complained of (still less have the Government taken action to fulfil their procedural obligations under Article 3 of the Convention).
I am unable to see how it can be said that the issue of the case has been resolved by the sole fact that a possible violation of Article 3 has finally ended and I am deeply worried by a judgment that sets such a precedent in the Court’s Article 3 case-law. Moreover one can easily conceive possible developments and applications of this new precedent, capable of spreading across a broader range of Convention violations such as serious violations of Article 3, or of Article 5 and so forth.
I respectfully suggest that this judgment should not establish a precedent in the Court’s case-law."
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