Lopac i drugi protiv Hrvatske

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF LOPAC AND OTHERS v. CROATIA

(Applications nos. 7834/12 and 3 others)

JUDGMENT 

STRASBOURG

10 October 2019

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Lopac v. Croatia, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Krzysztof Wojtyczek, President,
Pere Pastor Vilanova,
Pauliine Koskelo, judges,
and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 17 September 2019, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in four applications (nos. 7834/12, 43801/13, 19327/14 and 63535/16) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by four Croatian nationals, Mr Željko Lopac (“the first applicant”), Mr Zvonimir Poščić (“the second applicant”), Mr Irfan Zjakić (“the third applicant”) and Mr Goran Kamenjašević (“the fourth applicant”), on the dates listed in the Appendix to this judgment.

2.  Each applicant was represented by a lawyer. The names of their representatives are listed in the Appendix.

3.  The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.

4.  The Government were given notification of the complaints concerning the right of property and the breach of the principle “no crime without law” on 26 April 2017 (applications no. 7834/12, 43801/13, and 63535/16) and 27 November 2017 (application no. 19327/14), and the remainder of the applications was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.

5.  The Government objected to the examination of the application by a Committee. Having considered the Government’s objection, the Court rejects it.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

6.  The applicants’ personal details are set out in the Appendix.

7.  The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

A.  Proceedings in the first applicant’s case

8.  On 8 May 2001 the Austrian authorities granted the first applicant permanent residence.

9.  When entering Croatia every year from 1998 onwards the first applicant declared the temporary importation of a vessel in his ownership to the Croatian customs authorities with a view to being exempted from paying the relevant taxes. He did so also on 17 July 2004.

10.  However, on 29 March 2005 the Customs Administration instituted administrative-offence proceedings (prekršajni postupak) against him for having imported a vessel into Croatia without paying the relevant taxes.

11.  Concurrently, the Customs Administration instituted tax-related administrative proceedings and in a decision of 13 June 2005 ordered the first applicant to pay the import duties due on his vessel in the amount of 166,886.70 Croatian kunas (HRK)[1] plus the statutory default interest. They found that the first applicant had not satisfied the conditions for exemption from payment of customs duties provided for in Article 5 of Annex C to the Convention on Temporary Admission (hereafter “the Istanbul Convention”).

12.  On 7 November 2005 the Ministry of Finance, as the second‑instance administrative authority, dismissed an appeal by the first applicant and upheld the first-instance decision of 13 June 2005.

13.  On 15 December 2006 the first applicant paid customs duties in the total amount of HRK 198,439.45[2]. At the same time, he brought an action for judicial review, which the Administrative Court dismissed in a judgment of 31 July 2008. The Administrative Court upheld the administrative authorities’ decisions, finding that the first applicant’s registered domicile had been in Croatia, that he had been registered as a tax payer in Croatia, and that it was irrelevant that he had been granted the right to reside permanently in Austria.

14.  Meanwhile, on 29 May 2007 the Customs Administration discontinued the aforementioned administrative-offence proceedings because they found that the first applicant had satisfied the conditions for exemption provided for in Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention.

15.  On 25 October 2008 the first applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Administrative Court’s judgment of 31 July 2008, claiming that there had been a breach of his constitutional rights to equality before the law, appeal, judicial review, fair hearing and freedom of movement. He also relied on his Convention rights to a fair hearing and an effective remedy, and the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. He complained, in particular, that the administrative authorities and the Administrative Court had wrongly interpreted the term “person resident” in Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention by equating it with the term “domicile” as defined in domestic legislation.

16.  By a decision of 6 July 2011 the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible a constitutional complaint lodged by the first applicant, finding that the case did not raise any constitutional issue. This decision was served on the first applicant’s representative on 18 July 2011.

B.  Proceedings in the second applicant’s case

17.  On 4 April 1996 the second applicant was granted the right to reside permanently in the Czech Republic.

18.  By a decision of 23 May 2006 the Customs Administration ordered the second applicant to pay the relevant taxes for having imported a vessel, in the amount of HRK 904,334.78[3] plus the statutory default interest. They found that he did not meet the conditions for exemption provided for in Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention.

19.  On 18 October 2013 the Ministry of Finance, as the second-instance administrative authority, dismissed an appeal by the second applicant and upheld the first-instance decision.

20.  In its judgment of 23 July 2015 the Administrative Court dismissed an action for judicial review lodged by the second applicant, finding that at the relevant time his registered domicile had been in Croatia and that as a Croatian citizen he had been obliged to pay import duties.

21.  The second applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint against the Administrative Court’s judgment of 9 September 2009 claiming, inter alia, that the administrative authorities had violated his constitutional rights to equality before the law, appeal, judicial review, a fair hearing, personal and family life, the right to leave Croatia, and the right of ownership, and breached the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. He also relied on his Convention right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.

22.  By a decision of 21 November 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed on the merits a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant, finding, inter alia, that there had been no violation of his constitutional right of ownership. This decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 10 December 2012.

C.  Proceedings in the third applicant’s case

23.  On 15 November 2006 the Czech authorities granted the third applicant a long-term residence permit valid until 15 November 2016.

24.  On 15 September 2012 the Customs Administration instituted administrative-offence proceedings (prekršajni postupak) against the third applicant for having imported a car into Croatia without paying the relevant taxes.

25.  On 19 November 2012 the Customs Administration found the third applicant guilty of having committed the relevant administrative offence and fined him HRK 3,000[4]. The Customs Administration found that the third applicant’s registered domicile had been in Croatia at the time of the commission of the offence. Therefore, it was irrelevant that he had been granted long-term residence in the Czech Republic.

26.  On 3 April 2013 the High Court for Administrative Offences dismissed an appeal lodged by the third applicant and upheld the first‑instance decision, endorsing the reasons given therein.

27.  The third applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint against the second‑instance decision, claiming that there had been a breach of his constitutional rights to a fair hearing, freedom of movement and freedom to choose residence. He also alleged that there had been a violation of his constitutional right guaranteeing that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty. In so doing, he explicitly relied on the relevant provision of the Croatian Constitution. He further claimed that the Customs Administration and the High Court for Administrative Offences had misinterpreted the text of Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention.

28.  Concurrently, the Customs Administration instituted tax-related administrative proceedings and in a decision of 20 June 2013 ordered the third applicant to pay import duties in the amount of 79,871.84 Croatian kunas (HRK)[5] plus the statutory default interest. On 13 August 2013 the Customs Administration had issued a decision impounding the third applicant’s car. It is not clear whether the third applicant appealed against those decisions.

29.  By a decision of 24 October 2013 the Constitutional Court declared a constitutional complaint lodged by the third applicant inadmissible because the case did not raise any constitutional issue. This decision was served on the third applicant’s representative on 18 November 2013.

D.  Proceedings in the fourth applicant’s case

30.  On 12 October 1992 the fourth applicant was granted the right to reside permanently in Germany.

31.  During a roadside inspection carried out on 23 January 2012, Customs Administration officials found that the fourth applicant was driving his wife’s vehicle, which had German registration plates.

32.  By a decision of 22 January 2013 the Customs Administration ordered the fourth applicant to pay import duties in the amount of HRK 402,412.05[6] plus the statutory default interest. They found that he did not meet the conditions for exemption provided for in Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention.

33.  On 6 July 2006 the Ministry of Finance, as the second-instance administrative authority, dismissed an appeal by the fourth applicant and upheld the first-instance decision.

34.  In its judgment of 23 July 2015 the Administrative Court upheld the administrative authorities’ decisions, finding that the fourth applicant’s registered domicile had been in Croatia and that it was irrelevant that he had been granted the right to reside permanently in Germany.

35.  On 26 November 2015 the High Administrative Court dismissed an appeal by the fourth applicant and upheld the first-instance decision, endorsing the reasons given therein.

36.  The fourth applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint against the High Administrative Court’s judgment of 26 November 2015 claiming that the administrative and judicial authorities had wrongly interpreted Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention and thereby had violated his constitutional rights to judicial review and to a fair hearing.

37.  By a decision of 13 April 2016 the Constitutional Court declared the fourth applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible because the case did not raise any constitutional issue. This decision was served on the fourth applicant’s representative on 27 April 2016.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE

38.  Section 76 of the Administrative Disputes Act (Zakon o upravnim sporovima – Official Gazette nos. 20/10 with subsequent amendments) allows for the possibility of reopening proceedings on the basis of a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. The text of that provision is reproduced in the case of Guberina v. Croatia (no. 23682/13, § 28, 22 March 2016).

39.  The remaining relevant international and domestic law and practice is summarised in the case of Žaja v. Croatia (no. 37462/09, §§ 26-27 and 29‑61, 4 October 2016).

THE LAW

I.  JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

40.  Given that the applications at hand concern similar facts and complaints and raise identical issues under the Convention, the Court decides to join them, pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of the Court.

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION

41.  The first, second and fourth applicants complained that their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions had been violated because the domestic authorities’ decisions ordering them to pay import taxes had been based on the wrong interpretation of Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

42.  The Government contested that argument.

A.  Admissibility

1.  The parties’ arguments

43.  The Government disputed the admissibility of this complaint by arguing that the first and the fourth applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies.

44.  The Government argued that, in their constitutional complaints (see paragraphs 15 and 36 above), the first and the fourth applicants had failed to complain of the violation of their constitutional right of ownership.

45.  The first and the fourth applicants replied that they had properly exhausted domestic remedies. They explained that they had raised their complaints in substance before the national authorities.

2.  The Court’s assessment

46.  The Court first notes that it is evident that the first and the fourth applicants did not rely on the relevant provision of the Constitution guaranteeing the right of ownership. Nor did they rely on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see paragraphs 15 and 36 above).

47.  The Court notes that under the law the Constitutional Court examines only the violations of the constitutional rights alleged in a constitutional complaint (see Žaja, cited above, §§ 27 and 68). However, that rule is not absolute (ibid., § 69). In particular, the Constitutional Court’s case-law suggests that in certain cases it is not necessary for persons lodging a constitutional complaint to refer to the relevant Articles of the Constitution because sometimes it may be sufficient for a violation of a constitutional right to be apparent from the complainant’s submissions and the case file (ibid., § 69).

48.  Therefore, while it is true that in their constitutional complaints the first and the fourth applicants did not explicitly rely on the relevant provision of the Constitution guaranteeing the right of ownership or on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, they did complain of a wrong interpretation of the Istanbul Convention. In particular, they argued that the administrative authorities’ decisions ordering them to pay import taxes had been founded on an erroneous interpretation of the term “person resident” in Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention (see paragraphs 15 and 36 above).

49.  Having regard to its case-law (see Lelas v. Croatia, no. 55555/08, §§ 49-52, 20 May 2010, and, mutatis mutandis, Žaja, cited above, §§ 68‑72), the Court considers that, by having therefore raised in substance the same issue at the domestic level, the first and the fourth applicants afforded to the national authorities the opportunity to put right the violations alleged against them.

50.  It follows that the Government’s objection as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies must be rejected.

51.  The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

1.  The parties’ arguments

52.  The first, second and fourth applicants reiterated their main argument that they had been living abroad and thus, in accordance with Annex C to the Istanbul Convention, had not been bound to pay the taxes in question. They stated that the Istanbul Convention, in its official text, did not refer to “domicile” but to “living” abroad. Therefore, the fact that while living abroad they had had their domicile registered in Croatia had not been relevant. What should have mattered for the application of the Istanbul Convention had been whether they had been living abroad or in Croatia.

53.  The Government argued that the applicants had not met the requirements for exemption set out in Annex C to the Istanbul Convention and that therefore the customs authorities had rendered their decisions based on the law, decisions which had been foreseeable for the applicants.

2.  The Court’s assessment

54.  It was not disputed between the parties that the customs authorities’ decisions ordering the first, second and fourth applicants to pay the relevant duties had constituted an interference with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Having regard to its case-law (see Di Belmonte v. Italy, no. 72638/01, § 38, 16 March 2010, and Imbert de Trémiolles v. France (dec.), nos. 25834/05 and 27815/05, 4 January 2008), the Court sees no reason to hold otherwise.

55.  The Court must further determine whether that interference was justified, that is to say whether it was provided for by law, in the public interest and proportional.

56.  As regards the lawfulness of the interference, the Court first notes that it was based on law, specifically on the relevant customs legislation and the Istanbul Convention, notably its Annex C.

57.  However, the Court further reiterates that the existence of a legal basis is not in itself sufficient to satisfy the principle of lawfulness. When speaking of “law”, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 alludes to a concept which comprises statutory law as well as case-law and implies qualitative requirements, notably those of accessibility and foreseeability (see, for example, Brezovec v. Croatia, no. 13488/07, § 60, 29 March 2011 with further references to Mullai and Others v. Albania, no. 9074/07, § 113, 23 March 2010; and Carbonara and Ventura v. Italy, no. 24638/94, § 64, ECHR 2000‑VI). In particular, the law is “foreseeable” when an individual is able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail and when it affords a measure of protection against arbitrary interferences by the public authorities (see, for example, Ljaskaj v. Croatia, no. 58630/11, § 65, 20 December 2016, and Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 141 and 143, ECHR 2012).

58.  In the specific context of taxation, under the same Article, the Court has held that the lack of the required clarity and precision of the domestic law, offering divergent interpretations on an important fiscal issue, upset the requirement of the “quality of law” under the Convention and did not provide adequate protection against arbitrary interference by the public authorities with property rights (see Shchokin v. Ukraine, nos. 23759/03 and 37943/06, § 56, 14 October 2010; and Serkov v. Ukraine, no. 39766/05, § 42, 7 July 2011)

59.  In the Žaja case (cited above, §§ 90-106) the Court found that the practice of application of Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention in Croatia had at the relevant time been inconsistent and given rise to uncertainty and ambiguity as to who may benefit from the exemption, more specifically whether the decisive element was domicile or residence. Holding that the relevant law had therefore been unforeseeable, the Court in the Žaja case found a violation of Article 7 of the Convention.

60.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Since, as noted above (see paragraphs 57-58), Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention requires that any interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions must be lawful, which implies the qualitative requirement of foreseeability, the Court’s findings in Žaja apply with equal force in the present case.

61.  There has accordingly been a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

III.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7 OF THE CONVENTION

62.  The third applicant complained that his actions had not amounted to an administrative offence and that the domestic authorities had wrongly interpreted Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention. He relied on Article 7 of the Convention, which in the relevant part reads as follows:

“1.  No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.”

63.  The Government contested that argument.

A.  Admissibility

1.  The parties’ arguments

64.  The Government disputed the admissibility of this complaint, arguing that the third applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. Specifically, they argued that in his constitutional complaint the applicant had neither complained of a violation of Article 7 of the Convention nor of an inconsistent interpretation of the Istanbul Convention. In particular, in his constitutional complaint the applicant had alleged violations of his constitutional rights to equality before the law and a fair hearing, which corresponded to those rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.

65.  The applicant replied that he had properly exhausted the domestic remedies. He explained that he had drawn attention to the violation of Article 7 of the Convention throughout the proceedings before the domestic authorities by raising his arguments.

2.  The Court’s assessment

66.  The Court notes that in his constitutional complaint the applicant argued that his constitutional rights had been violated because of the erroneous interpretation of the provisions of the Istanbul Convention. In so doing he relied, inter alia, on the relevant provision of the Croatian Constitution, which reflects the principle “no crime without law” and corresponds to the rights guaranteed by Article 7 of the Convention (see paragraph 27 above). It follows that the Government’s objection as to the non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies must be rejected.

67.  The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

68.  The Court reiterates that it has already found a violation of Article 7 of the Convention in a case raising similar issues to the present one (see paragraph 59 above).

69.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.

70.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 7 of the Convention.

IV.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

71.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

1.  The parties’ submissions

72.  The applicants claimed the following amounts in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage:

-  58,000 euros (EUR) (the first applicant),

-  EUR 212,682.56 (the second applicant),

-  EUR 22,474.91 (the third applicant), and

-  EUR 20,000 (the fourth applicant).

73.  The Government contested those claims.

2.  The Court’s assessment

74.  The Court reiterates that a judgment in which it finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its consequences. If national law does not allow – or allows only partial – reparation to be made, Article 41 empowers the Court to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate (see Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, §§ 32-33, ECHR 2000-XI).

(a)  The first, second and fourth applicants

75.  The Court notes that the first, second and fourth applicants can now, relying on section 76 of the Administrative Disputes Act (see paragraph 38 above), lodge an application for the reopening of the administrative proceedings in respect of which the Court has found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

76.  Given the nature of the applicants’ complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the Court considers that in the present case the most appropriate way of repairing the consequences of that violation would be to reopen the proceedings complained of. As domestic law allows such reparation to be made, the Court considers that there is no call to award the applicants any sum in respect of pecuniary or non‑pecuniary damage.

(b)  The third applicant

77.  The Court notes that the third applicant claimed, on account of pecuniary damage sustained:

-  EUR 398.93 corresponding to the fine he had been ordered to pay in the administrative-offence proceedings (see paragraph 25 above),

-  EUR 10,579 corresponding to the customs debt he had been ordered to pay in the tax-related administrative proceedings (see paragraph 28 above), and

-  EUR 6,496.98 for the diminished value of his car and the other loss resulting from the car having been impounded (see paragraph 28 above).

He also claimed EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

78.  As regards the third applicant’s claim for pecuniary damage corresponding to the size of the fine and his claim for non-pecuniary damage, the Court notes that the third applicant can under the Administrative Offences Act lodge an application for the reopening of the administrative-offence proceedings in respect of which the Court has found a violation of Article 7 of the Convention (see Žaja, cited above, § 114). The Court also notes that under the same Act read in conjunction with relevant provision of the Criminal Procedure Act (see Žaja, loc. cit.), the State Attorney must lodge an application for the protection of legality if a judicial decision adopted in administrative-offence proceedings entailed a violation of human rights.

79.  Given the nature of the third applicant’s complaint under Article 7 of the Convention, the Court considers that in the present case the most appropriate way of repairing the consequences of that violation would be to reopen the proceedings complained of. As domestic law allows such reparation to be made, the Court considers that there is no call to award the third applicant any sum in respect of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage.

80.  As concerns the remainder of the third applicant’s claim for pecuniary damage, the Court notes that he did not complain before the Court of the tax-related administrative proceedings or the impounding of his car. Therefore, the Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the remainder of the pecuniary damage sought.

(c)  Conclusion

81.  In the light of the foregoing, the Court rejects the applicants’ claims for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.

B.  Costs and expenses

82.  The applicants also claimed EUR 7,320 (the first applicant), EUR 3,461.83 (the third applicant) and EUR 2,114.73 (the fourth applicant) for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court. The second applicant did not submit a claim for costs and expenses.

83.  The Government contested these claims.

84.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum.

85.  In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the first applicant EUR 807, the third applicant EUR 826 and the fourth applicant EUR 846 for the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants. The Court also considers it reasonable to award the first applicant EUR 1,500, the third applicant EUR 1,060 and the fourth applicant EUR 1,270 for the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before it, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.

86.  However, the claim for costs and expenses incurred in the other domestic proceedings must be rejected, given that the applicants will be able to have those costs reimbursed in the proceedings following their petition for reopening (see Vinčić and Others v. Serbia, nos. 44698/06 and 30 other applications, § 65, 1 December 2009).

C.  Default interest

87.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.  Decides to join the applications;

2.  Declares the applications admissible;

3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of the first, second and fourth applicant;

4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 7 of the Convention in respect of the third applicant;

5.  Holds,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the following amounts in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into Croatian kunas at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants:

(i)  EUR 2,307 (two thousand three hundred and seven euros) to the first applicant;

(ii)  EUR 1,886 (one thousand eight hundred eighty-six euros) to the third applicant; and

(iii)  EUR 2,116 (two thousand one hundred and sixteen euros), to the fourth applicant;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 October 2019, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Renata Degener                          Krzysztof Wojtyczek
Deputy Registrar                          President

APPENDIX

[1].  About EUR 22,830 at the material time

[2].  About EUR 27,000 at the material time

[3].  About EUR 124.564 at the material time

[4].  About EUR 400 at the material time

[5].  About EUR 10,678 at the material time

[6].  About EUR 53.230 at the material time