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EUROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
PRVI ODJEL
PREDMET STOJANOVIĆ PROTIV HRVATSKE
(Zahtjev br. 23160/09)
PRESUDA
Ova je presuda ispravljena 5. studenog 2013. u skladu s pravilom 81. Poslovnika Suda.
STRASBOURG
19. rujna 2013.
Ova presuda postaje konačna pod okolnostima navedenim u članku 44. stavku 2. Konvencije. Može biti podvrgnuta uredničkim izmjenama.
U predmetu Stojanović protiv Hrvatske, Europski sud za ljudska prava (Prvi odjel), zasjedajući u vijeću u sastavu:
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, predsjednica,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Julia Laffranque,
Ksenija Turković,
Dmitry Dedov, suci,
i Søren Nielsen, tajnik Odjela
nakon vijećanja zatvorenog za javnost 27. kolovoza 2013. donosi sljedeću presudu koja je usvojena ovog datuma:
POSTUPAK
ČINJENICE
I OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA
„... Ponašate se kao komunist: „Tko nije s nama, taj je protiv nas”... Zašto se od javnosti krije da osim ministarske plaće, A. H. prima veliki novac kao član još deset nadzornih odbora? ... Osim toga, dobro se sjećate njegove izjave kada je rekao da, dok je on ministar, Stojanović neće postati profesor...”
„... Plaćam vlastite račune dok mnogi sjede u raznim nadzornim odborima, primaju naknadu za to i imaju druge privilegije.“
Podnositelj zahtjeva tvrdio je da pritom nije spomenuo A.H.-a. Nadalje je izjavio:
„Također sam tom prilikom [podsjetio] dr. I.V.-a ... da mi je A.H. prijetio na okruglom stolu HDZ-a [o zdravstvu dana 9. listopada 1996.] ... da nikada neću postati profesor jer nemam potrebne stručne ili znanstvene kvalifikacije i [jer] nisam stručnjak.“
„A.H.: Što se tiče tvrdnje da moj bivši prijatelj Joža Stojanović nije stručnjak [i] njegove optužbe o izboru [navodno] loše tehnologije. Tu su tehnologiju iz njegova područja stručnosti, radiologije, izabrali članovi Hrvatskog liječničkog zbora, [prvenstveno] njegova stručnog društva za radiologiju, koji su usput rečeno redoviti sveučilišni profesori što ti Joža nikad nećeš postati jer nemaš stručne ni znanstvene kvalifikacije.“
„Tužiteljev zahtjev osnovan je u dijelu koji se tiče prvo tuženika [trgovačkog društva izdavača] i u potpunosti neosnovan u pogledu drugo tuženika [podnositelja zahtjeva].
Nema sumnje da je [podnositelj zahtjeva] dao intervju V.B.-u, novinaru tjednika Imperijal, koji je 4. travnja 1997. objavljen u 6. izdanju tog tjednika pod naslovom: Razotkrivši [H-ove] makinacije nisam podvalio HDZ-u. Također je neosporno da je u tom intervjuu [podnositelj zahtjeva] predstavio svoje viđenje situacije u hrvatskom zdravstvu pri čemu je istaknuo da nije riječ o napadu na stranku (HDZ) i da osobno nema ništa protiv svog kolege A.H.-a, no da se ne slažu po pitanju koncepta i strategije za zdravstvo. [Podnositelj zahtjeva] u svom je iskazu naveo da nije autorizirao intervju iako stoji iza svake riječi u njemu te da nije odabrao naslov i ne zna tko je to učinio. Dodao je da riječ „makinacije“ nije namjerno stavljena u naslov intervjua iz zlonamjernosti i da se ne odnosi osobno na tužitelja s obzirom na to da to nije bila svrha intervjua.
U svojoj je tužbi tužitelj tvrdio da uvreda proizlazi iz naslova intervjua, a ne njegova sadržaja.
Prema iskazu autora tog članka V.B.-a slijedi da je osmislio naslov na temelju riječi i tvrdnji koje je [podnositelj zahtjeva] koristio tom prilikom i u njihovim raspravama o situaciji u zdravstvu te da se [podnositelj zahtjeva] nije protivio naslovu kada je o njemu telefonski obaviješten prije objavljivanja intervjua.
Člankom 2. stavkom 8. Zakona o javnom priopćavanju definira se autorizacija kao odobrenje za objavljivanje dano u pisanome obliku ili u usmenome obliku, ako postoji tonski zapis o usmenoj autorizaciji.
U ovom predmetu međutim nije riječ o autoriziranom intervjuu, a pogotovo ne o autorizaciji njegova naslova, jer [podnositelj zahtjeva] tvrdi da nije autorizirao intervju, a prvi tuženik nije podnio dokaze o suprotnome. Iako novinar V.B. tvrdi da autorizacija postoji, on [sam] nije to rekao sa sigurnošću kada je izjavio [u svom iskazu] da 'intervju je bio odobren koliko se ja sjećam'.
Činjenica ostaje da se riječ „makinacije“ iz naslova povezuje s tužiteljem koja je osobito pogodila tužitelja jer prema njegovu mišljenju ona podrazumijeva da je on loša osoba...
Budući da za većinu ljudi riječ „makinacija“ ima negativni prizvuk jer je povezana sa spletkama, trikovima i lukavosti, razumno je očekivati da je u tom pogledu tužitelj pretrpio duševnu bol zbog povrede njegova ugleda i časti. Stoga je sud utvrdio da je prvi tuženik odgovoran za štete. Također treba napomenuti da se uporaba tako teške riječi, koja se očito koristi isključivo za senzacionalistički učinak i za privlačenje čitatelja te se iz tih razloga nalazi na naslovnoj stranici, ne može opravdati tvrdnjom da je riječ o autorovom vrijednosnom sudu rada i karaktera tužitelja. To je dodatno potkrijepljeno činjenicom da u samom tekstu intervjua nisu navedeni argumenti za to [viđenje]. Suprotno tome, [podnositelj zahtjeva] tvrdi da osobno nema ništa protiv svog kolege A.H., no da se ne slaže s njim po pitanju koncepta i strategije za zdravstvo. U svom je iskazu [podnositelj zahtjeva] također izjavio da taj naslov ne predstavlja svrhu intervjua.
U pogledu drugog ... članka koji je zapravo tumačenje telefonskog razgovora između dr. I.V.-a i [podnositelja zahtjeva], sud je također utvrdio da sadrži izjave kojima se naštetilo ugledu, časti i dostojanstvu tužitelja. [Razlog tome jest činjenica] da stavljanjem tih riječi u usta [podnositelja zahtjeva] autor implicira da se skrivalo od javnosti da tužitelj uz ministarsku plaću dobiva veliku količinu novaca kao član dodatnih deset nadzornih odbora. Međutim, [podnositelj zahtjeva] u svom iskazu tvrdi da u tom telefonskom razgovoru nikada nije spomenuo tužiteljevo ime kada je govorio o [članstvu] mnogih osoba u nadzornim odborima...
[Podnositelj zahtjeva] također je u svom iskazu rekao da je u telefonskom razgovoru s dr. I.V.-om spomenuo ... da mu je tužitelj rekao na okruglom stolu HDZ-a da nikada neće postati profesor jer nema stručnih ili znanstvenih kvalifikacija. Iako je [podnositelj zahtjeva] mogao protumačiti te tužiteljeve riječi kao prijetnju s obzirom na to da ih je tužitelj izrekao dok je vršio dužnost ministra zdravstva, jasno proizlazi iz zapisnika prve sjednice okruglog stola HDZ-a o zdravstvu od 15. listopada 1996., koji je [podnositelj zahtjeva] priložio spisu, da su te izjave izvučene iz konteksta stranačke rasprave o situaciji u zdravstvu u kojoj je tužitelj izjavio da su tehnologiju u zdravstvu, za koju je [podnositelj zahtjeva] tvrdio da je loša, odabrali članovi Hrvatskog liječničkog zbora koji su također redoviti sveučilišni profesori što tuženik nikad neće biti jer nema [odgovarajuće] stručne i znanstvene kvalifikacije.
Budući da je tužiteljev vrijednosni sud stručnih i znanstvenih kvalifikacija [podnositelja zahtjeva] izrečen na zatvorenoj stranačkoj raspravi i izvučen iz konteksta u predmetnom novinskom članku korištenjem riječi 'dok god sam ja ministar', jasno je da je na taj način tužitelj prikazan kao osoba koja je iskoristila svoj politički položaj kako bi naštetila drugima.
Budući da [podnositelj zahtjeva] nije odabrao naslov predmetnog intervjua niti je riječ 'makinacije' spomenuta u tekstu, budući da on nije autorizirao taj intervju i posebice ne njegov naslov, budući da ne samo da nije dopustio autoru novinarskog tumačenja telefonskog razgovora između njega i dr. I.V.-a njegovo objavljivanje, već je zapravo zabranio [objavljivanje], i budući da se predmetni telefonski razgovor nije odvio na način na koji je objavljen [prikazan u članku] ... tužiteljev zahtjev protiv [podnositelja zahtjeva] proglašen je neosnovanim jer postupanje [podnositelja zahtjeva] nije dovelo do objavljivanja izjava koje su naštetile časti i dostojanstvu tužitelja.
Štoviše, iz iskaza svih svjedoka koji su prema podnositelju zahtjeva bili prisutni u sobi dok je on razgovarao s dr. I.V.-om, tj. iz iskaza svjedoka I.B.-a, N.L.-a i M.K.-a, koje je sud prihvatio kao točne zbog njihova uvjerljiva prikaza, slijedi da je V.B. sjedio u susjednoj sobi u tom trenutku i da je mogao čuti samo ono što je [podnositelj zahtjeva] govorio s obzirom na to da zvučnik na telefonu nije bio uključen jer telefoni sa zvučnicima ne postoje u bolnici. Uz njihove iskaze da [podnositelj zahtjeva] tom prilikom nije spomenuo tužiteljevo ime, to je potvrdio i dr. I.V. kojeg je sud također saslušao kao svjedoka. Nadalje, [podnositelj zahtjeva] izjavio je u svom iskazu da u Imperijalu nije porekao telefonski razgovor nakon njegova objavljivanja, no da je to učinio nekoliko puta na druge načine i u sredstvima javnog priopćavanja. [Posvjedočio je da] je odmah nakon objavljivanja razgovarao s glavnom urednicom Imperijala, gđom. I.D., i upozorio je da nije rekao ono što je objavljeno [pod njegovim imenom] na što je ona odgovorila da to nije nešto bitno. Mora se napomenuti da I.D. koja je saslušana pred sudom kao svjedokinja nije porekla mogućnost da je [podnositelj zahtjeva] izrekao primjedbe nakon objavljivanja tog teksta.
Iz navedenih razloga sud nije mogao prihvatiti iskaz svjedoka V.B. koji je tvrdio da je intervju bio autoriziran kao točan jer [bi u tom slučaju] prvi tuženik sigurno priložio dokaze o toj autorizaciji. [Sud] također nije mogao [prihvatiti V.B.-ov iskaz u dijelu u kojem je izjavio] da je krišom čuo cijeli telefonski razgovor jer je bio uključen zvučnik i da mu [podnositelj zahtjeva] nije zabranio objavljivanje tog razgovora. [Razlog tome jest] činjenica da je svjedok I.B. posvjedočio da je nakon razgovora vidio [podnositelja zahtjeva] kako se svađa s V.B.-om i govori mu da ne objavljuje ništa dok ne dobije pismenu autorizaciju, a tu pismenu autorizaciju prvi tuženik nije dostavio tijekom postupka.“
„Kao odgovor na tvrdnje o [izostanku] autorizacije koji su predstavljeni u žalbi, [sud primjećuje da] autorizacija podrazumijeva odobrenje za objavljivanje razgovora ili izjave. Stoga je njezina svrha zaštita intervjuirane osobe u pogledu sadržaja njegovih ili njezinih izjava.
Međutim, pitanje autorizacije također se može pojaviti u [kontekstu] građanskog postupka za naknadu štete koji protiv izdavača pokrene treća osoba kojoj je naštetio objavljeni tekst. Neosporno je da [predmetni] intervju nije autoriziran u značenju članka 2. stavka 8. Zakona o javnom priopćavanju, dok tumačenje telefonskog razgovora ... predstavlja informacije za koje po prirodi nije potrebna autorizacija.
...
... [Prvostupanjski] sud donio je odluku (u onom dijelu u kojem odbacuje tužbu protiv [podnositelja zahtjeva]) na temelju zaključka da [podnositelj zahtjeva] ne samo da nije dopustio objavljivanje već je zabranio novinaru objavljivanje sadržaja njegova telefonskog razgovora s dr. I.V.-om.
Taj zaključak nije jasan. Nije jasan jer je [podnositelj zahtjeva] ... posvjedočio da se telefonski razgovor nije odvio onako kako je objavljen. Također je posvjedočio da je novinar V.B. mogao čuti samo dio razgovora, točnije samo njegovu stranu. Stoga, ako on [novinar] nije mogao čuti sve i [čak] ako [podnositelj zahtjeva] nije spomenuo činjenice koje se pojavljuju u objavljenom tekstu, [prvostupanjski] sud trebao je obrazložiti zašto je [podnositelj zahtjeva] zabranio novinaru pisanje o tome da se taj telefonski razgovor dogodio.
Ako je istina da nikada nije rekao [ono što je objavljeno] (ili nije rekao sve [to]), trebalo je ispitati zašto to onda nije porekao.
Konačno, postavlja se pitanje zašto je prekinuo pregled pacijenta da bi telefonski razgovarao s dr. I.V.-om u neposrednoj blizini novinara umjesto da je odgodio taj razgovor za kasnije.
Izjave svjedoka koji su navodno bili prisutni tijekom telefonskog razgovora prvostupanjski sud nije ocijenio u skladu s člankom 8. Zakona o parničnom postupku. Umjesto toga, sud je većinski pregledao te izjave i ocijenio ih kao 'točne i uvjerljive'.
Da ih je ocijenio u skladu sa zakonom, primijetio bi da prema N.L.-ovom iskazu I.B. nije bio prisutan, a da ona [N.L.] nije obraćala pozornost na sadržaj telefonskog razgovora.
Također bi primijetio da je svjedok I.B. posvjedočio da u telefonskom razgovoru nisu spomenuti nadzorni odbori ni A.H. M.H.-ov iskaz bio je istovjetan...
Nasuprot tome, [podnositelj zahtjeva] posvjedočio je da je u telefonskom razgovoru [doista] raspravljao o nadzornim odborima i naknadi koju dobivaju njihovi članovi te da je spomenuo A.H.-a u vezi s 'prijetnjama' njegovom [profesionalnom] napredovanju.
Tome se treba dodati da je [podnositelj zahtjeva] također posvjedočio da se riječ 'makinacije' odnosi na način na koji se A.H. privatno odnosio prema njemu.
Prvostupanjski sud propustio je ocijeniti sve navedeno.“
„... Ne primam plaću od [političke] stranke niti sjedim u otprilike deset nadzornih odbora i dobivam za to naknadu...“
Kada ga je sudac pitao je li tom prilikom spomenuo tužiteljevo ime, podnositelj zahtjeva odgovorio je sljedeće:
„Ne, no kada sam odgovarao na pitanja dr. I.V.-a spomenuo sam ministra zdravstva, a u to je doba tužitelj bio ministar zdravstva.“
Na pitanje je li tom prilikom rekao dr. I.V.-u išta o navodnim prijetnjama ministra zdravstva da nikad neće postati profesor, podnositelj zahtjeva odgovorio je sljedeće:
„Dr. I.V. me pitao zašto mi je tužitelj prijetio na što sam ja odgovorio da bi trebao pročitati zapisnik ... okruglog stola HDZ-a o zdravstvenoj reformi od 15. listopada 1996. Ne sjećam se točno jesam li rekao još nešto kao odgovor na to pitanje.“
„Nema sumnje da je tuženik [podnositelj zahtjeva] dao intervju V.B.-u, novinaru tjednika Imperijal, koji je 4. travnja 1997. objavljen u 6. izdanju tog tjednika pod naslovom: 'Razotkrivši [H-ove] makinacije nisam podvalio HDZ-u'. Također je neosporno da je u tom intervjuu tuženik predstavio svoje viđenje situacije u hrvatskom zdravstvu pri čemu je iskazao neslaganje s tužiteljem, koji je u to doba bio ministar zdravstva, po pitanju koncepta i strategije za zdravstvo. U svojoj je tužbi tužitelj tvrdio da uvreda proizlazi iz naslova intervjua, a ne njegova sadržaja. Nije jasno tko je osmislio naslov intervjua, je li tuženik autorizirao taj intervju, uključujući naslov, i je li tuženik u prisustvu novinara V.B.-a obavio telefonski razgovor s dr. I.V.-om čiji je sadržaj objavljen u obliku u kojem ga je protumačio novinar, te je li tuženik dao dopuštenje tom novinaru da objavi [sadržaj] tog telefonskog razgovora, i konačno jesu li tuženikove izjave tijekom tog telefonskog razgovora, ako su [doista] izrečene, istinite u obliku u kojem su objavljene.
Prema iskazu autora tog članka V.B.-a slijedi da je osmislio naslov na temelju riječi i tvrdnji koje je [podnositelj zahtjeva] koristio tom prilikom i u njihovim raspravama o situaciji u zdravstvu te da se [podnositelj zahtjeva] nije protivio naslovu kada je [podnositelja zahtjeva] o njemu telefonski obavijestio prije objavljivanja intervjua.
Sud je prihvatio taj iskaz kao točan jer je tuženik u svom iskazu izjavio da iako nije autorizirao intervju, stoji iza svake navedene riječi i da ga je spreman potpisati, te da iako nije odabrao naslov intervjua, prihvatio [ga] ja jer je mislio da riječ 'makinacije' nije stavljena u naslov iz zlonamjernosti te da se ona zapravo odnosi na to kako se tužitelj privatno ponaša prema njemu i da je on shvatio tu riječ u značenju trika, lukavosti, varke i spletke.
Budući da riječ 'makinacije' nedvojbeno ima negativni prizvuk i upućuje na nepošteno ponašanje, potpuno je razumno očekivati da je tužitelj pretrpio duševnu bol uslijed ove povrede njegova dostojanstva, časti i ugleda. Stoga je potrebno utvrditi tuženikovu odgovornost za štete neovisno o tome je li [on] koristio tu tešku riječ u vezi s tužiteljem u intervjuu ili ju je u naslovu intervjua koristio ... autor. Razlog tome nije samo činjenica da tuženik nije porekao korištenje tog izraza i takav prikaz tužitelja već [i] činjenica da je on tijekom postupka učinio upravo suprotno i izjavio da se slaže s naslovom...“
„U pogledu drugog ... članka koji je zapravo tumačenje telefonskog razgovora između dr. I.V.-a i tuženika, sud je također utvrdio da sadrži izjave kojima se naštetilo ugledu, časti i dostojanstvu tužitelja. [Razlog tome jest činjenica] da stavljanjem tih riječi u usta tuženika autor implicira da se skrivalo od javnosti da tužitelj uz ministarsku plaću dobiva veliku količinu novaca kao član dodatnih deset nadzornih odbora. Međutim, [podnositelj zahtjeva] u svom iskazu tvrdi da u tom telefonskom razgovoru nikada nije spomenuo tužiteljevo ime kada je govorio o članstvu mnogih [osoba] u nadzornim odborima...
Tuženik je također u svom iskazu rekao da je u telefonskom razgovoru s dr. I.V.-om spomenuo ... da mu je tužitelj rekao na okruglom stolu HDZ-a da nikada neće postati profesor jer nema stručnih ili znanstvenih kvalifikacija. Iako je tuženik mogao protumačiti te tužiteljeve riječi kao prijetnju s obzirom na to da ih je tužitelj izrekao dok je vršio dužnost ministra zdravstva, jasno proizlazi iz zapisnika prve sjednice okruglog stola HDZ-a o zdravstvu od 15. listopada 1996., koji je [podnositelj zahtjeva] priložio spisu, da su te izjave izvučene iz konteksta stranačke rasprave o situaciji u zdravstvu u kojoj je tužitelj izjavio da su tehnologiju u zdravstvu, za koju je tuženik tvrdio da je loša, odabrali članovi Hrvatskog liječničkog zbora koji su također redoviti sveučilišni profesori što tuženik nikad neće biti jer nema [odgovarajuće] stručne i znanstvene kvalifikacije.
Budući da je tužiteljev vrijednosni sud stručnih i znanstvenih kvalifikacija tuženika izrečen na zatvorenoj stranačkoj raspravi i izvučen iz konteksta u predmetnom novinskom članku korištenjem riječi 'dok god sam ja ministar', jasno je da je na taj način tužitelj prikazan kao osoba koja je iskoristila svoj politički položaj kako bi naštetila drugima.
Budući da su informacije objavljene u novinarskom tumačenju telefonskog razgovora između dr. I.V.-a i tuženika nedvojbeno naštetile dostojanstvu, časti i ugledu tužitelja, tuženiku je naloženo da plati tužitelju naknadu za njihovo objavljivanje bez obzira na tuženikove tvrdnje da nije dao novinaru V.B.-u dopuštenje da objavi taj razgovor i da se razgovor nije odvio u obliku u kojem je objavljen. Sud nije uspio utvrditi točan sadržaj tog telefonskog razgovora iz iskaza svjedoka koji su prema tuženiku bili prisutni u prostoriji tijekom njegova telefonskog razgovora s dr. I.V.-om ili iz iskaza samog dr. I.V.-a.
Štoviše, dr. I.V. posvjedočio je da se ne sjeća je li mu tijekom telefonskog razgovora tuženik rekao da je tužitelj član još deset nadzornih odbora i da za to dobiva veliku svotu novaca. Također je mislio da mu tuženik nikada nije rekao ništa o tome da je tužitelj pokušao spriječiti tuženika u stjecanju titule profesora. Također je izjavio da je bio upoznat s novinskim člankom te da ga nije porekao i da sad žali zbog toga. Znao je da je tuženik često iznosio kritike o situaciji u zdravstvu tijekom tužiteljeva mandata kao ministra zdravstva i naglasio je da ih tuženik nije potkrijepio [dobrim] argumentima.
S druge je strane svjedok I.B. posvjedočio da iako nije bio prisutan tijekom telefonskog razgovora, nije čuo niti je mogao čuti što dr. I.V. govori jer nije bio uključen zvučnik. Također nije čuo da se spominje [tužiteljevo ime] ili nadzorni odobri u tom razgovoru. Međutim, svjedokinja N.L., koja je bila prisutna tijekom tog razgovora i koja nije obraćala pozornost na njegov sadržaj, tvrdi da su u prostoriji bili samo ona, tuženik i M.K.
Svjedok M.K. također je porekao bilo kakav spomen tužitelja ili nadzornih odbora u tom telefonskom razgovoru.
Uzimajući u obzir činjenicu da su svi ovi svjedoci tvrdili da zvučnik nije bio uključen baš kao što je tvrdio i tuženik, sud nije prihvatio iskaz svjedoka V.B.-a koji je tvrdio suprotno. Međutim, iskaz tog svjedoka prihvaćen je u dijelu u kojem je on izjavio da mu je tuženik odmah nakon razgovora objasnio o čemu je razgovarao s dr. I.V.-om i da nije tražio tuženika posebnu autorizaciju za objavljivanje tog razgovora s obzirom na to da je bilo logično da je tuženik znao da će razgovor biti objavljen s obzirom na dano objašnjenje, i da se nakon objavljivanja članka tuženik nije naljutio na njega nego je nastavio i dalje surađivati s njim.
Činjenica jest da je sam tuženik priznao u svom iskazu da je obavio telefonski razgovor s dr. I.V.-om iako je znao da se novinar V.B. nalazi u tom trenutku u nasuprotnoj sobi i da je pritom bio svjestan da novinar može čuti razgovor. [Tuženik] je to potvrdio svojom izjavom da je nakon razgovora zabranio novinaru V.B.-u da ga objavi.
S druge strane, tuženik je kategorički tvrdio da zvučnik nije bio uključen tijekom telefonskog razgovora jer takvih telefona nema u njihovoj ustanovi. Stoga je novinar
V.B. mogao čuti samo dio razgovora, tj. samo ono što je [tuženik] govorio, ne i ono što je dr. I.V. govorio, što je u suprotnosti s novinskim člankom u kojem je objavljen cijeli telefonski razgovor, tj. navodi i riječi dr. I.V.-a. To znači da je tuženik naknadno prenio ono što se izreklo u razgovoru novinaru V.B.-u tako da bi on to mogao objaviti.
No, čak i ako je novinar V.B. sam izmislio cijeli telefonski razgovor, to ne bi moglo osloboditi tuženika od odgovornosti s obzirom na to da se od tuženika moglo očekivati poricanje tih tvrdnji, osobito jer je u svom iskazu sam izjavio da je riječ o 'sumnjivu članku'. Međutim, on to nije učinio s obzirom na to da do objavljivanja tog poricanja nije došlo niti je tuženik imao nikakvu pismenu evidenciju o razgovoru s glavnom urednicom Imperijala [u kojoj se navodi] da članak nije točan. Glavna urednica Imperijala I.D. na saslušanju je posvjedočila da se ne sjeća razgovora s tuženikom nakon objavljivanja teksta iako priznaje da je telefonski razgovarala s njim nekoliko puta i stoga ne može poreći mogućnost da je tuženik izrekao primjedbe nakon objavljivanja teksta.“
„Prema iskazu tužitelja koji je sud prihvatio kao ... vrlo uvjerljiv slijedi da je objavljivanje tih izjava vrlo negativno utjecalo na njega s obzirom na javnu dužnost koju je izvršavao u to vrijeme i skromna financijska sredstva koja je njegovo ministarstvo imalo na raspolaganju zbog kojih je njegov projekt mogao preživjeti samo uz strogu financijsku disciplinu. Posljedica objavljivana tog članka bio je gubitak povjerenja ljudi na području zdravstva koji su radili za male plaće. To se odrazilo u bolnici u kojoj je radio kao liječnik jer su pacijenti zbog gubitka povjerenja počeli mijenjati liječnika dok su ga studenti kojima je predavao na Medicinskom fakultetu provocirali sljedećim: 'Čitate li Imperijal? I onda nas vi učite etici!' Sve je to također negativno utjecalo na njegovu obitelji jer su im neki prijatelji počeli okretati leđa te su im upućivani neugodni anonimni telefonski pozivi. Tužitelj je izjavio da nije potražio liječničku pomoć za tegobe od kojih je patio jer si je kao liječnik sam propisivao lijekove s obzirom na to da se osjećao vrlo loše u to vrijeme i nije mogao spavati.
Budući da tužitelj nije zatražio liječničku pomoć za tegobe od kojih je patio i stoga nema odgovarajuću medicinsku dokumentaciju, sud nije smatrao potrebnim zatražiti mišljenje zdravstvenog stručnjaka u pogledu trajanja i težine tih tegoba s obzirom na to da je, uzimajući u obzir sadržaj čanka i javnu dužnost koju je izvršavao tužitelj u to doba, potpuno razumljivo da je on patio od teških mentalnih tegoba.
S obzirom na to da je tuženik takvim postupanjem ozbiljno narušio dostojanstvo, čast i ugled tužitelja te mu uzrokovao tegobe, bilo je potrebno sukladno članku 200. Zakona o obveznim odnosima [iz 1978.] dodijeliti tužitelju naknadu štete u iznosu od
30.000 [hrvatskih] kuna i pritom uzeti u obzir činjenicu da su te izjave objavljene u tjedniku Imperijal te .. da je prodano 2.638 primjeraka tog izdanja Imperijala.“
„Tvrdnje predstavljene u žalbi nisu osnovane jer je prvostupanjski sud u potpunosti i ispravno utvrdio činjenice predmeta te je također ispravno primijenio materijalno pravo.
Stoga je prvostupanjski sud ispravno ocijenio izvedene dokaze ... i utvrdio da je tuženik izrekao niz uvreda protiv tužitelja (sve su objavljene u tisku) kojima je naštetio časti, ugledu i dostojanstvu tužitelja uslijed čega je tužitelj patio od teških mentalnih tegoba... Prvostupanjski sud utvrdio je to na temelju iskaza svjedoka V.B., ali i iskaza samog tuženika koji je izjavio da iako nije autorizirao intervju objavljen u novinama Imperijal pod naslovom 'Razotkrivši [H-ove] makinacije nisam podvalio HDZ-u', stoji iza svake riječi objavljene u članku ...
Nakon što je utvrdio da je tuženik izrekao uvrede protiv tuženika kojima je naštetio [njegovoj] časti, ugledu i dostojanstvu, prvostupanjski sud ispravno je dodijelio tužitelju naknadu za pretrpljene mentalne tegobe u iznosu od 30.000 HRK u skladu s kriterijima utvrđenima člankom 200. Zakona o obveznim odnosima.
Štoviše, u ovom je predmetu prvostupanjski sud prilikom ocjene opravdanosti dodjele naknade i njezine visine imao na umu [sve] okolnosti predmeta, tj. iznošenje uvreda protiv tužitelja koji je u to doba bio ministar zdravstva, odnosno poznata osoba u hrvatskoj javnosti, ... osoba visokog integriteta u profesionalnom životu, osoba koja je istaknuta u svojoj struci i društvenom angažmanu. Iznesene uvrede stoga su osobito povrijedile čast i ugled tužitelja kao takve osobe što je uzrokovalo teške mentalne tegobe od kojih je patio.
Visina naknade stoga je bila ... sukladna težini pretrpljenih mentalnih tegoba koje su proizašle iz povrede njegove časti i ugleda.“
„Podnositelj prigovara zbog navodne povrede članaka ... i 38. Ustava ...
[Redovni] sudovi nedvojbeno su utvrdili da je objavljivanje predmetnih članaka naštetilo časti i ugledu tužitelja što je uzrokovalo njegove mentalne tegobe. Stoga u provedenom građanskom postupku u skladu s odgovarajućim zakonskim odredbama nisu povrijeđena podnositeljeva [ustavna] jamstva utvrđena [člancima na koje se poziva].“
II MJERODAVNO DOMAĆE PRAVO
A. Ustav
Članak 16. *
(1) Slobode i prava mogu se ograničiti samo zakonom da bi se zaštitila sloboda i prava drugih ljudi te pravni poredak, javni moral i zdravlje.
(2) Svako ograničenje slobode ili prava mora biti razmjerno naravi potrebe za ograničenjem u svakom pojedinom slučaju.
...
Članak 38.
*(1) Jamči se sloboda mišljenja i izražavanja misli.
(2) Sloboda izražavanja misli obuhvaća osobito slobodu tiska i drugih sredstava priopćavanja, slobodu govora i javnog nastupa i slobodno osnivanje svih ustanova javnog priopćavanja.
(3) Zabranjuje se cenzura. Novinari imaju pravo na slobodu izvještavanja i pristupa informaciji.
(4) Jamči se pravo na ispravak svakomu komu je javnom viješću povrijeđeno Ustavom i zakonom utvrđeno pravo.
B. Zakon o obveznim odnosima iz 1978.
1. Mjerodavne odredbe
Osnove odgovornosti
Članak 154.
„Tko drugome uzrokuje štetu dužan je naknaditi je ako ne dokaže da je šteta nastala bez njegove krivnje.“
Šteta
Članak 155.
„Šteta je umanjenje nečije imovine (obična šteta) i sprečavanje njezina povećanja (izmakla korist), a i nanošenje drugom fizičkog ili psihičkog bola ili straha (nematerijalna šteta).“
...
V. NAKADA NEMATERIJALNE ŠTETE
Objavljivanje presude ili ispravka
Članak 199.
„U slučaju povrede prava ličnosti sud može narediti, na trošak štetnika, objavljivanje presude odnosno ispravka, ili narediti da štetnik povuče izjavu kojom je povreda učinjena, ili što drugo čime se može ostvariti svrha koja se postiže naknadom.“
Novčana naknada
Članak 200.
„Za pretrpljene fizičke bolove, za pretrpljene duševne bolove zbog smanjenja životne aktivnosti. naruženosti, povrede ugleda i časti; slobode ili prava ličnosti, smrti bliske osobe te za strah sud će, ako nađe da okolnosti slučaja a osobito jačina bolova i straha i njihovo trajanje to opravdavaju, dosuditi pravičnu novčanu naknadu, nezavisno od naknade materijalne štete, a i kad nje nema.
Pri odlučivanju o zahtjevu za naknadu nematerijalne štete te o visini njezine naknade sud će voditi računa o .... cilju kome služi ta naknada, ali i o tome da se njome ne pogoduje težnjama koje nisu spojive sa njezinom prirodom i društvenom svrhom.“
...
ODGOVORNOST VIŠE OSOBA ZA ISTU ŠTETU
Solidarna odgovornost
Članak 206. stavak 1. i 4.
„(1) Za štetu koju je više osoba uzrokovalo zajedno svi sudionici odgovaraju solidarno.
(4) Kad je nedvojbeno da je štetu uzrokovala neka od dviju ili više određenih, osoba koje su na neki način međusobno povezane, a ne može se utvrditi koja je od njih štetu uzrokovala, te osobe odgovaraju solidarno.“
Regres isplatioca
Članak 208.
(1) Solidarni dužnik koji isplati više nego što iznosi njegov udio u šteti može tražiti od svakog od ostalih dužnika [proporcionalno njihovu udjelu] da mu naknadi ono što je platio za njega.
(2) Koliko iznosi udio svakoga pojedinog dužnika sud određuje s obzirom na težinu [stupanj] njegove krivnje i težinu posljedica koje su proistekle iz njegova djelovanja.
(3) Ako se udjeli dužnika ne mogu utvrditi, na svakog pada jednak dio, osim ako pravičnost zahtijeva da se u konkretnom slučaju drugačije odluči.“
C. Zakon o javnom priopćavanju
Određenje pojmova
Članak 2. stavak 7. i 8.
„(7) Intervju je razgovor i izjava u pisanome ili usmenome obliku, namijenjen objavljivanju u javnome glasilu.
(8) Autorizacija je odobrenje za objavljivanje dano u pisanome obliku ili u usmenome obliku, ako postoji tonski zapis o usmenoj autorizaciji.“
...
Glavni urednik
Članak 14. stavak 2. i 3.
„(2) Glavni urednik [informacijskog medija] odgovoran je, u skladu sa zakonom, za sve objavljene informacije.
(3) Odgovornost glavnoga urednika iz stavka 2. ovoga članka odnosi se i na uredničku obradu objavljene informacije (izbor naslova, podnaslova, teksta ispod fotografije i slično).“
...
Odgovornost za štetu
Članak 22.
„(1) Nakladnik koji informacijom objavljenom u javnome glasilu prouzroči drugome štetu dužan ju je naknaditi.
(4) Nematerijalna šteta naknađuje se ispravljanjem netočne informacije, objavljivanjem ispravka informacije i isprikom te isplatom pravične novčane naknade za pretrpljene bolove i strah, ako jakost i trajanje bolova i straha to opravdavaju, sukladno općim propisima obveznoga prava.
(5) Nematerijalnu štetu dužan je naknaditi nakladnik koji informacijom o osobnom ili obiteljskom životu, ili nekom drugom informacijom objavljenom u javnome glasilu povrijedi privatnost, dostojanstvo, ugled, čast ili koje drugo Ustavom ili zakonom zaštićeno pravo osobe.
Oslobođenje nakladnika od odgovornosti za naknadu štete
Članak 23. stavak 1.
(1) Nakladnik se oslobađa odgovornosti za naknadu štete:
1 ...
2. ako je informacija kojom je šteta učinjena autorizirani intervju,
3. ako se informacija kojom je šteta učinjena temelji na:
- istinitim činjenicama, ili
- činjenicama za koje je autor imao osnovani razlog povjerovati da su istinite i poduzeo je sve potrebite mjere za provjeru njihove istinitosti a postojalo je opravdano zanimanje javnosti za objavu te informacije i ako je postupano u dobroj vjeri,
4. ...
5. ako je informacija kojom je šteta učinjena fotografija oštećenika snimljena na javnome mjestu ili fotografija oštećenika snimljena uz njegovo znanje i pristanak radi objavljivanja, a oštećenik nije zabranio objavljivanje, odnosno ograničio pravo autora fotografije na iskorištavanje djela,
6. ako se sporne informacije odnose na vrijednosne sudove autora čije je objavljivanje bilo u javnom interesu i ako su te informacije dane u dobroj vjeri.“
Objavljivanje ispravka
Članak 31. stavak 1. i 2.
„(1) Novine i druga povremena izdanja te radijske i televizijske postaje dužne su objaviti ispravak objavljene informacije.
(2) Pravo na objavljivanje ispravka informacije ima fizička ili pravna osoba čije je dostojanstvo, ugled i čast, neko drugo pravo ili interes povrijeđeno netočnom ili nepotpunom informacijom, a ako su ta prava ili interesi povrijeđeni uvredljivom informacijom fizička ili pravna osoba ima pravo odgovora na objavljenu uvredljivu informaciju.“
D. Kodeks časti hrvatskih novinara
„Novinar je obvezan iznositi točnu, potpunu i provjerenu informaciju. On navodi osobe ili ustanove od kojih je dobio podatak, informaciju ili izjavu. Ima pravo i ne otkriti izvor informacije, ali za objavljeni podatak snosi moralnu, materijalnu [građansku] i krivičnu odgovornost.“
E. Zakon o parničnom postupku
Članak 221.a
„Ako sud na temelju izvedenih dokaza (članak 8.) ne može sa sigurnošću utvrditi neku činjenicu, o postojanju činjenice zaključit će primjenom pravila o teretu dokazivanja.“
...
5.a Ponavljanje postupka u povodu konačne presude Europskog suda za ljudska prava u Strasbourgu o povredi temeljnog ljudskog prava ili slobode
Članak 428.a
„(1) Kad Europski sud za ljudska prava utvrdi povredu kojeg ljudskog prava ili temeljne slobode zajamčene Konvencijom za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda i dodatnih Protokola uz tu Konvenciju koje je Republika Hrvatska ratificirala, stranka može, u roku od trideset dana od konačnosti presude Europskog suda za ljudska prava, podnijeti zahtjev sudu u Republici Hrvatskoj koji je sudio u prvom stupnju u postupku u kojemu je donesena odluka kojom je povrijeđeno ljudsko pravo ili temeljna sloboda, za izmjenu odluke kojom je to pravo ili temeljna sloboda povrijeđeno.
(2) Postupak iz stavka 1. ovoga članka provodi se uz odgovarajuću primjenu odredaba o ponavljanju postupka.
(3) U ponovljenom postupku sudovi su dužni poštivati pravna stajališta izražena u konačnoj presudi Europskog suda za ljudska prava kojom je utvrđena povreda temeljnog ljudskog prava ili slobode.“
PRAVO
I NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANKA 10. KONVENCIJE
„1. Svatko ima pravo na slobodu izražavanja. To pravo obuhvaća slobodu mišljenja i slobodu primanja i širenja informacija i ideja bez miješanja javne vlasti i bez obzira na granice. Ovaj članak ne sprječava države da podvrgnu režimu dozvola ustanove koje obavljaju djelatnost radija ili televizije te kinematografsku djelatnost.
2. Kako ostvarivanje tih sloboda obuhvaća dužnosti i odgovornosti, ono može biti podvrgnuto formalnostima, uvjetima, ograničenjima ili kaznama propisanim zakonom, koji su u demokratskom društvu nužni radi interesa državne sigurnosti, teritorijalne cjelovitosti ili javnog reda i mira, radi sprječavanja nereda ili zločina, radi zaštite zdravlja ili morala, radi zaštite ugleda ili prava drugih, radi sprječavanja odavanja povjerljivih informacija ili radi očuvanja autoriteta i nepristranosti sudbene vlasti.
A.Dopuštenost
(a) Tvrdnje strana
(b) Ocjena Suda
2. Neiscrpljenost domaćih pravnih sredstava
(a) Tvrdnje strana
(b) Ocjena Suda
B. Osnovanost
1. Tvrdnje strana
(a) Vlada
(b) Podnositelj zahtjeva
(a) Pitanje miješanja
(b) Zakonitost i legitiman cilj
(c) „Nužno u demokratskom društvu“
(i) Mjerodavna načela
„(a) Test nužnosti u demokratskom društvu zahtijeva od Suda da utvrdi je li miješanje kojemu se prigovara bilo u skladu s neodgodivom društvenom potrebom. Države potpisnice imaju određenu slobodu procjene postojanja takve potrebe, no to dolazi zajedno s europskim nadzorom koji obuhvaća i zakonodavstvo i odluke donesene u skladu s njim, uključujući i odluke neovisnih sudova. Sud je stoga ovlašten donijeti konačnu odluku o tome je li „ograničenje“ sukladno sa slobodom izražavanja koja je zaštićena člankom 10.
(b) Zadatak Suda pri ostvarivanju svoje nadzorne funkcije nije zauzeti mjesto nadležnih domaćih sudova već radije na temelju članka 10. ocijeniti odluke koje su sudovi donijeli temeljem svoje slobodne ocjene. To ne znači da je nadzor ograničen na utvrđivanje je li tužena država svoje diskrecijske ovlasti koristila razumno, pažljivo ili u dobroj vjeri; ono što Sud mora učiniti je razmotriti miješanje kojemu se prigovara u kontekstu slučaja u cjelini, uključujući sadržaj primjedbi protiv podnositelja i kontekst u kojem su te primjedbe iznijete ...
(c) Posebice, Sud mora utvrditi jesu li razlozi koje su navela državna tijela kako bi opravdala miješanje relevantni i dovoljni te je li poduzeta mjera bila razmjerna legitimnim ciljevima. Pritom, Sud se mora uvjeriti da su državna tijela, temeljem prihvatljive procjene relevantnih činjenica, primijenila standarde koji su bili u skladu s načelima sadržanima u članku 10. ...
(d) Prilikom ocjenjivanja razmjernosti miješanja, treba stvoriti razliku između izjava o činjenicama i vrijednosnih prosudbi. Dok se postojanje činjenica može dokazati, istinitost vrijednosnih prosudbi nije dokaziva iako mora postojati dostatna činjenična osnova koja ih podržava, u suprotnom će se smatrati pretjeranima (Id., § 76). Stoga, razlika između činjenica i vrijednosnih prosudbi leži u količini činjeničnih dokaza koje je potrebno utvrditi ... Drugim riječima, dok je zahtjev za dokazivanje istinitosti vrijednosne prosudbe gotovo nemoguće ispuniti te time dolazi do kršenja članka 10. ..., zahtjev da se u skladu s razumnim standardom dokazivanja dokaže da je izjava o činjenicama substancijalno istinita nije u suprotnosti s člankom 10. Konvencije ...
(e) Priroda i ozbiljnost nametnute sankcije također su čimbenici koje treba uzeti u obzir prilikom ocjenjivanja razmjernosti miješanja na temelju članka 10. Konvencije ... Temeljem Konvencije, dosuđivanje naknade štete zbog klevete mora biti u razumnom odnosu razmjera s pretrpljenim narušavanjem ugleda ...“
(ii) Prvi članak
(iii) Drugi članak
(α) U pogledu navodne izjave podnositelja zahtjeva o članstvu A.H.-a u nadzornim odborima
(β) U pogledu izjave podnositelja zahtjeva o navodnim prijetnjama A.H.-a njegovom profesionalnom napredovanju
(iv) Zaključak
II NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANKA 6. STAVKA 1. KONVENCIJE
„Prilikom utvrđivanja građanskih prava i obveza ... svatko ima pravo na pravičnu ... raspravu ...pred ... sudom...”
III PRIMJENA ČLANKA 41. KONVENCIJE
A. Naknada štete
B. Troškovi i izdatci
C. Zatezna kamata
IZ TIH RAZLOGA SUD JEDNOGLASNO
(a) da tužena država treba isplatiti podnositelju zahtjeva, u roku od tri mjeseca od datuma kada presuda postane konačna u skladu s člankom 44. stavkom 2. Konvencije, sljedeće iznose koje je potrebno preračunati u hrvatske kune po tečajnoj stopi važećoj na dan namirenja:
(i) 1.500 EUR (jedna tisuća pet stotina eura), na ime naknade nematerijalne štete, uz sve poreze koji bi mogli biti obračunati;
(ii) 1.630 EUR (jedna tisuća šest stotina i trideset eura)[1], na ime naknade troškova i izdataka, uz sve poreze koji bi se mogli biti obračunati podnositelju zahtjeva;
(b) da se od proteka prethodno navedena tri mjeseca do namirenja plaća obična kamata koja je jednaka najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Europske središnje banke tijekom razdoblja neplaćanja, uvećanoj za tri postotna boda.
Sastavljeno na engleskome jeziku i otpravljeno u pisanom obliku dana 19. rujna 2013. u skladu s pravilom 77. stavcima 2. i 3. Poslovnika suda.
Søren Nielsen Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre
Tajnik Predsjednica
Prevela prevoditeljska agencija Alkemist
[1] Tekst ispravljen 5. studenog 2013. glasi „20.518 HRK”
[2] Tekst ispravljen 5. studenog 2013. glasi „5.600 (EUR)”
[3] Tekst ispravljen 5. studenog 2013 glasi „5.600 EUR (pet tisuća šest stotina eura)”
_____________________________________________________
Prevod presude preuzet sa stranice Zastupnika Republike Hrvatske pred Evropskim sudom za ljudska prava
https://uredzastupnika.gov.hr/
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF STOJANOVIĆ v. CROATIA
(Application no. 23160/09)
JUDGMENT
This version was rectified on 5 November 2013 under Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
STRASBOURG
19 September 2013
FINAL
17/02/2014
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Stojanović v. Croatia, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, President,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Julia Laffranque,
Ksenija Turković,
Dmitry Dedov, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 27 August 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 23160/09) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Croatian national, Mr Josip Stojanović (“the applicant”), on 1 March 2009.
2. The applicant was represented by Ms S. Gašić, an advocate practising in Zagreb. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs Š. Stažnik.
3. The applicant alleged in particular that by ordering him to pay damages for defaming a politician the domestic courts had violated his freedom of expression.
4. On 10 November 2010 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Zagreb.
6. On 4 April 1997 the weekly magazine Imperijal published two articles entitled “By exposing H.’s machinations I did not set up HDZ (Iznošenjem [H-ovih] makinacija nisam podvalio HDZ-u)” and “Dr I.V. fiercely attacked Dr. Josip Stojanović (Dr [I.V.] žestoko napao dr. Josipa Stojanovića)”. The front page of the magazine featured the title: “By exposing H.’s machinations I did not set up President T. (Razotkrivši [H-ove] makinacije nisam podvalio predsjedniku [T.-u])”.
7. On 2 May 1997 Imperijal published a third article entitled “H. gets involved again (Još jedan [H-ov] angažman)”.
8. The first article contained an interview with the applicant in which he criticised the policy of his colleague from the same ruling political party, HDZ, Mr A.H., who was at the time the Minister of Health.
9. The second article reproduced a telephone conversation between the applicant and his party’s general secretary, Dr I.V. The author of the article claimed to have overheard the conversation. According to the article, Dr I.V. had called the applicant from the party’s headquarters to enforce party discipline by asking him to retract some statements made in a previous interview given to the same magazine and to refrain from further public criticism of A.H. The article suggested that the applicant tell Dr I.V., inter alia, the following:
“... You behave like a communist: ‘Who is not with us is against us’... Why is it kept secret from the public that, apart from receiving a Minister’s salary, A.H. sits on another ten supervisory boards and receives a lot of money for that? ... Besides, you very well remember his statement when he said that as long as he was the Minister Stojanović would not become a professor ...”
10. The third article claimed that A.H. was a member of the executive board of a private polyclinic which was the first health care institution in Croatia equipped with an MRI scanner. It further suggested that the Ministry of Health had refused to grant an operating licence to another similar institution that would have been equipped with the same device, and that A.H., as the Minister of Health, had thereby used his political position to prevent competition.
11. On 16 September 1997 Mr A.H. brought a civil action for defamation against the company that publishes the magazine Imperijal, Imperijal Media d.d. (hereafter: “the publishing company”) and the applicant, in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu). He sought a court order that the defendants should pay him jointly and severally 250,000 Croatian kunas (HRK) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. He argued that the defendants, by referring to his actions as “machinations”, as well as by publishing untrue statements that he sat on ten supervisory boards, that he would not allow the applicant to become a professor as long as he was the Minister, and that he had used his political position to refuse a licence to a private polyclinic with a view to preventing competition, had harmed his reputation.
12. At a hearing held on 18 December 1998 the court heard the applicant, who admitted that he had received a telephone call from Dr I.V. under the circumstances described in the second article but that, contrary to what was reported in that article, he had actually told him the following:
“... I pay my own bills, while many sit on a number of supervisory boards, receive remuneration for doing so and have other privileges.”
The applicant claimed that in so doing he had not mentioned A.H. He further testified:
“I also [reminded] Dr I.V. on that occasion ... that A.H. had threatened me at a HDZ round table [on health care, on 9 October 1996] ... that I would never become a professor because I did not have the required professional or scientific qualities and [because] I was inexpert.”
13. In the course of the proceedings the court also obtained and consulted the record of the discussion held during the HDZ round table on health care of 15 October 1996. The relevant part of the record reads as follows:
“A.H.: As regards my former friend Joža Stojanović being inexpert ... [and] his slur concerning the choice of [allegedly] bad technology, that technology was chosen, in his field of expertise, radiology, by members of the Croatian Medical Association, [in particular] its radiology section, who are, by the way, regular university professors, which you Joža would never become because you do not have the professional and scientific qualities.”
14. On 17 April 2000 the Municipal Court gave judgment, allowing the plaintiff’s claim in the part which concerned the publishing company. In particular, it found that by publishing the three articles in question the publishing company had tarnished A.H.’s reputation. The court thus ordered the publishing company to publish the judgment in its weekly magazine Imperijal, to pay A.H. HRK 70,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, together with the statutory default interest running from the adoption of the judgment until payment, as well as to pay him HRK 17,138 in costs. On the other hand, it dismissed A.H.’s action in so far as it concerned the applicant, finding no proof that the applicant had authorised the publication of the first and the second article. Given that the third article had been written by a journalist of Imperijal, it was beyond dispute that the applicant could not have been held liable for its content. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:
“The plaintiff’s claim is well-founded in part as regards the first defendant [the publishing company] and entirely unfounded as regards the second defendant [the applicant].
It is beyond dispute that [the applicant] gave an interview to V.B., a journalist of the weekly Imperijal, which was published in issue no. 6 of that weekly on 4 April 1997 under the title: ‘By exposing H.’s machinations I did not set up HDZ’. It is also undisputed that in that interview [the applicant] presented his view of the situation in the Croatian health care sector, where he stressed that that was not an attack on the party (HDZ) and that he had nothing against his colleague A.H. personally, but that they disagreed in terms of the concept and strategy of health care. [The applicant] in his testimony stated that he had not authorised that interview although he stood by every word in it, but that he had not chosen the title and did not know who had. He added that the word ‘machinations’ from the title of that interview had not been put in the title with any malicious intent, and that it did not refer to the plaintiff personally, as that had not been the purpose of the interview.
In the statement of claim the plaintiff asserted that in relation to this interview he had been affronted by the title, and not by its text.
From the testimony of the author of that article, V.B., it follows that he came up with the title on the basis of the words and arguments used by [the applicant] on that occasion and otherwise in their discussions concerning the situation in the health care sector, and that [the applicant] had not objected to that title when he was informed about it by telephone before the interview was published.
Section 2 paragraph 8 of the Public Information Act provides that an authorisation is permission to publish given in written form or in oral form, if there is an audio recording of the oral authorisation.
This case however does not concern an authorised interview, still less authorisation of its title, because [the applicant] claims that he did not authorise it, whereas the first defendant did not submit any evidence that he had. Even though journalist V.B. claims that the authorisation exists, he [himself] is not certain of it when stating [in his testimony] that ‘that interview, as far as I remember, was authorised.’
The fact remains that the title associates the word ‘machinations’ with the plaintiff, which, according to the plaintiff, particularly struck him because it suggests that he is a bad person...
Since the majority of people indeed understand the word ‘machination’ as something negative, because it is associated with scheming, trickery and cunning, it is quite reasonable to expect that on that account the plaintiff suffered mental distress as a result of a breach of his reputation and honour. Therefore, the court found the first defendant liable for damages. It is to be noted that the use of such a hard word which was obviously used only for sensational effect and to attract readers, and, for the same reasons featured on the front page, cannot be justified by arguing that it constituted a value judgment on the part of the author as to the plaintiff’s work and person. It is all the more so because in the text of the interview no arguments are presented for that [view]. On the contrary, [the applicant] claims that he has nothing against his colleague A.H. personally, but that they disagree in terms of the concept and strategy of health care. In his testimony [the applicant] also stated that such a title did not represent the purpose of that interview.
As regards the second ... article, which is an interpretation of a telephone conversation between Dr I.V. and [the applicant], the court also found that it contains statements damaging to the reputation, honour and dignity of the plaintiff. [That is so] because the author, by putting those words into the mouth of the [the applicant], suggests that it had been kept secret from the public that, apart from receiving his ministerial salary, the plaintiff had been receiving a lot of money for sitting on another ten supervisory boards. However, [the applicant] in his testimony claims that in that telephone conversation, when talking about the involvement of many in [sitting on] supervisory boards, he never mentioned the plaintiff’s name...
[The applicant] also said in his statement that in the telephone conversation with Dr I.V. he had mentioned ... that the plaintiff had actually said to him at the HDZ round table that he would never become a professor because he did not have the professional or scientific qualities. Although [the applicant] could have understood these words of the plaintiff as a threat, since the plaintiff uttered them while he [was] the Minister of Health, it clearly stems from the minutes of the first session of the HDZ round table on health care of 15 October 1996, which [the applicant] furnished for the file, that these statements were taken out of the context of a party discussion on the situation in the health care sector, where the plaintiff, speaking about technology in health care, of which [the applicant] said was bad, stated that it had been chosen by members of the Croatian Medical Association, who were also regular university professors, which the defendant would never become because he did not have the [relevant] professional and scientific qualities.
Since this value judgement on the part of the plaintiff concerning [the applicant’s] professional and scientific qualities was made at a closed party discussion and was taken out of context in the newspaper article in question by using the words ‘as long as I am the Minister’, it is evident that in that way the plaintiff was portrayed as a person who used his political position to harm others.
Given that [the applicant] did not choose the title of the interview in question, nor was the word ‘machinations’ mentioned in [its] text, and given that he did not authorise that interview, and especially not its title, and given that not only did he not allow the author of the journalistic interpretation of the telephone conversation between him and Dr I.V. to publish it, but he actually prohibited it [publication], and given that the telephone conversation in question was not conducted the way it had been published [presented in the article] ... the plaintiff’s claim against [the applicant] was dismissed as unfounded, because [the applicant’s] conduct did not lead to the publication of the statements which harmed the honour and dignity of the plaintiff.
In particular, from the statements by all the witnesses who were, according to [the applicant] present in the room while he was talking on the telephone with Dr I.V., that is, from the statements by witnesses I.B., N.L. and M.K., which the court accepted as accurate because they were convincingly presented, it follows that V.B. was sitting in an adjacent room at the time and could hear only what [the applicant] was saying since the speaker on the telephone was not turned on, which speakers do not exist in the hospital. Apart from that they testified that [the applicant] had not mentioned the plaintiff’s name on that occasion: this was confirmed by Dr I.V., whom the court also heard as a witness. Furthermore, [the applicant] stated in his testimony that after the publication of the telephone conversation he had not denied it in Imperijal but that he had done so several times in other ways and also in the media. [He testified that] immediately after the publication he had spoken with the editor-in-chief of Imperijal, Ms I.D., warning her that he had not said what had been published [what had been attributed to him] at which she had said that this was not a big deal. It is to be noted that I.D., who was heard by the court as a witness, did not exclude the possibility that [the applicant] had had some remarks after the publication of that text.
For these reasons the court could not accept as accurate the witness testimony of V.B., according to whom that interview had been authorised, because [had it been so] the first defendant would certainly furnished evidence [in support] of it. Nor could [the court accept V.B.’s testimony in the part which stated that] he had overheard the entire telephone conversation because the speakerphone was turned on, and that [the applicant] did not prohibit him from publishing that conversation. [That is] so because witness I.B. testified that after the conversation he had seen [the applicant] arguing with V.B. and telling him not to publish anything until he had approved it in writing, which written approval the first defendant did not produce during the proceedings.”
15. Following an appeal by the plaintiff, on 30 April 2002 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) upheld the first-instance judgment but reduced the amount of damages and costs payable to A.H. by the publishing company to HRK 50,000 and the costs to HRK 12,241.60. However, it quashed the first-instance judgment in its part concerning the applicant, in particular his liability for the first and the second article, and remitted the case for a fresh decision. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:
“In response to the arguments raised in the appeal concerning the [lack of] authorisation, [the court notes that] its meaning is permission to publish a conversation or statement. Therefore, its purpose is to protect the interviewee in relation to the content of his or her statements.
However, the issue of authorisation may also arise in the [context of] civil proceedings for damages instituted against the publisher by a third person harmed by the published text.
It is undisputed that that the interview [in question] was not authorised within the meaning of section 2(8) of the Public Information Act, whereas the interpretation of the telephone conversation ... is information, which by [its] nature does not require authorisation.
...
... [The first-instance] court based its decision (in its part dismissing the action against [the applicant]) on the finding that not only had [the applicant] not allowed publication, but had actually prohibited the journalist from publishing the content of the telephone conversation he had had with Dr I.V.
That finding is not clear. It is not clear because [the applicant] ... testified that the telephone conversation did not happen as it was published. He also testified that journalist V.B. could only hear part of the content of the conversation, in particular his side of it. So, if he [the journalist] could not hear everything and [even] if [the applicant] did not mention the facts appearing in the published text, the [first-instance] court needed to clarify why [the applicant] had prohibited the journalist from writing about that telephone conversation.
If it is true that he never said [what was published] (or did not say all [of it]), it was necessary to examine why he did not deny it.
Lastly, the question arises why he interrupted his work with the patient and had a telephone conversation with Dr I.V. in the immediate proximity of the journalist, instead of postponing that conversation for later.
The statements by witnesses who were allegedly present during the telephone conversation were not assessed by the first-instance court in accordance with section 8 of the Civil Procedure Act. Instead, the court largely reproduced those statements and assessed them as ‘accurate and convincing’.
Had it assessed them in accordance with the law, it would have noticed that the testimony of N.L. indicated that I.B. was not present, and that she [N.L.] had not paid attention to the content of the telephone conversation.
It would also have noticed that witness I.B. testified that neither supervisory boards nor A.H. were mentioned in the telephone conversation. M.H’s testimony was identical...
In contrast to these witnesses, [the applicant] testified that in the telephone conversation supervisory boards, and the remuneration received by their members, had [indeed] been discussed, and that he had mentioned A.H. in connection with ‘threats’ to his [career] advancement.
To that it should be added that [the applicant] also testified that the word ‘machinations’ referred to how A.H. acted toward him personally.
The first-instance court failed to assess all the aforementioned.”
16. On 4 July 2002 the Zagreb Commercial Court (Trgovački sud u Zagrebu) opened (summary) bankruptcy proceedings against the publishing company and on the same day closed them finding that the company’s assets were not sufficient to cover even the costs of the bankruptcy proceedings. On 15 April 2003 the same court deleted that company from the register of commercial companies.
17. In the resumed civil proceedings for defamation, at the hearing held on 21 May 2003 the court again heard the applicant who, as regards the telephone conversation between him and Dr I.V., testified that he had mentioned supervisory boards in that conversation by saying:
“... I do not receive my salary from the [political] party nor do I sit on about ten supervisory boards and receive remuneration for doing so ...”
When asked by the judge whether on that occasion he had mentioned the plaintiff’s name, the applicant replied:
“No, but replying to Dr I.V.’s questions I mentioned the Minister of Health, and at that time the plaintiff was the Minister of Health.”
To the question whether on that occasion he had said anything to Dr I.V. about the alleged threats by the Minister of Health that he would never become a professor, the applicant replied:
“Dr I.V. asked me why the plaintiff had threatened me, to which I replied that he should read the minutes of the ... HDZ round table on health care reform of 15 October 1996. I do not remember exactly whether I said anything else in reply to that question.”
18. On 21 May 2003 the Zagreb Municipal Court gave judgment, ordering the applicant to pay A.H. HRK 30,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, together with the statutory default interest running from the adoption of the judgment until payment, and HRK 23,088 in costs.
19. The court found that the word “machinations” undoubtedly had a negative connotation and indicated dishonest behaviour. Its use to describe the plaintiff’s actions was therefore likely to harm his dignity, honour and reputation and cause him mental distress. Since in his testimony before the court the applicant had stated that he agreed with the title of the first article containing the impugned expression, it was irrelevant whether he had actually used it in his interview or whether the title of the article had been formulated by the journalist who had interviewed him. In particular, the court held as follows:
“It is beyond dispute that the defendant [the applicant] gave an interview to V.B., a journalist of the weekly Imperijal, which was published in issue no. 6 of that weekly on 4 April 1997 under the title: ‘By exposing H.’s machinations I did not set up HDZ’. It is also undisputed that in that interview the defendant presented his view of the situation in the Croatian health care sector, where he disagreed with the plaintiff, who was the Minister of Health at that time, as regards the concept and strategy of health care. In the statement of claim the plaintiff asserted that in relation to this interview he had been affronted by the title, and not by its text. It is unclear who came up with the title of the interview, whether the defendant authorised that interview, including the title, and whether the defendant had had a telephone conversation with Dr I.V. in the presence of journalist V.B., the content of which was published as the journalist’s interpretation of that conversation, and whether the defendant gave permission to that journalist to publish [the content of] that telephone conversation, and finally whether the statements made by the defendant during that telephone conversation, if [indeed they were] made, were true as published.
From the testimony of the author of that article, V.B., it follows that he came up with the title on the basis of the words and arguments used by [the applicant] on that occasion and otherwise in their discussions concerning the situation in the health care sector, and that [the applicant] had not objected to that title when he had informed [the applicant] about it by telephone before the interview was published.
The court accepted this testimony as accurate, since the defendant in his testimony himself stated that, although he had not authorised that interview, he stood by every word in it and was prepared to sign his name to it, and that, although he had not chosen the title for the interview, he accepted [it] as it was because he believed that the word ‘machinations’ had not been included in the title with any malicious intent, and that it had referred to the plaintiff’s behaviour towards him personally, and that he interpreted the meaning of that word as trickery, cunning, deception and scheming.
Since the word ‘machinations’ undoubtedly has negative connotations and indicates dishonourable conduct, it is absolutely reasonable to expect that the plaintiff suffered mental distress as a result of this violation of his dignity, honour and reputation. It was therefore necessary to find the defendant liable for damages, regardless of whether [he] had used this hard word in his interview by referring to the plaintiff or whether it was used in the title of that interview by ... the author. That is so not only because the defendant did not deny using this expression and this depiction of the plaintiff, but, on the contrary, [also because] during the proceedings he stated that he agreed with the title ...”
20. The court also found that the allegations that the plaintiff sat on ten supervisory boards and that he had said that he would not allow the applicant to become a professor as long as he was the Minister, were also harmful to the plaintiff’s dignity, honour and reputation. The first allegation depicted the plaintiff as a person enjoying an affluent life with high earnings, while others had no money to buy bread and the health care system was in a critical financial state. The second allegation portrayed the plaintiff as a person who used his political position to harm others. The court further established that these allegations were untrue. First, the plaintiff did not sit on ten supervisory boards but on one executive board, for which he did not receive remuneration. Second, the plaintiff had never said that the applicant would not become a professor as long as he was the Minister. Rather, the plaintiff had said on the occasion that the applicant would never become a professor because he did not meet the relevant requirements. Despite the applicant’s arguments that he had not authorised publication of the content of the telephone conversation between him and Dr I.V. and that the second article did not accurately reflect the content of that conversation, the court nevertheless held the applicant liable for injury to A.H.’s reputation. It held, inter alia, that even if the author of the second article had made up the content of the telephone conversation himself, this could not have exonerated the applicant from liability, since, knowing that the article contained untruths, he could have been expected to deny published defamatory statements as inaccurate and to have asked the magazine to publish his denial. In particular, the court held as follows:
“As regards the second ... article, which is an interpretation of a telephone conversation between Dr I.V. and the defendant, the court also found that it contained statements damaging to the reputation, honour and dignity of the plaintiff. [That is so] because the author, by putting those words into the mouth of the defendant, suggests that it had been kept secret from the public that, in addition to his ministerial salary, the plaintiff had been receiving a lot of money for sitting on another ten supervisory boards. However, the defendant in his testimony claims that in his telephone conversation, when talking about the involvement of many [people] in supervisory boards, he never mentioned the plaintiff’s name...
The defendant in his testimony also said that in the telephone conversation with Dr I.V. he had mentioned ... that the plaintiff had actually said to him at the HDZ round table that he would never become a professor because he did not have the professional or scientific qualities. Although the defendant could have understood these words of the plaintiff as a threat, since the plaintiff uttered them while he [was] the Minister of Health, it clearly stems from the minutes of the first session of the HDZ round table on health care of 15 October 1996, which the defendant furnished for the file, that these statements were taken out of the context of a party discussion on the situation in the health care sector, where the plaintiff, speaking about technology in health care, of which the defendant said was bad, stated that it had been chosen by members of the Croatian Medical Association, who were also regular university professors, which the defendant would never become because he did not have the [relevant] professional and scientific qualities.
Since, this value judgement on the part of the plaintiff concerning the defendant’s professional and scientific qualities was made at a closed party discussion and was taken out of context in the newspaper article in question by using the words, ‘as long as I am the Minister’, it is evident that in that way the plaintiff was portrayed as a person who uses his political position to harm others.
Since the information published in this journalistic interpretation of the telephone conversation between Dr I.V. and the defendant undoubtedly harmed the dignity, honour and reputation of the plaintiff, the defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff damages for its publication, regardless of the defendant’s contention that he had not given the journalist V.B. permission to publish that conversation and that the conversation had not happened in the way it was published.
The court could not establish the precise contents of that telephone conversation by hearing the witnesses who were, according to the defendant, present in the room where he was speaking on the telephone to Dr I.V., or by hearing Dr I.V. as a witness.
In particular, Dr I.V. testified that he did not remember whether during that telephone conversation the defendant had told him that the plaintiff sat on another ten supervisory boards and was receiving a lot of money for doing so. He also thought that the defendant had never told him anything about the plaintiff preventing the defendant from becoming a professor. He also stated that he knew about the newspaper article and that he had not denied it, which he now regretted. He had known that the defendant often criticised the situation in the health care sector during the plaintiff’s time as Minister of Health, and had pointed out that the defendant had done this without [good] arguments.
On the other hand, witness I.B. testified that, although he had been present during that telephone conversation, he had not heard, nor could he have heard, what Dr I.V. was saying, as there was no speakerphone. Nor had he heard [the plaintiff’s name] or supervisory boards mentioned in that conversation. However, witness N.L., who was present during that conversation and who had not paid attention to its content, claims that there was no one in that room apart from the defendant, M.K. and herself.
Witness M.K. also disputed that there was any mention of the plaintiff or of supervisory boards in that telephone conversation.
In view of the fact that all these witnesses had claimed that the speakerphone had not been switched on, as the defendant had also claimed, the court did not accept the testimony of witness V.B., who had claimed the opposite. However, the testimony of that witness was accepted in the part in which he stated that immediately after the conversation the defendant had explained to him what he had talked about with Dr I.V., and that he had not asked the defendant for special authorisation to publish that conversation, since it was logical that the defendant knew that the conversation would be published in view of the explanation given, and that after the publication of the article the defendant had not been angry with him and had continued to work together with him subsequently.
The fact is that the defendant himself admitted in his testimony that he had had the telephone conversation with Dr I.V., knowing that journalist V.B. had at that time been sitting in a room opposite, where he had been aware that the journalist could hear the conversation. [The defendant] confirmed this by stating that after the conversation he had prohibited journalist V.B. from publishing it.
On the other hand, the defendant categorically claimed that the speakerphone had not been turned on during the telephone conversation, since there were no such phones in their institution. Therefore, journalist V.B. could only have heard a part of that conversation, that is, what he [the defendant] had been saying, and not what Dr I.V. had been saying, whereas, in contrast to this, in the newspaper article the entire telephone conversation had been published, that is, also including the words of Dr I.V. That means that the defendant must have subsequently told journalist V.B. what had been said in the conversation, so that he could publish it. But even if journalist V.B. had made up that telephone conversation himself, that is, without any subsequent explanation by the defendant, this could not exonerate the defendant from liability, since it could have been expected that the defendant would deny those allegations, even more so because in his testimony he had himself said that it was a ‘stinky article’. However, he did not do so, as such a denial was certainly not published, nor does the defendant have any written record of any conversation with the editor-in-chief of Imperijal [in which it was said] that the article was not accurate. The editor-in-chief of Imperijal, I.D., heard as a witness, testified that she did not remember the defendant speaking to her after the publication of the text, although she had spoken with him several times by telephone, and therefore she did not exclude the possibility that the defendant had made some remarks after the publication of the text.”
21. In determining the amount of non-pecuniary damages, the court took into account that 2,638 copies of the issue of Imperijal in which the impugned articles had been published had been sold. In particular, as regards the award of damages, the court held as follows:
“From the plaintiff’s testimony, which this court accepted as ... very convincing, it follows that the publication of these statements affected him very badly, given the public office he held at the time, since his Ministry had very modest financial means at its disposal and his project could only survive with strict financial discipline. [T]he effect of the publication of this article was that he began to lose the confidence of people in health care, who worked for meagre salaries. [T]his was reflected in the hospital where he was working as a doctor, because patients, losing confidence, had started going to see other doctors, whilst students at the Faculty of Medicine where he taught as a professor, heckled him with: ‘Do you read Imperijal? And you teach us ethics!’ All this also negatively affected his family, because some friends started turning their backs on them, and they also received unpleasant anonymous telephone calls. The plaintiff stated that he had not sought medical assistance for the distress he was suffering because, as a doctor, he had been prescribing medication for himself, as he felt very bad at that time and could not sleep.
Since, therefore, the plaintiff did not seek medical assistance for the distress he was suffering, and thus does not possess the relevant medical documentation, the court did not consider it necessary to obtain an opinion from a medical expert as regards the duration and the intensity of this suffering, given that in view of the content of the article and the public office the plaintiff held at the time, it is completely understandable that he suffered intense mental distress as a result.
Given that the defendant by acting in this way seriously tarnished the dignity, honour and reputation of the plaintiff, causing him distress, it was necessary, pursuant to section 200 of the [1978] Obligations Act ... to award the plaintiff damages in the amount of 30,000 [Croatian] kunas, while taking into account the fact that these statements were published in the weekly Imperijal, and ... 2,638 copies of that issue ofImperijal were sold.”
22. By a decision of 12 July 2005 the Zagreb Municipal Court rectified its judgment of 21 May 2003 (see paragraph 18 above) so that it ordered not only the applicant but also the publishing company to pay, together with the applicant, jointly and severally (solidarno), HRK 30,000 to A.H. in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, together with the statutory default interest running from the adoption of the judgment until payment, and HRK 23,088 in costs.
23. On 8 November 2005 the Zagreb County Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance judgment of 21 May 2003 as rectified by the decision of 12 July 2005. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:
“The arguments raised in the appeal are not well-founded, because the first-instance court established the facts of the case fully and correctly, and also correctly applied the substantive law.
Thus, the first-instance court correctly assessed the evidence taken ... and established that the defendant had uttered a series of insults against the plaintiff (all of which were published in the press), whereby he had harmed the honour, reputation and dignity of the plaintiff, as a result of which the plaintiff had suffered severe mental distress ... The first-instance court established this not only from the testimony of witness V.B. but also from the testimony of the defendant himself, who testified that, although the interview published in the newspaper Imperijal entitled: ‘By exposing H.’s machinations I did not set up HDZ’ had not been authorised, he stood by every word published in that article ...
As the first-instance court had established that the defendant had uttered insults against the plaintiff, harming [his] honour, reputation and dignity, it correctly awarded the plaintiff damages for mental distress suffered in the amount of HRK 30,000, according to the criteria set out in section 200 of the Obligations Act.
In particular, in this case the first-instance court, when assessing whether the award was justified, and its level, had in mind [all] the circumstances of the case, which in this case meant that the insults were made against the plaintiff, who was at that time the Minister of Health, that is, a person well known to the Croatian public, ... a person with high integrity in his professional life, who was prominent in his profession and in his social involvement. The insults uttered therefore particularly violated the honour and reputation of the plaintiff as such a person, as a result of which he had suffered severe mental distress.
The level of the award was therefore ... appropriate to the severity of the mental distress he suffered as a result of this breach of his honour and reputation.”
24. On 13 February 2006 the applicant paid A.H. HRK 74,622.33, namely the judgment debt.
25. The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the second-instance judgment, alleging, inter alia, a violation of his constitutional right to freedom of expression.
26. On 24 June 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint and served its judgment on his representative on 3 September 2008. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:
“The complainant alleges a violation of Articles ... and 38 of the Constitution ...
The [ordinary] courts established without doubt that the publication of the articles in question had harmed the honour and reputation of the plaintiff, as a result of which he had suffered mental distress. Therefore, in the civil proceedings conducted in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions, the complainant’s [constitutional] guarantees provided in the [Articles relied on], were not violated.”
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. The Constitution
27. The relevant part of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette nos. 56/1990, 135/1997, 8/1998 (consolidated text), 113/2000, 124/2000 (consolidated text), 28/2001 and 41/2001 (consolidated text), 55/2001 (corrigendum)) provides as follows:
Article 16
“(1) Rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law in order to protect the rights and freedoms of others, the legal order, public morals or health.
(2) Every restriction of rights and freedoms should be proportional to the nature of the necessity for the restriction in each individual case.
...
Article 38
“(1) Freedom of thought and expression shall be guaranteed.
(2) Freedom of expression shall include in particular freedom of the press and other media, freedom of speech and public expression, and free establishment of all media institutions.
(3) Censorship shall be forbidden. Journalists shall have the right to freedom of reporting and access to information.
(4) The right to correction shall be guaranteed to anyone whose rights guaranteed by the Constitution or a statute have been breached by public information.”
B. The 1978 Obligations Act
Relevant provisions
28. The Obligations Act (Zakon o obveznim odnosima, Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nos. 29/1978, 39/1985 and 57/1989, and Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia nos. 53/91, 73/91, 111/93, 3/94, 7/96, 91/96, 112/99 and 88/01 – hereafter: “the 1978 Obligations Act”), which was in force between 1 October 1978 and 31 December 2005, was the legislation governing contracts and torts. According to that Act courts were entitled to award compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused, inter alia, by injury to one’s reputation and honour. The relevant provisions of the Obligations Act read as follows:
Grounds for liability
Section 154
“Anyone who causes damage to another shall be bound to compensate it unless he or she proves that the damage occurred through no fault of his or her own.”
Damage
Section 155
“Damage is diminution of one’s property (actual damage) or prevention of its increase (lost profits), as well as the infliction of physical or mental pain or fear (non-pecuniary damage).”
...
V. REDRESS FOR NON-PECUNIARY DAMAGE
Publication of a judgment or correction
Section 199
“In the event of a breach of the rights of personality the court may order, at the expense of the tortfeasor, publication of the judgment, or a correction, or order the tortfeasor to retract the statement that caused the breach, or [order] any other form of redress capable of attaining the purpose [otherwise] achieved by an award of damages.”
Non-pecuniary damages
Section 200
“The court shall award non-pecuniary damages for physical pain, for mental anguish caused by loss of amenities of life, disfigurement, breaches of reputation, honour, liberty or the rights of personality or the death of a close relative, and for fear, if it finds that the circumstances of the case, in particular the intensity of the pain, anguish or fear and their duration, justify such an award, irrespective of any award of pecuniary damages, and even in the absence of pecuniary damage.
When deciding on a claim for non-pecuniary damages and its amount, the court shall take into account ... the purpose of those damages, as well as that it should not favour aspirations that are incompatible with its nature and social purpose.”
...
LIABILITY OF SEVERAL PERSONS FOR THE SAME DAMAGE
Joint and several liability
Section 206(1) and (4)
“(1) Where the damage has been caused by several persons together, they shall be jointly and severally liable.
(4) When it is certain that the damage was caused by any two or more [specific] persons who are in some way connected with each other, and it is impossible to determine which of them caused the damage, those persons shall be jointly and severally liable.”
Reimbursement of the payer
Section 208
(1) A joint debtor who has made payment in excess of his share in damage caused may seek reimbursement from each of the remaining debtors [in proportion to their share] of what he has paid on their behalf.
(2) The share to be paid by each individual debtor shall be determined by the court, having regard to the seriousness [the degree] of their fault and the severity of the consequences arising from their actions.
(3) If the shares are impossible to determine, each debtor shall be liable for an equal share, unless fairness in a specific case requires otherwise.”
C. The Public Information Act
29. The relevant part of the Public Information Act (Zakon o javnom priopćavanju, Official Gazette nos. 83/1996, 143/1998 (corrigendum), 96/2001 (amendments) and 69/2003 (consolidated text)), as in force at the material time, provided:
Definitions of terms
Section 2(7) and (8)
“(7) An interview is a conversation or statement in written or oral form intended for publication in the media.
(8) Authorisation is permission to publish given in written form or in oral form, if there is an audio recording of the oral authorisation.”
...
Editor-in-chief
Section 14(2) and (3)
“(2) The editor-in-chief [of a information medium] is liable, in accordance with the law, for all information published [by it].
(3) Liability of the editor-in-chief referred to in paragraph 2 of this section also refers to editing of published information (selection of a title, subtitle, text under a photograph, and so on).”
...
Liability for damage
Section 22
“(1) A publisher who causes damage to another person by publishing certain information in the media shall be obliged to compensate it.
(4) Non-pecuniary damage shall be compensated for by correcting false information, by publishing a correction of the information and an apology, and by payment of just satisfaction for the pain and anguish sustained, if their duration and intensity so justify, in accordance with the general provisions of civil law.
(5) Non-pecuniary damage shall be compensated for by a publisher who, through information about personal or family life, or by any other information published in the media, violates another person’s privacy, dignity, reputation, honour or any other constitutionally or statutorily protected right.”
Exemption from liability for damage
Section 23(1)
“The publisher shall not be liable in damages:
- true facts, or
- facts for which the author had reasonable grounds to believe they were true and undertook all necessary measures to verify their veracity, provided there existed a legitimate public interest in publishing such information and the author acted in good faith,
Publication of a correction
Section 31(1) and (2)
“(1) Newspapers and other periodicals as well as radio and television stations are bound to publish a correction of published information.
(2) The right to ask for a correction of published information belongs to an individual or legal entity whose dignity, reputation and honour, or any other right or interest has been breached by the publication of inaccurate or incomplete information. If those rights or interests are breached by [the publication of] insulting information the individual or legal entity has the right to reply to insulting published information.”
D. The Code of Ethics of Croatian Journalists
30. The relevant part of the Code of Ethics of Croatian Journalists (Kodeks časti hrvatskih novinara, of 27 February 1993, applicable at the material time, reads as follows:
“A journalist is bound to publish true, balanced and verified information. He or she shall indicate persons or institutions from which he or she obtained data, information or statement. He or she has a right not to disclose the source of information, but for published information bears moral, material [civil] and criminal responsibility.”
E. The Civil Procedure Act
31. The relevant provision of the Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parničnom postupku, Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nos. 4/1977, 36/1977 (corrigendum), 36/1980, 69/1982, 58/1984, 74/1987, 57/1989, 20/1990, 27/1990 and 35/1991, and Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia nos. 53/91, 91/1992, 58/93, 112/99,88/01, 117/03, 88/05, 2/07, 84/08, 123/08, 57/11 and 148/11), reads as follows:
Section 221a
“If, on the basis of the evidence taken (section 8), the court cannot establish a particular fact with [the requisite degree of] certainty, it shall rule on the existence [or non-existence] of that fact by applying the rules on the burden of proof.”
...
5.a. Reopening of proceedings following a final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg finding a violation of a fundamental human right or freedom
Section 428a
“(1) When the European Court of Human Rights has found a violation of a human right or fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or additional protocols thereto, ratified by the Republic of Croatia, a party may, within thirty days of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights becoming final, file a petition with the court in the Republic of Croatia which adjudicated at first instance in the proceedings in which the decision violating the human right or fundamental freedom was rendered, to set aside the decision [in question].
(2) The proceedings referred to in paragraph 1 of this section shall be conducted by applying, mutatis mutandis, the provisions on the reopening of proceedings.
(3) In the reopened proceedings the courts are required to observe the legal views expressed in the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights finding a violation of a fundamental human right or freedom.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
32. The applicant complained that the first-instance judgment of 21 May 2003 (as rectified by the decision of 12 July 2005) and the second-instance judgment of 8 November 2005 had violated his freedom of thought and freedom of expression. In particular, he complained that he had been ordered to pay damages for tarnishing A.H.’s reputation, although he had never used the word “machinations” to describe A.H.’s actions, had not authorised publication of the content of the telephone conversation between him and Dr I.V., and even though the second article did not accurately reflect the content of that conversation. He relied on Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention.
33. The Government contested this argument.
34. The Court reiterates that it is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, and that it is therefore not bound by the characterisation given by the applicant or the Government. A complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on (see, for example, Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey [GC], no. 3976/05, § 52, 2 November 2010; Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, § 54, 17 September 2009; and Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, § 44,Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I).
35. In the Court’s view the present case concerns the right to impart information and ideas, that is, expression of opinion in the media, which is protected by Article 10 of the Convention, and not freedom of thought, which is protected by Article 9 (see, mutatis mutandis, Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010). Therefore, this complaint falls to be examined solely under Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
A. Admissibility
36. The Government disputed the admissibility of this complaint on two grounds. They argued that Article 10 was inapplicable and that, in any event, the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies.
1. Applicability of Article 10 of the Convention
(a) The arguments of the parties
37. The Government noted that before the domestic courts, including the Constitutional Court, the applicant had maintained that he was not the author of the statements for which he had been ordered to pay damages, and that they had been made up by the journalist who had interviewed him. They therefore concluded that, by insisting that the disputed statements were not his, the applicant had admitted that he had not actually imparted any ideas or information within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. In other words, the applicant in the present case could not have enjoyed the protection of that Article because he had not exercised his right to freedom of expression. If the Court were to hold otherwise and find a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, that would have led to an absurd situation, as it would have found a violation of the applicant’s right which the applicant himself claimed he had not exercised.
38. The applicant replied that he had exercised his freedom of expression when giving an interview to a journalist from Imperijal in which he had criticised the policy of the Minister of Health. Even though the domestic courts’ judgments suggested that he had not been ordered to pay damages for what he had said in that interview but for its title and for what he had allegedly said in the telephone conversation with Dr I.V., the exercise of his freedom of expression had been stifled indirectly, as he had been sanctioned for something that he had not said (in that interview).
(b) The Court’s assessment
39. The Court reiterates that the extent of liability in defamation must not go beyond a person’s own words, and that an individual may not be held responsible for statements or allegations made by others, be it an editor or journalists (see Reznik v. Russia, no. 4977/05, § 45, 4 April 2013). Therefore, in a situation such as the one in the present case, where the applicant actually argues (see paragraph 38 above) that, by attributing to him, in connection with the interview in which he had criticised the policy of the Minister of Health, statements he had never made and ordering him to pay damages for those statements, the domestic courts had indirectly stifled the exercise of his freedom of expression, he may rely on the protection of Article 10 of the Convention. That is so because, if the applicant’s argument proves to be correct, the damages he was ordered to pay would be likely to discourage him from making criticisms of that kind in future (see, mutatis mutandis, Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, § 44, Series A no. 103). The Court therefore finds that Article 10 of the Convention is applicable to the present case.
40. It follows that the Government’s objection to the applicability of Article 10 of the Convention must be dismissed.
2. Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies
(a) The arguments of the parties
41. Relying on the above arguments concerning inapplicability of Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraph 37 above), the Government further submitted that, even though the applicant had formally invoked that Article before the domestic courts, his main argument before those courts had been that he had not made the statements for which he had been ordered to pay damages. In the Government’s view, the domestic remedies would have been properly exhausted only if the applicant, without disputing that he had been the author of those statements, had complained that by making them he had exercised his freedom of expression. However, he had not done so.
42. The applicant referred to the above arguments concerning applicability of Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraph 38 above) and submitted that by complaining of a violation of his freedom of expression before each of the domestic courts involved he had properly exhausted domestic remedies.
(b) The Court’s assessment
43. The Court notes, having regard to the Government’s arguments (see paragraph 41 above), that their objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies is closely related to their objection as regards inapplicability of Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraph 37 above). The Court thus refers to its findings as above, according to which the applicant in the present case may rely on Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraph 39 above). It further notes that he did raise the issue of freedom of expression before the domestic courts (see paragraphs 25-26 above).
44. It follows that the Government’s objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies must also be dismissed.
45. The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The arguments of the parties
(a) The Government
46. The Government submitted that, if the Court were to find Article 10 of the Convention applicable in the present case, they would admit that there had been an interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. However, that interference had been lawful, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society.
47. The Government argued that the judgment whereby the domestic courts had ordered the applicant to pay damages to A.H. had a basis in law, in particular on sections 154 and 200 of the Obligations Act (see paragraph 28 above).
48. The interference had also pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of protecting the reputation and rights of others, in this case, the plaintiff A.H., who had been found to be a victim of insult and defamation, for which, as well as the magazine Imperijal, the applicant had also been found liable.
49. As to whether the interference had been “necessary in a democratic society”, the Government pointed out that the applicant had not been ordered to pay damages for his critical remarks about the policy of the Minister of Health, but because the title of the article in which those remarks had been published contained the word “machinations”, which had negative connotations, as it implied dishonourable and dishonest behaviour. That value judgment about the actions of A.H. had no basis in fact whatsoever, let alone in the facts mentioned in the article. Likewise, as regards the second article, the applicant had been ordered to pay damages for making statements presented as fact which the domestic courts had found to be indubitably untrue. Those statements presented as fact had also implied dishonourable and dishonest behaviour, and thus they were defamatory to the person concerned.
50. As to the proportionality of the interference, the Government emphasised that for his defamatory statements the applicant had been ordered to pay civil damages in the amount of HRK 30,000, rather than being convicted of a criminal offence: the amount of damages in their view was a moderate sum.
51. The Government further submitted, relying on the view of the domestic courts (see paragraph 20 above), that if the applicant had been aware that the published information was not accurate, it could have been expected that he would ask the magazine Imperijal to publish a denial, which he had not done.
52. Having regard to the above, the Government argued that the domestic courts’ judgments in the present case had not been in violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
(b) The applicant
53. The applicant disagreed. He maintained his view that he had not had any intention of insulting A.H. in his private or professional capacity (as a doctor). Instead, he had been freely expressing his views, opinions and value judgments on the state of health care in Croatia. Nevertheless, he had been sanctioned for making critical remarks and expressing his disagreement with the policy of development of the health care sector advocated by A.H.
54. The applicant challenged in particular the Government’s contention that the amount of damages he had been ordered to pay had been moderate. He explained that, apart from the principal sum of HRK 30,000, he had also had to pay HRK 12,169.04 as the statutory default interest accrued on the principal amount of damages, the costs of proceedings in the amount of HRK 23,088 and the statutory default interest accrued on the principal amount of costs, that is, a total of HRK 74,622.33 (see paragraph 24 above). That amount had at the time of payment been equal to some 10,000 euros. Given that at that time the applicant was already retired and that the amount in question was more than his annual income, it could not have been argued that the sum he had paid was moderate.
55. As regards the Government’s argument that he should have denied the published defamatory statements as inaccurate (see paragraph 51 above), the applicant argued that, pursuant to section 31(2) of the Public Information Act (see paragraph 29 above), it was A.H. and not him who should have denied them.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) Whether there was interference
56. In the light of the above finding, that the applicant may rely on Article 10 of the Convention in the present case (see paragraphs 43-44 above), the Court considers that the Zagreb Municipal Court’s judgment of 21 May 2003 (as rectified by that court’s decision of 12 July 2005), which was upheld by the Zagreb County Court’s judgment of 8 November 2005, ordering the applicant to pay jointly and severally with the publishing company HRK 30,000 to A.H. as compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained for the defamatory statements contained in the title of the first article and in the second article, and HRK 23,088 in costs, constituted an interference with his right to freedom of expression.
(b) Lawfulness and legitimate aim
57. The Court also accepts that the interference was “prescribed by law”, namely by sections 154 and 200 of the Obligations Act (see paragraph 28 above), and that it pursued a legitimate aim, as it was intended to protect the reputation or rights of others within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. Having established that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression in the present case was lawful and pursued a legitimate aim, the only question for the Court to determine is whether that interference was “necessary in a democratic society”.
(c) “Necessary in a democratic society”
(i) The applicable principles
58. In this respect, the following general principles emerge from the Court’s case‑law (see, for example, Europapress Holding d.o.o. v. Croatia, no. 25333/06, § 54, 22 October 2009):
“(a) The test of necessity in a democratic society requires the Court to determine whether the interference complained of corresponded to a pressing social need. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by independent courts. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10...
(b) The Court’s task in exercising its supervisory function is not to take the place of the competent domestic courts but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they have taken in accordance with their margin of appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully or in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole, including the content of the comments held against the applicants and the context in which they made them...
(c) In particular, the Court must determine whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the interference were relevant and sufficient and whether the measure taken was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities, basing themselves on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts, applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10...
(d) In assessing the proportionality of interference, a distinction needs to be made between statements of fact and value judgments. While the existence of facts can be demonstrated, the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof even though there must be a sufficient factual basis to support it, failing which it may be excessive (Id., § 76). Therefore, the difference between facts and value judgments lies in the degree of factual proof which has to be established ... In other words, while the requirement to prove the truth of a value judgment is generally impossible to fulfil and infringes Article 10 ..., the requirement to prove to a reasonable standard of proof that a factual statement was substantially true does not contravene Article 10 of the Convention...
(e) The nature and severity of the sanction imposed are also factors to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of the interference under Article 10 of the Convention ... Under the Convention, an award of damages for defamation must bear a reasonable relationship of proportionality to the injury to reputation suffered ...”
59. Turning to the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the domestic courts first found the publishing company solely liable for publishing in its weekly magazine Imperijal the three articles in question, and ordered it to pay A.H. HRK 50,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained by the injury to his reputation (see paragraphs 14-15 above). However, those courts later on found that the applicant was also liable for two of those three articles, and ordered him to pay A.H. jointly and severally with the publishing company HRK 30,000 of the aforementioned 50,000 HRK of non-pecuniary damages (see paragraphs 18 and 22-23 above). In particular, the applicant was found liable (jointly and severally with the publishing company) for the fact that the word “machinations” was used in the title of the first article to describe A.H.’s actions, as well as for the two defamatory statements he had allegedly made during the telephone conversation between him and Dr I.V., the content of which was reported in the second article. Given that the applicant claimed that in his interview he had never used the word “machinations”, that he had not authorised publication of the telephone conversation in question and that the second article did not accurately reflect the content of that conversation, the Court is first required to ascertain whether the applicant’s tort liability for defamation in the present case went beyond his own words (see paragraph 39 above).
(ii) The first article
60. In the first article, which was in fact an interview with the applicant, he criticised the policies of A.H., who was the Minister of Health at the time. In respect of that article the domestic courts found the applicant (and the publishing company jointly and severally) liable for damages only because of the use of the word “machinations” to describe A.H.’s actions, contained in the title of the article. In particular, the courts held the applicant liable for harming A.H.’s reputation despite the fact that he had not used the impugned expression in the interview and even though it was clear that the title – for which under section 14(3) of the Public Information Act an editor-in-chief was exclusively liable (see paragraph 29 above) – had been formulated by the journalist who had interviewed the applicant. They held that it was sufficient that the applicant, in his testimony before the court, had accepted the title (see paragraph 19 above).
61. The Court finds this conclusion by the domestic courts difficult to sustain. For the Court it is one thing to describe someone’s actions as “machinations” in the press, and quite another to agree with such a description, when formulated by someone else and published in the press, in the courtroom. The Court is aware that under certain circumstances slandering someone or reiterating earlier libellous statement in a courtroom may constitute a separate cause of action for defamation. However, in the present case the cause of action was the applicant’s statements to the media, and not those he made before the first-instance court in the ensuing civil proceedings. In particular, the domestic courts held the applicant liable for damages because the word “machinations” was used in the title of the article to describe A.H.’s actions, and not because the applicant subsequently agreed with that description at the hearing before the first-instance court (see paragraph 23 above). In those circumstances, as the Court already observed above (see paragraph 60 above), under section 14(3) of the Public Information Act any liability for the words in the title of the article could have been imputed only to the editor-in-chief of the magazine and not to the applicant himself.
62. Therefore, as regards the title of the first article, it cannot be said that the reasons adduced by the domestic courts for holding the applicant liable (jointly and severally with the publishing company) for the injury to A.H.’s reputation were “relevant and sufficient” and thus capable of justifying the interference with his freedom of expression. Rather, by holding the applicant liable for the title of the first article those courts extended his liability in defamation beyond his own words.
(iii) The second article
63. The second article contained extracts from a telephone conversation between the applicant and his political party’s secretary-general Dr I.V., in which the applicant allegedly stated that it was kept secret from the public that A.H. sat on ten supervisory boards and was receiving a high remuneration on that account. In that conversation the applicant also allegedly accused A.H. of threatening him that he would not become a professor as long as A.H. was the Minister. The domestic courts found that these allegations were both untrue and defamatory. However, they had difficulties to establish, with the requisite degree of certainty, whether the applicant had actually made those allegations, and if so whether he had authorised the publication of the article, both of which the applicant denied. The courts eventually found, basing themselves exclusively on the testimony of the journalist of Imperijal who had interviewed the applicant, that the applicant had retold the content of the telephone conversation to the journalist, precisely so that he could publish it. They therefore held the applicant (together with the publishing company jointly and severally) liable for tarnishing A.H.’s reputation. The domestic courts also held that even if the two defamatory statements were a complete fabrication by the journalist, this could not have exonerated the applicant from liability, as he, knowing that the article contained untruths, had not denied them nor asked the magazine to publish a denial (see paragraph 20 above).
64. As regards the issue of whether the applicant authorised the publication of what was said during the telephone conversation between him and Dr I.V., the Court notes that the Zagreb County Court, in its decision of 30 April 2002, held that the information in question by its nature did not require authorisation (see paragraph 15 above). The Court therefore finds that the issue of authorisation in the present case is of no relevance for examining whether the applicant’s right of freedom of expression was breached.
65. As regards the issue of whether the second article accurately reflected what the applicant had said during the telephone conversation in question, the Court considers, for the reasons set out below, that this issue should be analysed separately for each defamatory statement. It reiterates in this connection that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role, and that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case. It is not the Court’s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts, and as a general rule it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them. Though the Court is not bound by the findings of domestic courts, in normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by those courts (see Europapress Holding d.o.o., cited above, § 62). It has however held that such elements existed in cases where the decisions of the domestic authorities had not been based on “an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts”, and has accordingly found violations of, for example, Article 10 (see Chemodurov v. Russia, no. 72683/01, §§ 28-29, 31 July 2007), Article 11 (see Alekseyev v. Russia, nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, §§ 86-88, 21 October 2010) and even Article 6 § 1 (see Khamidov v. Russia, no. 72118/01, §§ 170-175, 15 November 2007).
(α) As regards the applicant’s alleged statement concerning A.H.’s membership of supervisory boards
66. As regards the alleged statement by the applicant that A.H. sat on ten supervisory boards and was receiving a high remuneration on that account, the Court finds, having compared the text of that statement as published in Imperijal (see paragraph 9 above) with the applicant’s testimonies before the first-instance court (see paragraphs 12 and 17 above), that the domestic courts were entitled to consider that the applicant had indeed made such a statement during the telephone conversation with Dr I.V. and that it had been accurately reported in the second article. Namely, in his testimony before the first-instance court the applicant admitted that during the telephone conversation in question he had mentioned membership of about ten supervisory boards and receiving remuneration on that account. While it is true that he argued that in so doing he had never mentioned A.H.’s name, he, in his own admission, added that he had mentioned the Minister of Health, and that A.H. had been the Minister of Health at the time (see paragraph 17 above). Therefore, there are no elements that would lead the Court to depart from the finding of the domestic courts that the applicant had indeed made the statement in question and that it was accurately reported in the second article. That finding was therefore based on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.
67. The Court further accepts the domestic courts’ view that accusing A.H. of sitting on ten supervisory boards and receiving a high level of remuneration for doing so was a factual statement, which had been proved to be incorrect. The Court also agrees with the domestic courts that the statement in question was indeed defamatory, as it insinuated that A.H. had unduly benefited financially from his political position (see paragraph 20 above).
68. Consequently, since the applicant’s liability did not go beyond his own words, and given that the statement in question was both false and defamatory, the Court considers that as regards that statement the reasons adduced by the domestic courts for holding the applicant liable (jointly and severally with the publishing company) for the injury to A.H.’s reputation were “relevant and sufficient” to justify the interference with his freedom of expression.
(β) As regards the applicant’s statement concerning A.H.’s alleged threats to his career advancement
69. As regards the applicant’s statement that A.H. had threatened him that he would not become a professor, the Court observes that there is an important discrepancy between the text of that statement as published in Imperijal (see paragraph 9 above) and the applicant’s testimony before the first-instance court (see paragraphs 12 and 17 above). In particular, while the applicant testified that during the telephone conversation with Dr I.V. he had indeed mentioned A.H.’s threats that he would never become a professor (see paragraphs 12 and 17 above), there is nothing in that testimony that would suggest that the applicant also said that in doing so A.H. had used the words “as long as I am the Minister”, as was reported in the second article. Whether the applicant said that A.H. had threatened him by using those words or not, is important because the answer to that question is decisive for the issue of whether the applicant’s statement may be regarded as a factual statement or a value judgment. In this connection the Court reiterates that drawing inferences from the existing facts, such as, for example, attributing or imputing motives or intentions to someone’s behaviour, is generally intended to convey opinions, and is thus more akin to value judgments (see Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway [GC], no. 23118/93, § 50, ECHR 1999‑VIII). Therefore, if the applicant in the telephone conversation at issue told Dr I.V. that A.H. had threatened him by using the words “as long as I am the Minister”, his statement is to be viewed as a statement of fact and thus susceptible of proof. On the other hand, if the applicant told his interlocutor during that conversation about A.H.’s threats without referring to the impugned phrase, his statements are to be seen as value judgments. If the latter is the case, he cannot be blamed for having understood what A.H. said to him at the round table on health care of 15 October 1996 as a threat because, having regard to the minutes of that round table (see paragraph 13 above), he had, in the Court’s view, a sufficient factual basis to support that belief.
70. From the domestic courts’ judgments it would appear that they found it established that during the telephone conversation in question the applicant had indeed told his interlocutor that A.H. had threatened him that he would not become a professor as long as A.H. was the Minister, and thus qualified the applicant’s statement as a statement of fact, which he had later on been unable to prove (see paragraph 20 above). However, having regard to the importance of the principle that an individual’s liability in defamation must not extend beyond his or her own words, as well as the potential chilling effects which breaches of that principle can have on freedom of expression (see paragraph 39 above), the Court finds that there are cogent elements leading it to depart from that factual finding of the domestic courts in the present case. Firstly, from the domestic courts’ finding that the applicant retold the content of the telephone conversation to the journalist so that he could publish it, it does not necessarily follow that the journalist reported it accurately. As Dr I.V. and three other witnesses were unable to confirm that the applicant had used the impugned phrase, and since the applicant categorically denied having done so, it would seem that in the absence of other evidence (such as audio recording of the telephone conversation in question or of the subsequent discussion between the applicant and the journalist) this finding was based exclusively on the testimony of the journalist, whose credibility appears dubious, as he clearly had an interest in proving that what he had published was accurate. To defer to the factual findings of the domestic courts in such circumstances and to accept that plaintiffs in defamation cases would have to meet such a low standard of proof would render meaningless the principle that liability in defamation must not go beyond one’s own words. Their finding that during the telephone conversation at issue the applicant had told his interlocutor that A.H. had threatened him by using the phrase “as long as I am the Minister”, was therefore not based on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts. As a consequence thereof, the domestic courts mistakenly qualified the applicant’s statement as a statement of fact, rather than as a value judgment the veracity of which is not susceptible of proof. While it is true that value judgments may be excessive in the absence of any factual basis, the Court has already found this was not so in the present case (see paragraph 69 above).
71. Furthermore, as regards that statement, the Court is likewise unable to accept the additional argument in the reasoning of the domestic courts, according to which even if the journalist had made up the content of the telephone conversation himself, that is, without any subsequent explanation by the applicant, this could not have exonerated the applicant from liability, since he could have been expected to deny published defamatory statements as inaccurate (see paragraph 20 above). The Court is unaware, and the Government did not furnish any evidence, of any statutory provision or any case-law of the domestic courts requiring defendants in defamation cases (civil or criminal) to deny or retract defamatory statements in order to be exempted from liability. On the contrary, as correctly pointed out by the applicant (see paragraph 55 above), it was A.H. who should have denied the published defamatory statements as he was, pursuant to section 31(2) of the Public Information Act (see paragraph 29 above), the only person in the present case who had the right to have such a denial published.
72. Consequently, since the applicant’s liability as regards his statement that A.H. threatened him that he would not become a professor as long as A.H. was the Minister, went beyond his own words, that he was not required to deny it, and given that he had a sufficient factual basis to support his belief that A.H. had actually threatened him, the Court considers that, as regards that statement, the reasons adduced by the domestic courts for holding the applicant liable (jointly and severally with the publishing company) for the injury to A.H.’s reputation cannot be regarded as “relevant and sufficient” to justify the interference with his freedom of expression.
(iv) Conclusion
73. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression in the form of the Zagreb Municipal Court’s judgment of 21 May 2003 (as rectified by that court’s decision of 12 July 2005) ordering the applicant to pay damages for the injury to A.H.’s reputation was not “necessary in a democratic society” in so far as it concerned the title of the first article and the applicant’s statement reproduced in the second article that A.H. had threatened him that he would not become a professor.
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in the present case.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
74. The applicant also complained that the above-mentioned civil proceedings were unfair, and about their outcome. He relied on Article 6 § 1, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
75. The Court notes that the applicant complained about the outcome of the proceedings. However, unless the outcome was arbitrary, the Court is unable to examine it under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that the courts lacked impartiality or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair. In any event, having regard to its findings under Article 10 above, the Court does not find it necessary to examine further to what extent this conclusion would affect the fairness of the proceedings.
76. It follows that this complaint is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
77. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
78. The applicant claimed HRK 74,622.33 in compensation for pecuniary damage, which is the amount he had paid to A.H. following the Zagreb Municipal Court judgment of 21 May 2003. He also claimed HRK 50,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
79. The Government contested these claims.
80. As regards the applicant’s claim for pecuniary damage, the Court first notes that the sum sought corresponds to the amount of damages, costs of proceedings and the accrued statutory default interest the applicant paid in the execution of the Zagreb Municipal Court’s judgment of 21 May 2003 for defaming A.H. The Court further reiterates that a judgment in which it finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its consequences. If national law does not allow – or allows only partial – reparation to be made, Article 41 empowers the Court to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate (see Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, §§ 32-33, ECHR 2000-XI). In this connection the Court notes that under section 428a of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 31 above) an applicant may seek the reopening of the civil proceedings in respect of which the Court has found a violation of the Convention. Given that in the instant case it found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention as regards the title of the first article and one of the two applicant’s statements reproduced in the second article (see paragraph 73 above), the Court considers that in the present case the most appropriate way of repairing the consequences of that violation is to reopen the proceedings complained of. As it follows that the domestic law allows such reparation to be made, the Court considers that there is no call to award the applicant any sum in respect of pecuniary damage.
81. On the other hand, the Court finds that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards him EUR 1,500 under that head, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
B. Costs and expenses
82. The applicant also claimed HRK 41,348 for costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and HRK 12,030[1] for those incurred before the Court.
83. The Government contested these claims.
84. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,630[2] for costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before it, plus any tax that may be chargeable on the applicant. On the other hand, as regards the costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings, the Court is of the opinion that they must be rejected given that the applicant will be able to have (the relevant part of) those costs reimbursed in the proceedings following his petition for reopening (see paragraph 80 above, and Vinčić and Others v. Serbia, nos. 44698/06,44700/06, 44722/06, 44725/06, 49388/06, 50034/06, 694/07, 757/07, 758/07, 3326/07, 3330/07, 5062/07, 8130/07, 9143/07, 9262/07, 9986/07, 11197/07, 11711/07, 13995/07,14022/07, 20378/07, 20379/07, 20380/07, 20515/07, 23971/07, 50608/07, 50617/07, 4022/08, 4021/08, 29758/07 and 45249/07, § 65, 1 December 2009).
C. Default interest
85. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning the freedom of expression admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Croatian kunas at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 1,500 (one thousand and five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,630 (one thousand six hundred and thirty euros)[3], plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 September 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre
Registrar President
[1] Rectified on 5 November 2013: the text was “HRK 10,518”
[2] Rectified on 5 November 2013: the text was “EUR 5,600”
[3] Rectified on 5 November 2013: the text was “EUR 5,600 (five thousand six hundred euros)”
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