Predmet je formiran na osnovu predstavke podnete od strane pet hrvatskih državljana, rodjenih 1965., 1963., 1985., 1995., odnosno 2001. godine i žive u Čakovcu. Prvi i drugi podnosioci su supružnici, a treći, četvrti i peti podnosioci su njihova deca.

Tokom 2004. godine, M.T., ćerka prvog podnosioca i druge podnositeljke, odnosno sestra trećeg, četvrtog i petog podnosioca, ušla je u vezu sa izvesnim M.M., koji je počeo da živi u njihovoj porodičnoj kući. Dana 1. marta 2005. godine M.T. i M.M., dobili su ćerku V.T. Ubrzo nakon rodjenja deteta, M.M. je počeo nasilno da se ponaša prema M.T., ali i ostalim ukućanima i ubrzo se iselio iz njihove kuće.
Dana 4. januara 2006. godine, Centar za socijalni rad, podeo je krivičnu prijavu protiv M.M., navodeći da je došao u Centar tvrdeći da ima bombu, koju će baciti na M.T. i dete.
Dana 5. januara, M.T. je podnela krivičnu prijavu protiv M.M., zato što je u više navrata dolazio u kuću njenih roditelja, u kojoj je živela sa detetom i pretio da će ih ubiti.
Dana 3. februara 2006. godine, odredjen mu je pritvor i pokrenut je postupak pred Općinskim sudom u Čakovcu. Dana 15. marta 2006. godine, M.M. je oglašen krivim i osudjen je na kaznu zatvora u trajanju od pet meseci, uz meru obaveznog psihijatrijskog lečenja. M.M. je kaznu zatvora služio u Varaždinu, iz kog je pušten dana 3. jula 2006. godine.

Dana 15. avgusta 2006. godine, upucao je M.T., njihovu ćerku V.T. i na kraju sebe. Policija je obavila razgovor sa svedokom, komšijom M.T., koji je video M.M. kako se približava kući M.T. neposredno pre pucnjave. Na zahtev policije, istražni sudija je izdao nalog za pretres stana M.G., za koga se sumnjalo da je nabavio oružje za M.M, medjutim nije utvrdjena direktna veza izmedju njih, pa sudija nije postupao dalje.
Dana 28. novembra 2006. godine, tužilaštvo je odbacilo krivičnu prijavu protiv M.M, za ubistvo M.T i V.T, zato što je bio mrtav.

Dana 6. novembra 2006. godine, podnosioci su poslali zahtev državnom odvjetništvu, za naknadu nematerijalne štete u vezi sa smrću M.T. i V.T., medjutim nije im odgovoreno.

Evropski Sud za ljudska prava, uzimajući u obzir sve okolnosti predmetnog slučaja, kao i sudsku praksu, utvrdjuje povredu Čl. 2 Konvencije, s obzirom na nedostatak odgovarajućih mera za sprečavanje smrti M.T. i V.T.
U dodatku presude, nalazi se izdvojeno mišljenje.

Preuzmite presudu u pdf formatu

VIJEĆE EUROPE

EUROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA

PRVI ODJEL

PREDMET BRANKO TOMAŠIĆ I DRUGI PROTIV HRVATSKE

(Zahtjev br. 46598/06)

PRESUDA

STRASBOURG

15. siječnja 2009.

Ova će presuda postati konačnom pod okolnostima utvrđenim u članku 44. stavku 2. Konvencije. Može biti podvrgnuta uredničkim izmjenama.

U predmetu Branko Tomašić i drugi protiv Hrvatske, Europski sud za ljudska prava (Prvi odjel), zasjedajući u vijeću u sastavu:

Christos Rozakis, predsjednik,
Nina Vajić,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Dean Spielmann,
Giorgio Malinverni,
George Nicolaou, suci,

i g. Søren NIELSEN, tajnik Odjela,
nakon vijećanja zatvorenog za javnost 11. prosinca 2008., donosi sljedeću presudu koja je usvojena tog datuma:

POSTUPAK

1. Postupak u ovome predmetu pokrenut je na temelju zahtjeva (br. 46598/06) protiv Republike Hrvatske što ga je 30. listopada 2006. pet hrvatskih državljana, g. Branko Tomašić, gđa Đurđa Tomašić, g. Marko Tomašić, g. Tomislav Tomašić i gđica Ana Tomašić ("podnositelji zahtjeva") podnijelo Sudu na temelju članka 34. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda ("Konvencija").

2. Podnositelje zahtjeva zastupala je gđa I. Bojić, odvjetnica iz Zagreba. Hrvatsku vladu ("Vlada") zastupala je njena zastupnica gđa Š. Stažnik.

3. Dana 7. svibnja 2007. Sud je odlučio Vladu obavijestiti o zahtjevu. Na temelju odredaba članka 29. stavka 3. Konvencije, odlučio je istovremeno ispitati dopuštenost i osnovanost zahtjeva.

ČINJENICE

I. OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA

4. Podnositelji zahtjeva rođeni su 1956., 1963., 1985., 1995. odnosno 2001. godine i žive u Čakovcu. Prvi podnositelj zahtjeva i druga podnositeljica zahtjeva su supružnici, dok su treći i četvrti podnositelj zahtjeva i peta podnositeljica zahtjeva njihova djeca.

5. Tijekom 2004. M.T., kći prvog podnositelja zahtjeva i druge podnositeljice zahtjeva, te sestra trećeg i četvrtog podnositelja zahtjeva i pete podnositeljice zahtjeva, ušla je u vezu s izvjesnim M.M. Počeli su živjeti zajedno s podnositeljima zahtjeva u njihovome domu. Dana 1. ožujka 2005. rodila im se kći V.T. Ubrzo nakon toga M.M. je imao niz sukoba s ukućanima te je često upućivao verbalne prijetnje M.T., zbog čega se u srpnju 2005. iselio iz kuće. Dana 4. siječnja 2006. Centar za socijalnu skrb Čakovec (u daljnjem tekstu: "Centar za socijalnu skrb") podnio je prijavu Policijskoj upravi međimurskoj navodeći između ostalog da je 2. siječnja 2006. M.M. došao u Centar tvrdeći da ima bombu koju će "baciti na svoju bivšu suprugu [to znači M.T.] i dijete".

6. Dana 5. siječnja 2006. M.T. je Državnom odvjetništvu u Čakovcu podnijela kaznenu prijavu protiv M.M.-a. Navela je da je u razdoblju od srpnja 2005. M.M. u više navrata dolazio u dom njezinih roditelja gdje je živjela s kćeri i da je prijetio da će nju i njihovu zajedničku kćer ubiti bombom ako ne pristane vratiti mu se. Uz to ju je često zvao telefonom i mobitelom joj slao SMS poruke ponavljajući iste prijetnje.

7. Dana 3. veljače 2006. M.M.-u je određen pritvor nakon što je 27. siječnja 2006. protiv njega pokrenut kazneni postupak pred Općinskim sudom u Čakovcu. U psihijatrijskom mišljenju pribavljenom tijekom postupka navedeno je da je 2. siječnja 2006. M.M. pred zaposlenicima Centra za socijalnu skrb tvrdio da ima bombu i da su njegove prijetnje ozbiljne. Istu je tvrdnju ponovio 19. siječnja 2006. pred policijskim službenicima Policijske uprave međimurske. Mjerodavni dijelovi zaključaka tog mišljenja glase kako slijedi:

"1. Optuženik M.M. je osoba koja pati od dubokog poremećaja osobnosti etiološki povezanog s urođenom disfunkcijom mozga i izrazito nepovoljnim odgojnim okolnostima u djetinjstvu. Dg. mješoviti poremećaj osobnosti ...

2. U kontekstu navedenog poremećaja osobnosti, optuženikova reakcija na problematične situacije svodi se na neodgovarajući i patološki obrambeni mehanizam s precijenjenim idejama i s tim povezanim aktivnostima. Te precijenjene ideje ne prelaze granicu duševne bolesti.

3. Nisam pronašao elemente trajne ili privremene urođene duševne bolesti, smanjenih intelektualnih sposobnosti ili epilepsije koji bi mogli biti povezani s kaznenim djelima koja se optuženiku stavljaju na teret.

4. Nije ovisan o alkoholu, drogama niti drugim tvarima ...

5. S obzirom na navedeno u točkama 1., 2. i 3. te imajući na umu sve ostale informacije koje su dosad prikupljene u vezi s kaznenim djelima, smatram da je njegova sposobnost voljnog kontroliranja i shvaćanja značenja i posljedica svoga čina tempore criminis bila umanjena, ali nije bio potpuno neubrojiv.

6. Postoji velika vjerojatnost da će ponoviti isto ili slično kazneno djelo. Kako bi se to spriječilo, preporučujem sudu da, uz ostale mjere, odredi i obvezno psihijatrijsko liječenje s dominantno psihoterapijskim pristupom, a sve s ciljem formiranja konstruktivnijih rješavanja životnih situacija."

8. Dana 15. ožujka 2006. Općinski sud je M.M.-a proglasio krivim zbog toga što je u nekoliko navrata u razdoblju od srpnja do 30. prosinca 2005. prijetio M.T. pred njenom obiteljskom kućom i na parkiralištu u blizini gradskoga groblja kad bi M.T. bila sama. Izvikivao je prijetnje da će bombom ubiti nju, sebe i njihovo dijete. Dana 2. siječnja 2006. u Centru za socijalnu skrb izjavio je da je kad je prijetio mislio ozbiljno, da uistinu ima bombu i da će na djetetov prvi rođendan 1. ožujka 2006. ubiti sebe i dijete. Osuđen je na kaznu zatvora u trajanju od pet mjeseci i određena mu je sigurnosna mjera obveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja tijekom boravka u zatvoru, a po potrebi i nakon toga. U određivanju obveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja optuženiku, sud se u cijelosti pozvao na nalaze iz izvješća psihijatra. Mjerodavni dio presude glasi kako slijedi:

"... tijekom čitavog razdoblja o kojemu je riječ optuženik je žrtvi govorio da će baciti bombu na sebe i njihovo dijete, kao i na nju [žrtvu] ako se zatekne u blizini. Ti su događaji kulminirali 30. prosinca. Optuženik se nije suzdržao od spominjanja bombe čak ni pred djelatnicima Centra za socijalnu skrb i policajcem. Osim toga, pred policajcem je rekao da će sebe i dijete raznijeti bombom na djetetov prvi rođendan. Stoga nema sumnje da su i žrtva i svjedoci te prijetnje shvatili ozbiljno. ... Prema tome, žrtvini strahovi zbog vlastite sigurnosti i zbog sigurnosti njezinoga djeteta bili su opravdani ...

...

... ispunjeni su svi uvjeti za određivanje sigurnosne mjere [obveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja] budući da je optuženik počinio kazneno djelo u stanju smanjene ubrojivosti i da postoji vjerojatnost ponavljanja istih ili sličnih djela. Potrebno je odrediti obvezno psihijatrijsko liječenje za vrijeme izvršavanja kazne i potom na slobodi. Liječenje će se temeljiti na dominantno psihoterapijskom pristupu, kako je preporučio vještak, s ciljem da se [kod optuženika] razviju sposobnosti za konstruktivnije rješavanje teških životnih situacija."

9. Dana 28. travnja 2006. Županijski sud u Čakovcu skratio je sigurnosnu mjeru na trajanje M.M.-ove zatvorske kazne i potvrdio ostatak presude. Mjerodavni dio presude glasi kako slijedi:

"... nema sumnje da su se česte prijetnje ubojstvom ... bombom trebale prema svim objektivnim mjerilima shvatiti ozbiljno i da bi [takve prijetnje] uzrokovale stvarni osjećaj uznemirenosti, straha i zabrinutosti kod svake prosječne osobe, osobito u situaciji kad žrtva zna da je počinitelj agresivna osoba izvan kontrole, kao što je to bio slučaj sa žrtvom u ovome predmetu.

Nema sumnje ni da je ... optuženik svoje prijetnje upućivao tijekom razdoblja od pola godine u kojem se žrtva, zbog stalnih prijetnji, bojala ne samo za vlastitu sigurnost, već i za sigurnost i dobrobit svoga djeteta, koje tada još nije bilo navršilo ni godinu dana. Žrtva je time nedvojbeno dovedena u težak i nezavidan položaj svakodnevno strahujući za svoj i kćerkin život, što potvrđuje ne samo njezin iskaz, već i činjenica da je zatražila pomoć od nadležnih tijela, [poput] policije, centra za socijalnu skrb i državnoga odvjetništva.

...

Ocjenjujući .... pobijanu presudu na temelju članka 379. stavka 1.(2) Zakona o kaznenom postupku, ovaj je žalbeni sud utvrdio da je prvostupanjski sud prekršio zakonske odredbe na štetu optuženika kad je naložio da se sigurnosna mjera obveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja nastavi nakon optuženikovog otpusta [iz zatvora], što je protivno članku 75. Kaznenog zakona prema kojemu obvezno psihijatrijsko liječenje može trajati do prestanka razloga zbog kojih je primijenjeno, ali u svakom slučaju do prestanka izvršenja kazne zatvora.

...

... ovaj se sud ne slaže s optuženikovim tvrdnjom da bi u njegovome slučaju svrha kažnjavanja bila ostvarena uvjetnom osudom, posebno s obzirom na činjenicu da optuženik ... nije pokazao samokritičnost u odnosu na svoje postupke niti ikakvo kajanje zbog onoga što je izrekao ..."

10. M.M. je kaznu zatvora služio u Zatvoru u Varaždinu iz kojeg je pušten 3. srpnja 2006. Dana 15. kolovoza 2006. ustrijelio je M.T., njihovu kćer V.T. i sebe. Prije pucnjave, susjed M.T. ga je opazio kako nosi automatsku pušku i kako ostavlja bicikl u obližnjoj šumi. Susjed je odmah pozvao policiju. Policija je na mjesto događaja došla nakon dvadeset minuta, neposredno nakon tragičnoga događaja.

11. Dana 15. kolovoza 2006. policija je obavila obavijesni razgovor sa susjedom M.T., I.S.-om koji je vidio M.M.-a kako se približava kući M.T. neposredno prije kritičnoga događaja. Na zahtjev policije, dana 17. kolovoza 2006. istražni sudac Županijskog suda u Varaždinu izdao je nalog za pretragu stana i vozila u vlasništvu izvjesnog M.G.-a za kojega je postojala sumnja da je M.M.-u nabavio oružje. Nalog je izvršen istoga dana, ali nije utvrđena veza između M.G.-a i oružja koje je koristio M.M. Istražni sudac nije poduzeo nikakve daljnje korake u tom predmetu.

12. Dana 18. kolovoza 2006. policija je Državnom odvjetništvu u Čakovcu dostavila izvješće u kojemu je iscrpno opisala okolnosti tragičnoga događaja.

13. Dana 28. studenoga 2006. državno je odvjetništvo odbacilo kaznenu prijavu protiv M.M.-a za ubojstvo M.T. i V.T. zbog toga što je bio mrtav. Nije jasno tko je podnio tu kaznenu prijavu, ali primjerak rješenja državnog odvjetništva poslan je podnositeljima zahtjeva. Dopisom od istog tog datuma državno je odvjetništvo zatražilo od Policijske uprave međimurske da prikupi sve podatke vezane za psihijatrijsko liječenje M.M.-a u Zatvoru u Varaždinu. Mjerodavni dio izvješća što su ga 13. prosinca 2006. sastavile zatvorske vlasti Zatvora u Varaždinu glasi kako slijedi:

"M.M. je boravio u pritvoru u Zatvoru u Varaždinu od 3. veljače do 22. svibnja 2006. kad je upućen na odsluženje kazne zatvora ... koje je prestalo 3. srpnja 2006.

Psihijatrijskim vještačenjem M.M.-a, provedenim tijekom njegovoga boravka u pritvoru, utvrđeno je da on pati od mješovitog poremećaja osobnosti koji je posljedica urođene disfunkcije mozga i nepovoljnih odgojnih okolnosti u djetinjstvu. U svom je nalazu i mišljenju vještak psihijatar preporučio da mu se odredi obvezno psihijatrijsko liječenje s dominantno psihoterapijskim pristupom, a sve s ciljem formiranja konstruktivnijih rješavanja životnih situacija.

Za vrijeme služenja kazne zatvora bio je predviđen intenzivni tretman koji se sastojao od čestih individualnih razgovora, u skladu s pojedinačnim programom izvršavanja kazne zatvora. Rijetko je na vlastitu inicijativu dolazio na razgovore, pa je to, radi potreba liječenja, od njega zahtijevalo osoblje. ...

Dok je bio u zatvoru, M.M. je bio kod zatvorskog liječnika pet puta, nekad na vlastitu inicijativu, a nekad na poziv liječnika. Nije inzistirao na psihijatrijskoj terapiji, pa se stoga njegovo liječenje, prema preporuci vještaka, temeljilo na intenzivnom psihoterapijskom tretmanu od strane osoblja, upravitelja zatvora i ostalih koji su s njime razgovarali. Bio je izrazito introvertirana osoba, pa se njegova stvarna osobnost nije mogla otkriti u pritvorskim i zatvorskim uvjetima."

14. Dana 11. prosinca 2006. Policijska uprava međimurska obavila je obavijesni razgovor s upraviteljem Zatvora u Varaždinu, P.L.-om. Mjerodavni dio izvješća o obavijesnom razgovoru sastavljenog 2. prosinca 2006. glasi kako slijedi:

"Gore navedeni je upravitelj Zatvora u Varaždinu i izjavljuje da je pokojni M.M. služio kaznu zatvora u Zatvoru u Varaždinu od 3. veljače do 3. srpnja 2006. ...

Tijekom boravka u zatvoru M.M. je bio psihijatrijski liječen u skladu sa stručnim mišljenjem i preporukom. Liječenje se temeljilo na intenzivnom psihoterapijskom tretmanu M.M.-a, koji se sastojao od razgovora sa zatvorskim osobljem, njime [to jest, upraviteljem zatvora] i zatvorskim liječnikom. Tijekom liječenja M.M. nije primao niti tražio farmakoterapiju. Utvrđeno je i da je M.M. veoma introvertirana osoba koja nije željela surađivati u liječenju.

Za vrijeme boravka u zatvoru M.M. je bio kod zatvorskog liječnika pet puta u vezi s određenim problemima, odnosno bolestima.

Uz to tvrdi da ne postoje interni propisi o provedbi sigurnosne mjere i da se sva liječenja provode u skladu sa Zakonom o izvršavanju kazne zatvora."

15. Prema navodima Vlade, budući da nisu bili utvrđeni propusti osoba zaduženih za izvršenje M.M.-ove zatvorske kazne i sigurnosne mjere, istraga je zaključena, iako u tom smislu nije donesena nikakva formalna odluka.

16. U zatvorskom zdravstvenom kartonu M.M.-a, što ga je dostavila Vlada, nema nikakvih naznaka o psihijatrijskom ili psihoterapijskom tretmanu.

17. Dana 6. studenoga 2006. podnositelji zahtjeva podnijeli su državnome odvjetništvu prijedlog za rješenje svog zahtjeva za naknadu nematerijalne štete u vezi sa smrću M.T. i V.T. Naveli su da su nadležne vlasti propustile poduzeti odgovarajuće mjere radi zaštite života M.T. i V.T. te su ukazali na manjkavosti istrage o okolnostima njihove smrti. Zatražili su 1.105.000 hrvatskih kuna (HRK) na ime naknade štete i 13.481 HRK na ime troškova. Nije im odgovoreno. Na temelju članka 186.(a) Zakona o parničnom postupku, ako takav zahtjev ne bude prihvaćen ili o njemu ne bude odlučeno u roku od tri mjeseca od njegova podnošenja, podnositelj zahtjeva može podnijeti tužbu nadležnom sudu. Podnositelji zahtjeva nisu podnijeli građansku tužbu.

II. MJERODAVNO DOMAĆE PRAVO I PRAKSA

18. Članak 21. Ustava Republike Hrvatske (Narodne novine, br. 56/1990, 135/1997,8/1998, 113/2000, 124/2000 i 28/2001) glasi kako slijedi:

"Svako ljudsko biće ima pravo na život. ..."

19. Mjerodavni dio Ustavnog zakona o Ustavnom sudu (Narodne novine, br. 29/2002) glasi kako slijedi:

Članak 38.

"Svaka fizička i pravna osoba ima pravo predložiti pokretanje postupka za ocjenu suglasnosti zakona s Ustavom ..."

Članak 55.

"(1) Ustavni sud će ukinuti zakon ili pojedine njegove odredbe ako utvrdi da nije suglasan s Ustavom ..."

20. Mjerodavni dio članka 75. Kaznenog zakona Republike Hrvatske (Narodne novine, br. 110/1997, 58/1998, 50/2000, 129/2000, 51/2001, 62/2003 i 105/2004) glasi kako slijedi:

"Sigurnosna mjera obveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja može se primijeniti samo prema počinitelju koji je kazneno djelo počinio u stanju smanjene ubrojivosti ako postoji opasnost da razlozi za takvo stanje mogu i u budućnosti poticajno djelovati za počinjenje novog kaznenog djela.

Sigurnosna mjera obveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja može se pod uvjetima iz stavka 1. ovoga članka primijeniti za vrijeme izvršenja kazne zatvora ili uz zamjenu za kaznu zatvora ili uz uvjetnu osudu.

Obvezno psihijatrijsko liječenje traje do prestanka razloga zbog kojih je primijenjeno, ali u svakom slučaju do prestanka izvršenja kazne zatvora ... U svim slučajevima obvezno psihijatrijsko liječenje ne može trajati dulje od tri godine.

..."

21. Mjerodavne odredbe Zakona o kaznenom postupku (Narodne novine, br. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002, 143/2002, 63/2002, 62/2003 i 115/2006) glase kako slijedi:

Članak 174. stavak 2.

"[Kako bi mogao] odlučiti hoće li zahtijevati provođenje istrage ... državni će odvjetnik ... zahtijevati od redarstvenih vlasti da prikupe potrebne obavijesti i poduzmu druge mjere radi otkrivanja ... počinitelja ..."

Članak 177.

"Ako postoje osnove sumnje da je počinjeno kazneno djelo za koje se progoni po službenoj dužnosti, redarstvene vlasti dužne su poduzeti potrebne mjere da se pronađe počinitelj kaznenog djela, ... te da prikupe sve obavijesti koje bi mogle biti od koristi za uspješno vođenje kaznenog postupka. ..."

Članak 187.

"(1) Istraga se pokreće protiv određene osobe kad postoji osnovana sumnja da je počinila kazneno djelo. (2) U istrazi će se prikupiti dokazi i podaci koji su potrebni da bi se moglo odlučiti hoće li se podignuti optužnica ili obustaviti postupak ..."

22. Mjerodavne odredbe Zakona o obveznim odnosima (Narodne novine, br. 35/2005) glase kako slijedi:

Članak 19.

"(1) Svaka fizička i pravna osoba ima pravo na zaštitu svojih prava osobnosti pod pretpostavkama utvrđenim zakonom.

(2) Pod pravima osobnosti u smislu ovoga Zakona razumijevaju se prava na život, tjelesno i duševno zdravlje, ugled, čast, dostojanstvo, ime, privatnost osobnog i obiteljskog života, slobodu i dr.

..."

Članak 1100.

...""(1) U slučaju povrede prava osobnosti sud će, ako nađe da to težina povrede i okolnosti slučaja opravdavaju, dosuditi pravičnu novčanu naknadu, nezavisno od naknade imovinske štete, a i kad nje nema.

Članak 1101.

"(1) U slučaju smrti ili osobito teškog invaliditeta neke osobe pravo na pravičnu novčanu naknadu neimovinske štete imaju članovi njezine uže obitelji (bračni drug, djeca i roditelji).

(2) Takva se naknada može dosuditi i braći i sestrama, djedovima i bakama, unučadi te izvanbračnom drugu, ako je između njih i umrlog, odnosno ozlijeđenog postojala trajnija zajednica života.

..."

23. Članak 13. Zakona o ustrojstvu državne uprave (Narodne novine, br. 75/1993, 48/1999, 15/2000 i 59/2001) glasi kako slijedi:

"Štetu koja građaninu, pravnoj osobi ili drugoj stranci nastane nezakonitim ili nepravilnim radom tijela državne uprave, tijela jedinica lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave ... naknađuje Republika Hrvatska.."

24. Mjerodavni dio članka 186.(a) Zakona o parničnom postupku (Narodne novine, br. 53/91, 91/92, 58/93, 112/99, 88/01 i 177/03) glasi kako slijedi:

"Osoba koja namjerava podnijeti tužbu protiv Republike Hrvatske dužna se prije podnošenja tužbe obratiti nadležnom državnom odvjetništvu sa zahtjevom za mirno rješenje spora.

...

Ako zahtjev iz stavka 1. ovoga članka ne bude prihvaćen ili o njemu ne bude odlučeno u roku od tri mjeseca od njegova podnošenja, podnositelj zahtjeva može podnijeti tužbu nadležnom sudu. ..."

25. Mjerodavne odredbe Zakona o izvršavanju kazne zatvora (Narodne novine, br. 128/1999 i 190/2003) glase kako slijedi:

Članak 2.

"Glavna svrha izvršavanja kazne zatvora jest, uz čovječno postupanje i poštovanje dostojanstva osobe koja se nalazi na izdržavanju kazne zatvora ... njegovo osposobljavanje za život na slobodi u skladu sa zakonom i društvenim pravilima."

PRIPRAVA ZA OTPUST I POMOĆ POSLIJE OTPUSTA

Članak 13.

"Kaznionica, odnosno zatvor će tijekom izvršavanja kazne zatvora pravodobno osigurati pripravu zatvorenika za otpuštanje u suradnji s ustanovama i drugim pravnim osobama u čijem su djelokrugu poslovi pomoći poslije otpusta [iz zatvora]."

POJEDINAČNI PROGRAM IZVRŠAVANJA KAZNE ZATVORA

Članak 69.

"(1) Pojedinačni program izvršavanja kazne zatvora (u daljnjem tekstu: program izvršavanja) jest skup pedagoških, radnih, zaokupljenosnih, zdravstvenih, psiholoških i sigurnosnih radnji i mjera kojima se planira izvršavanje kazne zatvora primjereno osobinama i potrebama zatvorenika te vrsti i mogućnostima kaznionice, odnosno zatvora. Program izvršavanja donosi se radi ispunjavanja svrhe izvršavanja kazne zatvora iz članka 7. ovoga Zakona.

(2) Program izvršavanja ... donosi upravitelj na prijedlog stručnog tima kaznionice, odnosno zatvora .... (3) Program izvršavanja sadrži podatke o: ... posebnim postupcima (... psihološka i psihijatrijska pomoć,...), posebnim mjerama sigurnosti. ..."

ZAŠTITA ZDRAVLJA

Članak 103.

"(1) Zatvoreniku se osigurava liječenje i redovita briga o tjelesnom i duševnom zdravlju. ..."

26. Članak 22. Zakona o državnom odvjetništvu (Narodne novine, 75/1995) glasi kako slijedi:

"(1) Troškovi zastupanja pred sudovima i drugim nadležnim tijelima priznaju se nadležnom državnom odvjetništvu prema propisima o nagradama i naknadama za rad odvjetnika.

(2) Sredstva naplaćena na ime troškova zastupanja prihod su državnog proračuna."

27. Kad je riječ o građanskom postupku za naknadu štete, Vlada je dostavila nekoliko odluka Vrhovnoga suda u kojima on daje mišljenje o odgovornosti države za štetu koju su prouzročila upravna tijela. Mjerodavni dijelovi odluke br. Rev 2203/1991-2 od 30. prosinca 1991. glase kako slijedi:

"Naime, konkretnu štetu prouzročili su svojim nezakonitim i nepravilnim radom radnici OKPD V. - P. odnosno KPD L. time što su dopustili da osuđenik, sklon nasilju kao što je spomenuti D.P., pobjegne iz toga doma, umjesto da su ga u tome spriječili pa i sredstvima prisile (čl. 175. i 176. st. 1. toč. 4. Zakona o izvršenju krivičnih i prekršajnih sankcija - "Narodne novine" br. 21/74 i 39/74).

Izvršenjem kazne, a posebno kazne zatvora, ostvaruje se svrha kažnjavanja određena zakonom, što znači uz ostalo sprečavanje konkretnog učinioca da učini krivično djelo na način da mu se ograniči kretanje. U konkretnom slučaju radnici navedenih kazneno-popravnih ustanova za koje snosi odgovornost tuženica, propustili su to učiniti u odnosu na osuđenika koji je izvršenjem predmetnog štetnog događaja ponovio čin nasilja kako je učinio (u težem obliku) i prilikom izvršenja krivičnog djela zbog kojeg je osuđen i zbog kojeg se nalazio na izdržavanju kazne zatvora ... Da se radi o društveno opasnoj osobi koju je posebno u ovom slučaju trebalo spriječiti u vršenju krivičnih djela držanjem u zatvoru proizlazi ne samo iz činjenice da je učinio krivično djelo razbojništva, već i iz činjenice da je nasilničkom djelatnošću pored tužitelja oštetio i brojne druge osobe za vrijeme trajanja njegovog bjegstva iz zatvora. Treba dodati da na to upućuje i njegova ranija osuđivanost ...

...

Stoga u konkretnom slučaju postoji pravno relevantna uzročna veza između nezakonitog i nepravilnog rada tijela tuženice te bijega i štetne posljedice ... a što sve dovodi do odgovornosti tuženice."

Mjerodavni dio odluke br. Rev 186/04-2 od 10. siječnja 2006. glasi kako slijedi:

"Po odredbi čl. 13. Zakona o sustavu državne uprave ("Narodne novine", broj 75/93, 48/99, 15/00 i 59/01) Republika Hrvatska dužna je naknaditi štetu koja građaninu, pravnoj osobi ili drugoj osobi nastane nezakonitim ili nepravilnim radom tijela državne uprave, tijela jedinice lokalne samouprave i uprave ....

...

Da bi određeno propuštanje ili postupanje suprotno zakonu, drugom propisu ili općem aktu predstavljalo nezakoniti rad ... potrebno je i postojanje volje ili pristanka da se time oštete prava i interesi trećega."

28. Podnositelji zakona dostavili su nekoliko odluka Vrhovnoga suda koje se tiču istoga pitanja.

Mjerodavni dio odluke br. Rev 713/1998-2 od 13. rujna 2000. glasi kako slijedi:

"Da bi određeno propuštanje primjene ili postupanje suprotno zakonu, drugom propisu ili općem aktu predstavljalo nezakonit rad, odnosno da bi određeno nečinjenje ili činjenje suprotno uobičajenom ili propisanom načinu obavljanja djelatnosti predstavljalo nepravilan rad potrebno je i postojanje volje ili pristanka da se time oštete prava i interesi trećega."

Mjerodavni dio odluke br. Rev 218/04-2 od 27. listopada 2004. glasi kako slijedi:

"Dakle, da bi tužitelji kao oštećenici mogli osnovano zahtijevati naknadu štete od Republike Hrvatske, moraju se ostvariti propisane pretpostavke, a te su da je šteta posljedica nezakonitog ili nepravilnog rada osobe ili tijela koje obavlja tu službu ili djelatnost. Pri tome se nezakonit rad očituje kao postupanje suprotno zakonu, drugom propisu ili općem aktu ili propuštanje da se zakon, drugi propis ili opći akt primijeni, s voljom ili pristankom da se trećem nanese šteta. Nepravilan rad očituje se kao činjenje ili nečinjenje suprotno uobičajenom ili propisanom načinu obavljanja djelatnosti, a može se zaključiti o postojanju volje ili pristanka da se time oštete prava i interesi trećega."

Mjerodavni dio odluke br. Rev 730/04-2 od 16. studenoga 2005. glasi kako slijedi:

"... da se nezakonit rad očituje kao postupanje suprotno zakonu ili propuštanje primjene zakonskih odredbi s voljom ili pristankom da se trećem nanese šteta, a nepravilan rad je činjenje ili nečinjenje suprotno uobičajenom ili propisanom načinu obavljanja djelatnosti. ... Teret dokaza bio je na tužitelju. .... Tužitelj, koji tvrdi da mu je nastala šteta, bio je, dakle, dužan dokazati postojanje štete, štetnu radnju tužene (u ovom slučaju nezakonit ili nepravilan rad tijela državne uprave u smislu čl. 13. Zakona o sistemu državne uprave) i uzročnu vezu između štetne radnje i nastale štete."

Mjerodavni dio odluke br. Rev 257/06-2 od 18. svibnja 2006. glasi kako slijedi:

"Smisao odredbe čl. 13. Zakona o sustavu državne uprave je ta, da država odgovara za štetu u slučaju kad bi bila riječ o svjesnom postupanju suprotno zakonu s voljom da se nekome nanese šteta."

PRAVO
I. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANKA 2. KONVENCIJE

29. Podnositelji zahtjeva podnijeli su dva prigovora na temelju članka 2. Konvencije. Kao prvo, prigovorili su da je država propustila ispuniti svoje pozitivne obveze da spriječi smrt M.T. i V.T. i, kao drugo, da država nije provela temeljitu istragu o mogućoj odgovornosti svojih službenika za smrt M.T. i V.T.

Članak 2. Konvencije glasi kako slijedi:

"1. Pravo svakoga na život zaštićeno je zakonom. Nitko ne smije biti namjerno lišen života osim u izvršenju sudske presude na smrtnu kaznu za kaznena djela za koje je ta kazna predviđena zakonom.

2. Nije u suprotnosti s odredbama ovog članka lišenje života proizašlo iz upotrebe sile koja je bila nužno potrebna:

a) pri obrani bilo koje osobe od protupravnog nasilja;

b) pri zakonitom uhićenju ili pri sprječavanju bijega osobe zakonito lišene slobode;

c) radi suzbijanja pobune ili ustanka u skladu sa zakonom."

A. Dopuštenost

Tvrdnje stranaka

30. Vlada je ustvrdila da su podnositelji zahtjeva imali na raspolaganju nekoliko pravnih sredstava koje su propustili iscrpiti. Kao prvo, nisu podnijeli kaznenu prijavu protiv osobe koju su smatrali odgovornom za smrt M.T. i V.T., što bi im omogućilo da predlože izvođenje dokaza i provedbu istražnih mjera. Da su to učinili, nadležno državno odvjetništvo bi po njihovoj kaznenoj prijavi donijelo obrazloženo rješenje. Čak i kad bi kaznena prijava bila odbačena, podnositelji zahtjeva bi tada imali mogućnost sami nastaviti kazneni progon.

31. Kao drugo, podnositelji zahtjeva mogli su podnijeti građansku tužbu za naknadu štete protiv države na temelju članaka 1100. i 1101. Zakona o obveznim odnosima, te na temelju Konvencije koja je u Hrvatskoj izravno primjenjiva.

32. I na kraju, činjenica da odgovornost države postoji samo ako se dokaže uzročna veza između štetne radnje i nanesene štete predstavlja univerzalno prihvaćeno načelo odgovornosti za štetu koje nije specifičnost hrvatskoga pravnog sustava.

33. Podnositelji zahtjeva ustvrdili su da prema domaćem pravu treći i četvrti podnositelj zahtjeva i peta podnositeljica zahtjeva nemaju pravo tražiti naknadu štete za smrt V.T. Građanska tužba protiv države za naknadu štete, koja je postojala kao mogućnost za sve podnositelje zahtjeva u odnosu na smrt M.T. te za prvog podnositelja zahtjeva i drugu podnositeljicu zahtjeva u odnosu na smrt V.T., nije imala izgleda za uspjeh. Naime, bilo bi nemoguće dokazati da su ispunjeni uvjeti što ih je utvrdio Vrhovni sud, a to je da su radnje nadležnih vlasti bile nezakonite i da su oni postupali s namjerom prouzročenja štete trećim osobama ili barem da su pristali na takav ishod. Nadalje, da su izgubili spor, morali bi platiti troškove zastupanja države u postupku od strane državnoga odvjetništva, koje je imalo pravo na nagradu prema odredbama Odvjetničke tarife. Prema standardima sudske prakse Vrhovnoga suda, podnositelji zahtjeva mogli su tražiti naknadu štete u iznosu od oko 800.000 HRK. Budući da bi se troškovi zastupanja države odredili prema vrijednosti spora, oni bi iznosili oko 80.000 HRK. To znači da bi premašili zajednički godišnji dohodak podnositelja zahtjeva, koji je iznosio oko 14.000 HRK, budući da je jedini član njihovoga kućanstva koji je ostvarivao dohodak bio prvi podnositelj zahtjeva. S obzirom na činjenicu da njihov mogući zahtjev za naknadu štete nije imao izgleda za uspjeh, postojao je vrlo visok rizik da bi morali platiti troškove zastupanja državnoga odvjetništva kojih nisu imali pravo biti oslobođeni. Plaćanje tih troškova bi ih financijski uništilo, što je bio razlog zbog kojeg nisu podnijeli građansku tužbu protiv države.

34. U odnosu na Vladin prigovor da su trebali podnijeti kaznenu prijavu protiv osoba koje su smatrali odgovornima za smrt svojih bliskih srodnika, podnositelji zahtjeva ustvrdili su da su sve informacije koje su im bile poznate bile poznate i mjerodavnim državnim vlastima i da su u tim okolnostima vlasti trebale poduzeti odgovarajuće korake u svrhu istrage smrti M.T. i V.T.

Ocjena Suda

35. Sud ističe da je svrha članka 35. da se državama ugovornicama dade prilika spriječiti ili ispraviti povrede za koje se navodi da su ih počinile, prije nego se ti navodi iznesu pred institucije Konvencije. Dakle, države su oslobođene od obveze da za svoje postupke odgovaraju pred međunarodnim tijelom prije nego što su imale priliku ispraviti stvari kroz svoje pravne sustave. Pravilo iscrpljenja domaćih pravnih sredstava iz članka 35. Konvencije nalaže da podnositelj zahtjeva treba imati redovni put do onih pravnih sredstava koja se odnose na navodne povrede i koja su istovremeno dostupna i dovoljna. Postojanje takvih pravnih sredstava mora biti dovoljno izvjesno ne samo u teoriji, već i u praksi, a ako to nije tako, tada će tim pravnim sredstvima nedostajati potrebna dostupnost i učinkovitost; na tuženoj državi je da utvrdi da su ti uvjeti ispunjeni (vidi Selmouni v. France [GC], br. 25803/94, §§ 74 i 75, ECHR 1999-V).

36. Članak 35. predviđa podjelu tereta dokazivanja. Vlada koja se poziva na neiscrpljenje domaćih pravnih sredstava dužna je uvjeriti Sud da je pravno sredstvo bilo djelotvorno te raspoloživo u teoriji i praksi u relevantno vrijeme, drugim riječima, da je bilo dostupno, da je moglo pružiti pravnu zaštitu u odnosu na prigovore podnositelja zahtjeva, te da je davalo razumne izglede za uspjeh (vidi Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16. rujna 1996., Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, § 68).

37. Sud ističe da se prilikom primjene ovoga pravila mora na odgovarajući način uzeti u obzir kontekst. U tom je smislu potvrdio da se članak 35. mora primijeniti s određenim stupnjem fleksibilnosti i bez prekomjernoga formalizma (vidi Cardot v. France, 19. ožujka 1991., Serija A br. 200, § 34). Potvrdio je i da pravilo iscrpljenja pravnih sredstava nije apsolutno, a nije ni podobno za automatsku primjenu; kad se preispituje je li ono bilo poštovano bitno je uzeti u obzir posebne okolnosti dotičnoga predmeta (vidi Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 6. studenoga 1980., Serija A br. 40, § 35). To znači da, između ostalog, Sud mora realno uzeti u obzir ne samo postojanje formalnih pravnih sredstava u pravnome sustavu dotične ugovorne stranke, već i opći pravni i politički kontekst u kojemu oni funkcioniraju, te osobne okolnosti podnositelja zahtjeva (vidi Akdivar and Others, naprijed citirano, § 69140).

38. U odnosu na materijalni prigovor da država, protivno članku 2., nije poduzela odgovarajuće pozitivne mjere radi zaštite života osobe, mogućnost ostvarenja naknade štete za smrt osobe će općenito i u uobičajenim okolnostima predstavljati primjerenu i dovoljnu zadovoljštinu (vidi, E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, br. 33218/96, § 110 i, mutatis mutandis, Caraher v. the United Kingdom (dec.), br. 24520/94, ECHR 2000-I).

39. Sud na početku primjećuje da novodoneseni članci 1100. i 1101. Zakona o obveznim odnosima, koji je stupio na snagu 1. siječnja 2006., pružaju mogućnost traženja naknade štete u vezi sa smrću bračnog druga, djeteta ili roditelja, te da se naknada štete može dosuditi i braći i sestrama, djedu i baki, unučadi te izvanbračnom drugu ako je između njih i umrlog postojala trajnija zajednica života. Sud stoga utvrđuje da prema domaćem pravu, treći i četvrti podnositelj zahtjeva, kao njezini ujaci, i peta podnositeljica zahtjeva, kao njezina teta, nemaju pravo na naknadu štete zbog ubojstva V.T. Iz toga slijedi da se Vladin prigovor u odnosu na trećeg i četvrtog podnositelja zahtjeva i petu podnositeljicu zahtjeva u vezi sa smrću V.T. mora odbiti.

40. Kad je riječ o pravu prvog podnositelja zahtjeva i druge podnositeljice zahtjeva na naknadu štete za smrt M.T. i V.T., te pravu trećeg i četvrtog podnositelja zahtjeva i pete podnositeljice zahtjeva na naknadu štete za smrt M.T., Sud primjećuje da članci 1100. i 1101. Zakona o obveznim odnosima doista predstavljaju pravnu osnovu za traženje naknade štete od države. Sud će sada ispitati je li Vlada dokazala da građanska tužba za naknadu štete protiv države predstavlja pravno sredstvo koje je potrebno iscrpiti u okolnostima ovoga predmeta.

41. Sud primjećuje da nakon što je M.M. ubio M.T. i V.T. nije utvrđena odgovornost državnih službenika uključenih u slučaj u odnosu na dužnost mjerodavnih vlasti da zaštite živote žrtava. U tim bi se okolnostima moglo reći da građanska tužba za naknadu štete protiv države nema puno izgleda za uspjeh, osobito s obzirom na zahtjev iz domaćeg prava i prakse da odgovornost države postoji samo u slučaju nezakonitog postupanja od strane tijela vlasti ili nezakonitog propusta i namjere tijela vlasti da prouzroče štetu trećoj osobi ili prihvaćanja takvoga ishoda.

42. Međutim, neovisno o izgledima za uspjeh moguće građanske tužbe o zakonitosti postupanja mjerodavnih vlasti, Sud primjećuje da, bilo kako bilo, ono o čemu je ovdje riječ nije pitanje jesu li vlasti postupale zakonito odnosno je li uopće postojala pojedinačna odgovornost državnog službenika s bilo koje osnove. Puno šire od toga, središnje pitanje u ovome predmetu navodne su manjkavosti domaćeg sustava zaštite života ljudi od postupaka opasnih kriminalaca koji su kao takvi utvrđeni od strane mjerodavnih vlasti i postupanja prema takvim pojedincima, uključujući i pravni okvir u kojemu nadležne vlasti trebaju djelovati i predviđene mehanizme. U vezi s time, Sud primjećuje da Vlada nije dokazala da su se ta pitanja, a osobito prigovori podnositelja zahtjeva na temelju članka 2. Konvencije koji se odnose na manjkavosti domaćega prava i prakse prije smrti M.T. i V.T., mogla ispitati i u jednome od postupaka na koji se pozvala.

43. Glede Vladine tvrdnje da su nakon ubojstva M.T. i V.T. podnositelji zahtjeva mogli podnijeti i kaznenu prijavu, Sud primjećuje da je korak u tom smjeru poduzeo istražni sudac Županijskog suda u Varaždinu kad je 17. kolovoza 2006. naložio pretragu stana i vozila izvjesnog M.G. kojega se sumnjičilo da je M.M.-u nabavio oružje, kao i Državno odvjetništvo u Čakovcu kad je 28. studenoga 2006. od Policijske uprave međimurske zatražilo da prikupi sve podatke o psihijatrijskom liječenju M.M.-a dok je služio kaznu zatvoru. Ti koraci, međutim, nisu doveli do pokretanja kaznenog ili nekog drugog postupka protiv bilo koje od uključenih osoba. Sud ne vidi na koji bi način još jedna kaznena prijava o tim istim pitanjima, da su je podnositelji zahtjeva podnijeli, mogla dovesti do drukčijega ishoda. U vezi s time, Sud ponavlja da, u predmetima koji se odnose na smrt u okolnostima iz kojih bi mogla proizići odgovornost države, vlasti moraju djelovati na vlastitu inicijativu čim saznaju za dotičnu stvar. One to ne mogu prepustiti inicijativi rodbine bilo u smislu podnošenja formalne prijave ili u smislu preuzimanja odgovornosti za vođenje ikakvog istražnog postupka (vidi, na primjer, McKerr v. the United Kingdom, br. 28883/95, § 111, ECHR 2001-III, i Slimani v. France, br. 57671/00, § 29, ECHR 2004-IX (izvaci)).

44. Iz toga slijedi da se pravna sredstva što ih je Vlada predložila nisu morala iscrpiti. U donošenju tog zaključka, Sud je uzeo u obzir posebne okolnosti ovoga predmeta, kao i činjenicu da je dovedeno u pitanje jedno od temeljnih prava, a to je pravo na život (vidi, između drugih izvora prava, McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27. rujna 1995., Serija A br. 324, § 147) i da je svrha Konvencije jamčiti prava koja nisu teorijska ili iluzorna, već su praktična i djelotvorna (vidi, na primjer, Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], br. 24833/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-I). Vladin se prigovor, prema tome, treba odbiti.

45. Sud utvrđuje da ovaj dio zahtjeva nije očigledno neosnovan u smislu članka 35. stavka 3. Konvencije. Uz to utvrđuje i da nije nedopušten ni po kojoj drugoj osnovi. Stoga se mora proglasiti dopuštenim.

B. Osnovanost

Tvrdnje stranaka

46. Podnositelji zahtjeva prigovorili su da država nije ispunila svoju pozitivnu obvezu jer, iako je vlastima bilo dobro poznato da su M.M.-ove prijetnje upućene M.T. i V.T. ozbiljne, nisu naložili i proveli pretragu njegovoga stana i vozila tijekom prvog kaznenog postupka koji se vodio protiv njega, a u kojemu je bio optužen za ozbiljne prijetnje upućene M.T. i V.T. Podnositelji zahtjeva ustvrdili su da, prije nego što je M.M. pušten iz zatvora, mjerodavne vlasti nisu pravilno provodile njegovo psihijatrijsko liječenje niti su procijenile njegovo duševno stanje i vjerojatnost da će izvršiti svoje prijetnje. Ukazali su na nedostatke propisa o izvršenju kazne zatvora i ustvrdili da je domaće pravo manjkavo jer se optuženik proglašen krivim za kazneno djelo može podvrgnuti psihijatrijskom liječenju samo za vrijeme trajanja kazne zatvora. Podnositelji zahtjeva prigovorili su i da domaće vlasti nisu provele propisnu i temeljitu istragu o mogućoj odgovornosti države za smrt njihovih bliskih srodnika.

47. Vlada je ustvrdila da su domaće vlasti prijetnje M.M.-a shvatile ozbiljno i da je iz tog razloga zadržan u pritvoru gdje se nalazio tijekom cijeloga suđenja. Osuđen je na kaznu zatvora razmjernu težini osude za kazneno djelo koja je bila unutar granica što ih je zakon postavio za kazneno djelo za koje je bio optužen. Nadalje, psihijatrijsko mu je liječenje određeno tijekom trajanja kazne zatvora, kako predviđa domaće pravo.

48. Što se tiče njihove procesne obveze na temelju članka 2., Vlada je ustvrdila da je nadležno državno odvjetništvo naložilo policiji da prikupi relevantne podatke o smrti M.T. i V.T.. Policija je, između ostalog, obavila obavijesni razgovor s upraviteljem zatvora iz kojeg je vidljivo na koji se način provodila mjera obveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja. Državno odvjetništvo nije utvrdilo da je bilo ikakvih propusta od strane zatvorskih vlasti koji bi predstavljali kazneno djelo. Što se tiče njihovoga sudjelovanja u istrazi, podnositelji zahtjeva nisu podnijeli posebnu kaznenu prijavu i nisu dokazali da su ikada zatražili informacije o istrazi.

Ocjena Suda
a. Materijalnopravni aspekt članka 2. Konvencije

Opća načela

49. Sud ponavlja da članak 2. nalaže državi da poduzme odgovarajuće mjere kako bi zaštitila živote osoba pod njezinom jurisdikcijom (vidi L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9. lipnja 1998., Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, § 36). To uključuje primarnu dužnost države da osigura pravo na život donošenjem djelotvornih kaznenopravnih odredaba koje će odvraćati od počinjenja kaznenih djela protiv osobe, popraćenih provedbenim mehanizmima za sprječavanje, suzbijanje i kažnjavanje povreda tih odredaba (vidi Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], br. 43577/98 i 43579/98, § 160, ECHR 2005-VII).

50. To se u odgovarajućim okolnostima proširuje i na pozitivnu obvezu vlasti da poduzmu preventivne operativne mjere radi zaštite pojedinca čiji je život ugrožen kriminalnim radnjama drugog pojedinca. S obzirom na poteškoće vezane za održavanje mira i reda u suvremenim društvima, nepredvidljivost ljudskoga ponašanja i operativne odluke koje se moraju donijeti u smislu prioriteta i resursa, Sud pazi i da, prilikom razmatranja pozitivnih obveza, članak 2. ne tumači na način da vlastima nametne nemoguć ili nerazmjeran teret (vidi Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28. listopada 1998., Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII, § 116). Prema tome, vlasti ne mogu u slučaju svakog navodnog rizika za život podlijegati zahtjevu iz Konvencije u vezi s poduzimanjem operativnih mjera radi sprječavanja ostvarenja tog rizika.

51. Pozitivna će obveza nastati kad se utvrdi da su vlasti znale ili da su u to vrijeme trebale znati za postojanje stvarnog i neposrednog rizika za život identificirane osobe zbog kriminalnih radnji treće osobe, te da su propustile poduzeti mjere u okviru svojih ovlasti za koje se, prema razumnoj prosudbi, moglo očekivati da će spriječiti taj rizik (vidi Osman, naprijed citirano, § 116; Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, br. 46477/99, § 55, ECHR 2002-III; te Bromiley v. the United Kingdom (dec.), br. 33747/96, 23. studenoga 1999.).

Primjena tih načela na ovaj predmet

52. Sud je prvo ispitao jesu li mjerodavne vlasti znale odnosno jesu li trebale znati za to da M.M. predstavlja rizik za živote M.T. i V.T. Sud primjećuje da je nadležno državno odvjetništvo pokrenulo kazneni postupak protiv M.M. zbog ozbiljnih prijetnji upućenih M.T. i V.T., koji je imao za posljedicu proglašenje M.M.-a krivim prema optužnici i njegovom osudom na kaznu zatvora od pet mjeseci. Domaći su sudovi utvrdili da je M.M. upućivao prijetnje M.T. i V.T. kroz duže vremensko razdoblje, to jest, od srpnja do prosinca 2005. Utvrdili su i da se on nije suzdržao od ponavljanja tih prijetnji pred zaposlenicima Centra za socijalnu skrb u Čakovcu i policijom, uključujući i njegovu najavu da će M.T. i V.T. raznijeti bombom na prvi rođendan V.T. 1. ožujka 2006. U više je navrata tvrdio da ima bombu, a mogao je isto tako imati i drugo oružje. Da su domaće vlasti te prijetnje smatrale ozbiljnim prijetnjama dokazuje i činjenica da je M.M. osuđen na bezuvjetnu kaznu zatvora. Nadalje, psihijatrijskim vještačenjem M.M.-a, obavljenim u tijeku kaznenoga postupka, utvrđeno je da on pati od mješovitog poremećaja osobnosti i da mu je potrebno obvezno psihijatrijsko liječenje kako bi razvio sposobnosti za konstruktivnije rješavanje teških životnih situacija. Utvrđeno je i da postoji opasnost od ponavljanja istih ili sličnih kaznenih djela, što je, kako se čini, od presudnog značaja u ovome predmetu.

53. Naprijed iznesena utvrđenja domaćih sudova i zaključci psihijatrijskoga vještačenja nedvojbeno ukazuju na to da su domaće vlasti znale da su prijetnje oduzimanjem života M.T. i V.T. ozbiljne i da se trebaju poduzeti sve razumne mjere kako bi ih se zaštitilo od tih prijetnji. Sud će sada ispitati jesu li mjerodavne vlasti poduzele sve razumne mjere u okolnostima ovoga predmeta radi zaštite života M.T. i V.T.

54. Sud prvo primjećuje da, iako je M.M. u nekoliko navrata spomenuo da ima bombu, a mogao je isto tako imati i drugo oružje, tijekom prvog kaznenog postupka protiv njega nije naložena pretraga njegovoga stana i vozila. Takva pretraga nije naložena niti izvršena unatoč tome što su mjerodavne vlasti znale za njegove naprijed spomenute izjave već 4. siječnja 2006., kad je Centar za socijalnu skrb u Čakovcu Policijskoj upravi međimurskoj podnio izvješće s takvim navodima.

55. Nadalje, Sud primjećuje da je u psihijatrijskom izvješću sastavljenom za potrebe kaznenoga postupka protiv M.M.-a naglašena potreba za njegovim kontinuiranim psihijatrijskim liječenjem kako bi mu se pomoglo da razvije sposobnosti za konstruktivnije rješavanje teških životnih situacija. Kad je odluka o određivanju obveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja postala pravomoćnom i ovršnom nakon donošenja presude žalbenoga suda 28. travnja 2006., M.M. je u pritvoru već proveo dva mjeseca i dvadeset i pet dana. Budući da je bio osuđen na kaznu zatvora od pet mjeseci, njegovo psihijatrijsko liječenje do puštanja iz zatvora moglo je trajati samo dva mjeseca i pet dana. Sud smatra da psihički problemi M.M.- a, s obzirom na njihovu težinu utvrđenu psihijatrijskim vještačenjem tijekom kaznenoga postupka protiv njega, teško da su se uopće mogli riješiti u tako kratkome roku.

56. Osim toga, Vlada nije dokazala da je obvezno psihijatrijsko liječenje određeno u odnosu na M.M.-a tijekom njegovoga boravka u zatvoru uistinu i pravilno provedeno. Dostavljeni dokumenti pokazuju da se liječenje M.M.-a u zatvoru sastojalo od razgovora sa zatvorskim osobljem od kojih nitko nije bio psihijatar. Nadalje, Vlada nije dokazala da je upravitelj Zatvora u Varaždinu donio pojedinačni program izvršavanja kazne zatvora kako propisuje članak 69. Zakona o izvršavanju kazne zatvora. Takav pojedinačni program u odnosu na M.M.-a ima još veću važnost ako se uzme u obzir činjenica da su mu domaći sudovi kaznu zatvora izrekli zajedno s tako značajnom mjerom kao što je obvezno psihijatrijsko liječenje zbog ozbiljnih prijetnji smrću koje je upućivao, a sve to kako bi mu se pomoglo da razvije sposobnosti za konstruktivnije rješavanje teških životnih situacija.

57. Sud nadalje primjećuje da je propis koji uređuje provedbu mjere obveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja, to jest, mjerodavne odredbe Zakona o izvršavanju kazne zatvora, vrlo općenite naravi. Prema mišljenju Suda, ovaj predmet dokazuje da takva općenita pravila ne rješavaju na odgovarajući način pitanje provedbe mjere obveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja kao sigurnosne mjere, u cijelosti prepuštajući odluku o tome kako postupiti slobodnoj ocjeni zatvorskih vlasti. Međutim, Sud smatra da takvi propisi trebaju biti dovoljno podrobni kako bi se mogla pravilno ostvariti svrha kaznenih sankcija. U ovome predmetu ni mjerodavni propis, a ni sudska presuda kojom je M.M.-u određeno obvezno psihijatrijsko liječenje nisu pružili dovoljno pojedinosti o provedbi tog liječenja.

58. Budući da M.M. u zatvoru nije odgovarajuće psihijatrijski liječen, tako nije učinjena ni ocjena njegovoga stanja neposredno prije nego što je pušten iz zatvora, kako bi se procijenilo koliki je rizik da će kad se nađe na slobodi izvršiti svoje prijašnje prijetnje o lišavanju života M.T. i V.T. Sud takav propust smatra osobito upadljivim s obzirom na to da su sudovi njegove prijetnje uzeli ozbiljno i da je u prethodnom psihijatrijskom izvješću izričito navedeno da postoji velika vjerojatnost da bi mogao ponoviti ista ili slična kaznena djela. U vezi s time, Sud primjećuje da je žalbeni sud u svojoj presudi od 28. travnja 2006. utvrdio da M.M. nije pokazao samokritičnost glede svojih postupaka, a niti kajanje zbog onoga što je rekao. Nadalje, Sud primjećuje da je M.M. u nekoliko navrata rekao da je imao namjeru ubiti M.T. i V.T. na prvi rođendan V.T. 1. ožujka 2006. S obzirom na činjenicu da je M.M. taj dan proveo u zatvoru, čini se da je tim više bilo potrebno izvršiti novu procjenu prijetnje koju je predstavljao za živote M.T. i V.T. prije njegovoga puštanja iz zatvora.

59. Sud primjećuje i da je prvostupanjski sud M.M.-u odredio mjeru obveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja tijekom boravka u zatvoru, a po potrebi i nakon toga, prema preporuci psihijatra (vidi stavak 7. ove presude). Međutim, žalbeni je sud tu mjeru skratio na trajanje kazne zatvora, jer prema hrvatskome pravu ne postoji mogućnost produženja obveznog psihijatrijskog liječenja nakon odsluženja kazne zatvora za one kojima je takvo liječenje potrebno.

60. S obzirom na naprijed izneseno, Sud smatra da nisu poduzete odgovarajuće mjere kako bi se smanjila vjerojatnost da M.M. ostvari svoje prijetnje nakon puštanja iz zatvora (vidi Osman v. the United Kingdom, naprijed citirano, § 116).

61. Naprijed utvrđene činjenice ovoga predmeta dovoljne su da na temelju njih Sud može utvrditi povredu materijalnopravnog aspekta članka 2. Konvencije zbog propusta mjerodavnih domaćih vlasti da poduzmu sve potrebne i razumne mjere u okolnostima ovoga predmeta da zaštite živote M.T. i V.T.

62. Sud ponavlja da obveza zaštite života na temelju članka 2. Konvencije nalaže postojanje nekog oblika djelotvorne službene istrage kada je smrt pojedinca bila posljedica uporabe sile, bilo od strane državnih službenika ili privatnih osoba (vidi, mutatis mutandis, McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, naprijed citirano, § 161, te Kaya, naprijed citirano, str. 329, § 105). Osnovna svrha takve istrage je osigurati djelotvornu provedbu domaćih zakona kojima se štiti pravo na život (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Paul and Audrey Edwards, naprijed citirano, § 69). Vlasti moraju poduzeti razumne mjere koje su im na raspolaganju kako bi osigurale dokaze koji se odnose na incident. Bilo kakav propust u istrazi koji dovodi u pitanje mogućnost utvrđivanja uzroka smrti ili identificiranja osobe ili osoba koje su odgovorne dovest će do rizika povrede tih standarda. Za koji god da se način postupanja odluče, vlasti moraju djelovati na vlastitu inicijativu čim saznaju za dotičnu stvar (vidi, na primjer, mutatis mutandis, Ilhan v. Turkey [GC], br. 22277/93, ECHR 2000-VII, § 63).

63. U ovome je predmetu od početka bilo jasno da je počinitelj djela o kojima je riječ bila privatna osoba, M.M., i njegova odgovornost u tom smislu nikada nije dovedena u pitanje. Međutim, M.M. se ubio, pa je stoga svaka daljnja primjena mehanizama kaznenoga prava u odnosu na njega bila beskorisna.

64. Sada još preostaje utvrditi je li u okolnostima ovoga predmeta država imala dodatnu pozitivnu obvezu ispitati kaznenu odgovornost bilo kojega od državnih službenika uključenih u taj slučaj. Sud prvo ponavlja da iako se pravo na kazneni progon ili osudu treće stranke za kazneno djelo ne može neovisno ostvarivati (vidi Perez v. France [GC], br. 47287/99, § 70, ECHR 2004-I), Sud je u više navrata izjavio da djelotvorni pravosudni sustav, prema zahtjevima članka 2., može, a u određenim okolnostima i mora, podrazumijevati mogućnost utjecanja kaznenopravnoj zaštiti. Međutim, ako povreda prava na život ili tjelesni integritet nije prouzročena namjerno, pozitivna obveza uspostave djelotvornog pravosudnog sustava na temelju članka 2. ne mora u svakom slučaju nužno zahtijevati osiguranje pravnog sredstva u kaznenom pravu. Sud je već presudio da se na konkretnom području liječničkog nemara obveza, na primjer, može smatrati ispunjenom i ako u pravnome sustavu žrtve imaju pravno sredstvo pred građanskim sudovima, bilo samostalno ili u vezi s pravnim sredstvom pred kaznenim sudovima, koje omogućuje utvrđivanje odgovornosti dotičnih liječnika i dobivanje odgovarajuće zadovoljštine u građanskom postupku, poput naloga za isplatu odštete ili objavu odluke. Mogu se predvidjeti i stegovne mjere (vidi Vo v. France [GC], br. 53924/00, § 90, ECHR 2004-VIII; Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], br. 32967/96, § 51, ECHR 2002-I; Lazzarini and Ghiacci v. Italy (dec.), br. 53749/00, 7. studenoga 2002.; Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], br. 37703/97, § 90, ECHR 2002-VIII te Tarariyeva v. Russia, br. 4353/03, § 75, ECHR 2006-... (izvaci)). Isto bi se trebalo odnositi i na moguću odgovornost državnih službenika za smrt koja je nastupila zbog njihovoga nemara. Međutim, u prigovoru podnositelja zahtjeva u odnosu na materijalnopravni aspekt članka 2. Konvencije nije riječ o tome je li bilo pojedinačne odgovornosti državnog službenika po bilo kojoj osnovi. Sud smatra da je glavni prigovor usmjeren na manjkavosti nacionalnog sustava zaštite života ljudi od postupaka opasnih kriminalaca koji su kao takvi prepoznati od strane mjerodavnih vlasti i postupanja prema takvim pojedincima, uključujući i pravni okvir u kojemu nadležne vlasti trebaju djelovati i predviđene mehanizme.

65. S obzirom na narav prigovora podnositelja zahtjeva u odnosu na materijalnopravni aspekt članka 2. Konvencije i utvrđenja Suda u tom pogledu koja upućuje na to da su postupci o kojima je riječ bili svakako nedostatni sa stajališta materijalnopravnog aspekta članka 2., Sud smatra da nema potrebe odvojeno ispitivati prigovor podnositelja zahtjeva u odnosu na postupovni aspekt članka 2. Konvencije.

II. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANKA 13. KONVENCIJE

66. Podnositelji zahtjeva uz to su prigovorili i da nisu imali na raspolaganju djelotvorno pravno sredstvo u odnosu na svoje prigovore na temelju članka 2. Pozvali su se na članak 13. Konvencije koji glasi kako slijedi:

"Svatko čija su prava i slobode koje su priznate u ovoj Konvenciji povrijeđene ima pravo na djelotvorna pravna sredstva pred domaćim državnim tijelom čak i u slučaju kad su povredu počinile osobe koje su djelovale u službenom svojstvu."

A. Dopuštenost

67. Sud utvrđuje da ovaj prigovor nije očigledno neosnovan u smislu članka 35. stavka 3. Konvencije. Uz to utvrđuje da nije nedopušten ni po kojoj drugoj osnovi. Stoga se mora proglasiti dopuštenim.

B. Osnovanost

68. Vlada je ustvrdila da su podnositelji zahtjeva mogli zatražiti istragu o smrti M.T. i V.T. u okviru kaznenog postupka, te da su mogli podnijeti i građansku tužbu na temelju članaka 1100. i 1101. Zakona o obveznim odnosima.

69. U odgovoru na Vladino očitovanje, podnositelji zahtjeva ustvrdili su da nije bilo potrebe da oni podnose posebnu kaznenu prijavu jer su vlasti znale za sve činjenice vezane za smrt M.T. i V.T. Kad je riječ o pravnom sredstvu u građanskom postupku na koje se poziva Vlada, ustvrdili su da im ono nije bilo dostupno.

70. Sud na početku primjećuje da je prigovor podnositelja zahtjeva na temelju članka 13. Konvencije povezan s njihova dva prigovora na temelju članka 2. Konvencije (vidi stavak 29. ove presude). Sud će u nastavku zasebno ispitati ta dva aspekta navodne povrede članka 13. Konvencije.

71. Kad je riječ o prigovoru podnositelja zahtjeva da nisu imali djelotvorno pravno sredstvo u odnosu na svoj prigovor o postupovnom aspektu članka 2. Konvencije, Sud smatra da, s obzirom na njegova utvrđenja u odnosu na taj aspekt članka 2., ne preostaju nikakva posebna pitanja koja bi se ispitala na temelju članka 13. Konvencije.

72. Kad je riječ o prigovoru podnositelja zahtjeva da nisu imali djelotvorno pravno sredstvo u odnosu na svoje navode glede materijalnopravne povrede članka 2. Konvencije, Sud utvrđuje da je ono što podnositelji zahtjeva dovode u pitanje čitav sustav zaštite života ljudi od postupaka opasnih kriminalaca, uključujući i pravni okvir u kojemu nadležne nacionalne vlasti trebaju djelovati. Prema mišljenju Suda, to su više pitanja o općenitom održavanju mira i reda u nacionalnom sustavu prevencije kriminaliteta, a ne pitanja koja bi se mogla na pravilan način rješavati u bilo kojem postupku pred redovnim sudovima. Zadaća redovnoga suda nije da kaže jesu li ili nisu važeći regulatorni standardi dobri, već da odlučuje u pojedinačnim predmetima primjenjujući postojeće zakone.

73. U vezi s time, Sud ponavlja da članak 13. ne jamči pravno sredstvo koje će omogućiti osporavanje zakona države ugovornice pred nacionalnim tijelom zbog toga što su protivni Konvenciji ili jednakovrijednim domaćim normama (vidi James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21. veljače 1986., Serija A br. 98, § 85 i Leander v. Sweden, 26. ožujka 1987., Serija A br. 116, § 77). U Hrvatskoj je Konvencija ugrađena u nacionalni pravni sustav, a pravo na život zajamčeno je i Ustavom, te postoji mogućnost osporavanja ustavnosti zakona pred Ustavnim sudom. Međutim, glavni prigovor podnositelja zahtjeva u odnosu na materijalnopravni aspekt članka 2. Konvencije nije da su postojeći zakoni i praksa neustavni, već da su manjkavi s obzirom na zahtjeve članka 2. Konvencije, što je tvrdnja koja se ne može osporavati pred nacionalnim sudovima jer su za rješavanje takvih pitanja zaduženi članovi zakonodavne vlasti i političari uključeni u osmišljavanje opće kaznene politike.

74. Međutim, uloga međunarodnog suda za zaštitu ljudskih prava potpuno je različita od uloge nacionalnih sudova budući da međunarodni sud ispituje postojeće standarde zaštite života ljudi, uključujući i pravni okvir određene države. U tim okolnostima, Sud smatra da nakon što je, utvrđenjem povrede materijalnopravnog aspekta članka 2. Konvencije, utvrdio odgovornost države za smrt M.T. i V.T., nije potrebno posebno ispitivati pitanja na temelju članka 13. Konvencije.

III. PRIMJENA ČLANKA 41. KONVENCIJE

75. Članak 41. Konvencije predviđa:

"Ako Sud utvrdi da je došlo do povrede Konvencije i dodatnih protokola, a unutarnje pravo zainteresirane visoke ugovorne stranke omogućava samo djelomičnu odštetu, Sud će, prema potrebi, dodijeliti pravednu naknadu povrijeđenoj stranci."

A. Šteta

76. Svaki podnositelj zahtjeva potražuje 60.000 eura (EUR) na ime nematerijalne štete.

77. Vlada smatra da je zahtjev podnositelja zahtjeva za pravednu naknadu nepotkrijepljen i neutemeljen.

78. Sud konstatira da je utvrdio da su vlasti, u odnosu na smrt dvoje bliskih srodnika podnositelja zahtjeva, prekršile Konvenciju. U tim okolnostima, Sud smatra da su podnositelji zahtjeva zacijelo pretrpjeli nematerijalnu štetu. Presuđujući na pravičnoj osnovi i uzimajući u obzir naknadu dosuđenu u usporedivim predmetima, on podnositeljima zahtjeva zajedno dosuđuje 40.000 EUR s tog naslova uvećanih za sve poreze koji bi im se mogli zaračunati.

B. Troškovi i izdaci

79. Podnositelji zahtjeva potražuju i 9.150 HRK za troškove i izdatke što su ih pretrpjeli pred Sudom.

80. Vlada nije dala svoje primjedbe.

81. Prema sudskoj praksi Suda, podnositelj zahtjeva ima pravo na naknadu troškova i izdataka samo u mjeri u kojoj je dokazano da su oni stvarno i nužno nastali i da su s obzirom na visinu bili razumni. U ovome predmetu, uzevši u obzir informacije koje ima i naprijed navedene kriterije, Sud smatra razumnim podnositeljima zahtjeva dosuditi iznos od 1.300 EUR za postupak pred Sudom, uvećanih za sve poreze koji bi se podnositeljima zahtjeva mogli zaračunati.

C. Zatezna kamata

82. Sud smatra primjerenim da se zatezna kamata temelji na najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Europske središnje banke uvećanoj za tri postotna boda.

IZ TIH RAZLOGA, SUD JEDNOGLASNO

1. proglašava zahtjev dopuštenim;

2. presuđuje da je došlo do povrede članka 2. Konvencije u njegovom materijalnopravnom aspektu, zbog pomanjkanja odgovarajućih mjera za sprječavanje smrti M.T. i V.T.;

3. presuđuje da nema potrebe posebno ispitivati prigovor u odnosu na postupovni aspekt članka 2. Konvencije;

4. presuđuje da nema potrebe ispitivati prigovor na temelju članka 13. Konvencije;

5. presuđuje

(a) da tužena država podnositeljima zahtjeva zajedno treba isplatiti, u roku od tri mjeseca od dana kad presuda postane konačnom u skladu s člankom 44. stavkom 2. Konvencije, sljedeće iznose koje je potrebno preračunati u nacionalnu valutu tužene države prema tečaju važećem na dan namirenja

(i) 40.000 EUR (četrdeset tisuća eura) na ime nematerijalne štete, uvećanih za sve poreze koji bi se podnositeljima zahtjeva mogli zaračunati;
(ii) 1.300 EUR (tisuću i tristo eura) na ime troškova i izdataka, uvećanih za sve poreze koji bi se podnositeljima zahtjeva mogli zaračunati;

(b) da se od proteka naprijed navedena tri mjeseca do namirenja na naprijed navedene iznose plaća obična kamata prema stopi koja je jednaka najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Europske središnje banke tijekom razdoblja neplaćanja, uvećana za tri postotna boda;

6. odbija ostatak zahtjeva podnositelja zahtjeva za pravednu naknadu.

Sastavljeno na engleskome jeziku i otpravljeno u pisanom obliku dana 15. siječnja 2009. u skladu s pravilom 77. stavcima 2. i 3. Poslovnika Suda.

Søren Nielsen Tajnik

Christos Rozakis Predsjednik

U skladu s člankom 45. stavkom 2. Konvencije i pravilom 74. stavkom 2. Poslovnika Suda, ovoj se presudi prilaže suglasno mišljenje suca Nicolaoua.

SUGLASNO MIŠLJENJE SUCA NICOLAOUA

Ono što je u ovome predmetu, kako mi se čini, trebalo prvenstveno i žurno osigurati je djelotvorna policijska zaštita žrtava, majke i djeteta. To ne znači da, u potrazi za boljim rješenjem jedne očito vrlo teške situacije, nije trebalo pokušati i s pružanjem psihijatrijske pomoći počinitelju zločina, zajedno s mjerama socijalne podrške.

Naravno, nemoguće je znati bi li obvezno psihijatrijsko liječenje s "dominantno psihoterapijskim pristupom" koje je preporučio sudski vještak bilo djelotvorno barem u sprječavanju gubitka života. Međutim, ono što je ovdje bitno je to da su sudovi, i u prvostupanjskom i u žalbenom postupku, smatrali da je potrebno donijeti takav nalog, koji se u mjerodavnom pravu opisuje kao "sigurnosna mjera". Moramo pretpostaviti da su sudovi znali u kakvom će se regulatornom okviru nalog provoditi, uključujući i moguće poteškoće u njegovom izvršenju zbog pomanjkanja iscrpnih pravila. Unatoč tome, oni su zacijelo očekivali da će se taj nalog izvršiti jer bi u suprotnome bio bez značenja i svrhe. Nažalost, nalog u stvarnosti nije izvršen. Kako se navodi u stavku 56. presude, nije dokazano da je "obvezno psihijatrijsko liječenje [koje je bilo ]određeno ... uistinu i pravilno provedeno".

Nema sumnje da bi bilo korisno da su postojala posebna pravila kojima bi se utvrdili praktični koraci za izvršenje naloga za psihijatrijsko liječenje. Međutim, teško mi je prihvatiti da je bez takvih pravila nalog o kojemu je riječ od samog svog nastanka bio nedjelotvoran. Vlasti nisu uvjerljivo objasnile da su učinile sve što je bilo moguće kako bi stvorile okruženje u kojemu bi nalog imao izglede za uspjeh. Zapravo, ništa ne ukazuje na to da je M.M.-u bila na raspolaganju specijalistička psihijatrijska pomoć niti ima kakvih naznaka o tome da su učinjeni napori u cilju izvršenja naloga. Rečeno je da je M.M. bio nesklon suradnji. Međutim, ne smije se pretpostaviti da bi se to nastavilo ili da bi takav njegov stav prevladao da mu je pružena odgovarajuća stručna pomoć u pravom kontekstu. Stoga se ne mogu prikloniti stavu izraženom u stavku 42. presude da "bilo kako bilo, ono o čemu je ovdje riječ nije pitanje jesu li vlasti postupale zakonito odnosno je li uopće postojala pojedinačna odgovornost državnog službenika s bilo koje osnove ".

U Hrvatskoj, prema pravilu utvrđenom kroz domaću sudsku praksu, činjenica da je ovlaštena osoba pogriješila, činjenjem ili nečinjenjem, ne čini državu solidarno odgovornom za naknadu štete osim ako se ne dokaže da je "postojala namjera vlasti da prouzroče štetu trećoj osobi ili njihovo prihvaćanje takvoga ishoda". Čini mi se da takvo ograničenje nije u skladu s punom odgovornošću države koja se mora smatrati neophodnom sastavnicom u zaštiti života na temelju članka 2.

Uzimajući u obzir okolnosti ovoga predmeta, mogućnost utvrđenja građanske odgovornosti ne bi se trebala povezivati s pretpostavkama o tome koliko bi dugo liječenje trebalo trajati da bi se moglo reći je li bilo uspješno ili neuspješno. U pomanjkanju konkretnog iskustva, koje se moglo steći pravilnom provedbom liječenja, nije bilo moguće dati valjanu ocjenu. Stoga domaće odredbe koje se odnose na duljinu liječenja ovdje ne mogu biti izravno relevantne; problem u vezi s trajanjem liječenja pojavio bi se tek kad bi se nedvojbeno dokazalo da je liječenje trebalo biti dulje.

I na kraju ono što je možda najvažnije: da su odgovorni pažljivo razmotrili situaciju, tada bi bilo jasno da je, nakon puštanja M.M.-a iz zatvora, žrtvama ubojstva bila prijeko potrebna policijska zaštita, bez koje su ostali u smrtnoj opasnosti. Žalosno je to što ništa nije učinjeno u tom smjeru i što, kako se čini, nitko nije ni na koji način odgovarao. U takvim okolnostima pojedinačni propust ne bi se trebao potpuno zanemariti zbog nesavršenosti regulatornih odredaba koje se odnose na izvršenje naloga za psihijatrijsko liječenje.

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Prevod presude preuzet sa https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF BRANKO TOMAŠIĆ AND OTHERS v. CROATIA

(Application no. 46598/06)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

15 January 2009

FINAL

15/04/2009

This judgment may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Branko Tomašic and Others v. Croatia,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Christos Rozakis, President,

Nina Vajić,

Anatoly Kovler,

Elisabeth Steiner,

Dean Spielmann,

Giorgio Malinverni,

George Nicolaou, judges,

and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 11 December 2008,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 46598/06) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by five Croatian nationals, Mr Branko Tomašić, Mrs Ðurđa Tomašić, Mr Marko Tomašić, Mr Tomislav Tomašić and Miss Ana Tomašić (“the applicants”), on 30 October 2006.

2. The applicants were represented by Mrs I. Bojić, a lawyer practising in Zagreb. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs Š. Stažnik.

3. On 7 May 2007 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

4. The applicants were born in 1956, 1963, 1985, 1995 and 2001 respectively and live in Čakovec. The first and second applicants are husband and wife and the third to fifth applicants are their children.

5. During 2004 M.T., the first and second applicants’ daughter and the third to fifth applicants’ sister, entered into a relationship with a certain M.M. They started living together with the applicants in their home. On 1 March 2005 they had a child, V.T. Soon afterwards M.M. had a series of disputes with the members of the household and often expressed verbal threats against M.T., which resulted in him moving out of the house in July 2005. On 4 January 2006 the Čakovec Social Welfare Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb Čakovec – hereinafter “the Welfare Centre”) filed a report with the Međimurje Police Department (Policijska uprava međimurska) stating, inter alia, that on 2 January 2006 M.M. had come to the Centre and claimed that he had a bomb and would “throw it at his former wife [meaning M.T.] and child”.

6. On 5 January 2006 M.T. lodged a criminal complaint with the Čakovec State Attorney’s Office against M.M. She alleged that on a number of occasions since July 2005 M.M. had come to her parents’ house where she also lived with her daughter and had threatened to kill her and their daughter with a bomb unless she agreed to come back to him. He had also often made telephone calls and sent SMS messages to her by mobile phone repeating the same threats.

7. On 3 February 2006 M.M. was detained following the instigation of the criminal proceedings against him in the Čakovec Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Čakovcu) on 27 January 2006. A psychiatric opinion obtained during the proceedings stated that on 2 January 2006 M.M. had claimed before the employees of the Welfare Centre that he had a bomb and that his threats had been meant seriously. He had repeated the same claim on 19 January 2006 before police officers from the Međimurje Police Department. The relevant parts of the conclusions of the report read as follows:

“1. Defendant M.M. is a person suffering from a profound personality disorder etiologically linked to innate malfunctioning of the brain and the highly unfavourable pedagogical circumstances of his childhood. Dg: mixed personality disorder ...

2. In the context of the said personality disorder the defendant’s reaction to a problematic situation was an inadequate and pathological defence mechanism with inflated ideas and related activities. These inflated ideas do not amount to a mental illness.

3. I have not found elements of either permanent or temporary innate mental illness, diminished intellectual capacity or epilepsy which might be linked to the criminal offences with which the defendant is charged.

4. He is not addicted to alcohol, drugs or other substances ...

5. In view of what has been said under 1, 2 and 3 and in view of all the other information collected so far in connection with the criminal offences, I consider that his ability to wilfully control and understand the meaning and consequences of his act tempore criminis was diminished, but that [he was not] completely unaccountable.

6. There is a strong likelihood that he will repeat the same or similar criminal offences. In order to prevent this, I recommend that the court, apart from the other measures, order compulsory psychiatric treatment with a predominantly psychotherapeutic approach with the aim of developing an ability to resolve difficult situations in life in a more constructive manner.”

8. On 15 March 2006 the Municipal Court found M.M. guilty of threatening M.T. on several occasions during the period between July and 30 December 2005 both in front of her family house and at the parking lot near the city graveyard when M.T. had been alone. He had shouted threats that he would kill her, himself and their child with a bomb; at the Welfare Centre on 2 January 2006 he had said that his threats had been meant seriously, that he actually had a bomb and that he would kill himself and the child with the bomb on the child’s first birthday on 1 March 2006. He was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment and a security measure of compulsory psychiatric treatment was ordered during his imprisonment and afterwards as necessary. In ordering the defendant’s compulsory psychiatric treatment the court relied entirely on the findings of the psychiatric report. The relevant part of the judgment read as follows:

“... throughout the whole period in question the defendant had been telling the victim that he would throw a bomb at himself and their child as well as her [the victim] if she happened to be around. These events came to a head on 30 December. The defendant did not refrain from mentioning a bomb either in front of the Welfare Centre’s employees or a policeman. Furthermore, he said in front of the policemen that he would blow himself and the child up with a bomb on the child’s first birthday. Therefore, there is no doubt that both the victim and the witnesses understood these threats as being meant seriously ... Thus, the victim’s fears for her own as well as her child’s safety were justified ...

...

... all conditions for ordering a security measure [of compulsory psychiatric treatment] have been fulfilled since the defendant committed a crime while his capacity for understanding was diminished and it is likely that he will repeat the same or similar offence. It is necessary to order compulsory psychiatric treatment during his prison term and after his release. The treatment shall take a predominantly psychotherapeutic approach, as recommended by the expert, in order to develop [the defendant’s] ability to address difficult situations in life in a more constructive manner.”

9. On 28 April 2006 the Čakovec County Court (Županijski sud u Čakovcu) reduced the security measure to the duration of M.M.’s prison sentence and upheld the remaining part of the judgment. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:

“... there is no doubt that frequent murder threats by ... a bomb should by any objective test have been understood as meant seriously and that [such threats] would cause a real sense of disquiet, fear and anxiety in an average person, in particular in a situation where the victim has known the perpetrator as an aggressive person out of control, as is the case with the victim in the present case.

There is also no doubt that ... the defendant’s threats extended throughout a period of half a year during which the victim feared, owing to continued threats, not only for her own safety but also for the safety and wellbeing of her child which was not even a year old at the time. The victim was thus undoubtedly put in a difficult and unenviable position where she feared daily for her and her daughter’s life, which was confirmed not only in her testimony but also the fact that she sought assistance from the competent authorities [such as] the police, the Social Welfare Centre and the State Attorney.

...

While examining ... the impugned judgment under Article 379 paragraph 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure this appellate court has established that the first-instance court violated the statutory provisions to the detriment of the defendant when it ordered that a security measure of compulsory psychiatric treatment should continue after the defendant’s release [from prison], which is contrary to Article 75 of the Criminal Code according to which compulsory psychiatric treatment may last as long as the reasons for its application exist but no longer than the prison term.

...

... this court does not agree with the defendant’s argument that in his case the purpose of punishment would be achieved by a suspended sentence, especially in view of the fact that the defendant ... did not show any self-criticism as regards his acts or any feelings of remorse for what he had said ...”

10. M.M. served his sentence in Varaždin Prison and was released on 3 July 2006. On 15 August 2006 he shot M.T., her daughter V.T. and himself. Before the shooting he was spotted by M.T.’s neighbour carrying an automatic gun and leaving his bicycle in the adjacent woods. The neighbour immediately called the police. The police arrived at the scene twenty minutes later, just after the tragic event.

11. On 15 August 2006 the police interviewed M.T.’s neighbour I.S. who had seen M.M. approaching M.T.’s house immediately before the critical event. At the request of the police, on 17 August 2006 an investigating judge of the Varaždin County Court issued a search warrant of a flat and a vehicle belonging to a certain M.G. who was suspected of having procured weapons for M.M. The warrant was executed the same day, but no connection was established between M.G. and the weapons used by M.M.. The investigating judge has not taken any further steps in that case.

12. On 18 August 2006 the police submitted a report to the Čakovec County State Attorney’s Office detailing the circumstances of the tragic event.

13. On 28 November 2006 the State Attorney’s Office dismissed a criminal complaint against M.M. for murdering M.T. and V.T. on the ground that he was dead. It is unclear who lodged that complaint, but a copy of this decision was sent to the applicants. In a letter of the same day the State Attorney’s Office asked the Međimurje Police Department to collect all information concerning psychiatric treatment of M.M. in Varaždin Prison. The relevant part of a report drawn up on 13 December 2006 by the Varaždin prison authorities reads as follows:

“M.M. had been kept in detention on remand in Varaždin Prison from 3 February to 22 May 2006 when he was sent to serve his prison term ... which expired on 3 July 2006.

A psychiatric examination of M.M. carried out during his stay in detention showed that he suffered from a mixed personality disorder which derived from innate malfunctioning of the brain and the unfavourable pedagogical circumstances of his childhood. In the same opinion the expert psychiatrist recommended that compulsory psychiatric treatment be ordered with a predominantly psychotherapeutic approach with the aim [that M.M.] develop an ability to resolve difficult situations in life in a more constructive manner.

While M.M. served his prison term, intensive treatment consisting in frequent individual conversational sessions was envisaged, in accordance with the individual programme of serving a prison term. He rarely came for the sessions of his own accord and was therefore, in [order to satisfy] the need for treatment, requested to do so by the staff. ...

While in prison M.M. saw the prison doctor on five occasions, sometimes of his own accord, sometimes at the doctor’s call. He did not insist on his psychiatric therapy and therefore his treatment was based, as recommended by the expert, on intensive psychotherapeutic treatment by the staff, the prison governor and the others who talked to him. He was a highly introverted person, so his true personality could not be detected in detention or prison conditions.”

14. On 11 December 2006 the Međimurje Police Department interviewed the Varaždin prison governor, P.L. The relevant part of a report on the interview drawn up on 2 December 2006 reads as follows:

“The above-mentioned is the governor of Varaždin Prison and he states that the late M.M. served his prison term in Varaždin Prison from 3 February to 3 July 2006 ...

While in prison M.M. underwent psychiatric treatment pursuant to the expert opinion and recommendation. The treatment was based on intensive psychotherapeutic treatment of M.M. consisting of conversational sessions between M.M. and the prison staff, himself [meaning the governor] and the prison doctor. During the treatment M.M. neither received nor asked for any pharmacotherapy. It was also established that M.M. was a very introverted person who did not wish to cooperate in the treatment.

During his stay in the prison M.M. saw the prison doctor on five occasions in connection with some other problems, that is to say, illnesses.

He further maintains that there are no internal regulations on the implementation of security measures and that all treatment is carried out in accordance with the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act.”

15. According to the Government, since no oversights on the part of the persons in charge of the execution of the M.M.’s prison term and security measure had been established, the investigation was concluded, although no formal decision to that effect has been adopted.

16. M.M.’s medical record from prison, submitted by the Government, does not indicate any psychiatric or psychotherapeutic treatment.

17. On 6 November 2006 the applicants submitted a proposal to the State Attorney for a settlement of their claim for non-pecuniary damages related to the deaths of M.T. and V.T. They alleged failures by the competent authorities to take adequate steps to protect the lives of M.T. and V.T. and inadequacy of the investigation into the circumstances of their deaths. They sought 1,105,000 Croatian kunas (HRK) in compensation and HRK 13,481 for costs. They received no reply. Under section 186(a) of the Civil Procedure Act, where such a request has been refused or no decision has been taken within three months of its submission the person concerned may file an action with the competent court. The applicants have not brought a civil action.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

18. Article 21 of the Constitution (Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette nos. 56/1990, 135/1997, 8/1998, 113/2000, 124/2000 and 28/2001) reads as follows:

“Every human being has the right to life.

...”

19. The relevant part of the Constitutional Court Act (Ustavni zakon o Ustavnom sudu, Official Gazette no. 29/2002) reads as follows:

Section 38

“Everyone has the right to request the institution of proceedings to review the constitutionality of statutes ...”

Section 55

“(1) The Constitutional Court shall quash a statute or its provisions if it finds that they are incompatible with the Constitution ...”

20. The relevant part of Article 75 of the Criminal Code (Kaznenei zakon Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 28/1998, 50/2000, 129/2000, 51/2001, 11/2003 and 105/2004) reads as follows:

“The security measure of compulsory psychiatric treatment may be imposed only as regards a perpetrator who, at the time of committing a criminal offence, suffered from significantly diminished responsibility [and] where there is a risk that the factors giving rise to the state [of diminished responsibility] might incite the future commission of a further criminal offence.

The security measure of compulsory psychiatric treatment may be imposed, under the conditions set out in paragraph 1 of this Article, during the execution of a prison sentence, in lieu of a prison sentence or together with a suspended sentence.

Compulsory psychiatric treatment shall be imposed for as long as the grounds for its application exist, but [it shall not] in any case exceed the prison term ... Compulsory psychiatric treatment shall not under any circumstances exceed three years.

...”

21. The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002, 143/2002, 63/2002, 62/2003 and 115/2006) read as follows:

Article 174(2)

“In order to ... decide whether to request an investigation ... the State Attorney shall order the police to collect the necessary information and take other measures concerning the crime [at issue] with a view to identifying the perpetrator ...”

Article 177

“Where there is a suspicion that a criminal offence liable to public prosecution has been committed, the police shall take the necessary measures with a view to indentifying the perpetrator ... and collect all information of possible relevance for the conduct of the criminal proceedings...”

Article 187

“(1) An investigation shall be opened against a particular individual where there is a suspicion that he or she has committed a criminal offence.

(2) During the investigation evidence and information necessary for deciding whether an indictment is to be brought or the proceedings are to be discontinued shall be collected ...”

22. The relevant provisions of the Civil Obligations Act (Zakon o obveznim odnosima, Official Gazette no. 35/2005) read as follows:

Section 19

“(1) Every legal entity and every natural person has the right to respect for their personal integrity under the conditions prescribed by this Act.

(2) The right to respect for one’s personal integrity within the meaning of this Act includes the right to life, physical and mental health, good reputation and honour, the right to be respected, the right to respect for one’s name and privacy of personal and family life, freedom et alia.

...”

Section 1100

“(1) Where a court finds it justifiable, on account of the seriousness of an infringement of the right to respect for one’s personal integrity and the circumstances of a particular case, it shall award non-pecuniary damages, irrespective of compensation for pecuniary damage or where no such damage exists.

...”

Section 1101

“(1) In the case of death or particularly serious invalidity of a person the right to non-pecuniary damages shall vest in his or her close family members (spouse, children and parents).

(2) Such damages may be awarded to the siblings, grandparents, grandchildren and a common-law spouse where these persons and the deceased permanently shared the same household.

„

23. Section 13 of the State Administration Act (Zakon o ustrojstvu državne uprave, Official Gazette nos. 75/1993, 48/1999, 15/2000 and 59/2001) reads as follows:

“The Republic of Croatia shall compensate damage caused to a citizen, legal entity or other party by unlawful or wrongful conduct of a State administration body, a body of local self-government and administration ...”

24. The relevant part of section 186(a) of the Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parničnom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 53/91, 91/92, 58/93, 112/99, 88/01 and 117/03 reads as follows:

“A person intending to bring a civil suit against the Republic of Croatia shall beforehand submit a request for a settlement with the competent State Attorney’s office.

...

Where the request has been refused or no decision has been taken within three months of its submission, the person concerned may file an action with the competent court.

...”

25. The relevant provisions of the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act (Zakon o izvršavanju kazne zatvora, Official Gazette nos. 128/1999 and 190/2003) read as follows:

PURPOSE OF A PRISON TERM

Section 2

“The main purpose of a prison term, apart from humane treatment and respect for personal integrity of a person serving a prison term, ... is development of his or her capacity for life after release in accordance with the laws and general customs of society.”

PREPARATION FOR RELEASE AND ASSISTANCE AFTER THE RELEASE

Section 13

“During the enforcement of a prison sentence a penitentiary or prison shall, together with the institutions and other legal entities in charge of assistance after release, ensure preparation of a prisoner for his or her release [from prison].”

INDIVIDUAL PRGRAMME FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF A PRISON TERM

Section 69

(1) The individual programme for the enforcement of a prison term (hereinafter “the enforcement programme”) consists of a combination of pedagogical, working, leisure, health, psychological and safety acts and measures aimed at organising the time spent during the prison term according to the character traits and needs of a prisoner and the type and possibilities of a particular penitentiary or prison. The enforcement programme shall be designed with a view to fulfilling the purposes of a prison term under section 7 of this Act.

(2) The enforcement programme shall be designed by a prison governor on the proposal of a penitentiary or a prison’s expert team ...

(3) The enforcement programme shall contain information on ... special procedures (... psychological and psychiatric assistance ... special security measures ...)

...”

HEALTH PROTECTION

Section 103

“(1) Inmates shall be provided with medical treatment and regular care for their physical and mental health...”

26. Section 22 of the State Attorney Act (Zakon o državnom odvjetništvu, Official Gazette 75/1995) reads as follows:

“(1) The State Attorney’s Office is entitled to compensation for the costs of representation before the courts and other competent bodies according to the regulations on lawyers’ fees.

(2) Funds obtained as the costs of representation are paid into the State’s budget.”

27. As regards civil proceedings for damages the Government submitted several decisions of the Supreme Court expressing its opinion on the responsibility of the State for damage caused by the administrative authorities.

The relevant parts of decision no. Rev 2203/1991-2 of 30 December 1991 read as follows:

“The employees of Open Penitentiary V.-P. and of L. State Prison caused the damage in question by their unlawful and wrongful conduct in allowing D.P. to escape from the penitentiary instead of preventing his escape by the use of force if necessary (sections 175 and 176, paragraph 140, of the Enforcement of Penal and Misdemeanours Sanctions Act, Official Gazette nos. 21/74 and 39/74).

Enforcement of a sentence, and in particular the enforcement of a prison term, fulfils the purpose of punishment defined by law which includes, inter alia, preventing a perpetrator from committing [a further] criminal offence by restricting his freedom of movement. In the circumstances of the present case the employees of the above-mentioned penitentiaries, for whose conduct the defendant [the State] is liable, failed to [prevent the escape] of a convict who repeated the same act of violence (in even more serious circumstances) as the criminal offence for which he had been convicted and placed in prison ... The fact that he committed a criminal offence of robbery and caused damage to the plaintiff and numerous other persons by acts of violence during his escape shows that he is a danger to society who should have been prevented from committing criminal offences by being kept in prison. The same transpires from his previous criminal record ...

Therefore, in the case at issue there is a legally relevant causal link between the unlawful and wrongful conduct of the defendant’s employees, the escape and the harmful act ... which all lead to the defendant’s liability.”

The relevant part of decision no. Rev 186/04-2 of 10 January 2006 reads as follows:

“Pursuant to section 13 of the State Administration Act (Official Gazette nos. 75/93, 48/99, 15/00 and 59/01) the Republic of Croatia is obliged to compensate damage resulting from unlawful or wrongful conduct of the State administration bodies, bodies of local self-government and administration ...

...

Conduct or an omission that is against a law or any other regulation amounts to an unlawful act ... if there exists an intent to cause damage to the rights or interests of third persons or acceptance of that outcome .”

28. The applicants submitted several decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the same issue.

The relevant part of decision no. Rev 713/1998 of 13 September 2000 reads as follows:

“Conduct or an omission that is against a law or any other regulation amounts to an unlawful act only if there exists an intent to cause damage to the rights and interests of a third person or acceptance of that outcome. The same is true in respect of conduct or a failure to act, contrary to the common or prescribed manner of acting, amounting to wrongful conduct.”

The relevant part of decision no. Rev 218/04-2 of 27 October 2004 reads as follows:

“The plaintiffs’ claim for damages against the Republic of Croatia is justified only where the statutory conditions have been fulfilled, namely, that the damage is a consequence of unlawful or wrongful conduct of a person or a body performing [civil] service. Unlawful conduct means acting against a law or any other regulation or an omission to apply a regulation with intent to cause harm to a third person or acceptance of that outcome. Wrongful conduct means an act or a failure to act that is contrary to the common or prescribed manner of acting and from which it can be concluded that there has been an intent to cause harm to the rights and interests of a third person or acceptance of that outcome.”

The relevant part of decision no. Rev 730/04-2 of 16 November 2005 reads as follows:

“... unlawful conduct means acting against the law or omitting to apply statutory provisions with intent to cause damage to a third person or acceptance of that outcome. Wrongful conduct means an act or a failure to act, contrary to the common or prescribed manner of acting ... The burden of proof is on the plaintiff. ... The plaintiff claiming damages is obliged to prove the existence of damage, a harmful act by the defendant (in this case unlawful or wrongful conduct of the State administration bodies within the meaning of section 13 of the State Administration Act) and a causal link between the harmful act and the actual damage.”

The relevant part of decision no. Rev 257/06-2 of 18 May 2006 reads as follows:

“The purpose of section 13 of the State Administration Act is [to make] the State liable for the damage caused by consciously acting against the law with intent to cause damage to another.”

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION

29. The applicants made a twofold complaint under Article 2 of the Convention. They contended firstly that the State had failed to comply with their positive obligations in order to prevent the deaths of M.T. and V.T. and secondly that the State had failed to conduct a thorough investigation into the possible responsibility of their agents for the deaths of M.T. and V.T.

Article 2 of the Convention reads as follows:

“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

A. Admissibility

The parties’ submissions

30. The Government argued that the applicants had several remedies at their disposal which they had failed to exhaust. Firstly, they had failed to lodge a criminal complaint against any person they held responsible for the deaths of M.T. and V.T., which would have enabled them to propose evidence and investigating measures to be taken. Had they done so, the competent State Attorney’s Office would have issued a reasoned decision on their complaint. Even if such a complaint had been dismissed, the applicants could have then continued the criminal prosecution of their own motion.

31. Secondly, the applicants could have brought a civil action for compensation against the State under sections 1100 and 1101 of the Civil Obligations Act and under the Convention, which was directly applicable in Croatia.

32. Lastly, the fact that the State’s liability existed only where a causal link between a harmful act and the actual damage was proven was a universally accepted principle of liability for damages that was not specific to the Croatian legal system.

33. The applicants contended that under domestic law the third to fifth applicants had no right to seek compensation for the death of V.T. A civil action for compensation from the State, which was a possibility open to all the applicants in respect of the death of M.T. and to the first and second applicants in respect of the death of V.T, would have had no prospect of success. That was because the requirements established by the Supreme Court, namely, that the acts of the responsible authorities had to be unlawful and that they had to have acted with intent to cause damage to third persons or at least acceptance of that outcome would have been impossible to prove. Furthermore, if they had lost they would have had to bear the costs of representation of the State in the proceedings by a State Attorney’s Office, which was entitled to the fees set out in the Scale of Lawyers’ Fees. According to the standards of the Supreme Court’s case-law, the applicants could have claimed about HRK 800,000 in compensation. As the costs of representation of the State were to be assessed according to the value of the claim, they would have amounted to about HRK 80,000. Thus they would have exceeded the applicants’ joint annual income, which was about HRK 14,000 since the only member of their family living in the same household who had an income was the first applicant. In view of the fact that their possible claim had no prospect of success, the risk of having to bear the State Attorney’s fees, from which they had no right of exemption, was very high. Bearing these costs would have financially ruined them, which was why they had not lodged a civil action against the State.

34. As to the Government’s objection that they should have lodged a criminal complaint against the persons they considered responsible for the deaths of their close relatives, the applicants argued that all information known to them had also been known to the relevant State authorities and that in those circumstances it had been incumbent on the authorities to take appropriate steps to investigate the deaths of M.T. and V.T.

The Court’s assessment

35. The Court points out that the purpose of Article 35 is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Convention institutions. Consequently, States are dispensed from answering for their acts before an international body before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 of the Convention requires that normal recourse should be had by an applicant only to remedies that relate to the breaches alleged and at the same time are available and sufficient. The existence of such remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness; it falls to the respondent State to establish that these various conditions are satisfied (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, §§ 74 and 75, ECHR 1999‑V).

36. Article 35 provides for a distribution of the burden of proof. It is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say, that it was accessible, was one which was capable of providing redress in respect of the complaints invoked and offered reasonable prospects of success (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑IV, § 68).

37. The Court would emphasise that the application of this rule must make due allowance for the context. Accordingly, it has recognised that Article 35 must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (see Cardot v. France, 19 March 1991, Series A no. 200, § 34). It has further recognised that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically; in reviewing whether the rule has been observed, it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of the individual case (see Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 6 November 1980, Series A no. 40, § 35). This means, amongst other things, that the Court must take realistic account not only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting Party concerned but also of the general legal and political context in which they operate as well as the personal circumstances of the applicants (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, § 69).

38. In respect of a substantive complaint of failure of the State to take adequate positive measures to protect a person’s life in violation of Article 2, the possibility of obtaining compensation for the death of a person will generally, and in normal circumstances, constitute an adequate and sufficient remedy (see, E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 33218/96, § 110 and, mutatis mutandis, Caraher v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 24520/94, ECHR 2000‑I).

39. The Court notes at the outset that the newly introduced sections 1100 and 1101 of the Civil Obligations Act, which entered into force on 1 January 2006, provide a possibility of seeking compensation in connection with the death of one’s spouse, child or parent and that compensation may also be awarded to the siblings, grandparents, grandchildren and a common-law spouse where these persons and the deceased permanently shared the same household. The Court therefore finds that under domestic law the third to fifth applicants, being her aunts and uncles, have no right of compensation for the killing of V.T. It follows that the Government’s objection in respect of the third to fifth applicants in connection with the death of V.T. must be rejected.

40. As to the first and second applicants’ right of compensation for the deaths of both M.T. and V.T. and the third to fifth applicants’ right of compensation for the death of M.T., the Court notes that sections 1100 and 1101 of the Civil Obligations Act do provide a legal ground for seeking compensation from the State. The Court will now examine whether the Government have shown that a civil action for compensation against the State is a remedy that has to be exhausted in the circumstances of the present case.

41. The Court notes that after M.M. had killed M.T. and V.T. no responsibility of the State officials involved was established in respect of the relevant authorities’ duty to protect the lives of the victims. In these circumstances it might be said that a civil action for damages against the State does not have much prospect of success, in particular in view of the requirement under domestic law and practice that the State’s liability be engaged only in the event of unlawful conduct on the part of the authorities or unlawful failure to act and intent on the part of the authorities to cause damage to a third person or acceptance of that outcome.

42. However, and notwithstanding the chances of success of a potential civil action concerning the lawfulness of the acts of the relevant authorities, the Court notes that in any event the issue here is not a question of whether the authorities acted unlawfully or whether there was any individual responsibility of a State official on whatever grounds. Much more broadly, the central question of the present case is the alleged deficiencies of the national system for the protection of the lives of others from acts of dangerous criminals who have been identified as such by the relevant authorities and the treatment of such individuals, including the legal framework within which the competent authorities are to operate and the mechanisms provided for. In this connection the Court notes that the Government have not shown that these issues, and in particular the applicants’ complaint under Article 2 of the Convention related to the insufficiencies of domestic law and practice preceding the deaths of M.T. and V.T., could be examined in any proceedings relied on by the Government.

43. As to the Government’s argument that after the killings of M.T. and V.T. the applicants could also have lodged a criminal complaint, the Court notes that a step in that respect was taken by an investigating judge of the Varaždin County Court when, on 17 August 2006, he ordered a search of a flat and vehicle of a certain M.G. who had been suspected of having procured weapons to M.M. and by the Čakovec State Attorney’s Office when, on 28 November 2006, it asked the Međimurje Police Department to collect all information concerning M.M.’s psychiatric treatment while he had been serving his prison sentence. However, those steps did not lead to any criminal or other proceedings against any of the persons involved. The Court cannot see how an additional criminal complaint about the same issues lodged by the applicants might have led to a different outcome. In this connection the Court reiterates that in cases concerning a death in circumstances that might give rise to the State’s responsibility the authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention. They cannot leave it to the initiative of the next-of-kin either to lodge a formal complaint or to take responsibility for the conduct of any investigative procedures (see, for example, McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, § 111, ECHR 2001-III, and Slimani v. France, no. 57671/00, § 29, ECHR 2004‑IX (extracts)).

44. It follows that the remedies proposed by the Government did not have to be exhausted. In making this conclusion, the Court has taken into consideration the specific circumstances of the present case as well as the fact that a right as fundamental as the right to life is at stake (see, among other authorities, McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324, § 147) and that the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are not theoretical or illusory, but rights that are practical and effective (see, for example, Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-I). Accordingly, the Government’s objection has to be rejected.

45. The Court finds that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further finds that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

The parties’ arguments

46. The applicants complained that the State had failed to comply with their positive obligation because, although it had been well known to the authorities that M.M.’s threats against M.T. and V.T. had been serious, they had failed to order and carry out a search of his premises and vehicle in the course of the first set of criminal proceedings against him in which he had been charged with making serious threats against MT. and V.T. They argued that, before his release from prison, the relevant authorities had failed to properly administer his psychiatric treatment and evaluate his mental condition and the likelihood that he would carry out his threats. They alleged insufficiencies of the regulation concerning the enforcement of a prison term and also maintained that the domestic law was defective because an accused found guilty of a crime could be given compulsory psychiatric treatment only for the duration of his or her prison term. The applicants also complained that the domestic authorities had failed to conduct a proper and thorough investigation into the State’s possible responsibility for the deaths of their close relatives.

47. The Government argued that the domestic authorities had taken M.M.’s threats seriously and had for that reason remanded him in custody, where he had stayed during the whole trial. He had been sentenced to a prison term commensurate with the seriousness of his conviction and within the statutory framework of the offence he had been charged with. Furthermore, his compulsory psychiatric treatment had been ordered during his prison term, as provided for under domestic law.

48. As to their procedural obligation under Article 2, the Government contended that the competent State Attorney’s Office had ordered the police to collect relevant information concerning the deaths of M.T. and V.T. The police had, inter alia, interviewed the prison governor, and this had shown how the measure of compulsory psychiatric treatment had been administered. The State Attorney’s Office had not found that there had been any failure on the part of the prison authorities amounting to a criminal offence. As to their participation in the investigation, the applicants had failed to lodge a separate criminal complaint and had not shown that they had ever sought to be informed about the investigation.

The Court’s assessment

a. Substantive aspect of Article 2 of the Convention

General principles

49. The Court reiterates that Article 2 enjoins the State to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, § 36). This involves a primary duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 160, ECHR 2005-VII).

50. It also extends in appropriate circumstances to a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual. Bearing in mind the difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the Court is also careful, when considering positive obligations, not to interpret Article 2 in such a way as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on authorities (see Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑VIII, § 116). Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising.

51. A positive obligation will arise where it has been established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see Osman, cited above, § 116; Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, § 55, ECHR 2002-III; and Bromiley v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 33747/96, 23 November 1999).

Application of these principles to the present case

52. The Court has examined firstly whether the relevant authorities were or should have been aware that M.M. presented a risk for the lives of M.T. and V.T. The Court notes that the competent State Attorney’s Office instituted criminal proceedings against M.M. on charges of making serious threats against M.T. and V.T., which resulted in M.M. being found guilty as charged and sentenced to five months’ imprisonment. The domestic courts established that M.M. had been making threats against M.T. and V.T. for a long period of time, namely, from July to December 2005. They found further that he had not refrained from repeating those threats both before the employees of the Čakovec Welfare Centre and the police, including his announcement that he was going to blow M.T. and V.T. up with a bomb on the latter’s first birthday, which was 1 March 2006. He repeatedly claimed that he was in possession of a bomb and could well have had other weapons. That these threats were taken by the domestic authorities as being meant seriously is shown by the fact that M.M. was sentenced to an unconditional prison term. Furthermore, a psychiatric examination of M.M. carried out in the course of the criminal proceedings established that he was suffering from a mixed personality disorder and was in need of compulsory psychiatric treatment in order to develop the ability to cope with difficult situations in life in a more constructive manner. It was established further that there was a danger that he would repeat the same or similar offences, which appears crucially important in the present case.

53. The above findings of the domestic courts and the conclusions of the psychiatric examination undoubtedly show that the domestic authorities were aware that the threats made against the lives of M.T. and V.T. were serious and that all reasonable steps should have been taken in order to protect them from those threats. The Court will now examine whether the relevant authorities took all steps reasonable in the circumstances of the present case to protect the lives of M.T. and V.T.

54. The Court firstly notes that although M.M. had mentioned on several occasions that he had a bomb, and could well have had other weapons, no search of his premises and vehicle was ordered in the course of the initial criminal proceedings against him. No such search was ordered and carried out, although the relevant authorities had been aware of his above statements as early as 4 January 2006, when the Čakovec Social Welfare Centre filed a report containing such allegations with the Međimurje Police Department.

55. The Court notes further that a psychiatric report drawn up for the purposes of the criminal proceedings against M.M. stressed the need for continued psychiatric treatment in order to help him develop the capacity for coping with difficult situations in life in a more constructive manner. When the decision ordering his compulsory psychiatric treatment became final and enforceable following the adoption of the appellate court’s judgment of 28 April 2006, M.M. had already spent two months and twenty-five days in detention. Since he was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment, it follows that his psychiatric treatment could only have lasted two months and five days before his release from prison. The Court considers that in such a short period M.M.’s psychiatric problems, in view of their gravity as established in the psychiatric examination carried out during the criminal proceedings against him, could hardly have been addressed at all.

56. Moreover, the Government have failed to show that the compulsory psychiatric treatment ordered in respect of M.M. during his prison term was actually and properly administered. The documents submitted show that the treatment of M.M. in prison consisted of conversational sessions with the prison staff, none of whom was a psychiatrist. Furthermore, the Government have failed to show that an individual programme for the execution of M.M.’s prison term was designed by the Varaždin prison governor as required under section 69 of the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act. Such individual programme in respect of M.M. takes on additional importance in view of the fact that his prison term was combined with a measure as significant as compulsory psychiatric treatment ordered by the domestic courts in relation to the serious death threats he had made in order to help him develop the capacity to cope with difficult situations in life in a more constructive manner.

57. The Court notes further that the regulation concerning the enforcement of a measure of compulsory psychiatric treatment, namely the relevant provisions of the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act, is of a very general nature. In the Court’s view, the present case shows that these general rules do not properly address the issue of enforcement of obligatory psychiatric treatment as a security measure, thus leaving it completely to the discretion of the prison authorities to decide how to act. However, the Court considers that such regulations need to be sufficient in order to ensure that the purpose of criminal sanctions is properly satisfied. In the present case neither the regulation on the matter nor the court’s judgment ordering M.M.’s compulsory psychiatric treatment provided sufficient details on the administration of this treatment

58. Since no adequate psychiatric treatment was provided to M.M. in the prison there was also no assessment of his condition immediately prior to his release from prison with a view to assessing the risk that, once at large, he might carry out his previous threats against the lives of M.T. and V.T. The Court finds such a failure particularly striking given that his threats had been taken seriously by the courts and that the prior psychiatric report expressly stated that there was a strong likelihood that he might repeat the same or similar offences. In this connection the Court notes that the appellate court established in its judgment of 28 April 2006 that M.M. had not shown any self-criticism as regards his acts or any remorse for what he had said. Furthermore, the Court notes that M.M. said on several occasions that he had meant to kill M.T. and V.T. on the latter’s first birthday which was on 1 March 2006. In view of the fact that M.M. spent that day in prison, a fresh assessment of the threat he posed to the lives of M.T. and V.T. appears to have been all the more necessary before his final release.

59. The Court also notes that the first instance court ordered a measure of compulsory psychiatric treatment against M.M. during his imprisonment and afterwards as necessary as recommended by the psychiatrist (see § 7 above). However, the appellate court reduced that measure to the duration of his prison term since under Croatian law there is no possibility of extending compulsory psychiatric treatment beyond a prison term for those in need of such treatment.

60. In view of the above the Court considers that no adequate measures were taken to diminish the likelihood of M.M. to carry out his threats upon his release from prison (see Osman v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 116).

61. The facts of this case, as established above, are sufficient to enable the Court to find a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 2 of the Convention on account of failure of the relevant domestic authorities to take all necessary and reasonable steps in the circumstances of the present case to afford protection for the lives of M.T. and V.T.

b. Procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention

62. The Court reiterates that the obligation to protect life under Article 2 of the Convention requires that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force, either by State officials or private individuals (see, mutatis mutandis, McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 161, and Kaya, cited above, p. 329, § 105). The essential purpose of such an investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life (see, mutatis mutandis, Paul and Audrey Edwards, cited above, § 69). The authorities must take the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death, or identify the person or persons responsible, will risk falling foul of this standard. Whatever mode is employed, the authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention (see, for example, mutatis mutandis, Ilhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, ECHR 2000-VII, § 63).

63. In the present case it was clear from the beginning that the perpetrator of the acts in question was a private individual, M.M., and his responsibility in that respect has never been put into question. However, M.M. killed himself and therefore any further application of criminal law mechanisms in respect of him became futile.

64. It now remains to be established whether in the circumstances of the present case the State had a further positive obligation to investigate the criminal responsibility of any of the State officials involved. The Court firstly reiterates that although the right to have third parties prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence cannot be asserted independently (see Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 70, ECHR 2004-I), the Court has stated on a number of occasions that an effective judicial system, as required by Article 2, may, and under certain circumstances must, include recourse to the criminal law. However, if the infringement of the right to life or to physical integrity is not caused intentionally, the positive obligation imposed by Article 2 to set up an effective judicial system does not necessarily require the provision of a criminal-law remedy in every case. The Court has already held that in the specific sphere of medical negligence, the obligation may for instance also be satisfied if the legal system affords victims a remedy in the civil courts, either alone or in conjunction with a remedy in the criminal courts, enabling any liability of the doctors concerned to be established and any appropriate civil redress, such as an order for damages and for the publication of the decision, to be obtained. Disciplinary measures may also be envisaged (see Vo v. France [GC], no. 53924/00, § 90, ECHR 2004‑VIII; Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967/96, § 51, ECHR 2002‑I; Lazzarini and Ghiacci v. Italy (dec.), no. 53749/00, 7 November 2002; Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], no. 37703/97, § 90, ECHR 2002-VIII and Tarariyeva v. Russia, no. 4353/03, § 75, ECHR 2006‑... (extracts)). The same should apply in respect of the possible responsibility of State officials for the deaths occurring as a result of their negligence. However, the applicants’ complaint in respect of the substantive aspect of Article 2 of the Convention is not whether there was any individual responsibility of a State official on whatever grounds. The Court considers that the central complaint concentrates on the deficiencies of the national system for the protection of the lives of others from acts of dangerous criminals who have been identified as such by the relevant authorities and the treatment of such individuals, including the legal framework within which the competent authorities are to operate and the mechanisms provided for.

65. In view of the nature of the applicants’ complaint under the substantive aspect of Article 2 of the Convention and the Court’s finding in this respect which imply that the procedures involved were necessarily insufficient from the standpoint of the substantive aspect of Article 2, the Court considers that there is no need for it to examine separately the applicants’ complaint under the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION

66. The applicants further complained that they had no effective remedy at their disposal in respect of their Article 2 complaints. They relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

A. Admissibility

67. The Court finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further finds that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

68. The Government argued that the applicants could have requested a criminal investigation into the deaths of M.T. and V.T. and also brought a civil action for compensation against the State under sections 1100 and 1101 of the Civil Obligations Act.

69. In reply to the Government’s observations, the applicants submitted that there had been no need for them to lodge a separate criminal complaint because the authorities had been aware of all the facts surrounding the deaths of M.T. and V.T. As to the civil remedy relied on by the Government, they argued that it was not accessible to them.

70. The Court notes at the outset that the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention is linked to their complaints under Article 2 of the Convention, which are twofold (see paragraph 29 above). The Court proceeds by examining these two aspects of the alleged violation of Article 13 separately.

71. As regards the applicant’s complaint that they had no effective remedy in respect of their complaint concerning the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention, the Court considers that in view of its findings in respect of that aspect of Article 2, no separate issue is left to be examined under Article 13 of the Convention.

72. As regards the applicant’s complaint that they had no effective remedy in respect of their allegations concerning the substantive violation of Article 2 of the Convention, the Court finds that what the applicants challenge is the whole system for the protection of the lives of persons from the acts of dangerous criminals, including the legal framework within which the competent national authorities are to operate. In the Court’s view, these are more questions of general policing in the national system for the prevention of crimes and not issues which could be properly addressed in any particular proceedings before the ordinary courts. It is not for an ordinary court to say whether the regulatory standards in operation are right or not, but to decide individual cases by applying the existing laws.

73. In this connection the Court reiterates that Article 13 does not guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State’s laws as such to be challenged before a national authority on the ground of being contrary to the Convention or equivalent domestic norms (see James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, § 85 and Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, § 77). In Croatia the Convention has been incorporated into the national legal system and the right to life is also guaranteed by the Constitution and there is a possibility of challenging the constitutionality of the laws before the Constitutional Court. However, the applicants’ main complaint under the substantive aspect of Article 2 of the Convention is not that the existing laws and practices are unconstitutional but that they are deficient in view of the requirements of Article 2 of the Convention, a claim that cannot be challenged before the national courts, since it is for the legislators and politicians involved in devising general criminal policy to deal with such issues.

74. However, the role of an international court for the protection of human rights is quite different from that of the national courts and it is for the former to examine the existing standards for the protection of the lives of persons, including the legal framework of a given State. In these circumstances the Court considers that after having established the State’s responsibility for the deaths of M.T. and V.T. by finding a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 2 of the Convention, no separate issue needs to be examined under Article 13 of the Convention.

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

75. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

76. Each applicant claimed 60,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

77. The Government deemed the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction unsubstantiated and unfounded.

78. The Court notes that it has found that the authorities, in relation to the death of the applicants’ two close relatives breached the Convention. In these circumstances the Court considers that the applicants must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis and having regard to the awards made in comparable cases, it awards the applicants EUR 40,000 jointly under that head, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them.

B. Costs and expenses

79. The applicants also claimed HRK 9,150 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.

80. The Government did not comment.

81. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,300 for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.

C. Default interest

82. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the application admissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its substantive aspect, on account of the lack of appropriate steps to prevent the deaths of M.T. and V.T.;

3. Holds that there is no need to examine separately the complaint under the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention;

4 Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention;

5. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants jointly, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts which are to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) EUR 40,000 (forty thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants;

(ii) EUR 1,300 (one thousand three hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 January 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Søren NielsenChristos Rozakis

RegistrarPresident

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the concurring opinion of Judge Nicolaou is annexed to this judgment.

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE NICOLAOU

It seems to me that what was primarily and urgently required in the present case was effective police protection of the victims, mother and child. That is not to say that psychiatric help, together with social support measures, directed towards the perpetrator of the crimes, should not also have been tried in the search for a better solution to what was, obviously, a very difficult situation.

There is, of course, no way of knowing whether compulsory psychiatric treatment of “ a predominantly psychotherapeutic approach”, as prescribed by expert appointed, would have been effective at least in preventing the loss of life. What, however, is important here is that the courts, both at first instance and on appeal, considered that it was necessary to make such order, described in the relevant law as a “security measure”. It must be assumed that the courts were aware of the regulatory framework in which the order would take effect, including possible difficulties in its enforcement due to the lack of detailed rules. They must, nonetheless, have expected compliance in the absence of which the order would have been devoid of meaning and purpose. There was, unfortunately, no real compliance. As is pointed out in paragraph 56 of the judgment, it has not been shown “that the compulsory psychiatric treatment ordered was actually and properly administered”.

It would, undoubtedly, have been helpful to have had specific rules spelling out the practical steps for the enforcement of psychiatric treatment orders. But I find it difficult to accept that without such rules the order in question was, from its inception, ineffectual. The authorities have not explained convincingly that they did all that was possible to provide an environment in which the order would stand a chance of success. There is in fact no indication that specialist psychiatric help was made available to M.M. and neither is there any indication that efforts were made to enforce the order. It has been said that M.M. was himself reluctant to cooperate; but it should not be assumed that this would have persisted or that it would have prevailed if appropriate expert help, in the right context, had been forthcoming. Therefore, I am unable to subscribe to the view, expressed in paragraph 42 of the judgment, that “in any event the issue here is not a question of whether the authorities acted unlawfully or whether there was any individual responsibility of a State official on whatever grounds”.

In Croatia, under a rule established by domestic case-law, the fact that a person in authority is at fault, whether by act or omission, will not render the State vicariously liable for compensation unless it is shown “that there was an intent on the part of the authorities to cause damage to a third person or acceptance of that outcome”. That restriction seems to me to be inconsistent with full State responsibility which must be regarded as an indispensable component in the protection of life under Article 2.

Having regard to the circumstances of the present case, the prospect of civil liability should not be associated with suppositions concerning what should have been the duration of sufficient treatment that would signal either success or failure. In the absence of actual experience, that could have been gained from properly administered treatment, no valid assessment was possible. Therefore, domestic provisions relating to length of treatment cannot here be directly relevant; a problem regarding duration would arise only where it was positively shown that a longer period of treatment was called for.

Finally and perhaps most importantly, it should have been apparent, if those responsible had carefully reflected on the situation, that the murder victims were, after M.M.’s release from prison, imperatively in need of police protection without which their lives remained in mortal danger. Sadly, nothing at all was done in that direction and, as it seems, no one has been held accountable in any way. In such circumstances individual fault should not be completely discounted by reason of imperfections in regulatory provisions concerning the enforcement of psychiatric treatment orders.

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presude

Presuda Apelacionog suda u Beogradu Gž 330/2023 od 11.11.2023.
nasilje nad ženama nasilje u porodici poštovanje privatnog i porodičnog života nematerijalna šteta pravo na pijetet
Presuda Apelacionog suda u Beogradu Gž2 30/2023 od 28.2.2024.
najbolji interes deteta nasilje u porodici poštovanje porodičnog života roditeljsko pravo izdržavanje deteta