Džalud (Jaloud) protiv Holadnije

Država na koju se presuda odnosi
Holandija
Institucija
Evropski sud za ljudska prava
Broj predstavke
47708/08
Stepen važnosti
Referentni slučaj
Jezik
Srpski
Datum
20.11.2014
Članovi
1
2
2-1
2-2
41
Kršenje
2
2-1
Nekršenje
nije relevantno
Ključne reči po HUDOC/UN
(Čl. 1) Obaveza poštovanja ljudskih prava
(Čl. 1) Nadležnost država
(Čl. 2) Pravo na život
(Čl. 2) Pozitivne obaveze
(Čl. 2-1) Efikasna istraga
(Čl. 2-1 / ICCPR-6) Život
(Čl. 2-2) Apsolutno nužno
(Čl. 2-2) Upotreba sile
(Čl. 41) Pravično zadovoljenje - opšte
Tematske ključne reči
VS deskriptori
Zbirke
Sudska praksa
Presuda ESLJP
Veliko veće
Sažetak
Od jula 2003. godine do marta 2005. godine, holandske trupe su bile u sastavu Snaga za stabilizaciju u Iraku (Stabilisation Force in Iraq (SFIR)). One su bile stacionirane u jugoistočnom Iraku kao deo Multinacionalne divizije Jugoistok (MND-JI), koja je bila pod komandom jednog oficira oružanih snaga Velike Britanije. Učestvovanje holandskih snaga u MND-JI je bilo regulisano Memorandumom o razumijevanju između Velike Britanije i Kraljevine Nizozemske, a Ratna pravila su bila aneks uz taj memorandum. Oba dokumenta su bila klasifikovana kao poverljiva.

Podnositelj predstavke je otac iračkog državljanina koji je poginuo u aprilu 2004. godine usled rana uzrokovanih mecima koje je zadobio kada je na automobil, u kojem se nalazio kao putnik, otvorena vatra nakon što je prošao kontrolni punkt u brzini. Kontrolni punkt su u to vreme držali članovi Iračkog korpusa za civilnu odbranu (IKCO), kojima se pridružila jedna patrola holandskih vojnika koji su stigli na lice mesta nakon što je na kontrolni punkt otvorena vatra iz jednog drugog vozila nekoliko minuta pre incidenta u kojem je ubijen sin podnositelja predstavke. Jedan od holandskih vojnika je priznao da je više puta otvorio vatru na automobil u kojem je putovao sin podnositelja predstavke, ali je tvrdio da je to učinio u samoodbrani, verujući da se našao pod vatrom koja je otvorena iz vozila. Nakon istrage koju je preduzela Kraljevska vojna policija, vojni tužilac je zaključio da je sin podnositelja predstavke verovatno pogođen iračkim metkom te da je holandski vojnik delovao u samoodbrani. Dakle, on je odlučio da okonča istragu. Tu odluku je potvrdio Vojno odeljenje Apelacionog suda, koji je zaključio da je vojnik reagovao na otvaranje vatre iz vlastitih redova, pogrešno misleći da je vatra otvorena iz vozila, da je on, imajući u vidu te okolnosti, delovao u granicama primljenih uputstava, te da je odluka da se on krivično ne goni opravdana.

U svojoj predstavci Evropskom sudu, podnositelj predstavke se žalio na povredu člana 2. Konvencije zbog toga što istraga nije bila nezavisna i dovoljno efikasna. Dana 9. jula 2013. godine, Veće Suda je odlučilo da ustupi nadležnost Velikom veću.
Pravo – član 1 (jurisdikcija): Vlada je uložila preliminarni prigovor da žalbeni navodi ne potpadaju pod teritorijalnu jurisdikciju Holandije budući da tu vlast vrše drugi: ili Sjedinjene Države ili Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo određene na osnovu Rezolucije 1483 Saveta bezbednosti UN, ili samo Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, kao “vodeća nacija” na jugoistoku Iraka koja ima komandu nad holandskim kontigentom SFIR-a.

Odbijajući taj argument, Sud je istakao da činjenica, da neka država ugovornica izvršava neku odluku ili nalog koji je izdala neka strana država, nije po sebi dovoljna da oslobodi državu ugovornicu njenih obaveza na osnovu Konvencije i da Holandija ne može biti oslobođena “jurisdikcije” prostom činjenicom da je prihvatila da bude pod operativnom kontrolom komandujućeg oficira Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva.

Ona je preuzela odgovornost za pružanje sigurnosti u području gdje su njene trupe bile stacionirane, izuzevši druge države učesnice, te je tamo zadržala punu komandu nad svojim kontigentom. Nije relevantna ni činjenica da je kontrolni punkt gdje se desila pucnjava formalno držalo osoblje IKCO-a jer je IKCO bio pod nadzorom i ovlašću oficira koalicionih snaga. Prema tome, holandske trupe nisu bile na raspolaganju nekoj stranoj vlasti ili pod isključivim vodstvom ili kontrolom neke druge države.

Fatalna pucnjava se desila na kontrolnom punktu koji je držalo osoblje pod komandom i direktnim nadzorom holandskog vojnog oficira, koji je uspostavljen u okviru obavljanja misije SFIR-a koja je predviđena na osnovu Rezolucije 1483 SBUN. Dakle, ona se desila pod “jurisdikcijom” Holandije.
Zaključak: preliminarni prigovor odbijen (jednoglasno).

Član 2 (proceduralni aspekt): Sud nije prihvatio navod podnositelja predstavke da istraga nije bila nezavisna. Nisu postojali dokazi da je činjenica, da je jedinica Kraljevske vojne policije, koja je sprovela prvobitnu istragu, delila kvartove s vojnim osobljem koje je navodno odgovorno za smrt, ugrozila po sebi njenu neyavisnost do te mere da je izmenila kvalitet istrage. Ni činjenica da se javni tužilac u velikoj meri pozvao na izveštaje Kraljevske vojne policije ne pokreće to pitanje zbog toga što se javni tužioci neizostavno oslanjaju na policiju da bi dobili informacije i podršku. U vezi s vojnim oficirom koji je učestvovao kao sudija u Vojnom veću Apelacionog suda koje je potvrdilo odluku o nesprovođenju krivičnog gonjenja protiv holandskog vojnog oficira koji je pucao na automobil, Sud je istakao da su se u sastavu Vojnog vijeća nalazila dva civilna člana Apelacionog suda i jedan vojni član. Vojni član je bio viši oficir koji je imao kvalifikacije sa to sudijsko mjesto, te su se ista pravila funkcionalne neovisnosti i nepristrasnosti primenjivala na njega, kao i na civilne sudije. Dakle, Vojno veće je pružilo dovoljne garancije nezavisnosti u smislu člana 2.

Međutim, u pogledu delotvornosti istrage, Sud je ustanovio da je ona bila obeležena nizom nedostataka. Ono što je značajno je da se Vojno veće Apelacionog suda ograničilo na zaključak da je oficir koji je otvorio vatru delovao u samoodbrani, reagirajući greškom na vatru koja je došla iz njegovih vlastitih redova s druge strane puta, a da nije razmotrilo izvesne aspekte koji su relevantni za pitanje proporcionalnosti pribegavanja sili, a naročito da li je ispaljeno više metaka nego što je bilo potrebno te da li je pucnjava prestala čim je situacija to dozvolila. Dokumenti koji sadrže potencijalno relevantne informacije za ta pitnja nisu bili na raspolaganju Vojnom veću u to vreme. Tako zapisnik o izjavama osoblja IKCO-a koje je čuvalo kontrolni punkt u vreme pucnjave i spisak imena osoblja IKCO-a koje je pucalo iz svog oružja nisu priloženi spisu.

Osim toga, oficir koji je otvorio vatru je ispitan tek šest sati nakon pucnjave. Iako ne postoji dokaz da se radi o manipulaciji, činjenica da odgovarajući koraci nisu preduzeti da bi se smanjio rizik od njegovog tajnog dogovaranja s drugim svedocima je predstavljala jedan drugi nedostatak. U vezi s autopsijom, ona je obavljena bez prisustva bilo kakve kvalifikovane odgovorne osobe iz Holandije. Nalaz patologa je bio ekstremno kratak, nedostajali su mu detalji te nije sadržavao nikakve fotografije. Konačno, fragmenti metala koji su identifikovani kao fragmenti metka koji su izvađeni iz tela – potencijalno važni materijalni dokazi – nisu sačuvani ni ispitani u odgovarajućim uslovima te su potom nestali pod nepoznatim okolnostima.

Ukratko, istraga o okolnostima u vezi sa smrću nije zadovoljila standarde koji proizilaze iz člana 2. zbog toga što dokumenti koji su sadržavali važne informacije nisu bili na raspolaganju ni sudskim vlastima, a ni podnositelju predstavke; nikakve mere opreza nisu poduzete da bi se onemogućilo da se oficir koji je otvorio vatru tajno dogovora s drugim svedocima pre nego što je bio ispitan; nije preduzeto ništa da bi se obavila autopsija pod uslovima dostojnim istrage o mogućoj krivičnoj odgovornosti jednog državnog agenta, a izveštaj o autopsiji je bio neadekvatan; konačno, važni materijalni dokazi su zagubljeni pod nepoznatim okolnostima. Ne može se reći da su ti propusti bili neizbežni, čak i u posebno teškim uslovima koji su vladali u Iraku u relevantno vreme.
Zaključak: povreda (jednoglasno).

Preuzmite presudu u pdf formatu

 EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA  

VELIKO VEĆE

PREDMET DŽALUD (JALOUD) PROTIV HOLANDIJE

(Predstavka br. 47708/08)

PRESUDA

STRAZBUR

20. novembar 2014.

Ova presuda je pravosnažna, ali može biti predmet redaktorskih izmena.

U predmetu Džalud protiv Holadnije, Evropski sud za ljudska prava, zasedajući u Velikom veću u sastavu:

Din Špilman (Dean Spielmann), predsednik,
Josep Kasadeval (Casadevall)
Guido Raimondi,
Ineta Ziemele,
Mark Filiger (Villiger),
Izabel Bero-Lefevr (Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre),
Elizabet Štajner (Elisabeth Steiner),
Alvina Đulumjan (Gyulumyan),
Jan Šikuta (Ján Šikuta),
Paivi Hirvela (Päivi Hirvelä),
Luis Lopez Gera (López Guerra),
Andraš Šajo (András Sajó),
Zdravka Kalaidžieva (Kalaydjieva),
Aleš Pejhal (Pejchal),
Johanes (Johannes) Silvis,
Valerij Gritco (Valeriu Griţco)
Julija Antoanela Motok (Iulia Antoanella Motoc), sudije,
i Majkl O’Bojl (Michael O’Boyle), zamenik sekretara

Nakon većanja zatvorenih za javnost, održanih 19. februara i 10. septembra 2014, Izriče sledeću presudu, usvojenu potonjeg dana:

POSTUPAK

  1. Predmet je formiran na osnovu predstavke (br. 47708/08) koju je 6.oktobra 2008. godine protiv Kraljevine Holandije Evropskom sudu za ljudska prava (u daljem tekstu: Sud) podneo irački državljanin, g. Sabah Džalud (u daljem tekstu: podnosilac predstavke) u skladu sa članom 34 Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: Konvencija).
  2. Podnosioca predstavke su zastupali gđa L. Zehfeld [Zegveld] i g. A. V. Eikelboom [ Eikelboom], advokati iz Amsterdama. Državu Holandiju (u daljem tekstu: Država) je predstavljao njen zastupnik pred Sudom, g. R.A.A. Beker [Böcker], službenik Ministarstva spoljnih poslova.
  3. Podnosilac predstavke je naročito tvrdio da je povređen član 2 Konvencije zbog neadekvatne istrage o smrti njegovog sina, g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda.
  4. Predstavka je dostavljena Državi 6. decembra 2011.
  5. Treće odeljenje Suda, u sastavu Josep Kasadeval, predsednik, AlvinaĐulumjan, Korneliu Birsan (Corneliu Bîrsan), Jan Šikuta, Luis Lopez Gera, Kristina Pardalos, Johanes Silvis, sudije, i Santjago Kesada (Santiago Quesada), sekretar Odeljenja, je 9. jula 2013. predmet ustupilo Velikom veću, pošto nijedna strana nije izrazila prigovor (shodno članu 30 Konvencije i pravilu 72 Poslovnika Suda).
  6. Sastav Velikog veća je određen saglasno odredbama člana 26, st. 4 i 5 Konvencije, i pravilu 24 Poslovnika Suda. Elizabet Štajner, sudija zamenik, zamenila je sudiju Pardalosa koji nije bio u mogućnosti da učestvuje u daljem razmatranju ovog predmeta.
  7. I podnosilac predstavke i Država podneli su pisane napomene. Pored toga, napomenu treće strane je podnela i Država Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, koju je predsednik ovlastio da učestvuje u postupku (prema članu 35, st. 2 Konvencije i pravilu 44, st. 2 Poslovnika Suda). Državu intervenijenta je predstavljala njena zastupnica pred Sudom, gđa R.Tomlinson, službenica Ministarstva spoljnih poslova.
  8. Javna rasprava je održana u zgradi Suda u Strazburu 19. februara 2014. (shodno pravilu 59, st. 3 Poslovnika Suda). 

Pred Sudom su se pojavili:

(a) u ime Države
g. R.BEKER, Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova, zastupnik,
dr. M. KAUJER [KUIJER], Ministarstvo bezbednosti i pravde, savetnik,
g. B.VAN HOEK, Javno tužilaštvo, savetnik,
komandant H. VARNAR (WARNAR), Ministarstvo odbrane, vojno lice savetnik;

(b) u ime podnosioca predstavke:
gđa. L.ZEHFELD, pravna zastupnica,
g. A.V.EIKELBOOM, pravni zastupnik;

(c) u ime države intervenijenta: Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva
gđa. R.TOMLINSON, Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova,zastupnica UK pred Sudom,
g.Dž. IDI (EADIE), KRALJIČIN ZASTUPNIK, pravni zastupnik,
g. Dž.BENSON, Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova savetnik,
gđa. M. EDIS (ADDIS), Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova, posmatrač

Sudu su se obratili g. Beker, g. Eikelboom, gđa Zehfeld i g. Idi, koji su takođe i odgovarali na pitanja sudija.

ČINJENICE

  1. Podnosilac predstavke, g. Sabah Džalud je irački državljanin rođen 1943. i živi u An-Nasirjahu (An-Nasiryah) u Iraku. On je otac pokojnog g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda, koji je preminuo 21. aprila 2004. sa dvadeset devet godina.

A.  Okolnosti predmeta

1. Smrt g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda

  1. Na dan 21. aprila 2004, oko 02:12 časova, neidentifikovani automobil se približio kontrolnom punktu za vozila (KPV) pod nazivom “B-13” na glavnoj ruti snabdevanja „Džekson“ [Jackson] severno od grada Ar Rumajthah [Ar Rumaythah], u pokrajini Al-Muthana [Al-Muthanna] u jugoistočnom Iraku. Automobil je usporio i okrenuo se. Iz unutrašnjosti automobila je otvorena vatra na čuvare kontrolnog punkta, koji su svi bili pripadnici Iračkog korpusa civilne odbrane (IKCO). Čuvari su uzvratili vatru. Niko nije bio pogođen; automobil se odvezao i nestao u noći.
  2. Na poziv komandanta kontrolnog punkta, vodnika IKCO-a Husama Sada (Hussam Saad), patrola od šest holandskih vojnika, predvođenih poručnikom A, stigla je na mesto događaja oko 02:30 časova.
  3. Petnaestak minuta kasnije, automobil marke Mercedes se brzo približio KPV-u. Udario je jedno od nekoliko buradi koja su bila postavljena na sredinu puta kako bi formirala kontrolni punkt, ali je nastavio da vozi. Na automobil je otvorena vatra: poručnik A. je ispalio 28 metaka iz jurišne puške Diemaco; moguće je da su hice ispalili i jedan ili više pripadnika IKCO-a naoružanih puškama Kalašnjikov AK-47 (vidi stavove 21 i 49-52 dole u tekstu). U tom trenutku vozač je zaustavio auto.
  4. Sin podnosioca predstavke, g. Azhar Sabah Džalud, nalazio se na suvozačkom sedištu. Bio je pogođen na nekoliko mesta, uključujući i u grudi. Holandski vojnici su ga izvukli iz automobila i pokušali da mu pruže prvu pomoć. Uprkos tome, g. Azhar Sabah Džalud je preminuo. Proglašen je mrtvim jedan sat nakon incidenta.
  5. Telo je podvrgnuto rendgenskom pregledu. Na radiografskim snimcima se u grudnom košu i na drugim mestima vide predmeti koji su identifikovani kao metalni.
  6. Obdukciju je izvršio irački lekar, koji je sastavio kratak izveštaj na arapskom. U telu su pronađeni metalni predmeti koje je moguće identifikovati kao fragmente metaka.
  7. Nije utvrđeno ko je ispalio metke, niti iz kog oružja.

2. Istraga

a.  Početak istrage

  1. U zvaničnom izveštaju vodnika prve klase (wachtmeester 1e klasse) Shelingerhouta [Schellingerhout], pripadnika Kraljevske vojne policije, odreda As-Samavah [As-Samawah], se navodi da je u 03:25 časova primljen telefonski poziv iz operativne prostorije bataljona, kojim je prijavljen oružani incident. Jedan automobil je udario u KPV. Pripadnici holandskih i iračkih oružanih snaga su otvorili vatru i putnik u automobilu je bio ranjen. Prebačen je u bolnicu. Istraga je poverena Kraljevskoj vojnoj policiji.
  2. Sedmočlana dežurna grupa (piketgroep) Kraljevske vojne policije je u pratnji prevodioca izišla u 03:50 časova i stigla na mesto događaja oko 04:50 časova. Vodnici prve klase Kraljevske vojne policije Brokman (Broekman) i Van Lar (Laar) su počeli sa obezbeđivanjem dokaza u 05:50 časova. Pripadnici Kraljevske vojne policije u Hagu i javni tužilac Regionalnog suda su obavešteni o incidentu takođe u 5 časova.

b.  Preuzimanje tela preminulog, automobila i ličnog naoružanja poručnika A. i vodnika IKCO-a Husama Sada

  1. Telo je preuzeo zastavnik (adjudant-onderofficier) Kraljevske vojne policije Kortman u 07:30 časova i prevezao ga do pokretne bolnice u Kamp Smitiju [Camp Smitty]. U 11:45 časova, nakon sto je lokalni sud izdao pismenu dozvolu, telo je prebačeno u Opštu bolnicu u As-Samavi. Obdukciji, koju je izvršio irački lekar, nije prisustvovao nijedan svedok iz policije.
  2. Zastavnik Kortman je oko 05:10 časova preuzeo Mercedes koji je kasnije odšlepan do Kamp Smitija.
  3. Vodnik prve klase Shelingerhout je oduzeo pušku Kalašnjikov AK47 vodnika Husama Sada oko 07:50 časova; oko 11:55 časova takođe je oduzeo pušku Diemaco C7A1 poručnika A. Oba oružja su kasnije obeležena i stavljena na raspolaganje javnom tužiocu Arnhema.

c.   Iskazi dati oficirima Kraljevske vojne policije

  1. Sledeći su iskazi dostavljeni istražnim i sudskim vlastima u domaćim postupcima.

i) Gospodin Davud Džoad (Dawoud Joad) Kathim

  1. Na dan 21.aprila 2004. oko 5:05 časova, zastavnik Kraljevske vojne policije Merks [Mercx] je, uz pomoć prevodioca, uzeo iskaz od vozača automobila Mercedes, g. Davuda Džoada Kathima. G. Davud Džoad Kathim je priznao da je prethodne večeri popio dve konzerve piva, ali ne više od toga, i nije smatrao da je bio pod dejstvom alkohola. Izjavio da nije primetio nikakav kontrolni punkt sve dok nije bilo prekasno da izbegne udarac u dva bureta. U to vreme je bio mrak i nije bilo nikakvog osvetljenja. Na njegovo potpuno iznenađenje, na njegov auto je pucano dok je vozio kroz kontrolni punkt. Njegov prijatelj g. Azhar Sabah Džalud je bio pogođen; g. Davud Džoad Kathim ga je čuo kako kaže da umire. Želeo je da podnese žalbu zato što kontrolni punkt nije bio jasno obeležen.

ii) Vodnik IKCO-a Husam Sad

  1. Na dan 21. aprila 2004, oko 05:15 časova, vodnik prve klase Kraljevske vojne policije Verdenburg (Weerdenburg) je uzeo iskaz od vodnika IKCO-a Husama Sada. Potonji je izjavio da je prijavio pucnjavu iz automobila oko 02:10 časova; poručnik A. je stigao otprilike oko 02:30 časova. Vodnik Husam Sad je otišao da potraži ispaljene čaure zajedno sa poručnikom A, još jednim holandskim vojnikom i prevodiocem. Odjednom je čuo prasak i ugledao automobil koji se približava iz pravca grada Ar Rumajthaha. Uprkos naređenju da stane, automobil je nastavio da ide napred. Tada je čuo pucnjavu sa leve strane puta. On lično, međutim, nije ispalio nijedan hitac.

iii) Drugi pripadnici IKCO-a

  1. Vodnik prve klase Verdenburg je potom saslušao ostale iračke vojnike, ali oni nisu pružili nikakve značajne informacije.

iv) Gospodin Valid Abd Al Husein Mađied [Walid Abd Al Hussein Majied]

  1. Na dan 21. aprila 2004, oko 7 časova, vodnik Kraljevske vojne policije Klinkenberg je uzeo iskaz od g. Valida Abd Al Husein Mađieda, prevodioca koji je radio za IKCO. Prevodilac je bio u pratnji patrole poručnika A. između dva kontrolna punkta. Nakon što je stigao na KPV B1.3 i od vodnika IKCO-a Husama Sada saznao za prvi oružani incident, pridružio se poručniku A. i ostalima u potrazi za ispaljenim čaurama. Odjednom je čuo kako padaju burad, okrenuo se i video automobil kako se približava. Povikao je “Stani, stani, stani” ali je auto nastavio. Holandski vojnik koji je stajao na suprotnoj strani puta je pucao na automobil. Nakon što se auto zaustavio, pomogao je putnicima tako što je prevodio. Leva ruka suvozača je bila prekrivena krvlju, a vozač se osećao na alkohol.

v) Vodnik Tojnisen [Teunissen] 

  1. Na dan 21. aprila 2004. oko 09:30 časova, vodnik prve klase Kraljevske vojne policije Van Lar (Laar) i vodnik Klinkenberg uzeli su iskaz od pešadijskog vodnika Tojnisena. Kada je stigao na KPV B1.3 u 02:00 časa, vodnik IKCO-a ga je obavestio o onome što se dogodilo. Zajedno sa svojim poručnikom, vodnikom IKCO-a i prevodiocem, otišao je do puta da potraži ispaljene čaure. Nalazio se otprilike 100 metara od kućice KPV kada se okrenuo, iznenađen zvukom. Video je automobil koji se brzo kretao ka KPV; kada je automobil prošao KPV, čuo je pucnjavu iz KPV. Njih četvorica su se bacili u zaklon. Kada je automobil stigao do nivoa gde su oni bili, ispaljeni su hici sa druge strane puta, gde se nalazio poručnik. On je povikao “Obustavite paljbu”, ali se to nije čulo. Kada je pucnjava prestala, automobil se takođe zaustavio. Suvozač je krvario iz donjeg dela tela i levog ramena. Vodnik Tojnisen i redov Finkelnberg su ga izvukli iz automobila, položili na zemlju i previli mu rane. On i poručnik A. su pokušavali da ožive putnika sve dok im lekar nije rekao da više nema smisla pokušavati.

vi) Poručnik A, prvi iskaz

  1. Na dan 21. aprila 2004. oko 11:15 časova, vodnici prve klase Kraljevske vojne policije Brokman i Van Lar su saslušali poručnika A. predočivši mu njegova prava. Poručnik A. je izjavio da je bio odgovoran za nadgledanje dva kontrolna punkta za vozila, od kojih je jedan KPV B1.3 na putu Džekson severno od Ar Rumajthaha. Nakon što je prijavljen prvi oružani incident, on je stigao na KPV B1.3 oko 02:30 časova; nameravao je da pešice izvidi to područje zajedno sa vodnikom Tojnisenom i vodnikom IKCO-a. Oko 02:45 časova ga je trgla buka. Pogledao je iza sebe i video kako se približavaju dva zaslepljujuća automobilska svetla. Tada su ispaljeni hici iz pravca automobila; čuvši ih, bacio se u zaklon uz ivicu puta. Bio je uveren da su hici ispaljeni iz unutrašnjosti automobila. Kada je auto stigao do nivoa na kojem se on nalazio, on je nategao pušku; čim je auto malo prošao, počeo je da puca u zadnji deo. Ispalio je 28 metaka u ciljanoj paljbi. Reagovao je na opasnost izazvanu time što je prvo na njega pucano. Ispraznio je ceo okvir, 28 metaka; to je trajalo otprilike sedam sekundi. Suvozač je bio pogođen a on i vodnik Tojnisen su pokušavali da ga ožive dok nije stigla pomoć. Do tada više nije bilo pulsa. Ubrzo nakon toga stigao je komandir čete; poručnik A. ga je upoznao sa događajima.

 vii) Redov Finkelnberg

  1. Na dan 23. aprila 2004, oko 13:50 časova, zastavnik Kraljevske vojne policije Kortman i vodnik prve klase Brokman uzeli su iskaz od redova Finkelnberga. On je 21. aprila 2004. u 02:00 časa stigao sa poručnikom A. i vodnikom Tojnisenom, između ostalih, na KPV B1.4, gde je vodnik IKCO-a izvestio poručnika A. da je došlo do oružanog incidenta na KPV B1.3. Patrola je stoga krenula ka tom kontrolnom punktu, na koji je stigla u 02:30 časova. Poručnik A, vodnik Tojnisen, vodnik IKCO-a i prevodilac su krenuli putem u smeru Hamze da potraže ispaljene čaure. Automobil tamne boje se približio velikom brzinom, prošao pored njega kroz kontrolni punkt, udarivši neku od buradi na putu. Kroz pojačivač slike je video poručnika A, s leve strane puta, kako se baca u zaklon; potom je video vatrene bljeske iz nekoliko oružja s leve strane puta i čuo hice iz tog pravca. Paljba je bila pojedinačna. U određenom trenutku je video kako se automobil zaustavlja. Dok je paljba još uvek trajala, čuo je vodnika Tojnisena kako viče “Obustavite paljbu!”. Otišao je do vozila i isekao odeću suvozača kako bi je olabavio. Dok je vodnik Tojnisen pružao prvu pomoć, on je pretresao automobil u potrazi za oružjem. Pronašao je ručni frižider sa gotovo praznom flašom alkoholnog pića. Potom se pridružio vodniku Tojnisenu i poručniku A. u pokušajima da ožive putnika dok potonji nije proglašen mrtvim. Zamerio je poručniku A. što je pucao dok su njegove sopstvene trupe bile na suprotnoj strani puta i što je ispalio tako veliki broj metaka, kao i pripadnicima IKCO-a, što su pucali u pravcu sopstvenih snaga.

viii) Konjički narednik Kvist (Quist) 

  1. Na dan 23. aprila 2004. oko 13:50 časova, zastavnik Kraljevske vojne policije (opperwachtmeester) Volfs [Wolfs] i vodnik prve klase Van Lar uzeli su iskaz od konjičkog narednika (wachtmeester) On se 21. aprila 2004. oko 02:00 časa nalazio na KPV B1.4 sa poručnikom A. i ostalim članovima svoje patrolne jedinice, koju je predvodio vodnik Tojnisen. Došlo je do pucnjave na KPV B1.3 i oni su otišli tamo. Po dolasku je primetio da na kontrolnom punktu nema pripadnika IKCO-a, ali je video grupu ljudi sa leve strane puta, nasuprot kućici. Nakon što je konjički narednik Kvist parkirao vozilo, poručnik A, vodnik Tojnisen, prevodilac Valid i vodnik IKCO-a su krenuli pešice u pravcu severa da potraže ispaljene čaure. U jednom trenutku je video automobil kako se približava velikom brzinom iz pravca Ar Rumaithaha; kada je auto stigao do kontrolnog punkta, udario je neku od buradi ili velikih komada kamenja koji su tamo bili postavljeni. Čuo je paljbu iz automatskog oružja iz pravca gde su se nalazili pripadnici IKCO-a, koja je potom prestala. Zatim se ponovo čula paljba na nekih 100 metara od njega, ali nije mogao da kaže ko je pucao. Mislio je da je pucano iz više oružja. Video je da se vozilo zaustavilo na udaljenosti od 50 metara. Sačinio je operativni izveštaj. Video je kako poručnik A. i vodnik Tojnisen pokušavaju da ožive žrtvu.

ix) Poručnik A, drugi iskaz 

  1. Na dan 23. aprila 2004. oko 15:35 časova, vodnik prve klase Kraljevske vojne policije Brokman i zastavnik Kortman uzeli su drugi iskaz od poručnika A. Potonji je izjavio da se vodnik IKCO-a, kad ga je poslednji put video, poigravao (klungelen) sa svojom puškom AK-47. Poručnik A. je rekao vodniku da ne upire pušku u njega. Na temu oružanog incidenta je izjavio da je, koliko se seća, verovatno ležao na ravnom delu puta; nije pucao iz stojećeg položaja. Primenio je oživljavanje usta na usta na povređenom putniku iz auta i seća se da je osetio ukus alkohola. Zamenik komandira čete IKCO-a mu je dao spisak imena pripadnika IKCO-a koji su pucali iz svog oružja i odgovarajuće brojeve metaka koji su ispalili i zatražio dopunu municije.

d.  Ostali izveštaji iz istrage

i) Pregled automobila Mercedes

  1. Na dan 22. aprila 2004, zastavnik Kraljevske vojne policije Forthauzen [Voorthuijzen] i vodnik Hajden [Heijden] su pregledali automobil koji je zastavnik Kortman oduzeo prethodnog dana. Bio je to crni Mercedes Benz 320 E AMG. Imao je crne registarske tablice sa obeležjima na arapskom pismu; one su vidljivo pokrivale bele registarske tablice sa crnim latiničnim slovima i brojevima. Oštećenja na automobilu su odgovarala udarcima u strana tela pri velikoj brzini. Zadnje staklo je bilo razbijeno. Pronađene su rupe na zadnjem delu automobila, na levoj i desnoj strani karoserije, i u sedištima. Komadića metala je bilo na raznim mestima; jedan, identifikovan kao fragment metka, je očigledno prošao kroz suvozačko sedište. Zaključeno je da je na automobil pucano i sa leve i sa desne strane; sa leve, iz oružja kalibra manjeg od 6 mm, a sa desne, iz oružja kalibra većeg od 6 mm. Tačni uglovi pod kojima je pucano na automobil, međutim, nisu mogli da budu utvrđeni. 

ii) Rendgenski snimci i fotografije

  1. Na dan 9. maja 2004, zastavnik Kraljevske vojne policije Forthauzen i vodnik Klinkenberg su preuzeli CD-ROM sa rendgenskim snimcima tela Azhara Sabaha Džaluda. Na njima su se videli delići metala u levom delu grudnog koša, levom kuku i levoj podlaktici. Snimanje je izvršio zastavnik Dalinga, rendgenski tehničar u Kamp Smitiju, u As-Samavi, u pokrajini Al-Muthana.
  2. Dokument sadrži fotokopije pomenutih rendgenskih snimaka i fotografija. Prate ih opisi koji se nalaze u zvaničnom izveštaju zastavnika Kortmana. Fotografije uključuju slike puta i okoline kontrolnog punkta; neke su snimljene po dnevnom svetlu, neke očigledno noću. Nekoliko fotografija prikazuje čaure kako leže na zemlji, uključujući neke opisane kao 7x39 mm (kao da su ispaljene iz puške Kalašnjikov AK-47)[1], i ispaljene i neispaljene metke, i određenu količinu ispaljenih čaura kalibra 5,56x45 mm (kao da su ispaljene iz puške Diemaco C7A1) na gomili jedne uz druge.Ostale prikazuju muško telo sa ranama na ruci, gornjoj levoj četvrtini leđa i desnoj strani zadnjice. Na slikama je pored toga i automobil Mercedes tamne boje; navode se detalji rupa na karoseriji i u sedištima koje bi mogle da odgovaraju rupama od metaka.

iii)  Izveštaj potpukovnika IKCO-a Avadua Karima Hadija (Awadu Kareem Hadi)

  1. Na dan 22. aprila 2004, potpukovnik IKCO-a Avadu Karim Hadi, komandant 603. bataljona IKCO-a, poslao je izveštaj iz svog bataljonskog štaba u sedište iračke policije. Sledi tekst izveštaja (grub, rukom pisan prevod sa arapskog na engleski koji je podneo podnosilac predstavke):

„Detalji nesreće koja se događa u datumu (20/04/2004) i informacije koje dolaze iz prvog bataljona (Ar-Rumajte) a detalji su:

 U čas (21:05 [sic] posle ponoći) od datuma (20/04/2004) [sic] automobil marke (Mercedes) dolazi uz veliku brzinu upravljan iz (Al Hamze) ka (Al Nasiriji [Al Nassiriya]) i kada auto je stignut na lokaciju kontrolnog punkta ne staje i pravi sudar sa preprekama prisutnim u kontrolnom punktu i on je bio nemarnost a vojnici vikali na njega i zvali da stane a on je nastavljen i ne staje i posle toga holandski vojnici vide da nema načina i pucaju na njega i onda povređena osoba (Azhar Sabah Džalud) onda on je umro a on je bio sedeo pored vozača.

Sa našim pozdravima,

[potpis] potpukovnik Avadu Karim Hadi

Kopija za / PJCC“

iv) Delići metala

  1. U zvaničnom izveštaju zastavnika Kraljevske vojne policije Forthauzena od 21. juna 2004. se navodi da je 2. juna 2004. primljen dokument na arapskom, koji je prevodilac preveo usmeno i za koji je utvrđeno da predstavlja izveštaj bagdadske policije. U izveštaju se navodi da su tri delića metala ispitana u Bagdadu na zahtev policije Al-Muthane a radi utvrđivanja municije iz koje potiču i oružja iz kojeg su ispaljena; međutim, poreklo delića metala nije moglo biti utvrđeno zato što ih je bilo premalo. Kopija dokumenta na arapskom je bila priložena uz izveštaj zastavnika Forthauzena. Nije navedeno u čijoj su nadležnosti delići metala ostali, niti gde su pohranjeni.

e.  Irački dokument 

  1. Na dan 21. aprila 2004, g. Davud Džoad Kathim, vozač automobila Mercedes, podneo je prijavu iračkoj policiji protiv vojnika koji su pucali na njegov auto. Iz njegovog izjave na zapisnik proizlazi da je g. Davud Džoad Kathim bio u zabludi da su strane trupe u pitanju bile poljske, a ne holandske. G. Davud Džoad Kathim je izjavio za zapisnik da mu je prevodilac rekao da kaže da je sve hice ispalio IKCO, mada on, u stvari, nije video nijednog pripadnika IKCO-a da je ispalio ijedan hitac.

f.   Dodatni izveštaj, zapisnici iskaza koje su dali pripadnici IKCO-a 

  1. Nakon sto je Veće ustupilo nadležnost Velikom Veću, Država je predočila službeni zapisnik sledećih iskaza pripadnika IKCO-a. Sledi prevod sudskog tumača koji je kasnije podneo podnosilac predstavke: 

„Ime: A Sad Mosah
Broj oružja: GL 5574
Municija: 4 X 30 metaka
 „Tokom drugog incidenta ležao sam u položaju potpune preglednosti i obezbeđenja. Video sam automobil kako se kreće velikom brzinom iz pravca Ar Rumaithe prema kontrolnom punktu. Video sam kako je uleteo u dva bureta pored kontrolnog punkta i jednostavno nastavio da se kreće. Moj komandant [vodnik IKCO-a Husam Sad] je hodao napred zajedno sa prevodiocem i dva holandska vojnika i tada sam čuo veliki broj ispaljenih hitaca. Ja lično nisam ispalio nijedan. Ništa više od ovoga ne mogu da Vam kažem.“

Ime: Hajder Šarif [Haider Shareef]
Broj oružja: UE 0481 1984
Municija: 4 okvira sa ukupno 120 metaka
 „Ne mogu da Vam kažem ništa o prvom incidentu zato što sam u to vreme spavao u stražarskoj kućici.
Tokom drugog incidenta stajao sam pored kontrolnog punkta za vozila i video kako se jedan Mercedes Benz kreće prema kontrolnom punktu. Video sam kako je Mercedes Benz uleteo u dva bureta za naftu i nastavio da se kreće u pravcu Hamze. Čuo sam holandske vojnike kako viču stani, stani, a onda sam čuo pucnjavu. Ništa drugo nisam video jer sam stajao iza kućice na suprotnoj strani od stražarske kućice.“

PREVODILAC Ime: Valid Abd Al Husein Mađied
Datum rođenja: 25.10.1969, Kuvajt/Havali (Hawalli)
„Krenuli smo u 0:00 časova i bili smo u patrolnoj vožnji. Do 01:30 časova smo bili ovde i potom smo se odvezli na sledeći kontrolni punkt. Kad smo stigli tamo, komandir kontrolnog punkta je rekao da je došlo do pucnjave na prethodnom kontrolnom punktu. Čuo sam poručnika V. [verovatno poručnika A.] kako kaže da treba da uđem u auto i odvezli smo se nazad na kontrolni punkt. Kad smo stigli, pitali smo šta se dogodilo. Komandir kontrolnog punkta, vodnik IKCO-a Husam je rekao da se nakon našeg odlaska tamo zaustavio kamion i da je vozač kamiona rekao da se jedno vozilo marke Opel kretalo iza njih. Onda se Opel približio, napravio polukružno okretanje 100 metara pre kontrolnog punkta i ugasio svetla. Tada je iz tog vozila ispaljeno nekoliko hitaca na kontrolni punkt. Vodnik Husam Sad je otvorio vatru i ispraznio dva okvira od kojih je svaki imao po 30 metaka u pravcu pomenutog vozila. Njegovi ljudi su takođe otvorili vatru. Kada sam čuo ovaj izveštaj, otišao sam zajedno sa poručnikom V. da potražimo čaure od metaka. Prošli smo kontrolni punkt i tada sam čuo zvuk buradi koja padaju. Okrenuo sam se i video da je vozilo uletelo u burad i da se kretalo prema nama. Verujem da se vozilo nije kretalo brzo. Video sam da se vozilo zanosilo. Povikao sam glasno na arapskom stani, stani, stani, ali je vozilo nastavilo da se kreće. Čovek je delovao pijano i zatvorio je prozore. Nakon što je vozilo prošlo, čuo sam pucnjavu. Holandski vodnik mi je rekao da nađem zaklon. Taj holandski vodnik je potom viknuo glasno da se obustavi vatra. Ja sam, takođe, isto to vikao u pravcu ljudi iz IKCO-a. Holandski vojnik na drugoj strani puta je nastavio da puca. Nije prestao čak ni kada je holandski vodnik viknuo da se obustavi paljba. Kada se vozilo zaustavilo, pokušao sam da razgovaram sa ljudima u vozilu u skladu sa uputstvima holandskog vodnika. Rekao sam vozaču da iziđe i legne ne zemlju. On je to uradio. Kada sam se obratio suvozaču, čuo sam vozača kako kaže da je suvozač povređen. Tada smo otišli pravo do vozila i otvorili suvozačeva vrata. Video sam da je suvozačeva leva ruka krvava. Tada sam otišao do vozača koji mi je rekao da su pili i da nisi videli kontrolni punkt. Osetio sam da vozač smrdi na alkohol. Hici su i dalje bili ispaljivani dok se vozilo zaustavljalo, ali ne znam iz kog su pravca dolazili. Kada smo otišli da pokupimo čaure od prvog incidenta, svi su se udaljili od kontrolnog punkta, nikog nije bilo na putu i bilo je mračno. Nije bilo svetla koje bi ukazivalo na kontrolni punkt, što znači da nije bilo jasno da tamo kontrolni punkt uopšte postoji. Mislim da je čudno sto je pucano na vozilo zato što u tom trenutku nije bilo pucnjave. Mislim da je trebalo da ispale hitac upozorenja, vozilo bi se tada zaustavilo. Takođe mogu da Vam kažem da sam, tokom potrage za čaurama iz prvog incidenta, hodao istom stranom puta zajedno sa holandskim vodnikom i vodnikom IKCO-a. Holandski poručnik je išao drugom stranom. Ne znam koliko je još drugih ljudi tada išlo iza mene. Takođe mogu da Vam kažem da ne znam da li je pucano na kontrolni punkt iz vozila tokom drugog oružanog incidenta.

Na dan 21. aprila 2004. oko 05:15 časova saslušan je:
Ime: Husam Sad, lice o kome je reč je SGT [vodnik] i lokalni KDT [commandant, komandir] IKCO-a.
Broj oružja: 84MD5596, marka AK 47, a u vreme saslušanja nije bio napunjen.
Takođe je imao u posedu 2 puna okvira (2x30 metaka).
Jedan okvir je bio prazan.
„Kada sam stupio na dužnost imao sam 120 metaka u posedu. Oko 02:10 časova sam ispalio 60 metaka. U tom trenutku došao je jedan automobil iz pravca Al Hamze i zaustavio se ispred Saobraćajnog kontrolnog punkta. Tada su se svetla na vozilu ugasila i auto se okrenuo nazad u pravcu Al Hamze. Čuo sam pucnje i video vrhove cevi pušaka uperene iz automobila. Uzvratio sam paljbom iz mog AK 47. Moj položaj na početku oružanog incidenta je bio ispred stražarske kućice. Nakon pucnjave smo potrčali u pravcu vozila, zajedno sa trojicom kolega. Te kolege se zovu:
- Ala [Alla’a] Adnan
- Muhamed Hazem [Mohammad Khazem]
- Hamid Džaber [Hameed Jaber].
Ova trojica kolega su takođe pucala.
Oko 02:15 časova se ovaj auto iznenada odvezao.
Nakon ovoga smo odmah pozvali bazu. Poručnik A. stiže do nas oko 20 do 25 minuta kasnije. KDT, prevodilac, poručnik A. i još neko odlaze da potraže čaure. Tokom potrage se jedan automobil približio saobraćajnom kontrolnom punktu na glavnoj ruti snabdevanja “Džekson” iz pravca Rumaithaha a krećući se u pravcu Al Hamze.
KDT je bio na desnoj strani puta tražeći prazne čaure (posmatrano u smeru Al Hamze). Poručnik A. se nalazio na levoj strani puta tražeći prazne čaure (posmatrano u smeru Al Hamze).
Iznenada sam čuo zvuk kao da je automobil udario u burad na Saobraćajnom kontrolnom punktu. Video sam da je auto nastavio da vozi u pravcu Al Hamze.
Pokušali smo povicima da zaustavimo auto. Tada smo čuli pucnje. Čuo sam pucnje s leve strane puta (posmatrano u smeru Al Hamze). Koliko je meni poznato, iz Mercedesa nije pucano. Jedan vojnik holandske vojske je stajao na desnoj strani puta.
Ja lično nisam ispalio nijedan hitac u pravcu Mercedesa.“

Na dan 21. aprila oko 05:30 časova je saslušan:
Ime: Hamid Džaber [Hameed Jaber]
Broj oružja: 84MD0596
Municija: 1 okvir sa 15 metaka, 2 okvira, svaki sa po 30 metaka, 1 okvir sa 25 metaka
„U vreme drugog incidenta sam ležao iza stražarske kućice. Video sam i čuo automobil kako prilazi iz pravca Ar Rumajtaha. Vozilo je velikom brzinom prošlo kroz kontrolni punkt i udarilo u dva bureta. Tada sam čuo pucnje. Ne znam ništa drugo. Tokom prvog incidenta sam ispalio 15 metaka.“

Na dan 21. aprila 2004. oko 06:15 časova je saslušan:
Ime: Haider Mohsen
Broj oružja: GB 4140
Municija: 4 okvira, svaki sa po 30 metaka.
„Spavao sam tokom prvog incidenta. Nisam mogao da iziđem napolje zato što je pucano na stražarsku kućicu. Kada sam izišao napolje video sam auto kako odlazi u pravcu Al Hamze.
Tokom drugog incidenta sam video Mercedes kako prilazi. Stajao sam na KPV-u. Tada smo se nalazili u položaju potpune preglednosti i obezbeđenja. Čuo sam Mercedes kako je udario u burad za naftu i video kako se potom velikom brzinom odvezao u pravcu Al Hamze.
Čuo sam Holanđanina kako viče „stani“. Međutim, automobil se nije zaustavio.
Čuo sam pucnje. Čuo sam da je automobil stao. Čuo sam glasove iz radija u automobilu. Svirao je vrlo glasno. Ništa drugo nisam video.“

Na dan 21. aprila oko 06:00 časova su saslušani:
Ime: Ali Husein [Hussein]
Broj oružja: S41297 Municija:
3 okvira, svaki sa po 30 metaka,
1 okvir sa 26 metaka.
„Tokom drugog incidenta ležao sam u položaju potpune preglednosti i obezbeđenja. Video sam auto kako velikom brzinom prolazi kroz KPV u pravcu Al Hamze. Čuo sam holandskog vojnika kako viče „stani, stani“. Nisam želeo da pucam pošto su naši sopstveni ljudi hodali ispred KPV.
Tada sam čuo pucnjavu. Pucao sam 4 puta tokom prvog incidenta. Tada sam stajao ispred stražarske kućice.“

Na dan 21. aprila oko 05:45 časova saslušan je: Ime: Ahmed Galeb [Ghaleb]
Broj oružja: S54469
Municija: 4x30 metaka
 „Tokom prvog incidenta sam spavao u stražarskoj kućici. Nisam ispalio nijedan hitac tada. Tokom drugog incidenta sam ležao u položaju potpune preglednosti i obezbeđenja tik uz stražarsku kućicu. Čuo sam kako je automobil udario u dva bureta. Auto je nastavio da se kreće velikom brzinom (očigledno je ubrzavao). Onda sam začuo pucnje ispred KPV. Ništa drugo ne znam.“

Ime: Ala [Alâa] A Dnan
Broj oružja: 84 MD 0890
Municija: 3 okvira sa 30 metaka i 1 okvir sa 22 metaka
„Pucao sam tokom prvog incidenta. To su bili pucnji. [sic]
Tokom drugog incidenta sam se nalazio u položaju potpune preglednosti i obezbeđenja i ležao sam na levoj strani puta. Gledao sam u pravcu Hamze. Bio sam [sic] da je jedan auto dolazio iz pravca Ar Rumajte. Prošao je kroz saobraćajni kontrolni punkt i tako udario dva bureta. Nisam mogao da vidim šta se tada dogodilo, ali jesam čuo pucnje.“

Ime: Ilia MUHAMED HAZEM [MOHAMMED KHAZEM], kaplar 2. klase
Broj oružja: 84 MD 6151
Municija: 4 okvira sa ukupno 120 metaka
„Nisam ispalio nijedan hitac prošle noći zato što nisam dobio naređenje da pucam. Stajao sam pored saobraćajnog kontrolnog punkta okrenut u smeru Hamze. U jednom sam trenutku čuo kako automobil naleće na bure za naftu. Automobil je nastavio da se kreće u pravcu Hamze. Čuo sam Holanđane kako viču vozaču kola koja su prošla da stane. Onda sam čuo pucnje. Kada sam video da se Mercedes zaustavio, i ja sam potrčao u tom pravcu. Nisam mogao da vidim ko stoji sa leve i desne strane puta pošto je bio mrak.
Murtada Hazat [Khazaat]
Jaser Abd Alal [Yasser Abd Alaal]
Ahmed Šaker [Shaker]
Ali Husein [Hussein]
Pomenuti ljudi su došli u 4:10 časova.“

Ime: SAHIB DŽASIM [JASSIM]
Broj oružja: 84 MV 7435
Municija: 4 okvira sa ukupno 120 metaka
 „Tokom prvog incidenta sam stajao kraj saobraćajnog kontrolnog punkta. Video sam jedan kamion kako se kreće iz pravca Hamze prema kontrolnom punktu. Vozač je rekao da ga prati jedan automobil i pokazao je na taj auto. Vozač kamiona je rekao da je automobil marke Opel. U određenom trenutku je iz automobila ispaljeno mnogo hitaca. Moje kolege su na to reagovale i uzvratile paljbu. Onda smo se rasporedili u krug u kojem smo imali potpunu preglednost i obezbeđenje, nakon čega se automobil odvezao dalje.
Tokom drugog incidenta ležao sam na zemlji u položaj potpune preglednosti i obezbeđenja pored saobraćajnog kontrolnog punkta. Video sam automobil kako dolazi iz pravca Ar Rumajte. Auto se kretao velikom brzinom pa je naleteo na bure za naftu.
Auto je potom prošao pravo kroz saobraćajni punkt i čuo sam pucnje. Ne mogu da Vam kažem ništa više što bi dodatno objasnilo situaciju.“

3. Postupci pred domaćim sudovima 

  1. Na dan 8. januara 2007, pravna zastupnica podnosioca predstavke, gđa. Zehfeld, je na pisarnici Vojnog veća podnela zahtev javnom tužilaštvu pri regionalnom sudu u Arnhemu u ime najbližih srodnika g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda. Zahtevala je da bude obaveštena o ishodu istrage o njegovoj smrti i odlukama o gonjenju osumnjičenih ako ih ima, a u cilju pokretanja postupka shodno članu 12 Zakonika o krivičnom postupku (Wetboek van Strafvordering) (vidi dole).
  2. Javni tužilac je u odgovoru 11. januara 2007. naveo da je istraga zaključena 11. juna 2004; da je g. Azhar Sabah Džalud verovatno (vermoedelijk) pogođen iračkim metkom; da je holandski vojnik koji je takođe pucao na vozilo imao pravo da se pozove na samoodbranu; i da iz tog razloga nijedan pripadnik holandske vojske nije označen kao osumnjičeni.
  3. Na dan 1.februara 2007, gđa Zehfeld je poslala dopis javnom tužiocu, zahtevajući da se u spise predmeta uvrste, između ostalog, Pravila angažovanja i svi drugi izveštaji iz istraga koje su sprovele iračke vlasti.
  4. Javni tužilac je odgovorio 14.februara, odbijajući zahtev gđe Zehfeld. Pozivajući se na presudu Veća Suda u predmetu Ramsahai i drugi protiv Holandije, predstavka br. 52391/99, izrečenu 10. novembra 2005, naveo je da član 6 Konvencije nije primenjiv s obzirom na to da postupak shodno članu 12 Zakonika o krivičnom postupku ne obuhvata utvrđivanje „krivične optužbe“ te je postupak vezan za pristup spisima predmeta u takvim slučajevima drugačiji od onog koji se primenjuje u običnim krivičnim postupcima.
  5. Na dan 2. oktobra 2007, podnosilac predstavke, kog su zastupali njegovi pravni zastupnici gđa Zehfeld i g. Pestman, podneo je predlog za gonjenje poručnika A. Apelacionom sudu u Arnhemu shodno članu 12 Zakonika o krivičnom postupku. Tvrdio je da ništa ne potkrepljuje sugestiju da je g. Azhar Sabah Džalud ubijen iračkim metkom; da broj metaka koje je ispalio poručnik A. ukazuje na nesrazmerno nasilje, da poručnik A. nije ispalio hitac upozorenja i da nije poslušao naređenje vodnika Tojnisena da obustavi paljbu; da je, u skladu sa članom 50 Prvog dopunskog protokola uz Ženevske konvencije, g. Azhar Sabah Džalud imao biti smatran civilom u odsustvu bilo kakvih naznaka koje bi ukazivale na suprotno i da stoga nije smeo da bude izložen ciljanoj puščanoj paljbi; kao i da smrtonosna sila koju je poručnik A. upotrebio u svakom slučaju nije bila neophodna. On se takođe pozvao na iskaz koji je vozač automobila dao iračkoj policiji, da mu je rečeno da ćuti o učešću holandskog vojnog osoblja.
  6. Na dan 28. januara 2008, glavni državni tužilac (hoofdofficier van justitie) pri Regionalnom sudu u Arnhemu je uputio dopis glavnom pravobraniocu (hoofdadvocaat-generaal) Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu, s preporukom da se odbaci predlog podnosioca predstavke. Priložio je podrobni iskaz javnog tužioca koji je (jula 2004) doneo odluku da ne goni poručnika A. Po mišljenju javnog tužioca, premda se mora prihvatiti da je poručnik A. pucao na automobil, ne može se dokazati da je poručnik A. izazvao smrt g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda; štaviše, čak i da to jeste bio slučaj, poručnik A. je opravdano mogao da poveruje da je napadnut i da treba da se brani. Iskaz javnog tužioca takođe sadrži i sledeći pasus: 

„Na osnovu Rezolucije Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija br. 1483, Sjedinjenim

Državama i Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu su priznate posebne odgovornosti kao okupacionim silama. Međutim, za razliku od britanskih snaga, holandske nisu smatrane za okupacione sile u Iraku: Holandija SFIR smatra mirovnom operacijom (vredesoperatie). Vlada je zauzela stav da uloga holandskih oružanih snaga treba da ostane ograničena na podršku Britancima u oblasti u južnom Iraku koja im je dodeljena (Donji dom Parlamenta, 2002-34, br. 23432, br. 16). Ozakonjenje upotrebe funkcionalne sile od strane SFIR se ne nalazi u ius in bello, već u mandatu Saveta bezbednosti i Pravilima angažovanja (PA) zasnovanim na njemu, kao i u uputstvu holandskim vojnicima o upotrebi sile koje je na njima zasnovano. Shodno PA, sila se može upotrebiti protiv bilo kog lica koje potpada pod domašaj relevantnog pravila. Dakle, takva lica u određenim slučajevima mogu biti civili. To se takođe odnosi – što se odražava i u uputstvu o upotrebi sile – na suštinsko pravo na samoodbranu. Uputstvo i cilj vojnog starešine, posmatrani u vezi sa doživljenom pretnjom, su od odlučujućeg značaja u smislu da li će i na koji način vojnik iskoristiti svoja ovlašćenja da upotrebi silu.“ 

  1. Javni tužilac je zatim tvrdio da nije moguće utvrditi nikakvu povredu procesnog aspekta člana 2 Konvencije, pošto Konvencija nije bila obavezujuća za holandske trupe u Iraku: holandske trupe nisu vršile nikakvu efektivnu vlast u Iraku.
  2. Na dan 1. februara 2008, glavni pravobranilac Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu je podneo pisano mišljenje u kojem je izrazio načelni stav da je odluka da se ne preuzme gonjenje opravdana. Holandski pripadnik oružanih snaga ostaje u nadležnosti Holandije za krivična dela gde god se u svetu nalazio. Međutim, u Rezoluciji SB UN br. 1483 se sugeriše da države saradnice nisu imale status okupacionih sila, a oružani sukob je već bio okončan u vreme smrti g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda. Štaviše, čak i pod pretpostavkom da je u to vreme u Iraku postojao oružani sukob, s obzirom na okolnosti u kojima je došlo do incidenta, a koje nisu imale veze sa sukobom kao takvim, poručnik A. ne bi mogao biti gonjen shodno propisima o ratnim zločinima. Prema običnom krivičnom pravu, poručnik A. bi imao pravo da se pozove na samoodbranu. Međutim, holandska država bi se mogla naći u položaju u kojem bi novčana naknada ex gratia bila odgovarajuća čak i u odsustvu osuđujuće presude.
  3. Apelacioni sud je održao pretres 18.marta 2008. Pravna zastupnica podnosioca predstavke, gđa Zehfeld, je podnela zahtev za sprovođenje određenih istražnih radnji, uključujući i uvršćivanje u spise predmeta kopija, a, po potrebi, i prevoda Pravila angažovanja i relevantnih uputstava izdatih na osnovu njih; iračkog obdukcionog nalaza; iskaza g. Davuda Džoada Kathima iračkoj policiji; i saslušanje iračkog prevodioca g. Mađieda u vezi sa navodima g. Davuda Džoada Kathima da mu je taj prevodilac rekao da ćuti o umešanosti holandskih trupa. Ona je takođe izrazila sumnju u nalaz da su hice ispalili irački pripadnici i tvrdila da je poručnik A. prekoračio granice legitimne samoodbrane.
  4. Apelacioni sud je izrekao svoju odluku 7. aprila 2008. Odbio je da naloži dodatne istražne radnje, zauzevši stav da su takve radnje postale besmislene usled protoka vremena od incidenta. Odbio je da naloži gonjenje poručnika A. U obrazloženju je, između ostalog, naveo i sledeće:

„Opravdanost funkcionalne primene sile u oblasti koja je u pitanju nalazi se u Pravilima angažovanja (PA) i Uputstvima o upotrebi sile SFIR, revidiranoj verziji od 24. jula 2003, zasnovanim na tom dokumentu. Pravna zastupnica je od Apelacionog suda zatražila iza zatvorenih vrata da joj omogući uvid u PA. Ona, međutim, nisu priložena spisima predmeta, [a] nemaju ih ni Apelacioni sud ni pravobranilac. Test u ovom predmetu biće sproveden shodno Uputstvima o upotrebi sile SFIR. U ovom uputstvu je naznačeno da je primena sile dozvoljena, između ostalog, u samoodbrani i radi odbrane sopstvenih trupa i ostalih lica koja je odredio komandant MND (JI). U ovom uputstvu se u pogledu ciljane paljbe navodi da ciljana paljba može biti otvorena ako se [pripadnik SFIR lično], njegove trupe ili lica pod njegovom zaštitom nađu u opasnosti od nasilja koje može dovesti do teških telesnih povreda ili smrti a nema drugog načina da se to spreči. Primeri koji su navedeni obuhvataju slučajeve u kojima neko lice otvara vatru ili uperi oružje u lice o kom je reč, sopstvene trupe ili lica pod njegovom zaštitom i u kojima neko lice namerno usmerava vožnju automobila na lice o kom je reč, sopstvene trupe ili lica pod njegovom zaštitom.

Iz spisa proizlazi da je [poručnik A.], koji je istraživao tragove vezane za oružani incident koji se odigrao neposredno pre toga, a u kojem su bili ispaljeni hici iz jednog automobila, bio suočen na licu mesta sa automobilom koji se nije obazirao na KPV i koji se kretao u njegovom pravcu velikom brzinom. U tom trenutku su ispaljeni hici. [Poručnik A.] je pretpostavio da su hici ispaljeni iz automobila. Ova pretpostavka je potpuno razumljiva imajući u vidu činjenicu da se od [poručnika A.] nije tražilo da očekuje da hice u njegovom pravcu ispale njegove sopstvene ili prijateljske jedinice – prisutni holandski vojnici ili prisutni pripadnici IKCO-a. To što je pravna zastupnica tvrdila da su drugi koji su bili prisutni na licu mesta drugačije procenili situaciju nije od značaja. Uostalom, [poručnik A.] je bio u drugačijem položaju i nije posmatrao situaciju na isti način kao druga grupa na suprotnoj strani puta, koja je, štaviše, koristila i pojačivač slike. Niti je od značaja činjenica da je [poručnik A.] pucao u trenutku kada je automobil prošao, s obzirom na to da je neposredno pre toga pucano na položaj iz vozila koje se udaljavalo odatle a [poručnik A.] je, kao što je naveo, morao da uzme u obzir činjenicu da su na drugoj strani puta bile prijateljske trupe koje nije želeo da dovede u svoju liniju vatre. Pravna zastupnica je zatim ukazala na to da je [poručnik A.] mogao da ispali hitac upozorenja. Prema Uputstvu o upotrebi sile, hitac upozorenja se ispaljuje samo ukoliko operativni uslovi to dozvoljavaju a za tim nema potrebe ako je, na primer, oružanom napadu izloženo lice o kom je reč ili drugi u neposrednoj blizini.

Imajući u vidu gore navedeno, Apelacioni sud smatra da je [poručnik A.] mogao osnovano da poveruje da su on i njegove trupe bili pod paljbom i da je, na osnovu te pretpostavke, postupio u granicama važećeg Uputstva o upotrebi sile.

Apelacioni sud stoga smatra da je javni tužilac s pravom odbio da preuzme gonjenje.“

B.   Oružje korišćeno u incidentu

1.  Diemaco C7A1

  1. Pešadijska puška Diemaco C7A1 je standardno oružje holandske vojske. Kanadske proizvodnje, predstavlja razvijenu verziju poznatije američke puške Armalite AR-15/Colt M16. Omogućava automatsku i poluatomatsku paljbu. Standardni okviri koji se izdaju holandskim oružanim snagama sadrže do 30 metaka. U automatskom režimu paljbe ispaljuje 700940 metaka u minutu.
  2. Puška Diemaco, kao i AR-15/M16, ispaljuje metke kalibra 5,56x45 mm (ili 5,56 NATO). Kada metak pogodi telo velikom brzinom, on promeni pravac i često se rasprsne i prouzrokuje teška oštećenja tkiva.

2.  Kalašnjikov (Kalashnikov) AK-47

  1. Puška Kalašnjikov AK-47 je prvobitno konstruisana i proizvedena u Sovjetskom Savezu, ali se njene dvojnice proizvode u mnogim zemljama. Nekada glavno oružje pešadije Varšavskog pakta, AK-47 i njene dvojnice koriste vojske mnogih zemalja, uključujući lokalne snage u Iraku.
  2. Njenu municiju, metke kalibra 7,62x39 mm, kao i samu pušku AK-47, prave u velikim količinama mnogi proizvođači. Standardni metak ima značajnu probojnu moć; međutim, kada pogodi telo i pri tom ne prođe kroz njega, i on, takođe, može da promeni pravac i rasprsne se, stvarajući gotovo isti efekat kao i NATO metak kalibra 5,56 mm.

C.  Holandsko vojno prisustvo u Iraku

1. Opšti istorijat

  1. Holandske trupe jačine bataljona učestvovale su u Stabilizacionim snagama u Iraku (SFIR) od 23. jula 2003. do marta 2005. Bile su stacionirane u pokrajini Al-Muthana, u okviru Multinacionalne divizije za jugoistočnu zonu (MND-JI), koja se nalazila pod komandom jednog oficira oružanih snaga Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva.
  2. Učešće holandskih snaga u MND-JI uređeno je Sporazumom o razumevanju između Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva i Kraljevine Holandije, kojem su priložena Pravila angažovanja. Oba dokumenta su bila i ostala poverljiva.
  3. Holandsko vojno osoblje je dobilo promemoriju koju je sačinio Načelnik generalštaba (Chef Defensiestaf). To je bio referentni dokument u kojem su se nalazila i sažeta Pravila angažovanja. Dobili su i Uputstvo o upotrebi sile (Geweldsinstructie), koje je takođe sačinio Načelnik generalštaba.
  4. Što se tiče okupacije Iraka između 1.maja 2003. i 28. juna 2004, vidi, opšte uzev, presudu Velikog veća u predmetu Al-Skeini i drugi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, predstavka br. 55721/07, st. 9-19, izrečenu 7. jula 2011.

2. Dopis Donjem domu Parlamenta

  1. Na dan 6. juna 2003, ministar spoljnih poslova (Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken) i ministar odbrane (Minister van Defensie) uputili su zajednički dopis Donjem domu Parlamenta (Tweede Kamer der StatenGeneraal) o situaciji na Bliskom Istoku (Donji dom Parlamenta, parlamentarna godina 2002-03, br. 23.432, br.116), u kojem su konkretno obrazložili zašto je Vlada odlučila da pošalje holandske snage da učestvuju u SFIR-u i predočili osnovne podatke. U dopisu, između ostalog, stoji:

„Holandske jedinice će u skladu sa zahtevom Britanaca biti raspoređene u južnom Iraku, u pokrajini Al-Muthana....Ova pokrajina je u nadležnosti britanske divizije. Operativni lanac komandovanja stoga ide preko štaba britanske divizije, potom preko američkog štaba u Bagdadu do američke Centralne komande (CENTKOM) koja koordinira upravljanje vojskom.“

i

„Mandat/Pravni osnov

Osnov za slanje holandskih trupa u Irak se nalazi u Rezoluciji Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija br. 1483. Vlada smatra da odredbe ove rezolucije pružaju takav osnov. Rezolucija je eksplicitno zasnovana na Glavi VII Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija, a u rezoluciji se u prvom stavu pozivaju zemlje članice i organizacije da „pomognu narodu Iraka u njegovim naporima da reformiše svoje institucije, obnovi svoju zemlju i doprinese uslovima stabilnosti i bezbednosti u Iraku u skladu sa ovom rezolucijom“. Zemlje članice i međunarodne i regionalne organizacije su u pretposlednjem operativnom stavu Rezolucije br. 1483 pozvane da „doprinesu sprovođenju ove rezolucije“. U izveštaju sa sastanka Saveta bezbednosti na kojem je ova rezolucija usvojena potvrđuje se postojanje širokog konsenzusa u pogledu polazne tačke, po kojoj ova rezolucija predstavlja osnov za slanje trupa zemalja članica u Irak, u okvirima utvrđenim ovom rezolucijom.

U preambuli Rezolucije se jasno navodi da treba praviti razliku između Sjedinjenih Država i Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, koji su aktivni u Iraku u svojstvu (hoedanigheid) okupacionih sila, i država koje nemaju to svojstvo. Ovaj zaključak Saveta bezbednosti u rezoluciji usvojenoj shodno Glavi VII Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija mora se tumačiti kao merodavno mišljenje u pogledu statusa država učesnica, mišljenje koje je obavezujuće za države članice Ujedinjenih nacija.

U stavu 5 rezolucije se jasno apeluje na („pozivaju se“) sve zemlje na koje se odnosi (uključujući i zemlje koje nisu prisutne kao okupacione sile) „da se u potpunosti pridržavaju svojih obaveza iz međunarodnog prava, uključujući naročito Ženevske konvencije iz 1949. i Haški pravilnik iz 1907“. Holandija će se odazvati ovom pozivu.“

i

„Uticaj

Stabilizacione snage će se sastojati od koalicije zemalja učesnica koje će predvoditi Sjedinjene Države i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo. Važno je da i ostale zemlje koje daju trupe budu u dovoljnoj meri uključene u utvrđivanje opšte političko-vojne politike bezbednosnih snaga i razmenu podataka. Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo će u tu svrhu osnovati „Odbor učesnica“ za britanski sektor, koji će omogućiti bliske konsultacije državnih predstavnika, slično postupku koji su Britanci uspostavili za ISAF [tj. Međunarodne snage za bezbednosnu pomoć, raspoređene u Avganistanu] i koji sada takođe primenjuju Holandija i Nemačka za ISAF. Zemlje koje daju trupe će takođe biti uključene u upravljanje vojskom preko nacionalnih predstavnika u operativnom štabu.“

i

 „Uputstvo o upotrebi sile (Pravila angažovanja)

„Pravila angažovanja“ (PA) predstavljaju uputstva vojnim jedinicama u kojima su propisuju okolnosti, uslovi, stepen i modaliteti za dozvoljenu upotrebu sile. Njihov sadržaj se ne objavljuje. PA su sačinjena na osnovu vojno-operativnih aspekata i prava, uključujući humanitarno i ratno pravo, kao i političko/diplomatskih okolnosti. Ona se sačinjavaju u skladu sa NATO dokumentom u kojem su propisane smernice za PA.

Kao što je praksa u drugim mirovnim operacijama, predviđeno je da Holandija preuzima PA od „vodeće nacije“, u ovom slučaju Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva. Holandija može da unese izmene u uputstvo o upotrebi sile u skladu sa domaćim direktivama i interesima. Iako PA još uvek nisu završena, Vlada namerava da ona budu čvrsta, što podrazumeva, između ostalog, i šira ovlašćenja za „zaštitu snaga“ i stvaranje bezbednog i stabilnog okruženja. Na osnovu ovoga, Vlada pretpostavlja da će PA pružiti dovoljno mogućnosti za obavljanje zadataka čak i u slučaju neprijateljstava ili pobuna.

Komandna struktura

 Čitava operacija u Iraku je pod komandom CENTKOM SAD, u kojoj komandant Koalicionih kopnenih snaga (KKKS) rukovodi operacijama iz Bagdada. Irak je u tu svrhu podeljen na četiri sektora. Sektorima u severnom Iraku i oko Bagdada će rukovoditi Sjedinjene Države. Poljska je zadužena za jedan sektor a Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo za jug Iraka. Holandski bataljon će biti pod operativnom kontrolom britanske divizije kao nezavisna jedinica (zelfstandige eenheid). U okviru NATO podrške Poljskoj je odlučeno da nešto holandskog ljudstva bude raspoređeno u štab Poljske. Pored toga, poljski sektor se graniči sa američkim sektorom i prisustvo holandskog ljudstva će omogućiti bolju sveukupnu koordinaciju.

Uzgred (Overigens), Holandija će sve vreme zadržati „punu komandu“ („full command“) [engleski u originalu] nad holandskim vojnim osobljem. Načelnik Generalštaba će štititi mandat i vojni cilj holandskih trupa. On će po potrebi izdavati dodatne naloge u ime ministra odbrane.“

3. Prisustvo Kraljevske vojne policije u Iraku

  1. Jedinica Kraljevske vojne policije je bila pripojena holandskim snagama u Iraku. Podnosilac predstavke je naveo da su oni delili životni prostor sa redovnim trupama.

D.  Uputstva za holandsko osoblje SFIR

  1. Tužena Država je podnela verzije promemorije od 24. jula 2003. za komandante SFIR i džepnog izdanja Pravila angažovanja SFIR izdatog holandskom osoblju. Kao relevantno za slučaj pred Sudom navela je sledeće (prevod Suda, izrazi na engleskom koji su korišćeni u holandskom originalu su obeleženi kurzivom):

 1. Promemorija za zapovednike SFIR

 “Ovo uputstvo sadrži pojednostavljen izvod iz PA za MND (JI) namenjen oficirima i podoficirima, i holandskih ograničenja koja za njih važe. U slučaju nedoumice, konsultujte tekst Pravila angažovanja na engleskom jeziku i relevantne holandske izjave. PA i holandske izjave će imati prioritet na mestima gde se ovaj dokument razlikuje od PA i holandskih izjava.

MISIJA

1. Vaša misija je da doprinosite stvaranju sigurnog i stabilnog okruženja u Iraku koje će omogućiti obnovu zemlje i prelazak na predstavničku samoupravu. Upotreba strogo neophodne sile je dozvoljena pod dole propisanim uslovima.

OPŠTA PRAVILA

2. Upotreba sile je dozvoljena isključivo ako su ostala sredstva nedovoljna. Obratite pažnju na sledeće:

a) ni pod kakvim uslovima ne upotrebljavajte silu veću od one koja Vam je strogo neophodna kako biste ostvarili svoj zadatak;

b) kolateralna šteta (pričinjena ljudima ili stvarima) mora biti sprečena u najvećoj mogućoj meri.

SAMOODBRANA

3. Primena strogo neophodne sile, uključujući i silu koja može prouzrokovati smrt ili teška telesna oštećenja (smrtonosna sila) (deadly force) i koja uključuje upotrebu dozvoljenog oružja je dozvoljena da biste:

a) se odbranili;

b) sprečili krađu ili uništenje imovine koja pripada SFIR i koja je neophodna za obavljanje misije.

UPOTREBA SILE IZ DRUGIH RAZLOGA

4. Upotreba strogo neophodne sile, uključujući i silu koja može prouzrokovati smrt ili teška telesna oštećenja (smrtonosna sila) (deadly force) i koja uključuje upotrebu dozvoljenog oružja, osim u samoodbrani, dozvoljena je radi:

a) odbrane sopstvenih trupa i drugih lica koje označi komandant MND JI (označena lica [designated persons]);

b) sprečavanja krađe ili uništenja imovine koju označi komandant MND JI (označena imovina [designated property]);

c) sprečavanja neovlašćenog pristupa vojnim instalacijama koje pripadaju SFIR i drugim mestima koje označi komandant MND JI (uključujući označenu imovinu [designated property]) (na primer, zabranjenim vojnim zonama) (Military Restricted Areas);

d) lišenja slobode, pretresa i razoružavanja neprijateljskih jedinica ukoliko ugrožavaju bezbednost jedinica SFIR ili drugih lica koja označi komandant MND (JI) u obavljanju misije;

e) delovanja protiv neprijateljskih akata i neprijateljskih namera;

f) postupanja po naređenju Vašeg komandanta na terenu.

...

POSTUPAK UPOZORENJA

6. Ukoliko operativne okolnosti to dozvoljavaju, morate prethodno dati upozorenje da ćete otvoriti vatru. Neki primeri situacija u kojima je dozvoljeno otvoriti vatru bez upozorenja su:

a) ako ste Vi lično ili drugi u Vašoj neposrednoj blizini pod oružanim napadom; ili

b) ako biste davanjem upozorenja povećali opasnost da ćete Vi ili bilo ko biti ubijeni ili teško ranjeni.

7. Upozorenje izdajete uzvikom:

na engleskom:

„STABILIZACIONE SNAGE! STOJ ILI PUCAM!“

a potom, na lokalnom jeziku,

„OEGAF DFEE-SJ! AU-OEILLAARMIEBILLNAAR!“[2] (Stoj, vojska! Ili pucam!)

8. Ukoliko se ne postupi u skladu sa upozorenjem, možete ispaliti pucanj upozorenja po naređenju komandanta na terenu ili na osnovu postojećih standardnih operativnih postupaka.

NEPRIJATELJSKI AKT I NEPRIJATELJSKA NAMERA

9. Neprijateljski akt [hostile act] je agresivni čin koji predstavlja napad ili pretnju napadom uz upotrebu sile koji može dovesti do smrti ili teške povrede, a koji je uperen protiv Vaših trupa, označenih lica ili označene imovine. Slede primeri (spisak nije iscrpan) neprijateljskih akata:

a) lice puca na Vas, Vaše trupe ili označena lica ili označenu imovinu;

b) lice postavlja eksplozive ili zapaljive naprave ili ih baca na Vas, Vaše trupe ili označena lica ili označenu imovinu;

c) lice namerno vozi automobil na Vas, Vaše trupe ili označena lica ili označenu imovinu.

...

ZAHTEV VEZAN ZA UPOTREBU STROGO NEOPHODNE SILE

11. Kad god je upotreba sile dozvoljena, u obavezi ste da ograničite silu na onoliko koliko je zaista neophodno. Preduzmite sve moguće mere predostrožnosti kako biste sprečili eskalaciju i sveli kolateralnu štetu na minimum. Zabranjeno je napadati civile kao takve, izuzev u slučaju samoodbrane. Zabranjeno je napadati imovinu koja je po svojoj prirodi isključivo civilna ili verska, osim ukoliko se ne koristi u vojne svrhe.

12. Ako morate da otvorite vatru, u obavezi ste da:

a) otvarate samo ciljanu paljbu;

b) ne ispaljujete više hitaca nego što je neophodno; i

c) preduzmete sve neophodne mere predostrožnosti da sprečite kolateralnu štetu (pričinjenu ljudima i imovini); id) obustavite paljbu čim situacija to dozvoli. Potom morate da obezbedite područje i zbrinete ranjenike.

DRUGE KOMANDNE SMERNICE

...

18. Sprečite i prijavite po komandnoj liniji bilo kakvu sumnju na krivično delo suprotno humanitarnom ratnom pravu.“

 2. Džepno izdanje Pravila o angažovanju SFIR

„MISIJA

1. Vaša misija je da doprinosite stvaranju sigurnog i stabilnog okruženja u Iraku kako bi omogućili obnovu zemlje i prelazak na predstavničku samoupravu.

UPOTREBA SILE

2. Upotreba sile je dozvoljena u sledećim slučajevima:

a) u samoodbrani;

b) radi odbrane sopstvenih trupa i drugih lica koja označi komandant MND (JI)

c) radi sprečavanja krađe ili uništenja imovine koja pripada SFIR a koja je od suštinskog značaja za obavljanje misije i druge imovine koju označi komandant MND (JI);

d) radi sprečavanja neovlašćenog pristupa vojnim instalacijama koje pripadaju SFIR i drugim mestima koje označi komandant MND (JI) (uključujući označenu imovinu) (na primer zabranjenim vojnim zonama [Military Restricted Areas]);

e) radi lišenja slobode, pretresa i razoružavanja neprijateljskih jedinica ukoliko ugrožavaju bezbednost jedinica SFIR ili drugih lica koja označi komandant MND (JI) u obavljanju misije;

f) po naređenju Vašeg komandanta na terenu.

OPŠTA PRAVILA

3. Upotreba sile je dozvoljena isključivo ako su druga sredstva nedovoljna. Obratite pažnju na sledeće:

a) trudite se da izbegnete eskalaciju;

b) ni pod kakvim uslovima ne upotrebljavajte silu veću od one koja Vam je strogo neophodna kako biste ostvarili svoj zadatak;

c) kolateralna šteta (pričinjena ljudima ili stvarima) mora biti sprečena koliko god je moguće.

4. Lica koja napadnu Vas ili druge, ili koja neovlašćeno uđu u vojne instalacije SFIR ili druga mesta koja označi komandant MND (JI), mogu biti lišena slobode i podvrgnuta pretresu u cilju razoružavanja dok se ne utvrdi da više nemaju oružja kojima Vi ili drugi možete biti ubijeni ili ranjeni. Možete oduzeti opasne predmete i po potrebi ih onesposobiti – za trenutnu upotrebu – ukoliko ovi predmeti ugrožavaju lica, imovinu ili sprovođenje misije.

5. Čim sprovođenje misije to dozvoli, lica lišena slobode moraju biti predata nadležnim iračkim ili okupacionim (britanskim) vlastima.

6. Postupajte prema svakome humano.

7. Preuzmite i zbrinite ranjenike, bez obzira na frakciju kojoj pripadaju.

8. Nemojte sakupljati „ratne trofeje“.

9. Sprečite povrede humanitarnog ratnog prava i prijavite sve povrede ili sumnje na povrede svom komandantu.

10. Prijavite svaku upotrebu sile vašem komandantu.

UPOZORENJA I PUCNJI UPOZORENJA

11. Ukoliko situacija to dozvoljava, u obavezi ste da izdate upozorenje pre ispaljivanja ciljanih hitaca. Upozoravate da ćete pucati ako [lica kojima se obraćate] ne stanu ili ne obustave akt ugrožavanja. Upozorenje izdajete uzvikom: na engleskom:

„STABILIZACIONE SNAGE! STOJ ILI PUCAM!“

a potom, na lokalnom jeziku,

„OEGAF DFEE-SJ! AU-OE ILLA ARMIE BILL NAAR!“ (Stoj, vojska! Ili pucam!)

12. Ukoliko se ne postupi u skladu sa upozorenjem, možete da ispalite pucanj upozorenja po naređenju komandanta na terenu ili na osnovu naređenja koja ste dobili.

CILJANA PALJBA

13. Možete otvoriti paljbu ukoliko Vama, Vašim trupama ili licima pod Vašom zaštitom preti nasilje koje može izazvati teška telesna oštećenja ili smrt a nema drugih načina da se to spreči. Evo nekih primera:

-  možete pucati na lice koje puca ili je uperilo oružje u Vas, Vaše trupe ili lica pod Vašom zaštitom;

- možete pucati u lice koje postavlja eksplozive ili zapaljive naprave ili ih baca na Vas, Vaše trupe ili lica pod Vašom zaštitom ili se priprema da to učini;

- možete pucati na lice koje namerno vozi automobil na Vas, Vaše trupe ili lica pod Vašom zaštitom.

MINIMUM SILE

14. Ako morate da otvorite vatru, morate da:

- otvarate samo ciljanu paljbu;

- ne ispaljujete više hitaca nego što je neophodno; i

- obustavite paljbu čim situacija to dozvoli..

15. Zabranjena je namerna upotreba sile protiv civila, osim ukoliko to nije neophodno u samoodbrani.

16. Zabranjeno je napadati imovinu koja je po svojoj prirodi isključivo civilna ili verska, osim:

a) ako se ta imovina koristi u vojne svrhe; i

b) ako Vam Vaš komandant ne naredi.

17. Zabranjeno je simuliranje napada ili drugih agresivnih radnji.

18. Zabranjena je upotreba suzavca.“

E.  Kraljevska vojna policija

  1. Kraljevska vojna policija je ogranak oružanih snaga, u rangu Kraljevske mornarice (Koninklijke Marine), Kraljevske kopnene vojske (Koninklijke Landmacht) i Kraljevskog vazduhoplovstva (Koninklijke Luchtmacht). Njeni pripadnici imaju status vojnih lica i nose vojne činove. Ona ima sopstveni lanac komandovanja; njen komandant nosi čin generalpukovnika (luitenant-generaal) i neposredno odgovara ministru odbrane.
  2. Dužnosti Kraljevske vojne policije, koje su relevantne za ovaj predmet, obuhvataju „vršenje policijskih dužnosti za holandske i druge oružane snage, kao i za međunarodne vojne štabove i pripadnike tih oružanih snaga i štabova“ (član 6, st. 1, t. b Zakona o policiji (Politiewet 1993)).
  3. Pripadnici Kraljevske vojne policije prolaze i vojnu i policijsku obuku. Podoficiri koji imaju čin vodnika (wachtmeester) ili viši čin mogu biti imenovani za državnog službenika sa istražnim ovlašćenjima (opsporingsambtenaren), a određene kategorije oficira mogu biti imenovane za pomoćnike javnog tužioca (hulpofficieren van justitie).
  4. U svojstvu vojnih policajaca ili istražitelja vojne policije, pripadnici Kraljevske vojne policije su podređeni javnom tužiocu Regionalnog suda u Arnhemu.

F.   Vojno veće Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu. 

  1. U vreme o kojem se radi, članom 9 Zakonika o vojnom krivičnom postupku (Wet militaire strafrechtspraak) je bilo predviđeno da sudska veća Vojnog veća Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu čine dvoje sudija Apelacionog suda, od kojih jedan predsedava većem, i jedan vojni član. Vojni član treba da bude aktivni oficir sa činom kapetana (kapitein ter zee, Kraljevska mornarica), pukovnika (kolonel, Kraljevska kopnena vojska), pukovnika avijacije (kolonel, Kraljevsko vazduhoplovstvo) ili višim činom, koji je takođe kvalifikovan za sudijsku funkciju i koji se unapređuje u počasni čin komodora (commandeur, Kraljevska mornarica), brigadnog generala (brigadegeneraal, Kraljevska kopnena vojska) ili vazduhoplovnog komodora (commodore, Kraljevsko vazduhoplovstvo) ukoliko već nema taj čin. Nije mogao biti pripadnik Kraljevske vojne policije. Vojni član je bivao imenovan na period od četiri godine s pravom da jedanput bude ponovo izabran na isti period i morao je da se penzioniše kad navrši šezdeset godina (član 6, st. 4 Zakonika o vojnom krivičnom postupku).
  2. Shodno članu 68, st. 2 Zakona o pravosuđu (Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie), vojni članovi Vojnog veća Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu postupaju u svojstvu sudija ravnopravno sa kolegama civilima i na njih se odnose iste obaveze čuvanja tajne (članovi 7 i 13 tog Zakona) i nezavisnosti i nepristrasnosti u radu (član 12); njihovo profesionalno ponašanje podleže istom nadzoru kao i ponašanje njihovih kolega civila (članovi 13a-13g). Taj nadzor obuhvata postupak razmatranja konkretnog ponašanja od strane Vrhovnog suda (Hoge Raad), koji pred Vrhovnim sudom pokreće vrhovni državni pravobranilac (procureur-generaal) a na zahtev zainteresovane strane ili proprio motu.

G.  Relevantno domaće pravo i postupak

  1. Sledeće odredbe domaćeg prava su od značaja za ovaj predmet:

1. Ustav Kraljevine Holandije

Član 97

„1. Oružane snage brane i štite interese Kraljevine i održavaju i unapređuju međunarodni pravni poredak.

2. Vlada ima vrhovnu vlast nad oružanim snagama.“

2. Krivični zakonik (Wetboek van Strafrecht)

Član 41

„1.   Niko ne može biti kažnjen za delo izvršeno radi odbrane sopstvenog ili tuđeg fizičkog integriteta (liif), seksualnog integriteta (eerbaarheid) ili imovine od neposrednog protivpravnog napada.

2. Prekoračenje granica nužne samoodbrane nije kažnjivo ukoliko je prouzrokovano snažnom emocijom neposredno izazvanom napadom.“

Član 42

„Ko izvrši delo propisano zakonom ne podleže kazni za to delo.“

Član 43

„1.  Niko ne može biti kažnjen za delo izvršeno radi sprovođenja službenog naloga koji je izdao organ sa odgovarajućim ovlašćenjima.

2. Službeni nalog koji je izdao organ bez odgovarajućih ovlašćenja ne omogućava nekažnjivost, osim ako je podređeni u dobroj veri smatrao da mu je nalog izdao [organ koji je postupao u okviru svojih ovlašćenja] a njegov podređeni položaj mu je nalagao da po istom postupi.“

3. Vojni krivični zakonik (Wetboek van Militair Strafrecht)

Član 4

„Holandsko krivično pravo se primenjuje na vojno osoblje koje izvrši bilo koje kažnjivo delo van Holandije.“

Član 38

„1.  Kazni ne podleže niko ko izvrši delo dozvoljeno ratnim pravom u granicama svojih ovlašćenja i niko čijim bi kažnjavanjem bio povređen važeći ugovor između Holandije i sile sa kojom je Holandija u ratu ili propis usvojen u skladu sa takvim ugovorom.

2. Kazni ne podleže vojno lice koje upotrebi silu tokom zakonitog izvršenja zadatka a u skladu sa pravilima propisanim za taj zadatak.“

Član 73

„Izraz „rat“ u ovom zakoniku označava i oružani sukob koji se ne može smatrati ratom u pravom smislu te reči a u kojem Kraljevina učestvuje, bilo radi sopstvene ili kolektivne samoodbrane ili radi ponovnog uspostavljanja međunarodnog mira i stabilnosti.“

Član 135

„Izraz „službeno uputstvo“ (dienstvoorschrift) označava pisanu odluku opšteg sadržaja izdatu u obliku ili u skladu sa nalogom Krunskog saveta Kraljevini ili jednoj od zemalja Kraljevine[3] (bij of krachtens algemene maatregel van rijksbestuur of van bestuur dan wel een bij of krachtens landsverordening onderscheidenlijk landsbesluit gegeven schriftelijk besluit van algemene strekking) koja se odnosi na interese vojne službe bilo kakve prirode (enig militair dienstbelang) i koja sadrži naređenje ili zabranu upućenu vojnom osoblju.“

4. Zakon o vojnom krivičnom postupku (Wet Militaire Strafrechtspraak)

Član 1

„...

3. Odredbe Zakonika o krivičnom postupku se shodno primenjuju osim u slučajevima kada ovaj Zakon od njega odstupa.“

Član 8

„...

8. Za odlučivanje o žalbi na presudu na koju je dozvoljena žalba a koju je izreklo vojno veće Regionalnog suda iz člana 3 [tj. Regionalnog suda u Arnhemu] isključivu nadležnost ima veće sastavljeno od više sudija, pod nazivom Vojno veće, u okviru Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu. Ovo veće takođe odlučuje o žalbi shodno članu 12 Zakonika o krivičnom postupku.“

5. Zakonik o krivičnom postupku (Wetboek van Strafvordering)

Član 12

„1.   Kada javni tužilac nađe da nema osnova za gonjenje izvršioca kažnjivog dela ili odustane od gonjenja, svako ko ima neposredan interes (rechtstreeks belanghebbende) može podneti pisanu žalbu Apelacionom sudu u čijoj je nadležnosti doneta odluka da nema osnova za gonjenje ili da se odustane od gonjenja.

...“

Član 148

„1.  Javni tužilac je zadužen za istragu krivičnih dela izvršenih u području nadležnosti regionalnog suda za koji je imenovan, kao i za istragu u području nadležnosti tog regionalnog suda krivičnih dela izvršenih u području nadležnosti drugih regionalnih ili okružnih sudova.

2. U tom cilju izdaje naloge drugim licima zaduženim za [takvu] istragu... .“

H.  Relevantna nacionalna sudska praksa

1. Predmet Erik O.

  1. Dok je 27. decembra 2007. predvodio jednu jedinicu zaduženu za spasavanje sadržaja kontejnera koji je ležao duž rute „Džekson“, stariji vodnik (sergeant-majoor) Kraljevske mornarice (Korps Mariniers) Erik O. je ispalio pucanj upozorenja u zemlju kako bi odvratio grupu pljačkaša. Metak je rikošetirao od površine, smrtno ranivši jednog pljačkaša.
  2. Stariji vodnik O. je optužen za nepoštovanje službenih uputstava jer je navodno upotrebio silu koja je prevazilazila onu koja je dozvoljena promemorijom i Uputstvom o upotrebi sile, ili, alternativno, za nehatno lišenje života.
  3. Vojno veće Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu je starijeg vodnika O. oslobodilo krivice u postupku po žalbi tužilaštva na prvostepenu oslobađajuću presudu. U presudi izrečenoj 4. maja 2005, Landelijk Jurisprudentie Nummer (jedinstveni broj sudskog predmeta, u daljem tekstu: LJN) AT4988, zaključeno je da su Pravila angažovanja predstavljala službeno uputstvo uprkos njihovoj tajnosti. U presudi se zatim zaključuje da je stariji vodnik O. postupao u okvirima ograničenja Pravila angažovanja i da nije bio nehatan.

2. Predmeti Mustafić i Nuhanović 

  1. Bosna i Hercegovina je 1992. proglasila nezavisnost od Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije. Usledio je rat koji je trajao do decembra 1995. Savet bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija je Rezolucijom br. 743 (1992) usvojenom 21. februara 1992. osnovao Zaštitne snage Ujedinjenih nacija (UNPROFOR). Države koje su dale trupe za ove snage uključivale su i Holandiju, koja je dala bataljon vazdušno-desantne pešadije. Ovaj bataljon, poznat kao Holandski bataljon, bio je raspoređen kao mirovna snaga pod komandom Ujedinjenih nacija u i oko gradića Srebrenice u istočnoj Bosni, koji se tada nalazio pod upravom Vlade Republike Bosne i Hercegovine sa bošnjačkom većinom.
  2. Na dan 10. jula 1995, snage bosanskih Srba napale su srebreničku „bezbednu zonu“ sa nadmoćnim snagama. Zauzele su celu zonu i preuzele kontrolu nad njom uprkos prisustvu Holandskog bataljona, koji je na kraju kontrolisao samo bazu u selu Potočari. U danima koji su usledili, bošnjački muškarci koji su pali u ruke snagama bosanskih Srba su odvojeni od žena i dece i ubijeni. Danas je opšte prihvaćena činjenica da su snage bosanskih Srba i srpske paravojne snage ubile više od 7.000, možda čak i 8.000 bošnjačkih muškaraca i dečaka u onome što je u međuvremenu postalo poznato kao „srebrenički masakr“.
  3. Preživeli rođaci trojice muškaraca ubijenih u srebreničkom masakru jula 1995. podneli su holandskim sudovima građanske tužbe protiv Države Holandije.
  4. Podnosioci tužbe u prvom predmetu (Mustafić protiv Države Holandije) su preživeli rođaci električara koji je de facto bio službenik Holandskog bataljona, premda nije neposredno uživao status koji se dodeljuje zaposlenima u Ujedinjenim nacijama. Tvrdili su da je Država Holandija prekršila ugovor jer je zamenik komandanta Holandskog bataljona odbio da mu dozvoli da sa svojom porodicom ostane u bazi u Potočarima, usled čega je bio prinuđen da bazu napusti istog dana, iako je trebalo da ga zapovednici Holandskog bataljona zaštite tako što će ga zadržati u njoj i evakuisati ga sa samim Holandskim bataljonom. Alternativno, zahtevali su naknadu štete. Podnosilac tužbe u drugom predmetu (Nuhanović protiv države Holandije) je on lično, de facto službenik Holandskog bataljona, za koji je radio kao prevodilac, ali takođe bez statusa zaposlenog u Ujedinjenim nacijama; on je bio sin jednog od ubijenih u masakru, i brat drugog. Zahtevao je naknadu štete jer je zamenik komandanta Holandskog bataljona isterao ova dva čoveka iz baze.
  5. Vrhovni sud je 6. septembra 2013. izrekao presude u oba predmeta (LJN BZ9225, Nuhanović, i LJN BZ9228, Mustafić). Slede izvodi iz ove dve presude, koje su u svojim glavnim delovima identične a koje su relevantne za ovaj predmet pred Sudom (izvod iz presude Nuhanović u prevodu samog Vrhovnog suda):

„3.10.1.  U Delu 1 kasacione žalbe tvrdi se da je Apelacioni sud u stavovima 5.7 i 5.8 međupresude o pravnom osnovu tužbe propustio da prihvati da je kontingent trupa UN, koji je bio osnovan u skladu sa Glavom VII Povelje UN i bio stavljen pod komandu i kontrolu Ujedinjenih nacija – u ovom slučaju UNPROFOR, u čijem je sastavu bio Holandski bataljon – organ Ujedinjenih nacija. To znači da postupke ovakvog kontingenta trupa treba pripisati pozivanjem na član 6 DARIO [tj. Nacrta članova o odgovornosti međunarodnih organizacija Komisije za međunarodno pravo (Šezdeset treća sednica Komisije za međunarodno pravo, UN doc. A/66/10, koji će biti objavljen u Godišnjaku Komisije za međunarodno pravo, 2011, Tom. II, Drugi deo)] a ne pozivanjem na član 7 DARIO. Prema ovom delu žalbe, primena člana 6 DARIO znači da bi postupke Holandskog bataljona u načelu trebalo uvek pripisivati Ujedinjenim nacijama.

3.10.2. Iz Komentara o članu 7 DARIO je očigledno ... da se ovo pravilo o pripisivanju odnosi, između ostalog, na situaciju u kojoj Država stavlja trupe na raspolaganje Ujedinjenim nacijama u kontekstu mirovne misije UN-a, a komanda i kontrola su prebačeni na UN, dok Država koja je trupe stavila na raspolaganje zadržava disciplinska ovlašćenja i krivičnu nadležnost („organsku komandu“). U zaključcima Apelacionog suda se implicira da se ta situacija pojavljuje i u ovom predmetu. Na kraju krajeva, Apelacioni sud je tokom razmatranja pravnog osnova tužbe u stavu 5.10 međupresude zaključio – a to nije osporavano ni u kasacionoj žalbi – da nije sporno da je Holandija, kao Država koja daje trupe, zadržala kontrolu nad kadrovskim pitanjima vojnog osoblja o kom je reč, koji su i dalje bili u službi Holandije, kao i da je zadržala pravo da kazni to vojno osoblje u skladu sa disciplinskim i krivičnim propisima. Tvrdnja u delu 1 kasacione žalbe da Apelacioni sud nije primenio pravilo o pripisivanju iz člana 6 DARIO i da je umesto toga pogrešno primenio pravilo o pripisivanju iz člana 7 DARIO stoga nije održiva.

3.11.1.   U Delu 2 kasacione žalbe je iznet niz tvrdnji kojima se osporavaju zaključci o pravnom osnovu tužbe u stavovima 5.8 – 5.20 međupresude, u kojima je Apelacioni sud definisao kriterijum delotvorne kontrole nad primenom pravila o pripisivanju iz člana 7 DARIO u ovom predmetu.

3.11.2.  Tvrdnja izneta u ovoj žalbi, da međunarodno pravo isključuje mogućnost da postupci mogu biti pripisani i nekoj međunarodnoj organizaciji i Državi te da je stoga Apelacioni sud pogrešno pošao od pretpostavke da je postojala mogućnost da su i Ujedinjene nacije i Država imale delotvornu kontrolu nad spornim postupcima Holandskog bataljona, zasnovana je na pogrešnom tumačenju prava. Kao što je zaključeno gore u stavu 3.9.4, međunarodno pravo, naročito u članu 7 DARIO u sadejstvu sa članom 48, st. 1 DARIO, ne isključuje mogućnost dvojnog pripisivanja postupaka o kojima je reč.

Sledi da je Apelacioni sud mogao da ostavi otvorenim pitanje da li su Ujedinjene nacije imale delotvornu kontrolu nad postupcima Holandskog bataljona u rano veče 13. jula 1995. Čak i da je to bio slučaj, to ne mora neizostavno da znači da su Ujedinjene nacije snosile isključivu odgovornost.

3.11.3.  Tvrdnje iznete u kasacionoj žalbi, da je Apelacioni sud primenio pogrešan kriterijum prilikom ocene da li je Država imala delotvornu kontrolu nad Holandskim bataljonom u trenutku spornih postupaka, takođe su zasnovane na pogrešnom tumačenju prava. Za odlučivanje o tome da li je Država imala delotvornu kontrolu, nije neophodno da se Država davanjem uputstava Holandskom bataljonu suprotstavila komandnoj strukturi Ujedinjenih nacija ili da je nezavisno vršila operativnu komandu. Iz komentara na član 7 DARIO ... je očigledno da je pripisivanje postupaka Državi koja je dala trupe ili međunarodnoj organizaciji zasnovano na stvarnoj kontroli nad konkretnim postupcima, pri čemu moraju biti uzete u obzir sve stvarne okolnosti i poseban kontekst predmeta. Apelacioni sud je u zaključcima o pravnom osnovu tužbe koji se osporavaju razmatrao da li je Država imala stvarnu kontrolu nad spornim postupcima Holandskog bataljona u svetlu svih okolnosti kao i posebnog konteksta ovog predmeta. Dakle, Apelacioni sud nije pogrešno protumačio ili primenio pravo.“

 Stoga je Vrhovni sud zaključio da je presuda Apelacionog suda po kojoj je Država Holandija odgovorna za smrt tri čoveka održiva.

I.  Ostali nacionalni dokumenti

1. Izveštaj o oceni sprovođenja vojnog krivičnog postupka u operacijama u inostranstvu

  1. Ovaj izveštaj, datiran 31. avgusta 2006, je pripremio odbor koji su činili jedan državni funkcioner, bivši glavni pravobranilac pri Apelacionom sudu u Arnhemu i jedan sudija. Izveštaj je sačinjen po nalogu ministra odbrane a na zahtev Donjeg doma Parlamenta nakon uznemirenja koje je izazvao predmet Erik O. (vidi st. 67-69 gore u tekstu)
  2. Nadležnost u smislu člana 1 Konvencije bila je jedna od tema ovog izveštaja. U njemu se na tu temu (na str. 30) navodi:

„...Formalni ekstrateritorijalni efekat Konvencije izgleda da je ograničen na određene konkretne slučajeve. To ne menja činjenicu da su standardi koji proizlaze iz Konvencije od opšteg značaja za holandske vojne operacije u inostranstvu. Iz Konvencije naročito proizlaze važni osnovni standardi koji se mogu primenjivati na krivične istrage u vezi sa upotrebom sile kojom je prouzrokovana smrt ili ranjavanje.

...“

Sledi analiza domaće sudske prakse o materijalnim i procesnim aspektima člana 2 u svetlu prakse Suda.

  1. U Izveštaju se pominju izmene koje su već izvršene u politici gonjenja i načinu na koji se Pravila angažovanja i druga uputstva prenose komandantima na terenu posle presude u predmetu Erik O. U izveštaju se predlažu dalja usklađivanja.
  2. Potvrđene su kritike na račun nedovoljne pripremljenosti pripadnika Kraljevske vojne policije za policijski rad u stranim operativnim zonama, ali je do 2006. već „mnogo uloženo u poboljšanje kvaliteta rada vojne policije“ i još će toga biti učinjeno u mesecima koji slede.
  3. U izveštaju se u sličnom tonu navodi da Javnom tužilaštvu, koje čine pravnici civili, povremeno nedostaje „situaciona svest“. To je dovelo do ishitrenih odluka o gonjenju pripadnika vojske, pri čemu je predmet Erik O.naveden kao relevantni primer koji to ilustruje. Međutim, i ovde je, takođe, uočen napredak.
  4. Oružani incident koji je doveo do ove predstavke je pomenut među stvarnim predmetima koje je odbor proučavao, ali nije podrobno razmatrao.

2. Izveštaj Van den Bergovog odbora

  1. U odgovor na tvrdnje da su pripadnici holandske vojske zlostavljali pa čak i mučili iračke građane, ministar odbrane je naložio istragu zvaničnog odbora. Ovaj odbor su činili jedan bivši poslanik (njen predsednik, dr. J.T. van den Berg, po kom je odbor i dobio ime), jedan aktivni poslanik, jedan penzionisani general-pukovnik i jedan penzionisani kontra-admiral.
  2. Izveštaj sa nalazima odbora je objavljen juna 2007. U njemu se navodi da su prethodnu verziju izveštaja pročitala i komentarisala dva pravna stručnjaka, od kojih je jedan gđa Zehfeld, koja sada zastupa podnosioca predstavke.
  3. U izveštaju se pominju nesuglasice u okviru jedinice Kraljevske vojne policije za koju se, između ostalog, navodi da nije bila adekvatno obučena za sprovođenje krivičnih istraga na način na koji to čini policija, kao i tenzije između jedinice Kraljevske vojne policije i bataljona Kraljevske mornarice, prvih holandskih kontingenata poslatih u Irak (pre bataljona Kraljevske kopnene vojske koji je tamo bio stacioniran u vreme smrti g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda).
  4. U Izveštaju se takođe navodi da Holandija nije bila “okupaciona sila“ i da je iz tog razloga uvela određene klauzule; između ostalog, holandske trupe nisu bile ovlašćene da bilo koga interniraju ili gone za krivično delo. Svako koga bi holandske trupe uhapsile morao je da bude predat ili britanskoj vojsci ili iračkim vlastima, u zavisnosti od prirode dela za koje se sumnjiči. “Razgovori” sa tim uhapšenim licima bili su dozvoljeni u okviru konteksta zaštite snaga.
  5. Autori izveštaja su se bavili i pitanjem da li se za lica koja se nalaze izvan Kraljevine Holandije u području u kojem su holandske trupe aktivne u oružanom sukobu može reći da se nalaze u holandskoj nadležnosti. Odgovor na ovo pitanje bio je potvrdan.
  6. Ministar odbrane je ovaj izveštaj predstavio Donjem domu Parlamenta 18. juna 2007, uz propratni dopis u kojem je komentarisao neke od nalaza odbora ali i prihvatio njegove zaključke.

3. Konačni izveštaj o oceni

  1. Konačni izveštaj o oceni je objavljen nakon potpunog povlačenja poslednjeg holandskog kontingenta. U njemu se navodi da je holandska Vlada zadacima holandskih trupa dodala jedan broj „klauzula“ (ograničenja). Shodno tim „klauzulama“, Holandija neće preduzimati nikakve administrativne dužnosti i neće sprovoditi „aktivnosti vezane za razvoj rukovodilačkih kadrova sektora javne bezbednosti“. Rukovodila se željom da ne bude smatrana de facto okupacionom silom.
  2. Što se tiče izbora metoda, navodi se da je prvobitna namera bila da se ne naglašava vojno prisustvo i da se što više izbegava upotreba patrola i kontrolnih punktova. U praksi se, međutim, pokazalo da se bezbednost najbolje čuva upravo čestim patroliranjem, i danju i noću, i uspostavljanjem kontrolnih punktova za vozila na rutama koje bi mogli koristiti kriminalci ili teroristi.
  3. Na drugim mestima u izveštaju se navodi da je bilo više incidenata u kojima je pucano na holandske trupe, a veći broj njih se odigrao na kontrolnim punktovima za vozila. Nije utvrđeno da je izvršeno ijedno delo suprotno Pravilima angažovanja u slučajevima u kojima su Iračani poginuli ili bili ranjeni. Pominje se da je jedan Iračanin, kog su ranile holandske trupe, proveo nekoliko nedelja na lečenju u Holandiji.

J.  Relevantno međunarodno pravo

1. Haški pravilnik

  1. Definiciju okupacione sile i njene dužnosti od značaja za ovaj predmet je moguće pronaći prvenstveno u članovima 42 do 56 Pravilnika o zakonima i običajima rata na kopnu (usvojenom u Hagu, 18. oktobra 1907, u daljem tekstu „Haški pravilnik“).
  2. Slede članovi 42 i 43 Haškog pravilnika:

Član 42

„Teritorija se smatra okupiranom kad je de facto pod vlašću vlasti neprijateljske vojske. Okupacija se prostire samo na teritorije gde je ta vlast uspostavljena i može da se vrši.“

Član 43

„Pošto je vlast zakonite vlasti prešla u ruke okupatora, on je dužan da preduzme sve mere u svojoj moći da bi uspostavio i obezbedio, koliko god je to moguće, javni red i bezbednost, poštujući, izuzev apsolutne sprečenosti, zakone koji su na snazi u zemlji.“

2. Četvrta ženevska konvencija

  1. Članovima 27 do 34 i 47 do 78 Konvencije (IV) o zaštiti građanskih lica za vreme rata (usvojene u Ženevi, 12. avgusta 1949, u daljem tekstu „Četvrta ženevska konvencija“) podrobno se uređuju obaveze okupacione sile. Sledi tekst članova 6 i 29 Četvrte ženevske konvencije:

Član 6

„Ova Konvencija se primenjuje čim otpočne sukob ili okupacija pomenuti u članu 2.

Na teritoriji strana u sukobu, primena Konvencije prestaje opštim završetkom vojnih operacija.

Na okupiranoj teritoriji primena ove Konvencije prestaje godinu dana posle opšteg završetka vojnih operacija; ipak, okupaciona sila, ukoliko ona vrši funkciju vlasti na toj teritoriji, je za vreme trajanja okupacije vezana odredbama sledećih članova ove Konvencije: 1.do 12, 27, 29. do 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 do 77 i 143.“

Član 29

„Strana u sukobu u čijim se rukama možda nalaze zaštićena lica odgovorna je za postupanje svojih službenih lica prema njima, bez obzira na pojedinačnu odgovornost do koje može doći.“

3. Rezolucije Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija

  1. Savet bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija (u daljem tekstu: Savet bezbednosti) je usvojio Rezoluciju br. 1483 (2003) na svom 4761. sastanku 22. maja 2003. Slede izvodi iz te Rezolucije od značaja za ovaj predmet:

Savet bezbednosti,

Pozivajući se na sve svoje prethodno usvojene relevantne rezolucije,

Potvrđujući suverenitet i teritorijalni integritet Iraka,

...

Uzimajući u obzir dopis koji su 8. maja 2003. stalni predstavnici Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva Velike Britanije i Severne Irske pri Ujedinjenim nacijama uputili predsedniku Saveta bezbednosti (S/2003/538) i priznajući konkretna ovlašćenja, odgovornosti i obaveze shodno važećem međunarodnom pravu ovih država kao okupacionih sila pod objedinjenom komandom (u daljem tekstu: Uprava)

Uzimajući takođe u obzir da druge države koje nisu okupacione sile sada rade ili u budućnosti mogu raditi pod nadležnošću Uprave,

Pozdravljajući dalje spremnost država članica da doprinose stabilnosti i sigurnosti u Iraku dajući doprinos u ljudstvu, opremi i drugim resursima pod nadležnošću Uprave,

...

Postupajući u skladu sa Glavom VII Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija,

1. Apeluje na države članice i organizacije učesnice da pomognu narodu Iraka u njegovim naporima da reformiše svoje institucije, obnovi svoju zemlju i doprinese uslovima stabilnosti i bezbednosti u Iraku u skladu sa ovom rezolucijom;

2. Poziva države članice koje su u mogućnosti da odmah odgovore na humanitarne apele Ujedinjenih nacija i drugih međunarodnih organizacija za Irak i da pomognu u zadovoljavanju humanitarnih i ostalih potreba iračkog naroda obezbeđivanjem hrane, medicinskih zaliha i resursa neophodnih za obnovu i rehabilitaciju ekonomske infrastrukture Iraka;

...

4. Poziva Upravu da u skladu sa Poveljom Ujedinjenih nacija i drugim relevantnim međunarodnim pravom, unapređuje dobrobit iračkog naroda kroz delotvorno upravljanje teritorijom, uključujući naročito rad na obnavljanju uslova bezbednosti i stabilnosti i na stvaranju uslova u kojima irački narod može slobodno da odredi sopstvenu političku budućnost;

5. Poziva sve učesnike da se u potpunosti pridržavaju svojih obaveza iz međunarodnog prava, uključujući naročito Ženevske konvencije iz 1949. i Haški pravilnik iz 1907;

...

8. Traži od generalnog sekretara da imenuje specijalnog predstavnika za Irak čije će nezavisne obaveze obuhvatati redovno izveštavanje Saveta o svojim aktivnostima u skladu sa ovom rezolucijom, koordinaciju aktivnosti Ujedinjenih nacija u postkonfliktnim procesima u Iraku, koordinaciju između Ujedinjenih nacija i međunarodnih agencija angažovanih na pružanju humanitarne pomoći i aktivnostima vezanim za obnovu Iraka, i, u koordinaciji sa Upravom, na pomoći narodu Iraka putem:

a) koordinacije humanitarne pomoći i pomoći u obnovi koju pružaju agencije Ujedinjenih nacija i između agencija Ujedinjenih nacija i nevladinih organizacija;

b) unapređenja bezbednog, urednog i dobrovoljnog povratka izbeglica i raseljenih lica;

c) intenzivnog rada sa Upravom, narodom Iraka i ostalim učesnicima na pojačavanju napora na obnovi i uspostavljanju nacionalnih i lokalnih institucija za predstavničko upravljanje, uključujući zajednički rad na omogućavanju procesa koji vodi ka međunarodno priznatoj, predstavničkoj vlasti Iraka;

d) omogućavanja obnove ključne infrastrukture u saradnji sa drugim međunarodnim organizacijama;

e) unapređenja ekonomske obnove i uslova za održivi razvoj, uključujući putem koordinacije sa nacionalnim i regionalnim organizacijama, prema prilici, civilnim društvom, donatorima, i međunarodnim finansijskim institucijama;

f) podsticanja međunarodnih napora radi doprinosa osnovnim funkcijama civilne uprave;

g) unapređenja zaštite ljudskih prava;

h) podsticanja međunarodnih napora radi obnove kapaciteta iračke civilne policije; i

i) podsticanja međunarodnih napora za unapređenje pravne i pravosudne reforme;

9. Pruža podršku uspostavljanju privremene iračke uprave koju će formirati narod Iraka uz pomoć Uprave i u saradnji sa specijalnim predstavnikom, kao prelazne uprave kojom će rukovoditi Iračani, dok obaveze Uprave ne preuzme međunarodno priznata, predstavnička vlast, koju uspostavi narod Iraka;

...

26. Poziva države članice i međunarodne i regionalne organizacije da doprinesu sprovođenju ove rezolucije;

27. Odlučuje da i dalje radi na ovim pitanjima.“

      94.  Savet bezbednosti je na svom 4844. sastanku 16. oktobra 2003. usvojio Rezoluciju br. 1511 (2003). Slede izvodi iz ove Rezolucije koji su od značaja za ovaj predmet:

Savet bezbednosti,

Potvrđujući svoje prethodne rezolucije o Iraku, uključujući rezoluciju br. 1483 (2003) od 22. maja 2003. i br. 1500 (2003) od 14. avgusta 2003, i o pretnjama miru i bezbednosti izazvanih terorističkim aktima, uključujući rezoluciju br. 1373 (2001) od 28.septembra 2001. i druge relevantne rezolucije.

Naglašavajući da Država Irak ima suverenitet Iraka u Državi Irak, potvrđujući pravo iračkog naroda na slobodno određivanje sopstvene političke budućnosti i kontrolu sopstvenih prirodnih resursa, ponavljajući svoju odlučnost da dan kada će Iračani upravljati svojom zemljom mora doći brzo i priznajući značaj međunarodne podrške, naročito zemalja u regionu, suseda Iraka, i regionalnih organizacija u ekspeditivnom sprovođenju ovog procesa.

Priznajući da je međunarodna podrška obnovi uslova stabilnosti i bezbednosti od suštinskog značaja za dobrobit naroda Iraka kao i mogućnost svih učesnica da svoj posao obavljaju u korist naroda Iraka i pozdravljajući doprinos država članica u tom smislu u skladu sa rezolucijom br. 1483 (2003),

...

Postupajući u skladu sa Glavom VII Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija,

...

13. Utvrđuje da je obezbeđivanje bezbednosti i stabilnosti od suštinskog značaja za uspešno okončanje političkih procesa iz stava 7 gore u tekstu i za sposobnost Ujedinjenih nacija da delotvorno doprinose tom procesu i sprovođenju rezolucije br. 1483 (2003) i ovlašćuje multinacionalne snage pod objedinjenom komandom da preduzimaju sve neophodne mere kako bi doprinele očuvanju bezbednosti i stabilnosti u Iraku, i neophodnih uslova za sprovođenje rasporeda i programa, kao i da doprinose bezbednosti Misije Ujedinjenih nacija za pomoć Iraku, Vladajućeg veća Iraka i ostalih institucija iračke privremene uprave, i ključne humanitarne i ekonomske infrastrukture ;

14. Poziva države članice da multinacionalnim snagama iz stava 13 gore u tekstu daju doprinos u pomoći, uključujući i vojne snage;

...

16. Naglašava značaj uspostavljanja delotvorne iračke policije i bezbednosnih snaga za očuvanje zakona, reda i bezbednosti i borbu protiv terorizma u skladu sa stavom 4 rezolucije br. 1483 (2003) i poziva države članice i međunarodne i regionalne organizacije da doprinesu obuci i opremanju iračke policije i bezbednosnih snaga;

...

25. Zahteva da Sjedinjene Države u ime multinacionalnih snaga iz stava 13 gore u tekstu izveštavaju Savet bezbednosti o naporima i napretku ovih snaga po potrebi a najmanje jednom u šest meseci.

26. Odlučuje da i dalje radi na ovim pitanjima .“

4. Sudska praksa Međunarodnog suda pravde

a.   Pravne posledice podizanja zida na okupiranim palestinskim teritorijama

  1. U Pravnim posledicama podizanja zida na okupiranim palestinskim teritorijama, Savetodavno mišljenje, Izveštaji MSP 2004, str. 136, [Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 2004, p. 136], Međunarodni sud pravde (u daljem tekstu: MSP) je zauzeo sledeća stanovišta: 

„109.   MSP bi napomenuo da, premda je nadležnost država prvenstveno teritorijalna, one je ponekad mogu vršiti i izvan svoje nacionalne teritorije. S obzirom na cilj i svrhu Međunarodnog pakta o građanskim i političkim pravima, čini se prirodnim da čak i u tim slučajevima države ugovornice Pakta treba da budu obavezne da se pridržavaju njegovih odredaba.

Komitet za ljudska prava se u svojoj praksi dosledno pridržava tog stava. Komitet stoga nalazi da je Pakt primenjiv i kada država vrši nadležnost na stranoj teritoriji. On je odlučivao o zakonitosti postupanja Urugvaja u slučajevima hapšenja koje su izvršili urugvajski agenti u Brazilu ili Argentini (predmet br.  52/79, López Burgos protiv Urugvaja); predmet br. 56/79 Lilian Čeliberti de Kasariego protiv Urugvaja [Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay]). Istu je odluku doneo i u predmetu koji se odnosio na oduzimanje pasoša od strane urugvajskog konzulata u Nemačkoj (predmet br. 106181, Montero protiv Urugvaja).

U pripremnim radovima na Paktu se potvrđuje tumačenje člana 2 tog instrumenta koje je dao Komitet. Oni ukazuju na to da autori Pakta prilikom izbora formulacija nisu imali nameru da dozvole državama da izbegavaju svoje obaveze kada vrše nadležnost izvan svoje nacionalne teritorije. Oni su samo nameravali da spreče lica koja borave u inostranstvu da se pozivaju u svojim državama porekla na prava koja ne potpadaju pod nadležnost tih država, već pod nadležnost država u kojima borave (vidi diskusiju o preliminarnom nacrtu u dokumentu Komisije za ljuska prava, E/CN.4/SR.194, stav 46; i Zvanični zapisnik sa desete sednice Generalne skupštine Ujedinjenih nacija, Aneksi, Al2929, Deo II, Poglavlje V, stav 4 (1995)).

110. MSP s tim u vezi prima k znanju stav koji je zauzeo Izrael u vezi sa primenljivošću Pakta u saopštenjima upućenim Komitetu za ljudska prava i stanovište Komiteta.

Izrael je 1998. izjavio da je prilikom pripreme svog izveštaja za Komitet morao da se suoči sa sledećim pitanjem: „da li su pojedinci koji žive na okupiranim teritorijama zaista pod nadležnošću Izraela“ u svrhu primene Pakta (CCPR/C/SR. 1675, stav 21). Izrael je zauzeo stav da „Pakt i slični instrumenti nisu neposredno primenjivi na trenutnu situaciju na okupiranim teritorijama“ (ibid, stav 27).

Komitet je u svojim zaključnim napomenama nakon razmatranja izveštaja, izrazio zabrinutost zbog stava Izraela i ukazao „na dugogodišnje prisustvo Izraela na [okupiranim] teritorijama, na dvosmislen stav Izraela prema njihovom budućem statusu, kao i prema vršenju delotvorne nadležnosti od strane izraelskih snaga bezbednosti na njima“ (CCPR/C/79/Add.93, stav 10). Uprkos doslednom stavu Izraela u smislu da „Pakt ne važi izvan sopstvene teritorije, naročito na Zapadnoj obali i Gazi...“, Komitet je 2003. doneo sledeći zaključak:

 „u trenutnim okolnostima, odredbe Pakta se primenjuju u korist stanovništva okupiranih teritorija, u pogledu svih postupaka vlasti ili službenih lica države ugovornice na tim teritorijama koji utiču na uživanje prava zajemčenih Paktom i potpadaju pod opseg državne odgovornosti Izraela shodno načelima javnog međunarodnog prava“ (CCPR/C0/78/1SR, stav 11).

111. MSP zaključuje da Međunarodni pakt o građanskim i političkim pravima važi u pogledu postupaka neke države tokom vršenja nadležnosti izvan svoje sopstvene teritorije.“

b.   Oružane aktivnosti na teritoriji Konga (Demokratska Republika Kongo protiv Ugande)

96. U Oružanim aktivnostima na teritoriji Konga (Demokratska Republika Kongo protiv Ugande), Presuda, Izveštaji MSP 2005, str. 168, Međunarodni sud pravde je zaključio sledeće:

„172.   MSP primećuje da se, prema običajnom međunarodnom pravu, koje se ogleda u članu 42 Haškog pravilnika iz 1907, neka teritorija smatra okupiranom kad je stvarno pod vlašću neprijateljske vojske a okupacija se prostire samo na teritorije gde je ta vlast uspostavljena i može da se vrši (vidi Pravne posledice podizanja zida na okupiranim palestinskim teritorijama, Savetodavno mišljenje, Izveštaji MSP 2004, str.167, stav 78 i str.172, stav 89).

173. U cilju donošenja zaključka da li država čije su vojne snage prisutne na teritoriji druge države kao rezultat intervencije predstavlja, „okupacionu silu“ u značenju u kojem je taj izraz shvaćen u jus in bello, MSP mora da razmotri postoji li dovoljno dokaza koji potvrđuju da je pomenuta vlast zapravo uspostavljena i da li je vrši država koja interveniše u područjima o kojima je reč. U ovom slučaju MSP će morati da se uveri da oružane snage Ugande u DRK nisu bile samo postavljene na određenim lokacijama, već su Vladu Konga zamenile sopstvenom vlašću. U tom slučaju, nijedno opravdanje Ugande za okupaciju ne bi bilo ni od kakvog značaja; niti bi bilo od značaja da li je Uganda uspostavila strukturiranu vojnu upravu nad okupiranom teritorijom.“

i

„179.  Zaključivši da je Uganda bila okupaciona sila u regionu Ituri u vreme događaja, MSP utvrđuje da je Uganda odgovorna kako za sve akte njene vojske suprotne njenim međunarodnim obavezama, tako i za svaki nedostatak budnosti radi sprečavanja povreda ljudskih prava i međunarodnog humanitarnog prava koje su izvršili drugi akteri prisutni na okupiranoj teritoriji, uključujući pobunjeničke grupe koje su delovale za sopstveni račun.

180. MSP ističe da Uganda u svakom trenutku snosi odgovornost za sve činjenje i nečinjenje njenih vojnih snaga na teritoriji DRK suprotno njenim obavezama shodno pravilima međunarodnog prava ljudskih prava i međunarodnog humanitarnog prava, koja su relevantna i primenjiva u konkretnoj situaciji.“

i

„213.  MSP sada prelazi na pitanje da li činjenje i nečinjenje UPDF [Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (Narodnih odbrambenih snaga Ugande)] i njenih oficira i vojnika može biti pripisano Ugandi. Postupci UPDF u celini se jasno mogu pripisati Ugandi, s obzirom na to da su u pitanju postupci državnog organa. Prema ustaljenom pravilu međunarodnog prava, koje je običajnog karaktera, „postupak svakog državnog organa mora biti smatran postupkom te države“ (Razlika koja se odnosi na imunitet od pravnog postupka specijalnog izvestioca Komisije za ljudska prava [Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights], Savetodavno mišljenje, Izveštaji MSP 1999 (I), str. 87, stav 62), Postupke pojedinih vojnika i oficira UPDF treba smatrati postupcima državnog organa. Po mišljenju MSP, postupci vojnika Ugande u DRK se mogu pripisati Ugandi zbog njihovog vojnog statusa i funkcije. Tvrdnja da lica o kojima je reč nisu delovala u svojstvu lica koja vrše državnu vlast u konkretnim okolnostima je stoga neosnovana.

214. Štaviše, za pripisivanje postupaka osoblja UPDF Ugandi je nebitno da li je ono postupalo suprotno datim uputstvima ili je prekoračilo svoja ovlašćenja. Prema ustaljenom pravilu, koje je po svojoj prirodi običajno a ogleda se u članu 3 Četvrte haške konvencije o zakonima i običajima rata na kopnu iz 1907. kao i u članu 91 Dopunskog protokola br. 1 uz Ženevske konvencije iz 1949, zaraćena strana je odgovorna za sva dela koja izvrše lica koja pripadaju njenim oružanim snagama.“

c.   Primena Konvencije o sprečavanju i kažnjavanju zločina genocida (Bosna i Hercegovina protiv Srbije i Crne Gore)

97. U Primeni Konvencije o sprečavanju i kažnjavanju zločina genocida (Bosna i Hercegovina protiv Srbije i Crne Gore), Presuda, Izveštaji MSP 2007, str.43, Međunarodni sud pravde je zauzeo sledeći stav:

„399.   Ova odredba [tj. član 8 Članova o odgovornosti država Komisije za međunarodno pravo] mora biti tumačena u svetlu jurisprudencije ovog Suda o ovoj temi, naročito njegove Presude iz 1986. u predmetu Vojne i paravojne aktivnosti u i protiv Nikaragve (Nikaragva protiv Sjedinjenih Američkih Država) o kojoj je bilo reči (u stavu 391). MSP je u toj presudi, kao što je gore navedeno, prvo odbacio argumente da kontraše treba izjednačiti sa organima Sjedinjenih Država zato što su bili „potpuno zavisni“ od njih i dodao da je odgovornost tužene strane i dalje mogla postojati ukoliko je dokazano da je ona sama „naložila ili sprovela izvršenje dela u suprotnosti sa ljudskim pravima i humanitarnim pravom kako je tvrdila država koja je podnela tužbu“ (Izveštaji MSP 1986, str.64, para. 115); što ga je navelo na sledeći značajni zaključak:

 „Da bi ovi postupci doveli do pozivanja Sjedinjenih Država na pravnu odgovornost, moralo bi se u načelu dokazati da je ta država imala delotvornu kontrolu nad vojnim i paravojnim operacijama u vreme kada su izvršene navodne povrede.“ (Ibid, str. 65)

400. Ovako formulisan test razlikuje se u dva pogleda od gore opisanog testa kojim se utvrđuje da li se neko lice ili subjekat može izjednačiti sa državnim organom čak i ako nema takav status po domaćem pravu. Prvo, u ovom kontekstu nije neophodno pokazati da su lica koja su izvršila akte za koje se tvrdi da su suprotni međunarodnom pravu bila, opšte uzev, u odnosu „potpune zavisnosti“ od tužene države; potrebno je dokazati da su postupali u skladu sa uputstvima države ili pod njenom „delotvornom kontrolom“. Mora se, međutim, dokazati da je ova „delotvorna kontrola“ vršena, ili da je država davala uputstva u pogledu svake operacije tokom koje je došlo da navodne povrede, a ne uopšteno, u pogledu sveukupnih radnji koje su preduzela lica ili grupe lica koja su izvršile povrede.“

i

„406. Mora se takođe napomenuti da test „sveukupne kontrole“ ima veliki nedostatak jer proširuje opseg državne odgovornosti daleko izvan osnovnog načela prava o međunarodnoj odgovornosti: država je odgovorna samo za svoje sopstvene postupke, odnosno za postupke lica koja deluju u njeno ime po bilo kom osnovu. To se odnosi na akte koje su izvršili njeni zvanični organi, kao i lica ili subjekti koji nisu formalno priznati kao zvanični organi po domaćem pravu, ali koji se uprkos tome moraju izjednačiti sa državnim organima zato što su potpuno zavisni od države. Osim u ovim slučajevima, odgovornost države postoji i u postupcima lica ili grupa lica – koji nisu državni organ niti sa njima mogu biti poistovećeni – samo ako ta dela, pod pretpostavkom da su protivna međunarodnom pravu, mogu biti pripisana njoj po međunarodnom običajnom pravu, kao što se ogleda u navedenom članu 8 [tj. članu 8 Članova o odgovornosti država Komisije za međunarodno pravo]. To je slučaj kada je organ države dao uputstva ili nalog u skladu sa kojima su izvršioci protivpravnog akta postupali ili kada je vršio delotvornu kontrolu nad radnjom tokom koje je protivpravni akt izvršen. U tom smislu, test „sveukupne kontrole“ nije prikladan jer isuviše, skoro do tačke pucanja, rasteže vezu koja mora da postoji između postupaka organa neke države i njene međunarodne odgovornosti.“

5. Članovi o odgovornosti država Komisije za međunarodno pravo

  1. Komisija za međunarodno pravo je na svojoj 53. sednici 2001. godine usvojila Članove o odgovornosti država sa komentarima i podnela ih Generalnoj skupštini Ujedinjenih nacija u okviru izveštaja Komisije za međunarodno pravo o radu na toj sednici (A/56/10). Izveštaj se pojavio u Godišnjaku Komisije za međunarodno pravo, 2001, Tom II, Drugi deo. Sledi prikaz članova i komentara na njih (usvojenih zajedno sa samim članovima) od značaja za ovaj predmet (fusnote su izostavljene):

Član 2  Elementi međunarodno protivpravnih akata države

  „Akt države protivan međunarodnom pravu postoji kada neka radnja, koja se sastoji od činjenja ili nečinjenja:

a) može da se pripiše toj državi po međunarodnom pravu; i

b) predstavlja kršenje međunarodne obaveze te države.“

Komentar ovog člana obuhvata i sledeći tekst:

„(5)  Da bi se konkretan postupak okarakterisao kao akt protivan međunarodnom pravu, on prvo mora biti pripisiv državi. Država predstavlja stvaran, organizovan subjekat, pravno lice sa punom nadležnošću da postupa po međunarodnom pravu. Ali ovo priznanje ne negira osnovnu činjenicu da država ne može sama od sebe da deluje. „Akt države“ mora da obuhvata neko činjenje ili nečinjenje ljudskog bića ili grupe: „Države mogu da deluju samo posredstvom i preko svojih službenih lica ili predstavnika.“ Postavlja se pitanje koja lica treba smatrati licima koja deluju u ime države, tj. šta predstavlja „akt države“ u smislu državne odgovornosti.

(6) Kada se govori o pripisivanju državi, to znači da je država subjekat međunarodnog prava. Shodno mnogim pravnim sistemima, državne organe čine različita pravna lica (ministarstva ili drugi pravni subjekti), za koje se smatra da imaju distinktna prava i obaveze za koje samo ona mogu biti tužena i za koje su odgovorna. Ta je pozicija drugačija u smislu međunarodnog prava o odgovornosti država. Država se tretira kao celina, u skladu sa njenim priznanjem kao jednog pravnog lica po međunarodnom pravu. U ovom, kao i u drugim pogledima, pripisivanje akta državi je nužno normativna radnja. Od presudnog je značaja to što je dati događaj u dovoljnoj meri povezan sa postupkom (bilo činjenjem ili nečinjenjem) koji se može pripisati državi shodno nekom od pravila iz poglavlja II.

(7) Drugi uslov za postojanje akta države protivnog međunarodnom pravu je da akt koji je pripisiv državi predstavlja povredu međunarodne obaveze te države...

(12) Izraz „pripisivanje“ u tački (a) označava radnju pripisivanja određenog činjenja ili nečinjenja državi. Izraz „imputiranje“ se takođe koristi u međunarodnoj praksi i sudskim odlukama. Međutim, izrazom „pripisivanje“ se izbegava svaki nagoveštaj da je pravni proces povezivanja postupka sa državom fiktivan ili da je postupak o kojem je reč „u stvari“ postupak nekog drugog.

(13)  U tački (b) se pominje kršenje međunarodne obaveze a ne pravila ili norme međunarodnog prava. U tom smislu nije od značaja samo postojanje pravila već i njegova primena na odgovornu državu u konkretnom slučaju. Izraz „obaveza“ se obično koristi u međunarodnim sudskim odlukama i praksi kako bi obuhvatila sve mogućnosti. Pominjanje „obaveze“ je ograničeno na obavezu shodno međunarodnom pravu a ovo pitanje se dodatno razjašnjava u članu 3.“

Član 6  Postupak organa koje državi na raspolaganje stavila druga država

„Zvanični zapisnik skupštine, 56. sednica, Dodatak br. 10 (A/56/10): Postupak organa kojeg je nekoj državi stavila na raspolaganje druga država smatraće se aktom prve države po međunarodnom pravu, ako taj organ postupa prilikom vršenja elemenata državne vlasti države kojoj je stavljen na raspolaganje.“

Komentar ovog člana sadrži i sledeći tekst:

„(2) Reči „stavila na raspolaganje“ u članu 6 odražavaju osnovni uslov koji mora biti ispunjen da bi se postupak organa shodno međunarodnom pravu smatrao aktom države prijema a ne države slanja. Pojam organa koji je „stavljen na raspolaganje“ državi prijema je poseban, a podrazumeva da taj organ postupa uz odobrenje, pod nadležnošću i radi ostvarenja ciljeva države prijema. Taj organ ne samo da mora da bude imenovan da vrši funkcije koje pripadaju državi kojoj je stavljen na raspolaganje već tokom vršenja funkcija koje mu je država korisnica poverila mora i da postupa u skladu sa mašinerijom te države i pod njenim isključivim rukovodstvom i kontrolom a ne u skladu sa uputstvima države slanja. Dakle, član 6 se ne bavi običnim situacijama međudržavne saradnje ili kolaboracije u skladu sa ugovorom ili nečim drugim.

(3) Primeri situacija koje bi mogle potpasti pod ovaj ograničeni pojam državnog organa koji je jedna država drugoj „stavila na raspolaganje“ bi mogli obuhvatati deo zdravstvene službe ili neke druge jedinice koja je upućena da izvršava naređenja druge zemlje da bi pomogla u borbi protiv epidemije ili prirodne katastrofe, ili sudije imenovane da u određenim predmetima vrše funkciju sudskih organa druge države. S druge strane, član 6 se ne odnosi na puku pomoć koju organi jedne države nude drugoj na teritoriji ove druge. Na primer, jedna država može drugoj poslati svoje oružane snage kako bi joj one pomogle u ostvarenju prava na kolektivnu samoodbranu ili iz drugih razloga. Kada snage o kojima je reč ostaju pod nadležnošću vlasti države slanja, one vrše elemente državne vlasti te države a ne države prijema. Mogu se takođe pojaviti situacije u kojima organ jedne države postupa u skladu sa zajedničkim uputstvima sopstvene i druge države, ili može postojati jedan subjekat koji predstavlja zajednički organ nekoliko država. U tim slučajevima, postupak o kojem je reč se može pripisati obema državama shodno drugim članovima u ovom poglavlju.

(4) Stoga je uspostavljanje funkcionalne veze između organa o kojem je reč i strukture ili vlasti države prijema od ključnog značaja u smislu člana 6. Pojam organa koji je jedna država drugoj „stavila na raspolaganje“ isključuje slučajeve kada su državni organi poslati u drugu državu radi ostvarenja ciljeva prve države ili čak i zajedničkih ciljeva, pri čemu oni zadržavaju sopstvenu samostalnost i status: na primer, kulturni centri, diplomatske ili konzularne misije, strane organizacije koje pružaju humanitarnu ili drugu pomoć. Iz polja dejstva člana 6 su takođe isključene situacije u kojima se funkcije države „korisnice“ vrše bez njene saglasnosti, recimo, kada je neka država, koja je dovedena u položaj zavisnosti, čija je teritorija okupirana ili slično, prinuđena da se odrekne delovanja njenih sopstvenih organa i da dozvoli da umesto njih u većoj ili manjoj meri deluju organi druge države.

(5) Postoje još dva kriterijuma koji moraju biti ispunjena da bi se mogao primeniti član 6. Prvo, organ o kojem je reč mora da ima status organa države slanja; i drugo, njegovi postupci moraju obuhvatati vršenje elemenata državne vlasti države prijema. Ovaj prvi uslov iz polja dejstva člana 6 isključuje postupke privatnih subjekata ili pojedinaca koji nikada nisu imali status organa države slanja. Na primer, stručnjaci ili savetnici stavljeni nekoj državi na raspolaganje u sklopu programa tehničke pomoći obično nemaju status organa države slanja. Drugi uslov je da organ koji je jedna država stavila drugoj na raspolaganje mora da „vrši elemente državne vlasti“ države prijema. Akt koji se može pripisati državi prijema postoji samo u slučaju da postupci pozajmljenog organa uključuju vršenje državne vlasti te države. U poređenju sa brojem slučajeva kooperativnog delovanja država u oblastima kao što su uzajamna odbrana, pomoć i razvoj, član 6 pokriva samo konkretan i ograničen pojam „prenete odgovornosti“. Međutim, ta situacija nije nepoznata u praksi država.“

Član 8 Postupak pod rukovodstvom ili kontrolom države

„Postupak lica ili grupe lica smatra se aktom države po međunarodnom pravu ako to lice ili grupa lica faktički postupa po uputstvima države, ili pod njenim rukovodstvom ili kontrolom“.

Komentar ovog člana sadrži i sledeći tekst:

„(2) Pripisivanje državi postupka koji je faktički ona odobrila je široko prihvaćeno u međunarodnoj jurisprudenciji. U tim slučajevima nije bitno da li su jedno ili više lica o kojima se radi privatni pojedinci niti da li njihovi postupci uključuju „državnu aktivnost“. Do takvih slučajeva najčešće dolazi kada državni organi dopunjuju sopstveno delovanje regrutovanjem ili podsticanjem privatnih lica ili grupa, koji deluju kao „najamnici“ pri čemu ostaju izvan zvanične strukture države. Oni obuhvataju, na primer, pojedince ili grupe privatnih pojedinaca, koji su unajmljeni ili su poslati kao „volonteri“ u susedne zemlje, ili kojima je naloženo da sprovedu određene misije u inostranstvu iako ih država nije zvanično angažovala i oni nisu pripadnici njene policije ili oružanih snaga.“

i

„(5)  Žalbeno veće Međunarodnog krivičnog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju se takođe bavilo ovim pitanjima. Veće je u predmetu Tadić naglasilo da:

Uslov koji postavlja međunarodno pravo da bi se državi pripisala dela privatnih lica jeste da država vrši kontrolu nad tim privatnim licima. Stepen kontrole može, međutim, varirati zavisno od činjenica i okolnosti svakog pojedinačnog slučaja. Žalbeno veće ne vidi zašto bi u svim zamislivim okolnostima međunarodno pravo iziskivalo visoki prag za sprovođenje testa kontrole.

Žalbeno veće je smatralo da potreban stepen kontrole „vlasti SRJ nad tim oružanim snagama koju zahteva međunarodno pravo da bi se taj oružani sukob smatrao međunarodnim jeste sveukupna kontrola koja se ne svodi samo na finansiranje i opremanje takvih snaga, već uključuje i učešće u planiranju i nadziranju vojnih operacija“. Tokom obrazlaganja odluke, većina sudija je smatrala nužnim da izrazi neslaganje sa pristupom MSP u predmetu Vojne i paravojne aktivnosti u i protiv Nikaragve. Međutim pravna pitanja i činjenično stanje u predmetu Tadić se razlikuju od onog s kojim se MSP suočavao u tom predmetu. Mandat tribunala se usredsređuje na pitanja krivične odgovornosti pojedinaca a ne država a pitanje u tom predmetu se nije odnosilo na odgovornost već na važeća pravila međunarodnog humanitarnog prava. U svakom slučaju, u oba predmeta je bilo potrebno oceniti da li je određeni postupak u toj meri sproveden pod kontrolom države da postupak koji je kontrolisan treba njoj pripisati.“

K.  Dokumenti od značaja za okupaciju Iraka

1. Nalog br. 28 Privremene koalicione uprave

  1. Nalog br. 28 Privremene koalicione uprave, pod nazivom „Uspostavljanje Iračkog korpusa civilne odbrane“, je 9. marta 2003. proglasio upravnik Privremene koalicione uprave, ambasador L. Pol [Paul] Bremer. Slede izvodi iz tog naloga od značaja za ovaj predmet:

Shodno mojim nadležnostima šefa Privremene koalicione uprave (PKU), u skladu sa zakonima i običajima ratovanja, a saglasno relevantnim rezolucijama Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija, uključujući Rezoluciju br. 1483(2003),

Imajući u vidu da se u Rezoluciji br. 1483 apeluje na države članice da pomognu narodu Iraka u njegovim naporima da reformiše svoje institucije, obnovi svoju zemlju, i doprinese uslovima stabilnosti i bezbednosti u Iraku,

Shvatajući potrebu da se bez odlaganja otklone pretnje javnoj bezbednosti i stabilnosti prouzrokovane protivpravnim aktima ili katastrofama,

Prepoznajući da kontinuirani napadi i akti sabotaže ostataka stranke BAAS i terorista namernih da podriju bezbednost u Iraku iziskuju privremeno uspostavljanje iračkih lokalnih policijskih snaga koje će sa Koalicionim snagama sarađivati na suprotstavljanju pretnjama i očuvanju bezbednosti u Iraku, Proglašavam:

Član 1 Uspostavljanje Iračkog korpusa civilne odbrane

1) Uspostavlja se Irački korpus civilne odbrane kao privremena institucija, a do donošenja odluke o nastavku rada ili rasformiranju korpusa od strane međunarodno priznate predstavničke vlade koju uspostavi narod Iraka.

2) Irački korpus civilne odbrane predstavlja agenciju za bezbednost i vanredne situacije u Iraku. Pripadnici Iračkog korpusa civilne odbrane su Iračani koji će svojim radom dopunjavati operacije koje u Iraku sprovode vojne snage Koalicije radi suprotstavljanja organizovanim grupama i pojedincima koji koriste nasilje protiv naroda Iraka i njegove nacionalne infrastrukture.

3) U cilju podrške operacijama Koalicije radi obezbeđivanja bezbednosti i stabilnosti narodu Iraka, Irački korpus civilne odbrane je ovlašćen da vrši policijske dužnosti, uključujući i sledeće zadatke: patroliranje po gradskim i seoskim područjima; sprovođenje operacija potrage i oduzimanja nezakonitog oružja i ostale krijumčarene robe; obezbeđivanje fiksnih lokacija, kontrolnih punktova, područja, ruta i konvoja; kontrolu mase i suzbijanje nereda; usluge reagovanja u katastrofama; usluge potrage i spasavanja; pružanje podrške humanitarnim misijama i spasavanju u katastrofama (sic), uključujući usluge prevoza; zajedničko patroliranje sa Koalicionim snagama; i učešće u drugim aktivnostima u cilju izgradnje pozitivnih odnosa između iračkog naroda i Koalicionih snaga, uključujući saradnju sa lokalnom zajednicom.

4) Irački korpus civilne odbrane je odvojen od iračke policije i Nove iračke vojske. Irački korpus civilne odbrane dopunjuje policiju ali će biti formiran da sprovodi operacije koje premašuju kapacitete policije.

5) Dok su na dužnosti ili pod nadzorom Koalicionih snaga, pripadnici Iračkog korpusa civilne odbrane neće biti pod rukovodstvom ili kontrolom iračke policije. Osim u slučajevima predviđenim ovim Nalogom, Irački korpus civilne odbrane neće imati niti vršiti funkcije nacionalnog sektora javne bezbednosti.

6) Irački korpus civilne odbrane nije sastavni deo Nove iračke vojske, formirane shodno Nalogu br. 22 PKU, Formiranje Nove iračke vojske (PKU/Nalog od 9. avgusta 2003/22) i ne podleže nalozima komandnog lanca Nove iračke vojske.

...

Član 4 Funkcionisanje Iračkog korpusa civilne odbrane

1) Irački korpus civilne odbrane deluje pod nadležnošću upravnika PKU i podleže nadzoru Koalicionih snaga. Upravnik KPU može visokom vojnom zapovedniku Koalicionih snaga u Iraku poveriti odgovornost i nadležnost da zapošljava, obučava, organizuje i kontroliše pripadnike Iračkog korpusa civilne odbrane. Ova odgovornost i nadležnost može dalje biti poverena u skladu sa članom 7 dole u tekstu.

2) Za operativno ili taktičko komandovanje jedinicama Iračkog korpusa civilne odbrane koji deluje sa Koalicionim snagama zadužen je oficir Koalicionih snaga kog odredi visoki vojni zapovednik Koalicionih snaga u Iraku u skladu sa članom 7 dole u tekstu. ...

...

Član 7 Poveravanje nadležnosti

Upravnik Privremene koalicione uprave može da zaduženja iz ovog Naloga koja odredi poveri visokom vojnom zapovedniku Koalicionih snaga u Iraku. Taj visoki vojni zapovednik Koalicionih snaga u Iraku može dalje da poverava zaduženja iz ovog Naloga onima pod njegovom komandom.“

2. Memorandum o razumevanju MND (JI) (Multinacionalne divizije za jugoistočnu zonu)

   100. Tužena Država je podnela sledeći izvod iz Memoranduma o razumevanju kojim se uređuje aranžman između Holandije i Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva:

„14.1  Pripadnici MND (JI) mogu da poseduju i nose oružje i municiju u Iraku u skladu sa svojim nacionalnim operativnim pravilima i postupcima a u svrhu sprovođenja misije MND (JI) i kada ih za to ovlasti komanda MND (JI).

14.2  PA za MND (JI) su priložena u Aneksu F. Zaštita snaga a ne misija MND (JI) predstavlja osnovni parametar za određivanje nivoa naoružanja u profilu PA. Učesnice mogu da ukažu na nameru da za sopstvene snage određuju različite nivoe naoružanja posredstvom nacionalnih naredbi ili razjašnjenja svojim komandantima Nacionalnih kontingenata, pod uslovom da:

a) obaveste pravnog savetnika Komande MND (JI) o svim razlikama pre primene tih PA u Iraku.

b) nijedna razlika ne predviđa viši nivo naoružanja od onog odobrenog PA MND (JI).

14.3  Usled nivoa poverljivosti, Aneks E [verovatno se misli na Aneks F] se posebno dostavlja ovlašćenim licima. Potpis na ovom MoR, međutim, označava pristupanje PA u Aneksu F.“

  1. Po Državi, u Memorandumu o razumevanju je takođe bilo propisano da će Holandija imati isključivu disciplinsku i krivičnu nadležnost nad svojim osobljem.
  2. Zastupnik tužene Države je na raspravi izjavio da je Memorandum o razumevanju poverljiv dokument i da je ministar odbrane odbio da skine oznaku poverljivosti sa njega kako bi bio podnet Sudu.

3. Memorandum o razumevanju MND (C-J) (Multinacionalne divizije za centralnu južnu zonu)

  1. Letonske trupe su u SFIR učestvovale u okviru multinacionalne divizije stacionirane u centralnom južnom Iraku pod komandom Poljske. Vlada Republike Letonije je 11. januara 2005. objavila relevantni Memorandum o razumevanju u Letonskom glasniku (Latvijas Vēstnesis), zvaničnoj publikaciji u kojoj se objavljuju pravni akti i zvanična obaveštenja (br. 5 (3163)). Slede relevantni delovi tog dokumenta:

„ČLAN ČETIRI – MANDAT

4.1.  Shodno Rezoluciji br. 1483 SB UN, MND (C-J) SFIR će imati mandat da pomogne Upravi u očuvanju stabilnosti i bezbednosti u Iraku tako što će dati doprinos u osoblju, opremi i drugim resursima koji će biti pod njenom objedinjenom komandom u skladu sa aranžmanima propisanim u članu pet dole u tekstu. Osnovni zadaci MND (C-J) su navedeni u Izjavi o misiji priloženoj uz ovaj MoR...

4.2.  Pripadnici MND (C-J) svoje dužnosti obavljaju na strog, pravedan i nepristrasan način i uzdržavaju se od svih postupaka koji nisu u saglasnosti sa nezavisnom prirodom njihovih dužnosti. Ovim se ne zadire u pravo SFIR na samoodbranu, produženu samoodbranu, zaštitu snaga i sprovođenje misije.

ČLAN PET – KOMANDOVANJE I KONTROLA MND (C-J)

5.1.  Položaj komandanta MND (C-J) pripada Republici Poljskoj. Republika Poljska će koordinirati uvođenjem strukture MND (C-J) i biti dužna da obezbedi obaveštavanje učesnica o napretku u uspostavljanju te strukture.

5.2.  Pripadnici Nacionalnih kontingenata će ostati pod punom komandom svojih učesnica preko komandanta/visokog nacionalnog predstavnika svog Nacionalnog kontingenta. Operativna kontrola nad svim Nacionalnim kontingentima koji učestvuju u MND (C-J) će se dodeliti višem komandantu.

5.3.  Učesnice su zadužene za planiranje i izvršenje pokreta svojih snaga i logističku podršku od matičnih baza do LI [luka iskrcavanja] duž strateških LK [linija komunikacije]. Ova se obaveza može poveriti drugim agencijama koje postupaju u ime učesnica. Operacije prijema, razmeštanja i daljih pokreta [snaga do konačnih odredišta] (PRDP), uključujući izdavanje dozvole za iskrcavanje, će se sprovoditi u skladu sa postojećim Standardnim operativnim postupcima, osim ako se drugačije ne odluči. Taktička kontrola svih aspekata Strateških i Taktičkih LK će se dodeliti relevantnim Organizacijama za kontrolu pokreta na nivou operativne zone (CJTF-7) 5.4.  Komanda MND (C-J) je nadležna za koordinaciju logističkih sredstava Elementa nacionalne podrške radi ispunjenja operativnih zahteva ili obezbeđivanja usklađivanja upotrebe ograničene infrastrukture ili sredstava. U takvim se okolnostima mogu primeniti odredbe člana jedanaest. Logistička sredstva koja čine celinu ili deo doprinosa učesnice MND (C-J) će biti kontrolisana u skladu sa stavom 5.2 gore u tekstu.

5.5.  Prenos nadležnosti (PN) snaga na Komandu MND (C-J) u skladu sa navedenim Komandnim statusom će se sprovesti nakon što komandanti Nacionalnih kontingenata (KNK) proglase da je postignuta Puna operativna sposobnost (POS). Učesnice će potvrditi MND (C-J) Komandni status svojih snaga pomoću sredstava veze o PN.

5.6.  Komandant Nacionalnog kontingenata/visoki nacionalni predstavnik je zadužen za održavanje reda i discipline unutar Nacionalnog kontingenta pod njegovim zapovedništvom.

5.7.  Komanda MND (C-J) može zahtevati povlačenje bilo kog člana osoblja kog je učesnica dala MND (C-J). Komandant Nacionalnog kontingenta/visoki nacionalni predstavnik će razmotriti svaki takav zahtev i postarati se da ga uvaži kad god je to dozvoljeno po njegovim sopstvenim nacionalnim propisima.

5.8.  Komanda MND (C-J) je zadužena za koordinaciju sa PKU u POO MND (C-J). Nakon konsultacija sa učesnicama kojih se to tiče, komandanti brigada će predložiti predstavnike koji će biti vojne osobe za kontakt sa PKU u POO njihovih brigada, uz obaveštavanje komandanta MND (C-J). Ovi predstavnici će takođe biti članovi Zajedničkog koordinacionog odbora.

5.9.  Engleski će biti službeni radni i komandni jezik u MND (C-J) sve do nivoa bataljona, s izuzetkom Borbene grupe 1.

ČLAN ČETRNAEST- PRAVILA ANGAŽOVANJA (PA)/NOŠENJE ORUŽJA I MUNICIJE

14.1.  Pripadnici MND (C-J) mogu da poseduju i nose oružje i municiju u Iraku u cilju sprovođenja misije MND (C-J) kada ih za to ovlasti Komanda MND (C-J).

14.2.  PA za MND (C-J) će biti deo operativne naredbe MND (C-J). Zaštita snaga, a ne misija MND (C-J), predstavlja osnovni parametar za određivanje nivoa naoružanja u profilu PA. Učesnice mogu da ukažu na nameru da za sopstvene snage određuju različite nivoe naoružanja posredstvom nacionalnih naredbi ili razjašnjenja svojim komandantima Nacionalnih kontingenata, pod uslovom da:

a) obaveste Komandu MND (C-J) o početnim razlikama pre PN. O ostalim razlikama mogu da obaveštavaju po potrebi.

b) nijedna razlika ne predviđa nivo naoružanja viši od onog koji je odobren PA MND (C-J)

ČLAN ŠESNAEST – ODŠTETNI ZAHTEVI

16.1.   Osim u slučajevima predviđenim ovim MoR, svaka učesnica se odriče prava da zahteva obeštećenje od bilo koje druge učesnice za povredu (uključujući povredu sa smrtnim ishodom) koju pretrpi osoblje njenog Nacionalnog kontingenta ili za oštećenje ili gubitak imovine u njenom posedu ili u posedu osoblja Nacionalnog kontingenta izazvanog činjenjem ili nečinjenjem bilo koje druge učesnice ili osoblja njenog Nacionalnog kontingenta tokom vršenja službenih dužnosti u vezi sa ovim MoR.

16.2.   Kada u pogledu bilo kakvog odštetnog zahteva relevantne učesnice zajedno utvrde da je oštećenje, gubitak, povreda ili smrt bila izazvana nepromišljenim činjenjem ili nečinjenjem, namernim nezakonitim postupkom ili grubim nemarom samo jedne učesnice, njenog vojnog osoblja, posilnih ili službenih lica, samo će ta učesnica snositi troškove bilo kakve odgovornosti za tu štetu.

16.3.  Kada je za povredu, smrt, gubitak ili oštećenje odgovorno više učesnica ili nije moguće jednoj konkretnoj učesnici pripisati odgovornost za povredu, smrt, gubitak ili oštećenje, procesuiranje i namirenje odštetnog zahteva će odobriti relevantne učesnice. Troškove procesuiranja i namirenja odštetnog zahteva će ravnomerno snositi učesnice o kojima se radi. 

16.4.  Odštetni zahtevi trećih strana, uključujući za gubitak ili oštećenje imovine ili ličnu povredu, bolest ili smrt ili u pogledu bilo koje druge stvari koju je izazvalo ili se pripisuje osoblju MND (C-J) ili bilo kom licu koje ona zapošljava, bez obzira na to da li ono inače živi u Iraku, a koji nisu nastali u vezi sa vojnim borbenim operacijama, se podnose i o njima odlučuje učesnica čije su osoblje, imovina, aktivnosti ili sredstva Nacionalnog kontingenta navodno izazvali štetu a u skladu sa nacionalnim pravom države učesnice.

16.5.   Odštetni zahtevi trećih strana će se podnositi Glavnom štabu MND (C-J) koji će ih proslediti učesnici koja se smatra odgovornom. U slučaju da je više učesnica odgovorno za povredu, smrt, gubitak ili oštećenje ili odgovornost za povredu, smrt, gubitak ili oštećenje nije moguće pripisati jednoj konkretnoj učesnici, troškove procesuiranja i namirenja odštetnih zahteva trećih strana će ravnomerno podeliti učesnice o kojima je reč.

ANEKS A UZ MOR MND (C-J)

IZJAVA O MISIJI STABILIZACIONIH SNAGA MND (C-J)

 Uvod

1. Misija će učesnice uključiti u pomaganje u sprovođenju ključnih zadataka. Pored toga, ti će zadaci sve više obuhvatati saradnju sa Privremenom koalicionom upravom (PKU) i lokalnim stanovništvom Iraka na obnovi i uspostavljanju lokalnih institucija.

Područje operativne odgovornosti (POO) MND C-J

2. Područje operativne odgovornosti (POO) Stabilizacionih snaga u Iraku (SFIR) u MND (C-J) obuhvata pet pokrajina: Babil, Karbalu, Vasit [Wasit], Al Kadistjah [Al Qadistyah] i An Nadžaf [An Najaf]. Orijentaciona mapa POO MND (C-J) se nalazi u Prilogu 1 uz ovaj Aneks.

Ključni zadaci

3. MND (C-J) SFIR MND će preduzeti niz zadataka u POO radi ostvarenja svoje Misije a oni će se utvrđivati u zavisnosti od razvoja situacije. Ključni zadaci će obuhvatati:

a) Spoljnu bezbednost/bezbednost granica. Rukovodi MND (C-J) SFIR. Zaštita ključnih tačaka, uključujući nadzor nad kopnenom granicom i pomoć u uspostavljanju i obuci iračkih Pograničnih bezbednosnih snaga.

b) Unutrašnju bezbednost. Rukovodi MND (C-J) SFIR. Očuvanje sigurnog i bezbednog okruženja, uključujući operacije kojima rukovode obaveštajne strukture radi uklanjanja pretnje od subverzivnih i naoružanih grupa.

c) Zaštitu snaga. Rukovodi MND (C-J) SFIR. Ovo će obuhvatati sve aspekte trenutnih operacija kako bi se osigurala bezbednost SFIR, a na ograničeno vreme i osoblja PKU širom POO.

d) Bezbednost fiksnih lokacija. Rukovodi MND (C-J) SFIR. To će obuhvatati odgovornost za očuvanje bezbednosti na kritičnim i osetljivim lokacijama unutar POO.

e) Upravljanje i podršku infrastrukturi. Rukovodi KPU. MND (C-J) SFIR će tokom ograničenog perioda podržavati napore KPU (C-J) da uspostavi lokalnu vlast zasnovanu na vladavini prava koja obezbeđuje jednaka prava i pravdu svim iračkim građanima u POO bez obzira na njihovu nacionalnost, veroispovest ili rod. MND (CJ) SFIR će to podržati radom na uspostavljanju mehanizama za upravljanje i civilnu upravu na lokalnom i regionalnom nivou dok KPU ne bude sposobna da radi sa lokalnim iračkim stanovništvom na uspostavljanju pune vlasti. MND (C-J) SFIR će nastaviti to da podržava u POO zajedno sa Timovima za podršku Vladi (TPV) dok Timovi lokalnih vlasti (TLV) KPU ne počnu sa radom u POO. MND (C-J) SFIR će nastaviti da održava veze sa TPV nakon što PKU preuzme kontrolu i blisko će sarađivati sa PKU (C-J) kako bi obezbedila sinhronizaciju vojnih operacija sa aktivnostima Koalicije. Može se nastaviti sa pružanjem podrške tokom ograničenog perioda kako bi se pomoglo uspostavljanju i održavanju iračke infrastrukture.

f) Razvoj sektora javne bezbednosti. Rukovodi PKU. MND (C-J) SFIR će pružati podršku ograničeni period. MND (C-J) SFIR će nastaviti da pomaže razvoj Civilne policije, uključujući sprovođenje zajedničkih patrola, formiranje Tima za ocenu policije, razvoj postupka po prigovoru i podršku lokalnim iračkim sudovima i pravosuđu u očuvanju reda i mira. Nakon uspešnog prenosa [ovih dužnosti] na PKU i lokalne Iračane, MND (C-J) SFIR će nastaviti da vrši ulogu veze kako bi koordinirala operacije sektora javne bezbednosti, njegovu obuku i nadzor nad njim zajedno sa vojskom.

g) Ratni zločinci. Rukovodi PKU. Možda će biti potrebno da MND (C-J) SFIR pruža podršku kako bi omogućila lišenje slobode osumnjičenih za ratne zločine u POO.

h) Obnovu osnovnih službi. Rukovodi PKU. MND (C-J) SFIR će pružati podršku ograničeni period dok angažovani civili i iračko osoblje ne budu u stanju da preuzmu odgovornost. MND (C-J) SFIR će biti odgovorna uz podršku PKU za omogućavanje pružanja osnovnih usluga unutar POO.

i) Izgradnju iračke Vojske. Rukovodi PKU. MND (C-J) SFIR će pružati nominalnu vojnu pomoć ali snabdevanje ljudstvom, obuka i opremanje iračke Vojne strukture predstavljaju funkciju PKU.

4. Shodno Četvrtoj ženevskoj konvenciji (Civilnoj konvenciji), jedina uprava koja može da postupa u svojstvu „sile koja drži zaštićeno lice“ u POO je Komanda MND (C-J) SFIR a u ime Uprave.

5. Komandant MND (C-J) SFIR će po potrebi održavati veze sa političkim, društvenim i verskim vođama u POO kako bi obezbedio da pripadnici MND (C-J) SFIR na odgovarajući način poštuju verske, etničke i kulturne osetljivosti u Iraku.

Identifikacija

6. Vojno i paravojno osoblje MND (C-J) SFIR će nositi uniforme i oružje za koje je ovlašćeno naređenjima koje dobije. Iračka Civilna policija će na dužnosti biti vidno prepoznatljiva po uniformi i drugim posebnim oznakama i može nositi oružje za koje je ovlašćena Uredbama i Naredbama PKU i nakon formiranje iračke (uprave).

Procena pretnje

7. Koalicione snage ocenjuju postojanje unutrašnje pretnje stabilnosti Iraka od strane oružanih frakcija koje se bore za političku moć i uticaj, ostataka partije BAAS i organizacija koje su se od nje odvojile, kriminalaca i terorista. Pretnje spolja su ograničene i susedne zemlje pružaju podršku [SFIR]. Situacija je dinamična i podložna promenama. Možda će biti potrebno promeniti stav snaga MND (C-J) SFIR kako se situacija bude razvijala i učesnice će morati da budu fleksibilne.

8. Učesnice moraju da razumeju potrebu da komandantu MND (C-J) SFIR pružaju sve informacije od značaja za bezbednost misije, njenog osoblja, opreme i lokacija.

Pripadnici SFIR u MND (C-J)

9. Shvata se da će se sastav MND (C-J) možda izmeniti nakon što ona bude uspostavljena.

Konačna nadležnost za tumačenje

10. Komandant MND (C-J) ima konačnu nadležnost za operativno tumačenje ove Izjave o misiji.

Rezime

11. U ovoj Izjavi o misiji se propisuju obaveze i dužnosti učesnica i navode osnovni zadaci misije MND (C-J) SFIR u POO.“

  1. Potpisnice ovog dokumenta su: Republika Letonija, Ministarstvo odbrane Republike Bugarske, Ministarstvo odbrane Kraljevine Danske, ministar oružanih snaga Dominikanske Republike, Ministarstvo nacionalne odbrane Filipina, ministar odbrane Republike Honduras, Ministarstvo odbrane Republike Kazahstana, Ministarstvo nacionalne odbrane Republike Litvanije, Ministarstvo odbrane Mongolije, ministar odbrane Kraljevine Holandije, Ministarstvo odbrane Republike Nikaragve, Ministarstvo odbrane Kraljevine Norveške, Ministarstvo nacionalne odbrane Rumunije, Ministarstvo odbrane Republike El Salvador, Ministarstvo odbrane Republike Slovačke, Ministarstvo odbrane Kraljevine Španije, Ministarstvo odbrane Kraljevine Tajland, Ministarstvo odbrane Ukrajine i ministar nacionalne odbrane Republike Poljske.

PRITUŽBE

  1. Podnosilac predstavke se žalio na povrede procesnog aspekta člana 2
  2. Žalio se na to da istraga nije bila u dovoljnoj meri nezavisna a iz sledećih razloga:
  1. Jedinica Kraljevske vojne policije u Iraku se nalazila pod isključivim zapovedništvom komandanta holandskog bataljona; javno tužilaštvo tamo uopšte nije bilo prisutno. S obzirom na to da su pripadnici jedinice delili životni prostor sa redovnim trupama, nije postojala dovoljna distanca između njih i pojedinaca koji bi mogli biti zaduženi za sprovođenje istrage.
  2. Odluka javnog tužioca u Arnhemu da ne goni poručnika A. bila je u potpunosti zasnovana na izveštajima Kraljevske vojne policije, na koje se javni tužilac isuviše oslanjao.
  3. Vojno veće Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu, čiji je sastav obuhvatao aktivnog oficira vojske koji nije pripadao sudstvu, se takođe potpuno oslanjalo na rezultate veoma ograničenih istraga koje je sprovela Kraljevska vojna policija.
  1. Podnosilac predstavke se takođe žalio na to da istraga nije bila dovoljno delotvorna a iz sledećih razloga:
  1. Nisu uzeti iskazi ni od jednog pripadnika IKCO koji je bio svedok incidenta pošto je istražitelj Kraljevske vojne policije odlučio da informacije koje su oni dali nisu ni od kakvog značaja.
  2. Saslušanje ključnog svedoka, g. Davuda Džoada Kathima, vozača Mercedesa, je bilo izuzetno površno. Njegovi dokazi su bili važni jer je bio jedini dostupni civilni svedok koji nije bio ni u kakvoj hijerarhijskoj ili drugoj funkcionalnoj vezi sa poručnikom A. Štaviše, njegov iskaz u obliku u kojem su ga zapisali istražitelji Kraljevske vojne policije nije bio u skladu sa iskazom koji je kasnije istog dana dao jednom iračkom službenom licu.
  3. Poručnik A. je prvi put ispitan tek sedam sati nakon incidenta i tokom tog perioda nije bio odvojen od ostalih svedoka. Stoga je imao dovoljno prilike da pre saslušanja razgovara o incidentu su ostalim svedocima i da svoj iskaz uskladi sa njihovim.
  4. Dan nakon incidenta, poručnik A. je izjavio da je uspeo da od zamenika komandanta IKCO pribavi spisak imena osoblja IKCO koje je pucalo iz svog oružja i broj metaka koje je ispalilo. Činjenica da je on, kao glavni osumnjičeni, bio u stanju da pribavi ove informacije od ključnog svedoka takođe je uticala na delotvornost istrage.
  5. Pored toga, spisak koji je poručnik A. pribavio nije bio uvršćen u spise predmeta, uprkos njegovom mogućem značaju za predmet.
  6. Kraljevska vojna policija je bila u posedu tela g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda nekoliko sati ali tokom tog perioda uopšte nije bila izvršena obdukcija. Telo je prebačeno u jednu iračku civilnu bolnicu, gde je obdukcija izvršena u odsustvu službenih lica Kraljevske vojne policije. Nalazi obdukcije, takvi kakvi su bili, su priloženi spisima predmeta ali nisu prevedeni. 
  7. Sa ostalim forenzičkim dokazima se postupalo na sličan, neoprezan način. Naročito, izveštaj o fragmentima metaka izvađenih iz tela nije podrobno preveden.
  1. Konačno, podnosilac predstavke se žalio što najbliži srodnici g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda nisu bili u dovoljnoj meri uključeni u istragu i obaveštavani o njenom napretku. Naročito, nikad nije učinjen nijedan pokušaj da se kontaktira porodica g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda; niti se iko potrudio da je obavesti o odluci da se ne preuzme gonjenje poručnika A.

PRAVO

I NAVODNE POVREDE ČLANA 2 KONVENCIJE

A.  Dopuštenost

1. Preliminarni prigovor Države

  1. Država je osporavala dopuštenost predstavke jer g. Azhar Sabah Džalud nije potpadao pod „nadležnost“ tužene Države ugovornice u smislu člana 1 Konvencije.
  2. Kao što je učinio i u presudi u predmetu Al-Skeini i drugi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [VV], predstavka br. 55721/07, st. 102, ECHR 2011, Sud će ovaj prigovor razmatrati zajedno sa meritumom.

2. Zaključak o dopuštenosti

  1. U svetlu podnesaka strana, Sud smatra da predstavka otvara ozbiljna činjenična i pravna pitanja iz Konvencije i da odlučivanje o njima iziskuje razmatranje merituma. Sud stoga zaključuje da predstavka nije očigledno neosnovana u smislu člana 35, st. 3, t. (a) Konvencije. Nije utvrđen nijedan drugi osnov za proglašenje predstavke nedopuštenom. Sud će stoga predstavku proglasiti dopuštenom što ne utiče na njegovu odluku o preliminarnom prigovoru Države, o kojem će odlučiti dole u tekstu.

B.  Nadležnost

1. Argumenti izneti pred Sudom

a.  Tužena Država

  1. Holandska država je tvrdila da događaji na koje se podnosilac predstavke žali ne potpadaju pod „nadležnost“ Holandije u smislu člana 1 Konvencije. Zamolila je Sud da povuče razliku između ovog predmeta i predmeta Al-Skeini i drugi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [VV], predstavka br. 55721/07, ECHR 2011.
  2. Prvo, Holandija nije bila „okupaciona sila“ u smislu međunarodnog humanitarnog prava. Samo su Sjedinjene Države i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo bile „okupacione sile“ i kao takve su određeni u Rezoluciji br. 1483 Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija; po tome su se razlikovali od drugih država koje su radile pod Privremenom koalicionom upravom.
  3. Niti je Holandija u Iraku bila preuzela ikakva javna ovlašćenja koja obično vrši neka suverena vlast. Ova su se ovlašćenja u potpunosti nalazila u rukama Sjedinjenih Država i Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, koji su bili uspostavili Privremenu koalicionu upravu.
  4. Kontingent Holandije se sve vreme nalazio pod operativnom kontrolom komandanta MND (JI), oficira iz Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva.
  5. Premda su holandske trupe u početnim fazama operacija SFIR morale da se uključe u poslove javne bezbednosti, ova je obaveza tokom 2003. prešla u ruke iračkih organa. Holandski organi i trupe stoga nisu vršili policijska ovlašćenja u vreme događaja na koje se podnosilac predstavke žali.
  6. Sud je u predmetu Al-Skeini i drugi zaključio da je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo imalo „nadležnost“ u smislu člana 1 Konvencije jer je do smrti o kojima je bilo reči došlo usled postupaka vojnika Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva tokom ili u vezi sa bezbednosnim operacijama, konkretno, sa vojnim patrolama koje su vršili. Nasuprot tome, do smrti g. Azhara Sabaha Džoada je došlo na kontrolnom punktu za vozila koji je uspostavio IKCO, i na kojem je bilo raspoređeno njegovo osoblje. Premda se holandsko vojno osoblje tu nalazilo u vreme događaja kako bi posmatralo i savetovalo, to nije podrazumevalo hijerarhijski odnos zbog kojeg bi Holandija bila odgovorna: vlast se nalazila u rukama iračkih bezbednosnih snaga.
  7. Holandske snage nikada nisu imale fizičku vlast ili kontrolu nad g. Azharom Sabahom Džaludom, jer ga nikada nisu lišile slobode. Broj holandskih vojnika na jugoistoku Iraka bio je, opšte uzev, ograničen i oni nisu imali stepen kontrole potreban da bi to područje potpalo pod „nadležnost“ Holandije u svrhu člana 1.
  8. Činjenica da je jedno vojno lice pucalo u neko lice, čak i pod pretpostavkom da se može utvrditi da je taj pucanj bio smrtonosan, sama po sebi nije dovoljna za postojanje nadležnosti u ovom smislu. Tužena Država je ukazala na odluku Velikog veća u predmetu Banković i drugi protiv Belgije i drugih, predstavka br. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII, u kojoj je Sud utvrdio da puka činjenica da je neko lice žrtva napada bombardera određene države nije dovoljna da bi to lice potpalo pod nadležnost te države.
  9. Konačno, čak i pod pretpostavkom da je Holandija vršila delotvornu kontrolu nad kontrolnim punktom za vozila u dotično vreme, područje u kojem je reč je bilo toliko ograničeno da ne bi postojala nikakva suštinska razlika između „delotvorne sveukupne kontrole nad područjem“ i „vlasti i kontrole službenog lica države“.

b.  Država intervenijent

  1. Država Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo je naglasila „suštinski teritorijalnu“ prirodu nadležnosti u smislu člana 1; svako prostiranje te nadležnosti izvan teritorije neke Države ugovornice je izuzetno. Po njenom tumačenju navedene odluke u predmetu Banković, naročito stava 65, ona podrazumeva da pojmu „nadležnost“ ne treba dozvoliti da „evoluira“ ili da se „postupno razvija“ na isti način kao pravo u pogledu materijalnih prava i sloboda zajemčenih Konvencijom; po njenim rečima, doktrina „živog instrumenta“ nije primenljiva.
  2. Tvrdila je da je Država ugovornica, koja vrši „delotvornu kontrolu nad nekim područjem“ izvan svoje nacionalne teritorije, bilo kao rezultat zakonite ili nezakonite vojne akcije, shodno članu 1 obavezna da unutar tog područja obezbedi čitav opseg materijalnih prava iz Konvencije i dopunskih Protokola koje je ratifikovala. Po njenim tvrdnjama, iz toga sledi da su okolnosti u kojima se ovaj izuzetak od teritorijalnog karaktera nadležnosti mogu primeniti nužno veoma ograničene.
  3. Ipak, Sud se u st. 80 presude u predmetu Al-Skeini i drugi složio sa britanskim Apelacionim sudom da bi bilo nerealno očekivati od snaga Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva u Basri i drugde u Iraku da lokalnom stanovništvu jemče čitav spektar materijalnih prava iz Konvencije.
  4. Sud je u predmetu Al-Skeini i drugi i drugim predmetima utvrdio da nadležnost iz člana 1 postoji na osnovu isključive fizičke vlasti i kontrole i stvarne ili naizgled zakonske vlasti nad nekim pojedincem (hipotetično u presudi u predmetu Isa i drugi protiv Turske [Issa and Others v. Turkey], predstavka br. 31821/96, izrečenoj 16. novembra 2004, ali u stvarnosti u presudi Velikog veća u predmetu Očalan protiv Turske [Öcalan v. Turkey], predstavka br. 46221/99, ECHR 2005-IV; Al Sadun i Mufdi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom], predstavka br. 61498/08, ECHR 2010; i Medvedev i drugi protiv Francuske [Medvedyev and Others v. France], predstavka br. 3394/03, ECHR 2010). Nasuprot tome, Sud u navedenoj odluci u predmetu Banković i drugi fizički akt bombardovanja nije shvatio kao primer fizičke vlasti i kontrole koja bi dovela do vanteritorijalne nadležnosti; stoga ni fizički akt pucanja na vozilo u pokretu u kojem se nalaze pojedinci koji nisu lišeni slobode ne treba tako shvatiti.
  5. Suštinska razlika između ovog predmeta i predmeta Al-Skeini i drugi leži u činjenici da je u ovom drugom predmetu Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo priznato kao „okupaciona sila“ u smislu člana 42 Haškog pravilnika i da je stoga imalo dužnost iz člana 43 tog Pravilnika da vrši ovlašćenja koja obično pripadaju državi.
  6. Konačno, ako Sud odluči da je Holandija u ovom predmetu imala nadležnost, postoji „stvarna opasnost“ da će Države ugovornice u budućnosti možda biti „obeshrabrene da se odazovu na poziv Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija da snagama pod mandatom Ujedinjenih nacija daju doprinos u trupama a na štetu misije Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija da obezbeđuje međunarodni mir i bezbednost“.

c.  Podnosilac predstavke

  1. Podnosilac predstavke je tvrdio da sva pitanja na koja se žali potpadaju pod nadležnost Holandije.
  2. Prvo, nadležnost je postojala na osnovu kontrole koju je Holandija uživala u odnosu na svoja vojna lica. Holandija je preko njih vršila neka ključna javna ovlašćenja. Privremenom koalicionom upravom nisu rukovodile samo Sjedinjene Države i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo. Iako su ove dve države na sebe bile preuzele zadatke administrativnog i koordinativnog karaktera, druge države – uključujući Holandiju – su učestvovale u sprovođenju nadležnosti PKU i osiguranju bezbednosti. To je obuhvatalo „vršenje nekih javnih ovlašćenja koje obično vrši suverena vlast“.
  3. Holandske trupe su vršile takva javna ovlašćenja kada su „s odobrenjem, na poziv ili uz prećutnu saglasnost“ KPU nadzirale IKCO na kontrolnom punktu.
  4. Kao što je zvanični stav holandske Vlade odražavao, Holandija je sve vreme bila zadržala punu kontrolu nad holandskim vojnim osobljem.
  5. Drugo, Holandija je imala nadležnost na osnovu svoje delotvorne vojne kontrole nad područjem o kojem je reč. Citirajući presudu u predmetu Isa i drugi protiv Turske, predstavka br. 31821/96, izrečenu 16. novembra 2004, podnosilac predstavke je tvrdio da neka država može imati nadležnost čak i ako je njena vojna kontrola bila ograničena u vremenskom i geografskom smislu.
  6. Treće, Holandija je imala nadležnost kao „okupaciona sila“ u smislu člana 42 Haškog pravilnika. Mada je priznao da su u Rezoluciji br. 1483 Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija zapravo samo Sjedinjene Države i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo bile označene kao „okupacione sile“, određivanje tog statusa u smislu Haškog pravilnika predstavlja pitanje činjenica a ne izbora.
  7. Memorandum o razumevanju MND (C-J) (vidi stav 103 gore u tekstu) – koji je podnosilac predstavke u ovu svrhu smatrao istovetnim Memorandumu o razumevanju koji se odnosi na ovaj predmet – se zapravo pozivao na Haški pravilnik, iz čega proizlazi da je taj Pravilnik važio.
  8. Četvrto, nijedna druga država nije imala kontrolu nad događajima o kojima je reč. Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo nije imalo nikakvu neposrednu vojnu odgovornost u pokrajini Al-Muthana; niti je Holandija, u svakom slučaju, ikad pokušala da mu ustupi nadležnost. Niti je u vreme događaja postojala bilo kakva iračka civilna uprava ili iračke vojne ili policijske snage; tokom ovog perioda je PKU bila ta koja je vršila vlast, uz ostale članice vojne koalicije, uključujući Holandiju.
  9. U pogledu činjeničnog stanja, holandsko vojno osoblje je imalo kontrolu nad kontrolnim punktom za vozila i vlast nad iračkim ljudstvom raspoređenim na njemu. Štaviše, holandska Kraljevska vojna policija je sprovela istragu: ona je oduzela pušku vodnika IKCO Husama Sada i automobil g. Davuda Džoada Kathima i preuzela telo g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda. To znači da je Holandija vršila „neka javna ovlašćenja koja obično vrši suverena vlast“.
  10. Konačno, holandski ministar odbrane je u svom dopisu Parlamentu od 18. juna 2007. uz izveštaj Van den Bergovog odbora prihvatio zaključak tog odbora da Konvencija važi u pogledu holandskih trupa u njihovom vezama sa iračkim državljanima u Iraku.

2. Ocena Suda

a.  Memorandum o razumevanju MND (C-J) (Multinacionalne divizije za centralnu-južnu zonu)

  1. Zastupnik Države je na raspravi pred Sudom u odgovoru na pitanje Suda izjavio da su holandski organi zaduženi za odbranu odbili da skinu oznaku poverljivosti sa Memoranduma o razumevanju između Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva i Holandije u pokrajini Al-Muthana kako bi Sud mogao da ga koristi; međutim, Memorandum o razumevanju MND (C-J) je „[pružao] dobru predstavu o vrsti dokumenta o kojoj [smo] govorili“.
  2. Sud konstatuje da potpisnice Memoranduma o razumevanju MND (C-J) obuhvataju organe zadužene za odbranu brojnih zemalja koje su dale trupe za SFIR, uključujući holandskog ministra odbrane (vidi stav 104 gore u tekstu). Takođe konstatuje da je član Memoranduma o razumevanju MND (JI) koji je Država bila spremna da obelodani (vidi stav 100 gore u tekstu) veoma sličan, mada ne i istovetan, odgovarajućem članu Memoranduma o razumevanju MND (C-J) (vidi stav 103 gore u tekstu) a da zastupnik tužene Države nije ni pomenuo, pa čak ni sugerisao, postojanje bilo kakve značajne suštinske razlike između ta dva memoranduma. Sud će u tim okolnostima poći od pretpostavke da su ova dva dokumenta ista u pogledu relevantnih pitanja. Ipak će s odgovarajućom dozom opreza koristiti Memorandum o razumevanju MND (C-J).

b.  Primenljiva načela

  1. Sud želi da napomene da, iako je nadležnost država prvenstveno teritorijalna, one je ponekad vrše izvan nacionalne teritorije (uporedi sa Savetodavnim mišljenjem MSP u predmetu Pravne posledice podizanja zida na okupiranim palestinskim teritorijama, Izveštaji MSP za 2004, str. 136, st. 109, vidi stav 95 gore u tekstu). Sud ponavlja da je u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Al-Skeini, st. 130-139, na sledeći način dao kratak prikaz načela o vršenju nadležnosti u smislu člana 1 Konvencije izvan teritorije Država ugovornica:

„130.  ... Kao što je propisano članom [1 Konvencije], obaveza koju preuzima Država ugovornica je ograničena na „jemčenje“ („reconnaître“ u tekstu na francuskom) nabrojanih prava i sloboda osobama pod njenom „nadležnošću“ (vidi, presude u predmetu Sering protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Soering v. the United Kingdom], od 7. jula 1989, st. 86, Serija A br. 161; odluku Velikog veća u predmetu Banković i ostali protiv Belgije, predstavka br. 52207/99, st. 66, ECHR 2001- XII). „Nadležnost“ u smislu člana 1 predstavlja osnovni kriterijum. Vršenje nadležnosti predstavlja neophodan uslov da bi se Država ugovornica mogla smatrati odgovornom za činjenje ili nečinjenje koje joj se može pripisati, a koje je podstaklo tvrdnju o kršenju prava i sloboda iz Konvencije (vidi presudu Velikog veća u predmetu Ilašku i drugi protiv Moldavije i Rusije [Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia], predstavka br. 48787/99, st. 311, ECHR 2004-VII).

(α)  Teritorijalno načelo

131. Nadležnost neke države u smislu člana 1 je prvenstveno teritorijalna (vidi st. 86. u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Sering; st. 61 i 67 u navedenoj odluci Banković; st. 312 u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Ilašku). Pretpostavlja se da se nadležnost obično vrši na celoj teritoriji države (vidi st. 312 u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Ilašku; st. 139 u presudi Velikog veća u predmetu Asanidze protiv Gruzije [Assanidze v. Georgia], predstavka br. 71503/01, ECHR 2004-II). Nasuprot tome, dela koja Države ugovornice izvrše ili koja proizvode posledice izvan njihove teritorije mogu predstavljati vršenje nadležnosti u smislu člana 1 samo u izuzetnim slučajevima (vidi st. 67 navedene odluke u predmetu Banković).

132. Sud je u svojoj dosadašnjoj praksi prihvatio izvestan broj izuzetnih okolnosti koje mogu dovesti do toga da neka Država ugovornica vrši nadležnost van svojih teritorijalnih granica. U svakom od tih slučajeva se o pitanju da li postoje izuzetne okolnosti koje iziskuju i opravdavaju zaključak Suda da je država vršila vanteritorijalnu nadležnost mora odlučivati uz uzimanje u obzir konkretnih činjenica.

(β)   Vlast i kontrola službenih lica države

133. Sud u svojoj praksi prihvata da se, izuzetno od načela teritorijalnosti, nadležnost neke Države ugovornice u smislu člana 1 može odnositi i na postupke njenih organa koji proizvode posledice van njene sopstvene teritorije (vidi st. 91 presude u predmetu Drozd i Janousek protiv Francuske i Španije, izrečene 26. juna 1992. godine, Serija A br. 240; st. 62 presude o preliminarnim prigovorima u predmetu Loizidou protiv Turske, od 23. marta 1995, Serija A br. 310; st. 52 presude o meritumu u predmetu Loizidou protiv Turske, od 18. decembra 1996, Izveštaji o presudama i odlukama 1996-VI; i st. 69 u navedenoj odluci u predmetu Banković)...

135... Sud prihvata da Država ugovornica vrši vanteritorijalnu nadležnost kada preuzme neka ili sva javna ovlašćenja koja bi obično vršila Vlada te teritorije a s njenim odobrenjem, na njen poziv ili uz njenu prećutnu saglasnost (vidi st. 71 u navedenoj odluci u predmetu Banković). Prema tome, kada u skladu sa običajem, ugovorom ili drugim sporazumom, vlasti Države ugovornice vrše izvršne ili sudske funkcije na teritoriji druge države, ta Država ugovornica može biti odgovorna za povrede Konvencije izvršene tokom vršenja tih funkcija sve dok se dela o kojima je reč mogu pripisati njoj a ne teritorijalnoj državi (vidi presudu u navedenom predmetu Drozd i Janousek; presudu u predmetu Žontiom i drugi protiv Francuske [Gentilhomme and Others v. France], predstavke br. 48205/99, 48207/99 i 48209/99, izrečenu 14. maja 2002. godine; i str. 57 odluke Komisije o dopuštenosti predstavki u predmetu X i Y protiv Švajcarske, predstavke br. 7289/75 i 7349/76, izrečene 14. jula 1977, DR 9).

136. Pored toga, praksa Suda pokazuje da upotreba sile od strane službenih lica države koji deluju van njene teritorije u izvesnim okolnostima može svako lice koje je tako stavljeno pod kontrolu organa te države dovesti u nadležnost te države u smislu člana 1. Ovo načelo se primenjuje kada službena lica jedne države liše neko lice slobode u inostranstvu. Na primer, Veliko veće je u st. 91 presude u predmetu Očalan protiv Turske, predstavka broj 46221/99, ECHR 2005-IV, zauzelo stav da „je podnosilac predstavke bio pod delotvornom turskom vlašću, te, prema tome, u „nadležnosti“ te države u smislu člana 1 čim su ga kenijska službena lica neposredno predala turskim službenim licima, premda je Turska, u ovom slučaju, vršila vlast izvan svoje teritorije“. U presudi Isa i drugi protiv Turske, predstavka br. 31821/96, od 16. novembra 2004, Sud je ukazao na to da bi se moralo zaključiti da su srodnici podnosilaca predstavke bili pod nadležnošću Turske na osnovu vlasti i kontrole turskih vojnika nad njima da je ustanovljeno da su ih ti vojnici uhapsili u severnom Iraku, pre no što su ih odveli u obližnju pećinu i pogubili ih. Sud je u st. 86-89 odluke u predmetu Al-Sadun and Mufdi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, predstavka br. 61498/08, od 30. juna 2009, zauzeo stav da su dva iračka državljanina koja su bila držana u vojnim zatvorima pod britanskom kontrolom bila pod nadležnošću Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva budući da je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo vršilo potpunu i isključivu kontrolu nad zatvorima i licima koja su tamo bila držana. Konačno, Veliko veće je u st. 67 presude u predmetu Medvedev i drugi protiv Francuske, predstavka br. 3394/03, ECHR 2010-..., zauzelo stav da su podnosioci predstavke bili pod nadležnošću Francuske budući da su francuska službena lica imala isključivu i potpunu kontrolu nad brodom i njegovom posadom od trenutka kad je presretnut u međunarodnim vodama. Sud ne smatra da je nadležnost u navedenim predmetima proizlazila samo iz kontrole koju je vršila Država ugovornica nad zgradama, avionom ili brodom u kojima su ta lica bila držana. U takvim je slučajevima odlučujuća fizička vlast i kontrola nad licem o kom je reč...

(γ)  Delotvorna kontrola nad nekim područjem

138. Još jedan izuzetak od načela, po kojem je nadležnost iz člana 1 ograničena na sopstvenu državnu teritoriju, pojavljuje se kada neka Država ugovornica vrši delotvornu kontrolu nad nekim područjem van svoje državne teritorije usled zakonite ili nezakonite vojne akcije. Obaveza Države ugovornice da jemči prava i slobode iz Konvencije na tom području proizlazi iz činjenice da ona tu vrši tu kontrolu, bilo da to čini neposredno, posredstvom vlastitih oružanih snaga ili posredstvom podređene lokalne uprave (vidi st. 62 u navedenoj presudi o preliminarnim prigovorima u predmetu; st. 76 presude Velikog veća u predmetu Kipar protiv Turske, predstavka br. 25781/94, ECHR 2001-IV; st. 70 odluke u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Banković; st. 314-316 u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Ilašku; st. 52 u navedenoj presudi o meritumu u predmetu Loizidou). Kada se ustanovi činjenica o takvoj dominaciji nad teritorijom, nije potrebno utvrđivati da li Država ugovornica vrši podrobnu kontrolu nad politikom i delovanjem podređene lokalne uprave. Činjenica da je dalje postojanje te uprave obezbeđeno vojnom i drugim vrstama podrške Države ugovornice podrazumeva odgovornost te Države za njenu politiku i delovanje. Država koja vrši kontrolu je shodno članu 1 obavezna da u području pod svojom kontrolom jemči kompletan spektar materijalnih prava iz Konvencije i onih dopunskih Protokola koje je ratifikovala. Ona će se smatrati odgovornom za svaku povredu tih prava (vidi st. 76-77 presude u navedenom predmetu Kipar protiv Turske).

139. Pitanje da li neka Država ugovornica vrši ili ne vrši delotvornu kontrolu nad nekim područjem van vlastite teritorije je činjenično pitanje. Prilikom utvrđivanja postojanja delotvorne kontrole, Sud prvenstveno uzima u obzir broj vojnika koje država ima na određenom području (vidi st. 16 i 56 u navedenoj presudi o meritumu u predmetu Loizidou; st. 387 u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Ilašku). I drugi pokazatelji mogu biti od značaja, kao što je stepen do kojeg vojna, ekonomska i politička pomoć koju država pruža lokalnoj podređenoj upravi toj državi obezbeđuje uticaj i kontrolu nad tim regionom (vidi st. 388-394 navedene presude u predmetu Ilašku)....“

c.  Primena navedenih načela na činjenice ovog predmeta

  1. Tužena strana se u velikoj meri oslanjala na argument da se Holandija ne može kriviti za događaje na koje se podnosilac predstavke žalio jer je nadležnost pripadala drugom: bilo Sjedinjenim Državama i Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu zajedno, državama koje su određene kao „okupacione sile“ u Rezoluciji br. 1483 Savet bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija, ili samo Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu, kao „vodećoj naciji“ na jugoistoku Iraka koja je komandovala holandskim kontingentom SFIR.
  2. Radi utvrđivanja nadležnosti shodno Konvenciji, Sud uzima u obzir konkretan činjenični kontekst i relevantna pravila međunarodnog prava.
  3. Prvo, u pogledu međunarodno-pravnih osnova, Sud ističe da status „okupacione sile“ u smislu člana 42 Haškog pravilnika ili odsustvo istog nije samo po sebi od odlučujućeg značaja. Premda je zaključio da je taj koncept relevantan u (navedenoj) presudi u predmetu Al-Skeini (st. 143) i u presudi Al-Džeda protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom] [VV], predstavka br. 27021/08, st. 77, ECHR 2011, Sud nije morao da se poziva na njega kada je utvrdio odgovornost Turske u vezi sa događajima na severu Kipra (vidi, između ostalog, presudu o preliminarnim prigovorima u predmetu Loizidou protiv Turske, izrečenu 23. marta 1995, Serija A br. 310, i u predmetu Kipar protiv Turske [VV], predstavka br. 25781/94, ECHR 2001-IV), ili Rusije u pogledu situacije na moldavskoj teritoriji istočno od Dnjestra (vidi, između ostalog, presude Velikog veća u predmetu Ilašku i drugi protiv Moldavije i Rusije, predstavka br. 48787/99, ECHR 2004‑VII, i u predmetu Katan i drugi protiv Republike Moldavije i Rusije [Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia], predstavke br. 43370/04, 8252/05 i 18454/06, ECHR 2012 (izvodi)).
  4. Pored toga, činjenica da je odluka ili naredba organa strane države izvršena sama po sebi nije dovoljna da Državu ugovornicu oslobodi obaveza koje je preuzela shodno Konvenciji (vidi, mutatis mutandis, st. 40 presude u predmetu Pelegrini protiv Italije [Pellegrini v. Italy], predstavka br. 30882/96, ECHR 2001-VIII, i st. 21 presude u predmetu K. protiv Italije, predstavka br. 38805/97, ECHR 2004-VIII). Tužena strana stoga nije oslobođena svoje „nadležnosti“ u smislu člana 1 Konvencije samo zato što je prihvatila operativnu kontrolu komandanta MND (JI), oficira Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva. Sud primećuje da je Holandija zadržala „punu kontrolu“ nad svojim vojnim osobljem, kao što su ministri spoljnih poslova i odbrane istakli u svom dopisu Parlamentu (vidi stav 57 gore u tekstu).
  5. U Rezoluciji br. 1483 Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija se odražavalo prisustvo u Iraku snaga iz brojnih država članica Ujedinjenih nacija koje deluju pod „Upravom“ (Privremenom koalicionom upravom) koju su činile Sjedinjene Države i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo. Premda se u Rezoluciji potvrđivao „suverenitet i teritorijalni integritet“ Iraka, u njoj su pozvani „svi učesnici“, bez obzira na to da li imaju status Okupacione sile „da se u potpunosti pridržavaju svojih obaveza iz međunarodnog prava, uključujući naročito Ženevske konvencije iz 1949. i Haški pravilnik iz 1907.“ (vidi stav 93 gore u tekstu).
  6. Savet bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija je nakon Rezolucije br. 1483 i u Rezoluciji br. 1511 takođe „naglasio“ suverenitet države Irak. U njoj se države članice Ujedinjenih nacija pozivaju da daju doprinos ovim multinacionalnim snagama radi ponovnog uspostavljanja stabilnosti i bezbednosti i pozivaju se države članice, kao i međunarodne i regionalne organizacije, da doprinesu obuci i opremanju iračke policije i bezbednosnih snaga (vidi stav 94 gore u tekstu).
  7. Praktični razvoj tih multinacionalnih snaga je zasnovan na mreži Memoranduma o razumevanju u kojima su utvrđeni međusobni odnosi raznih naoružanih kontingenata prisutnih u Iraku. U dopisu koji su 6. juna 2003. Donjem domu Parlamenta uputili ministri spoljnih poslova i odbrane (vidi stav 57 gore u tekstu) se naglašava da holandska Vlada zadržava punu komandu nad holandskim kontingentom u Iraku. S obzirom na formulaciju stava 5.2. Memoranduma o razumevanju MND (C-J) (vidi stav 103 gore u tekstu), Sud shvata da su ove informacije bile zasnovane na Memorandumu o razumevanju MND (JI). 
  8. Na osnovu Memoranduma o razumevanju za MND (C-J), kao i izvoda iz Memoranduma o razumevanju za MND –JI, koji je na raspolaganje Sudu dala Država (vidi stav 100 gore u tekstu), čini se da je formulisanje suštinske politike – uključujući, u granicama dogovorenim u obliku Pravila angažovanja priloženim uz Memorandume o razumevanju, i propisivanje posebnih pravila o upotrebi sile - ostalo u isključivoj nadležnosti pojedinačnih država koje su dale trupe, iako su snage nacija koje nisu bile „vodeće nacije“ primale svakodnevna naređenja od stranih komandanata.
  9. Stoga je to predstavljao osnov po kojem je holandska Vlada izdala promemoriju za komandante SFIR i džepno izdanje Pravila angažovanja za holandsko osoblje (vidi stav 59 gore u tekstu).
  10. Mada su holandske trupe bile stacionirane u jednom području u jugoistočnom Iraku gde su snage SFIR bile pod komandom oficira iz Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, Holandija je preuzela potpunu odgovornost za obezbeđivanje tog područja, bez uključivanja ostalih država učesnica, i zadržala je punu komandu nad svojim kontingentom u njemu.
  11. Takođe nije od ključnog značaja ni to što je na kontrolnom punktu nominalno bilo raspoređeno iračko osoblje IKCO. Sud primećuje da shodno Nalogu br. 28 Privremene koalicione uprave („Uspostavljanje Iračkog korpusa civilne odbrane“, vidi stav 99 gore u tekstu), dužnosti IKCO nisu obuhvatale sprovođenje domaćeg zakonodavstva pod upravom iračkih vlasti; zapravo, IKCO je bio podređen i pod nadzorom oficira Koalicionih snaga (vidi st. 1(4)(a), 4(1) i 7).
  12. S obzirom na to, Sud ne može da zaključi da su holandske trupe bile stavljene „na raspolaganje“ ijednoj stranoj sili, bio to Irak, ili Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo ili bilo koja druga sila, ili da su bile „pod isključivim rukovodstvom ili kontrolom“ bilo koje druge države (uporedi, mutatis mutandis, sa članom 6 Članova o odgovornosti država Komisije za međunarodno pravo, vidi stav 98 gore u tekstu; vidi takođe Primenu Konvencije o sprečavanju i kažnjavanju zločina genocida (Bosna i Hercegovina protiv Srbije i Crne Gore), Presuda, Izveštaji MSP 2007, 43, st. 406, stav 97 gore u tekstu)).
  13. Sud će sad razmotriti okolnosti smrti g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda. Konstatuje da je g. Azhar Sabah Džalud preminuo kada su ispaljeni hici na vozilo u kojem se nalazio dok je ono prolazilo kroz kontrolni punkt na kojem je bilo raspoređeno osoblje pod komandom i neposrednim nadzorom oficira holandske Kraljevske kopnene vojske. Kontrolni punkt je bio uspostavljen tokom sprovođenja misije SFIR shodno Rezoluciji br. 1483 Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija (vidi stav 93 gore u tekstu) kako bi se ponovo uspostavili uslovi stabilnosti i bezbednosti povoljni za formiranje delotvorne uprave u zemlji. Sud je uveren da je tužena Strana svoju „nadležnost“ vršila u okvirima svoje misije SFIR a radi ostvarivanja vlasti i kontrole nad licima koja prolaze kroz kontrolni punkt. Pošto je to bio slučaj, Sud konstatuje da je do smrti g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda došlo u okviru „nadležnosti“ Holandije, pri čemu se taj izraz ima tumačiti u smislu člana 1 Konvencije.
  14. Sud je utvrdio nadležnost Holandije. On nije pozvan da utvrdi da li je nadležnost možda istovremeno vršilo Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo ili neka druga Država ugovornica Konvencije.

d.  Pripisivanje

  1. Sud ponavlja da test za utvrđivanje postojanja „nadležnosti“ iz člana 1 Konvencije nikad nije poistovećivan sa testom za utvrđivanje odgovornosti neke države za međunarodno protivpravni akt po opštem međunarodnom pravu (vidi st. 115 presude u navedenom predmetu Katan). Pored toga, Sud je u presudi u predmetu Al-Skeini naglasio da „kad god država posredstvom svojih službenih lica ima vlast i kontrolu a prema tome i nadležnost nad nekim pojedincem, ona u smislu člana 1 ima obavezu da jemči tom pojedincu prava i slobode na osnovu Dela I Konvencije koji su relevantni za situaciju tog pojedinca. Prema tome, prava iz Konvencije se u tom smislu mogu „deliti i prilagođavati“ (uporedi sa odlukom u navedenom predmetu Banković, st. 75).“
  2. Činjenice na kojima je podnosilac predstavke zasnovao svoje pritužbe proizlaze iz činjenja i nečinjenja holandskog vojnog osoblja i istražnih i sudskih organa. Stoga one mogu otvoriti pitanje o odgovornosti Holandije shodno Konvenciji.

e.  Preliminarni prigovor Države

  1. Sud odbacuje preliminarni prigovor Države, koji je razmatrao zajedno sa meritumom (vidi stav 110 gore u tekstu). Sada mora da razmotri valjanost pritužbi podnosioca predstavke.

C.  Navodna povreda obaveze o sprovođenju istrage iz člana 2

  1. Podnosilac predstavke je tvrdio da tužena Država nije valjano ispunila svoje obaveze da istraži smrt njegovog sina a u cilju izvođenja odgovornog lica pred lice pravde. Pozvao se na član 2 Konvencije, po kojem:

„1. Pravo na život svake osobe zaštićeno je zakonom. Niko ne može biti namerno lišen života, sem prilikom izvršenja presude suda kojom je osuđen za zločin za koji je ova kazna predviđena zakonom.

2. Lišenje života se ne smatra protivnim ovom članu ako proistekne iz upotrebe sile koja je apsolutno nužna:

a) radi odbrane nekog lica od nezakonitog nasilja;

b) da bi se izvršilo zakonito hapšenje ili sprečilo bekstvo lica zakonito lišenog slobode;

c) prilikom zakonitih mera koje se preduzimaju u cilju suzbijanja nereda ili pobune.“

           Tužena Država je poricala da je to takve povrede uopšte došlo.

  1. Država intervenijent se nije bavila meritumom pritužbi podnosioca predstavke.

1. Argumenti predočeni pred Sudom

a.  Podnosilac predstavke

  1. Podnosilac predstavke je doveo u pitanje nezavisnost istrage o smrti g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda i postupka koji je usledio.
  2. Prvo je doveo u pitanje nezavisnost jedinice Kraljevske vojne policije u Iraku. Zamolio je Sud da primi k znanju da su članovi te jedinice delili životni prostor sa holandskim trupama SFIR i da su stoga bili u njihovoj neposrednoj blizini. Takođe je izjavio da je jedinica Kraljevske vojne policije bila pod svakodnevnom kontrolom zapovednika holandskog bataljona, s obzirom na to da je tužilac kom je bila u obavezi da podnosi izveštaje bio stacioniran u Holandiji.
  3. Nedostatak nezavisnosti jedinice Kraljevske vojne policije je takođe uticao na odluku javnog tužilaštva da ne goni poručnika A. Ta je odluka u ogromnoj meri bila zasnovana na istrazi Kraljevske vojne policije. Podnosilac predstavke se pozvao na presudu u predmetu Ergi protiv Turske, izrečenu 28. jula 1998, Izveštaji 1998-IV, u kojoj je Sud utvrdio povredu procesnog aspekta člana 2 jer se javni tužilac koji je doneo odluku o odbijanju nadležnosti u velikoj meri oslanjao na izveštaj žandarmerije o incidentu.
  4. I Vojno veće Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu se takođe potpuno oslanjalo na rezultate veoma ograničenih istraga Kraljevske vojne policije. Ono je, međutim, trebalo da naloži istragu koju će sprovesti nezavisni sudija.
  5. Konačno, prisustvo aktivnog oficira vojske u sastavu Vojnog veća Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu je značilo da odluka tog tela ne može biti nezavisna. Podnosilac predstavke se pozvao na presude u predmetu Akoć protiv Turske [Akkoç v. Turkey], predstavke br. 22947/93 i 22948/93, ECHR 2000-X, i u predmetu Inđal [Incal v. Turkey], izrečenu 9. juna 1998, Reports 1998-IV.
  6. Podnosilac predstavke je takođe tvrdio da istraga nije bila adekvatna.
  7. Prvo je istakao propust da se domaćim spisima predmeta prilože iskazi osoblja IKCO koji su bili prisutni na kontrolnom punktu u vreme pucnjave. U izveštaju Kraljevske vojne policije, koji je podnet javnom tužiocu i Vojnom veću Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu, samo se ukazivalo na to da ta lica nisu bila u stanju da kažu išta važno. Zapravo, pojedini pripadnici IKCO su dali podrobne iskaze. Oni su, međutim, bili uskraćeni podnosiocu predstavke i Vojnom veću Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu i predočeni su tek tokom postupka pred Sudom.
  8. Saslušanje g. Davuda Džoada Kathima, kog je podnosilac predstavke opisao kao „ključnog svedoka“ jer je bio jedini civilni svedok i jedini preživeli u incidentu koji nije primao naređenja od poručnika A, bilo je izuzetno površno. Štaviše, njegov iskaz u obliku u kojem su ga zapisali istražitelji Kraljevske vojne policije, nije bio u skladu sa iskazom koji je kasnije istog dana uzelo jedno iračko službeno lice.
  9. Poručnik A. je ispitan tek sedam sati nakon incidenta i nije bio držan odvojeno od drugih svedoka tokom tog perioda. Stoga je imao dovoljno prilike da pre saslušanja o incidentu razgovara s drugim svedocima i da svoj iskaz uskladi sa njihovim
  10. Dan nakon incidenta, poručnik A. je izjavio da je bio u mogućnosti da od zamenika komandanta IKCO pribavi spisak imena pripadnika IKCO koji su pucali iz svog oružja kao i broj metaka koje su ispalili. Činjenica da je on kao glavni osumnjičeni bio u mogućnosti da pribavi ove informacije od ključnog svedoka je takođe uticala na delotvornost istrage. Pored toga, spisak koji je poručnik A. pribavio nije priložen spisima predmeta, uprkos njegovom potencijalnom značaju za ovaj predmet.
  11. Kraljevska vojna policija je izvestan broj sati držala telo g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda ali tokom tog perioda nije izvršena obdukcija. Telo je prevezeno u jednu iračku civilnu bolnicu, gde je obdukcija izvršena u odsustvu službenih lica Kraljevske vojne policije. Nalazi obdukcije, takvi kakvi su bili, su bili priloženi spisima predmeta ali ne i prevedeni.
  12. Prema ostalim forenzičkim dokazima se postupalo na sličan, neoprezan način. Naročito, nije uopšte sačinjen podroban prevod izveštaja o fragmentima metaka izvađenim iz tela.
  13. Konačno, podnosilac predstavke se žalio što najbliži srodnici g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda nisu bili u dovoljnoj meri uključeni u istragu i obaveštavani o njenom napretku. Naročito, nikad nije učinjen nijedan pokušaj da se kontaktira porodica g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda. Niti se iko potrudio da je obavesti o odluci da se ne preuzme gonjenje poručnika A.

b.  Tužena država

  1. Tužena Država je tvrdila da nije bilo nikakve povrede člana 2.
  2. Ona je tvrdila da se ne postavlja pitanje nezavisnosti.
  3. Kraljevska vojna policija je imala sopstveni komandni lanac i prilikom sprovođenja istraga je odgovarala samo Javnom tužilaštvu; zasnivanje odluke da se ne preuzme gonjenje poručnika A na izveštaju o njenoj istrazi bilo je neizbežno. U svakom slučaju, ništa ne ukazuje na nedostatak nezavisnosti Vojnog veća Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu.
  4. Isto tako, istraga je bila dovoljno delotvorna.
  5. Kraljevska vojna policija je pretražila mesto incidenta i obezbedila raspoložive dokaze odmah po dolasku.
  6. Poručnik A, koji je sam izvestio o incidentu, je preuzeo punu odgovornost za pucnjavu od samog početka i ništa nije ukazivalo na to da je uopšte pokušao da manipuliše dokazima.
  7. Pripadnici IKCO su zapravo bili saslušani ali nisu bili u stanju da pruže ikakve informacije od značaja. U svakom slučaju, oni nisu bili osumnjičeni.
  8. Iskazi koje su Kraljevska vojna policija i iračka policija uzeli od g. Davuda Džoada Kathima nisu bili protivrečni, mada je njegova sugestija u potonjem iskazu, da mu je prevodilac rekao da tvrdi da je pucalo samo osoblje IKCO, neuverljiva.
  9. S obzirom na to da u holandskom kampu nije postojao objekat u kojem bi mogla biti izvršena obdukcija, telo je moralo da bude predato Iračanima. Iračke su vlasti odlučile da holandsko osoblje isključe sa obdukcije.
  10. U svakom slučaju, istraga je bila dovoljna jer je tokom nje utvrđeno da je od prisutnih holandskih vojnika samo poručnik A. pucao na automobil, te je krivični postupak bio usredsređen na njega.
  11. Konačno, podnosilac predstavke je u dovoljnoj meri bio uključen u postupak. Obavešten je preko svoje advokatice čim je ona podnela takav zahtev; a informacije koje su mu predočene su bile dovoljne da bi on mogao delotvorno da učestvuje u žalbenom postupku u kojem je osporavao odluku da se protiv poručnika A. ne preuzme gonjenje.

2. Ocena Suda

a.  U pogledu toga da li je samo poručnik A. ispalio hice ili je to učinilo i osoblje IKCO

  1. Sud prvo mora da razmotri tvrdnju podnosioca predstavke da raspoloživi dokazi, uključujući, naročito, iskaze koje su uzeti od osoblja IKCO ali nisu priloženi spisima predmeta u postupku pred domaćim sudom, ukazuju na to da je samo poručnik A. ispalio hice.
  2. Istina je da nijedan pripadnik IKCO nije priznao da je pucao na automobil u kojem se nalazio g. Azhar Sabah Džalud. Sud, međutim, primećuje da je, prema istražiteljima Kraljevske vojne policije, automobil u kojem se g. Azhar Sabah Džalud nalazio bio pogođen mecima različitih kalibara, neki kalibra manjeg od 7 mm dok su drugi bili većeg kalibra (vidi stav 32 gore u tekstu). To deluje u skladu sa upotrebom najmanje dve različite vrste vatrenog oružja, prilično verovatno puške Diemaco C7A1 koja se izdaje holandskoj vojsci (i koja koristi metke kalibra 5,56 mm NATO, vidi stav 50 gore u tekstu) i puške Kalašnjikov koju nose pripadnici IKCO (a koja koristi metke kalibra 7,62, vidi stav 52 gore u tekstu). U tom okolnostima, tvrdnja podnosioca predstavke da je samo poručnik A. ispalio hice ne može biti potvrđena.
  3. U svakom slučaju, na Sudu je samo da razmotri da li su procesne obaveze iz člana 2 Konvencije ispunjene. Stoga nema potrebe da u pogledu ovog pitanja utvrđuje činjenično stanje.

b.  Relevantna načela

  1. Kao što je Sud utvrdio u svojoj gore navedenoj presudi Al-Skeini i drugi:

„163.  Opšta zakonska zabrana proizvoljnog ubijanja od strane službenih lica države ne bi bila delotvorna u praksi kad ne bi postojao postupak za preispitivanje zakonitosti upotrebe smrtonosne sile koju su koristile državni organi. Obaveza da se zaštiti pravo na život na osnovu ove odredbe, tumačena zajedno sa opštom obavezom države u smislu člana 1 Konvencije da „jemče svakome u svojoj nadležnosti prava i slobode određene u (...) Konvenciji“, po implikaciji iziskuje neki oblik delotvorne službene istrage kada su pojedinci ubijeni usled upotrebe sile, inter alios, službenih lica države (vidi, presudu u navedenom predmetu Meken [McCann], st. 161). Osnovna svrha takve istrage je da obezbedi delotvornu primenu domaćih zakona koji štite pravo na život i, u predmetima u koje su umešana službena lica ili organi države, da obezbedi da oni odgovaraju za smrtne slučajeve koji su se desili pod njihovom odgovornošću (vidi presudu Velikog veća u predmetu Načova i drugi protiv Bugarske [Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria], predstavke br. 43577/98 i 43579/98, st. 110, ECHR 2005-VII). Međutim, istraga mora biti i dovoljno široka da bi omogućila istražnim organima da uzmu u obzir ne samo postupke službenih lica države koji su neposredno upotrebili smrtonosnu silu nego i ukupne okolnosti, uključujući pitanja kao što je planiranje i kontrola operacija o kojima je reč, kada je to nužno da bi se utvrdilo da li se država povinovala obavezama iz člana 2 da bi zaštitila život (vidi, po implikaciji, st. 150 i 162 u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Meken i drugi; st. 128 presude u predmetu Hju Džordan protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom], predstavka br. 24746/94, ECHR 2001-III (izvodi); st. 143 i 151 navedene presude u predmetu Meker [McKerr]; st. 100-125 presude u predmetu Šenahan protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Shanaghan v. The United Kingdom], predstavka br. 37715/97, od 4. maja 2001; st. 77-78 presude u predmetu Finukejn protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Finucane v. the United Kingdom], predstavka br. 29178/95, ECHR 2003-VIII; st. 114-115 navedene presude u predmetu Načova; i takođe, mutatis mutandis, st. 71 presude u predmetu Cekov protiv Bugarske [Tzekov v. Bulgaria], predstavka br. 45500/99, od 23. februara 2006).

164. Sud je već zauzeo stav da procesna obaveza iz člana 2 važi i u teškim bezbednosnim uslovima, uključujući u kontekstu oružanog sukoba (vidi, među ostalim primerima, st. 81 presude u predmetu Guleć protiv Turske [Güleç v. Turkey], od 27. jula 1998, Izveštaji o presudama i odlukama 1998-IV; st. 79 i 82 presude u predmetu Ergi protiv Turske, od 28. jula 1998, Izveštaji 1998-IV; st. 85-90 i 309-320 i 326-330 presude u predmetu Ahmet Uzkan i drugi protiv Turske [Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey], predstavka br. 21689/93, od 6. aprila 2004; st. 180 i 210 presude u predmetu Isajeva protiv Rusije [Isayeva v. Russia], predstavka br. 57950/00, od 24. februara 2005; st. 39-51 presude u predmetu Kanlibaš protiv Turske [Kaniblaş v. Turkey], predstavka br. 32444/96, od 8. decembra 2005). Jasno je da istražitelji mogu naići na prepreke kada je do smrti koja treba da bude istražena shodno članu 2 došlo u okolnostima opšteg nasilja, oružanog sukoba ili pobune, i, kao što je zapazio specijalni izvestilac Ujedinjenih nacija ...., konkretna ograničenja mogu iziskivati primenu manje delotvornih istražnih mera ili mogu prouzrokovati kašnjenje istrage (vidi, na primer, st. 121 presude u predmetu Bazorkina protiv Rusije, predstavka br. 69481/01, od 27. jula 2006). Ipak, obaveza iz člana 2 da se zaštiti život podrazumeva da se čak i u teškim bezbednosnim uslovima moraju preduzeti svi razumni koraci kako bi se obezbedilo sprovođenje delotvorne, nezavisne istrage o navodnim povredama prava na život (vidi, među ostalim primerima, st. 86-92 presude u predmetu Kaja protiv Turske [Kaya v. Turkey] od 19. februara 1998, Izveštaji o presudama i odlukama 1998-I; st. 82-85 u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Ergi; st. 101-110 presude Velikog veća u predmetu Tanrıkulu protiv Turske, predstavka br. 23763/94, ECHR 1999-IV; st. 156-166 presude u predmetu Hašijev i Akajeva protiv Rusije [Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia], predstavka br. 57942/00 i 57945/00, od 24. februara 2005; st. 215-224 presude u navedenom predmetu Isajeva; st. 158-165 presude u predmetu Musajev i drugi protiv Rusije [Musayev and Others v. Russia], predstavke br. 57941/00, 58699/00 i 60403/00, od 26. jula 2007).

165. Koji će oblik istrage postići cilj člana 2 može varirati u zavisnosti od okolnosti. Međutim, koji se god modalitet primenio, vlasti moraju da postupaju na sopstvenu inicijativu čim saznaju za slučaj. One ne mogu prepustiti najbližim srodnicima preminulog lica inicijativu da podnesu formalnu prijavu ili da preuzumu odgovornost za pokretanje istražnog postupka (vidi st. 310 u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Ahmet Uzkan i drugi; i st. 210 u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Isayeva). Građanski postupak, koji se pokreće na inicijativu najbližeg srodnika a ne vlasti, i koji ne obuhvata identifikaciju ili kažnjavanje nijednog navodnog izvršioca, se ne može uzeti u obzir prilikom procene da li je država poštovala svoje procesne obaveze iz člana 2. Konvencije (vidi, na primer, st. 141 u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Hju Džordan). Osim toga, procesna obaveza države iz člana 2, ne može biti ispunjena samom dosuđivanjem obeštećenja (vidi st. 121 navedene presude u predmetu Meker; st. 117 navedene presude u predmetu Bazorkina).

166. Kao što je navedeno, istraga mora biti delotvorna u smislu da može dovesti do utvrđivanja da li je upotrebljena sila bila opravdana u datim okolnostima, i do identifikacije i kažnjavanja odgovornih. Ne radi se o obavezi koja se odnosi na rezultat, nego na sredstva. Vlasti moraju preduzimati razumne korake koji su im na raspolaganju da bi obezbedile dokaze koji se odnose na incident, uključujući, između ostalog, izjave očevidaca, forenzičke dokaze i, po potrebi, obdukciju kojom se obezbeđuju potpun i precizan izveštaj o povredama i objektivna analiza kliničkih nalaza, uključujući uzrok smrti. Svaka manjkavost istrage kojom se ugrožava njen kapacitet za utvrđivanje uzroka smrti, ili odgovornosti jednog ili više lica, dovodi do opasnosti da ona ne ispuni ovaj standard (vidi st. 312 u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Ahmet Uzkan i drugi; st. 212 u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Isajeva i presude koje su tu navedene).

167. Da bi istraga o protivpravnom ubistvu koje su navodno izvršila službena lica države bila delotvorna, potrebno je da lica koja su odgovorna za istragu i koja je sprovode budu nezavisna od onih umešanih u događaje. To podrazumeva ne samo odsustvo hijerarhijske ili institucionalne veze već i praktičnu nezavisnost (vidi, na primer, st. 104 u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Šenahan). Zahtev vezan za brzinu i razumnu ekspeditivnost se podrazumeva u ovom kontekstu. Iako mogu postojati prepreke ili poteškoće koje u određenim situacijama sprečavaju napredovanje istrage, brzo reagovanje vlasti tokom istraživanja upotrebe smrtonosne sile se opšte uzev može smatrati suštinski važnim za očuvanje poverenja javnosti u njihovu privrženost vladavini prava i za sprečavanje bilo kakvih percepcija da one saučestvuju ili tolerišu protivpravna dela. Iz istih razloga mora postojati dovoljan element javnog uvida u istragu ili njene rezultate kako bi se obezbedila odgovornost u praksi, kao i u teoriji. Potreban stepen uvida javnosti može varirati od predmeta do predmeta. Međutim, najbliži srodnik žrtve u svim slučajevima mora biti uključen u postupak u meri u kojoj je to nužno za zaštitu njegovih legitimnih interesa (vidi st. 311-314 navedene presude u predmetu Ahmet Uzkan i drugi; st. 211-214 navedene presude u predmetu Isajeva i predmete koji su tu navedeni).“

c.  Nezavisnost istrage

i) Jedinica Kraljevske vojne policije u Iraku

  1. Podnosilac predstavke je doveo u pitanje nezavisnost jedinice Kraljevske vojne policije koja je sprovela prvobitnu istragu zato što su njeni pripadnici živeli u neposrednoj blizini osoblja Kraljevske kopnene vojske koje krivi za smrt svog sina. Država je tvrdila da je Kraljevska vojna policija dovoljno nezavisna.
  2. Sud primećuje da nezavisnost, a time i delotvornost istrage o navodnom protivpravnom lišenju života može biti dovedena u pitanje ako postoje bliski odnosi između istražitelja i onih koji su pod istragom (uporedi sa st. 337 presude Velikog veća u predmetu Ramsahai i drugi protiv Holandije, predstavka br. 52391/99, ECHR 2007-II).
  3. Država nije poricala da je u vreme događaja jedinica Kraljevske vojne policije delila životni prostor sa osobljem Kraljevske kopnene vojske. Međutim, nema sugestija o postojanju okolnosti, niti su one postale očigledne, koje bi Sud mogle navesti na zaključak da je to samo po sebi uticalo na nezavisnost jedinice Kraljevske vojne policije u meri koja bi umanjila kvalitet njenih istraga.
  4. Niti Sud konstatuje da je utvrđeno da fizička razdaljina između jedinice Kraljevske vojne policije stacionirane u Iraku i javnog tužioca zaduženog za njene istrage, čije je sedište bilo u Arnhemu, dovela do podređivanja jedinice Kraljevske vojne policije zapovedniku bataljona holandske Kraljevske kopnene vojske na svakodnevnoj osnovi. Podnosilac predstavke nije podneo nikakve dokaze koji bi mogli da potkrepe ovu sugestiju.

ii) Oslanjanje na izveštaje Kraljevske vojne policije

  1. Podnosilac predstavke je tvrdio da se javno tužilaštvo isuviše oslanjalo na izveštaje Kraljevske vojne policije. Država je ovo osporila.
  2. Javni tužioci se neizbežno oslanjaju na informacije i podršku policije. To samo po sebi nije dovoljno za zaključak da nisu u dovoljnoj meri nezavisni od policije (vidi, mutatis mutandis, st. 344 navedene presude u predmetu Ramsahai).
  3. Štaviše, jedinica Kraljevske vojne policije je upravo i bila stacionirana u Iraku kako bi vršila policijske dužnosti kao što su ove o kojima je reč. Stoga oslanjanje javnog tužioca na njene izveštaje samo po sebi ne otvara nijedno pitanje.
  4. Sud shvata da je suština ove pritužbe da istraga nije bila delotvorna a da izveštaji o istrazi nisu bili pouzdani. Posebno će razmotriti zabrinutost podnosioca predstavke u pogledu kvaliteta istrage Kraljevske vojne policije.

iii) Vojni član Vojnog veća Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu

  1. Podnosilac predstavke je tvrdio da je na nezavisnost Vojnog veća Apelacionog suda uticalo prisustvo aktivnog oficira vojske u njegovim redovima. Država je tvrdila da je nezavisnost Vojnog veća Apelacionog suda zagarantovana.
  2. Sud je u ovom predmetu uzeo u obzir sastav Vojnog veća u celini. Ono zaseda u tročlanom veću koje čine dva civilna člana Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu i jedan vojni član. Vojni član je visok oficir kvalifikovan za sudsku funkciju; on biva unapređen u počasni mornarički, vazduhoplovni ili čin generala ukoliko već nema taj čin (vidi stav 64 gore u tekstu). Pri vršenju sudske funkcije, ne podleže vojnoj vlasti i disciplini; ima istu funkcionalnu nezavisnost i nepristrasnost kao i civilne sudije (vidi stav 65 gore u tekstu). S obzirom na to, Sud je spreman da prihvati da Vojno veće obezbeđuje garantije koje su dovoljne u svrhu člana 2 Konvencije.

d.  Delotvornost istrage

i) Iskazi osoblja IKCO

  1. Podnosilac predstavke se u svojoj predstavci žalio na propust Kraljevske vojne policije da uzme iskaze od osoblja IKCO koje je čuvalo kontrolni punkt u vreme oružanog incidenta. U izveštaju podnetom Vojnom veću Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu se samo navodi da oni nisu pružili „nikakve značajne informacije“ (vidi stav 25 gore u tekstu).
  2. Nakon što je Veće ustupilo nadležnost Velikom veću, Država je podnela službeni zapisnik sa saslušanja pripadnika IKCO koja su sproveli oficiri Kraljevske vojne policije (vidi stav 38 gore u tekstu). Proizlazi da ovaj dokument sadrži informacije koje su mogle biti od pomoći Vojnom veću Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu, uključujući podatke o broju hitaca koje je svaki pripadnik IKCO ispalio i količinu municije koja mu je ostala, i mnogo podrobniju verziju iskaza prevodioca g. Valida Abda Al Husaina Mađieda.
  3. Kao što je Sud u brojnim navratima konstatovao, upotreba izraza „apsolutno nužna“ iz člana 2, st. 2 ukazuje na nužnost primene strožeg i uverljivijeg testa neophodnosti nego onog koji se inače primenjuje kada se utvrđuje da li je neki postupak države „neophodan u demokratskom društvu“ iz stava 2 članova 8-11 Konvencije. Naročito, sila koja se primenjuje mora biti strogo srazmerna ostvarenju ciljeva iz člana 2, st. 2, t.(a), (b) i (c) (vidi, među mnogim drugim presudama, st. 148 presude u predmetu Meken i drugi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom], od 27. septembra 1995, Serija A, predstavka br. 324; st. 93 presude u predmetu Keli i drugi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom], predstavka br. 30054/96, od 4. maja 2001; i st. 173 presude u predmetu Isajeva protiv Rusije, predstavka br. 57950/00, od 24. februara 2005). Sledi da nijedna domaća istraga ne može da ispuni standarde člana 2 Konvencije ako tokom nje nije utvrđeno da upotreba smrtonosne sile od strane službenih lica države nije prekoračila stepen koji su okolnosti iziskivale (vidi st. 87 presude u predmetu Kaja protiv Turske od 19. februara 1998, Izveštaji 1998-I).
  4. Premda istraga mora biti delotvorna u smislu da može dovesti do identifikacije i, ako je to nužno, kažnjavanja odgovornih (vidi, između ostalog, st. 107 presude u predmetu Hju Džordan protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, predstavka br. 24746/94, ECHR 2001-III (izvodi); st. 113 presude u predmetu Meker protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, predstavka br. 28883/95, ECHR 2001-III; st. 69 presude u predmetu Finukejn protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, predstavka br. 29178/95, ECHR 2003-VIII; st. 74 presude Velikog veća u predmetu Macarakis protiv Grčke [Makaratzis v. Greece], predstavka br. 50385/99, ECHR 2004-XI; st. 223 presude Velikog veća u predmetu Tahsin Ađar protiv Turske [Tahsin Acar v. Turkey], predstavka br. 26307/95, ECHR 2004-III; i st. 301 presude u predmetu Đulijani i Gađo protiv Italije [Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy], predstavka br. 23458/02 ECHR 2011), Sud takođe ističe da je istraga, koja je dovoljna da bi se utvrdilo da li je upotrebljena sila bila opravdana u datim okolnostima, od suštinskog značaja za ostvarivanje prava na odbranu svakog službenog lica države koje se goni u krivičnom postupku koji sledi (vidi, između ostalog i mutatis mutandis, st. 36 presude u predmetu Edvards protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Edwards v. the United Kingdom], od 16.decembra 1992, Serija A br. 247-B; st. 600 presude Velikog veća u predmetu Rou i Dejvis protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Rowe and Davis v. the United Kingdom], predstavka br. 28901/95, ECHR 2000-II; st. 112 presude u predmetu I.Dž.L. i drugi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [I.J.L. and Others v. the United Kingdom], predstavke br. 29522/95, 30056/96 i 30574/96, ECHR 2000-IX; i st. 41 presude u predmetu Dauset protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Dowsett v. the United Kingdom], predstavka br. 39482/98, ECHR 2003-VII).
  5. Vojno veće Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu je bilo dužno da razmotri da li je poručnik A. postupao u skladu sa uputstvima koja mu je izdao nadležni organ (član 38 Vojnog krivičnog zakonika, vidi stav 66 gore u tekstu). Uputstvo o upotrebi sile poručnika A, izneto u džepnom izdanju Pravila angažovanja (vidi stav 57 gore u tekstu) je pod zaglavljem „minimalna sila“ obuhvatalo i sledeći tekst (loc. cit, stav 14):

„Ako morate da otvorite vatru, morate da:

- otvarate samo ciljanu paljbu;

- ne ispaljujete više hitaca nego što je neophodno; i

- obustavite paljbu čim situacija to dozvoli..“ 

  1. Vojno veće Apelacionog suda se ograničilo na utvrđivanje sledeće činjenice: da je poručnik A. pogrešno reagovao na prijateljsku vatru sa suprotne strane puta i konstatovalo je da je poručnik A. iz tog razloga imao pravo da se poziva na nužnu samoodbranu (vidi stav 48 gore u tekstu). Ono se, međutim, nije bavilo aspektima od značaja za pitanje da li je poručnik A. postupao u okviru svojih uputstava u pogledu srazmernosti sile koju je upotrebio. Ono, naročito, nije donelo nikakav zaključak u pogledu toga da li je ispaljeno više hitaca nego što je bilo neophodno i da li paljba obustavljena čim je situacija to dozvolila.
  2. Sud zauzima stav da bi valjana procena u tom smislu Vojnom veću Apelacionog suda u Arnhemu nalagala vršenje uvida u službeni zapisnik o saslušanju pripadnika IKCO koje su sproveli oficiri Kraljevske vojne policije (vidi stav 38 gore u tekstu). Ovako, odsustvo tog dokumenta iz spisa pred Apelacionim sudom je ozbiljno umanjilo delotvornost njegovog razmatranja tog predmeta.

ii) Saslušanje g. Davuda Džoama Kathima

  1. Podnosilac predstavke je tvrdio da se sažetost iskaza koji je dao vozač automobila, g. Davud Džoad Kathim u obliku u kojem ga je zapisao istražitelj Kraljevske vojne policije (vidi stav 23 gore u tekstu), takođe odrazila na kvalitet istrage. Ukazao je na razlike između ovog iskaza i iskaza koji je g. Davud Džoad Kathim kasnije tog dana dao jednom iračkom službenom licu (vidi stav 37 gore u tekstu). Država je pak tvrdila da sve razlike između ta dva iskaza nisu dovoljne da izazovu sumnju u delotvornost istrage.
  2. Sud smatra da se nikakav zaključak ne može izvesti iz sažetosti prvog iskaza g. Davuda Džoada Kathima kao takvog. Razlike između prvog i drugog iskaza mogu opravdati sumnje u pouzdanost bilo kog od ta dva iskaza u obliku u kojem su zapisani, ali Sud ne može samo na osnovu toga da zaključi da istraga nije bila adekvatna.

iii) Kašnjenje u saslušanju poručnika A.

  1. Podnosilac predstavke je Sudu ukazao na kašnjenje u saslušanju poručnika A. posle incidenta kao i na to da nije bio odvojen od drugih svedoka incidenta tokom tog perioda. Država je tvrdila da poručnik A. nije učinio ništa čime bi omeo istragu.
  2. Poručnik A. je saslušan tek pošto se osoblje Kraljevske vojne policije na licu mesta nalazilo već više od šest sati (vidi stav 28 gore u tekstu). Iako, kako Država s pravom ukazuje, nema naznaka da se radi o obmani s njegove strane (ili bilo kog drugog holandskog vojnika), tokom tolikog perioda vremena je imao dovoljno prilike da u dosluhu sa drugima iskrivi istinu, ako je bio nameren da to učini. Čini se da nisu preduzete nikakve mere predostrožnosti da bi se ovo sprečilo.
  3. Kao i u navedenoj presudi u predmetu Ramsahai, Sud i ovde konstatuje da sama činjenica da nisu preduzeti odgovarajući koraci kako bi se umanjila opasnost od takvog dosluha predstavlja manjkavost u pogledu adekvatnosti istrage ( cit., st. 330).

iv) Spisak osoblja IKCO koje je pucalo iz svog oružja

  1. Podnosilac predstavke je tvrdio da je poručnik A. očigledno pribavio od zamenika komandanta IKCO spisak sa imenima pripadnika IKCO koji su pucali iz svog oružja i broj metaka koji su ispalili (vidi stav 31 gore u tekstu).
  2. Činjenica da je poručnik A. bio u mogućnosti da pribavi taj spisak sama po sebi ne otvara nikakva pitanja. On je do dolaska komandanta čete bio po činu najviši oficir Koalicije na licu mesta, a pored toga je bio odgovoran ne samo za holandsku patrolu već i za prisutno osoblje IKCO. Sledi da je poručnik A bio dužan da preduzme mere u cilju olakšanja istrage.
  3. Međutim, ovaj spisak, kada je postao dostupan, je trebalo da bude uvršćen u spise predmeta. Informacije koje je sadržao su se mogle pokazati korisnim, naročito u poređenju sa iskazima koji su uzeti od samih pripadnika IKCO. Sud konstatuje da istraga u ovom pogledu nije bila adekvatna.

v) Obdukcija

  1. Podnosilac predstavke se žalio na uslove u kojima je bila izvršena obdukcija i na izveštaj o njoj. Država je tvrdila da je obdukcija bila najdelotvornija moguća u datim okolnostima.
  2. Sud primećuje da se čini da je obdukcija izvršena u odsustvu bilo kog stručnog holandskog službenog lica. Ništa se ne zna o kvalifikacijama iračkog patologa koji ju je sproveo.
  3. Štaviše, izveštaj patologa je patio od ozbiljnih nedostataka; bio je izuzetno kratak, nije bio podroban i nije čak sadržao nikakve slike.
  4. Opšte uzev, čini se da nije ni razmotren neki alternativni aranžman za obdukciju. Na primer, ne čini se verovatnim da nijedna ili obe Okupacione sile ili možda neka druga koaliciona sila nije imala mogućnosti i kvalifikovano osoblje na raspolaganju.
  5. Sud stoga konstatuje da je istraga bila manjkava i u pogledu ovog pitanja.

vi) Fragmenti metaka

  1. Podnosilac predstavke je kritikovao nepostojanje podrobnog izveštaja o bilo kakvom ispitivanju fragmenata metaka. Država je bila mišljenja da je istraga uprkos tome bila adekvatna.
  2. Sud primećuje da su iz tela g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda izvađeni delići metala, za koje je utvrđeno da predstavljaju fragmente metaka. Čini se da su im od tog trenutka holandski istražitelji izgubili svaki trag (vidi stav 36 gore u tekstu).
  3. Bez obzira na to da li je postojala mogućnost da će se iz fragmenata metaka dobiti korisne informacije, Sud smatra da je neprihvatljivo to što oni nisu pohranjeni i ispitani u valjanim uslovima, po potrebi u Holandiji. 
  4. Istraga nije bila adekvatna i iz ovog razloga.

e.  Navodni propust Države da podnosioca predstavke uključi u istragu

  1. Podnosilac predstavke je tvrdio da nije učinjen nikakav napor da se kontaktiraju najbliži srodnici preminulog.
  2. Država je tvrdila da su istražitelji holandske Kraljevske vojne policije razgovarali sa podnosiocem predstavke i drugim najbližim srodnicima u vreme obdukcije, ali da su otišli kada im se učinilo da se porodica sprema da ih uzme za taoce.
  3. Podnosilac predstavke je osporavao tvrdnju Države, koja ne može biti potvrđena jer nije podneto nikakvo prikladno pisano svedočanstvo.
  4. Bez obzira na to da li je ijedna od ovih verzija događaja istinita, Sud zaključuje da je utvrđeno da je podnosiocu predstavke na njegov zahtev odobren uvid u spise predmeta istražitelja; on je zapravo bio u položaju da ih podnese Sudu. Uvid u spise predmeta je takođe bio dovoljan da mu omogući da pokrene postupak shodno članu 12 Zakonika o krivičnom postupku, tokom kojeg je bio u položaju da veoma delotvorno osporava odluku da se ne preuzme gonjenje poručnika A.
  5. Sud stoga utvrđuje da ne postoje nikakvi pokazatelji da je postupak bio manjkav u pogledu ovog pitanja (vidi st. 349-350 navedene presude u predmetu Ramsahai).

f.  Zaključak

  1. Sud je spreman da u razumnoj meri uzme u obzir relativno teške uslove u kojima su holandski vojnici i istražitelji morali da rade. Naročito se mora priznati da su bili angažovani u jednoj stranoj zemlji, koju je tek trebalo ponovo izgraditi nakon posledica neprijateljstava, zemlji čiji su im jezik i kultura bili strani, i čije je stanovništvo – kao što svedoči prvi oružani incident 21. aprila 2004. godine (vidi stav 10 gore u tekstu) – očigledno obuhvatalo i naoružane neprijateljske elemente.
  2. Uprkos tome, Sud mora da zaključi da istraga okolnosti smrti g. Azhara Sabaha Džaluda iz sledećih razloga nije ispunila standarde iz člana 2 Konvencije: prvo, dokumenti koji su sadržali važne podatke nisu bili stavljeni na raspolaganje sudskim organima i podnosiocu predstavke (zvaničan zapisnik iskaza koji su uzeti od osoblja IKCO i spisak koji je sastavio poručnik A, a u kojem je zabeleženo koji su pripadnici IKCO pucali iz svog oružja i broj metaka koji je svaki od njih ispalio); drugo, jer nisu preduzete nikakve mere predostrožnosti u cilju sprečavanja dosluha poručnika A. sa drugim svedocima događaja pre no što je saslušan; treće, jer nije učinjen nikakav pokušaj da se obdukcija izvrši pod uslovima koji su priličili istrazi o mogućoj krivičnoj odgovornosti službenog lica države, i jer je izveštaj o obdukciji bio neadekvatan; i, četvrto, jer su važni materijalni dokazi – fragmenti metaka izvađeni iz tela – zatureni pod nepoznatim okolnostima. Ne može se zaključiti da su ovi propusti bili neizbežni, čak i u naročito teškim uslovima koji su preovlađivali u Iraku u vreme događaja.
  3. Navedeni propusti navode Sud da utvrdi da nisu ispunjene procesne obaveze iz člana 2 Konvencije.

II. PRIMENA ČLANA 41 KONVENCIJE

  1. Shodno članu 41 Konvencije:

„Kada Sud utvrdi prekršaj Konvencije ili protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo Visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo delimičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj stranci.“

  1. Podnosilac predstavke je podneo zahteve za naknadu nematerijalne štete i troškova i izdataka.
  2. Država intervenijent nije komentarisala zahteve za pravično zadovoljenje podnosioca predstavke.

A.  Šteta

  1. Podnosilac predstavke je zamolio Sud da Državi naloži da „u meri u kojoj je to moguće, ispravi učinjene povrede člana 2 putem sprovođenja druge, podrobne istrage o smrti [njegovog] sina, da goni one koji su u nju umešani i da podnosioca predstavke u potpunosti obaveštava i o istrazi i o gonjenju, ako do njega dođe“. Takođe je podneo zahtev za odštetu u iznosu od 25.000 evra (EUR) na ime nematerijalne štete.
  2. Tužena Država je smatrala da nalog koji je podnosilac predstavke zahtevao nije prikladan. Sudu je prepustila da o novčanoj naknadi odluči po svom nahođenju, pri čemu je istakla da su dosuđene naknade u predmetu AlSkeini bile niže.
  3. U pogledu zahteva podnosioca predstavke da naloži delotvornu istragu za kojom će uslediti gonjenje, Sud ponavlja opšte načelo da je tužena Država slobodna da odabere sredstvo pomoću kojeg će ispuniti svoju zakonsku obavezu iz člana 46 Konvencije, pod uslovom da je to sredstvo u skladu sa zaključcima iznetim u presudi Suda i da Sud samo u izuzetnim okolnostima ukazuje na korake koje treba preduzeti (vidi, na primer, st. 202203 presude Velikog veća u predmetu Asanidze protiv Gruzije [Assanidze v. Georgia], predstavka br. 71503/01, ECHR 2004-II, i st. 238-239 presude Velikog veća u predmetu Huten-Čapska protiv Poljske [Hutten-Czapska v. Poland], predstavka br. 35014/97, ECHR 2006-VIII). Shodno tome, Sud smatra da je na Komitetu ministara Saveta Evrope da u skladu sa članom 46 Konvencije razmotri pitanja vezana za to da li Država mora bilo šta, i šta konkretno, praktično da učini da bi postupila u skladu sa presudom (vidi, među brojnim drugim presudama, st. 181 u presudi Al-Skeini).
  4. U pogledu novčanih zahteva, Sud ističe da je u presudi u predmetu Al-Skeini, koji se takođe odnosio na povredu procesnog aspekta člana 2, podnosiocima predstavke dosudio iznose koje su zahtevali (ibid, st. 182). Sud u ovom predmetu smatra da je pravično da podnosiocu predstavke dosudi iznos koji je zahtevao, odnosno 25.000 EUR.

B.  Troškovi i izdaci

  1. Podnosilac predstavke je zahtevao naknadu od ukupno 13.200 EUR za 120 sati rada njegovih advokata. Izjavio je, međutim, da je podneo zahtev za domaću pravnu pomoć i da neće i dalje zahtevati naknadu ovog iznosa ako mu ta pomoć bude odobrena.
  2. Podnosilac predstavke je pored toga podneo račun s troškovima puta i boravka koje su njegova dva pravna zastupnika imali kako bi prisustvovali raspravi i za poštarinu. Zbir ove dve sume, za koje su podnete priznanice, je iznosio 1.372,06 EUR.
  3. Tužena Država je tvrdila da ovi zahtevi ne stoje jer su iznosi čija se naknada zahtevala pokriveni domaćom pravnom pomoći i odbila je da komentariše dodatni iznos.
  4. Podnosilac predstavke nije obavestio Sud da je odbijen njegov zahtev u vezi sa iznosom iz stava 236 gore u tekstu. Stoga se ne može utvrditi da se odnosi na „stvarno pretrpljene“ izdatke. S obzirom na to, ne može se dosuditi odgovarajuća naknada.
  5. Sud u potpunosti odobrava dodatni zahtev iz stava 237 gore u tekstu.

C. Zatezna kamata

  1. Sud smatra da zatezna kamata treba da bude zaračunata po stopi jednakoj graničnoj aktivnoj kamatnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke uvećanoj za tri procentna poena.

 

IZ OVIH RAZLOGA, SUD JEDNOGLASNO

  1. Spaja preliminarni prigovor Države meritumu;

  2. Proglašava predstavku dopuštenom;

  3. Zaključuje da je g. Azhar Sabah Džalud potpadao pod nadležnost tužene Države i odbacuje preliminarni prigovor Države;

  4. Zaključuje da je prekršena procesna obaveza iz člana 2 Konvencije;

  5. Zaključuje

(a) da tužena Država treba u roku od tri meseca da podnosiocu predstavke plati 25.000 EUR (dvadeset hiljada evra) na ime nematerijalne štete, kao i iznos svih naplativih poreza na taj iznos;

(b) da tužena Država treba u roku od tri meseca da podnosiocu predstavke plati 1.372,06 EUR (jednu hiljadu tri stotine sedamdeset dva evra i šest centi) na ime troškova i izdataka, kao i iznos svih naplativih poreza na taj iznos;

(c)  da od isteka gore navedena tri meseca do isplate bude zaračunata zatezna kamata na naveden iznos po stopi jednakoj graničnoj aktivnoj kamatnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke uvećanoj za tri procentna poena;

  1. Odbacuje ostatak zahteva za pravično zadovoljenje podnosioca predstavke.

 

Presuda sačinjena na engleskom i francuskom jeziku i izrečena na javnoj raspravi u zgradi Suda u Strazburu 20. novembra 2014. godine, u skladu sa pravilom 77 st. 2 i 3 Poslovnika Suda.

Majkl O’Bojl                              Din Špilman

zamenik sekretara                   predsednik

 

U skladu sa članom 45, stav 2 Konvencije i pravilom 74, stav 2 Poslovnika Suda, uz ovu presudu su priložena sledeća izdvojena mišljenja:

  • Saglasno mišljenje sudije Špilman, kojem se pridružio sudija Raimondi;
  • Zajedničko saglasno mišljenje sudija Kasadevala, Bero-Lefevr, Šikute, Hirvele, Lopez Gere, Šaja i Silvis; (c) Saglasno mišljenje sudije Motok.

D.S.

M.O’B.

Izdvojena mišljenja nisu prevedena, ali su navedena na engleskom i francuskom jeziku u zvaničnoj verziji ili verzijama presude. Zvanična verzija presude može se naći u bazi podataka HUDOC koja sadrži predmete iz sudske prakse Evropskog suda.

 [1] U stvari, 7,62x39 mm.

[2] Transkripcija holandskom ortografijom.

[3] Kraljevinu Holandiju čine autonomne “zemlje”; u to vreme, to su bile Evropska Holandija (Uža Holandija), i ostrvo Aruba i Holandski Antili (oba u Karibima).

 

 _____________________________________

Prevod je nastao uz podršku Fiducijarnog fonda za ljudska prava Saveta Evrope (www.coe.int/humanrightstrustfund). 

Prevod presude preuzet sa https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/

 

 

 

GRAND CHAMBER

CASE OF JALOUD v. THE NETHERLANDS

(Application no. 47708/08) 

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

20 November 2014

 This judgment is final but may be subject to editorial revision.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

PROCEDURE

THE FACTS

A. The circumstances of the case
1. The death of Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud
2. The investigation
3. Domestic proceedings

B. Weapons used in the incident
1. Diemaco C7A1
2. Kalashnikov AK-47

C. The Netherlands military presence in Iraq
1. General background
2. The letter to the Lower House of Parliament
3. Royal Military Constabulary presence in Iraq

D. Instructions to Netherlands SFIR personnel
1. The aide-mémoire for SFIR commanders
2. The SFIR soldier’s card

E. The Royal Military Constabulary

F. The Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal

G. Relevant domestic law and procedure

1. The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
2. The Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht)
3. The Military Criminal Code (Wetboek van Militair Strafrecht)
4. The Military Criminal Procedure Act (Wet Militaire Strafrechtspraak)
5. The Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering)

H. Relevant domestic case-law
1. The Eric O. case
2. The Mustafić and Nuhanović cases

I. Other domestic documents
1. Evaluation report on the application of military criminal procedure in operations abroad
2. The report of the Van den Berg Committee
3. The final evaluation report

J. Relevant international law
1. The Hague Regulations
2. The Fourth Geneva Convention
3. United Nations Security Council Resolutions
4. Case-law of the International Court of Justice
5. The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility

K. Documents relevant to the occupation of Iraq
1. Coalition Provisional Authority Order no. 28
2. The MND (SE) (Multinational Division, South East) Memorandum of Understanding
3. The MND (C-S) (Multinational Division, Central-South) Memorandum of Understanding

COMPLAINTS

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION

A. Admissibility
1. The Government’s preliminary objection
2. Conclusion on admissibility

B. Jurisdiction
1. Arguments before the Court
2. The Court’s assessment

C. Alleged breach of the investigative duty under Article 2
1. Arguments before the Court
2. The Court’s assessment

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
A. Damage
B. Costs and expenses
C. Default interest

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE SPIELMANN, JOINED BY JUDGE RAIMONDI

JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES CASADEVALL, BERRO-LEFEVRE, ŠIKUTA, HIRVELÄ, LÓPEZ GUERRA, SAJÓ AND SILVIS

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE MOTOC

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AOR Area of operational responsibility
CD-ROM Compact disc, read-only memory
CENTCOM American Central Command
CFLCC Coalition Forces Land Component Commander
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority
DARIO Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations (International Law Commission)
DR European Commission of Human Rights, Decisions and Reports
ECHR European Court of Human Rights, Reports of Judgments and Decisions (1999-present)
EUR Euro (currency)
GC Grand Chamber
GST Government support teams
I.C.J. International Court of Justice
ICDC Iraqi Civil Defence Corps
LJN Landelijk Jurisprudentienummer (National Jurisprudence Number, Netherlands)
LOC Lines of communication
loc. cit. loco citato (in the place cited)
MND (C-S) Multinational Division, Central-South
MND (SE) Multinational Division, South-East
MoU, MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PJCC Provisional Joint Coordination Center (emergency and local governmental services in Iraq)
POD Port of disembarkation
Reports European Court of Human Rights, Reports of Judgments and Decisions (1996-1998)
RoE, ROE Rules of Engagement
SFIR Stabilization Force in Iraq
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1995)
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
US, USA United States of America
VCP Vehicle checkpoint

In the case of Jaloud v. the Netherlands,

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:

Dean Spielmann, President,
Josep Casadevall,
Guido Raimondi,
Ineta Ziemele,
Mark Villiger,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Alvina Gyulumyan,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Luis López Guerra,
András Sajó,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva,
Aleš Pejchal,
Johannes Silvis,
Valeriu Griţco,
Iulia Antoanella Motoc, judges,
and Michael O’Boyle, Deputy Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 19 February 2014 and on 10 September 2014,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last‑mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 47708/08) against the Kingdom of the Netherlands lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Iraqi national, Mr Sabah Jaloud (“the applicant”), on 6 October 2008.

2. The applicant was represented by Ms L. Zegveld and Mr A.W. Eikelboom, lawyers practising in Amsterdam. The Netherlands Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr R.A.A. Böcker of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that Article 2 of the Convention had been violated in that the investigation into the death of his son, Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud, had been inadequate.

4. On 6 December 2011 the application was communicated to the Government.

5. On 9 July 2013 a Chamber of the Third Section, composed of Josep Casadevall, President, Alvina Gyulumyan, Corneliu Bîrsan, Ján Šikuta, Luis López Guerra, Kristina Pardalos, Johannes Silvis, judges, and also of Santiago Quesada, Section Registrar, relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, neither of the parties having objected to relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72 of the Rules of Court).

6. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. Subsequently Elisabeth Steiner, substitute judge, replaced Judge Pardalos, who was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case.

7. The applicant and the Government each filed written observations. In addition, third-party comments were received from the Government of the United Kingdom, which had been given leave by the President to take part in the proceedings (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2). The intervening Government were represented by their Agent, Ms R. Tomlinson of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

8. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 19 February 2014 (Rule 59 § 3).

There appeared before the Court:

(a) for the respondent Government
MrR. Böcker, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Agent,

DrM. Kuijer, Ministry of Security and Justice,Adviser,

MrB. van Hoek, Public Prosecution Service,Adviser,

Commander H. Warnar, Ministry of Defence, Military staffAdviser;

(b) for the applicant
MsL. ZegveldCounsel,

MrA.W. Eikelboom,Counsel;

(c) for the Third Party-State: the United Kingdom Government
MsR. Tomlinson, Foreign & Commonwealth Office,Agent,

MrJ. Eadie QC,Counsel,

MrJ. Benson, Foreign & Commonwealth Office,Adviser,

MsM. Addis, Foreign & Commonwealth Office,Observer.

The Court heard addresses by Mr Böcker, Mr Eikelboom, Ms Zegveld and Mr Eadie, and also their replies to its questions.

THE FACTS

9. The applicant, Mr Sabah Jaloud, is an Iraqi national who was born in 1943 and lives in An-Nasiryah, Iraq. He is the father of the late Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud, who died on 21 April 2004 at the age of twenty-nine.

A.  The circumstances of the case

1.  The death of Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud

10. On 21 April 2004, at around 2.12 a.m., an unknown car approached a vehicle checkpoint (VCP) named “B-13” on the main supply route “Jackson” north of the town of Ar Rumaytah, in the province of Al‑Muthanna, south-eastern Iraq. The car slowed down and turned. From inside the car shots were fired at the personnel guarding the VCP, all of them members of the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC). The guards returned fire. No one was hit; the car drove off and disappeared into the night.

11. Called by the checkpoint commander, ICDC Sergeant Hussam Saad, a patrol of six Netherlands soldiers led by Lieutenant A. arrived on the scene at around 2.30 a.m.

12. Some fifteen minutes later a Mercedes car approached the VCP at speed. It hit one of several barrels which had been set out in the middle of the road to form the checkpoint, but continued to advance. Shots were fired at the car: Lieutenant A. fired 28 rounds from a Diemaco assault rifle; shots may also have been fired by one or more ICDC personnel armed with Kalashnikov AK-47 rifles (see paragraphs 21 and 49-52 below). At this point the driver stopped the car.

13. The applicant’s son, Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud, was in the front passenger seat of the car. He had been hit in several places, including the chest. Netherlands soldiers removed him from the car and attempted to administer first aid. Despite this, Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud died. He was declared dead one hour after the incident.

14. The body was subjected to X-ray examination. The radiographs show objects identified as metallic inside the chest and elsewhere.

15. An autopsy was performed by an Iraqi physician, who drew up a brief report in Arabic. Metal objects identifiable as bullet fragments were found in the body.

16. It was not determined by whom the bullet or bullets had been fired, nor from what weapon.

2.  The investigation

a. Beginning of the investigation

17. An official record by Sergeant First Class (wachtmeester 1e klasse) Schellingerhout of the Royal Military Constabulary (Koninklijke marechaussee), As-Samawah detachment, shows that a telephone call was received at 3.25 a.m. from the batallion operations room, reporting the shooting incident. A car had crashed into the VCP. Shots had been fired by Netherlands and Iraqi armed forces and the car’s passenger had been wounded. He had been taken to hospital. The Royal Military Constabulary was asked to investigate.

18. A seven-person Royal Military Constabulary duty group (piketgroep), accompanied by an interpreter, had left at 3.50 a.m. and arrived on the scene at around 4.50.a.m. Royal Military Constabulary Sergeants First Class Broekman and Van Laar had begun securing evidence at 5 a.m. Also at 5 a.m., the Royal Military Constabulary staff in The Hague and the public prosecutor of the Regional Court (rechtbank) of Arnhem were informed of the incident.

b. Seizure of the body, the car and the personal weapons of Lieutenant A. and ICDC Sergeant Hussam Saad

19. The body was seized by Royal Military Constabulary Warrant Officer (adjudant-onderofficier) Kortman at 7.30 a.m. and transported to the mobile hospital at Camp Smitty. At 11.45 a.m., after permission had been given in writing by a local court, the body was transported to the General Hospital in As-Samawah. The post-mortem examination was carried out in the absence of any police witness by an Iraqi physician.

20. The Mercedes car was seized at around 5.10 a.m. by Warrant Officer Kortman and later towed to Camp Smitty.

21. At around 7.50 a.m. Sergeant First Class Schellingerhout seized Sergeant Hussam Saad’s Kalashnikov AK-47 rifle; at around 11.55 a.m. he also seized Lieutenant A.’s Diemaco C7A1 rifle. Both weapons were later labelled and placed at the disposal of the Arnhem public prosecutor.

c. Statements taken down by Royal Military Constabulary officers

22. The following statements were submitted to the investigating and judicial authorities in the domestic proceedings.

i. Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim

23. On 21 April 2004, at around 5.05 a.m., Royal Military Constabulary Warrant Officer Mercx took a statement from the driver of the Mercedes car, Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim, with the aid of an interpreter. Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim admitted to having drunk two cans of beer, but no more, on the previous night, and did not consider himself to have been intoxicated. He stated that he had not noticed any checkpoint until it was too late to avoid hitting two barrels. It had been dark at the time, and there had been no lighting. To his complete surprise, his car had been fired at as he was driving through the checkpoint. His friend Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud had been hit; Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim had heard him say that he was dying. He wished to submit a complaint because the checkpoint had not been clearly marked.

ii. ICDC Sergeant Hussam Saad

24. On 21 April 2004, at around 5.15 a.m., Royal Military Constabulary Sergeant First Class Weerdenburg took a statement from ICDC Sergeant Hussam Saad The latter stated that he had reported shooting from a car at around 2.10 a.m.; Lieutenant A. had arrived at approximately 2.30 a.m. Sergeant Hussam Saad had gone to look for spent cartridges with Lieutenant A., another Netherlands soldier and the interpreter. He had suddenly heard a bang and seen a car approaching from the direction of Ar Ruyaythah. The car had continued to move forward, despite being ordered to stop. He had then heard shooting from the left side of the road. He had not, however, fired any rounds himself.

iii. Other ICDC personnel

25. Sergeant First Class Weerdenburg next questioned the other Iraqi soldiers, but they provided no pertinent information.

iv. Mr Walied Abd Al Hussain Madjied

26. On 21 April 2004, at around 7 a.m., Royal Military Constabulary Sergeant Klinkenberg took a statement from Mr Walied Abd Al Hussain Madjied, an interpreter working with the ICDC. The interpreter had been accompanying Lieutenant A.’s patrol between two checkpoints. After arriving at VCP B1.3 and being told about the first shooting incident by ICDC Sergeant Hussam Saad, he had joined Lieutenant A. and others in the search for spent cartridges. He had suddenly heard the sound of barrels falling over, turned around and seen a car approaching. He had shouted “stop, stop, stop” but the car had driven on. Across the road from where he was standing, a Netherlands soldier had fired at the car. After the car stopped, he had assisted its occupants by providing interpretation. The passenger’s left arm had been covered in blood and the driver had smelled of alcohol.

v. Sergeant Teunissen

27. On 21 April 2004, at around 9.30 a.m., Royal Military Constabulary Sergeant First Class Van Laar and Sergeant Klinkenberg took a statement from Infantry Sergeant (sergeant) Teunissen. Arriving at VCP B1.3 at 2 a.m., he had been given information by the ICDC sergeant. Together with his lieutenant, the ICDC sergeant and the interpreter, he had gone up the road to look for spent cartridges. At a distance of approximately 100 metres from the VCP hut, he had turned around, startled by a sound. He had seen a car drive into the VCP at speed; when the car had passed the VCP, he had heard shooting from the VCP. The four of them had dived for cover. When the car had reached their level, shots had been fired from across the road, where the lieutenant was positioned. He had shouted “Stop firing”, but that had not been heard. When the firing stopped, the car had also stopped. The passenger had been bleeding from the lower body and the left shoulder. Sergeant Teunissen and Private Finkelnberg had removed him from the car, laid him on the ground and bandaged his wounds. He and Lieutenant A. had attempted to resuscitate the passenger until told by the doctor that there was no longer any point.

vi. Lieutenant A., first statement

28. On 21 April 2004, at around 11.15 a.m., Royal Military Constabulary Sergeants First Class Broekman and Van Laar heard Lieutenant A. under caution. Lieutenant A. stated that he was responsible for monitoring two vehicle checkpoints, one of which was VCP B1.3 on the Jackson road north of Ar-Rumaythah. After the first shooting incident had been reported, he had arrived at VCP B1.3 at around 2.30 a.m.; he had been intending to reconnoitre the area on foot, together with Sergeant Teunissen and the ICDC sergeant. At around 2.45 a.m. he had been startled by a noise. Looking behind him, he had seen two blazing car headlights approaching. Shots had then been fired from the direction of the car; on hearing them, he had dived for cover on the verge of the road. He had been convinced that shots were being fired from inside the car. When the car had reached his level, he had cocked his weapon; when it had just passed, he had started to shoot at its rear. He had fired 28 cartridges in aimed fire. He had been responding to the danger arising from his having been fired at first. He had fired the entire contents of a magazine, 28 rounds; this had taken approximately seven seconds. The passenger being wounded, he and Sergeant Teunissen had attempted to resuscitate him until help arrived. By that time there had been no pulse. Shortly afterwards, the company commander had arrived; Lieutenant A. had briefed him.

vii. Private Finkelnberg

29. On 23 April 2004, at around 1.50 p.m., Royal Military Constabulary Warrant Officer Kortman and Sergeant First Class Broekman took a statement from Private Finkelnberg. At 2 a.m. on 21 April 2004 he had arrived with Lieutenant A. and Sergeant Teunissen, among others, at VCP B1.4, where the ICDC sergeant reported to Lieutenant A. that there had been a shooting incident at VCP B1.3. The patrol had therefore gone to that checkpoint, arriving at 2.30 a.m. Lieutenant A., Sergeant Teunissen, the ICDC sergeant and the interpreter had gone up the road towards Hamza to look for spent cartridges. A dark-coloured motorcar had approached at high speed and driven past him through the checkpoint, hitting some barrels in the road. Through his image intensifier he had seen Lieutenant A., to the left of the road, going for cover; he had then seen muzzle flashes from several weapons on the left side of the road and heard shots from that direction. The firing was in single shots. At a certain moment he had seen the car stop. While the shots were being fired, he had heard Sergeant Teunissen shout “Stop firing”. He had gone up to the vehicle and cut the passenger’s clothes loose. While Sergeant Teunissen administered first aid, he had searched the car for weapons. He had found an icebox containing an almost empty bottle of alcoholic drink. He had then joined Sergeant Teunissen and Lieutenant A. in their attempts to resuscitate the passenger until the latter was declared dead. He was critical of Lieutenant A. for firing while his own troops were on the opposite side of the road and for firing so many rounds, and also of the ICDC for firing in the general direction of their own personnel.

viii. Cavalry Sergeant Quist

30. On 23 April 2004, at around 1.50 p.m., Royal Military Constabulary Sergeant Major (opperwachtmeester) Wolfs and Sergeant First Class Van Laar took a statement from Cavalry Sergeant (wachtmeester) Quist. On 21 April 2004 at around 2 a.m. he had been at VCP B1.4 with Lieutenant A. and the other members of his patrol unit, which had been led by Sergeant Teunissen. There had been shooting at VCP B1.3 and they had gone there. Upon arrival, he had noticed no ICDC personnel manning the checkpoint, but had seen a group of people to the left of the road opposite the hut. After Cavalry Sergeant Quist had parked his vehicle, Lieutenant A., Sergeant Teunissen, the interpreter Walied and the ICDC sergeant had walked off north to look for spent cartridges. At a certain point, he had seen a car approaching at high speed from Ar-Rumaythah; when the car reached the checkpoint, it had hit some of the barrels or rocks placed there. He had heard automatic gunfire from where the ICDC members were, which had then stopped. There had been further firing approximately 100 metres distant from him, but he could not tell who was firing up ahead. He did think that there had been firing from a plurality of weapons. He had seen the vehicle stop 50 metres away. He had made a situation report. He had seen Lieutenant A. and Sergeant Teunissen trying to resuscitate the victim.

ix. Lieutenant A., second statement

31. On 23 April 2004, at around 3.35 p.m., Royal Military Constabulary Sergeant First Class Broekman and Warrant Officer Kortman took a second statement from Lieutenant A. The latter stated that the very last time he had seen the ICDC sergeant the latter had been at the checkpoint, fiddling (klungelen) with his AK-47 rifle. Lieutenant A. had told the sergeant not to point the rifle at him. On the subject of the firing incident, he stated that as far as he remembered he had probably lain on a flat part of the road; he had not fired from a standing position. He had performed mouth-to-mouth resuscitation on the wounded passenger of the car and remembered him tasting of alcohol. The ICDC deputy company commander had given him a list of names of the ICDC personnel who had fired their weapons and the corresponding numbers of cartridges, and had asked for replacement ammunition.

d. Other investigation reports

i. Examination of the Mercedes car

32. On 22 April 2004 Royal Military Constabulary Warrant Officer Voorthuijzen and Sergeant Heijden examined the car seized by Warrant Officer Kortman the day before. It was a black Mercedes Benz 320 E AMG. It had black number plates with markings in Arabic script; these visibly covered white number plates bearing black letters in Latin script and numerals. The car had damage consistent with hitting foreign objects at speed. The rear window was shattered. Holes were found in the rear of the car, in the body on the right and left sides, and in the seats. Metal tips were found in various places; one, identified as a bullet fragment, had clearly passed through the passenger seat. The conclusion was that the car had been fired on from both the left and the right; from the left, with a weapon firing ammunition smaller than 6 mm calibre and, from the right, with a weapon firing ammunition larger than 6 mm calibre. The precise firing angles relative to the car could not, however, be determined.

ii. X-rays and photographs

33. On 9 May 2004 Royal Military Constabulary Warrant Officer Voorthuijzen and Sergeant Klinkenberg took receipt of a CD-ROM containing X-rays of Azhar Sabah Jaloud’s body. These showed fragments of metal in the left chest cavity, the left hip and the left lower arm. The X‑rays had been made by Warrant Officer Dalinga, X-ray technician at Camp Smitty, As-Samawah, Al-Muthanna province.

34. The file contains photocopies of the above-mentioned X-rays and of photographs. They are accompanied by descriptions, contained in an official report by Warrant Officer Kortman. The photographs include pictures of a road and a checkpoint area, some taken by daylight, some apparently taken at night. Several of the photographs show cartridges lying on the ground, including some described as 7x39mm (as fired by the Kalashnikov AK-47 rifle)[1], both spent and live, and a quantity of spent cartridges stated to be 5.56x45mm (as fired by the Diemaco C7A1 rifle) in a pile close together. Others show a male body with wounds to an arm, the upper left quarter of the back and the right buttock. Further pictures show a dark-coloured Mercedes motorcar; details are included of holes in the bodywork and upholstery that could be bullet holes.

iii. Report by ICDC Lieutenant Colonel Awadu Kareem Hadi

35. On 22 April 2004 ICDC Lieutenant Colonel Awadu Kareem Hadi, the commanding officer of 603 ICDC Battalion, sent a report from his batallion headquarters to the headquarters of the Iraqi police. It reads as follows (rough handwritten translation, from Arabic into English, submitted by the applicant):

“The details of the accident which is happened at date (20/04/2004) and information coming from the first batallion (Ar-Rumaytha) and the details are:

At the hour (21.05 [sic] after the midnight) from the date (20/04/2004) [sic] a car type (Mercedes) coming by high speed directed from (Al Hamza) to (Al Nassiriya) and when the car is reached to the location of the checkpoint does not stop and making a crash with the obstacles present in checkpoint and he was carelessness and the soldiers shouting on him and calling to stop and he is continued and does not stop and after that Dutch soldiers see that there is no way and shoot on him and then injured person ([Azhar Sabah Jaloud]) then he is died and he was sitting near the driver.

With our greetings

[signed] Lieutenant Colonel Awadu Kareem Hadi

A copy to / PJCC”

iv. The metal fragments

36. An official report by Royal Military Constabulary Warrant Officer Voorthuizen, dated 21 June 2004, states that on 2 June 2004 a document was received in Arabic, which, translated orally by an interpreter, was identified as a report by the Baghdad police. The report stated that three metal fragments had been examined in Baghdad at the request of the Al‑Muthanna police with a view to identifying the ammunition from which they had come and the weapon from which they had been fired; however, the provenance of the metal fragments could not be determined, as they were too few in number. A copy of a document in Arabic was attached to Warrant Officer Voorthuijzen’s report. It is not stated in whose custody the metal fragments had been left or where they were being stored.

e. Iraqi document

37. On 21 April 2004 Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim, the driver of the Mercedes car, lodged a complaint with the Iraqi police against the troops who had fired at his car. It appears from the statement, as taken down in writing, that Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim was under the misapprehension that the foreign troops involved had been Polish rather than Netherlands. Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim also put on record that he had been told by the interpreter to say that all of the shots had been fired by the ICDC, whereas in fact he had not seen any shots fired by ICDC personnel.

f. Supplementary report, recording statements taken from the ICDC members

38. After the Chamber’s relinquishment of jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber, the Government provided an official record of the following statements taken from the ICDC members. The following is a sworn translation subsequently submitted by the applicant:

“Name: A Saad Mossah

Weapon number: GL 5574

Ammunition: 4 X 30 cartridges

‘During the second incident I was lying in a position with all-round security. I saw that a car was travelling at high speed towards the checkpoint from the direction of Ar Rumaytha. I saw that it rammed into two drums by the checkpoint and simply continued going. My commander [ICDC Sergeant Hussam Saad] walked forwards together with the interpreter and two Dutch soldiers and then I heard a large number of shots fired. I myself did not fire any shots. I cannot tell you any more than this.’

Name Haider Shareef

Weapon number UE 0481 1984

Ammunition 4 Cartridge clips and 120 cartridges in total

‘1 cannot tell you anything about the first incident because I was asleep at the time in the watch hut.

During the second incident I was standing by the vehicle checkpoint and I saw a Mercedes Benz driving towards the checkpoint. I saw that the Mercedes Benz rammed into two oil drums and drove on in the direction of Hamsa. I heard the Dutch soldiers shouting stop, stop, and then I heard shots being fired. I saw nothing else because I was standing behind a hut on the opposite side to the watch hut.’

INTERPRETER

Name Walied Abd Al Hussain Madjied

Date of birth 25-10-1969 Kuwait / Hawalli

‘We started at 0:00 hours and we drove on patrol. Up till 01:30 hours we were present here and then we drove on to the following checkpoint. When we arrived there the checkpoint commander said that shots had been fired at the previous checkpoint. I heard lieutenant V. [presumably Lieutenant A.] say that I should get into the car and we drove back to the checkpoint. When we arrived we asked for details. The checkpoint commander and sergeant Hossam of ICDC said that after we had left a truck had stopped there and its driver said that a vehicle, which was an Opel, was driving behind them. Then an Opel approached, which made a U-turn 100 metres before the checkpoint and switched off its lights. And then there were several shots fired at the checkpoint from this vehicle. Sergeant Hussam Saad then fired two of his magazines, each containing 30 cartridges, at the above-mentioned vehicle until they were empty. Sergeant Hossam’s men also fired shots. After I heard this report I went together with lieutenant V. to look for cartridge cases. We walked past the checkpoint and then I heard the sound of falling drums. I turned around and saw that a vehicle had driven into the drums and was driving towards us. I believe that the vehicle was not driving fast. I did see that the vehicle was swerving. I shouted in Arabic in a loud voice stop, stop, stop, but the vehicle continued going. The man appeared to be drunk and he closed his windows. After the vehicle had passed I heard shots being fired. A Dutch sergeant then told me to look for cover. This Dutch sergeant then shouted in a loud voice to stop firing. I also shouted this in the direction of the people from I.C.D.C. A Dutch soldier on the other side of the road continued firing. He did not stop firing, not even when the Dutch sergeant had called out to stop firing. When the vehicle stopped, on the instructions of the Dutch sergeant I tried to talk to the people in the vehicle. I told the driver to get out and to lie on the ground. He did this. When I started to talk to front-seat passenger, I heard the driver say that the front-seat passenger was injured. We then went straight to the vehicle and opened the front-seat passenger’s door. I saw that the front-seat passenger’s left arm was bloody. I then walked over to the driver of the vehicle and he said that they had been drinking and had not seen that there was a checkpoint. I could smell that the driver stank of alcohol. While the vehicle was stopped, shots were still being fired, but I do not know where these came from. When we went to pick up cartridge cases from the first incident everyone walked away from the checkpoint and there was no-one on the road and it was dark there. There were no lights showing up the checkpoint, which meant that it was not clear that there was a checkpoint there. I think it is strange that shots were fired at the vehicle because there was no firing at that moment. I think that they should have fired a warning shot, then the vehicle would have stopped. I can also tell you that, during the search for cartridge cases from the first shooting incident, I was walking on the same side together with the Dutch sergeant and the sergeant from I.C.D.C. The Dutch lieutenant was walking on the other side. I do not know how many other people were then walking behind me. I can also tell you that I do not know whether shots were fired at the checkpoint from the vehicle during the second shooting incident.’

On 21 April 2004, at around 05:15 hours was interviewed:

Name; Hussam Saad, the person in question is SGT [sergeant] and local CDT [commandant, commander] of ICDC.

Weapon number: 84MD5596 and is AK 47 and at the time of the interview not loaded.

He also had in his possession 2x full magazines (2x30 cartridges).

1 magazine was empty.

‘At the start of my duty I had 120 cartridges in my possession. At around 02:10 hours I fired 60 cartridges. At that moment a car came from the direction of Al Hamza and stopped before the Traffic Control Point. The lights of this vehicle were then turned off and then the car turned back in the direction of Al Hamza. I hear shots and see muzzles pointing out of the car. I fire back with my AK 47. My position at the start of this shooting incident was in front of the watch hut. After the shooting we ran in the direction of the vehicle, together with three colleagues. These colleagues are called:

- Alla’a Adnan

- Mohammad Khazem

- Hameed Jaber.

These three colleagues also fired shots.

At around 02:15 hours this car suddenly drove away.

After this we immediately called up the base. Lieutenant A. arrives by us about 20 to 25 minutes later. The CDT, interpreter, lieutenant A. and someone else go to look for cartridge cases. During the search a car approached the Traffic Control Point on the Main Supply Route Jackson from the direction Ruymaythah and heading in the direction of Al Hamza.

The CDT was on the right-hand side of the road looking for cartridge cases, (looking in the direction of Al Hamza). Lieutenant A. was on the left-hand side of the road looking for cartridge cases, (looking in the direction of Al Hamza).

Suddenly I heard the sound as if a car had driven into the drums at the Traffic Control Point. I saw that the car continued driving in the direction of Al Hamza.

We tried to stop the car by shouting. Then we heard shots. I heard shots from the left-hand side of the road (looking in the direction of Al Hamza). As far as I am aware, no shots were fired from the Mercedes. A soldier from the Dutch army was standing on the right-hand side of the road.

I did not fire a single shot myself in the direction of the Mercedes.’

On 21 April 2004 at around 05:30 hours was interviewed;

Name: Hameed Jaber

Weapon number: 84MD0596

Ammunition:

1 cartridge clip containing 15 cartridges.

2 cartridge clips, each cartridge clip containing 30 cartridges.

1 cartridge clip containing 25 cartridges.

‘At the time of the second incident I was lying behind the watch hut. I saw and I heard a car approaching from the direction of Ar Rumaytah. This vehicle drove at high speed through the checkpoint and rammed into two drums. Then I heard shooting. I do not know anything else. During the 1st incident I fired 15 cartridges.’

On 21 April 2004 at around 06:15 hours was interviewed:

Name: Haider Mohsen

Weapon number: GB 4140

Ammunition: 4 magazines, each magazine containing 30 cartridges.

‘I was asleep during the 1st incident. I could not go outside on account of the shots being fired at the watch hut. When I came outside I saw a car driving away in the direction of Al Hamza.

During the 2nd incident I saw a Mercedes approaching. I was standing at the VCP. We had 360 degrees all-round security then. I heard the Mercedes driving into the oil drums and saw that it then drove away at high speed in the direction of Al Hamza.

I heard a Dutch person shouting “stop”. However, the car did not stop.

I heard shots. I heard the car stop. I heard voices coming from the car radio. This was playing very loudly. I did not see anything else.’

On 21 April 2004 at around 06:00 hours was interviewed:

Name Ali Hussein

Weapon number S41297

Ammunition:

3 magazines, each magazine containing 30 cartridges.

1 magazine containing 26 cartridges.

‘During the second incident I was lying within an all-round security. I saw a car driving at high speed through the VCP in the direction of Al Hamza. I heard a Dutch soldier shouting ‘stop, stop’. I did not want to shoot since our own people were walking in front of the VCP.

Then I heard shots being fired. I fired 4 times during the first incident. I was standing outside the watch hut then.’

On 21 April 2004 at around 05 45 hours was interviewed.

Name: Ahmed Ghaleb

Weapon number S54469

Ammunition: 4x30 cartridges.

‘During the first incident I was asleep in the watch hut. I did not fire any shots then. During the second incident I was lying within an all-round security just next to the watch hut. I heard a car ramming into two drums. The car continued driving fast, (it was clearly accelerating). Then I heard shots in front of the VCP. I know nothing else.’

Name Alâa A Dnan

Weapon number 84 MD 0890

Ammunition 3 magazines with 30 cartridges and 1 magazine with 22 cartridges

‘I fired shots during the first incident. These were shots. [sic]

During the second incident I was situated in an all-round and was lying on the left-hand side of the road. I was looking in the direction of Hamza. I was [sic] that a car was driving from the direction of Ar Rumayta. It drove through the traffic control point and thereby rammed a couple of drums. I could not see what happened then, but I did hear shots being fired.’

Name Ilia MOHAMMED KHAZEM, corporal 2nd rank

Weapon number 84 MD 6151

Ammunition 4 magazines with 120 cartridges in total

‘I did not fire a single shot last night because 1 did not receive any orders to do so. I was standing by the traffic control point facing the direction of Hamza. At a certain point I heard a car driving into an oil drum. The car continued driving in the direction of Hamza. I heard the Dutch people shouting stop at the driver of the car that had broken through. Then I heard shots. When I saw that the Mercedes had stopped I also ran in that direction. I could not see who was standing on the left and right-hand sides of the road because it was dark.

Murtada Khazaat

Yasser Abd Alaal

Ahmed Shaker

Ali Hussein

The above-mentioned people came at 04:10 AM hours.’

Name SAHIB JASSIM

Weapon number 84 MV 7435

Ammunition 4 magazines with 120 cartridges in total

‘During the first incident I was standing by the Traffic Control Point. I saw a truck driving from the direction of Hamza towards the traffic control point. The driver said that he was being followed by a car and he pointed to this car. The driver of the truck said that the car was an Opel. At a certain point there were many shots fired from the car. My colleagues reacted to this and all fired back at the car. We then moved into a 360 degree formation after which the car continued further.

During the second incident I was lying on the ground in an all-round by the traffic control point. I saw a car coming from the direction of Ar Rumayta. The car was travelling at high speed and thereby rammed into an oil drum. The car then drove straight through the traffic point and I heard that shots were fired. I cannot tell you anything else that would further explain the situation.”

3.  Domestic proceedings

39. On 8 January 2007 the applicant’s counsel, Ms Zegveld, wrote via the registry of the Military Chamber to the public prosecution service attached to the Regional Court of Arnhem on behalf of the next-of-kin of Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud. She asked to be informed of the outcome of the investigation into the latter’s death and any decisions made as to the prosecution of any suspects, with a view to bringing proceedings under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering) (see below).

40. The public prosecutor replied on 11 January 2007, stating that the investigation had been closed in June 2004; that Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud had presumably (vermoedelijk) been hit by an Iraqi bullet; that the Netherlands serviceman who had also fired at the vehicle was entitled to claim self-defence; and that for that reason no Netherlands service personnel had been designated as suspects.

41. On 1 February 2007 Ms Zegveld wrote to the public prosecutor asking, among other things, for the Rules of Engagement and any reports of investigations by the Iraqi authorities to be added to the file.

42. The public prosecutor replied on 14 February, declining to accede to Ms Zegveld’s requests. Referring to the Court’s Chamber judgment in the case of Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands, no. 52391/99, 10 November 2005, he stated that since the procedure under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not involve the determination of a “criminal charge”, Article 6 of the Convention did not apply and so arrangements for access to the case file in such cases were different from those applicable in ordinary criminal proceedings.

43. On 2 October 2007 the applicant, represented by his counsel Ms Zegveld and Mr Pestman, lodged a request under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the Arnhem Court of Appeal for the prosecution of Lieutenant A. He argued that there was nothing to support the suggestion that Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud had been killed by an Iraqi bullet; that the number of shots fired by Lieutenant A. reflected disproportionate violence; that Lieutenant A. had failed to fire a warning shot and had failed to heed Sergeant Teunissen’s order to cease firing; that, in accordance with Article 50 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud ought to have been considered a civilian in the absence of any indications to the contrary and ought therefore not to have been subjected to aimed rifle fire; and that the use of lethal force by Lieutenant A. had been unnecessary in any event. He also relied on the statement made to the Iraqi police by the driver of the car, to the effect that the latter had been told to keep quiet about the involvement of Netherlands military personnel.

44. On 28 January 2008 the Chief Public Prosecutor (hoofdofficier van justitie) to the Regional Court of Arnhem wrote to the Chief Advocate General (hoofdadvocaat-generaal) to the Court of Appeal of Arnhem, recommending that the applicant’s request be dismissed. He appended a detailed statement by the public prosecutor who had taken the decision (in July 2004) not to prosecute Lieutenant A. According to the public prosecutor, while it had to be accepted that Lieutenant A. had fired at the car, it could not be proved that Lieutenant A. had caused the death of Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud; moreover, even if such were the case, Lieutenant A. could reasonably have believed that he was under attack and needed to defend himself. The public prosecutor’s statement also contained the following passage:

“On the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 the special responsibilities of the United States and the United Kingdom as occupying powers were recognised. Unlike the British forces, however, the Netherlands were not to be considered an occupying power in Iraq: SFIR counts as a peacekeeping operation (vredesoperatie) for the Netherlands. The Government’s point of view was that the role of the Netherlands armed forces should remain limited to supporting the British in their appointed territory in southern Iraq (Lower House of Parliament, 2002-23, no. 23432, no. 16). The legitimisation for the use of functional force by SFIR is not to be found in ius in bello, but in the Security Council mandate, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) based thereon, and the Netherlands instruction card for the use of force which is derived from those. The ROE empower the use of force against any person who falls within the scope of the relevant rule. Accordingly, in certain cases such persons may be civilians. This also applies – as the instruction for the use of force reflects – to the inherent right of self-defence. The instructions and the objective of the commanding officer, seen in connection with the perceived threat, are decisive as to whether a soldier will make use of his powers to use force, and if so, how.”

45. The public prosecutor further argued that no violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural head could be found, since the Convention did not bind Netherlands troops in Iraq: the Netherlands troops had not exercised effective authority in Iraq.

46. On 1 February 2008 the Advocate General to the Court of Appeal of Arnhem submitted a written opinion expressing the provisional opinion that the decision not to prosecute had been sound. A Netherlands serviceman remained subject to Netherlands criminal jurisdiction wherever he might be in the world. However, UNSC Resolution 1483 indicated that co-operating States did not have the status of occupying powers, and the armed conflict had ended by the time of Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud’s death. Moreover, even assuming the existence of an armed conflict in Iraq at the time, given the circumstances in which the incident had taken place, which were unrelated to the conflict as such, it would not be feasible to prosecute Lieutenant A. under war crimes legislation. Under ordinary criminal law, Lieutenant A. would be entitled to claim self-defence. However, even without a conviction the Netherlands State might be in a position in which monetary compensation ex gratia was appropriate.

47. The Court of Appeal held a hearing on 18 March 2008. The applicant’s representative, Ms Zegveld, asked for certain investigative measures, including the addition to the file of copies and, where necessary, translations of the Rules of Engagement and the pertinent instructions based thereon; the Iraqi autopsy report; the statement by Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim to the Iraqi police; and the questioning of the Iraqi interpreter Mr Madjied in connection with Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim’s allegation that the interpreter had told him to keep silent about the involvement of Netherlands troops. She also queried the finding that shots had been fired by Iraqi personnel and argued that Lieutenant A.’s actions had gone beyond legitimate self-defense.

48. The Court of Appeal gave its decision on 7 April 2008. It declined to order further investigative measures, taking the view that the lapse of time since the incident had made any further such measures pointless. It refused to order the prosecution of Lieutenant A. Its reasoning read, inter alia, as follows:

“The legitimation for the functional use of force in the area in issue is laid down in the Rules of Engagement (RoE) and the SFIR Instructions on the use of force, revised version of 24 July 2003, which are derived from that document. Counsel has asked the Court of Appeal in camera to make the RoE available. These, however, are not included in the file, [and] neither the Court of Appeal nor the Advocate General have them. The test in the present case will be carried out under the SFIR Instructions on the use of force. It is indicated in this instruction that the use of force is permitted, inter alia, in self-defence and in defence of own troops and other persons designated by the MND (SE) Commander. On the subject of aimed fire, it is mentioned in this instruction that aimed fire may be given if [an SFIR member himself], own troops or persons under his protection are threatened with violence that may cause serious bodily harm or death and there are no other ways to prevent this. Examples given include cases in which a person fires or aims his weapon at the person concerned, own troops or persons under his protection and in which a person deliberately drives a car into the person concerned, own troops or persons under his protection.

It appears from the file that [Lieutenant A.], who was investigating traces relating to a shooting incident that had taken place shortly before, in which shots had been fired from a car, was confronted on the spot with a car that ignored the VCP and came in his direction at high speed. At that moment shots were fired. [Lieutenant A.] assumed that the shots were being fired from the car. This assumption is entirely understandable, in view of the fact that [Lieutenant A.] was not required to expect that shots would be fired from own or friendly units – the Netherlands servicemen present, or the members of the ICDC present – in his direction. It makes no difference that counsel has argued that others present on the spot made a different assessment of the situation. After all, [Lieutenant A.] was in a different position and did not observe the situation in the same way as the other group on the opposite side of the road, which moreover was using an image intensifier. Nor does the fact that [Lieutenant A.] fired at the moment when the car had passed make any difference, given that shortly before the post had been fired at by a vehicle distancing itself therefrom and [Lieutenant A.] had, as he has indicated, to consider the fact that there were friendly troops on the other side of the road whom he did not wish to draw into his line of fire. Counsel has further suggested that [Lieutenant A.] could have fired a warning shot. Pursuant to the Instructions on the use of force a warning shot shall be fired only if the operational conditions admit of it and there is no need to do so for example if the person concerned or others in the direct vicinity are under armed attack.

In view of the above the Court of Appeal considers that [Lieutenant A.] could reasonably [have] believe[d] that he and his own troops were under fire and that, on this assumption, he acted within the limits of the applicable Instructions on the use of force.

The Court of Appeal therefore finds that the Public Prosecutor rightly declined to bring a prosecution.”

B.  Weapons used in the incident

1.  Diemaco C7A1

49. The Diemaco C7A1 infantry rifle is the standard weapon issued to the Netherlands military. Of Canadian manufacture, it is a development of the better-known American-designed Armalite AR-15/Colt M16 rifle. It is capable of automatic and semiautomatic fire. The magazine issued to the Netherlands armed forces as standard holds up to thirty rounds. Its rate of fire in automatic mode is 700-940 rounds per minute.

50. Like the AR-15/M16, the Diemaco rifle fires the 5.56x45 mm (or 5.56 NATO) cartridge. The bullet yaws and frequently fragments when it hits a body at high velocity, causing severe damage to tissue.

2.  Kalashnikov AK-47

51. The Kalashnikov AK-47 rifle was originally designed and manufactured in the Soviet Union but clones have been produced in many countries. Formerly the main weapon of Warsaw Pact infantry, it and its clones are today issued to the military of many countries, including local forces in Iraq.

52. Like the AK-47 itself, its ammunition, the 7.62x39 mm cartridge, is produced in large quantities by many manufacturers. The standard bullet has considerable penetrating power; however, when it hits a body without passing right through, it too can yaw and fragment, producing much the same effects as the 5.56 mm NATO bullet.

C.  The Netherlands military presence in Iraq

1.  General background

53. From July 2003 until March 2005 Netherlands troops participated in the Stabilization Force in Iraq (SFIR) in battalion strength. They were stationed in the province of Al-Muthanna as part of Multinational Division South-East (MND-SE), which was under the command of an officer of the armed forces of the United Kingdom.

54. The participation of Netherlands forces in MND-SE was governed by a Memorandum of Understanding between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, to which Rules of Engagement were appended. Both documents were classified confidential and remain so.

55. Netherlands military personnel were issued with an aide-mémoire drawn up by the Netherlands Chief of Defence Staff (Chef Defensiestaf). This was a reference document containing a summary of the Rules of Engagement. They were also issued with Instructions on the Use of Force (Geweldsinstructie), likewise drawn up by the Chief of Defence Staff.

56. As to the occupation of Iraq between 1 May 2003 and 28 June 2004, see generally Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, §§ 9-19, 7 July 2011.

2.  The letter to the Lower House of Parliament

57. On 6 June 2003 the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken) and the Minister of Defence (Minister van Defensie) together sent a letter to the Lower House of Parliament (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal) on the situation in the Middle East (Lower House of Parliament, Parliamentary Year 2002-03, no. 23,432, no. 116), setting out, in particular, the reasons for which the Government had decided to send Netherlands forces to take part in SFIR and providing background information. This letter reads, inter alia:

“As requested by the British, the Netherlands units will be deployed in the south of Iraq, in the province of Al-Muthanna... This province comes within the responsibility of a British division. The operational line of command thus runs via British divisional headquarters and then via American headquarters in Baghdad to American Central Command (CENTCOM) which co-ordinates military direction.”

and

Mandate/Legal basis

The basis for sending Netherlands troops to Iraq is to be found in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. The Government is of the opinion that the provisions of this resolution provide such a basis. The resolution is explicitly based on Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and in its first paragraph appeals to Member States and organisations ‘to assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country, and to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq in accordance with this resolution’. More generally, the penultimate operational paragraph of Resolution 1483 calls upon Member States and international and regional organisations ‘to contribute to the implementation of this resolution’. The report of the Security Council meeting at which this resolution was adopted makes it clear that there was broad consensus as regards the starting point that this resolution provides a basis for Member States to send troops to Iraq, within the framework drawn by the resolution.

The resolution makes it clear in its preamble that there is a distinction to be drawn between the United States and the United Kingdom, which are active in Iraq in the capacity (hoedanigheid) of occupying powers, and states which do not have that capacity. This finding by the Security Council in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter must be understood as an authoritative opinion as to the status of the participating states, an opinion that is binding on the United Nations Member States.

Paragraph 5 of the resolution makes a clear appeal (‘calls upon’) to all the countries concerned (including the countries that are not present as occupying powers) ‘to comply fully with their obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907’. The Netherlands will heed this call.”

and

Influence

The Stabilization Force will consist of a coalition of participating countries led by the United States and the United Kingdom. It is important that the other troop-contributing countries should be sufficiently involved in the determination of the security force’s general political-military policy and the exchange of information. To that end, the United Kingdom will set up a ‘Committee of Contributors’ for the British sector, which will enable close consultation between Government representatives, analogous to the procedure which the British have set up for ISAF [i.e. the International Security Assistance Force, deployed in Afghanistan] and which is now also followed by the Netherlands and Germany for ISAF. Troop-contributing countries will also be involved in military direction through national representatives in the operational headquarters.”

and

Instructions for the use of force (Rules of Engagement)

‘Rules of Engagement’ (ROE) are instructions to military units which set out the circumstances, conditions, degree and modality of the permitted use of force. Their content is not made public. The ROE are drawn up on the basis of military-operational and legal considerations. These include considerations relating to humanitarian law and the laws of war, as well as political/diplomatic considerations. This is done with reference to a NATO document in which guidelines are set out for ROE.

As is the practice in other peace operations, it is provided that the Netherlands shall take over the ROE of the ‘lead nation’, in this case the United Kingdom. The Netherlands can make changes to the instructions for the use of force based on domestic directives and considerations. Although the ROE have not yet been finalised, the Government intends them to be robust, which means among other things that there should be wide powers for ‘force protection’ and the creation of a safe and stable environment. On this basis, the Government assumes that the ROE will offer sufficient possibility for carrying out the tasks even in the face of hostilities or riots.

Command structure

The entire operation in Iraq is under the command of US CENTCOM, in which a Coalition Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) directs the operation from Baghdad. For that purpose, Iraq is divided into four sectors. The sectors in northern Iraq and around Baghdad will be led by the United States. Poland is in charge of a sector and the United Kingdom is in charge of the south of Iraq. The Netherlands battalion will be under the operational control of the British division as an independent unit (zelfstandige eenheid). Within the framework of NATO support for Poland it has been decided to station some Netherlands personnel in Polish headquarters. Besides, the Polish sector adjoins the American sector and the presence of Netherlands personnel facilitates better overall co-ordination.

Incidentally (Overigens), the Netherlands will retain ‘full command’ [English in the original] over Netherlands military personnel at all times. The Chief of Defence Staff will guard the mandate and the military objective of the Netherlands troops. If necessary, he will give further directions in the name of the Minister of Defence.”

3.  Royal Military Constabulary presence in Iraq

58. There was a Royal Military Constabulary unit attached to the Netherlands forces in Iraq. It is stated by the applicant that they shared the living quarters of the regular troops.

D.  Instructions to Netherlands SFIR personnel

59. The respondent Government have submitted versions issued on 24 July 2003 of the aide-mémoire for SFIR commanders and the SFIR soldier’s card as issued to Netherlands personnel. As relevant to the case before the Court, they read as follows (translations by the Court, English-language expressions used in the Dutch original in italics throughout):

1.  The aide-mémoire for SFIR commanders

“This instruction sheet contains a simplified rendering, drawn up for commissioned and non-commissioned officers, of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for MND (SE) and the Netherlands restrictions applied to them. In case of doubt, consult the English-language text of the ROE and the pertaining Netherlands declarations. Where this sheet differs from the ROE and the Netherlands declarations, the ROE and the Netherlands declarations shall take precedence.

MISSION

1. Your mission is to contribute to the creation of a safe and stable environment in Iraq to make possible the reconstruction of the country and the transition to representative self-government. The use of strictly necessary force is permitted as set out below.

GENERAL RULES

2. Use of force is permitted only if other means are insufficient. Note the following:

(a) in all circumstances, use no greater force than is strictly necessary to carry out your task;

(b) collateral damage (to persons or goods) must be prevented as much as possible.

SELF-DEFENCE

4. The use of strictly necessary force, including force that may cause death or serious bodily harm (deadly force) and involving the use of permitted weapons, is permitted:

(a) to defend yourself;

(b) to prevent the theft or destruction of property belonging to SFIR that are essential for the execution of the mission.

USE OF FORCE FOR OTHER REASONS

4. The use of strictly necessary force, including force that may cause death or serious bodily harm (deadly force) and involving the use of permitted weapons, apart from the right to self-defence, is permitted:

(a) to defend own troops and other persons designated by the MND (SE) Commander (designated persons);

(b) to prevent the theft or destruction of goods designated by the MND (SE) Commander (designated property);

(c) to prevent unauthorised access to military installations belonging to SFIR and other places designated by the MND (SE) Commander (including designated property) (for example Military Restricted Areas);

(d) for the purpose of apprehending, searching and disarming enemy units if they endanger the safety of SFIR units or other persons designated by the MND (SE) Commander in the execution of the mission;

(e) against hostile acts and hostile intent;

(f) as ordered by your on-scene commander.

...

WARNING PROCEDURE

6. If operational circumstances permit, a warning that fire will be opened must be given beforehand. Some examples of situations in which it is permitted to open fire without warning are:

(a) if you yourself or others in your immediate vicinity are under armed attack; or

(b) if giving a warning will increase the risk that you or any other person may be killed or seriously wounded.

7. You give warning by calling out:

in English:

‘STABILIZATION FORCE! STOP OR I WILL FIRE!’

followed by, in the local language,

‘OEGAF DFEE-SJ! AU-OE ILLA ARMIE BILL NAAR!’[2] (Stop, army! Or I will fire!)

8. If the warning is not heeded, you may fire a warning shot as ordered by the on-scene commander or on the basis of existing standing orders.

HOSTILE ACT AND HOSTILE INTENT

9. A hostile act is an aggressive act amounting to an attack or a threatened attack using force that may result in death or serious injury directed against own troops, designated persons or designated property. The following are examples (not an exhaustive enumeration) of hostile acts:

(a) a person firing at you, at own troops or designated persons or designated property;

(b) a person placing explosives or incendiary devices or throwing them at you, at own troops, or at designated persons or designated property;

(c) a person deliberately driving a car into you, or into own troops, or designated persons, or designated property.

...

REQUIREMENT TO USE ONLY STRICTLY NECESSARY FORCE

11. Whenever it is permitted to use force, you are obliged to limit the amount of force to what is strictly necessary. Take all possible precautions to prevent escalation and limit collateral damage as much as possible. It is forbidden to attack civilians as such, except in case of self-defence. It is forbidden to attack property which is strictly civilian or religious in character, unless this property is used for military purposes.

12. If you must open fire, you are obliged:

(a) to fire only aimed shots;

(b) to fire no more shots than is necessary; and

(c) to take all necessary precautions to prevent collateral damage (to persons and property); and

(d) to cease firing as soon as the situation so permits. You must then secure the area and take care of any wounded.

OTHER COMMAND GUIDELINES

...

18. Prevent, and report up the line of command, any suspected crimes against the humanitarian laws of war.”

2.  The SFIR soldier’s card

“MISSION

1. Your mission is to contribute to the creation of a safe and stable environment in Iraq to make possible the reconstruction of the country and the transition to representative self-government.

USE OF FORCE

2. Use of force is permitted in the following cases:

(a) in self-defence;

(b) in defence of own troops and other persons designated by the MND (SE) Commander;

(c) to prevent the theft or destruction of property belonging to SFIR that are essential for the execution of the mission and other property designated by the MND (SE) Commander;

(d) to prevent unauthorised access to military installations belonging to SFIR and other places designated by the MND (SE) Commander (including designated property) (for example Military Restricted Areas);

(e) for the purpose of apprehending, searching and disarming enemy units if they endanger the safety of SFIR units or other persons designated by the MND (SE) Commander in the execution of the mission;

(f) as ordered by your on-scene commander.

GENERAL RULES

3. Use of force is permitted only if other means are insufficient. Note the following:

(a) try to avoid escalation;

(b) in all circumstances, use no greater force than is strictly necessary to carry out your task;

(c) collateral damage (to persons or goods) must be prevented as much as possible.

4. Persons who attack you or others, or who make or force unauthorised entry into SFIR military installations or other places designated by the MND (SE) Commander, may be apprehended and searched for the purpose of disarming them until it is established that they no longer dispose of weapons with which you or others can be killed or wounded. You may seize dangerous objects and if necessary disable them – for immediate use – if these objects endanger persons, property or the execution of the mission.

5. As soon as the execution of the mission so allows, apprehended persons must be handed over to the competent Iraqi or occupying (UK) authorities.

6. Treat everyone humanely.

7. Collect the wounded and take care of them, regardless of the faction to which they belong.

8. Do not collect ‘war trophies’.

9. Prevent violations of the humanitarian laws of war and report any violations and suspected violations to your commander.

10. Report all use of force to your commander.

WARNINGS AND WARNING SHOTS

11. If the situation permits, you are obliged to give warning before firing aimed shots. You warn that you will fire if [the persons addressed] do not halt, or do not cease the endangering act.

You give warning by calling out:

in English:

‘STABILIZATION FORCE! STOP OR I WILL FIRE!’

followed by, in the local language,

‘OEGAF DFEE-SJ! AU-OE ILLA ARMIE BILL NAAR!’ (Stop, army! Or I will fire!)

12. If the warning is not heeded, you may fire a warning shot as ordered by the on-scene commander or on the basis of orders given to you.

AIMED FIRE

13. You may open aimed fire if you yourself, own troops or persons under your protection are threatened with violence that may cause serious bodily harm or death and there are no other ways to prevent this.

Here are some examples:

  • you may fire at a person who is firing or aiming his weapon at you, at own troops or persons under your protection;
  • you may fire at a person who is placing explosives or incendiary devices or throwing them or preparing to thrown them at you, at own troops or persons under your protection;
  • you may fire at a person who is deliberately driving a car into you, own troops or persons under your protection.

MINIMUM FORCE

14. If you have to open fire, you must:

  • fire only aimed shots;
  • fire no more shots than is necessary; and
  • cease firing as soon as the situation allows.

15. It is forbidden to use deliberate force against civilians, unless this is necessary for self-defence.

16. it is forbidden to attack property with a strictly civilian or religious character, unless:

(a) this property is used for military purposes; and

(b) your commander orders you to.

17. It is forbidden to simulate an attack or other aggressive actions.

18. It is forbidden to use tear gas.”

E.  The Royal Military Constabulary

60. The Royal Military Constabulary is a branch of the armed forces, on a level with the Royal Navy (Koninklijke Marine), the Royal Army (Koninklijke Landmacht) and the Royal Air Force (Koninklijke Luchtmacht). Its members have military status and hold military rank. It has its own line of command; its commanding officer holds the rank of lieutenant general (luitenant-generaal) and is directly answerable to the Minister of Defence.

61. The duties of the Royal Military Constabulary, as relevant to the present case, include “carrying out police duties for Netherlands and other armed forces, as well as international military headquarters, and persons belonging to those armed forces and headquarters” (section 6(1)(b) of the 1993 Police Act (Politiewet 1993)).

62. Members of the Royal Military Constabulary undergo both military and police training. Non-commissioned officers holding the rank of sergeant (wachtmeester) or higher may be appointed as civil servants invested with investigative powers (opsporingsambtenaren), and certain categories of commissioned officers may be appointed as assistant public prosecutors (hulpofficieren van justitie).

63. In their capacity as military police or military police investigators, Royal Military Constabulary personnel are subordinate to the public prosecutor to the Regional Court of Arnhem.

F.  The Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal

64. At the relevant time, Article 9 of the Code of Military Criminal Procedure (Wet militaire strafrechtspraak) provided that the benches of the Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal should consist of two judges of the Court of Appeal, one of whom should preside, and one military member. The military member should be a serving officer holding the rank of captain (kapitein ter zee, Royal Navy), colonel (kolonel, Royal Army), group captain (kolonel, Royal Air Forceor higherwho was also qualified for judicial office; he was promoted to the titular rank of commodore (commandeur, Royal Navy), brigadier (brigadegeneraal, Royal Army) or air commodore (commodore, Royal Air Force) if he did not already hold that substantive rank. He could not be a member of the Royal Military Constabulary. The military member was appointed for a term of four years, renewable once for a further such term; compulsory retirement was at the age of sixty (Article 6 § 4 of the Code of Military Criminal Procedure).

65. Section 68(2) of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act (Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie) provides that the military members of the Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal participate as judges on an equal footing with their civilian colleagues and are subject to the same duties of confidentiality (sections 7 and 13 of that Act) and functional independence and impartiality (section 12); and also that they shall be subject to the same scrutiny of their official behaviour as civilian judges (sections 13a–13g). The latter involves review of specific behaviour by the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), initiated, at the request of an interested party or proprio motu, by the Procurator General (procureur-generaal) to the Supreme Court.

G.  Relevant domestic law and procedure

66. The provisions of domestic law which are relevant to the case are the following:

1.  The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Article 97

“1. There shall be armed forces for the defence and protection of the interests of the Kingdom, and in order to maintain and promote the international legal order.

2. The Government shall have supreme authority over the armed forces.”

2.  The Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht)

Article 41

“1. Anyone who commits an act which is necessary in order to defend his own or someone else’s physical integrity (lijf), sexual integrity (eerbaarheid) or property against immediate unlawful assault shall not be liable for punishment in respect of that act.

2. A transgression of the limits of necessary defence shall not be punishable if it has been caused by a strong emotion occasioned, with immediacy, by an assault.”

Article 42

“Anyone who commits an act prescribed by law shall not be liable for punishment in respect thereof.”

Article 43

“1. Anyone who commits an act for the purpose of carrying out an official order given by the authority invested with the relevant competence shall not be liable for punishment in respect thereof.

2. An official order given without the necessary competence does not confer impunity unless it was considered by the subordinate in good faith as having been given [by an authority acting within their competence] and obedience thereto lay within the ambit of his subordination.”

3.  The Military Criminal Code (Wetboek van Militair Strafrecht)

Article 4

“Netherlands criminal law shall apply to military personnel who commit any punishable act outside the Netherlands.”

Article 38

“1. Anyone who commits an act permitted under the laws of war within the limits of his competence, or who could not be punished without violating a treaty in force between the Netherlands and the power with which the Netherlands is at war or any regulation adopted pursuant to such a treaty, shall not be liable for punishment.

2. A serviceman who uses force in the lawful execution of his task and consistent with the rules laid down for that task shall not be liable for punishment.”

Article 71

“In this Code the expression ‘war’ shall be understood to include an armed conflict that cannot be considered a war properly so-called and in which the Kingdom is involved, whether for individual or collective self-defence or for the restoration of international peace and security.”

Article 135

“The expression ‘service instruction’ (dienstvoorschrift) shall mean a written decision of general purport given in the form of, or pursuant to, an order in council for the Kingdom or for one of the countries of the Kingdom[3] (bij of krachtens algemene maatregel van rijksbestuur of van bestuur dan wel een bij of krachtens landsverordening onderscheidenlijk landsbesluit gegeven schriftelijk besluit van algemene strekking) that concerns a military service interest of whatever nature (enig militair dienstbelang) and comprises an order or a prohibition directed to military personnel.”

4.  The Military Criminal Procedure Act (Wet Militaire Strafrechtspraak)

Section 1

“...

3. The Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply unless this Act deviates from it.”

Section 8

“...

2. Within the Court of Appeal of Arnhem a multi-judge chamber, to be called the Military Chamber, shall have exclusive competence to consider appeals against appealable judgments of the Military Chambers of the Regional Court mentioned in section 3 [i.e. the Arnhem Regional Court]. This Chamber shall also consider complaints under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

5.  The Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering)

Article 12

“1. If the perpetrator of a punishable act is not prosecuted, or if the prosecution is not pursued to a conclusion, then anyone with a direct interest (rechtstreeks belanghebbende) may lodge a written complaint with the Court of Appeal within whose area of jurisdiction the decision has been taken not to prosecute or not to pursue the prosecution to a conclusion.

...”

Article 148

“1. The public prosecutor shall be charged with the investigation of criminal acts which are triable by the regional court to which he is appointed, as well as the investigation, within the area of that regional court’s jurisdiction, of criminal acts triable by other regional courts or district courts.

2. To that end, he shall give orders to the other persons charged with [such] investigation. ...”

H.  Relevant domestic case-law

1.  The Eric O. case

67. On 27 December 2007, Sergeant Major (sergeant-majoor) Eric O. of the Royal Marines (Korps Mariniers), while leading a unit charged with salvaging the contents of a container lying alongside the “Jackson” route, fired a warning shot into the ground to deter a group of looters. The bullet ricocheted off the surface, mortally wounding a looter.

68. Sergeant Major O. was prosecuted for disobeying official instructions in that he had allegedly used force going beyond what was permitted by the aide-mémoire and the Instructions on the Use of Force, or in the alternative, negligent killing.

69. Following an appeal by the prosecution against an acquittal at first instance, the Military Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Arnhem acquitted Sergeant Major O. In its judgment of 4 May 2005, Landelijk Jurisprudentie Nummer (National Jurisprudence Number, “LJN”) AT4988, it held that the Rules of Engagement constituted official instructions despite their secrecy. It went on to find that Sergeant Major O. had acted within the constraints of the Rules of Engagement and had not been negligent.

2.  The Mustafić and Nuhanović cases

70. In 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. A war ensued that was to continue until December 1995. By its Resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992, the Security Council of the United Nations set up a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Troop-contributing nations included the Netherlands, which provided a battalion of airmobile infantry. This battalion, known as Dutchbat, was deployed as a peacekeeping force under United Nations command in and around the town of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia, which was then held by the Bosniac-dominated Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

71. On 10 July 1995 Bosnian Serb forces attacked the Srebrenica “safe area” in overwhelming force. They overran the area and took control despite the presence of Dutchbat, which in the end was left in control only of a compound in the village of Potočari. In the days that followed, Bosniac men who had fallen into the hands of the Bosnian Serb forces were separated from the women and children and killed. It is now generally accepted as fact that upwards of 7,000, perhaps as many as 8,000 Bosniac men and boys died at the hands of the Bosnian Serb forces and of Serb paramilitary forces in what has come to be known as the “Srebrenica massacre”.

72. Civil cases have been brought in the Netherlands courts against the Netherlands State by surviving relatives of three men killed in the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995.

73. The plaintiffs in the first case (Mustafić v. the State of the Netherlands) are surviving kin of an electrician who was a de facto employee of Dutchbat but did not enjoy any status conferred to persons employed by the United Nations directly. They alleged that the Netherlands State committed a breach of contract in that the Dutchbat deputy commander had refused to let him stay with his family in the compound at Potočari, as a result of which he was made to leave the compound that same day, whereas the Dutchbat leadership ought to have protected him by keeping him inside and evacuating him with Dutchbat itself. In the alternative, they alleged a tort. The plaintiff in the second case (Nuhanović v. the State of the Netherlands) was himself a de facto employee of Dutchbat, for which he worked as an interpreter but also without the status of United Nations employee; he is the son of one man killed in the massacre and the brother of another. He alleged a tort in that the Dutchbat deputy commander had turned the two men out of the compound.

74. On 6 September 2013 the Supreme Court gave judgment in both cases (LJN BZ9225, Nuhanović, and LJN BZ9228, Mustafić). As relevant to the case before the Court, these judgments, which in their essential parts are identical, read as follows (excerpt from the Nuhanović judgment, translation by the Supreme Court itself):

“3.10.1. Part 1 of the cassation appeal submits that in findings of law 5.7 and 5.8 of the interim judgment the Court of Appeal has failed to recognize that a UN troop contingent that has been established in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter and has been placed under the command and control of the United Nations – in this case UNPROFOR, of which Dutchbat formed part – is an organ of the United Nations. This means that attribution of the conduct of such a troop contingent should be made by reference to article 6 DARIO [i.e. the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (Sixty-third session of the International Law Commission, UN Doc A/66/10, to appear in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two)] and not by reference to article 7 DARIO. According to this part of the appeal, application of article 6 DARIO means that Dutchbat’s conduct should, in principle, always be attributed to the United Nations.

3.10.2. It is apparent from the Commentary of article 7 DARIO ... that this attribution rule applies, inter alia, to the situation in which a State places troops at the disposal of the United Nations in the context of a UN peace mission, and command and control is transferred to the United Nations, but the disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction (the ‘organic command’) remain vested in the seconding State. It is implicit in the findings of the Court of Appeal that this situation occurs in the present case. After all, in finding of law 5.10 of the interim judgment the Court of Appeal has held – and this has not been disputed in the cassation appeal – that it is not at issue that the Netherlands, as the troop-contributing State, retained control over the personnel affairs of the military personnel concerned, who had remained in the service of the Netherlands, and retained the power to punish these military personnel under disciplinary and criminal law. The submission in part 1 of the cassation appeal that the Court of Appeal has failed to apply the attribution rule of article 6 DARIO and has instead wrongly applied the attribution rule of article 7 DARIO therefore fails.

3.11.1. Part 2 of the cassation appeal consists of a series of submissions directed against findings of law 5.8 – 5.20 of the interim judgment, in which the Court of Appeal has defined the criterion of effective control in applying the attribution rule of article 7 DARIO to the present case.

3.11.2. In so far as these grounds of appeal are based on the submission that international law excludes the possibility that conduct can be attributed both to an international organization and to a State and that the Court of Appeal therefore wrongly proceeded on the assumption that there was a possibility that both the United Nations and the State had effective control over Dutchbat’s disputed conduct, they are based on an incorrect interpretation of the law. As held above at 3.9.4., international law, in particular article 7 DARIO in conjunction with article 48 (1) DARIO, does not exclude the possibility of dual attribution of given conduct.

It follows that the Court of Appeal was able to leave open whether the United Nations had effective control over Dutchbat’s conduct in the early evening of 13 July 1995. Even if this was the case, it does not necessarily mean that the United Nations had exclusive responsibility.

3.11.3. In so far as it is submitted in these grounds of the cassation appeal that the Court of Appeal has applied an incorrect criterion in assessing whether the State had effective control over Dutchbat at the moment of the disputed conduct, they too are based on an incorrect interpretation of the law. For the purpose of deciding whether the State had effective control it is not necessary for the State to have countermanded the command structure of the United Nations by giving instructions to Dutchbat or to have exercised operational command independently. It is apparent from the Commentary on article 7 DARIO ... that the attribution of conduct to the seconding State or the international organization is based on the factual control over the specific conduct, in which all factual circumstances and the special context of the case must be taken into account. In the disputed findings of law the Court of Appeal has examined, in the light of all circumstances and the special context of the case, whether the State had factual control over Dutchbat’s disputed conduct. The Court of Appeal has not therefore interpreted or applied the law incorrectly.”

It followed that the Court of Appeal’s judgment finding the Netherlands State responsible for the deaths of the three men could stand.

I.  Other domestic documents

1.  Evaluation report on the application of military criminal procedure in operations abroad

75. This report, dated 31 August 2006, was drawn up by a committee consisting of a senior civil servant, a former chief advocate general to the Arnhem Court of Appeal and a judge. It was commissioned by the Minister of Defence at the request of the Lower House of Parliament in the wake of the commotion caused by the Eric O. case (see §§ 67-69 above).

76. Among the subjects discussed in this report is jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. On this point, the report states (p. 30):

“The formal extraterritorial effect of the Convention would appear limited to certain specific cases. This does not alter the fact that the standards flowing from the Convention are of general importance to Netherlands military operations abroad. In particular, important basic standards arise from the Convention which can apply to criminal investigations into the use of force that has caused death or wounding. ...”

There follows an analysis of domestic case-law on the substantive and procedural aspects of Article 2 in the light of the Court’s case-law.

77. The report makes mention of changes already introduced in prosecution policy and the way in which Rules of Engagement and other instructions are relayed to field commanders following the Eric O. case. It suggests further adjustments.

78. Criticism of the lack of preparation of Royal Military Constabulary personnel for police work in foreign theatres of operation is confirmed, but by 2006 “much has been invested in improving the quality of military policing” and more is to be done in the months to come.

79. Similarly, the report states that the Public Prosecution Service, which is composed of civilian lawyers, has on occasion been found lacking in “situational awareness”. This has led to over-hasty decisions to prosecute military personnel, the Eric O. case being cited as a case in point. However, here also, improvements are observed.

80. The shooting incident which led to the present application is mentioned among the real-life cases studied by the committee, but is not discussed in detail.

2.  The report of the Van den Berg Committee

81. In response to allegations that Iraqi citizens had been maltreated or even tortured by Netherlands military personnel, the Minister of Defence ordered an inquiry by an official committee. This committee included a former member of parliament (its chairman, Dr J.T. van den Berg, from whom the committee takes its name), a serving member of parliament, a retired lieutenant general and a retired rear admiral.

82. A report of the committee’s findings was published in June 2007. It is stated that an earlier version of the report was read and commented on by two legal experts, one of these being Ms Zegveld, now the applicant’s representative.

83. The report mentions frictions within the Royal Military Constabulary unit, which is stated inter alia to have been inadequately trained for police-type criminal investigations, and tensions between the Royal Military Constabulary unit and the Royal Marines battalions, which were the first Netherlands contingents to be sent to Iraq (preceding the Royal Army battalion stationed there at the time of the death of Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud).

84. The report also states that the Netherlands was not an “occupying power” and for that reason had made certain caveats; among other things, Netherlands troops were not empowered to keep any persons interned or to prosecute crimes. Anyone arrested by Netherlands troops had to be handed over to either the United Kingdom military or to the Iraqi authorities, depending on the nature of the suspicion. “Conversations” with persons so arrested were permitted within the context of force protection.

85. The report addresses the question whether persons outside the Kingdom of the Netherlands in an area where Netherlands troops are operating in an armed conflict can be said to be within Netherlands jurisdiction. It answers this question in the affirmative.

86. The Minister of Defence presented this report to the Lower House of Parliament on 18 June 2007, with a covering letter commenting on some of its findings but endorsing the conclusions.

3.  The final evaluation report

87. A final evaluation report was published after the completed withdrawal of the last Netherlands contingent. It states that the Netherlands Government added a number of “caveats” (limitations) to the tasks of the Netherlands troops. These “caveats” were that the Netherlands would not assume any administrative duties and would not deploy “executive law enforcement development activities”. They were inspired by the desire not to be considered a de facto occupying power.

88. As to the choice of methods, it is stated that initially the intention was not to lay any great stress on the military presence, and to avoid as much as possible the use of patrols and checkpoints. In practice, however, it turned out that security could best be provided by means of frequent patrols, both by day and by night, and by setting up vehicle checkpoints on routes potentially used by criminals or terrorists.

89. Elsewhere the report states that there were a number of incidents in which Netherlands troops were fired at, a number of which had taken place at vehicle checkpoints. In the cases where Iraqis were wounded or killed, no acts contravening the Rules of Engagement had been established. It is mentioned that one Iraqi wounded by Netherlands fire spent several weeks in the Netherlands for treatment.

J.  Relevant international law

1. The Hague Regulations

90. The definition of an Occupying Power, and its duties as relevant to the case before the Court, can be found primarily in Articles 42 to 56 of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, 18 October 1907: hereafter, “the Hague Regulations”).

91. Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Regulations provide as follows:

Article 42

“Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.”

Article 43

“The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”

2.  The Fourth Geneva Convention

92. Articles 27 to 34 and 47 to 78 of the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva, 12 August 1949: hereafter, “the Fourth Geneva Convention”) set out the obligations of an Occupying Power in detail. Articles 6 and 29 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provide as follows:

Article 6

“The present Convention shall apply from the outset of any conflict or occupation mentioned in Article 2.

In the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of the present Convention shall cease on the general close of military operations.

In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, and 143.”

Article 29

“The Party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be is responsible for the treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of any individual responsibility which may be incurred.”

3.  United Nations Security Council Resolutions

93. The Security Council of the United Nations (“the Security Council”) adopted Resolution 1483 (2003) at its 4761st meeting on 22 May 2003. As relevant to the case before the Court, it reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions,

Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq,

...

Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/538) and recognizing the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states as occupying powers under unified command (the ‘Authority’),

Noting further that other States that are not occupying powers are working now or in the future may work under the Authority,

Welcoming further the willingness of Member States to contribute to stability and security in Iraq by contributing personnel, equipment, and other resources under the Authority,

...

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Appeals to Member States and concerned organizations to assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country, and to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq in accordance with this resolution;

2. Calls upon all Member States in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations for Iraq and to help meet the humanitarian and other needs of the Iraqi people by providing food, medical supplies, and resources necessary for reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq’s economic infrastructure;

...

4. Calls upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future;

5. Calls upon all concerned to comply fully with their obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907;

...

8. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq whose independent responsibilities shall involve reporting regularly to the Council on his activities under this resolution, coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq, coordinating among United Nations and international agencies engaged in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in Iraq, and, in coordination with the Authority, assisting the people of Iraq through:

(a) coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction assistance by United Nations agencies and between United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations;

(b) promoting the safe, orderly, and voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons;

(c) working intensively with the Authority, the people of Iraq, and others concerned to advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance, including by working together to facilitate a process leading to an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq;

(d) facilitating the reconstruction of key infrastructure, in cooperation with other international organizations;

(e) promoting economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development, including through coordination with national and regional organizations, as appropriate, civil society, donors, and the international financial institutions;

(f) encouraging international efforts to contribute to basic civilian administration functions;

(g) promoting the protection of human rights;

(h) encouraging international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police force; and

(i) encouraging international efforts to promote legal and judicial reform;

9. Supports the formation, by the people of Iraq with the help of the Authority and working with the Special Representative, of an Iraqi interim administration as a transitional administration run by Iraqis, until an internationally recognized, representative government is established by the people of Iraq and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority;

...

26. Calls upon Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute to the implementation of this resolution;

27. Decides to remain seized of this matter.”

94. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1511 (2003) at its 4844th meeting on 16 October 2003. As relevant to the case before the Court, it reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Iraq, including resolution 1483 (2003) of 22 May 2003 and 1500 (2003) of 14 August 2003, and on threats to peace and security caused by terrorist acts, including resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, and other relevant resolutions,

Underscoring that the sovereignty of Iraq resides in the State of Iraq, reaffirming the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources, reiterating its resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly, and recognizing the importance of international support, particularly that of countries in the region, Iraq’s neighbours, and regional organizations, in taking forward this process expeditiously,

Recognizing that international support for restoration of conditions of stability and security is essential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as to the ability of all concerned to carry out their work on behalf of the people of Iraq, and welcoming Member State contributions in this regard under resolution 1483 (2003),

...

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

...

13. Determines that the provision of security and stability is essential to the successful completion of the political process as outlined in paragraph 7 above and to the ability of the United Nations to contribute effectively to that process and the implementation of resolution 1483 (2003), and authorizes a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the implementation of the timetable and programme as well as to contribute to the security of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, the Governing Council of Iraq and other institutions of the Iraqi interim administration, and key humanitarian and economic infrastructure;

14. Urges Member States to contribute assistance under this United Nations mandate, including military forces, to the multinational force referred to in paragraph 13 above;

...

16. Emphasizes the importance of establishing effective Iraqi police and security forces in maintaining law, order, and security and combating terrorism consistent with paragraph 4 of resolution 1483 (2003), and calls upon Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute to the training and equipping of Iraqi police and security forces;

...

25. Requests that the United States, on behalf of the multinational force as outlined in paragraph 13 above, report to the Security Council on the efforts and progress of this force as appropriate and not less than every six months;

26. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

4.  Case-law of the International Court of Justice

a. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

95. In Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 2004, p. 136, the International Court of Justice held as follows:

“109. The Court would observe that, while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory. Considering the object and purpose of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would seem natural that, even when such is the case, States parties to the Covenant should be bound to comply with its provisions.

The constant practice of the Human Rights Committee is consistent with this. Thus, the Committee has found the Covenant applicable where the State exercises its jurisdiction on foreign territory. It has ruled on the legality of acts by Uruguay in cases of arrests carried out by Uruguayan agents in Brazil or Argentina (case No. 52/79López Burgos v. Uruguay; case No. 56/79Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay). It decided to the same effect in the case of the confiscation of a passport by a Uruguayan consulate in Germany (case No. 106181, Montero v. Uruguay).

The travaux préparatoires of the Covenant confirm the Committee’s interpretation of Article 2 of that instrument. These show that, in adopting the wording chosen, the drafters of the Covenant did not intend to allow States to escape from their obligations when they exercise jurisdiction outside their national territory. They only intended to prevent persons residing abroad from asserting, vis-à-vis their State of origin, rights that do not fall within the competence of that State, but of that of the State of residence (see the discussion of the preliminary draft in the Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/SR.194, para. 46; and United Nations, Official record, of the General Assembly, Tenth Session, Annexes, Al2929, Part II, Chap. V, para. 4 (1955)).

110. The Court takes note in this connection of the position taken by Israel, in relation to the applicability of the Covenant, in its communications to the Human Rights Committee, and of the view of the Committee.

In 1998, Israel stated that, when preparing its report to the Committee, it had had to face the question ‘whether individuals resident in the occupied territories were indeed subject to Israel’s jurisdiction’ for purposes of the application of the Covenant (CCPR/C/SR.1675, para. 21). Israel took the position that ‘the Covenant and similar instruments did not apply directly to the current situation in the occupied territories’ (ibid., para. 27).

The Committee, in its concluding observations after examination of the report, expressed concern at Israel’s attitude and pointed ‘to the long-standing presence of Israel in [the occupied] territories, Israel’s ambiguous attitude towards their future status, as well as the exercise of effective jurisdiction by Israeli security forces therein’ (CCPR/C/79/Add.93, para. 10). In 2003 in face of Israel’s consistent position, to the effect that ‘the Covenant does not apply beyond its own territory, notably in the West Bank and Gaza ...’, the Committee reached the following conclusion:

‘in the current circumstances, the provisions of the Covenant apply to the benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories, for all conduct by the State party’s authorities or agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant and fall within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the principles of public international law’ (CCPR/C0/78/1SR, para. 11).

111. In conclusion, the Court considers that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.”

b. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)

96. In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168, the International Court of Justice held as follows:

“172. The Court observes that, under customary international law, as reflected in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, territory is considered to be occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army, and the occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised (see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 167, para. 78, and p. 172, para. 89).

173. In order to reach a conclusion as to whether a State, the military forces of which are present on the territory of another State as a result of an intervention, is an ‘occupying Power’ in the meaning of the term as understood in the jus in bello, the Court must examine whether there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the said authority was in fact established and exercised by the intervening State in the areas in question. In the present case the Court will need to satisfy itself that the Ugandan armed forces in the DRC were not only stationed in particular locations but also that they had substituted their own authority for that of the Congolese Government. In that event, any justification given by Uganda for its occupation would be of no relevance; nor would it be relevant whether or not Uganda had established a structured military administration of the territory occupied.”

and

“179. The Court, having concluded that Uganda was an occupying Power in Ituri at the relevant time, finds that Uganda’s responsibility is engaged both for any acts of its military that violated its international obligations and for any lack of vigilance in preventing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by other actors present in the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own account.

180. The Court notes that Uganda at all times has responsibility for all actions and omissions of its own military forces in the territory of the DRC in breach of its obligations under the rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law which are relevant and applicable in the specific situation.”

and

“213. The Court turns now to the question as to whether acts and omissions of the UPDF and its officers and soldiers are attributable to Uganda. The conduct of the UPDF as a whole is clearly attributable to Uganda, being the conduct of a State organ. According to a well-established rule of international law, which is of customary character, ‘the conduct of any organ of a State must be regarded as an act of that State’ (Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 87, para. 62). The conduct of individual soldiers and officers of the UPDF is to be considered as the conduct of a State organ. In the Court’s view, by virtue of the military status and function of Ugandan soldiers in the DRC, their conduct is attributable to Uganda. The contention that the persons concerned did not act in the capacity of persons exercising governmental authority in the particular circumstances, is therefore without merit.

214. It is furthermore irrelevant for the attribution of their conduct to Uganda whether the UPDF personnel acted contrary to the instructions given or exceeded their authority. According to a well-established rule of a customary nature, as reflected in Article 3 of the Fourth Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907 as well as in Article 91 of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, a party to an armed conflict shall be responsible for all acts by persons forming part of its armed forces.”

c. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)

97. In Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, the International Court of Justice held as follows:

“399. This provision [i.e. Article 8 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State responsibility] must be understood in the light of the Court’s jurisprudence on the subject, particularly that of the 1986 Judgment in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) referred to above (paragraph 391). In that Judgment the Court, as noted above, after having rejected the argument that the contras were to be equated with organs of the United States because they were ‘completely dependent’ on it, added that the responsibility of the Respondent could still arise if it were proved that it had itself ‘directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State’ (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 64, para. 115); this led to the following significant conclusion:

‘For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.’ (Ibid., p. 65.)

400. The test thus formulated differs in two respects from the test — described above — to determine whether a person or entity may be equated with a State organ even if not having that status under internal law. First, in this context it is not necessary to show that the persons who performed the acts alleged to have violated international law were in general in a relationship of ‘complete dependence’ on the respondent State; it has to be proved that they acted in accordance with that State’s instructions or under its ‘effective control’. It must however be shown that this ‘effective control’ was exercised, or that the State’s instructions were given, in respect of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the persons or groups of persons having committed the violations.”

and

“406. It must next be noted that the ‘overall control’ test has the major drawback of broadening the scope of State responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle governing the law of international responsibility: a State is responsible only for its own conduct, that is to say the conduct of persons acting, on whatever basis, on its behalf. That is true of acts carried out by its official organs, and also by persons or entities which are not formally recognized as official organs under internal law but which must nevertheless be equated with State organs because they are in a relationship of complete dependence on the State. Apart from these cases, a State’s responsibility can be incurred for acts committed by persons or groups of persons — neither State organs nor to be equated with such organs — only if, assuming those acts to be internationally wrongful, they are attributable to it under the rule of customary international law reflected in Article 8 cited above [i.e. Article 8 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State responsibility]. This is so where an organ of the State gave the instructions or provided the direction pursuant to which the perpetrators of the wrongful act acted or where it exercised effective control over the action during which the wrong was committed. In this regard the ‘overall control’ test is unsuitable, for it stretches too far, almost to breaking point, the connection which must exist between the conduct of a State’s organs and its international responsibility.”

5.  The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility

98. Articles on State Responsibility with commentaries were adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations as a part of the International Law Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/56/10). The report appeared in the Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two. As relevant to the present case, the Articles and their commentaries (adopted together with the Articles themselves) read as follows (footnote references omitted):

Article 2
Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State

“There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission:

(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and

(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.”

The commentary on this Article includes the following:

“(5) For particular conduct to be characterized as an internationally wrongful act, it must first be attributable to the State. The State is a real organized entity, a legal person with full authority to act under international law. But to recognize this is not to deny the elementary fact that the State cannot act of itself. An ‘act of the State’ must involve some action or omission by a human being or group: ‘States can act only by and through their agents and representatives.’ The question is which persons should be considered as acting on behalf of the State, i.e. what constitutes an ‘act of the State’ for the purposes of State responsibility.

(6) In speaking of attribution to the State what is meant is the State as a subject of international law. Under many legal systems, the State organs consist of different legal persons (ministries or other legal entities), which are regarded as having distinct rights and obligations for which they alone can be sued and are responsible. For the purposes of the international law of State responsibility the position is different. The State is treated as a unity, consistent with its recognition as a single legal person in international law. In this as in other respects the attribution of conduct to the State is necessarily a normative operation. What is crucial is that a given event is sufficiently connected to conduct (whether an act or omission) which is attributable to the State under one or other of the rules set out in chapter II.

(7) The second condition for the existence of an internationally wrongful act of the State is that the conduct attributable to the State should constitute a breach of an international obligation of that State ...

(12) In subparagraph (a), the term ‘attribution’ is used to denote the operation of attaching a given action or omission to a State. In international practice and judicial decisions, the term ‘imputation’ is also used. But the term ‘attribution’ avoids any suggestion that the legal process of connecting conduct to the State is a fiction, or that the conduct in question is ‘really’ that of someone else.

(13) In subparagraph (b), reference is made to the breach of an international obligation rather than a rule or a norm of international law. What matters for these purposes is not simply the existence of a rule but its application in the specific case to the responsible State. The term ‘obligation’ is commonly used in international judicial decisions and practice and in the literature to cover all the possibilities. The reference to an ‘obligation’ is limited to an obligation under international law, a matter further clarified in article 3.”

Article 6
Conduct of organs placed at the disposal of a State by another State

“The conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall be considered an act of the former State under international law if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the State at whose disposal it is placed.”

The commentary on this Article includes the following:

“(2) The words ‘placed at the disposal of’ in article 6 express the essential condition that must be met in order for the conduct of the organ to be regarded under international law as an act of the receiving and not of the sending State. The notion of an organ ‘placed at the disposal of’ the receiving State is a specialized one, implying that the organ is acting with the consent, under the authority of and for the purposes of the receiving State. Not only must the organ be appointed to perform functions appertaining to the State at whose disposal it is placed, but in performing the functions entrusted to it by the beneficiary State, the organ must also act in conjunction with the machinery of that State and under its exclusive direction and control, rather than on instructions from the sending State. Thus article 6 is not concerned with ordinary situations of inter-State cooperation or collaboration, pursuant to treaty or otherwise.

(3) Examples of situations that could come within this limited notion of a State organ ‘placed at the disposal’ of another State might include a section of the health service or some other unit placed under the orders of another country to assist in overcoming an epidemic or natural disaster, or judges appointed in particular cases to act as judicial organs of another State. On the other hand, mere aid or assistance offered by organs of one State to another on the territory of the latter is not covered by article 6. For example, armed forces may be sent to assist another State in the exercise of the right of collective self-defence or for other purposes. Where the forces in question remain under the authority of the sending State, they exercise elements of the governmental authority of that State and not of the receiving State. Situations can also arise where the organ of one State acts on the joint instructions of its own and another State, or there may be a single entity which is a joint organ of several States. In these cases, the conduct in question is attributable to both States under other articles of this chapter.

(4) Thus, what is crucial for the purposes of article 6 is the establishment of a functional link between the organ in question and the structure or authority of the receiving State. The notion of an organ ‘placed at the disposal’ of another State excludes the case of State organs, sent to another State for the purposes of the former State or even for shared purposes, which retain their own autonomy and status: for example, cultural missions, diplomatic or consular missions, foreign relief or aid organizations. Also excluded from the ambit of article 6 are situations in which functions of the ‘beneficiary’ State are performed without its consent, as when a State placed in a position of dependence, territorial occupation or the like is compelled to allow the acts of its own organs to be set aside and replaced to a greater or lesser extent by those of the other State.

(5) There are two further criteria that must be met for article 6 to apply. First, the organ in question must possess the status of an organ of the sending State; and secondly its conduct must involve the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the receiving State. The first of these conditions excludes from the ambit of article 6 the conduct of private entities or individuals which have never had the status of an organ of the sending State. For example, experts or advisers placed at the disposal of a State under technical assistance programmes do not usually have the status of organs of the sending State. The second condition is that the organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State must be ‘acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority’ of the receiving State. There will only be an act attributable to the receiving State where the conduct of the loaned organ involves the exercise of the governmental authority of that State. By comparison with the number of cases of cooperative action by States in fields such as mutual defence, aid and development, article 6 covers only a specific and limited notion of ‘transferred responsibility’. Yet, in State practice the situation is not unknown.”

Article 8
Conduct directed or controlled by a State

“The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”

The commentary on this Article includes the following:

“(2) The attribution to the State of conduct in fact authorized by it is widely accepted in international jurisprudence. In such cases it does not matter that the person or persons involved are private individuals nor whether their conduct involves ‘governmental activity’. Most commonly, cases of this kind will arise where State organs supplement their own action by recruiting or instigating private persons or groups who act as ‘auxiliaries’ while remaining outside the official structure of the State. These include, for example, individuals or groups of private individuals who, though not specifically commissioned by the State and not forming part of its police or armed forces, are employed as auxiliaries or are sent as ‘volunteers’ to neighbouring countries, or who are instructed to carry out particular missions abroad.”

and

“(5) The Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has also addressed these issues. In the Tadić case, the Chamber stressed that:

The requirement of international law for the attribution to States of acts performed by private individuals is that the State exercises control over the individuals. The degree of control may, however, vary according to the factual circumstances of each case. The Appeals Chamber fails to see why in each and every circumstance international law should require a high threshold for the test of control.

The Appeals Chamber held that the requisite degree of control by the Yugoslavian ‘authorities over these armed forces required by international law for considering the armed conflict to be international was overall control going beyond the mere financing and equipping of such forces and involving also participation in the planning and supervision of military operations’. In the course of their reasoning, the majority considered it necessary to disapprove the ICJ approach in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case. But the legal issues and the factual situation in the Tadić case were different from those facing the Court in that case. The tribunal’s mandate is directed to issues of individual criminal responsibility, not State responsibility, and the question in that case concerned not responsibility but the applicable rules of international humanitarian law. In any event it is a matter for appreciation in each case whether particular conduct was or was not carried out under the control of a State, to such an extent that the conduct controlled should be attributed to it.”

K.  Documents relevant to the occupation of Iraq

1.  Coalition Provisional Authority Order no. 28

99. Coalition Provisional Authority Order no. 28, entitled “Establishment Of The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps”, was promulgated by the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, on 9 March 2003. As relevant to the case before the Court, it provides as follows:

Pursuant to my authority as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), under the laws and usages of war, and consistent with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483(2003),

Noting that Resolution 1483 appeals to Member States to assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions, rebuild their country, and to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq,

Understanding the need to address promptly threats to public security and stability resulting from wrongful acts or disasters,

Recognizing that continued attacks and acts of sabotage by Ba`athist remnants and terrorists intent on undermining security in Iraq necessitate the temporary establishment of an Iraqi constabulary force to operate with Coalition Forces to counter the threat and maintain security in Iraq,

I hereby promulgate the following:

Section 1
Establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps

1) The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps is established as a temporary institution, subject to a decision by an internationally recognized, representative government, established by the people of Iraq, to continue or disband the Corps.

2) The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps is a security and emergency service agency for Iraq. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps is composed of Iraqis who will complement operations conducted by Coalition military forces in Iraq to counter organized groups and individuals employing violence against the people of Iraq and their national infrastructure.

3) In support of Coalition operations to provide security and stability to the people of Iraq, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps is authorized to perform constabulary duties, including the following tasks: patrolling urban and rural areas; conducting operations to search for and seize illegal weapons and other contraband; providing fixed site, check point, area, route and convoy security; providing crowd and riot control; disaster response services; search and rescue services; providing support to humanitarian missions and disaster recover (sic) operations including transportation services; conducting joint patrols with Coalition Forces; and, participating in other activities designed to build positive relationships between the Iraqi people and Coalition authorities including serving as community liaisons.

4) The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps is distinct from the Iraqi police force and the New Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps will complement the police force, but will be designed to perform operations that exceed the capacity of the police.

a) While on duty and under the supervision of Coalition Forces, members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps will not be subject to the direction or control of the Iraqi Police. Except as provided herein, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps will not have, or exercise, domestic law enforcement functions.

b) The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps is not a component of the New Iraqi Army established by CPA Order 22, Creation of a New Iraqi Army (CPA/ORD/9 August 2003/22) and is not subject to the orders of the New Iraqi Army chain of command.

...

Section 4
Functioning of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps

1) The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps shall operate under the authority of the Administrator of the CPA and shall be subject to the supervision of Coalition Forces. The Administrator of the CPA may delegate to the senior military commander of Coalition Forces in Iraq responsibility and authority for the recruiting, training, organization, and control of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. This responsibility and authority may be redelegated pursuant to Section 7 below.

2) Operational or tactical command of units of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps operating with Coalition Forces shall be vested in an officer of Coalition Forces designated by the senior military commander of Coalition Forces in Iraq pursuant to Section 7 below. ...

...

Section 7 Delegation of Authority

The Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority may delegate responsibilities under this Order, as determined by the Administrator, to the senior military commander of Coalition Forces in Iraq. The senior military commander of Coalition Forces in Iraq may further delegate responsibilities under this Order to those under his command.”

2.  The MND (SE) (Multinational Division, South East) Memorandum of Understanding

100. The respondent Government have submitted the following excerpt from the Memorandum of Understanding governing the arrangement between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom:

“14.1 Members of MND (SE) may possess and carry arms and ammunition in Iraq according to their respective national operations rules and procedures for the purposes of carrying out the MND (SE) mission and when authorized to do so by Comd MND (SE).

14.2 ROE for the MND (SE) are at Annex F. The fundamental driver for the level of permissiveness in the ROE profile is Force Protection rather than the MND (SE) mission. Participants may indicate their intention to apply different levels of permissiveness to their own forces by means of national direction or clarifications to their National Contingent Commanders provided that:

a. All differences are communicated to Comd MND (SE) Legal Adviser prior to implementation of such ROE in Iraq.

b. No difference is more permissive than that authorized by MND (SE) ROE.

14.3 Due to its classification, Annex E [presumably Annex F is meant] is issued separately on restricted circulation. Signature of this MOU, however, signifies accession to the ROE contained within Annex F.”

101. According to the Government, the Memorandum of Understanding also provided that the Netherlands would exercise exclusive disciplinary and criminal jurisdiction over its personnel.

102. The Agent of the respondent Government, speaking at the hearing, stated that the Memorandum of Understanding was a classified document and that the Minister of Defence had declined to declassify it in order that it be submitted to the Court.

3.  The MND (C-S) (Multinational Division, Central-South) Memorandum of Understanding

103. Latvian troops participated in SFIR as part of the multinational division stationed in Central-South Iraq under Polish command. The Government of the Republic of Latvia published the applicable Memorandum of Understanding in the Latvian Herald (Latvijas Vēstnesis) the official publication of legal acts and official announcements, on 11 January 2005 (no. 5 (3163)). In its relevant parts, it reads as follows:

SECTION FOUR — MANDATE

4.1. In accordance with the UNSCR 1483, the mandate of the SFIR MND (C-S) will be to assist the Authority in maintaining stability and security in Iraq by contributing personnel, equipment and other resources to work under its unified command in accordance with arrangements set out in section five below. Main tasks of the MND (C-S) are set out in the Mission Statement annexed to this MOU ...

4.2. Members of MND (C-S) will carry out their duties in a strict, fair and equitable manner and will refrain from any action incompatible with the independent nature of their duties. This does not interfere with the right of SFIR to act in self-defence, extended self-defence as well as force protection and mission enforcement.

SECTION FIVE — COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MND (C-S)

5.1. The post of Commander MND (C-S) will be held by the Republic of Poland. The Republic of Poland will co-ordinate the introduction of the MND (C-S) structure and will be responsible for ensuring that the Participants remain informed of progress in implementing that structure.

5.2. Members of National Contingents will remain under Full Command of their participant through their National Contingent Commander/Senior National Representative. Operational Control of all National Contingents contributed to MND (C-S) will be assigned to a superior Commander.

5.3. Participants are responsible for planning and execution of movements of their forces and sustainment from home stations to PODs [ports of disembarkation] along the strategic LOCs [lines of communication]. This responsibility can be delegated to other agencies who act on behalf of the Participants. Reception, Staging and Onward Movements (RSOM) operations including Port Clearance will be conducted in line with existing Standard Operating Procedures unless otherwise decided. Tactical Control of all aspects of the Strategic and Tactical LOCs will be assigned to the respective Movements Control Organisations at the theatre level (CJTF-7).

5.4. Comd MND (C-S) has Co-ordinating Authority over National Support Element logistic assets in order to meet operational requirements or to ensure deconfliction of use of limited infrastructure or assets. In such circumstances the provisions of Section eleven may be applied. Those logistic assets that form all or part of a Participant’s contribution to MND (C-S) will be controlled in accordance with para 5.2 above.

5.5. Transfer of Authority (TO A) of Forces to Comd MND (C-S) in accordance with the Command Status above, will take place at declared Full Operational Capability (FOC) by the National Contingent Commanders (NCCs). Participants will confirm the Command Status of their Forces by signal to Comd MND (C-S) on TOA.

5.6. National Contingent Commanders/Senior National Representatives are responsible for the maintenance of order and discipline within the National Contingent under his or her command.

5.7. Comd MND (C-S) may request the withdrawal of any personnel contributed to MND (C-S). National Contingent Commanders/Senior National Representatives will review any such request and will seek to comply where permissible in accordance with their own National regulations.

5.8. Comd MND (C-S) is responsible for coordination with CPA in the MND (C-S) AOR. Brigade Commanders after consultation with concerned Participants will nominate representatives to be the military point of contact with CPA inside their Brigade AOR, keeping informed MND (C-S) Commander. These representatives will also sit on a Joint Co-ordination Board.

5.9. English will be the official working and command language in the MND (C-S) down to the battalion level, except for the Battle Group 1.

SECTION FOURTEEN — RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)/CARRIAGE OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION

14.1. Members of MND (C-S) may possess and carry arms and ammunition in Iraq for the purposes of carrying out the MND (C-S) mission when authorised to do so by Comd MND (C-S).

14.2. ROE for the MND (C-S) will be a part of MND (C-S) operational order. The fundamental driver for the level of permissiveness in the ROE Profile is Force Protection rather than the MND (C-S) mission. Participants may indicate their intention to apply different levels of permissiveness to their own forces by means of national direction or clarifications to their National Contingent Commanders/Senior National Representatives provided that:

a. Initial differences are to be communicated to Comd MND (C-S) before TO A. Other differences can be communicated if there is a need.

b. No difference is more permissive than that authorised MND (C-S) ROE.

SECTION SIXTEEN — CLAIMS

16.1. Except as covered elsewhere in this MOU, each Participant waives any claim it may have against any other Participant for injury (including injury resulting in death) suffered by its National Contingent personnel and damage or loss of property owned by it, its National Contingent personnel caused by acts of omissions of any other Participant or its National Contingent personnel in the performance of official duties in connection with this MOU.

16.2. Where the relevant Participants mutually determine in respect of any claim that damage, loss, injury or death was caused by reckless acts, reckless omissions, wilful misconduct or gross negligence of only one of the Participants, its service personnel, servants or agents the costs of any liability will be borne by that Participant alone.

16.3. Where more than one Participant is responsible for the injury, death, loss or damage or it is not possible to attribute responsibility for the injury, death, loss or damage specifically to one Participant, the handling and settling of the claim will be approved by the relevant Participants. The costs of handling and settling the claims will be equally shared between the Participants concerned.

16.4. Third party claims including those for property loss or damage and for personal injury, illness or death or in respect of any other matter arising from or attributed to MND (C-S) personnel or any persons employed by it, whether normally resident in Iraq or not and that do not arise in connection with military combat operations, shall be submitted and dealt with by the Participant whose National Contingent personnel, property, activities or other assets are alleged to have caused the claimed damage, in a manner consistent with the national laws of the Participant state.

16.5. Third party claims will be received initially by HQ MND (C-S) and will be forwarded to the Participant deemed to be responsible. Where more than one Participant is responsible for the injury, death, loss or damage or it is not possible to attribute responsibility for the injury, death, loss or damage specifically to one Participant; the cost of handling and settling the third party claims will be distributed equally between the Participants concerned.

ANNEX A
TO THE MND (C-S) MOU

THE STABILIZATION FORCE MND (C-S) MISSION STATEMENT

Introduction

1. The Mission will involve the Participants in assisting with the conduct of key tasks. Furthermore, these tasks will increasingly involve working with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the local people of Iraq with respect to restoration and establishment of local institutions.

MND C-S Area of Operational Responsibility (AOR)

2. The Area of Operational Responsibility (AOR) for the Stabilization Force in Iraq (SFIR) in MND (C-S) comprises five provinces: Babil, Karbala, Wasit, Al Qadistyah, An Najaf A provisional map of the MND (C-S) AOR is at Appendix 1 to this Annex.

Key Tasks

3. The SFIR MND (C-S) will undertake a range of tasks in the AOR in support of its Mission and these will be determined in response to the changing situation. Key tasks, will include:

a. External Security/Border Security. SFIR MND (C-S) led. Protection of key points, including monitoring the land border and assisting in the establishment and training of an Iraqi Border Security Force.

b. Internal Security. SFIR MND (C-S) led. The maintenance of a safe and secure environment, including intelligence-led operations to dislocate the threat from subversive and armed groups.

c. Force Protection. SFIR MND (C-S) led. This will include all aspects of current operations to ensure the security of SFIR and, for a limited period, CPA personnel throughout the AOR

d. Fixed Site Security. SFIR MND (C-S) led. This will include responsibility for maintaining security at the critical and sensitive sites within the AOR

e. Governance and Support for Infrastructure. CPA led. SFIR MND (C-S) will, for a limited period of time, support CPA (C-S) efforts to establish local governance based on the rule of law that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi citizens in the AOR without regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender. SFIR MND (C-S) will support this by working at the local and regional level to establish mechanisms for governance and civil administration until the CPA has the capability of working with the local Iraqi people to establish full governance. SFIR MND (C-S) will continue to support this within the AOR with Government Support Teams (GST) until the CPA Local Government Teams (LGT) are operational within the AOR Com SFIR MND (C-S) will continue to provide liaison to the GST after the CPA assumes control and will work closely with CPA (C-S) to ensure military operations are synchronised with Coalition activities. Further support may be provided for a limited period to assist in the establishment and maintenance of Iraqi infrastructure.

f. Law Enforcement Development. CPA led. SFIR MND (C-S) will provide support for a limited period. SFIR MND (C-S) will continue to assist with the development of the Civilian Police Force, including the conduct of joint patrols, the establishment of a Police Evaluation Team, the development of a Complaints Procedure, and support to the local Iraqi courts and judiciary in maintaining law & order. After successful transition to the CPA and the local Iraqis, SFIR MND (C-S) will maintain a liaison role in order to coordinate law enforcement operations, training and oversight with the military.

g. War Criminals. CPA led. SFIR MND (C-S) may need to provide support to facilitate the detention of suspected war criminal in the AOR.

h. Restoration of Essential Services. CPA led. SFIR MND (C-S) will provide support for a limited period until civilian contracted and Iraqi personnel can assume responsibility. SFIR MND (C-S) will be responsible with the support of CPA for facilitating the provision of essential services within the AOR.

i. Building the Iraqi Military. CPA led. SFIR MND (C-S) will provide nominal military support but the manning, training and equipping of an Iraqi Military Structure are a CPA function.

4. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention (the Civilian convention) the only authority to act as the ‘detaining power’ in the AOR is the Comd SFIR MND (C-S) on behalf of the Authority.

5. The Commander of SFIR MND (C-S) will liaise with such political, social and religious leaders as necessary in the AOR to ensure that religious, ethnic and cultural sensitivities in Iraq are appropriately respected by the members of the SFIR MND (C-S).

Identification

6. SFIR MND (C-S) military and paramilitary personnel will wear uniforms and carry arms as authorised by their orders. The Iraqi Civilian Police Force, when on duty, will be visibly identified by uniform or other distinctive markings and may carry arms as authorised by CPA Regulations and Orders and once the Iraqi (Administration) is established.

Threat Assessment

7. Coalition Forces assess that the internal threat to stability in Iraq is from armed factions jostling for political power and influence, remnants of the Baath Party and its splinter organisations, criminals and terrorists. Externally, the threat is limited and neighbouring countries are supportive. The situation is dynamic and may change. The SFIR MND (C-S) force posture may need to be adjusted as the situation develops and Participants will need to be flexible.

8. The Participants must understand the need to provide the Commander of SFIR MND (C-S) with any information relevant to the security of the mission, its personnel, equipment and locations.

Membership of SFIR in MND (C-S)

9. It is understood that once the MND (C-S) is established, its membership may change

Final Authority to Interpret

10. The Commander of MND (C-S) is the final authority regarding operational interpretation of this Mission statement.

Summary

11. This Mission Statement sets out the obligations and responsibilities of the Participants and outlines main tasks of the SFIR MND (C-S) mission in the AOR.”

104. The signatories to this document are the Republic of Latvia, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Secretary of the Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic, the Department of National Defence of the Philippines, the Secretary of Defence of the Republic of Honduras, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Hungary, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, the Ministry of Defence of Mongolia, the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Nicaragua, the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway, the Ministry of National Defence of Romania, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of El Salvador, the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic, the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Spain, the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Thailand, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland.

COMPLAINTS

105. The applicant alleged violations of Article 2 in its procedural aspect.

106. He complained that the investigation had been insufficiently independent, for the following reasons:

(a) The Royal Military Constabulary unit in Iraq had been under the sole command of the Netherlands battalion commander; there had been no presence of the public prosecution service. Since the members of the unit shared their living quarters with the regular troops, the distance between them and the individuals they might be called upon to investigate had been insufficient.

(b) The Arnhem public prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute Lieutenant A. had been based entirely on the reports of the Royal Military Constabulary, on which the public prosecutor had placed excessive reliance.

(c) The Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal, which included in its composition a serving Army officer who did not belong to the judiciary, also placed full reliance on the results of the very limited investigations by the Royal Military Constabulary.

107. The applicant also complained that the investigation had been insufficiently effective, for the following reasons:

(a) No statements had been taken from the ICDC personnel who had witnessed the incident, a Royal Military Constabulary investigator having decided that the information which they gave was of no pertinence.

(b) The questioning of the key witness, Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim, the driver of the Mercedes car, had been extremely cursory. His evidence was important because he was the only civilian witness available, and thus the only witness without any hierarchical or otherwise functional link to Lieutenant A. Moreover, his statement as recorded by the Royal Military Constabulary investigators was inconsistent with the statement which he made later the same day to an Iraqi official.

(c) Lieutenant A. had not been questioned for the first time until seven hours after the incident, and had not been separated from the other witnesses during that period. He would therefore have had ample opportunity to discuss the incident with the other witnesses beforehand and adapt his statement accordingly.

(d) The day after the incident, Lieutenant A. stated that he had been able to obtain from the ICDC deputy commander a list of the names of ICDC personnel who had fired their weapons and the corresponding number of rounds fired. The fact that he, as the prime suspect, had been able to obtain this information from a key witness also affected the effectiveness of the investigation.

(e) Furthermore, the list obtained by Lieutenant A. had not been added to the file, despite its potential importance to the case.

(f) The Royal Military Constabulary had held the body of Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud for some hours, yet no autopsy was performed during that period. The body was transferred to an Iraqi civilian hospital, where an autopsy was carried out in the absence of Royal Military Constabulary officials. The autopsy report, such as it was, was added to the file but not translated.

(g) Other forensic evidence had been treated in a similarly careless fashion. In particular, no detailed translation had been made of the report concerning the bullet fragments taken from the body.

108. Finally, the applicant complained that Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud’s next-of-kin had been insufficiently involved in the investigation and informed of its progress. In particular, no attempt had ever been made to contact Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud’s family; nor had anyone taken the trouble to inform them of the decision not to prosecute Lieutenant A.

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION

A.  Admissibility

1.  The Government’s preliminary objection

109. The Government disputed the admissibility of the application on the ground that Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud had not fallen within the “jurisdiction” of the respondent Contracting Party within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention.

110. As it did in Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, § 102, ECHR 2011, the Court will join this objection to the merits.

2.  Conclusion on admissibility

111. The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the application raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established. Without prejudice to its decision on the Government’s preliminary objection, which it will decide below, the Court will therefore declare the application admissible.

B.  Jurisdiction

1.  Arguments before the Court

a. The respondent Government

112. The Netherlands Government argued that the events complained of did not fall within the “jurisdiction” of the Netherlands within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. They asked the Court to distinguish the present case from Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, ECHR 2011.

113. Firstly, the Netherlands was not an “occupying power” in terms of international humanitarian law. Only the United States and the United Kingdom were “occupying powers”, having been so designated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483; this distinguished them from the other States working under the Coalition Provisional Authority.

114. Nor had the Netherlands assumed in Iraq any of the public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government. These powers were entirely in the hands of the United States and the United Kingdom, which had set up the Coalition Provisional Authority.

115. The Netherlands contingent had at all times been under the operational control of the commander of MND (SE), an officer from the United Kingdom.

116. Although in the early stages of SFIR operations Netherlands troops had had to involve themselves in law enforcement, in the course of 2003 that responsibility had passed into the hands of Iraqi authorities. By the time of the events complained of, therefore, police powers were not exercised by Netherlands authorities or troops.

117. In Al-Skeini and Others, the Court had found the United Kingdom to have “jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention because the deaths in issue had occurred as a result of the actions of United Kingdom soldiers during the course of, or contiguous to, security operations, notably military patrols, carried out by them. In contrast, the death of Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud had occurred at a vehicle checkpoint established and manned by the ICDC. Although Netherlands military personnel had been there at the relevant time to observe and advise, this did not imply a hierarchical relationship such as would render the Netherlands responsible: authority rested with the Iraqi security forces.

118. Netherlands forces had not at any time exercised physical authority or control over Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud, since he had never been in their custody. More generally, Netherlands forces had been present in south-eastern Iraq in limited strength and they had not had the degree of control needed to bring the area within Netherlands “jurisdiction” for purposes of Article 1.

119. The fact of a serviceman firing at a person, even assuming it could be established that the shot was fatal, was not in itself sufficient for jurisdiction in this sense to arise. The respondent Government pointed to Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (GC) (dec.), no. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII, in which the Court had found that the mere fact of being the victim of an attack by bomber aircraft of a particular State did not suffice to bring a person within the jurisdiction of that State.

120. Finally, even assuming that at the relevant time the Netherlands exercised effective control over the vehicle checkpoint, the area in question was so limited that there would no longer be any meaningful difference between “effective overall control of an area” and “State agent authority and control”.

b. The intervening Government

121. The United Kingdom Government stressed the “essentially territorial” nature of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1; any extension outside the territory of a Contracting State was exceptional. They interpreted the above-mentioned Banković decision, in particular its § 65, as implying that the notion of “jurisdiction” should not be allowed to “evolve”, or “incrementally develop”, in the same way as the law in respect of the substantive rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention; in their words, the “living instrument” doctrine was inapplicable.

122. They argued that a Contracting State which exercised “effective control over an area” outside its national territory, whether as a result of lawful or unlawful military action, had the responsibility under Article 1 to secure within that area the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional Protocols which it had ratified. From this it followed, in their submission, that the circumstances in which this exception to the territorial nature of jurisdiction might be applied were necessarily very limited.

123. Even so, in § 80 of Al-Skeini and Others the Court had agreed with the British Court of Appeal that it would have been unrealistic for United Kingdom forces in Basrah City and elsewhere in Iraq to be expected to guarantee the entire gamut of substantive Convention rights to the local population.

124. In Al-Skeini and Others and in other cases the Court had found Article 1 jurisdiction to exist based on exclusive physical power and control and actual or purported legal authority over an individual (hypothetically in Issa and Others v. Turkey, no. 31821/96, 16 November 2004, but in reality in Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, ECHR 2005‑IV; Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, no. 61498/08, ECHR 2010; and Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394/03, ECHR 2010). In contrast, in the above-mentioned Banković and Others decision the physical act of bombing had not been seen as an example of physical power and control such as might give rise to extra-territorial jurisdiction; consequently, neither should the physical act of shooting at a moving vehicle occupied by individuals not in detention.

125. An essential difference between the present case and Al-Skeini and Others was the fact that in the latter case the United Kingdom was recognised as an “occupying power” within the meaning of Article 42 of the Hague Rules and therefore had the attendant duty under Article 43 of those Rules to exercise the powers normally belonging to the State.

126. Finally, if the Court were to conclude that the Netherlands had jurisdiction in the present case, there was a “real risk” that Contracting States might in future be “deterred from answering the call of the United Nations Security Council to contribute troops to United Nations mandated forces, to the detriment of the United Nations Security council’s mission to secure international peace and security”.

c. The applicant

127. In the applicant’s submission the matters complained of came within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands.

128. In the first place, jurisdiction arose by virtue of the control enjoyed by the Netherlands over its own servicemen. Through them, the Netherlands exercised some key public powers. The Coalition Provisional Authority was not run by the United States and the United Kingdom alone; while these two States had taken upon themselves tasks of an administrative and coordinative nature, other States – including the Netherlands – participated by enforcing the CPA’s authority and providing security. This comprised “the exercise of some of the public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government”.

129. Netherlands troops were exercising such public powers when, with the “consent, invitation or acquiescence” of the CPA, it oversaw the ICDC at the checkpoint.

130. As was reflected in the official position of the Netherlands Government, the Netherlands at all times retained full command over Netherlands military personnel.

131. In the second place, the Netherlands enjoyed jurisdiction by virtue of its effective military control over the area in question. Citing Issa and Others v. Turkey, no. 31821/96, 16 November 2004, the applicant argued that jurisdiction could arise even if military control was limited in time and geographical projection.

132. In the third place, the Netherlands enjoyed jurisdiction as an “occupying power” within the meaning of Article 42 of the Hague Rules. Although admittedly only the United States and the United Kingdom were actually named as “occupying powers” by United Nations Security Council resolution 1483, the determination of that status within the meaning of the Hague Rules was a question of fact, not of choice.

133. The MND (C-S) Memorandum of Understanding (see paragraph 103 above) – which the applicant took to be the same, for present purposes, as the Memorandum of Understanding applicable in the present case – actually referred to the Hague Rules, from which it followed that those Rules were applicable.

134. In the fourth place, no other State had control over the events in issue. The United Kingdom had no direct military responsibility in Al‑Muthanna province; nor in any case had the Netherlands ever sought to defer jurisdiction to it. Nor did any Iraqi civilian administration or military or police forces exist at the relevant time; during this period, it was the CPA which exercised the powers of government, alongside other members of the military coalition, including the Netherlands.

135. As to the facts of the case, Netherlands military personnel had been in control of the vehicle checkpoint, and had authority over the Iraqi personnel manning it. Moreover, the Netherlands Royal Military Constabulary had carried out the investigation: they had seized ICDC Sergeant Hussam Saad’s rifle, Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim’s car and Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud’s body. This meant that the Netherlands had exercised “some of the public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government”.

136. Finally, the Netherlands Minister of Defence, in his letter of 18 June 2007 transmitting the report of the Van den Berg Committee to Parliament, had endorsed that committee’s conclusion that the Convention applied to Netherlands troops in their dealings with Iraqi nationals in Iraq.

2.  The Court’s assessment

a. The MND (C-S) (Multinational Division, Central-South) Memorandum of Understanding

137. Speaking at the Court’s hearing, the Agent of the Government stated, in response to a question from the Court, that the Netherlands defence authorities had declined to declassify the Memorandum of Understanding applicable between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in Al-Muthanna Province for the Court’s use; however, the MND (C-S)) Memorandum of Understanding “[gave] a good idea of the kind of document we [were] talking about”.

138. The Court notes that the signatories to the MND (C-S) Memorandum of Understanding include the defence authorities of a multitude of SFIR troop contributors, including the Netherlands Minister of Defence (see paragraph 104 above). It also observes that the section of the MND (SE) Memorandum of Understanding that the Government have been prepared to divulge (see paragraph 100 above) is very similar, though not identical, to the corresponding section of the MND (C-S) Memorandum of Understanding (see paragraph 103 above), and that the Agent of the respondent Government has not made mention of, or even suggested, the existence of any significant substantive difference between the two memoranda. In these circumstances, the Court will proceed on the basis that the two documents are in the relevant respects the same. It will nonetheless use the MND (C-S) Memorandum of Understanding with appropriate caution.

b. Applicable principles

139. The Court would observe that, while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory (compare Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, § 109, see paragraph 95 above). The Court reiterates that in Al‑Skeini, cited above, §§ 130-139, it summarised the principles on the exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention outside the territory of the Contracting States as follows:

“130. ... As provided by [Article 1 of the Convention] the engagement undertaken by a Contracting State is confined to ‘securing’ (‘reconnaître’ in the French text) the listed rights and freedoms to persons within its own ‘jurisdiction’ (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 86, Series A no. 161; Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others [GC] (dec.), no. 52207/99, § 66, ECHR 2001‑XII). ‘Jurisdiction’ under Article 1 is a threshold criterion. The exercise of jurisdiction is a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it which give rise to an allegation of the infringement of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention (see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 311, ECHR 2004‑VII).

(α) The territorial principle

131. A State’s jurisdictional competence under Article 1 is primarily territorial (see Soering, cited above, § 86; Banković, cited above, §§ 61 and 67; Ilaşcu, cited above, § 312). Jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the State’s territory (Ilaşcu, cited above, § 312; Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, § 139, ECHR 2004‑II). Conversely, acts of the Contracting States performed, or producing effects, outside their territories can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 only in exceptional cases (Banković, cited above, § 67).

132. To date, the Court in its case-law has recognised a number of exceptional circumstances capable of giving rise to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Contracting State outside its own territorial boundaries. In each case, the question whether exceptional circumstances exist which require and justify a finding by the Court that the State was exercising jurisdiction extra-territorially must be determined with reference to the particular facts.

(β) State agent authority and control

133. The Court has recognised in its case-law that, as an exception to the principle of territoriality, a Contracting State’s jurisdiction under Article 1 may extend to acts of its authorities which produce effects outside its own territory (see Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, judgment of 26 June 1992, Series A no. 240, § 91; Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, § 62, Series A no. 310; Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 18 December 1996, § 52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑VI; and Banković, cited above, 69)...

135. .. [T]he Court has recognised the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State when, through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, it exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government (Banković, cited above, § 71). Thus where, in accordance with custom, treaty or other agreement, authorities of the Contracting State carry out executive or judicial functions on the territory of another State, the Contracting State may be responsible for breaches of the Convention thereby incurred, as long as the acts in question are attributable to it rather than to the territorial State (see Drozd and Janousek, cited above; Gentilhomme and Others v. France, nos. 48205/9948207/99 and 48209/99, judgment of 14 May 2002; and also X and Y v. Switzerland, nos. 7289/75 and 7349/76, Commission’s admissibility decision of 14 July 1977, DR 9, p. 57).

136. In addition, the Court’s case-law demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, the use of force by a State’s agents operating outside its territory may bring the individual thereby brought under the control of the State’s authorities into the State’s Article 1 jurisdiction. This principle has been applied where an individual is taken into the custody of State agents abroad. For example, in Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, § 91, ECHR 2005‑IV, the Court held that ‘directly after being handed over to the Turkish officials by the Kenyan officials, the applicant was effectively under Turkish authority and therefore within the “jurisdiction” of that State for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, even though in this instance Turkey exercised its authority outside its territory’. In Issa and Others v. Turkey, no. 31821/96, 16 November 2004, the Court indicated that, had it been established that Turkish soldiers had taken the applicants’ relatives into custody in Northern Iraq, taken them to a nearby cave and executed them, the deceased would have been within Turkish jurisdiction by virtue of the soldiers’ authority and control over them. In Al‑Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 61498/08, §§ 86-89, 30 June 2009, the Court held that two Iraqi nationals detained in British-controlled military prisons in Iraq fell within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, since the United Kingdom exercised total and exclusive control over the prisons and the individuals detained in them. Finally, in Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394/03, § 67, ECHR 2010-..., the Court held that the applicants were within French jurisdiction by virtue of the exercise by French agents of full and exclusive control over a ship and its crew from the time of its interception in international waters. The Court does not consider that jurisdiction in the above cases arose solely from the control exercised by the Contracting State over the buildings, aircraft or ship in which the individuals were held. What is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and control over the person in question. ...

(γ) Effective control over an area

138. Another exception to the principle that jurisdiction under Article 1 is limited to a State’s own territory occurs when, as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action, a Contracting State exercises effective control of an area outside that national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control, whether it be exercised directly, through the Contracting State’s own armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration (Loizidou (preliminary objections), cited above, § 62; Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, § 76, ECHR 2001‑IV, Banković, cited above, § 70; Ilaşcu, cited above, §§ 314-316; Loizidou (merits), cited above, § 52). Where the fact of such domination over the territory is established, it is not necessary to determine whether the Contracting State exercises detailed control over the policies and actions of the subordinate local administration. The fact that the local administration survives as a result of the Contracting State’s military and other support entails that State’s responsibility for its policies and actions. The controlling State has the responsibility under Article 1 to secure, within the area under its control, the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional Protocols which it has ratified. It will be liable for any violations of those rights (Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, §§ 76-77).

139. It is a question of fact whether a Contracting State exercises effective control over an area outside its own territory. In determining whether effective control exists, the Court will primarily have reference to the strength of the State’s military presence in the area (see Loizidou (merits), cited above, §§ 16 and 56; Ilaşcu, cited above, § 387). Other indicators may also be relevant, such as the extent to which its military, economic and political support for the local subordinate administration provides it with influence and control over the region (see Ilaşcu, cited above, §§ 388-394)....”

c. Application of the above principles to the facts of the case

140. The respondent Party relied heavily on the argument that the Netherlands could not be blamed for the events complained of since authority lay elsewhere: either with the United States and the United Kingdom together, designated as “occupying powers” by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, or with the United Kingdom alone as “lead nation” in south-eastern Iraq, holding command over the Netherlands contingent of SFIR.

141. For the purposes of establishing jurisdiction under the Convention, the Court takes account of the particular factual context and relevant rules of international law.

142. Turning first to the international-law background, the Court points out that the status of “occupying power” within the meaning of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, or lack of it, is not per se determinative. Although it found that concept relevant in Al-Skeini (cited above, § 143) and in Al‑Jedda v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08, § 77, ECHR 2011, the Court did not need to have recourse to it in finding that the responsibility of Turkey was engaged in respect of events in northern Cyprus (see, inter aliaLoizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310, and Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, ECHR 2001‑IV), or that of Russia in respect of the situation in Moldovan territory east of the Dniester (see, inter aliaIlaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004‑VII, and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/048252/05 and 18454/06, ECHR 2012 (extracts)).

143. Furthermore, the fact of executing a decision or an order given by an authority of a foreign State is not in itself sufficient to relieve a Contracting State of the obligations which it has taken upon itself under the Convention (see, mutatis mutandisPellegrini v. Italy, no. 30882/96, § 40, ECHR 2001-VIII, and K. v. Italy, no. 38805/97, § 21, ECHR 2004‑VIII). The respondent Party is therefore not divested of its “jurisdiction”, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, solely by dint of having accepted the operational control of the commander of MND (SE), a United Kingdom officer. The Court notes that the Netherlands retained “full command” over its military personnel, as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence pointed out in their letter to Parliament (see paragraph 57 above).

144. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 reflected the presence in Iraq of forces from a plurality of United Nations Member States working under an “Authority” (the Coalition Provisional Authority) comprised of the United States and the United Kingdom. While reaffirming “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq”, this Resolution called upon “all concerned”, regardless of Occupying Power status, to “comply fully with their obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907” (see paragraph 93 above).

145. In the wake of Resolution 1483, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 also “underscored” the sovereignty of the State of Iraq. It urged United Nations Member States to contribute to this multinational force for the purpose of restoring stability and security and called upon Member States, as well as international and regional organisations, to contribute to the training and equipping of Iraqi police and security forces (see paragraph 94 above).

146. The practical elaboration of the multinational force was shaped by a network of Memoranda of Understanding defining the interrelations between the various armed contingents present in Iraq. The letter sent to the Lower House of Parliament on 6 June 2003 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence (see paragraph 57 above) emphasises that the Netherlands Government retained full command over the Netherlands contingent in Iraq. The Court understands, in view of the wording of paragraph 5.2 of the MND (C-S) Memorandum of Understanding (see paragraph 103 above), that this information was based on the MND-SE Memorandum of Understanding.

147. It appears from the Memorandum of Understanding for MND (C‑S), as well as the excerpt of the Memorandum of Understanding for MND-SE to which the Government have afforded the Court access (see paragraph 100 above), that while the forces of nations other than the “lead nations” took their day-to-day orders from foreign commanders, the formulation of essential policy – including, within the limits agreed in the form of Rules of Engagement appended to the Memoranda of Understanding, the drawing up of distinct rules on the use of force – remained the reserved domain of individual sending States.

148. Thus it was on this basis that an aide-mémoire for SFIR commanders and a soldier’s card were issued to Netherlands personnel by the Netherlands Government (see paragraph 59 above).

149. Although Netherlands troops were stationed in an area in south-eastern Iraq where SFIR forces were under the command of an officer from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands assumed responsibility for providing security in that area, to the exclusion of other participating States, and retained full command over its contingent there.

150. It is not decisive either that the checkpoint was nominally manned by Iraqi ICDC personnel. The Court notes that under Coalition Provisional Authority Order no. 28 (“Establishment Of The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps”, see paragraph 99 above) the duties of the ICDC did not include enforcement of domestic law in subordination of the Iraqi authorities; in fact, the ICDC was supervised by, and subordinate to, officers from the Coalition forces (see paragraphs 1(4)(a), 4(1) and 7).

151. That being so, the Court cannot find that the Netherlands troops were placed “at the disposal” of any foreign power, whether it be Iraq or the United Kingdom or any other power, or that they were “under the exclusive direction or control” of any other State (compare, mutatis mutandis, Article 6 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, see paragraph 98 above; see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, § 406, paragraph 97 above)).

152. The Court now turns to the circumstances surrounding the death of Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud. It notes that Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud met his death when a vehicle in which he was a passenger was fired upon while passing through a checkpoint manned by personnel under the command and direct supervision of a Netherlands Royal Army officer. The checkpoint had been set up in the execution of SFIR’s mission, under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (see paragraph 93 above), to restore conditions of stability and security conducive to the creation of an effective administration in the country. The Court is satisfied that the respondent Party exercised its “jurisdiction” within the limits of its SFIR mission and for the purpose of asserting authority and control over persons passing through the checkpoint. That being the case, the Court finds that the death of Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud occurred within the “jurisdiction” of the Netherlands, as that expression is to be construed within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention.

153. The Court has established jurisdiction in respect of the Netherlands. It is not called upon to establish whether the United Kingdom, another State Party to the Convention, might have exercised concurrent jurisdiction.

d. Attribution

154. The Court reiterates that the test for establishing the existence of “jurisdiction” under Article 1 of the Convention has never been equated with the test for establishing a State’s responsibility for an internationally wrongful act under general international law (see Catan, cited above, § 115). Furthermore, in Al-Skeini the Court emphasised that “whenever the State through its agents exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms under Section 1 of the Convention that are relevant to the situation of that individual. In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be ‘divided and tailored’ (compare Banković, cited above, § 75).”

155. The facts giving rise to the applicant’s complaints derive from alleged acts and omissions of Netherlands military personnel and investigative and judicial authorities. As such they are capable of giving rise to the responsibility of the Netherlands under the Convention.

e. The Government’s preliminary objection

156. The Court dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection, which it had joined to the merits (see paragraph 110 above). It must now consider the validity of the applicant’s complaints.

C.  Alleged breach of the investigative duty under Article 2

157. The applicant alleged that the respondent State had failed to meet its obligations properly to investigate the death of his son with a view to bringing the person responsible to justice. He relied on Article 2 of the Convention, which provides as follows:

“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”

The respondent Government denied that there had been any such violation.

158. The intervening Government did not address the merits of the applicant’s complaints.

1.  Arguments before the Court

a. The applicant

159. The applicant called into question the independence of the investigation into the death of Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud and the ensuing proceedings.

160. Firstly, he questioned the independence of the Royal Military Constabulary unit in Iraq. He asked the Court to note that members of this unit shared the living quarters with the Netherlands SFIR troops and were therefore in close proximity with them. He also stated that since the public prosecutor to whom it was required to report was stationed in the Netherlands, the Royal Military Constabulary unit was, on a day-to-day basis, under the control of the Netherlands battalion commander.

161. The lack of independence of the Royal Military Constabulary unit had also tainted the decision of the public prosecution service not to prosecute Lieutenant A. That decision had been based overwhelmingly on the Royal Military Constabulary’s investigation. The applicant relied on Ergi v. Turkey, 28 July 1998, Reports 1998‑IV, in which the Court had found a violation of Article 2 under its procedural head, in that the public prosecutor responsible for the decision to decline jurisdiction had relied heavily on a conclusion drawn in an incident report by the gendarmerie.

162. The Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal too had placed full reliance on the results of the very limited investigations by the Royal Military Constabulary. Instead, it ought to have ordered an investigation by an independent judge.

163. Finally, the presence of a serving military officer in the composition of the Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal meant that the decision of that body could not be independent. The applicant cited Akkoç v. Turkey, nos. 22947/93 and 22948/93, ECHR 2000‑X, and Incal v. Turkey, 9 June 1998, Reports 1998‑IV.

164. The applicant also argued that the investigation had been inadequate.

165. He pointed in the first place to the failure to include in the domestic case-file the statements taken from the ICDC personnel who had been present at the checkpoint at the time of the shooting. The report of the Royal Military Constabulary, as submitted to the public prosecutor and the Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal, had indicated only that these persons had been unable to state anything of relevance. In actual fact, detailed statements had been taken from individual ICDC members. These, however, had been withheld from the applicant and the Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal and produced only during the proceedings before the Court.

166. The questioning of Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim, whom the applicant described as a “key witness” because he was the only civilian witness and the only survivor of the incident who had not been under the orders of Lieutenant A., had been extremely cursory. Moreover, his statement, as recorded by the Royal Military Constabulary investigators, was inconsistent with the statement recorded later the same day by an Iraqi official.

167. Lieutenant A. had not been questioned until seven hours after the incident and not kept separate from other witnesses during that period. He would therefore have had ample opportunity to discuss the incident with the other witnesses beforehand and to adapt his statement accordingly.

168. The day after the incident, Lieutenant A. stated that he had been able to obtain from the ICDC deputy commander a list of the names of ICDC personnel who had fired their weapons, and the corresponding number of rounds fired. The fact that he, as the prime suspect, had been able to obtain this information from a key witness also affected the effectiveness of the investigation. Furthermore, the list obtained by Lieutenant A. was not added to the file, despite its potential importance to the case.

169. The Royal Military Constabulary had held the body of Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud for some hours, yet no autopsy had been performed during that period. The body had been transferred to an Iraqi civilian hospital, where an autopsy had been carried out in the absence of Royal Military Constabulary officials. The autopsy report, such as it was, had been added to the file but not translated.

170. Other forensic evidence had been treated in a similarly careless fashion. In particular, no detailed translation had been made of the report on the bullet fragments removed from the body.

171. Finally, the applicant complained that Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud’s next-of-kin had been insufficiently involved in the investigation and informed of its progress. In particular, no attempt had ever been made to contact Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud’s family; nor had anyone taken the trouble to inform them of the decision not to prosecute Lieutenant A.

b. The respondent Government

172. The respondent Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 2.

173. In their submission, no question of independence arose.

174. The Royal Military Constabulary had its own chain of command, and in conducting investigations answered only to the Public Prosecution Service; it was inevitable that the decision not to prosecute Lieutenant A. should be based on the report of their investigation. In any case, there was nothing to suggest a lack of independence on the part of the Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal.

175. Likewise, the investigation had been sufficiently effective.

176. The Royal Military Constabulary had examined the scene of the incident and secured the available evidence immediately on arrival.

177. Lieutenant A., having himself reported the incident, had taken full responsibility for the shooting from the outset and there was no appearance of any attempt on his part to manipulate the evidence.

178. The ICDC personnel had in fact been questioned, but had been unable to report anything of significance. In any event, they were not suspects.

179. The statements taken from Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim by the Royal Military Constabulary and the Iraqi police were not contradictory, although the suggestion made in the latter statement that the interpreter had instructed him to claim that only ICDC personnel had fired was implausible.

180. The facilities for an autopsy not being available at the Netherlands camp, the body had had to be transferred into Iraqi care. It had been a decision of the Iraqi authorities to exclude Netherlands personnel from the autopsy.

181. In any event, the investigation had been sufficient to determine that, of the Netherlands soldiers present, only Lieutenant A. had fired at the car, and the criminal proceedings had focused on him.

182. Finally, the applicant had been sufficiently involved in the proceedings. He had been informed through his lawyer as soon as the latter so requested; and the information given had been sufficient for him to participate effectively in the complaint proceedings in which he had challenged the decision not to prosecute Lieutenant A.

2.  The Court’s assessment

a. As to whether shots were fired by Lieutenant A. only, or also by ICDC personnel

183. The Court must deal first with the applicant’s submission that the available evidence, including in particular the statements which were taken from ICDC personnel but not added to the file of the domestic proceedings, shows that shots were fired only by Lieutenant A.

184. It is true that no ICDC member has admitted to having fired at the car in which Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud was a passenger. The Court notes, however, that, according to the Royal Military Constabulary investigators, the car in which Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud was a passenger was hit by bullets of different calibres, some smaller than 6mm, others larger (see paragraph 32 above). This would appear consistent with the use of at least two different types of firearms, quite conceivably the Diemaco C7A1 rifle issued to the Netherlands military (which fires the 5.56mm NATO round, see paragraph 50 above) and the Kalashnikov AK47 rifle carried by the ICDC (which fires a 7.62mm round, see paragraph 52 above). In these circumstances, the applicant’s allegation that shots were fired only by Lieutenant A. cannot be verified.

185. In any event, the Court is called upon only to consider whether the procedural obligations resulting from Article 2 of the Convention have been met. There is therefore no need for it to make any findings of fact on this point.

b. Relevant principles

186. As the Court held in its above-cited Al-Skeini and Others judgment:

“163. The general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing by agents of the State would be ineffective in practice if there existed no procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of the use of lethal force by State authorities. The obligation to protect the right to life under this provision, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention’, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State (see McCann, cited above, § 161). The essential purpose of such an investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws safeguarding the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 110, ECHR 2005-VII). However, the investigation should also be broad enough to permit the investigating authorities to take into consideration not only the actions of the State agents who directly used lethal force but also all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the operations in question, where this is necessary in order to determine whether the State complied with its obligation under Article 2 to protect life (see, by implication, McCann and Others, cited above, §§ 150 and 162; Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746/94, § 128, ECHR2001‑III (extracts); McKerr, cited above, §§ 143 and 151; Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom, no. 37715/97, §§ 100-125, 4 May 2001; Finucane v. the United Kingdom, no. 29178/95, §§ 77-78, ECHR 2003‑VIII; Nachova, cited above, §§ 114-115; and also, mutatis mutandis, Tzekov v. Bulgaria, no. 45500/99, § 71, 23 February 2006).

164. The Court has held that the procedural obligation under Article 2 continues to apply in difficult security conditions, including in a context of armed conflict (see, amongst other examples, Güleç v. Turkey, 27 July 1998, § 81, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑IV; Ergi v. Turkey, 28 July 1998, §§ 79 and 82, Reports 1998‑IV; Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey, no. 21689/93, §§ 85-90 and 309-320 and 326‑330, 6 April 2004; Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00, §§ 180 and 210, 24 February 2005; Kanlıbaş v. Turkey, no. 32444/96, §§ 39-51, 8 December 2005). It is clear that where the death to be investigated under Article 2 occurs in circumstances of generalised violence, armed conflict or insurgency, obstacles may be placed in the way of investigators and, as the United Nations Special Rapporteur has also observed ..., concrete constraints may compel the use of less effective measures of investigation or may cause an investigation to be delayed (see, for example, Bazorkina v. Russia, no. 69481/01, § 121, 27 July 2006). Nonetheless, the obligation under Article 2 to safeguard life entails that, even in difficult security conditions, all reasonable steps must be taken to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is conducted into alleged breaches of the right to life (see, amongst many other examples, Kaya v. Turkey, 19 February 1998, §§ 86‑92, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I; Ergi, cited above, §§ 82-85; Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763/94, §§ 101-110, ECHR 1999‑IV; Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, §§ 156-166, 24 February 2005; Isayeva, cited above, §§ 215‑224; Musayev and Others v. Russia, nos. 57941/0058699/00 and 60403/00, §§ 158-165, 26 July 2007).

165. What form of investigation will achieve the purposes of Article 2 may vary depending on the circumstances. However, whatever mode is employed, the authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention. They cannot leave it to the initiative of the next‑of‑kin either to lodge a formal complaint or to take responsibility for the conduct of any investigative procedures (see Ahmet Özkan and Others, cited above, § 310; Isayeva, cited above, § 210). Civil proceedings, which are undertaken on the initiative of the next-of-kin, not the authorities, and which do not involve the identification or punishment of any alleged perpetrator, cannot be taken into account in the assessment of the State’s compliance with its procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention (see, for example, Hugh Jordan, cited above, § 141). Moreover, the procedural obligation of the State under Article 2 cannot be satisfied merely by awarding damages (see McKerr, cited above, § 121; Bazorkina, cited above§ 117).

166. As stated above, the investigation must be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to a determination of whether the force used was or was not justified in the circumstances and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but of means. The authorities must take the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including inter alia eye-witness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of clinical findings, including the cause of death. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person or persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see Ahmet Özkan and Others, cited above, § 312; Isayeva, cited above, § 212 and the cases cited therein).

167. For an investigation into alleged unlawful killing by State agents to be effective, it is necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events. This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence (see, for example, Shanaghan, cited above, § 104). A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. While there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, a prompt response by the authorities in investigating a use of lethal force may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts. For the same reasons, there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory. The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case. In all cases, however, the victim’s next-of-kin must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests (see Ahmet Özkan and Others, cited above, §§ 311‑314; Isayeva, cited above, §§ 211-214 and the cases cited therein).”

c. Independence of the investigation

i. The Royal Military Constabulary unit in Iraq

187. The applicant questioned the independence of the Royal Military Constabulary unit which undertook the initial investigation, on the ground that they lived in close proximity to the Royal Army personnel whom he blames for his son’s death. The Government submitted that the Royal Military Constabulary was sufficiently independent.

188. The Court notes that the independence, and hence the effectiveness, of an investigation into an allegedly unlawful killing may be called into question if the investigators and the investigated maintain close relations with one another (compare Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391/99, § 337, ECHR 2007‑II).

189. The Government did not deny that at the relevant time the Royal Military Constabulary unit shared its living quarters with Royal Army personnel. However, no circumstances have been suggested, or become apparent, that might lead the Court to find that this in itself affected the independence of the Royal Military Constabulary unit to the point of impairing the quality of its investigations.

190. Nor does the Court find it established that the physical distance separating the Royal Military Constabulary unit stationed in Iraq from the public prosecutor in charge of its investigations, who was based in Arnhem, led to the subordination of the Royal Military Constabulary unit to the Netherlands Royal Army battalion commander on a day-to-day basis. The applicant has not submitted any evidence capable of supporting this suggestion.

ii. Dependence on Royal Military Constabulary reports

191. The applicant submitted that the public prosecution service had placed excessive reliance on the Royal Military Constabulary reports. The Government disputed this.

192. Public prosecutors inevitably rely on the police for information and support. This does not in itself suffice to conclude that they lack sufficient independence vis-à-vis the police (see, mutatis mutandisRamsahai, cited above, § 344).

193. Moreover, the Royal Military Constabulary unit was stationed in Iraq precisely to carry out police work such as that here in issue. The Public Prosecutor’s reliance on its reports therefore raises no issue in itself.

194. The Court understands the main thrust of this complaint to be that the investigation was ineffective and the resulting reports unreliable. It will address the applicant’s concerns about the quality of the Royal Military Constabulary investigation separately below.

iii. The military member of the Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal

195. The applicant argued that the independence of the Military Chamber of the Court of Appeal was tainted by the presence of a serving military officer in its midst. The Government argued that the independence of the Military Chamber of the Court of Appeal was guaranteed.

196. In the present case, the Court has had regard to the composition of the Military Chamber as a whole. It sits as a three-member chamber composed of two civilian members of the Arnhem Court of Appeal and one military member. The military member is a senior officer qualified for judicial office; he is promoted to titular flag, general or air rank if he does not already hold that substantive rank (see paragraph 64 above). In his judicial role he is not subject to military authority and discipline; his functional independence and impartiality are the same as those of civilian judges (see paragraph 65 above). That being so, the Court is prepared to accept that the Military Chamber offers guarantees sufficient for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention.

d. Effectiveness of the investigation

i. The statements by the ICDC personnel

197. In his application the applicant complained of the Royal Military Constabulary’s failure to take statements from the ICDC personnel who had been guarding the checkpoint at the time of the shooting incident. The report as submitted to the Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal stated only that they had provided “no pertinent information” (see paragraph 25 above).

198. Following the Chamber’s relinquishment of jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber, the Government submitted an official record of the questioning of the ICDC members by Royal Military Constabulary officers (see paragraph 38 above). It transpires that this document contains information that might potentially have been of assistance to the Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal, including accounts of the number of shots fired by each serviceman and the amount of ammunition remaining, and a far more detailed rendering of the statement made by the interpreter Mr Walied Abd Al Hussain Madjied.

199. As the Court has held on many occasions, the use of the term “absolutely necessary” in Article 2 § 2 indicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed from that normally applicable when determining whether State action is “necessary in a democratic society” under paragraph 2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. In particular, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out in sub-paragraphs 2 (a), (b) and (c) of Article 2 (see, among many other authorities, McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, § 149, Series A no. 324; Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 30054/96, § 93, 4 May 2001; and Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00, § 173, 24 February 2005). It follows that no domestic investigation can meet the standards of Article 2 of the Convention if it does not determine whether the use of lethal force by agents of the State went no further than the circumstances demanded (see Kaya v. Turkey, 19 February 1998, § 87, Reports 1998-I).

200. Although the investigation must be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to the identification and, if necessary, punishment of those responsible (see, inter alia, Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746/94, § 107, ECHR 2001‑III (extracts); McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, § 113, ECHR 2001‑III; Finucane v. the United Kingdom, no. 29178/95, § 69, ECHR 2003‑VIII; Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], no. 50385/99, § 74, ECHR 2004‑XI; Tahsin Acar v. Turkey [GC], no. 26307/95, § 223, ECHR 2004‑III; and Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02, § 301, ECHR 2011), the Court would also point out that an investigation sufficient to inform a judicial finding as to whether the force used was or was not justified in the circumstances is crucial to the exercise, by any State agent prosecuted in ensuing criminal proceedings, of the rights of the defence (see, inter alia and mutatis mutandis, Edwards v. the United Kingdom, 16 December 1992, § 36, Series A no. 247‑B; Rowe and Davis v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28901/95, § 60, ECHR 2000‑II; I.J.L. and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 29522/9530056/96 and 30574/96, § 112, ECHR 2000‑IX; and Dowsett v. the United Kingdom, no. 39482/98, § 41, ECHR 2003‑VII).

201. The Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal was called upon to consider whether Lieutenant A. had acted in accordance with the instructions given to him by the competent authority (Article 38 of the Military Criminal Code, see paragraph 66 above). Lieutenant A.’s instructions on the use of force, as set out on the soldier’s card (see paragraph 57 above) under the heading “minimum force”, included the following (loc. Cit., paragraph 14):

“If you have to open fire, you must:

fire only aimed shots;

fire no more shots than is necessary; and

cease firing as soon as the situation allows.”

202. The Military Chamber of the Court of Appeal confined itself to establishing as fact that Lieutenant A. had mistakenly reacted to friendly fire from across the road and to holding that Lieutenant A. was for that reason entitled to claim putative self-defence (see paragraph 48 above). It did not, however, address aspects relevant to the question whether Lieutenant A. had acted within the confines of his instructions as regards the proportionality of the force used. In particular, it made no findings as to whether more shots had been fired than was necessary and whether firing had ceased as soon as the situation allowed.

203. The Court takes the view that a proper assessment in the sense outlined above would have required the Military Chamber of the Arnhem Court of Appeal to have access to the official record of the questioning of the ICDC members by Royal Military Constabulary officers (see paragraph 38 above). As it is, the absence of that document from the Court of Appeal’s file seriously impaired the effectiveness of its examination of the case.

ii. The questioning of Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim

204. The applicant submitted that the brevity of the statement made by the driver of the car, Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim, as taken down by a Royal Military Constabulary investigator (see paragraph 23 above), also reflected on the quality of the investigation. He also pointed to the differences between this statement and the statement which Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim made later the same day to an Iraqi official (see paragraph 37 above). In the Government’s view, in contrast, any differences between the two statements were insufficient to cast doubt on the effectiveness of the investigation.

205. The Court considers that no conclusion can be drawn from the brevity of Mr Dawoud Joad Kathim’s first statement, as such. The discrepancies between the first and second statements may justify doubts as to the reliability of either statement, as recorded, but the Court cannot conclude on that ground alone that the investigation was inadequate.

iii. The delay in questioning Lieutenant A.

206. The applicant drew the Court’s attention to the delay in questioning Lieutenant A. after the incident, during which he was not kept separate from other witnesses to the incident. The Government submitted that Lieutenant A. did nothing to interfere with the investigation.

207. Lieutenant A. was only questioned after Royal Military Constabulary personnel had been on the scene for over six hours (see paragraph 28 above). Although, as the Government correctly point out, there is no suggestion of foul play on his part (or that of any Netherlands soldier), such a lapse of time would have allowed him sufficient opportunity to collude with others to distort the truth had he been minded to do so. No precautions seem to have been taken to prevent this from happening.

208. As in Ramsahai, cited above, the Court finds the mere fact that appropriate steps were not taken to reduce the risk of such collusion to amount to a shortcoming in the adequacy of the investigation (loc. cit., § 330).

iv. The list of ICDC personnel who had fired their weapons

209. The applicant submitted that Lieutenant A. apparently obtained from the ICDC deputy commander a list of the names of ICDC personnel who had fired their weapons, and the corresponding number of rounds fired (see paragraph 31 above).

210. The fact that Lieutenant A. was able to obtain this list does not in itself raise any issue. Until the company commander arrived he was the highest-ranking Coalition officer on the spot and moreover responsible not only for the Netherlands patrol but also for the ICDC personnel present. It follows that it was Lieutenant A.’s duty to take measures aimed at facilitating the investigation.

211. However, this list, once it was available, ought to have been added to the file. The information which it contained might have proved useful, especially in comparison with the statements taken from the ICDC members themselves. The Court finds that the investigation was inadequate on this point.

v. The autopsy

212. The applicant complained about the conditions under which the autopsy had taken place and about the resulting report. The Government argued that the autopsy had been as effective as it could have been in the circumstances.

213. The Court notes that the autopsy seems to have been carried out in the absence of any qualified Netherlands official. Nothing is known of the qualifications of the Iraqi pathologist who performed it.

214. Moreover, the pathologist’s report had serious shortcomings; extremely brief, it was lacking in detail and there were not even any pictures included.

215. More generally, it does not appear that any alternative arrangement was considered for the autopsy. For example, it does not appear unlikely that either or both of the Occupying Powers, or perhaps another Coalition power, had facilities and qualified personnel available.

216. The Court finds therefore that the investigation was deficient on this point also.

vi. The bullet fragments

217. The applicant criticised the absence of a detailed report on any examination of the bullet fragments. In the Government’s view, the investigation was nonetheless adequate.

218. The Court notes that fragments of metal identified as bullet fragments were taken from the body of Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud. The Netherlands investigators seem to have lost all trace of them since that point (see paragraph 36 above).

219. Whether or not the bullet fragments were capable of yielding useful information, the Court finds it unacceptable that they were not stored and examined in proper conditions, in the Netherlands if need be.

220. For this reason too the investigation was inadequate.

e. The alleged failure to involve the applicant in the investigation

221. The applicant claimed that no effort was made to contact the next-of-kin of the deceased.

222. The Government alleged that Netherlands Royal Military Constabulary investigators spoke to the applicant and other next-of-kin at the time of the autopsy, but left when it appeared that the family were preparing to take them hostage.

223. The applicant disputed the Government’s account, which, since no pertinent written record has been submitted, cannot be verified.

224. Whatever the truth of either version of events, the Court finds it established that the applicant was, at his request, granted access to the investigation file; he was in fact in a position to submit it to the Court. Access to the file was also sufficient to enable him to bring proceedings under Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the course of which he was in a position to put up a very effective challenge to the decision not to prosecute Lieutenant A.

225. The Court therefore finds no indication that the proceedings were deficient on this point (see Ramsahai, cited above, §§ 349-350).

f. Conclusion

226. The Court is prepared to make reasonable allowances for the relatively difficult conditions under which the Netherlands military and investigators had to work. In particular, it must be recognised that they were engaged in a foreign country which had yet to be rebuilt in the aftermath of hostilities, whose language and culture were alien to them, and whose population – witness the first shooting incident on 21 April 2004 (see paragraph 10 above) – clearly included armed hostile elements.

227. Even so, the Court must conclude that the investigation into the circumstances surrounding Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud’s death failed, for the following reasons, to meet the standards required by Article 2 of the Convention: firstly, documents containing important information were not made available to the judicial authorities and the applicant (the official record of statements taken from the ICDC personnel and the list, compiled by Lieutenant A., recording which ICDC members had fired their weapons and the number of rounds fired by each); secondly, in that no precautions were taken to prevent Lieutenant A. from colluding, before he was questioned, with other witnesses to the events; thirdly, in that no attempt was made to carry out the autopsy under conditions befitting an investigation into the possible criminal responsibility of an agent of the State, and in that the resulting report was inadequate; and fourthly, in that important material evidence – the bullet fragments taken from the body – was mislaid in unknown circumstances. It cannot be found that these failings were inevitable, even in the particularly difficult conditions prevailing in Iraq at the relevant time.

228. The above failings lead the Court to find that there has been a failure to meet the procedural obligations flowing from Article 2 of the Convention.

II.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

229. Article 41 of the Convention provides as follows:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

230. The applicant submitted claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses.

231. The intervening Government did not comment on the applicant’s just-satisfaction claims.

A.  Damage

232. The applicant asked the Court to order the Government to “remedy the violations of Article 2 which [had] occurred by, to the extent possible, performing another, thorough investigation into the death of [his] son, to prosecute those involved, and to keep the applicant fully informed of both the investigation and the prosecution, if applicable”. He also claimed 25,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

233. The respondent Government considered an order such as that sought by the applicant inappropriate. They left the award of monetary compensation to the Court’s discretion, while pointing out that the awards made in Al-Skeini had been lower.

234. As regards the applicant’s request to order an effective investigation followed by a prosecution, the Court reiterates the general principle that the respondent State remains free to choose the means by which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court’s judgment, and that it is only in exceptional circumstances that the Court will indicate what steps should be taken (see, for example, Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, §§ 202-203, ECHR 2004‑II, and Hutten-Czapska v. Poland [GC], no. 35014/97, §§ 238‑239, ECHR 2006‑VIII). Consequently it considers that it falls to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe acting under Article 46 of the Convention to address the issues as to what, if anything, may be required in practical terms by way of compliance (see, among many other references, Al-Skeini, § 181).

235. As regards the monetary claims, the Court points out that in Al‑Skeini, which also concerned a violation of the procedural head of Article 2, it awarded the applicants the sums which they claimed (ibid., § 182). In the present case, the Court considers it equitable to award to the applicant the sum which he claims, namely EUR 25,000.

B.  Costs and expenses

236. The applicant claimed a total of EUR 13,200 for 120 hours of work by his lawyers. He stated, however, that he had requested domestic legal aid and would not maintain his claim if this were granted.

237. The applicant submitted a further statement of travel and subsistence expenses, incurred by his two counsel to enable them to attend the hearing, and for postage. The total of these sums, for which vouchers were submitted, came to EUR 1,372.06.

238. The respondent Government submitted that no issue could arise in so far as the sums claimed were covered by domestic legal aid and declined to comment on the additional sum.

239. The applicant has not informed the Court that domestic legal aid has been refused in respect of the sum referred to in paragraph 236 above. It cannot therefore be established that it concerns expenses “actually incurred”. That being so, no corresponding award can be made.

240. The Court accepts the additional claim set out in paragraph 237 above in full.

C.  Default interest

241. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Joins the Government’s preliminary objection to the merits;

2. Declares the application admissible;

3. Holds that Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection

4. Holds that there has been a breach of the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention;

5. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 25,000 (twenty-five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable on this sum, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(b) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 1,372.06 (one thousand three hundred and seventy-two euros and six cents), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on this sum, in respect of costs and expenses;

(c) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 20 November 2014.

Michael O’Boyle    Dean Spielmann
Registrar             President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:

(a) concurring opinion of Judge Spielmann, joined by Judge Raimondi;

(b) joint concurring opinion of Judges Casadevall, Berro-Lefèvre, Šikuta, Hirvelä, López Guerra, Sajó and Silvis;

(c) concurring opinion of Judge Motoc.

D.S.
M.O’B.

 

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE SPIELMANN, JOINED BY JUDGE RAIMONDI

Translation

1. I had no difficulty in voting for the finding that Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud’s death occurred within the “jurisdiction” of the Netherlands, as that term is to be interpreted for the purpose of Article 1 of the Convention.

2. This finding is set out in paragraph 152 of the judgment and did not require any additional elaboration with regard to the concept of attribution.

3. The concept of “attribution” is indeed to be distinguished from that of “jurisdiction” as the latter has been interpreted in the Court’s case-law (see, recently, Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09, § 74, 16 September 2014, which essentially reproduces the explanations in the Al‑Skeini judgment (Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, §§ 130-141, ECHR 2011). The concept of “jurisdiction” essentially refers to the territorial principle, State agent authority and control, effective control over an area and the Convention legal space.

4. In contrast, the concept of “attribution” essentially concerns the sensitive issue of the “imputability” of internationally wrongful acts. Salmon’s Dictionary has the following entry for the term “attribution”:

“With regard to international-law responsibility, the fact of ascribing to a subject of international law the acts or omissions of individuals or bodies under its effective authority or acting on its behalf”. [Translation]

(Dictionnaire droit international public, edited by Jean Salmon, Preface by Gilbert Guillaume, Brussels, Bruylant, 2001).

5. The “codicil” of paragraphs 154 and 155, along with the unnecessary references to the case-law of the International Court of Justice (see paragraphs 95-97) and to the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility in the part of the judgment setting out the relevant international law, is ambiguous, subsidiary and incomprehensible.

Ambiguous, because the majority’s reasoning takes care to point out that the test for establishing the existence of “jurisdiction” under Article 1 of the Convention has never been equated with the test for establishing a State’s responsibility for an internationally wrongful act under general international law [4].

Subsidiary, because as soon as the Court concludes that the criteria for establishing the jurisdiction of the Netherlands have been met (see paragraph 152), it is no longer necessary, in order to dismiss the Government’s preliminary objection, to reconsider the facts behind the applicant’s complaints deriving from alleged acts and omissions of Netherlands military personnel and investigative and judicial authorities.

Incomprehensible, because the majority’s reasoning in paragraph 155 merely builds on the reasoning with regard to the establishment of “jurisdiction”.

6. It is in paragraph 152 that the Court settles this question, holding that the respondent State was exercising its “jurisdiction” within the limits of its SFIR mission and for the purpose of asserting authority and control over persons passing through the checkpoint.

7. There was therefore no need to examine the non-issue of “attribution”, which is completely separate from the question of “jurisdiction”. More fundamentally, the Court should in any event be careful not to conflate the notions of jurisdiction under Article 1 with the concept of State responsibility under general international law. Efforts to seek to elucidate the former by reference to the latter are conceptually unsound and likely to cause further confusion in an already difficult area of law.

 

JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES CASADEVALL, BERRO-LEFEVRE, ŠIKUTA, HIRVELÄ, LÓPEZ GUERRA, SAJÓ AND SILVIS

1. This judgment establishes that a Contracting State may have its own jurisdiction under the Convention in respect of military operations conducted abroad as part of a stabilisation force in cooperation with another State which enjoys full status as an Occupying Power. Like the United States of America, the United Kingdom was an occupying power in Iraq in 2004 within the meaning of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, whereas the Netherlands military merely assisted the United Kingdom in this occupation. However, the Netherlands authorities remained in full command of their military in the Iraqi province of Al Muthanna, and they exercised full authority and responsibility for establishing security in that region. Thus, Iraqi citizens passing a vehicle checkpoint between Ar Rumaythah and Hamsa, run by ICDC (Iraqi military) personnel who were operating under exclusive Netherlands command, found themselves within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands, as it is defined by the Court’s interpretation of Article 1 of the Convention. We agree with this part of the judgment, which is in line with and logically builds on the Court’s earlier case-law on jurisdiction, most notably Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 55721/07, ECHR 2011). It follows that the Netherlands were under a procedural obligation to investigate the tragic shooting incident which led to the death of the applicant’s son, and to do so in an effective and diligent manner (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, §§ 110 and 112-13, ECHR 2005-VII, and Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391/99, §§ 321,322, ECHR 2007 II). We agree that the Netherlands had this procedural obligation under the Convention. However, we respectfully disagree with some of the majority’s reasoning underpinning the finding of a procedural violation by the Netherlands.

2. It is important to realize the full context of the tragic incident. The applicant’s son was shot in Iraq at a vehicle checkpoint under Netherlands command in the night of 21 April 2004. Prior to this incident the checkpoint had come under fire from a car at 2.10 a.m. on the same night and the Iraqi military at the VCP had returned fire, apparently without causing casualties on either side. Netherlands servicemen had been called to the vehicle checkpoint to investigate that shooting. Their investigation started at 2.30 a.m. Fifteen minutes later, the car in which Mr Jaloud was sitting next to the driver approached the VCP at speed. The driver of the car, who had drunk a couple of beers, later submitted that he had not even seen the checkpoint. His car struck barrels alongside the road, causing a loud and sudden noise. The car continued on its way at speed and there were shouts to stop, followed immediately by shooting, after which the car came to a halt. It became clear that Mr Jaloud had been mortally wounded. Contrary to what some of the servicemen present, including lieutenant A., had thought, it transpired that no shots had been fired from the car.

3. The Netherlands Royal Military Constabulary, present in the region, was called on to begin an investigation into the death of Mr Jaloud. It started doing so as early as 4.50 a.m. The Netherlands Royal Military Constabulary has standing to conduct such investigations, independently from the military command, in respect of Netherlands service personnel. On the basis of a report of their investigations in Iraq, various other documents and a hearing, the Arnhem Court of Appeal later dismissed a request from the applicant for the prosecution of the Netherlands lieutenant A., who had admitted to firing at the passing car. The Netherlands appeal court found that the lieutenant had acted within the military instructions on legitimate (putative) self-defence.

4. It is clear, as the Court has stated on several occasions, that where the death to be investigated under Article 2 of the Convention occurs in circumstances of armed conflict or in an otherwise unstable region, obstacles may be placed in the way of investigators and concrete constraints may compel the use of less effective measures of investigation. The key question then is whether the investigation into the shooting was conducted in a sufficiently effective and diligent manner, in the sense that it would have been capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of results, but of means. In view of the criteria just mentioned, the procedural obligations under Article 2 also cover proceedings in which it is decided whether or not a person under suspicion should be charged in connection with his or her responsibility for the incident under investigation, although this is not the determination of a criminal charge itself and Article 6 of the Convention does not apply (see Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391/99, §§ 359-360, ECHR 2007-II).

5. What is undisputed is that the Royal Military Constabulary acted promptly once the matter had come to their attention. It further appears that the investigation was effective, in so far as it determined (a) the cause of death, and (b) identified the Netherlands officer who may have caused the death by shooting. The key question before the Netherlands appeal court was whether the officer should face charges, depending on whether he had or had not acted in compliance with the instruction on the use of force. Under the procedural obligation of Article 2 of the Convention, it is crucial that a judicial authority, in determining whether a serviceman should face further charges or whether he had acted in a justifiable manner within the instructions on the use of force, has the proper information at its disposal. The Arnhem Court of Appeal should have had at its disposal the full witness statements that were taken after the incident, but it appears that only a rather selective summary of these were present in the court file. While it cannot be speculated whether the court of appeal would have reached another conclusion had it been in a position to read all of the witness statements, this is a serious flaw in the quality of the investigation. So far we agree with the position taken by the majority of the Grand Chamber. However, we respectfully regret that the Grand Chamber also found it appropriate to scrutinise the investigations in Iraq in such a painstaking way that eyebrows may be raised about the role and competence of our Court. We restrict ourselves to two examples in the judgment.

6. The Court criticises the autopsy. Of course, from the perspective of “state of the art” forensic examinations as these would be carried out in the context of domestic proceedings, the autopsy performed in Iraq was inadequate, and that is easily admitted; however, in finding on that basis that this part of the investigation in Iraq was in violation of the Netherlands’ procedural obligations under Article 2, the majority of the Court is taking a rather big step. Whether the Royal Military Constabulary could have claimed full legal control over the body and the circumstances of the autopsy is highly questionable. The Court has not indicated any legal basis for it. Should the Netherlands Royal Constabulary perhaps have used force to secure its attendance at the autopsy? In fact, the Royal Military Constabulary held the body of Mr Azhar Sabah Jaloud for some hours, and something had to be done rapidly. The facilities for an autopsy not being available at the Netherlands camp, the body had to be transferred into Iraqi care. The body was then moved to an Iraqi civilian hospital, where an autopsy was carried out, in the absence of Royal Military Constabulary officials. The Government submit that it was the Iraqi authorities’ decision to exclude Netherlands personnel from the autopsy. There was no legal reason why they could not do so. In addition, according to the Government, the situation was becoming very tense: wider escalation might have followed if a confrontation had been sought; the Netherlands personnel who were present in the hospital reported their fear of being taken hostage and left the premises for that reason. Is this not an example of concrete constraints which may compel the use of less effective measures of investigation?

7. Another point of concern is where the Court reproaches the Netherlands for the fact that the Royal Military Constabulary did not separate witnesses prior to questioning “the prime suspect” in the shooting, that is, six hours after their arrival at the VCP. This raises questions. Is it really within the competence of our Court to set the standards for investigations at this detailed level in unstable situations such as these which prevailed in Iraq? That would be a very hazardous exercise. It seems obvious that concerns for security at a vehicle checkpoint continued to exist while the investigations were going on. The witnesses to the incident were also responsible for that security. Separating all the witnesses on the spot could have interfered with that duty. Equally, to separate persons in a command position from their military personnel abruptly and in such an unstable environment seems rather dangerous. There were obviously more dimensions to be taken into account than just the investigation, and it is not easy to imagine all of them.

8. To conclude, we consider that the Court has rightfully underlined that in a context such as the incident under scrutiny there may be obstacles to performing what may seem the most effective manner of investigation. However, this point of departure does not sit easily with all aspects of the subsequent painstaking analysis undertaken by the Court. Besides, the lieutenant, having reported the incident himself, took full responsibility for the shooting from the outset, and there was no appearance of any attempt on his part to manipulate the evidence.

 

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE MOTOC

(Translation)

1. A human being’s path to self-awareness is similar to that of Sisyphus. Albert Camus’s essay provides a remarkable illustration of the history of philosophy in this regard. But can we expect such self-awareness on the part of a court with regard to issues as difficult as the one addressed in this judgment? Will the Court not be condemned to remain “estranged from itself”? In the language of philosophy of law, and having regard to the principle of “law as integrity” as it has been interpreted by Ronald Dworkin, it seems that a court can never explicitly admit to the various interpretive approaches of stare decisis.

2. It is well known that Article 1 of the Convention remains one of the most problematic in terms of its application, and there are several contradictions in the manner in which the Court has interpreted it (see, for example, Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, § 75, ECHR 2001‑XII, and Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, §§ 136-137, ECHR 2011). While the Court has made remarkable efforts to provide clarification in the present judgment, we consider that this progress has been in the direction of general international law and international humanitarian law only.

3. Let us begin with general international law. Firstly, at the pre-interpretive stage the Court very clearly expresses its position on the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (see paragraph 98 of the judgment) and the case-law of the International Court of Justice (see paragraphs 95-97). Above all, however, for the first time in this case the Court specifies that it is ruling on the imputability resulting from application of the relevant Articles on State Responsibility of the International Law Commission. Thus, with regard to responsibility under international law, it states that “the alleged acts and omissions of Netherlands military personnel and investigative and judicial authorities” are such as to be capable of “giving rise to the responsibility of the Netherlands under the Convention”. Imputability was necessary in order to complement the legal logic arising from general international law, particularly State responsibility, with all the consequences that are entailed (see, in particular, M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy, Oxford University Press, 2011).

4. Similar comments can be made with regard to humanitarian law. Again at the pre-interpretive stage, the judgment quotes the relevant articles of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (“the Hague Regulations”, 1907) and the Fourth Geneva Convention.

5. However, one problem remains unresolved: that of the place to be given to human rights. Although the present judgment quotes the Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia judgment ([GC], nos. 43370/048252/05 and 18454/06, ECHR 2012), particularly its paragraph 115, and reiterates that the test for establishing the existence of “jurisdiction” under Article 1 of the Convention has not been equated with the test for establishing a State’s responsibility for an internationally wrongful act under general international law, it goes no further than that. Once the Court has – for the first time – ruled on “imputability” and has thus moved in the direction of general international law, it must still provide clarification on the differences between the State’s responsibility under general international law and under the Convention, particularly – in the present case – under Article 1.

6. Several questions remain outstanding in a general manner with regard to the relationship between human-rights standards when those human rights are applied within a State’s territory and when they are applied outside it, by virtue of the extraterritoriality resulting from Article 1 (see, for example, S. Besson, The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts to, Leiden Journal of International Law, Dec. 2012, pp. 857-884). Although the Court’s task in this case was facilitated by the shortcomings of the Arnhem Court of Appeal, the general question remains unanswered. Can we speak of different standards in human rights protection which are to be applied by one and the same State, and, if so, on the basis of which criteria?

7. One final remark: the United Kingdom’s argument concerning the “real risk” that States might be reticent to respond to calls from the United Nations Security to take part in an intervention under that body’s mandate (see paragraph 126 of the judgment) is, in our opinion, insubstantial from a legal perspective. Soldiers who take part in peace-keeping operations or are members of multi-national forces cannot enjoy immunity simply on account of the fact that their State is participating in such operations.

8. In conclusion, while the present judgment makes progress as regards the applicability of general international law, questions concerning the relationship between general international law and the human rights provided for in Article 1 have still to be clarified, as do the various conflicts of norms which may arise in the course of that Article’s application.

 


[1]. In fact, 7.62x39mm.

[2]. Transliteration using Dutch orthography

[3]. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is comprised of autonomous “countries”; at the relevant time, these were the Realm in Europe (the Netherlands proper) and the island of Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles (both in the Caribbean).

[4]. By referring, and rightfully so, to the judgment in Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, from which it is appropriate to quote paragraph 115 in extenso:

“115.  The Government of the Russian Federation contend that the Court could only find that Russia was in effective control if it found that the ‘Government’ of the ‘MRT’ could be regarded as an organ of the Russian State in accordance with the approach of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (see paragraph 76 above). The Court recalls that in the judgment relied upon by the Government of the Russian Federation, the International Court of Justice was concerned with determining when the conduct of a person or group of persons could be attributed to a State, so that the State could be held responsible under international law in respect of that conduct. In the instant case, however, the Court is concerned with a different question, namely whether facts complained of by an applicant fell within the jurisdiction of a respondent State within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. As the summary of the Court’s case-law set out above demonstrates, the test for establishing the existence of “jurisdiction” under Article 1 of the Convention has never been equated with the test for establishing a State’s responsibility for an internationally wrongful act under international law.”

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