Analiza slučaja pred Evropskim sudom za ljudska prava
Evropska Konvencija o ljudskim pravima
Praktični vodič za primenu Evropske konvencije o ljudskim pravima
Priručnici i vodiči kroz praksu Evropskog suda za ljudska prava
Evropski sud za ljudska prava u 50 pitanja
Glosar Evropske Konvencije o ljudskim pravima
Nacionalna mreža sudija i tužilaca za primenu standarda Evropskog suda za ljudska prava
Preuzmite presudu u pdf formatu
EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
DRUGO ODJELJENJE
Predmet Radunović i drugi protiv Crne Gore
(Predstavke br. 45197/13, 53000/13 i 73404/13)
PRESUDA
STRAZBUR
25. oktobar 2016. godine
Ova presuda će postati pravosnažna u okolnostima utrvđenim članom 44 stav 2 Konvencije. Ona može biti predmet redakcijske izmjene.
U predmetu Radunović protiv Crne Gore, Evropski sud za ljudska prava (Drugo odjeljenje), na zasijedanju vijeća u sastavu od:
Julia Laffranque, predsjednik,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Valeriu Gritco,
Ksenija Turković,
Jon Fridrik Kjolbro,
Stephanie Mourou-Vikstrom,
Georges Ravarani, sudije
i Stanley Naismith, sekretar odjeljenja,
Poslije vijećanja na zatvorenoj sjednici održanoj 4. oktobra 2016.godine, Donosi sledeću presudu, koja je usvojena tog dana:
PROCEDURA
ČINJENICE
I OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA
“3. Poslovi koji treba da budu obavljeni. Zaposleni je saglasan da obavlja sve poslove i zadatke propisane u opisu radnog mjesta u skladu sa uslovima koji su tamo propisani.
[...]
12. Sporovi. Svi sporovi između zaposlenog i Vlade koji budu proizilazili iz ovog Ugovora rješavaće upravnik, ili, u njegovom odsustvu, lice koje upravnik odredi, a zaposleni će imati pravo na prigovor u roku od trideset (30) dana od dana prijema obavještenja o bilo kakvoj odluci šefu Misije [u Ambasadi SAD-a u Podgorici].”
II RELEVANTNI DOMAĆI ZAKONI I PRAKSA
A. Ustav Crne Gore iz 2007 (objavljen u “Sl. listu Crne Gore” – br. 01/07)
B. Zakon o Ustavnom sudu Crne Gore (objavljen u “Sl. listu Crne Gore”, br. 64/08)
C. Zakon o Ustavnom sudu Crne Gore (objavljen u “Sl. listu Crne Gore”, br. 11/15)
D. Zakon o parničnom postupku (objavljen u “Sl. listu Republike Crne Gore”, br. 22/04, 28/05, 76/06 i “Sl. listu Crne Gore”, br. 73/10)
E. Zakon o radu (objavljen u “Sl. listu Crne Gore”, br. 49/08, 26/09, 88/09, 26/10, 59/11, 66/12 i 31/14)
F. Zakon o rješavanju sukoba sa propisima drugih zemalja (objavljen u “Sl. listu SFRJ”, br. 43/82 i 72/82 i u “Sl. listu FRJ”, br. 46/96)
G. Zakon o sudovima (objavljen u “Sl. listu RCG”, no. 05/02 i 49/04 i u “Sl. listu CG”, br. 22/08, 39/11, 46/13, 48/13 i 32/14)
III RELEVANTNI MEĐUNARODNI ZAKONI
“1. Država se ne može pozvati na jurisdikcioni imunitet pred sudom druge države koji je inače nadležan za postupke koji se odnose na ugovore o radu između država i pojedinaca za poslove koji se obavljaju ili će se obavljati, u cjelini ili djelimično na teritoriji druge države, osim ako je drugačije dogovoreno između država.
2. Stav 1 se ne primjenjuje ukoliko:
(a) je zaposleni angažovan za obavljanje određenih aktivnosti koje sprovode organi vlasti;
(b) je zaposleni:
- diplomatski predstavnik, kao što je definisano Bečkom konvencijom o diplomatskim odnosima iz 1961. godine;
- konzularni predstavnik, kao što je definisano Bečkom konvencijom o konzularnim odnosima iz 1963. godine;
- član diplomatskog osoblja stalne misije međunarodne organizacije ili specijalne misije, ili je angažovan da zastupa državu na međunarodnoj konferenciji; ili
- bilo koja druga osoba koja uživa diplomatski imunitet;
(c) je predmet spora zapošljavanje, obnavljanje zaposlenja ili ponovno postavljenje pojedinca;
(d) je predmet spora otkaz ili prestanak zaposlenja pojedinca i, kao što je određeno od strane predsjednika države, predsjednika vlade ili ministra spoljnih poslova države poslodavca, ukoliko bi takav postupak ometao interese te države;
(e) je zaposleni državljanin Države poslodavca u trenutku kada je postupak pokrenut, osim ako ta osoba ima stalno prebivalište u državi u kojoj je mjesto suđenja; ili
(f) država poslodavac i zaposleni imaju drugačiji pisani sporazum, pri čemu se uzimaju u obzir sve javne politike kojima se na sudove države u kojoj se obavlja ugovorni posao prenosi izuzetna nadležnost koja se određuje shodno stvarnoj nadležnosti za predmet
“ 1. Država se ne može pozvati na jurisdikcioni imunitet pred sudom druge države koji je inače nadležan za postupke koji se odnose na ugovore o radu između država i pojedinaca za poslove koji se obavljaju ili će se obavljati, u cjelini ili djelimično na teritoriji druge države, osim ako je drugačije dogovoreno između država.
2. Stav 1 se ne primjenjuje ukoliko:
- je zaposleni angažovan za obavljane određenih aktivnosti koje sprovode organi vlasti;
- je predmet spora zapošljavanje, obnavljanje zaposlenja ili ponovno postavljenje pojedinca;
- zaposleni nije ni državljanin ni rezident države u kojoj se vodi postupak u trenutku kada je zaključen ugovor o radu;
- je zaposleni državljanin države poslodavca u trenutku kada je postupak pokrenut;
- država poslodavac i zaposleni imaju drugačiji pisani sporazum, pri čemu se uzimaju u obzir sve javne politike kojima se na sudove države u kojoj se obavlja ugovorni posao prenosi izuzetna nadležnost koja se određuje shodno stvarnoj nadležnosti za predmet spora.
“Stav 2 (b) je namijenjen da potvrdi postojanje prakse država kao podrška pravilu imuniteta u sprovođenju diskrecionog prava zapošljavanja ili nezapošljavanja pojedinca od strane države na bilo koju zvaničnu funkciju ili radno mjesto. [...] Tako da su takođe akti ‘otpuštanje’ ili ‘udaljavanje’ zaposlenih u vladi od strane države, koji se obično dešavaju nakon zaključivanja istrage kao dijela nadzorne ili disciplinske nadležnosti koju sprovodi država poslodavac. Ovaj stav se takođe odnosi na predmete kada zaposleni traži obnovu ugovora o radu ili ponovno postavljenje nakon neblagovremenog prekida angažovanja. Pravilo imuniteta se primjenjuje na postupke zapošljavanja, obnavljanja ugovora o radu ili ponovnog postavljenja pojedinaca. Nesporna je mogućnost koja može biti na raspolaganju države u kojoj se vodi postupak za naknadu zbog ‘pogrešnog otkaza’ ili kršenja obaveze zapošljavanja ili obnove ugovora. Drugim riječima, ovaj stav ne sprječava zaposlenog da pokrene postupak protiv države poslodavca u državi u kojoj se vodi postupak i da traži naknadu za štetu koja proizilazi iz radnog odnosa, obnove ugovora o radu ili vraćanja na rad pojedinca.
[...]
Konačno, stavom 2 (e) je predviđena sloboda ugovora, koja uključuje slobodu prava i mogućnost izbora suda ili forum prograntum. Ova sloboda nije neograničena. Ona je predmet razmatranja javne politike [...] gdje eksluzivnu nadležnost imaju sudovi države u kojoj se vodi postupak iz razloga predmetne materije.
PRAVO
I SPAJANJE PREDSTAVKI
II NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 6 STAV 1 KONVENCIJE
“Tokom odlučivanja o njegovim pravima i obavezama ... svako ima pravo na pravičnu ... javnu raspravu ... pred sudom...”
III PRIMJENA ČLANA 41 KONVENCIJE
“Kada Sud utvrdi prekršaj Konvencije ili protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo Visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo djelimičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj strani.”
SA OVIH RAZLOGA, SUD, JEDNOGLASNO,
Sačinjeno na engleskom jeziku, u pismenoj formi, dana 25. oktobra 2016.godine, na osnovu pravila 77 stav 2 i 3 Pravilnika Suda.
Stanley Naismith Julia Laffranque
sekretar predsjednik
______________________
Prevod presude preuzet sa https://sudovi.me/vrhs/sadrzaj/NQN9
44. The Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, that were used as the basis for the text adopted in 2004, were adopted by the International Law Commission at its forty-third session in 1991, and submitted to the General Assembly at that session. Article 11 thereof read as follows:
“1. Unless otherwise agreed between the States concerned, a State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a court of another State which is otherwise competent in a proceeding which relates to a contract of employment between the State and an individual for work performed or to be performed, in whole or in part, in the territory of that other State.
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if:
(a) the employee has been recruited to perform functions closely related to the exercise of governmental authority;
(b) the subject of the proceeding is the recruitment, renewal of employment or reinstatement of an individual;
(c) the employee was neither a national nor a habitual resident of the State of the forum at the time when the contract of employment was concluded;
(d) the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted; or
(e) the employer State and the employee have otherwise agreed in writing, subject to any considerations of public policy conferring on the courts of the State of the forum exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter of the proceeding.”
45. In the commentary on that Article the Commission indicated as follows:
“Paragraph 2 (b) is designed to confirm the existing practice of States in support of the rule of immunity in the exercise of the discretionary power of appointment or non-appointment by the State of an individual to any official post or employment position. [...] So also are the acts of ‘dismissal’ or ‘removal’ of a government employee by the State, which normally take place after the conclusion of an inquiry or investigation as part of supervisory or disciplinary jurisdiction exercised by the employer State. This subparagraph also covers cases where the employee seeks renewal of his employment or reinstatement after untimely termination of his engagement. The rule of immunity applies to proceedings for recruitment, renewal of employment and reinstatement of an individual only. It is without prejudice to the possible recourse which may still be available in the State of the forum for compensation or damages for ‘wrongful dismissal’ or for breaches of obligation to recruit or to renew employment. In other words, this subparagraph does not prevent an employee from bringing action against the employer State in the State of the forum to seek redress for damage arising from recruitment, renewal of employment or reinstatement of an individual.
[...]
Finally, paragraph 2 (e) provides for the freedom of contract, including the choice of law and the possibility of a chosen forum or forum prorogatum. This freedom is not unlimited. It is subject to considerations of public policy [...] whereby exclusive jurisdiction is reserved of the courts of the State of the forum by reason of the subject-matter of the proceeding.”
46. For a more comprehensive overview see Cudak v. Lithuania ([GC], no. 15869/02, §§ 25-33, ECHR 2010).
47. Article 8 of the International Labour Organisation Convention on Termination of Employment (No. 158) provides, inter alia, that a worker who considers that his employment has been unjustifiably terminated shall be entitled to appeal against that termination to an impartial body, such as a court, labour tribunal, arbitration committee or arbitrator.
48. Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations sets out details as regards the functions of diplomatic missions.
THE LAW
I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
49. The Court considers that, in accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court, the applications should be joined, given their similar factual and legal background.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
50. The applicants complained, under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 thereto, that the domestic courts’ refusal to examine their civil claims on the merits deprived them of their right of access to court. Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of any case before it (see Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217/12, § 55, ECHR 2014 (extracts)) the Court considers that the applicants’ complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”.
51. The Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
52. The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust all domestic remedies. In particular, a constitutional appeal was an effective domestic remedy and at the time when the applicants lodged their applications their constitutional appeals were still pending.
53. The applicants referred to their submissions made in the applications, notably that a constitutional appeal was not an effective domestic remedy.
54. The Court has already held that a constitutional appeal in Montenegro could in principle be considered an effective domestic remedy, but as of 20 March 2015 (see Siništaj and Others v. Montenegro, nos. 1451/10, 7260/10 and 7382/10, § 123, 24 November 2015). The applicants lodged their applications in April, July and November 2013, that is long before the constitutional appeal became an effective domestic remedy in the respondent State (see Siništaj and Others, cited above, § 124).
55. The Court also notes that all the applicants did make use of a constitutional appeal and the Constitutional Court ruled in respect of the first and third applicants’ appeals, thus exhausting the said remedy in any event (see Karoussiotis v. Portugal, no. 23205/08, § 57, ECHR 2011 (extracts)). While the Constitutional Court appears not to have ruled yet in respect of the second applicant’s constitutional appeal, the Court considers that there is nothing in the case file which would indicate that it would rule any differently in that regard given its decisions in respect of the first and third applicants (see, mutatis mutandis, Lakićević and Others v. Montenegro and Serbia, nos. 27458/06, 37205/06, 37207/06 and33604/07, § 51, 13 December 2011; and Siništaj and Others, cited above, § 170).
56. In view of the above, the Court considers that the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion must be dismissed.
57. The Court notes that the applications are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
58. The applicants reaffirmed their complaint.
59. The Government submitted that the applicants’ complaints were of a fourth instance nature. They also maintained that the domestic courts ruled consistently in disputes of this kind and submitted a decision of the High Court of 20 November 2012 (see paragraph 40 above). In any event, it was not the Court’s role to examine the domestic courts’ interpretation of domestic law, and certain divergences in domestic jurisprudence were acceptable. They referred in this regard to Vinčić and Others v. Serbia (nos. 44698/06 et al., 1 December 2009).
60. The Government further maintained that the applicants’ employment contracts did not provide for the jurisdiction of national courts in case of a dispute. Pursuant to the Vienna Convention the Embassy had its seat in a foreign State, which had its own legal personality. They referred to section 29 of the Civil Procedure Act and section 46 of the Resolution of Conflict of Laws and Regulations of other States Act (see paragraphs 30 and 35 above). They maintained that granting immunity to a foreign State in civil proceedings pursued a legitimate aim of complying with international law and encouraging good diplomatic relations between States, and could not be considered as a restriction on access to a court. They concluded that there had been no violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
2. The relevant principles
61. The Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing, as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, must be construed in the light of the principle of the rule of law, one of the fundamental aspects of which is the principle of legal certainty, which requires that all litigants should have an effective judicial remedy enabling them to assert their civil rights (see Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, no. 47273/99, § 49, ECHR 2002‑IX). Everyone has the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. In this way Article 6 § 1 embodies the “right to a court”, of which the right of access, that is, the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect only (see Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, § 36, Series A no. 18).
62. However, the right of access to a court secured by Article 6 § 1 is not absolute, but may be subject to limitations; these are permitted by implication since the right of access by its very nature calls for regulation by the State. In this respect, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, although the final decision as to the observance of the Convention’s requirements rests with the Court. It must be satisfied that the limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see, for example, Cudak, cited above, § 55).
63. Moreover, the Convention has to be interpreted in the light of the rules set out in the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties, Article 31 § 3 (c) of which indicates that account is to be taken of “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. The Convention, including Article 6, cannot be interpreted in a vacuum (see Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 37112/97, § 35, ECHR 2001‑XI (extracts)). The Court must therefore be mindful of the Convention’s special character as a human rights treaty, and it must also take the relevant rules of international law into account, including those relating to the grant of State immunity (see Cudak, cited above, § 56; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], no. 34869/05, § 48, 29 June 2011).
64. It follows that measures taken by a High Contracting Party which reflect generally recognised rules of public international law on State immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to court as embodied in Article 6 § 1. Just as the right of access to a court is an inherent part of the fair trial guarantee in that Article, so some restrictions on access must likewise be regarded as inherent, an example being those limitations generally accepted by the community of nations as part of the rule of State immunity (see Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97, § 56, ECHR 2001‑XI).
65. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective. This is particularly so of the right of access to the courts in view of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial (see Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 28 October 1998, § 52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑VIII). It would not be consistent with the rule of law in a democratic society or with the basic principle underlying Article 6 § 1 – namely that civil claims must be capable of being submitted to a judge for adjudication – if a State could, without restraint or control by the Convention enforcement bodies, remove from the jurisdiction of the courts a whole range of civil claims or confer immunities from civil liability on categories of persons (see Fayed v. the United Kingdom, 21 September 1994, § 65, Series A no. 294‑B).
66. Therefore, in cases where the application of the rule of State immunity from jurisdiction restricts the exercise of the right of access to a court, the Court must ascertain whether the circumstances of the case justified such restriction.
67. The Court further reiterates that such limitation must pursue a legitimate aim and that State immunity was developed in international law out of the principle par in parem non habet imperium, by virtue of which one State could not be subject to the jurisdiction of another (see Cudak, § 60, and Al-Adsani, § 54, both cited above). It has taken the view that the grant of immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States through the respect of another State’s sovereignty (see Sabeh El Leil, cited above, § 52).
68. In addition, the impugned restriction must also be proportionate to the aim pursued. In this connection, the Court observes that the application of absolute State immunity has, for many years, clearly been eroded, in particular with the adoption of the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property by the United Nations General Assembly in 2004 (see Cudak, cited above, § 64). This convention is based on Draft Articles adopted in 1991, of which Article 11 concerned contracts of employment and created a significant exception in matters of State immunity, the principle being that the immunity rule does not apply to a State’s employment contracts with the staff of its diplomatic missions abroad, except in the situations that are exhaustively enumerated in paragraph 2 of Article 11 (see Sabeh El Leil, cited above, § 53).
69. Furthermore, it is a well-established principle of international law that a treaty provision may, in addition to the obligations it creates for the Contracting Parties, also be binding on States that have not ratified it in so far as that provision reflects customary international law, either “codifying” it or forming a new customary rule (see Cudak, cited above, § 66). Consequently, Article 11 of the International Law Commission’s 1991 Draft Articles, as now enshrined in the 2004 Convention, applies under customary international law, even if the State in question has not ratified that convention, provided it has not opposed it either (see Cudak, §§ 66-67, and Sabeh El Leil, § 54, both cited above).
3. Application to the present case
70. The Court first observes that in the Cudak and Sabeh El Leil cases, both of which concerned the dismissal of members of the local staff of embassies, it found that the restrictions on the right of access to a court pursued a legitimate aim (see Cudak, § 62, and Sabeh El Leil, § 55, both cited above). It does not find any reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
71. It should therefore now be examined whether the impugned restriction on the applicant’s right of access to a court was proportionate to the aim pursued.
72. The Court notes that the domestic courts clearly refused to apply jurisdictional immunity in an absolute manner, since they ruled in favour of the third applicant and ordered his reinstatement, which decision became final (see paragraph 11 above). The Supreme Court also initially took the view that the courts should rule on the merits of the applicants’ civil claims (see paragraph 13 above).
73. As the Court has pointed out (see paragraph 69 above), Article 11 of the International Law Commission’s 1991 Draft Articles, as now enshrined in the 2004 Convention, applies under customary international law, even if the State in question has not ratified that convention, provided it has not opposed it either (see Cudak, §§ 66-67, and Sabeh El Leil, § 57, both cited above). For its part, Montenegro has not ratified it, and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro did not oppose it (see paragraph 43 above). Consequently, it is possible to affirm that the provisions of the 2004 Convention apply to the respondent State, under customary international law, and the Court must take this into consideration in examining whether the right of access to a court, within the meaning of Article 6 § 1, was respected (see Sabeh El Leil, cited above, § 58).
74. The Court observes that Article 11 of the 2004 Convention enshrines the rule that a State has no jurisdictional immunity in respect of employment contracts, except in the situations exhaustively enumerated therein (see Sabeh El Leil, cited above, § 60).
75. It is noted in this regard that paragraph 2 (a), (b) and (e) of Article 11 was clearly irrelevant in the present case, as the applicants were not employed to perform any particular duties in the exercise of governmental authority, they were neither diplomatic or consular agents of the USA, nor nationals of that State.
76. As to paragraph 2 (c), the Court observes that the first and second applicants’ claims concerned both reinstatement and compensation. Notwithstanding the earlier domestic courts’ decision in respect of the third applicant’s reinstatement claim (see paragraph 11 above), the Court recalls that reinstatement falls under an exception which allows for an application of the rule of immunity. However, as noted above, it does not prevent an employee from bringing action against the employer State in the State of the forum to seek redress for damage arising from wrongful dismissal (see paragraph 45 above). Therefore, the applicants’ claims concerning compensation did not fall under the exception provided in paragraph 2 (c).
77. Paragraph 2 (d), which expressly concerns the dismissal of an employee, was not applicable in the present case since neither the domestic courts nor the Government have shown how the applicants’ duties could objectively have been linked to the security interests of the USA (see Sabeh El Leil, cited above, §§ 61-62, and Cudak, cited above, § 72).
78. Finally, the Court considers that paragraph 2 (f) was not applicable either given that the applicants’ employment contracts did not specify which court would have jurisdiction in respect of employment-related disputes (see paragraph 7 above).
79. In view of the above, the Court considers that the applicants’ claims relating to compensation did not fall within any of the exceptions provided for in Article 11 paragraph 2 of the 2004 Convention and that therefore, pursuant to paragraph 1 thereof, State immunity could not be relied on in the domestic proceedings.
80. When ruling upon the first applicant’s claim the Court of First Instance considered only in general that working for the embassies might be “sensitive or of a confidential nature” without going into any examination whatsoever of whether the first applicant’s job had been indeed sensitive or of a confidential nature (see, mutatis mutandis, Sabeh El Leil, cited above, §§ 63-64). While that court acknowledged that there were generally restrictions on State immunity in employment-related disputes, neither that nor any other domestic court ruling upon the applicants’ claims took into consideration the provisions of Article 11 of the 2004 Convention, in particular the exceptions enumerated therein that must be strictly interpreted (see Sabeh El Leil, cited above, § 66).
81. In view of the above, the Court considers that by rejecting the applicants’ claim for compensation relying on State immunity without giving relevant and sufficient reasons, and notwithstanding the applicable provisions of international law, as well as sections 28 of the Civil Procedure Act and sections 47 and 55 of Resolution of Conflict of Laws and Regulations of other States Act (see paragraphs 29 and 36-37 above), the Montenegrin courts failed to preserve a reasonable relationship of proportionality. They thus impaired the very essence of the applicants’ right of access to a court.
82. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
83. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
84. The first applicant claimed 70,370 euros (EUR), the second applicant claimed EUR 65,336.05, and the third applicant EUR 172,715.46 in respect of pecuniary damage, for loss of earnings due to their dismissal. The first applicant also claimed EUR 15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and the second and third applicants claimed EUR 10,000 each in this regard.
85. The Government contested these claims us unfounded.
86. The Court observes that in the present case an award of just satisfaction can only be based on the fact that the applicants did not have the benefit of the guarantees of Article 6. Whilst the Court cannot speculate as to the outcome of the proceedings had the position been otherwise, it does not find it unreasonable to regard the applicants as having incurred a loss of real opportunities (see, among other authorities, Colozza v. Italy, 12 February 1985, § 38, Series A no. 89; Cudak, cited above, § 79; and Sabeh El Leil, cited above, § 72). In addition, the applicants have sustained non-pecuniary damage which the finding of a violation of the Convention in this judgment does not suffice to remedy. Nevertheless, it is noted that the first applicant made no claim for pecuniary damages before the domestic courts (see paragraph 12 above) and thus cannot be said to have incurred a loss of real opportunities. Therefore, the Court rejects the first applicant’s claim in that regard and, ruling on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41, awards her EUR 3,600 for non-pecuniary damage. It also awards the second applicant EUR 19,000, and the third applicant EUR 22,000 for all heads of damage combined.
B. Costs and expenses
87. The first applicant claimed EUR 6,051 for costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and this Court, and the second and third applicants claimed EUR 3,572.50 each in this regard.
88. The Government contested these claims us unfounded.
89. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court finds the sums claimed reasonable and awards each applicant the sum claimed in its entirety.
C. Default interest
90. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Decides to join the applications;
2. Declares the applications admissible;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 3,600 (three thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to the first applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 19,000 (nineteen thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to the second applicant in respect of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage; and EUR 22,000 (twenty-two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to the third applicant in respect of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 6,051 (six thousand and fifty one euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to the first applicant, and EUR 3,572.50 (three thousand five hundred and seventy two euros and fifty cents), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to the second and third applicants each, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 October 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Julia Laffranque
Registrar President
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