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VIJEĆE EUROPE
EUROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
PRVI ODJEL
PREDMET BISTROVIĆ PROTIV HRVATSKE
(Zahtjev br. 25774/05)
PRESUDA
STRASBOURG 31. svibnja 2007.
U predmetu Bistrović protiv Hrvatske, Europski sud za ljudska prava (Prvi odjel), zasjedajući u vijeću u sastavu:
g. C.L. ROZAKIS, predsjednik,
g. L. LOUCAIDES,
gđa N. VAJIĆ,
g. E. STEINER,
g. K. HAJIYEV,
g. D. SPIELMANN,
g. G. MALINVERNI, suci,
i g. S. NIELSEN, tajnik Odjela,
nakon vijećanja zatvorenog za javnost 10. svibnja 2007. godine donosi sljedeću presudu koja je usvojena tog datuma:
POSTUPAK
Postupak u ovome predmetu pokrenut je na temelju zahtjeva (br. 25774/05) protiv Republike Hrvatske kojeg je 7. lipnja 2005. godine dvoje hrvatskih državljana, g. Josip Bistrović i gđa Jasenka Bistrović („podnositelji zahtjeva“) podnijelo Sudu na temelju članka 34. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda („Konvencija“) .
Podnositelje zahtjeva je zastupao g. M. Ramuščak, odvjetnik iz Varaždina. Hrvatsku Vladu („Vlada“) je zastupala njena zastupnica gđa Š. Stažnik.
Dana 12. rujna 2004. godine Sud je odlučio o zahtjevu obavijestiti Vladu. Primjenjujući članak 29. stavka 3. Konvencije odlučio je istovremeno odlučiti o osnovanosti i dopuštenosti zahtjeva.
ČINJENICE
I. OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA
Podnositelji zahtjeva su rođeni 1951. i 1955. godine i žive u Gojancu, Hrvatska.
Podnositelji zahtjeva, muž i žena, bili su vlasnici kuće i čestice oko nje u Gojancu, Hrvatska. Točno neodređenoga dana „Hrvatske ceste“, javno poduzeće sa sjedištem u Zagrebu, pokrenulo je postupak za izvlaštenje pred Uredom državne uprave u Varaždinskoj Županiji, Službom za prostorno uređenje, zaštitu okoliša, graditeljstvo i imovinsko-pravne poslove (u daljnjem tekstu „Županijski ured Varaždin“) tražeći da se provede izvlaštenje dijela zemljišne čestice podnositelja zahtjeva, radi izgradnje autoceste. Podnositelji zahtjeva su se usprotivili tom zahtjevu, tražeći da njihova nekretnina, i to kuća i okolna zemlja, budu izvlaštene u cijelosti. Podnositelji zahtjeva su ustvrdili da u slučaju djelomičnoga izvlaštenja njima kao poljoprivrednicima kuća i mala površina oko nje ne bi više nikako koristila, budući kuća i poljoprivredno zemljište na kojemu je ona izgrađena predstavlja nedjeljivu cjelinu. Nadalje, ne bi bilo kolnog pristupa dvorištu. Kao poljoprivrednici podnositelji zahtjeva ne bi mogli koristiti svoju imovinu bez da imaju pristup za traktore i druga vozila koja se koriste u poljoprivrednoj djelatnosti.
Osim toga, planirana bi autocesta prošla vrlo blizu kuće, uzrokujući time značajno zagađivanje bukom zbog velike gustoće prometa. Autocesta i izlazna cesta prolazile bi manje od dvadeset metara odnosno pet metara od njihove kuće.
Ukazali su na to da bi izgradnja plastičnih zidova za zaštitu od buke od 4.5 metara pretvorila njihovu kuću i njen okoliš u kavez, a da ih ne bi djelotvorno zaštitila od buke i zagađenja. Cijelo prizemlje, terasa i dio tavana nalazili bi se samo 2 do 3 metra od zaštitnih zidova.
Tvrdili su da bi se znatno smanjila vrijednost preostale imovine, budući bi ih izgradnja autoceste lišila životnih uvjeta koje su do tada uživali, kao što je izravni pristup do ceste, ugodno okruženje, veliko dvorište i niska izloženost buci, što je sve njihovu imovinu činilo pogodnom za poljoprivrednu djelatnost. Iz tih su razloga podnositelji zahtjeva naveli da nemaju nikakav gospodarski interes zadržati kuću i okolišno dvorište.
Županijski ured Varaždin održao je tri ročišta i pribavio mišljenje vještaka o učincima izgradnje autoceste na životne uvjete podnositelja zahtjeva u preostaloj kući i dvorištu, te drugo mišljenje vještaka o tržišnoj cijeni poljoprivrednog zemljišta.
Podnositelji zahtjeva su osporili predloženu razinu naknade, navodeći da imaju pravo na tržišnu vrijednost svog izvlaštenog zemljišta, te tvrdeći da je tržišna vrijednost zemlje pogodne za građenje u tom području 180 hrvatskih kuna (HRK) po kvadratnom metru, broj koji je bio značajno veći od predloženoga iznosa.
Odlukom od 16. travnja 2003. godine Županijski ured Varaždin odlučio je da se izvlašćuje, radi izgradnje autoceste, dio nekretnine podnositelja zahtjeva, i to poljoprivredna čestica i tri čestice zemlje pogodne za građenje od 795 m2, 221m2 odnosno 507m2. Podnositelji zahtjeva zadržali su vlasništvo kuće i okolnog dvorišta.
Određena je naknada u iznosu od 105.610,00 HRK na osnovu iznosa od 22,00 HRK po kvadratnom metru za poljoprivredno zemljište, procijenjenom na temelju izvješća koje je dostavio sudski vještak za poljoprivredu, i 70,00 HRK po kvadratnom metru za zemlju pogodnu za građenje, procijenjenom prema mjerilima koje je odredilo Ministarstvo financija, Porezna uprava, Ispostava Varaždin.
Mjerodavni dio te odluke glasi kako slijedi:
“Tijekom postupka izvlaštenja po punomoćnici “Hrvatskih cesta” d.o.. Zagreb imenovanim vlasnicima ponuđena je naknada od 22,00 kn/m2 za poljoprivredno zemljište i to kao tražena cijena, a koja je utvrđena po poljoprivrednom vještaku dipl.ing.agr. Ivanu Bašić... odnosno 70,00 kn/m2 građevinskog zemljišta, ... ali vlasnik ne prihvaća navedenu naknadu „Hrvatskih cesta“ već ustraje kod svojih zahtjeva za potpunim izvlaštenjem nekretnine čkbr. 9854 k.o. Varaždin sukladno čl. 7. Zakona o izvlaštenju budući kako navodi nema interesa koristiti preostale dijelove nekretnine, točnije tražiti izvlaštenje cjelokupnog zemljišta zajedno sa kućom i svim građevinskim objektima...
...Ovaj je Odsjek pribavio i mišljenje stalnog sudskog vještaka za graditeljstvo Dragutina Gergely ... kao i očitovanje projektanta dipl. ing. geod. Jegec Božidara,... iz kojih je vidljivo da nema potrebe predmetnu nekretninu u cijelosti izvlastiti da ista ima osiguran nesmetan prilaz sa ceste te da su predviđeni zidovi za zaštitu od buke.
...iz svega iznijetog proizlazi da kad bi se prihvatio takav zahtjev izvlaštenika, tada bi i sve druge kuće i gospodarske objekte koji su na istoj ili još manjoj udaljenosti od trase ili objekta jugozapadne obilaznice... trebalo [bi ] izvlastiti...
Također se ne može prihvatiti stajalište izvlaštenika da bi se izvlaštenjem samo dijela čkbr. 9854 k.o. znatno pogoršale njihove stambene prilike...jer izvlaštenici ne prebivaju na navedenoj adresi .”
“Iz obrazloženja citiranog rješenja jasno se može razabrati da je u postupku izvlaštenja tužiteljima (kao prijašnjim vlasnicima) utvrđena naknada u visini tržišne cijene za poljoprivredno zemljište, a utvrđena po stalnom sudskom vještaku za poljodjelstvo.... Te tržišna cijena za neizgrađeno građevinsko zemljište, u skladu sa mišljenjima građevinskih vještaka, te podacima Porezne uprave.
Iz, obrazloženja navedenog rješenja ovaj sud je također utvrdio da ... da je u vezi zahtjeva tužitelja za otkup preostalog dijela nekretnine, te mogućnost pristupa na nekretninu tužitelja sa ceste, pribavljeno mišljenje sudskog vještaka za graditeljstvo ... te očitovanje projektanta ... iz čijeg mišljenja proizlazi neosnovanost zahtjeva tužitelja za potpunim izvlaštenjem, iz razloga jer na istom području postoji još niz drugih kuća i gospodarskih objekata koji su, ili na istoj ili još manjoj udaljenosti od trase obilaznice, time da je svim ovlaštenicima osigurana zaštita od buke, da preostali dio nekretnine tužitelja ima nesmetan prilaz sa ceste, zbog čega ne postoje nikakvi opravdani razlozi zahtjevu tužitelja za potpuno izvlaštenje preostalog dijela ...
...ovaj sud je utvrdio da u upravnom postupku nisu počinjene nikakve, a osobito ne teške povrede postupka, smatrajući da je i materijalno pravo pravilno pirmjenjeno, kako u odnosu na odbijanje zahtjeva tužitelja za potpunim izvlaštenjem preostalog dijela njihove nekretnine, tako i u odnosu na utvrđenu visinu naknade, kako za poljoprivredno tako i za neizgrađeno građevinsko zemljište.
Kao što je već istaknuto, tužitelji u postupku pred sudom nisu ovlašteni iznositi nikakve nove činjenice, osim onih iznesenih u upravnom postupku, no, ovlašteni su u pogledu činjenica, koje su iznijeli u upravnom postupku, predložiti nove dokaze.
Ni uz tužbu, a ni tijekom postupka, tužitelji u odnosu na svoje prigovore i razloge zbog kojih zahtijevaju poništenje rješenja Ureda državne uprave ... od 16. travnja 2003. g., nisu doprinjeli nikakve dokaze kojima bi činjenice, na kojima je temeljeno citirano rješenje u odnosu na odbijanje zahtjeva tužitelja za otkup preostalog dijela njihove nekretnine ... mogle biti dovedene u sumnju...“
Podnositelji zahtjeva su tada podnijeli ustavnu tužbu, tvrdeći da je povrijeđeno njihovo pravo na jednakost pred zakonom, njihovo pravo na pošteno suđenje i njihovo pravo na žalbu, jer da nisu mogli Županijskom sudu u Varaždinu dostaviti nove dokaze i da je taj sud donio svoju odluku, a da mu nisu bili predočeni nikakvi dokazi. Tako se o njihovim prigovorima na mišljenje vještaka i o njihovim navodima o učincima izgradnje autoceste na njihove životne uvjete i na vrijednost njihove preostale imovine nije raspravljalo. Podnositelji zahtjeva su također tvrdili da je bilo povrijeđeno njihovo pravo na naknadu tržišne vrijednosti njihove izvlaštene imovine.
Dana 16. prosinca 2004. godine Ustavni sud je odbio ustavnu tužbu podnositelja zahtjeva kao neosnovanu. Odluka Ustavnoga suda glasi kako slijedi:
1. Ustavna tužba je podnijeta protiv presude Županijskog suda u Varaždinu, broj: P-1/03-9 od 30. prosinca 2003. godine, kojom je odbijena tužba podnositelja (tužitelja), podnijeta protiv tuženika Ministarstva pravosuđa, uprave i lokalne samouprave Republike Hrvatske, a radi poništenja rješenja Ureda državne uprave, Službe za prostorno uređenje, zaštitu okoliša, graditeljstvo i imovinsko-pravne poslove, klasa: UP/I-943-04/02-01/1936, ur.broj: 2186-05-05-03-11 od 16. travnja 2003. godine.
Prvostupanjskim upravnim rješenjem prihvaćen je prijedlog "H. c." d.o.o., Z., te je djelomično izvlaštena nekretnina k.č. broj 9854, k.o. V., u suvlasništvu podnositelja, te je određena naknada za izvlašteno zemljište, za ulaganja u zemljište i za poljoprivredne kulture u iznosu od 105.610,00 kuna.
2. Podnositelji ustavne tužbe smatraju povrijeđenim ustavno pravo iz članaka 14. stavka 2., 18., 29. stavka 1. i 50. stavka 1. Ustava Republike Hrvatske.
U ustavnoj tužbi podnositelji navode da je u postupku pogrešno utvrđeno činjenično stanje, budući da smatraju da je njihovu nekretninu trebalo izvlastiti u cijelosti, a ne samo djelomično. Smatraju da je Županijski sud trebao pribaviti cjelokupan spis upravnog predmeta i provjeriti nalaze vještaka u svezi utvrđenja da se ne treba izvlastiti cjelokupna nekretnina, kao i u svezi visine naknade, za koju smatraju da nije tržišna, već da je određena prema tablicama Porezne uprave. Smatraju da im je posebice povrijeđeno pravo na žalbu, jer u postupku pred Županijskim sudom nisu mogli iznositi nove činjenice, te da se upravo zbog toga čitav postupak pred nadležnim sudom može smatrati samovoljnim i arbitrarnim.
Od Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske traže ukidanje osporene presude.
Ustavna tužba nije osnovana.
3. Prema odredbi članka 62. stavka 1. Ustavnog zakona o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske ("Narodne novine", broj 49/02. - pročišćeni tekst, u daljnjem tekstu: Ustavni zakon), svatko može podnijeti Ustavnom sudu ustavnu tužbu ako smatra da mu je pojedinačnim aktom tijela državne vlasti, tijela jedinice lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave ili pravne osobe s javnim ovlastima, kojim je odlučeno o njegovim pravima i obvezama ili o sumnji ili optužbi zbog kažnjivog djela, povrijeđeno ljudsko pravo ili temeljna sloboda zajamčena Ustavom, odnosno Ustavom zajamčeno pravo na lokalnu i područnu (regionalnu) samoupravu.
Ustavni sud, u postupku u povodu ustavne tužbe, u granicama zahtjeva istaknutog u ustavnoj tužbi, utvrđuje je li u postupku odlučivanja o pravima i obvezama podnositelja, povrijeđeno podnositelju ustavno pravo, pri čemu se, u pravilu, ne upušta u pitanje jesu li sudovi pravilno i potpuno utvrdili činjenično stanje i ocijenili dokaze. Za Ustavni sud relevantne su samo one činjenice od čijeg postojanja ovisi ocjena o povredi ustavnog prava.
4. Predmetni postupak pred Županijskim sudom u Varaždinu podnositelji su pokrenuli na temelju odredbe članka 42a. stavka 3. Zakona o izvlaštenju ("Narodne novine", broj 9/94., 35/94., 112/00. - odluka Ustavnog suda i 114/01.), jer drugostupanjsko tijelo (Ministarstvo pravosuđa) nije u zakonom propisanom roku odlučilo o njihovoj žalbi. U takvom postupku, sud odlučuje o zakonitosti prvostupanjskog rješenja o izvlaštenju, na temelju činjenica koje su iznesene u tužbi i u odgovoru na tužbu tuženog tijela (ako isto odgovori u određenom roku), sve sukladno članku 42e.stavku 3. istog Zakona.
Po tužbi podnositelja proveden je postupak uz valjanu primjenu odredaba članka 42e. stavaka 1. i 2. Zakona o izvlaštenju, kojima je propisano:
Vijeće raspravlja i odlučuje na temelju činjenica koje su iznesene u upravnom postupku.
Stranka u tužbi ne može iznositi nove činjenice, ali može predložiti nove dokaze u pogledu činjenica koje je iznijela u upravnom postupku.
U svezi naknade za oduzeto zemljište, Županijski sud utvrđuje da je ta naknada određena u visini tržišne naknade za poljoprivredno zemljište, a utvrđena je po stalnom sudskom vještaku za poljodjelstvo, a visina naknade za građevinsko zemljište određena je na temelju mišljenja građevinskog vještaka i podataka Porezne uprave.
Glede potpunog izvlaštenja, koje su podnositelji tražili tijekom čitavog postupka izvlaštenja, Županijski sud u Varaždinu utvrdio je osnovanom ocjenu prvostupanjskog tijela da zemljište podnositelja ne treba u cijelosti izvlastiti, jer iz rezultata dokaznog postupka provedenog pred upravnim tijelom nedvojbeno proizlazi da na istom području postoji niz drugih kuća i gospodarskih objekata koji su na istoj ili na manjoj udaljenosti od koridora buduće obilaznice, time da je svim vlasnicima objekata osigurana zaštita od buke. Posebice je utvrđeno da preostali dio nekretnine podnositelja ima nesmetan prilaz sa ceste, zbog čega ne postoje opravdani razlozi za izvlaštenje preostalog dijela nekretnine u smislu članka 7. Zakona o izvlaštenju.
Županijski sud u Varaždinu utvrđuje da u provedenom postupku izvlaštenja nisu počinjene teške povrede postupka niti je materijalno pravo pogrešno utvrđeno, a posebice navodi da podnositelji nisu doprinijeli nikakve nove dokaze kojima bi činjenice na kojima se temelji pobijano rješenje mogle biti dovedene u sumnju.
5. Podnositelji u ustavnoj tužbi ističu da im je osporenom presudom povrijeđeno ustavno jamstvo jednakosti svih pred zakonom, zajamčeno člankom 14. stavkom 2. Ustava.
Utvrdivši da pravna stajališta Županijskog suda u Varaždinu u konkretnom slučaju nisu odstupila od ustaljene prakse u primjeni mjerodavnog materijalnog prava, niti su diskriminatorna po bilo kojoj ustavnoj osnovi, Ustavni sud nije prihvatio navode podnositelja da im u konkretnom slučaju nije osigurana jednakost pred zakonom, zajamčena člankom 14. stavkom 2. Ustava.
6. Nadalje, analizom navoda iz ustavne tužbe, osporavanih odluka, te spisa predmeta, Ustavni sud je, u pogledu navoda ustavne tužbe o povredi prava na žalbu, propisanog odredbom članka 18. Ustava, utvrdio da isti nisu osnovani, jer se o svim razlozima koje su podnositelji isticali tijekom žalbenog postupka očitovao nadležni sud, čija je nadležnost određena člankom 42a. Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o izvlaštenju („Narodne novine“, broj 114/01).
7. Ustavni sud je utvrdio da podnositeljima nije povrijeđeno ustavno pravo na pravično suđenje pred zakonom ustanovljenim neovisnim i nepristranim sudom (članak 29. stavak 1. Ustava), na čiju povredu također ukazuju.
Pravo na pravično suđenje bilo bi povrijeđeno ako stranci u postupku ne bi bila dana mogućnost da bude saslušana i da u okviru zakona sudjeluje u postupku, ako joj ne bi bila dana mogućnost da iznosi činjenice i predlaže dokaze, a nadležni sud se ne bi izjasnio o njenim navodima važnim za odlučivanje, ako pojedinačni akt protivno zakonu nije obrazložen, te da stranci na drugi način nije omogućeno pravično suđenje pred nadležnim tijelom ustanovljenim zakonom.
Budući da je Županijski sud u Varaždinu na temelju raspoloživih dokaza uz provjeru obrazloženja pobijanog rješenja o izvlaštenju izvršio nadzor zakonitosti tog rješenja u smislu odredbi Zakona o izvlaštenju, dakle postupak je proveo nadležni sud u skladu s odgovarajućim zakonskim odredbama materijalnog i procesnog prava, Ustavni je sud ocijenio da podnositeljima nije povrijeđeno navedeno ustavno pravo.
8. Podnositelji, također, smatraju da im je povrijeđeno i ustavno pravo propisano odredbom članka 50. stavka 1. Ustava.
Zakonom je moguće u interesu Republike Hrvatske ograničiti ili oduzeti vlasništvo, uz naknadu tržišne vrijednosti.
Kako je nadležni Županijski sud utvrdio da je postupak izvlaštenja proveden sukladno odredbama Zakona o izvlaštenju, uz pravilnu primjenu materijalnog prava i bez teških povreda postupka, te kako je, prema utvrđenjima istog Suda, podnositeljima određena naknada za oduzeto zemljište u visini tržišne vrijednosti, ustavno pravo nije povrijeđeno.
9. Stoga je, na temelju odredaba članaka 73. i 75. Ustavnog zakona, odlučeno kao u izreci.
II. MJERODAVNO DOMAĆE PRAVO
19. Mjerodavni dijelovi Zakona o izvlaštenju („Narodne novine“, broj 9/94, 35/94, 112/00, 114/01, 79/06 ) propisuju kako slijedi:
Članak 7. daje pravo vlasniku djelomično izvlaštene nekretnine tražiti potpuno izvlaštenje ako nema nikakvog interesa koristiti preostali dio imovine.
Članci 8. i 33. traže da naknada za izvlaštenu imovinu bude jednaka tržišnoj vrijednosti te imovine na dan donošenja prvostupanjske odluke u postupku za izvlaštenje.
Člankom 42., stavkom 1. dopuštena je tužba protiv drugostupanjskog rješenja o izvlaštenju mjesno nadležnom županijskom sudu.
Članak 42.a, stavak 3. propisuje da se takva tužba može podnijeti i ako drugostupanjsko upravno tijelo ne odluči o žalbi protiv prvostupanjske upravne odluke.
Članak 42.b propisuje da se u postupku izvlaštenja koji se vodi pred županijskim sudom na odgovarajući način primjenjuju odredbe Zakona o upravnim sporovima, ako nije drugačije propisano.
Članak 42.e, stavci 1. i 2. obvezuju nadležan županijski sud da odluči na temelju činjenica iznesenih u prethodnom upravnom postupku, te sprečavaju tužitelja iznositi nove činjenice, ali istovremeno dozvoljavaju predlaganje novih dokaza pred županijskim sudom.
Članak 42.e, stavak 3. propisuje da županijski sud, kad postupa po tužbi podnesenoj na temelju 42.a stavka 3. ispita predmet na temelju činjenica koje su iznesene u tužbi i odgovoru na tužbu tuženoga tijela koje je donijelo pobijanu odluku.
20. Članak 60. Zakona o upravnim sporovima („Narodne novine“, br. 53/1991, 9/1992 i 77/1992) propisuje primjenu Zakona o parničnom postupku na postupke u upravnim sporovima, ukoliko ti postupci nisu uređeni Zakonom o upravnim sporovima.
21. Članak 428.a Zakona o parničnom postupku daje mogućnost podnositelju zahtjeva u odnosu na kojega je Europski sud za ljudska prava utvrdio povredu Konvencije ili njenih protokola zatražiti ponavljanje domaćega postupka o kojemu se radi, u roku od 30 dana od kad presuda Suda postane konačnom. U ponovljenom postupku domaći sudovi obvezni su slijediti obrazloženje dano u presudi Suda.
PRAVO
I. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANKA 1. PROTOKOLA BR. 1.
22. Podnositelji zahtjeva su prigovorili da nisu primili punu tržišnu vrijednost svoje izvlaštene imovine i da se u postupku za izvlaštenje nije vodilo računa o značajno smanjenoj vrijednosti njihove preostale imovine. Pozvali su se na članak 1. Protokola br. 1. Konvencije, koji glasi kako slijedi:
„Svaka fizička ili pravna osoba ima pravo na mirno uživanje svojega vlasništva. Nitko se ne smije lišiti svoga vlasništva, osim u javnom interesu, i to samo uz uvjete predviđene zakonom i općim načelima međunarodnog prava.
Prethodne odredbe, međutim, ni na koji način ne umanjuju pravo države da primijeni zakone koje smatra potrebnima da bi uredila upotrebu vlasništva u skladu s općim interesom ili za osiguranje plaćanja poreza ili drugih doprinosa ili kazni.“
23. Vlada je osporila tu tvrdnju.
A. Dopuštenost
24. Vlada je tvrdila da podnositelji zahtjeva nisu iscrpili domaća pravna sredstva jer nisu podnijeli građansku tužbu za naknadu štete za izlaganje buci i opasnim imisijama. Pozvali su se na nalaze Suda u predmetu Cokarić v. Croatia (dec), br. 33212/02, 19. siječnja 2006.) gdje je utvrđeno kako slijedi:
„na temelju članka 156. Zakona o obveznim odnosima svatko može tražiti sprečavanje nastanka, između ostalog, ekološke štete. Štoviše, na temelju istog članka, vlasnik imovine može tražiti naknadu za štetu pretrpljenu pri izvođenju aktivnosti od općeg interesa. Uzimajući u obzir praksu Vrhovnog suda u tom pogledu, koja pokazuje da gore navedeni članak pokriva imovinsku štetu jednako kao i mogući pad vrijednosti imovine, Sud nalazi da su podnositelji zahtjeva trebali podnijeti takvu tužbu nadležnim domaćim sudovima, što ih je učinilo samo troje.“
25. Podnositelji zahtjeva su tvrdili da njihova situacija nema nikakve veze s predmetom Cokarić, jer su se sve odluke mjerodavne za izvlaštenje njihove imovine trebale donijeti tijekom postupka za izvlaštenje.
26. Sud primjećuje da pravilo o iscrpljivanju domaćih pravnih lijekova sadržano u članku 35., stavku 1. Konvencije zahtijeva da podnositelj zahtjeva ima redovni put do pravnih sredstava koja su dostupna i dovoljna da osiguraju zadovoljštinu u odnosu na navodne povrede (vidi, među ostalim izvorima prava, presudu u predmetu Akdivar and Others vs. Turkey od 16. rujna 1996., Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, str. 1210, § 65). Postojanje dotičnih pravnih sredstava mora biti dovoljno sigurno ne samo u teoriji, nego i u praksi, a ako to nije tako, tada će tim pravnim sredstvima nedostajati potrebna dostupnost i učinkovitost (ibid.).
27. Osim toga, prilikom primjene pravila mora se dostatno uzeti u obzir činjenica da se ono primjenjuje u kontekstu mehanizma za zaštitu ljudskih prava kojeg su se ugovorne stranke sporazumjele uspostaviti (ibid., § 69). Sukladno tome, Sud je priznao da se članak 35, stavak 1. mora primjenjivati uz određeni stupanj fleksibilnosti, te bez pretjeranog formalizma (vidi, na primjer, presudu u predmetu Cardot v. France od 19. ožujka 1991., Serija A br. 200, str.18, § 34). On je nadalje priznao da pravilo o iscrpljivanju domaćih pravnih sredstava nije ni apsolutno, niti se može primijeniti automatski; prilikom ispitivanja je li ono bilo poštivano, bitno je uzeti u obzir osobite okolnosti svakog pojedinog predmeta (vidi, na primjer, presudu u predmetu Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium od 6. studenog 1980., Serija A br. 40, str. 18, § 35). To između ostalog znači da on mora realno uzeti u obzir ne samo postojanje formalnih pravnih sredstava u pravnom sustavu dotične ugovorne stranke, već i sveukupni pravni i politički kontekst unutar kojeg one djeluju, kao i osobne prilike podnositelja zahtjeva (vidi naprijed citiranu presudu u predmetu Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, str. 1211, § 69).
28.Sud na početku primjećuje da su u predmetu Cokarić na koji se pozvala Vlada podnositelji zahtjeva prigovorili da su pretrpjeli štetne utjecaje na svoje životne uvjete i imovinu, zbog velike blizine novo uspostavljenih odvodnih radova, koji je prigovor stavljen bez obzira na bilo koji domaći postupak koji bi uključivao mogućnost da podnositeljima zahtjeva bude dosuđena naknada bilo koje vrste. Međutim, u ovome se predmetu radi o postupku za izvlaštenje u kojemu je dio nekretnine podnositelja zahtjeva bio podvrgnut izvlaštenju. Normalno je da se tijekom takvog postupka odredi iznos naknade, vodeći računa o svim mjerodavnim čimbenicima kao što je smanjenje vrijednosti preostale imovine zbog bilo kojih okolnosti. Sud stoga smatra da podnositelji zahtjeva, koji su bili stranka u postupku za izvlaštenje i koji su iznijeli svoje prigovore u odnosu na naknadu utvrđenu tijekom toga postupka, nisu morali pokrenuti poseban građanski postupak u tom pogledu. U takvim bi okolnostima takav zahtjev prekomjerno rastegnuo njihove dužnosti na temelju članka 35., stavka 1. Konvencije.
29. Sud primjećuje da ovaj prigovor nije očigledno neosnovan u smislu članka 35., stavka 3. Konvencije. Nadalje primjećuje da nije nedopušten ni po kojoj drugoj osnovi. Stoga treba biti proglašen dopuštenim.
B. Osnovanost
Tvrdnje stranaka
30.Nakon sažimanja načela utvrđenih sudskom praksom Suda u odnosu na članak 1. Protokola br. 1. Vlada je ustvrdila da u ovome predmetu zakonitost miješanja i legitimni cilj nisu sporni. Glede toga je li miješanje bilo razmjerno, tvrdili su da su podnositelji zahtjeva prigovorili samo činjenici da njihova nekretnina nije bila izvlaštena u cijelosti, jer, kao što su tvrdili, kuća i njen okoliš nisu bili prikladni za život budući da se nalaze preblizu autocesti u izgradnji. Vlada je ustvrdila da su ovi prigovori potpuno neosnovani, budući se preostali dio nekretnine podnositelja zahtjeva nalazi 40 metara od autoceste, i da će se, po dovršetku autoceste, nalaziti 80 metara od nje. Nadalje, na istoj udaljenosti od autoceste nalazi se i četrnaest drugih kuća, i te kuće nisu izvlaštene. Predviđene su mjere zaštite od buke. Konačno, tvrdili su da podnositelji zahtjeva nisu prigovorili iznosu naknade pred prvostupanjskim upravnim tijelom. Po mišljenju Vlade, podnositelji zahtjeva su dobili tržišnu vrijednost svoje imovine te je država stoga ispunila svoje obveze na temelju članka 1., Protokola br. 1. Tvrdili su da sudska praksa Suda nije uvela nikakvu obvezu država da nečiju imovinu izvlaste u cijelosti.
31.Podnositelji zahtjeva su se usprotivili tim tvrdnjama i naveli da im je nametnut prekomjeran pojedinačni teret zbog toga što nisu dobili tržišnu vrijednost za svoju izvlaštenu imovinu, te zbog smanjene vrijednosti njihove preostale imovine i nepodnošljivih životnih uvjeta u njihovoj kući, koja se sada nalazi manje od 3 metra od autoceste. Nadalje su osporili tvrdnju Vlade da se na istoj ili manjoj udaljenosti od autoceste nalazi četrnaest drugih kuća, tvrdeći da je njihova kuća jedina u krajnjoj blizini autoceste.
Ocjena Suda
32. Sud primjećuje na početku kako je u ovome predmetu nesporno da su podnositelji zahtjeva lišeni svoje imovine radi izgradnje autoceste u skladu s odredbama Zakona o izvlaštenju, i da je tako izvlaštenje imalo zakonit cilj u javnome interesu. Prema tome, na ovaj je predmet primjenjiva druga rečenica prvoga stavka članka 1. Protokola br. 1. (vidi, između mnogo drugih izvora prava, presude u predmetima Mellacher and Others v. Austria, 19. prosinac 1989., Serija A br. 169, str 24-25, stavak 42. i Papachelas v. Greece [GC], br. 31423/96, stavak 45., ECHR 1999-II).
33. Bitni je cilj članka 1. Protokola br. 1. zaštiti pojedince protiv neopravdanoga miješanja od strane države u mirno uživanje njihovoga vlasništva. Međutim, na temelju članka 1. Konvencije, svaka ugovorna stranka „osigurat će svakoj osobi pod svojom jurisdikcijom prava i slobode određene u ... Konvenciji“. Izvršavanje ove opće dužnosti može za sobom povlačiti pozitivne obveze koje su dio osiguranja djelotvornog vršenja prava zajamčenih Konvencijom. U kontekstu članka 1. Protokola br. 1. ove pozitivne obveze mogu tražiti da država poduzme mjere potrebne za zaštitu prava na imovinu (vidi predmete Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, br. 48553/99, stavak 96., ECHR 2002-VII i Broniowski v. Poland [GC], br. 31443/96, stavak 143., ECHR 2004-V), posebice kad postoji izravna veza između mjera koje podnositelj zahtjeva može legitimno očekivati od vlasti i djelotvornoga uživanja svojega vlasništva (vidi predmet Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], br. 48939/99, stavak 134-, ECHR 2004-XII). To znači, posebice, da države imaju obvezu osigurati sudske postupke koji nude potrebna postupovna jamstva i stoga omogućavaju domaćim sudovima da presuđuju djelotvorno i pošteno u svim predmetima koji se tiču pitanja vlasništva (vidi, mutatis mutandis, naprijed citirani predmet Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, stavak 96.).
U svakome predmetu u kojemu se radi o navodnoj povredi ove odredbe, Sud mora utvrditi
je li, zbog miješanja ili zbog pasivnosti države, postignuta poštena ravnoteža između zahtjeva općega interesa zajednice i zahtjeva za zaštitom temeljnih prava pojedinca. Potraga za ovom ravnotežom sadržana je u cijeloj Konvenciji te je također odražena u strukturi članka 1. Protokola br. 1. (vidi presudu u predmetu Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, od 23. rujna 1982, Serija A br. 52, str. 26, stavak 69. i Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, br. 47148/99, stavak 101., 22. veljače 2005.). Uvjeti naknade na temelju mjerodavnoga zakonodavstva bitni su za procjenu poštuje li pobijana mjera traženu poštenu ravnotežu i, osobito, ne nameće li nerazmjeran teret podnositelju zahtjeva. S tim u vezi, oduzimanje imovine bez plaćanja iznosa koji je razumno povezan s njenom vrijednošću redovno će predstavljati nerazmjerno miješanje koje se ne može opravdati na temelju članka 1. Međutim, taj članak ne jamči pravo na potpunu naknadu u svim okolnostima, budući da legitimni ciljevi „javnoga interesa“ mogu tražiti manje od naknade pune tržišne vrijednosti (vidi presudu u predmetu Holy Monasteries (The) v. Greece, od 9. prosinca 1994., Serija A br. 301-A, str. 34-35, stavci 70.-71. i naprijed citirani predmet Papachelas v. Greece, stavak 48.).
Kako bi ocijenio je li ponašanje države u skladu sa zahtjevima članka 1. Protokola br. 1., Sud mora uzeti u obzir činjenicu da je namjera Konvencije jamčiti prava koja su praktična i djelotvorna. On mora ići ispod površine i pogledati stvarnost situacije što traži sveukupno ispitivanje raznih interesa o kojima se radi; to može tražiti analizu ne samo uvjeta naknade – ako je situacija slična oduzimanju imovine (vidi na primjer presudu u predmetu Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, od 8. srpnja 1986., Serija A br. 102, str. 50-51, stavci 120.-121.) – nego, kao što je to slučaj u ovome predmetu, i ponašanja stranaka u postupku, uključujući i korake koje je poduzela država (vidi predmet Beyeler v. Italy [GC], br.33202/96, stavak114., ECHR 2000-I, i naprijed citirani predmet Novoseltskiy v. Ukraine, stavak 102.).
Okrećući se konkretnim okolnostima ovoga predmeta, Sud primjećuje da su podnositelji zahtjeva zatražili od Županijskog suda u Varaždinu da ponovno razmotri upravnu odluku kojom je izvlašten dio njihove nekretnine i procijenjena naknada koju treba platiti za to izvlaštenje. Sud primjećuje da stvar o kojoj treba odlučiti predstavlja najozbiljnije miješanje u pravo podnositelja zahtjeva zajamčeno člankom 1. Protokola br. 1., budući se tiče izvlaštenja njihove imovine. Imajući na umu najveću važnost posljedica izvlaštenja po vlasnička prava podnositelja zahtjeva, Sud smatra da je bilo potrebno pažljivo ispitivanje svih mjerodavnih čimbenika od strane suda koji postupa u tom predmetu kako bi se osiguralo da se poštuju zahtjevi iz članka 1. Protokola br. 1.
U tom pogledu Sud također ponavlja da postupci pred sudovima moraju biti u skladu s vladavinom prava, koja se može poistovjetiti s dobrim radom pravosuđa te da bi prava zajamčena Konvencijom bila iluzorna i teorijska, kad ne bi postojala obveza sudskih vlasti da obrazlože svoje odluke. Iako ne traži podroban odgovor na svaku tvrdnju predočenu pred sudom, ova obveza ipak pretpostavlja pravo stranke u postupku da se njezine navode pažljivo ispita (vidi naprijed citirani predmet Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, stavak 111.).
Sud primjećuje da je u ovome predmetu postojao ozbiljan spor glede primarnih činjenica. Podnositelji zahtjeva su tvrdili tijekom postupka da je djelomično izvlaštenje značajno smanjilo gospodarsku vrijednost preostale imovine kao i da im ju je učinila beskorisnom iz raznih razloga, kao što je nepostojanje kolnog pristupa imovini, vrlo velika blizina autoceste njihovoj kući i neodgovarajuća zaštita od buke i zagađenja. Međutim, iako je Županijski sud raspravio dio tvrdnji podnositelja zahtjeva, on nije odgovorio na njihove glavne prigovore koji se odnose na nalaze upravnih vlasti.
Tako je ostao neodgovoren jedan broj pitanja mjerodavnih za prava podnositelja zahtjeva na temelju članka 1. Protokola br. 1., kao što je metoda izračuna tržišne vrijednosti imovine podnositelja zahtjeva, precizan učinak planirane autoceste na njihove životne uvjete, tvrdnje stranaka da je mišljenje vještaka na koje se pozvala odluka upravnih vlasti bilo izrađeno bez da je vještak ikada posjetio konkretnu lokaciju. Nadalje, presudno pitanje koje se tiče učinka djelomičnoga izvlaštenja na vrijednost preostale nekretnine podnositelja zahtjeva nikada nije bilo raspravljeno i tako pri procjeni naknade koju treba dosuditi nije uzeto u obzir moguće smanjenje ove vrijednosti.
U tom pogledu Sud podsjeća da je on već u mnogo navrata ispitao odbijanje domaćih vlasti da odrede posebno obeštećenje za imovinu koja je ostala njezinim vlasnicima nakon djelomičnoga izvlaštenja. U nekim je predmetima Sud utvrdio da pri određivanju naknade domaći sudovi nisu uzeli u obzir narav građevine i je li ona ili nije osigurala neku prednost vlasnicima, nego su samo odredili naknadu u odnosu na stvarno izvlaštene čestice. Sud je međutim smatrao da se, s obzirom na slobodu procjene ostavljenu nacionalnim vlastima na temelju članka 1. Protokola br. 1., čini kako nema naznaka koje bi tražile zaključak da obijanje dati posebnu zadovoljštinu može predstavljati povredu članka 1. Protokola br. 1 (vidi, na primjer, predmete Azas v. Greece, br. 50824/99, stavke 51.-53., 19. rujna 2002. i Interoliva ABEE v. Greece, br. 58642/00, 10. srpnja 2003.).
Međutim, u predmetu Ouzounoglou v. Greece Sud je utvrdio da je izgradnja autoceste u velikoj blizini kuće podnositeljice zahtjeva (oko 15 metara) sigurno ograničila slobodno raspolaganje njenim pravom na korištenje kuće, a za koje ograničenje se utvrdilo da predstavlja miješanje u pravo podnositeljice zahtjeva na mirno uživanje njenoga vlasništva, i da je narav građevine očigledno izravnije pridonijela bitnome smanjenju vrijednosti preostale imovine nego u drugim, naprijed navedenim, predmetima koji se tiču Grčke (vidi predmet Ouzounoglou v. Greece, br. 32730/03, stavak 30., 24. studeni 2005.). Stoga takvo miješanje može tražiti davanje dodatne naknade za ograničeno korištenje kuće.
Po mišljenju Suda ovaj predmet spada u ovu potonju kategoriju predmeta. U tom pogledu Sud primjećuje da su podnositelji zahtjeva tvrdili da će buduća autocesta prolaziti dva do tri metra od njihove kuće i da je nekretnina izgubila svoj do tada ugodan okoliš, jako veliko dvorište i nisku izloženost buci, a što je sve tu imovinu činilo vrlo pogodnom za poljoprivredne aktivnosti. Sud primjećuje da domaće vlasti nisu vodile računa o niti jednome od ovih čimbenika kad su odredile naknadu za izvlaštenu imovinu podnositelja zahtjeva.
Nadalje, tijekom cijeloga domaćeg postupka podnositelji zahtjeva su tvrdili da je mišljenje vještaka koje je poslužilo kao osnova za procjenu učinaka autoceste na njihovu preostalu imovinu bilo izrađeno bez da je vještak ikada posjetio stvarnu lokaciju, što je dovelo do toga da je njihova kuća pogrešno ucrtana. Sud smatra da je bilo potrebno na precizan način utvrditi ove činjenice tako da se dalje potvrdi tvrdnja podnositelja zahtjeva da je njihova kuća pogrešno ucrtana na karti zemljišne čestice. Tek bi nakon takve potvrde svih čimbenika koji se tiču učinaka izgradnje autoceste na preostalu imovinu podnositelja zahtjeva, kao što je smanjenje vrijednosti njihove nekretnine, mogućnost njene prodaje i interes podnositelja zahtjeva za daljnjim korištenjem preostalog dijela nekretnine, domaće vlasti mogle odrediti odgovarajuću naknadu u postupku za izvlaštenje.
Sud stoga nalazi da time što nisu utvrdile sve mjerodavne čimbenike za utvrđivanje naknade za izvlaštenu imovinu podnositelja zahtjeva, i time što nisu dodijelile obeštećenje za smanjenu vrijednost njihove preostale nekretnine, nacionalne vlasti nisu postigle poštenu ravnotežu između uključenih interesa te da nisu uložile napore da osiguraju odgovarajuću zaštitu vlasničkih prava podnositelja zahtjeva u kontekstu postupka za izvlaštenje koji je uključivao krajnje miješanje države u ova prava.
S obzirom na naprijed rečeno, Sud nalazi da je došlo do povrede prava podnositelja zahtjeva na mirno uživanje njihovoga vlasništva, zajamčenog člankom 1. Protokola br. 1.
II. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANKA 6. STAVKA 1. KONVENCIJE
46. Podnositelji zahtjeva su tvrdili da postupak koji su pokrenuli po hrvatskom pravu pred Županijskim sudom u Varaždinu radi pobijanja upravne odluke koja se odnosi na izvlaštenje njihove imovine nije bio u skladu s člankom 6., stavkom 1. Konvencije, koji u mjerodavnom dijelu propisuje:
“Radi utvrđivanja svojih prava i obveza građanske naravi....svatko ima pravo...da sud...u razumnom roku ispita njegov slučaj.“
47. Vlada je ustvrdila da je bilo potrebno, prvo, utvrditi u kojoj su mjeri prava podnositelja zahtjeva, zajamčena člankom 6., stavkom 1. Konvencije, bila zaštićena u upravnom postupku koji je prethodio ispitivanju predmeta od strane Županijskoga suda.
48. U tom su pogledu tvrdili da su osnovna načela koja se primjenjuju u postupku pred upravnim tijelima, kao što je načelo zakonitosti, načelo materijalne istine, davanje prilike strankama da iznesu svoj predmet, neovisna ocjena dokaza i pravo na žalbu, sva pokazala da je taj postupak bio proveden u skladu s jamstvima sadržanim u članku 6. stavku 1. Konvencije. Nadležno upravno tijelo je u ovome predmetu održalo tri ročišta na kojima su podnositelji zahtjeva mogli iznijeti svoje dokaze i činjenice. Međutim, podnositelji zahtjeva nisu iznijeli nikakve dokaze na tim ročištima. Predmet je ispitao nadležni županijski sud, koji je, po mišljenju Vlade i s obzirom na članke 42.a do 42.h Zakona o izvlaštenju, zadovoljio zahtjeve suda pune nadležnosti na način da je taj sud bio nadležan ispitivati i činjenična i pravna pitanja. Jedino ograničenje ticalo se iznošenja novih činjenica koje nisu bile prethodno iznijete u upravnom postupku. Međutim, takvo ograničenje nije dovelo u pitanje punu nadležnost županijskoga suda, jer je načelo pravne sigurnosti i učinkovitoga vođenja postupka tražilo da se zaniječe mogućnost iznošenja novih činjenica nakon određene faze postupka, obično u žalbenoj fazi, bez negativnog utjecaja na punu nadležnost žalbenih sudova
49. Vlada je nadalje ustvrdila da su podnositelji zahtjeva samo ponovili prigovore koji su već bili izneseni tijekom upravnog postupka, bez iznošenja novih dokaza, a koje nisu iznijeli ni na ročištu pred Županijskim sudom u Varaždinu. Županijski je sud, našavši da je primjena i tumačenje mjerodavnih pravnih odredbi od strane upravnih tijela bila pravilna, odbio zahtjev podnositelja zahtjeva. Po mišljenju Vlade, postupak za izvlaštenje, uzet u cjelini, zadovoljio je zahtjeve članka 6. Konvencije.
50. Podnositelji zahtjeva su osporili te tvrdnje.
51. Bez odbacivanja tvrdnji Vlade glede općenite naravi upravnog postupka u Hrvatskoj, Sud primjećuje na početku nespornu činjenicu da je Ured državne uprave u Varaždnskoj županiji upravno tijelo koje se ne može smatrati sudom u smislu članka 6., stavka 1. Konvencije. Sud ponavlja da članak 6., stavak 1. traži da pri odlučivanju o građanskim pravima i obvezama, odluke koje donose upravne ili druge vlasti koje same ne zadovoljavaju zahtjeve toga članka – kao što je to u ovdje slučaj s Uredom državne uprave u Varaždinskoj županiji - moraju biti podvrgnute naknadnoj kontroli od strane „sudbenoga tijela koje ima punu nadležnost“, uključujući i ovlast ukinuti, u svakom pogledu, u odnosu na činjenična i pravna pitanja, pobijanu odluku (vidi, mutatis mutandis, slijedeće presude: Bendenoun v. France, 24. veljače 1994., Serija A br. 284, str. 19-20, stavak 46.; Fischer v. Austria, 26. travanj 1995., Serija A br. 312, str. 17, stavak 28.; Schmautzer v. Austria, 23. listopad 1995., Serija A br. 328-A, str. 15, stavak 34.; Umlauft v. Austria, 23. listopad 1995., Serija A br. 328-B, str. 39-40, stavci 37.-39.; i Wos v. Poland (dec.), br. 22860/02, stavak 92., ECHR 2005-...).
52. Prema hrvatskome pravu stranka koja je nezadovoljna nalazima u postupku za izvlaštenje provedenom pred nadležnim upravnim tijelima ima pravo podnijeti tužbu nadležnom županijskom sudu. Županijsku su sudovi, općenito, redovni sudovi žalbene nadležnosti u građanskim i kaznenim stvarima i prvostupanjski sudovi u odnosu na teška kaznena djela. I dok je žalbenu nadležnost u građanskim i kaznenim stvarima uređena Zakonom o parničnom postupku odnosno Zakon o kaznenom postupku, njihova je žalbena nadležnost u odnosu na postupak izvlaštenja uređena posebnim zakonom, i to Zakonom o izvlaštenju iz 1994. godine.
53. Sud primjećuje da je prema tom Zakonu županijski sud, kad ispituje tužbu, nadležan ispitati sve vidove stvari koja je pred njim. On u ispitivanju nije ograničen na pravna pitanja nego može također ispitivanje proširiti na činjenična pitanja, uključujući ocjenu dokaza. Jedino ograničenje koje se odnosi na ispitivanje predmeta pred županijskim sudom je to da mu se ne mogu predlagati nove činjenice. Međutim, ako se županijski sud ne slaže s nalazima upravnih tijela, ima ovlast ukinuti odluke protiv kojih je uložena žalba. Stoga Sud zaključuje da pravila koja uređuju ovlasti županijskoga suda u postupku izvlaštenja ne lišavaju te sudove mogućnosti djelovati kao sudovi pune nadležnosti.
54. Slijedi da je ovaj prigovor očigledno neosnovan i da ga treba odbiti u skladu s člankom 35., stavcima 3. i 4. Konvencije.
III. PRIMJENA ČLANKA 41. KONVENCIJE
55. Članak 41. Konvencije predviđa:
„Ako Sud utvrdi da je došlo do povrede Konvencije i dodatnih protokola, a unutarnje pravo zainteresirane visoke ugovorne stranke omogućava samo djelomičnu odštetu, Sud će, prema potrebi, dodijeliti pravednu naknadu povrijeđenoj stranci.“
A. Šteta
Podnositelji zahtjeva potražuju 349,665.05 eura (EUR) na ime naknade materijalne štete i 20,000 EUR na ime nematerijalne štete.
Vlada je smatrala da su potraživani iznosi prekomjerni.
Glede potraživane materijalne štete, uzimajući u obzir svoje nalaze koji se tiču članka 1. Protokola br. 1. uz Konvenciju (vidi stavak 45. ove presude), i nedostatnosti postupka provedenog pred Županijskim sudom u Varaždinu, Sud smatra da ne može nagađati je li ili nije podnositeljima zahtjeva dosuđena tržišna vrijednost njihove dvije izvlaštene čestice zemlje i u kojoj je mjeri umanjena vrijednost preostalog dijela imovine. Stoga, zbog nedostataka u domaćem postupku, Sud ne može ocijeniti zahtjev podnositelja zahtjeva za naknadu materijalne štete. U tom pogledu Sud konkretno upućuje na mogućnost koja je na raspolaganju podnositeljima zahtjeva da zatraže ponavljanje postupka u skladu sa člankom 428.a Zakona o parničnom postupku, što bi omogućilo novo ispitivanje njihovih zahtjeva koji se tiču izvlaštenja njihove imovine. Sada je na podnositeljima zahtjeva da iskoriste tu priliku. Tek nakon novog ispitivanja prigovora podnositelja zahtjeva u postupku izvlaštenja provedenom u skladu sa zahtjevima članka 1. Protokola br. 1. uz Konvenciju, Sud bi bio u položaju presuditi o mogućem zahtjevu podnositelja zahtjeva koji se odnosi na materijalnu štetu koju su pretrpjeli.
S druge strane, Sud smatra da su podnositelji zahtjeva sigurno pretrpjeli nematerijalnu štetu – kao što je trpljenje kao rezultat nedostatka poštivanja njihovih prava zajamčenih člankom 1. Protokola br. 1. – što nije dovoljno nadoknađeno nalazom povrede.
B. Troškovi i izdaci
Podnositelji zahtjeva također potražuju 20,764.40 hrvatskih kuna (HRK) na ime troškova i izdataka nastalih pred Sudom.
Vlada je ostavila Sudu da procijeni nužnost nastalih troškova.
Prema sudskoj praksi Suda podnositelj zahtjeva ima pravo na naknadu svojih troškova i izdataka samo u mjeri u kojoj je dokazano da su oni stvarno i nužno nastali i da su bili razumni glede količine. U ovome predmetu, uzevši u obzir informacije koje ima i naprijed navedene kriterije, Sud smatra razumnim dosuditi iznos od 2.800 EUR za postupak pred Sudom.
C. Zatezna kamata
63. Sud smatra primjerenim da se zatezna kamata temelji na najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Europske središnje banke uvećanoj za tri postotna boda.
IZ TIH RAZLOGA, SUD JEDNOGLASNO
1. proglašava prigovor na temelju članka 1. Protokola br. 1. dopuštenim, a ostatak zahtjeva nedopuštenim;
2. presuđuje da je došlo do povrede članka 1. Protokola br. 1. uz Konvenciju;
3. presuđuje
(a) da tužena država treba podnositeljima zahtjeva zajedno, u roku od tri mjeseca od dana kad presuda postane konačnom u skladu s člankom 44. stavkom 2. Konvencije, isplatiti slijedeće iznose koje treba pretvoriti u nacionalnu valutu tužene države prema tečaju važećem na dan namirenja:
(i) 5.000 EUR (pet tisuća eura) na ime nematerijalne štete;
(ii) 2.800 EUR (dvije tisuće osamsto eura) na ime troškova i izdataka; (iii) sve poreze koje bude trebalo zaračunati na naprijed navedene iznose;
(b) da se od proteka naprijed navedena tri mjeseca do namirenja na naprijed navedeni iznos plaća obična kamata prema stopi koja je jednaka najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Europske središnje banke tijekom razdoblja neplaćanja, uvećana za tri postotna boda;
4. odbija ostatak zahtjeva podnositelja zahtjeva za pravednu naknadu.
Sastavljeno na engleskome jeziku i otpravljeno u pisanom obliku dana 31. svibnja 2007. godine u skladu s pravilom 77. stavcima 2. i 3. Poslovnika Suda.
Søren NIELSEN tajnik
Christos ROZAKIS Odjela Predsjednik
___________________________________
Prevod presude preuzet sa https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF BISTROVIĆ v. CROATIA
(Application no. 25774/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
31 May 2007
FINAL
31/08/2007
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Bistrović v. Croatia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrsE. Steiner,
MrK. Hajiyev,
MrD. Spielmann,
MrG. Malinverni, judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 10 May 2007,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 25774/05) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Croatian nationals, Mr Josip Bistrović and Mrs Jasenka Bistrović (“the applicants”), on 7 June 2005.
2. The applicants were represented by Mr M. Ramušćak, a lawyer practising in Varaždin. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs Š. Stažnik.
3. On 12 September 2006 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicants were born in 1951 and 1955 respectively and live in Gojanec, Croatia.
5. The applicants, a husband and wife, owned a house and a surrounding plot of land in Gojanec, Croatia. On an unspecified date “Croatian Roads”, a public company based in Zagreb, instituted expropriation proceedings before the Varaždin County State Administration, Office for Urban Planning, Environment, Construction and Property Affairs (Ured državne uprave u Varaždinskoj Županiji, Služba za prostorno uređenje, zaštitu okoliša, graditeljstvo i imovinsko-pravne poslove, hereinafter the “Varaždin County Administration”), requesting that part of the applicants' plot of land be expropriated with a view to building a motorway. The applicants opposed this proposal, asking that their estate, namely the house and the surrounding land, be expropriated in its entirety. The applicants argued that with only partial expropriation they, as farmers, would have no further use for the house and the small area around it, since the house and the agricultural land on which it was built represented an inseparable unity. Furthermore, there would be no vehicle access to the courtyard. As farmers, the applicants could not use their property without access for tractors and other vehicles used in agricultural activity.
6. In addition, the planned motorway would pass in close proximity to the house, thus causing significant noise pollution due to the high traffic frequency. The motorway and the exit road would pass less then twenty metres and five metres respectively from the house.
7. They pointed out that the construction of 4.5-metre plastic noise-protection walls would transform their house and its surroundings into a cage, without efficiently protecting them from noise and pollution. The entire ground floor, the terrace and a part of the attic would be situated only 2 to 3 metres from the protection walls.
8. They argued that the value of the remaining property would significantly decrease, since construction of the motorway would deprive them of the living conditions they hitherto enjoyed, such as direct road access, pleasant surroundings, a huge courtyard and low noise exposure, all of which made the property very suitable for agricultural activity. For these reasons the applicants asserted that they had no economic interest in retaining the house and the surrounding courtyard.
9. The Varaždin County Administration held three hearings and obtained an expert opinion on the effects of the motorway construction on the applicants' living conditions in the remaining house and courtyard, and another expert opinion on the market value of the agricultural land.
10. The applicants contested the proposed level of compensation, asserting that they were entitled to the market value of their expropriated land, and claiming that the market value of land suitable for construction in the area was 180 Croatian Kunas (HRK) per square metre, a figure which was significantly higher than the amount proposed.
11. By a decision of 16 April 2003, Varaždin County Administration ruled that part of the applicants' estate, namely an agricultural plot and three plots of land suitable for construction measuring 795 m², 221m² and 507m² respectively, was expropriated with a view to building a motorway. The applicants retained ownership of the house and a surrounding courtyard.
12. Compensation was fixed at HRK 105,610.00, based on the sum of HRK 22.00 per square metre for agricultural land, assessed on the basis of the report submitted by a court expert for agriculture, and HRK 70.00 per square metre for land suitable for construction, assessed according to the criteria laid down by the Ministry of Finance, Tax Administration, Varaždin Office.
The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:
“During the expropriation proceedings a representative of “Croatian Roads” limited liability company (d.o.o.), Zagreb, offered the owners compensation in the amount of HRK 22 per square metre for agricultural land, on the basis of its market value as established by an agricultural expert, agricultural engineer Ivan Bašić, ... and HRK 70 per square metre for the land suitable for construction, on the basis of data submitted by the Tax Administration... The owners did not accept the above offer, however, but persisted with their request that parcel no. 9854 in the Varaždin Municipality Land Register be expropriated in its entirety, pursuant to section 7 of the Expropriation Act, claiming that they had no interest in using the remaining parts of their estate. More precisely, they sought expropriation of the entire estate together with the house and all other objects built on the estate...
...this Department has also obtained the expert opinion of a sworn court expert Dragutin Gergely, architecture engineer,... and the submissions of Božidar Jagec, the engineer who drew up the project,... from which it transpires that there is no need for total expropriation and that the remaining property continues to enjoy unhindered road access and that provision has been made for noise-protection walls.
...furthermore, if the owners' request for total expropriation is accepted, all other houses and economic objects which are at an equal or even lesser distance from the motorway... will also [have to] be expropriated...
In addition, the owners' argument that the partial expropriation of parcel no. 9854 would significantly deteriorate their housing conditions is unfounded because they ... do not live at that address.”
13. The applicants filed an appeal against that decision, but the second-instance administrative body failed to rule on it.
14. On 16 December 2003 the applicants filed a claim with the Varaždin County Court (Županijski sud u Varaždinu) under Section 42(a) § 3 of the Expropriation Act, seeking expropriation of their entire estate. They reasserted the arguments previously submitted to the administrative authority. The applicants further contended that the expert opinion had been drawn up without the expert ever actually visiting the site and without any study of traffic frequency on the road passing the applicants' house or on the effect of traffic pollution on their quality of life. The expert opinion had been prepared on the basis of a map of the land plot on which the applicants' house had been erroneously drawn.
15. The applicants also complained about the amount of compensation awarded to them and reiterated that the market value of the expropriated plots had not been established. Instead, the amount was fixed according to Varaždin Tax Administration tables. The applicants complained that their objections had not been adequately examined and addressed by the administrative authority.
16. On 30 December 2003 the Varaždin County Court held a hearing at which the applicants' representative repeated their arguments, but no new evidence was presented or requested by the court. On the same day the County Court dismissed the applicants' claim. The relevant part of its judgment reads as follows:
“The reasoning of the cited decision clearly indicates that compensation corresponding to the market value of the plaintiffs' (the former owners) estate was determined in the expropriation proceedings. The market value of the agricultural land was assessed by a sworn court expert for agriculture... and the market value of the land suitable for construction was assessed according to the opinion of construction experts and the data submitted by the Tax Administration.
Relying on the reasoning in the above-mentioned decision, this court has further established that, ... in respect of the plaintiffs' request for expropriation of their remaining estate and the existence of a road access to the estate, the expert opinion of a sworn court expert for construction ... had been obtained as well as the opinion of a geodesic engineer..., from which it followed that the plaintiffs' request for total expropriation was not founded because there were a number of other houses and other objects in the same area which were at an equal or lesser distance from the motorway and that noise protection had been ensured to all expropriated [properties] and that the remaining plaintiffs' property continued to enjoy road access. It follows that there are no well-founded reasons for the plaintiffs' request for total expropriation of their estate...
... this court has established that no procedural defects, and especially no grave procedural defects, were made in the administrative proceedings and that the substantive law had been correctly applied, both concerning the dismissal of the plaintiffs' request for total expropriation of their estate and in respect of the amount of compensation fixed for agricultural land and the land suitable for construction.
As has already been stated, while the plaintiffs are not entitled to bring any new facts in the proceedings before this court, except those presented in the administrative proceedings, they are allowed to bring new evidence in respect of the facts presented in the administrative proceedings.
However, the plaintiffs have, neither in their claim nor during the proceedings, presented any evidence concerning their objections and the reasons for which they seek annulment of the Varaždin County State Administration Office... decision of 16 April 2003, which would be capable of calling into question the facts on which the cited decision was based...”
17. The applicants then filed a constitutional complaint, arguing that their right to equality before the law, their right to a fair trial and their right of appeal had been violated in that they had been unable to submit new evidence to the Varaždin County Court and that that court had reached its decision without having any evidence presented to it. Thus, their objections with regard to the expert opinion and their assertions about the effects of the motorway construction on their living conditions and on the value of their remaining property had remained unaddressed. The applicants also argued that their right to compensation for the market value of their expropriated property had been violated.
18. On 16 December 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants' complaint as ill-founded. The decision of the Constitutional Court reads as follows:
“1. The constitutional complaint is lodged against the Varaždin County Court's judgment no. P-1/03-9 of 30 December 2003, by which the applicants' (plaintiffs') claim, filed against the Ministry of Justice as defendant, Administration and Local Self-government, seeking the annulment of the decision of the Varaždin State Administration, Office for Urban Planning, Environment, Construction and Property Affairs, class: UP/I-943-04/02-01/1936, no. 2186-05-05-03-11 of 16 April 2003, was dismissed.
The first instance administrative decision accepted the proposal by “Croatian Roads” d.o.o., Zagreb, for partial expropriation of parcel no. 9854, Varaždin Municipality Land Registry, owned by the applicants, and established the compensation for the expropriated land, for investments in the land and for the agricultural crops at HRK 105,610.
2. The applicants claimed a violation of their constitutional rights under Article 14 § 2, Article 18, Article 29 § 1 and Article 50 § 1 of the Constitution.
In their constitutional complaint the applicants argued that, in the preceding proceedings, the facts had been incorrectly established and that their estate should have been expropriated in its entirety. They maintained that the County Court should have obtained the entire administrative case-file and verified the experts' opinions with regard to the finding that there was no need for total expropriation, and the findings with regard to the amount of compensation, which they claimed did not correspond to the market value but had been fixed on the basis of the Tax Administration tables. They further asserted that their right to an appeal had been violated because in the proceedings before the County Court they had not been allowed to present new facts and for that reason the whole proceedings had been arbitrary.
They asked the Constitutional Court to quash the impugned judgment.
The constitutional complaint is unfounded.
3. Section 62 paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Court Act (Official Gazette no. 49/02) provides that everyone may lodge a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court if he or she deems that an individual act of a state body, a body of local and regional self-government or a legal person invested with public authority, which resulted in a decision on his or her rights and obligations, or on suspicion or accusation of a criminal act, has violated his or her constitutional right.
While deciding whether constitutional rights were violated in proceedings concerning the assessment of an individual's rights and obligations, within the scope of the claim contained in the constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court does not, in principle, consider whether the courts correctly and completely established the facts and assessed the evidence. For the Constitutional Court the only facts to be taken into consideration are those relevant for the assessment of a violation of a constitutional right.
4. The proceedings before the Varaždin County Court were instituted by the applicants pursuant to section 42a § 3 of the Expropriation Act (Official Gazette nos. 9/94, 35/94, 112/00 – the Constitutional Court's decision and 114/01) because the appellate administrative body (the Ministry of Justice) did not decide on their appeal within the fixed time-limit. In such proceedings, a court assesses the legality of the first-instance decision concerning expropriation on the basis of the facts presented in the claim filed with that court and the defendant body's reply (if the reply reaches the court within the fixed time-limit), ... pursuant to section 42e § 3 of the same Act.
The proceedings in connection with the applicants' claim were conducted under section 42e §§ 1 and 2 of the Expropriation Act, which provides:
The Chamber considers and decides on the basis of the facts presented in the administrative proceedings.
A claimant is not allowed to present new facts, but may present new evidence concerning the facts presented in the administrative proceedings.
As regards the compensation for the expropriated land, the County Court found that the compensation fixed corresponded to its market value. As regards the agricultural land, the compensation was assessed by a sworn court expert for agriculture, while the compensation for the land suitable for construction was assessed on the basis of an opinion by a construction expert and data provided by the Tax Administration.
As regards the applicants' request for total expropriation, the County Court upheld the first instance body's decision finding that there had been no need for expropriation of the applicants' estate in its entirety, in that the evidence presented to that administrative body had clearly demonstrated that there existed a number of other houses and other economic objects in the same area which were at an equal or lesser distance from the corridor of the future motorway and that all expropriated [properties] had been provided with protection against noise. In particular, it was established that the applicants' remaining estate continued to enjoy unhindered road access, and therefore there existed no justification for the expropriation of the applicants' remaining estate within the meaning of section 7 of the Expropriation Act.
The Varaždin County Court established that no grave procedural defects had occurred in the expropriation proceedings, nor had the material law been wrongly applied; in particular, it established that the applicants had failed to present any new evidence capable of calling into question the facts on which the impugned decision had been based.
5. The applicants further claimed in their constitutional complaint that the impugned judgment had violated the constitutional guarantee of equality of all before the law, provided for under Article 14 § 2 of the Constitution.
Having established that the legal opinions of the Varaždin County Court in the present case did not diverge from the established practice in the application of relevant substantive law, and were not discriminatory on any basis, the Constitutional Court does not accept the applicants' allegations that, in the present case, equality before the law was not secured to them, as guaranteed under Article 14 § 2 of the Constitution.
6. Furthermore, after analysing the constitutional complaint, the findings of the impugned decisions and the case-file, the Constitutional Court has established that the constitutional complaint's allegations about the violation of the applicants' right to an appeal, provided for under Article 18 of the Constitution, are not founded, in that the competent court addressed all of the arguments submitted by the applicants in the appellate proceedings, the competence of which is regulated by section 42a of the Act on Amendments to the Expropriation Act (Official Gazette no. 114/01).
7. The Constitutional Court considers further that the applicants' constitutional right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law (Article 29 § 1 of the Constitution) has not been violated.
The right to a fair trial would have been violated if a party to the proceedings had not been given an opportunity to be heard and to participate in the proceedings within the frames set out by laws; if a party had not been given an opportunity to present facts and evidence and a competent court had failed to rule on those of the party's arguments which were relevant to its decision; if, contrary to law, reasons had not been given for an individual act and if a party had in other way been prevented from having a fair trial before the competent body established by law.
Since the Varaždin County Court verified the legality of the impugned decision within the meaning of the Expropriation Act on the basis of the evidence presented to it and by scrutinising the reasoning of the impugned decision on expropriation, it follows that the proceedings were conducted ... in conformity with the relevant provisions of substantive and procedural law; the Constitutional Court therefore considers that the applicants' right to a fair trial was not violated.
8. The applicants' further claimed a violation of their constitutional right contained in Article 50 § 1 of the Constitution, which provides:
Any restriction [of property rights] or confiscation of property shall be done by law, in the interest of the Republic of Croatia, and compensation of the market value shall be paid.
Since the competent County Court established that the expropriation proceedings had been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Expropriation Act, with the correct application of substantive law and without grave procedural defects, and since the same court established that the applicants had received compensation for their expropriated estate equal to its market value, the cited constitutional right has not been violated.
9. For these reasons and pursuant to sections 73 and 75 of the Constitutional Court Act it has been so decided.”
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
19. The relevant parts of the 1994 Expropriation Act (Zakon o izvlaštenju, Official Gazette nos. 9/94, 35/94, 112/00 and 114/01) provide as follows:
Section 7 entitles the owner of an estate subject to partial expropriation to request its total expropriation if he or she has no interest in using the remaining property.
Sections 8 and 33 require that compensation for expropriated property equals the market value of that property on the date on which the first-instance decision in expropriation proceedings is adopted.
Section 42 § 1 enables an action to be brought before the competent county court against a second-instance administrative decision on expropriation.
Section 42(a) § 3 provides that such an action may also be brought if the second-instance administrative body fails to decide on appeal against the first-instance administrative decision.
Section 42(b) stipulates that, unless otherwise provided, the Administrative Disputes Act is to be applied in expropriation proceedings conducted before the competent county court.
Section 42(e) §§ 1 and 2 obliges the competent county court to decide on the basis of the facts presented in the preceding administrative proceedings, and prevents a claimant from presenting any new facts, while at the same time allowing presentation of new evidence before the county court.
Section 42(e) § 3 requires that the county court, when dealing with an action brought under Section 42(a) § 3, examines the case on the basis of the facts presented in such an action and of the submissions of the administrative body which issued the impugned decision.
20. Section 60 of the Administrative Disputes Act (Zakon o upravnim sporovima, Official Gazette nos. 53/1991, 9/1992 and 77/1992) provides for the application of the Civil Procedure Act to proceedings concerning administrative disputes, in so far as these proceedings are not regulated by the Administrative Disputes Act.
21. Section 428(a) of the Civil Procedure Act enables an applicant in respect of whom the European Court of Human Rights has found a violation of the Convention or its Protocols to request, within 30 days of the Court's judgment becoming final, the re-opening of the domestic proceedings in question. In the new proceedings the domestic courts are obliged to follow the reasons given in the Court's judgment.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1
22. The applicants complained that they had not received the full market value of their expropriated property and that no account had been taken in the expropriation proceedings of the significantly decreased value of their remaining property. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
23. The Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
24. The Government argued that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies because they did not file a civil action seeking damages for noise exposure and dangerous emissions. They relied on the Court's findings in the case of Cokarić v. Croatia ((dec), no. 33212/02, 19 January 2006) where it was found as follows:
“under section 156 of the Civil Obligations Act anyone can seek the prevention of damage, inter alia, to the environment. Moreover, under the same section, the owners of property may seek compensation for the damage actually sustained on account of activities in the general interest. Noting the case-law of the Supreme Court in this respect, which shows that the above section covers material damage as well as the possible drop in the value of property, the Court is satisfied that the applicants should have filed such an action with the competent domestic courts, which all but three of them failed to do.”
25. The applicants maintained that their situation had no relation to the Cokarić case because all of the decisions relevant to the expropriation of their property had to be taken in the course of expropriation proceedings.
26. The Court observes that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies contained in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention requires that normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged (see, among other authorities, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑IV, p. 1210, § 65). The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (ibid.).
27. In addition, the application of the rule must make due allowance for the fact that it is being applied in the context of machinery for the protection of human rights that the Contracting Parties have agreed to set up (ibid., § 69). Accordingly, the Court has recognised that Article 35 § 1 must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (see, for example, Cardot v. France, judgment of 19 March 1991, Series A no. 200, p. 18, § 34). It has further recognised that the rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically; in reviewing whether it has been observed it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of each individual case (see, for example, Van Oosterwijk v. Belgium, judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A no. 40, p. 18, § 35). This means, amongst other things, that it must take realistic account not only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting Party concerned but also of the general legal and political context in which they operate as well as the personal circumstances of the applicants (see the Akdivar judgment cited above, p. 1211, § 69).
28. The Court notes at the outset that in the Cokarić case relied on by the Government, the applicants complained that they had suffered damaging effects to their living conditions and their property due to the close proximity of a newly established sewage works, a complaint raised irrespective of any domestic proceedings involving a possibility of awarding the applicants compensation of any kind. However, the present case concerns expropriation proceedings in which a part of the applicants' estate was subject to expropriation. It is normal in the course of such proceedings that compensation be assessed, taking into account all relevant factors such as a decrease in the value of remaining property due to any circumstances. The Court therefore considers that the applicants, who were a party to the expropriation proceedings and who submitted their objections concerning the compensation fixed in the course of these proceedings, were not obliged to institute separate civil proceedings in this respect. In these circumstances such a requirement would overstretch their duties under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
29. The Court notes further that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
Submissions of the parties
30. After summarising the principles established by the Court's case-law in respect of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Government submitted that the legality of interference and the legitimate aim were not disputed in the present case. As to whether the interference had been proportional, they maintained that the applicants only objected to the fact that their estate had not been expropriated in its entirety since, as they alleged, the house and its surrounding area were not agreeable for living in that they were situated too close to the motorway under construction. The Government submitted that these objections were entirely unfounded, since the applicants' remaining estate was presently situated 40 metres from the motorway and, on completion of the motorway, would be situated 80 metres from it. Furthermore, fourteen other houses were at a similar distance from the motorway and these houses had not been expropriated. Noise-protection measures had been envisaged. Finally, they contended that the applicants had not objected to the amount of compensation before the first-instance administrative body. In the Government's view, the applicants had obtained the market value of their property and the State had therefore satisfied its obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No.1. They argued that the Court's case-law did not establish any obligation for the States to expropriate someone's property in its entirety.
31. The applicants contested these arguments and asserted that an excessive individual burden had been placed on them, in that they had not received the market value for their expropriated property, and because of the decreased value of their remaining property and insupportable living conditions in their house, which was now situated less than 3 metres from the motorway. They further contested the Government's assertion that there were fourteen other houses at the same or lesser distance from the motorway, claiming that theirs was the only house in extreme proximity to the motorway.
The Court's assessment
32. The Court notes at the outset that it was common ground in the present case that the applicants had been deprived of their property in accordance with the provisions of the Expropriation Act with a view of building a motorway, and that the expropriation thus pursued a lawful aim in the public interest. Accordingly, it is the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which is applicable in the instant case (see, among other authorities, the judgments in Mellacher and Others v. Austria, 19 December 1989, Series A no. 169, pp. 24-25, § 42 and Papachelas v. Greece [GC], no. 31423/96, § 45, ECHR 1999‑II).
33. The essential object of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is to protect individuals against unjustified interference by the State with the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. However, by virtue of Article 1 of the Convention, each Contracting Party “shall secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”. The discharge of this general duty may entail positive obligations inherent in ensuring the effective exercise of the rights guaranteed by the Convention. In the context of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, those positive obligations may require the State to take the measures necessary to protect the right of property (see Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, no. 48553/99, § 96, ECHR 2002-VII and Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no 31443/96, § 143, ECHR 2004-V), particularly where there is a direct link between the measures which an applicant may legitimately expect from the authorities and the effective enjoyment of his possessions (see Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, § 134, ECHR 2004‑XII). This means, in particular, that the States are under an obligation to provide judicial procedures that offer the necessary procedural guarantees and therefore enable the domestic courts and tribunals to adjudicate effectively and fairly any cases concerning property matters (see, mutatis mutandis, Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, cited above, § 96).
34. In each case involving an alleged violation of this provision, the Court must determine whether, due to the State's interference or passivity, a fair balance was struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights. The search for this balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention and is also reflected in the structure of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, p. 26, § 69 and Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, no. 47148/99, § 101, 22 February 2005). Compensation terms under the relevant legislation are material to the assessment of whether the contested measure respects the requisite fair balance and, notably, whether it does not impose a disproportionate burden on the applicant. In this connection, the taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value will normally constitute a disproportionate interference that cannot be justified under Article 1. That Article does not, however, guarantee a right to full compensation in all circumstances, since legitimate objectives of “public interest” may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value (see Holy Monasteries (The) v. Greece, judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 301‑A, pp. 34-35, §§ 70-71 and Papachelas v. Greece, cited above, § 48).
35. In order to assess the conformity of the State's conduct with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court must have regard to the fact that the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and effective. It must go beneath appearances and look into the reality of the situation, which requires an overall examination of the various interests in issue; this may call for an analysis not only of the compensation terms – if the situation is akin to the taking of property (see, for example, Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, pp. 50-51, §§ 120-121) – but also, as in the instant case, of the conduct of the parties to the proceedings, including the steps taken by the State (see Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 114, ECHR 2000‑I, and Novoseltskiy v. Ukraine, cited above, §102).
36. Turning to the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicants requested the Varaždin County Court to reconsider the administrative decision expropriating a part of their estate and assessing the compensation to be paid for this expropriation. The Court notes that the matter to be decided represented the most serious interference with the applicants' right guaranteed under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, since it concerns expropriation of their property. Bearing in mind the utmost importance of the consequences of the expropriation for the applicants' property rights, the Court considers that a careful examination of all relevant factors by a court dealing with the case was necessary to ensure that the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 were complied with.
37. In this respect the Court also reiterates that proceedings before courts must conform to the rule of law, which can be identified with the good administration of justice and that, in the absence of any obligation for a judicial authority to give reasons for their decisions, the rights guaranteed by the Convention would be illusory and theoretical. Without requiring a detailed response to each argument presented before a court, this obligation nevertheless presupposes the right of a party to the proceedings to have his or her essential contentions carefully examined (see Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, cited above, § 111).
38. The Court notes that in the present case there was a serious dispute as to the primary facts. Throughout the proceedings the applicants argued that partial expropriation significantly decreased the economic value of the remaining property as well as rendering it useless to them for a variety of reasons, such as the lack of vehicle access to the property, the motorway's very close proximity to their house and inadequate protection from noise and pollution. However, although the County Court addressed a part of the applicants' arguments, it did not answer their main objections concerning the administrative authority's findings.
39. Thus, a number of questions relevant to the applicants' rights under Article 1 of Protocol No.1, such as the method of calculating the market value of the applicants' property, the precise effect of the planned motorway on their living conditions, the applicants' assertion that the expert opinion relied on in the administrative body's decision had been drawn without the expert ever visiting the actual site, remained unanswered. Furthermore, a crucial question concerning the effect of the partial expropriation on the value of the applicants' remaining estate was never addressed and thus the potential decrease in this value in assessing the compensation to be awarded was not taken into account.
40. In this respect, the Court recalls that it has already examined on many occasions domestic authorities' refusal to fix a special indemnity for properties remaining to their owners after a partial expropriation. In some cases the Court found that, when fixing the compensation, the domestic courts had not had regard to the nature of the construction and whether or not it provided any advantage for the owners, but had only fixed compensation with regard to the plots actually expropriated. The Court considered, however, that, having regard to the margin of appreciation left under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the national authorities, there appeared no indication warranting the conclusion that the refusal to grant special indemnities might amount to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 (see, for example, Azas v. Greece, no. 50824/99, §§ 51-53, 19 September 2002 and Interoliva ABEE v. Greece, no. 58642/00, 10 July 2003).
41. In the case of Ouzounoglou v. Greece, however, the Court found that the construction of a motorway in the near vicinity of the applicant's house (about 15 metres) must have limited the free disposition of her right to use the house, which limitation was found to amount to an interference with the applicant's right to peaceful enjoyment of her possessions, and that the nature of the construction had evidently contributed more directly to the substantial depreciation of the value of the remaining property than in the other cases concerning Greece, mentioned above (see Ouzounoglou v. Greece, no. 32730/03, § 30, 24 November 2005). Therefore, such interference might warrant the granting of additional compensation for the limited use of the house.
42. In the Court's view the present case falls in the latter category of cases. In this respect the Court notes that the applicants argued that the future motorway would pass two to three metres from their house and that the estate had lost its hitherto pleasant surroundings, a huge courtyard and low noise exposure, all of which had made the property very suitable for agricultural activity. The Court notes that none of these factors were taken into account by the domestic authorities when fixing the compensation for the applicants' expropriated property.
43. Furthermore, throughout the domestic proceedings the applicants asserted that the expert's report serving as a basis for assessing the effects of the motorway on their remaining property had been drawn up without the expert ever visiting the actual site, which had resulted in their house being erroneously drawn. The Court considers that it was necessary to have these facts established in a precise manner by further verifying the applicants' argument that their house had been erroneously drawn on the map of the land plot. Only after such verification of all factors concerning the effects of the motorway construction on the applicants' remaining property, such as the decrease in the value of their estate, the possibility of selling it and the applicants' interest in further use of the remaining estate, would it be possible for the domestic authorities to fix adequate compensation in the expropriation proceedings.
44. The Court therefore finds that, by failing to establish all the relevant factors for establishing the compensation for the applicants' expropriated property, and by failing to grant indemnity for the decrease in the value of their remaining estate, the national authorities have failed to strike a fair balance between the interests involved and have failed to make efforts to ensure adequate protection of the applicants' property rights in the context of expropriation proceedings which involved the ultimate interference on the part of the State with these rights.
45. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court finds that there has been an infringement of the applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
46. The applicants contended that the proceedings which they had brought under Croatian law before the Varaždin County Court in order to challenge an administrative decision concerning the expropriation of their property had not complied with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”
47. The Government submitted that it was necessary, firstly, to establish to what extent the applicants' rights, as guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, had been protected in the administrative proceedings preceding the County Court's examination of the case.
48. In this respect they maintained that the basic principles governing proceedings before the administrative bodies, such as the principle of legality, the principle of material truth, providing an opportunity to the parties to present their case, the independent assessment of evidence and the right to appeal, all demonstrated that these proceedings had been conducted in accordance with the guarantees enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In the present case, the competent administrative body had held three hearings at which the applicants were able to present their evidence and facts. However, the applicants had failed to present any evidence at those hearings. The case was examined by the competent county court which, in the Government's view and having regard to sections 42 (a) to 42(h) of the Expropriation Act, satisfied the requirements of a court of full jurisdiction in that such a court had jurisdiction to examine questions of both fact and law. The only restriction concerned the presentation of new facts which had not been previously presented in the administrative proceedings. However, such a restriction had not undermined the full jurisdiction of the county court, because the principle of legal certainty and the efficient conduct of the proceedings required that the possibility of presenting new facts be denied after a certain stage in proceedings, usually at the appellate stage, without affecting the full jurisdiction of appellate courts.
49. The Government further contended that the applicants had merely repeated the objections already presented in the course of the administrative proceedings, without submitting any new evidence, which they had also failed to do at the hearing before the Varaždin County Court. The County Court, finding that the administrative bodies' application and interpretation of the relevant legal provisions had been correct, had dismissed the applicants' claim. In the Government's view the expropriation proceedings, taken as a whole, had satisfied the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention.
50. The applicants contested these arguments.
51. Without rejecting the Government's submissions as to the general nature of the administrative proceedings in Croatia, the Court notes at the outset the undisputed fact that the Varaždin County State Administration Office is an administrative body which cannot be considered a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 requires that in the determination of civil rights and obligations, decisions taken by administrative or other authorities which do not themselves satisfy the requirements of that Article - as is the case in this instance with the Varaždin County State Administration Office - must be subject to subsequent control by a “judicial body that has full jurisdiction”, including the power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the challenged decision (see, mutatis mutandis, the following judgments: Bendenoun v. France, 24 February 1994, Series A no. 284, pp. 19-20, § 46; Fischer v. Austria, 26 April 1995, Series A no. 312, p. 17, § 28; Schmautzer v. Austria, 23 October 1995, Series A no. 328‑A, p. 15, § 34; Umlauft v. Austria, 23 October 1995, Series A no. 328-B, pp. 39-40, §§ 37-39; and Wos v. Poland (dec.), no. 22860/02, § 92, ECHR 2005‑...).
52. Under Croatian law a party which is dissatisfied with the findings in expropriation proceedings conducted before the competent administrative bodies is entitled to bring an action in the competent county court. The county courts are, in general, ordinary courts of appellate jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters and first-instance courts in respect of serious crimes. While the appellate jurisdiction of county courts in civil and criminal matters is regulated by the Civil Procedure Act and the Criminal Procedure Act respectively, their appellate jurisdiction in respect of expropriation proceedings is regulated by special law, namely the 1994 Expropriation Act.
53. The Court notes that, under the above Act, a county court has jurisdiction when examining an action to examine all aspects of a matter before it. Its examination is not restricted to points of law but may also extend to factual issues, including the assessment of evidence. The only restriction concerning the examination of a case before a county court is that no new facts may be submitted to it. However, if a county court disagrees with the findings of the administrative bodies, it has the power to quash the decisions appealed against. Therefore, the Court concludes that the rules governing the powers of a county court in expropriation proceedings do not deprive such courts of acting as courts of full jurisdiction.
54. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
55. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
56. The applicants claimed 349,665.05 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
57. The Government deemed the requested amounts excessive.
58. As to the pecuniary damage claimed the Court, having regard to its findings concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see § 45 above) and the insufficiency of the proceedings conducted before the Varaždin County Court, the Court considers that it cannot speculate as to whether or not the applicants were granted the market value of their two expropriated plots of land and to what extent the value of their remaining property was decreased. Thus, on account of the shortcomings in the domestic proceedings, the Court is unable to assess the applicants' claim for pecuniary damage. In this respect the Court specifically refers to the opportunity available to the applicants to request re-opening of the proceedings in accordance with section 428(a) of the Civil Procedure Act, which would allow for a fresh examination of their claims concerning the expropriation of their property. It is now for the applicants to make use of that opportunity. Only after a fresh examination of the applicants' objections, in expropriation proceedings conducted in compliance with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, would the Court be in a position to rule on the applicants' potential claim concerning pecuniary damage sustained by them.
59. On the other hand, the Court considers that the applicants must have sustained non-pecuniary damage - such as distress resulting from the lack of respect for their rights guaranteed under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - which is not sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards the applicants EUR 5,000 jointly in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.
B. Costs and expenses
60. The applicants also claimed 20,764.40 Croatian Kunas (HRK) for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
61. The Government left to the Court to assess the necessity of the costs incurred.
62. Under the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,800 for the proceedings before it.
C. Default interest
63. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 o to the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants jointly, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts which are to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at a rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,800 (two thousand eight hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses;
(iii) any tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 31 May 2007, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
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