Yumak i Sadak protiv Turske

 EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA 

VELIKO VIJEĆE

PREDMET YUMAK I SADAK protiv TURSKE

(Predstavka br. 10226/03)

PRESUDA

STRAZBUR8. juli 2008.

Ova presuda je konačna ali može biti predmetom redakcijskih izmjena.

U predmetu Yumak i Sadak protiv Turske, Evropski sud za ljudska prava, zasjedajući u vijeću u sastavu:

Boštjan M. Zupančič, predsjednik,
Peer Lorenzen,
Françoise Tulkens,
Josep Casadevall,
Rıza Türmen,
Corneliu Bîrsan,
Volodymyr Butkevych,
Nina Vajić,
Anatoly Kovler,
Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Javier Borrego Borrego,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Renate Jaeger,
Ján Šikuta,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
Päivi Hirvelä, sudije,
i Vincent Berger, pravnik,

nakon vijećanja zatvorenih za javnost, održanih 21. novembra 2007. i 4. juna 2008., donijelo je sljedeću presudu, koja je usvojena posljednjeg navedenog datuma:

PROCEDURA

1. Postupak u ovom predmetu pokrenut je na osnovu predstavke (br. 10226/03) protiv Republike Turske koju su Sudu podnijeli dvoje turskih državljana, gospodin Mehmet Yumak i gospodin Resul Sadak (“podnositelji predstavke”), 1. marta 2003. temeljem člana 34 Konvencije o zaštiti ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (“Konvencija”).
2. Podnositelje predstavke, kojima je dodijeljena pravna pomoć, zastupao je gospodin T. Elçi, advokat iz Diyarbakıra. Vladu Republike Turske (“Vlada”) zastupao je njezin agent.
3. Podnositelji predstavke tvrde da izborni prag od 10% na državnom nivou za parlamentarne izbore zadire u slobodu izražavanja mišljenja naroda pri izboru zakonodavnog tijela. Pozvali su se na član 3 Prvog protokola.
4. Predstavka je dodijeljena Drugom odjelu Suda (pravilo 52, stav 1 Poslovnika Suda). Dana 9. maja 2006. Vijeće tog Odjela u čijem sastavu su sjedile sudije Jean-Paul Costa, Ireneu Cabral Barreto, Rıza Türmen, Mindia Ugrekhelidze, Antonella Mularoni, Elisabet Fura-Sandström i Dragoljub Popović, kao i Sally Dollé, registrar Odjela, proglasili su predstavku djelomično prihvatljivom.
5. Dana 5. septembra 2006. u Zgradi ljudskih prava u Strazburu održano je javno ročište o osnovanosti predstavke (pravilo 54, stav 3).
6. U svojoj presudi od 30. januara (presuda Vijeća), Vijeće je zaključilo, sa pet glasova za i dva glasa protiv, da nije došlo do povrede člana 3 Protokola br. 1. Zajedničko izdvojeno mišljenje dvoje sudija, Ireneu Cabral Barreto i Antonella Mularoni, dato je u dodatku ove presude.
7. Dana 21. aprila 2007. podnositelji predstavke su zatražili da se predmet uputi Velikom vijeću temeljem člana 43 Konvencije. Dana 9. jula 2007. panel Velikog vijeća odobrio je ovaj zahtjev.
8. Sastav Velikog vijeća utvrđen je u skladu sa odredbama člana 27, stavovi 2 i 3 Konvencije i pravilom 24.
9. Podnositelji predstavke i Vlada dostavili su svoja pismena zapažanja o osnovanosti. Zaprimljena su i zapažanja Međunarodne grupe za prava manjina (MRGI), nevladine organizacije sa sjedištem u Londonu, kojoj je predsjednik Suda dozvolio da dostavi pismenu intervenciju (član 36, stav 2 Konvencije i pravilo 24).
10. Javno saslušanje je održano 21. novembra 2007. u Zgradi ljudskih prava u Strazburu (pravilo 59, stav 3).

Pred Sudom su se pojavili:

(a)  u ime Vlade
G-din M. ÖZMEN, ko-agent,
G-din H. HÜNLER, advokat,
G-đa A. ÖZDEMIR,
G-đa PROTIV SIRMEN,
G-đa Y. RENDA,
G-đa Ö. GAZIALEM, savjetnici,

(b)  u ime podnositelja predstavke
G-din T. ELÇI, pravni zastupnik,
G-din T. FISHER,
G-đa E. FRANK, savjetnici;
G-din R. SADAK, podnositelj predstavke.

Sud je saslušao obraćanje g-dina Elçija i g-dina Özmena, kao i odgovore g-dina Fishera i Özmena na pitanja koja su postavili nekoliko sudija.

ČINJENICE

I. OKOLNOSTI SLUČAJA

11. Podnositelji predstavke su rođeni 1962., odnosno 1959. i obojica žive u Şırnaku. Kandidirali su se za parlamentarne izbore 3. novembra 2002. kao kandidati Narodne demokratske partije (DEHAP) u pokrajini Şırnak, ali ni jedan od njih nije izabran.

A. Parlamentarni izbori 3. novembra 2002.

12. Nakon zemljotresa 1999. Turska se suočila sa dvije veoma ozbiljne ekonomske krize, u novembru 2000., a potom i u februaru 2001. Potom je uslijedila politička kriza, prvenstveno zbog zdravstvenog stanja tadašnjeg premijera ali i zbog brojnih internih podjela unutar vladajuće koalicije, koju je činila grupa od tri političke stranke.
13. Upravo u takvom jednom kontekstu Velika narodna skupština Turske (“Narodna skupština”), je dana 31. jula 2002. odlučila objaviti da će datum narednih parlamentarnih izbora biti 3. novembar 2002.
14. Početkom septembra tri političke stranke lijeve orijentacije, Demokratska narodna stranka (HADEP), Stranka rada (EMEP) i Socijaldemokratska partija (SDP), odlučile su formirati “laburistički, mirovni i demokratski blok”, te formirati novu političku stranku DEHAP. Podnositelji predstavke su počeli svoju izbornu kampanju kao vodeći kandidati nove stranke u pokrajini Şırnak.
15. Takva predizborna alijansa već je bila formirana 1991., kada su Nacionalna laburistička stranka (slijednik MÇP-a i prethodnik MHP-a) i Reformistička demokratska stranka (IDP) osigurale mjesta za svoje kandidate tako što su udružili listu sa Strankom za dobrostanje (RP), a Narodna stranka rada (HEP – prethodnik DEHAP-a) osvojila je 18 mjesta u parlamentu tako što je svoje kandidate stavila na listu Narodne socijaldemokratske partije (SHP). Na taj način neke stranke, koje nemaju izgleda da osvoje 10% glasova na državnom nivou, ponekad uspijevaju ostvariti zastupljenost u parlamentu: pridruže se listi neke veće stranke, a onda, kada budu izabrani, izlaze iz iste i nastavljaju svojim putem, bilo kao nezavisni članovi parlamenta ili pod zastavom neke druge stranke.
16. Rezultati izbora održanih 3. novembra 2002. u pokrajini Şırnak donijeli su DEHAP-u 47,449 od ukupno 103,111 glasova, što je oko 45.95%. Međutim, kako stranka nije uspjela preći nacionalni prag od 10%, podnositelji predstavke nisu bili izabrani. Tri mjesta koja su dodijeljena pokrajini Şırnak podijeljena su na sljedeći način: dva mjesta za AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma – Stranku pravde i razvoja, stranku konzervativne desnice), za koju je glasalo 14.05% birača (14,460 glasova), i jedno mjesto za gospodina Tatara, nezavisnog kandidata koji je osvojio 9.69% (9,914 glasova).
17. Od osamnaest stranaka koje su učestvovale na izborima, samo AKP i CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Narodna republikanska stranka, ljevičarska stranke) uspjele su preći prag of 10%. Sa 34.26% glasova, AKP je osvojio 363 mjesta, od čega 66% u Narodnoj skupštini. Stranka CHP, koja je osvojila 19.4% glasova, dobila je 178 mjesta, ili 33% ukupnih mjesta. Izabrano je, također, i devet nezavisnih kandidata.
18. Međutim, DEHAP, koji je osvojio 6.22%, nije bio jedina stranka koja nije uspjela dobiti nijedno mjesto u parlamentu. To nije pošlo za rukom ni Stranci pravog puta (DYP, stranka desnog centra), Stranci nacionalističke akcije (MHP, nacionalistička stranka), Stranci mladih (GP, stranka centra) ni Domovinskoj stranci (ANAP, stranka desnog centra), koje su osvojile redom 9.54%, 8.36%, 7.25% i 5.13% glasova.
19. Rezultati ovih izbora općenito su interpretirani kao veliki politički preokret. Ne samo da je udio biračkog tijela koji nije zastupljen u parlamentu dostigao rekordni nivo u Turskoj (oko 45%) već je i stopa apstinencije (22% registriranih birača) po prvi put od 1980. premašila 20%. Kao posljedica toga, Narodna skupština koja je proizišla iz ovih izbora bila je najmanje reprezentativna skupština od 1946., kada je po prvi put uveden višestranački sistem. Štaviše, po prvi put od 1954., u parlamentu su bile zastupljene samo dvije stranke.
20. U nastojanju da objasne nereprezentativnost Narodne skupštine neki komentatori su se pozivali na kumulativni uticaj više faktora, prije svega postojanje veoma visokog nacionalnog praga. Na primjer, zbog protestnog glasanja povezanog sa ekonomskom i političkom krizom, pet stranaka koje su 1999. osvojile mjesta na parlamentarnim izborima – uključujući i tri stranke koje su činile vodeću koaliciju između 1999. i 2002. – nisu uspjele ostvariti prag od 10% u 2002., te su shodno tome ostale nezastupljene u parlamentu. Slično tome, izborna fragmentiranost je također imala uticaja na rezultate izbora jer brojni pokušaji formiranja predizbornih koalicija nisu urodili plodom.
21. Nakon ovih izbora, AKP, koja je imala apsolutnu većinu u parlamentu, formirala je vladu.

B.  Parlamentarni izbori od 22. jula 2007. (nakon presude Vijeća)

22. Početkom maja 2007. turski Parlament odlučio je održati prijevremene parlamentarne izbore, odabravši 22. juli 2007. za datum izbora. Odluka je donesena zbog političke krize koje je nastala uslijed nemogućnosti Parlamenta da izabere novog predsjednika Republike, koji će naslijediti Ahmeta Necdeta Sezera prije isteka njegovog prvog, sedmogodišnjeg mandata, 16. maja 2007. U normalnim okolnostima, izbori bi se trebali održati 4. novembra 2007.
23. Na ovim izborima, koje su obilježile dvije stvari, učestvovalo je četrnaest stranaka. Prvo, primijećena je veoma snažna mobilizacija glasačkog tijela nakon predsjedničkih izbora, budući da je stopa participacije porasla na 84%. Drugo, političke stranke su koristile dvije predizborne strategije kako bi zaobišle prag od 10%. Stranka demokratske ljevice (DSP) učestvovala je na izborima pod banerom CHP-a, suparničke stranke, čime je uspjela osvojiti 13 mjesta. Stranka za demokratsko društvo (DTP, prokurdska stranka lijevog usmjerenja) predstavila je svoje kandidate kao nezavisne kandidate pod sloganom “Hiljadu nada”; podržala je, također, određene turske kandidate lijeve orijentacije. Ovaj pokret su podržale i druge manje ljevičarske grupe kao što su EMEP, SDP i ÖDP (Stranka za slobodu i demokratiju, socijalistička stranke). Preko šezdeset nezavisnih kandidata natjecalo se na izborima u oko četrdeset pokrajinskih izbornih jedinica.
24. Na ovim izborima, prag od 10% uspjele su preći AKP, CHP i MHP. Sa 46.58% osvojenih glasova, AKP je osvojila 341 mjesta, odnosno ukupno 62% mjesta. CHP, sa 20.88% glasova, osvojila je 112 mjesta, odnosno ukupno 20.36% mjesta; međutim, 13 članova parlamenta koji su spomenuti u stavu 23 gore, naknadno su se povukli iz stranke CHP i vratili se u svoju izvornu stranku, DSP. Stranka MHP, koja je osvojila 14.27% glasova, dobila je 71 mjesto, odnosno 12.9% od ukupnih mjesta u parlamentu.
25. Jak nastup nezavisnih kandidata bio je jedna od glavnih karakteristika izbora održanih 22. jula 2007. Nezavisni kandidati su nestali iz Narodne skupštine 1980., da bi se ponovo pojavili 1999. kada je u skupštini bilo troje nezavisnih kandidata. U 2002. od ukupno 260 nezavisnih kandidata u parlament je ušlo devet. Na izborima 22. jula 2007., izabrano je 27 nezavisnih zastupnika u Parlamentu. Naročito, preko 20 kandidata izabrano je iz grupe “Hiljada nada”, koji su osvojili oko 2.23% glasova, a koji su se nakon izbora pridružili stranci DTP. Stranka DTP, koja je imala 20 članova u Parlamentu, što je minimalni broj neophodan za kreiranje parlamentarne grupe, bila je u stanju to uraditi. Među izabranim nezavisnim kandidatima bio je i jedan socijalista (nekadašnji predsjednik stranke ÖDP), jedan nacionalista (nekadašnji predsjednik Stranke velike unije – BBP, nacionalistička stranka) i jedan kandidat centrističke orijentacije (nekadašnji predsjednik ANAP-a).
26. Vladu je formirala stranka AKP, koja je ponovo imala apsolutnu većinu u Parlamentu.

II. RELEVANTNO DOMAĆE PRAVO I MEĐUNARODNO PRAVO I PRAKSA

A.  Ustavni i zakonodavni kontekst

1.  Ustav

27. Član 67 Ustava, izmijenjen 23. jula 1995., navodi:

“Građani imaju pravo da glasaju, da se kandidiraju na izborima, da se uključuju u političke aktivnosti, nezavisno ili kao članovi političke stranke i da učestvuju u referendumu u skladu sa pravilima utvrđenim zakonom.

Izbori i referendumi se provode pod upravom i nadzorom pravosuđa i u skladu sa principima slobodnog, ravnopravnog, tajnog i univerzalnog biračkog prava koje se realizira u jednom krugu glasanja, gdje se glasovi broje i bilježe u javnosti. Ipak, zakon, kroz odgovarajuće odredbe, propisuje način na koji turski državljani u inostranstvu mogu ostvariti svoje pravo glasanja.

Svaki turski državljanin sa napunjenih 18 godina ima pravo glasati i učestvovati na referendumima.

Ostvarivanje ovih prava uređeno je zakonom.

Aktivni pripadnici oružanih snaga, kadeti i lica koja služe kaznu zatvora, osim onih koji su osuđeni za djela počinjena iz nehata, lišeni su prava na glasanje.

Državna izborna komisija treba odrediti mjere koje bi trebalo poduzeti da bi se zajamčilo valjano prebrojavanje i evidentiranje glasova u zatvorima i pritvornim jedinicama, i te radnje se trebaju obavljati u prisustvu nadležnog sudije, koji će biti odgovoran za nadzor nad tim radnjama.

Izborni zakon mora pomiriti pravičnu zastupljenost sa stabilnošću vlade.

Izmjene i dopune izbornih zakona neće se primjenjivati na izbore koji se održavaju u godini koja slijedi nakon njihovog stupanja na snagu.”

28. Član 80 Ustava propisuje:

“Članovi Velike narodne skupštine Turske predstavljaju cijelu naciju, a ne regije i osobe koje su ih izabrali.”

29. Prema uvjetima člana 95 Ustava i člana 22 Zakona br. 2820 o političkim strankama, politička stranka koja ima najmanje dvadeset članova u Parlamentu može formirati parlamentarnu grupu.

2.  Izborni sistem

30. Zakon br. 2839 o izboru članova Narodne skupštine, objavljen u Službenim novinama 13. juna 1983., propisuje pravila sistema za parlamentarne izbore.
31. Velika narodna skupština Turske je jednodomni parlament koji trenutno broji 550 poslanika izabranih na mandat od 5 godina. Izbori se održavaju u jednom krugu glasanja u izbornim jedinicama koje su formirane od 81 pokrajine. Izbori se u istom danu održavaju na čitavoj teritoriji države; Glasanje je slobodno, jednako, univerzalno i tajno. Prebrojavanje glasova i evidentiranje rezultata je javno. Svaka pokrajina je zastupljena u Parlamentu sa najmanje jednim poslanikom. Sva druga mjesta se dodjeljuju proporcionalno broju lokalnog stanovništva. Pokrajine koje imaju između 118 poslanika čine jednu izbornu jedinicu. One koje imaju između 19 i 35 poslanika dijele se na dvije izborne jedinice; Istambul, koji ima preko 35 mjesta, podijeljen je na tri izborne jedinice.
32. Član 16 Zakona br. 2839 propisuje:

“... Političke stranke ne mogu predstavljati zajedničke liste...”

33. Član 33 Zakona br. 2839 (izmijenjen i dopunjen 23. maja 1987.) propisuje:

“Na općim izborima stranke ne mogu osvojiti mjesta osim ako ne ostvare, na nacionalnom nivou, više od 10% valjanih glasova ... Nezavisni kandidat, koji se kandidira na listi neke političke stranke može biti izabran samo ako lista te stranke ostvari dovoljan broj glasova koji prelazi nacionalni prag od 10% ...”

34. Kod raspodjele zastupničkih mjesta koristi se D’Hondtov sistem proporcionalne zastupljenosti. Ovaj metod – po kojem se glasovi sa svake liste dijele po nizu cijelih brojeva (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, itd.), a mjesta se potom dodjeljuju onim listama koje imaju najviše koeficijente – favorizira većinsku stranku.
35. Članovi 21(2) i 41(1) Zakona br. 2839 kaže sljedeće:

Član 21(2)

“Osobe koje žele nastupiti kao nezavisni kandidati moraju kod nadležnog tijela zaduženog za trezor ostaviti depozit u iznosu bruto mjesečne plaće državnog službenika najvišeg ranga kao garanciju, i potvrdu o uplati tog iznosa moraju dostaviti u dosje o kandidaturi za parlamentarne izbore.”

Član 41(1)

“... ako, tokom parlamentarnih izbora nezavisni kandidat nije dobio dovoljan broj glasova koji bi mu osigurao mjesto u Parlamentu, Trezor će zadržati deponirani iznos garancije.”

36. Član 36 Zakona br. 2820 o političkim strankama (objavljen u Službenim novinama 24. aprila 1983.) propisuje:

“Da bi mogla sudjelovati na izborima, politička stranka mora imati jedno mjesto u barem jednoj polovini pokrajina i održati sastanak skupštine najmanje šest mjeseci prije izbornog dana, ili mora imati grupu unutar Velike narodne skupštine.”

37. Član 81 Zakona br. 2820 kaže:

“Političke stranke nemaju pravo isticati na osnovu rase, religije, sekte, kulture ili jezika da na teritoriji Republike Turske postoje manjinske grupe.”

38. Prema relevantnom zakonodavstvu ime nezavisnog kandidata se ne štampa na glasačkim listićima koji se distribuiraju u blizini turskih granica. To znači da turski birači sa prebivalištem u inostranstvu mogu glasati samo za političku stranku, koristeći glasačke kutije koje su postavljene na graničnim prelazima ili većim aerodromima. Slično tome, tamo gdje političke stranke imaju dodijeljen medijski prostor na televiziji ili radiju u svrhu predizbornih kampanja, nezavisnim kandidatima to ne stoji na raspolaganju.

3.  Ustavna sudska praksa

39. Sudska praksa Ustavnog suda u vezi sa usklađenošću izbornih pragova sa načelom demokratske države je kontradiktorna.
40. Prije svega, u presudi koja je donesena 6. maja 1968. (E. 1968/15, K. 1968/13), Ustavni sud je smatrao da je “obični prag” koji je parlament uveo u nastojanju da ispravi učinke sistema proporcionalne zastupljenosti suprotan načelu demokratske države. Radi se o pragu koji varira shodno broju mjesta koje treba popuniti u svakoj parlamentarnoj izbornoj jedinici. Prag koji se primjenjuje u nekoj izbornoj jedinici izračunava se tako što se broj osvojenih glasova podijeli sa brojem mjesta koja treba popuniti, a mjesta se dodjeljuju onim kandidatima koji pređu taj prag. Ustavni sud je smatrao, naročito, da bi takav prag, koji bi predstavnicima manjinskih birača mogao omogućiti da formiraju vladu, vrlo vjerovatno spriječio zastupljenost svih političkih struja.
41. Kasnije, nakon usvajanja Ustava 1982., Ustavni sud je dao svoja mišljenja o pitanju izbornog sistema, konkretno u presudi od 1. marta 1984. (E. 1984/1, 1984/2), kojom je presudio na sljedeći način:

“Prvi stav člana 67 Ustava propisuje da građani imaju pravo glasati i kandidirati se na izborima u skladu sa zakonom propisanim pravilima. Međutim, on zakonodavnim tijelima ne pruža neograničeno polje slobodne procjene. Temeljem člana 67 izbori se provode pod upravom i nadzorom pravosudne vlasti i u skladu sa načelima slobodnog, jednakog, tajnog i univerzalnog glasanja na jednom glasačkom listiću, gdje se glasovi prebrojavaju i bilježe u javnosti. Sve dok se postupa po ovim pravilima, zakonodavna tijela mogu usvojiti koji god izborni sistem smatraju odgovarajućim. Da je ustavotvorna skupština imala poseban sistem na umu, usvojila bi određeno obavezujuće pravilo. Obzirom da to nije slučaj, zakonodavac je slobodan donijeti onaj sistem koji smatra da najbolje odgovara političkim i socijalnim uvjetima zemlje...

Pod uvjetom da ne donosi mjere koje imaju za namjeru ograničiti slobodu izražavanja ljudi ili podvrći politički život hegemoniji jedne stranke ili uništiti višestranački sistem, parlament može ustanoviti jedan od postojećih izbornih sistema”

42. U presudi od 18. novembra 1995. (E. 1995/54, K. 1995/59) Ustavni sud je imao priliku da presudi o ustavnosti člana 34/A Zakona br. 2839. Taj član, koji se poziva na član 33 istog zakona, također nameće izborni prag od 10% za dodjeljivanje mjesta za članove Skupštine izabrane u “nacionalnoj izbornoj jedinici”. Ustavni sud je odredbe kojima se uspostavlja nacionalna izborna jedinica proglasio ništavnim, ali je smatrao da je nacionalni prag od 10% u skladu sa članom 67 Ustava.

Relevantni dijelovi presude glase:

“... Ustav definira državu Tursku kao Republiku... Ustavna struktura države, koja se temelji na njenom suverenitetu, proizvod je narodne volje, posredno izražene kroz slobodne izbore. Taj izbor, koji je naglašen u brojnim članovima Ustava, jasno je i precizno utvrđen u članu 67, koji nosi naslov ‘Pravo na glasanje i uključivanje u političke aktivnosti.’ Stav 6 člana 67, koji je izmijenjen i dopunjen, propisuje da izborni zakoni moraju biti uobličeni na način da omoguće postizanje balansa između načela ‘pravične zastupljenosti’ i ‘državne stabilnosti.’ Cilj je osigurati da se volja birača odražava, što je više moguće, [u] zakonu. ... [Da bi se] izabrao sistem čije metode najviše doprinose izražavanju kolektivne volje i odražavanju kolektivnih odluka u zakonodavstvu, ... i donijeli odgovarajući zakoni u svjetlu specifičnih okolnosti zemlje i zahtjeva koji proizilaze iz Ustava, treba se opredijeliti za [sistem] koji je, u najvećoj mjeri, kompatibilan sa Ustavom ili odbaciti svaki sistem koji je neusklađen sa njim.

Uticaj reprezentativne demokratije je vidljiv u nekoliko polja. Nepravični sistemi koji su usvojeni sa namjerom da se ostvari stabilnost ugrozit će društvene razvoje. ... Kada je u pitanju zastupljenost, glavni uvjet za državnu stabilnost je upravo pravičnost, na čijem se značaju snažno insistira. Pravičnost osigurava stabilnost. Međutim, ideja stabilnosti u odsustvu pravičnosti dovodi do nestabilnosti. Načelo ‘pravične zastupljenosti’ na čijem [poštivanju] Ustav insistira, sastoji se od slobodnog, jednakog, univerzalnog i tajnog [glasanja], u jednom krugu glasanja i javnog prebrojavanja glasova i bilježenja rezultata, rezultat čega je broj predstavnika srazmjeran broju osvojenih glasova. Načelo ‘državne stabilnosti’ je referenca kada su u pitanju načini osmišljeni da odražavaju glasove [unutar] zakonodavne vlasti, ali i da zajamče snagu izvršne vlasti. ‘Državna stabilnost’, koja se namjerava osigurati kroz izborni prag (opisan kao ‘prečka’), baš kao i ‘pravična zastupljenost’ ..., zaštićena je Ustavom. Na izborima ... važno je iskombinirati ova dva načela, koji se u nekim situacijama čine oprečnim, na način [da se osigura] da su uravnoteženi i uzajamno komplementarni...

Da bi se ‘državna stabilnost’, kao cilj utvrđen Ustavom, ostvarila uveden je nacionalni [prag]...

Jasno je da je [prag] od 10% glasova na državnom nivou, koji je propisan članom 33 Zakona br. 2839 ... stupio na snagu nakon odobravanja zakona. Izborni sistem mora biti kompatibilan sa ustavnim principima ..., i neizbježno je da neki od ovih sistema trebaju sadržavati stroga pravila. Pragovi, koji proizilaze iz same prirode sistema i koji su [izraženi] u procentima, i [koji] na državnom nivou ograničavaju pravo glasanja i pravo na kandidiranje, primjenjivi su [i] prihvatljivi ... pod uvjetom da ne prelaze normalne granice... [Prag] od 10% sukladan je načelima državne stabilnosti i pravične zastupljenosti...”

Troje od jedanaest sudija Ustavnog suda nije se složilo sa argumentima većine, smatrajući da nacionalni prag od 10% nije u skladu sa članom 67 Ustava.

43. U istoj presudi, međutim, Ustavni sud je proglasio ništavnim izborni prag od 25% za raspodjelu mjesta unutar pokrajina (pokrajinski prag). Smatrajući da takav prag nije u skladu sa načelom pravične zastupljenosti, Sud je primijetio:

“Premda je nacionalni prag za parlamentarne izbore nametnut u skladu sa načelom ‘državne stabilnosti’, dodatno nametanje praga za svaku izbornu jedinicu nekompatibilno je sa načelom ‘pravične zastupljenosti’.”

4.  Kratak opis prethodnih parlamentarnih izbora

44. Izbori 1950., 1954. i 1957. – na kojima je korišten sistem većinske zastupljenosti – nisu bili u stanju osigurati balans između parlamentarne većine i opozicije. Ovaj disbalans bio je jedan od glavnih razloga za državni udar 1960. Nakon intervencije oružanih snaga, temeljem D’Hondtovog metoda, Parlament je usvojio proporcionalnu zastupljenost u nastojanju da osnaži pluralizam i politički sistem. Kao posljedica toga, izbori 1965. i 1969. osigurali su stabilne većine u Narodnoj skupštini, kao i zastupljenost manjih stranaka. Međutim, na izborima 1973. i 1977. glavni politički pokreti nisu uspjeli uspostaviti stabilne vlade, iako su imali široku podršku izbornog tijela. Taj period nestabilnosti obilježilo je kreiranje koalicije za koalicijom, od kojih je svaka bila oslabljena nesrazmjernim uticajem manjih partija na vladinu politiku.
45. Nakon vojnog režima koji je bio na snazi u periodu of 1980. do 1983., Zakon br. 2839 o izboru poslanika u Narodnu skupštinu, koji je usvojen 13. juna 1983., ponovo je uspostavio proporcionalnu zastupljenost, sa dva izborna praga. Na prag od 10% dodan je i pokrajinski prag (broj birača podijeljen sa brojem mjesta koja su trebala biti popunjena u svakoj izbornoj jedinici); Godine 1995. Ustavni sud je pokrajinski prag proglasio ništavnim. Na parlamentarnim izborima 1983. Domovinska stranka (ANAP) ostvarila je apsolutnu većinu u parlamentu.
46. Isto tako, parlamentarni izbori održani 29. novembra 1987. omogućili su ANAP-u, koji je osvojio 36.31% glasova, da formira stabilnu parlamentarnu većinu. Druge dvije stranke su također dobile mjesta. Na izborima 20. oktobra 1991. mjesta u Parlamentu je dobilo pet stranaka. Do ovakvog rezultata je došlo zahvaljujući činjenici da su tri manje političke stranke (MÇP, IDP i HEP) na izborima učestvovale pod zastavom drugih političkih stranaka, zaobilazeći član 16 Zakona br. 2839, koji zabranjuje formiranje zajedničkih lista prije izbora. Vlada je uspostavljena na temelju koalicije dvije stranke. Na ovim izborima, osamnaest kandidata HEP-a (Narodna laburistička stranka – pro-kurdska) izabrano je u Parlament sa liste (socijaldemokratske stranke) SHP-a; oni su kasnije izašli i SHP-a, kako bi se ponovo pridružili svojoj izvornoj stranci, HEP-u.
47. Na općim izborima održanim 24. decembra 1995. mjesta u parlamentu je osvojilo pet stranaka. Međutim, kako ni jedna od njih nije parlamentarna većina, formirali su koaliciju.
48. Na parlamentarnim izborima 1999., ponovo, nijedna stranka nije imala parlamentarnu većinu. Pet političkih stranaka osvojilo je mjesta u Narodnoj skupštini. Vladu je formirala koalicija triju stranaka.
49. Do izbora 3. novembra 2002., najveći udio glasova koji je otišao strankama koje u konačnici nisu bile zastupljene u parlamentu (19.4%) desio se 1987. godine. Godine 1991., zahvaljujući učešću dvije predizborne koalicije, jedna formirana između RP-a, MÇP-a i IDP-a, a druga između SHP-a i HEP-a, taj udio je pao na 0.5%. Nakon izbora 22. jula 2007. taj udio je bio 13.1%.
50. Kao što je spomenuto ranije (vidi stavove 12-21), izbori od 2. novembra 2002. omogućili su AKP-u da formira stabilnu vladu koja je trajala do 22. jula 2007, uprkos činjenici da 45.3% od oko 14.5 miliona glasova nije bilo zastupljeno u parlamentu.

B.  Relevantni dokumenti Vijeća Evrope

51. Vijeće Evrope nije utvrdilo obavezujuća pravila u vezi izbornih pragova.

1.  Dokumenti Parlamentarne skupštine Vijeća Evrope

52. Relevantni dio Rezolucije 1547 (2007) koja nosi naslov Stanje ljudskih prava i demokratije u Evropi, koju je Skupština usvojila 18. aprila 2007., kaže sljedeće:

“58. U etabliranim demokratijama, izborni prag za parlamentarne izbore ne bi trebao prelaziti 3%. Dakle, trebalo bi omogućiti da se izrazi maksimalni broj mišljenja. Uskraćivanje prava na zastupljenost brojnim grupama ljudi bilo bi pogubno za demokratski sistem. U dobro uspostavljenim demokratijama, mora se naći balans između pravične zastupljenosti mišljenja u zajednici i djelotvornosti u parlamentu i vladi.”

53. U svojoj preporuci 1791 (2007) naslovljenoj Stanje ljudskih prava i demokratije u Evropi, koja je usvojena 18. aprila 2007., Skupština je preporučila da Odbor ministara poduzme mjere kojima će otkloniti nedostatke identificirane u gore spomenutoj Rezoluciji. U vezi sa izbornim pragovima, preporučila je da Odbor ministara potakne zemlje članice da:

“17.10  razmotre smanjivanje pragova preko 3% za parlamentarne izbore i ... razmotre pitanje balansa između pravične zastupljenosti i učinkovitosti kako u parlamentu tako i u vladi.”

2.  Dokumenti Evropske komisije za demokratiju kroz pravo (Venecijanske komisije)

54. “Kodeks dobre prakse u izbornim pitanjima”, koji je Venecijanska komisija usvojila 2002. godine, nedvosmisleno navodi: “Pet principa na kojima počiva evropsko izborno nasljeđe su univerzalno, jednako, slobodno, tajno i direktno biračko pravo.” “Može se izabrati bilo koji izborni sistem, dok god poštuje ove principe”.
55. U relevantnom dijelu izvještaja Venecijanske komisije naslovljenog Izvještaj o izbornom zakonu i izbornoj administraciji u Evropi od 12. juna 2006., stoji sljedeće:

“Učinci nekog konkretnog izbornog sistema mogu varirati od zemlje do zemlje, [i] moramo shvatiti da se izbornim sistemima mogu nastojati ostvarivati različiti, a ponekad čak i antagonistički, politički ciljevi. Dok se neki izborni sistem može više koncentrirati na pravičnu zastupljenost partija u parlamentu, drugi može biti više okrenut ka izbjegavanju fragmentacije partijskog sistema i poticanju na formiranje vladajuće većine jedne stranke u parlamentu. Jedan izborni sistem potiče bliske odnose između birača i predstavnika “njihovog” biračkog tijela, dok drugi olakšava strankama da konkretno uvedu žene, manjine ili stručnjake u parlament kroz zatvorene stranačke liste. U nekim zemljama prihvaćeni su složeni izborni sistemi putem kojih se nastoje iskombinirati različiti politički ciljevi. Neke zemlje smatraju da je prioritet da izborni sistem bude lako razumljiv i jednostavan za biračko tijelo i administraciju. Prikladnost nekog izbornog sistema utvrđuje se prema tome da li on osigurava pravičnost, u kontekstu lokalnih uvjeta i problema. Naročito je važno osigurati transparentnost kod razrade listi. Dakle, izborni sistem i predložene reforme treba ocjenjivati u svakom pojedinačnom predmetu.”

56. U svom Izvještaju o izbornim pravilima i pozitivnoj diskriminaciji u pogledu učešća nacionalnih manjina u procesu odlučivanja u evropskim zemljama od 15. marta 2005., Venecijanska komisija, nakon što je izanalizirala prakse određenih zemalja članica, preporučila je pet konkretnih mjera za unapređenje zastupljenosti manjina. Dvije od tih mjera tiču se pitanja izbornih pragova:

“...

d. Izborni pragovi ne trebaju uticati na šanse nacionalnih manjina da budu zastupljene.

e. Izborne jedinice (broj, veličina, oblik i opseg) mogu biti formirane sa ciljem da se unaprijedi učešće manjina u procesima odlučivanja.”

3.  Dokumenti koji se konkretno odnose na izbore u Turskoj

(a)  Izvještaj Ad hoc Komiteta Parlamentarne skupštine Vijeća Evrope

57. Vlada se pozvala na izvještaj Ad hoc Komiteta za praćenje parlamentarnih izbora u Turskoj (3. novembra 2002.), od 20. decembra 2002. U relevantnom dijelu izvještaja stoji:

“Ko što su mediji već naširoko objavili, samo dvije od ukupno 18 stranaka se našlo u novom TBMM; AKP (Stranka za pravu i razvoj) i CHP (Narodna republikanska stranka), izostavljajući sve druge stranke, koje su do sada bile zastupljene u Parlamentu jer iste sada nisu uspjele preći prag od 10%. Stranka na vlasti je do izbora dobila samo 1% glasova. Izborima su dominirali problemi vezani ekonomiju i korupciju.

Jasnu i apsolutnu većinu imala je stranka AKP koja je dobila 362 mjesta, dok je opozicija dobila 179 mjesta, a nezavisnim kandidatima pripalo je 9 mjesta. (Ovi nezavisni članovi izabrani su u malim gradovima u kojima su uživali dobru reputaciju.) Treba podsjetiti da je AKP u prethodnom sazivu Parlamenta imala 59 mjesta, a CHP tri (Izbori 1999.).

Ova situacija bi vjerovatno mogla dovesti do veće stabilnosti u zemlji, ako se izbjegnu komplicirane i nestabilne koalicije. U ponedjeljak, 4. novembra 2002. Turska burza je porasla za 6.1%.

Međutim, to također znači da oko 44% glasača nema zastupnike u parlamentu.

Rezultate, dakle, moramo posmatrati kao jasan glas protesta protiv uređenja, obzirom da nijedna od tri stranke iz stare vladajuće koalicije nije dobila dovoljno glasova ni za jedno jedino mjesto!”

(b)  Rezolucija Parlamentarne skupštine 1380 (2004)

58. Stavovi 6 i 23 Rezolucije 1380 (2004) o “preuzetim časnim obavezama i odgovornostima Turske”, koju je Parlamentarna skupština Vijeća Evrope usvojila 22. juna 2004., kažu sljedeće:

“6.  Što se tiče pluralističke demokratije, Skupština je potvrdila da je Turska funkcionalna demokratija sa višestranačkim sistemom, slobodnim izborima i podjelom vlasti. Ipak, učestalost raspuštanja političkih stranaka uveliko zabrinjava i Skupština se nada da će, ubuduće, ustavne promjene od oktobra 2001. i one koje su uvedene Zakonom o političkim strankama iz marta 2002. smanjiti korištenje tako radikalnih mjera kao što je raspuštanje. Skupština također smatra da je zahtjev od najmanje 10% glasova osvojenih na državnom nivou za ulazak u Parlament pretjerano visok prag i da bi glasačke aranžmane za turske državljane koji žive u inostranstvu trebalo promijeniti.

...

23. Skupština, stoga, poziva Tursku, u okviru svojih ovlaštenja u tekućem procesu reforme, da:

...

ii. izmijeni izborni zakon na način da smanji izborni prag od 10% i da omogući turskim državljanima koji žive u inostranstvu da zbog glasanja ne moraju dolaziti na granicu;

...”

(c)  Izvještaj o “Praćenju parlamentarnih izbora u Turskoj (22. juli 2007.)”

59. Relevantni dijelovi izvještaja pod naslovom Praćenje parlamentarnih izbora u Turskoj, kojeg je sastavio ad hoc Odbor Parlamentarne skupštine Vijeća Evrope, kažu sljedeće:

“XII.  Zaključci i preporuke

55. Parlamentarni izbori u Turskoj, održani 22. jula 2007., bili su općenito u skladu sa preuzetim obavezama Turske prema Vijeću Evrope i sa Evropskim standardima za slobodne izbore.

56. Općenito, glasanje je bilo dobro organizirano i obavljeno je na uredan i profesionalan način, što svjedoči o dugogodišnjoj tradiciji demokratskih izbora u Turskoj.

57. Visok odaziv birača pokazuje da u Turskoj vlada povjerenje u demokratski proces.

58. Izborni administratori na svim nivoima izvršavali su svoje dužnosti učinkovito i u dobroj vjeri.

59. Međutim, Izvještač vjeruje da bi Turska mogla učiniti više u pogledu organiziranja boljih izbora koji bi jamčili istinski reprezentativan Parlament. Izborni prag od 10% bi se mogao smanjiti u skladu sa rezolucijama Skupštine 1380 (2004) i 1547(2007). To što je novi Parlament, koji je izabran 22. jula 2007. godine, daleko reprezentativniji od prethodnog, u smislu da predstavlja oko 90% mišljenja biračkog tijela, rezultat je činjenice da su u Parlamentu zastupljene tri, umjesto dvije partije i lukavosti opozicionih stranaka koje su sponzorirale nezavisne kandidate, a ne nekih konkretnih koraka koje su poduzele turske vlasti.

60. Turske vlasti bi se možda mogle pozvati na Venecijansku komisiju po ovom pitanju, i pojednostaviti izborni zakon.”

60. Štaviše, u odgovoru na pitanje jednog poslanika koji se obratio Parlamentarnoj skupštini 3. oktobra 2007., predsjednik Republike Turske je kazao da prag od 10% zadovoljava stvarnu potrebu, ali da se tokom vremena može i ukinuti (vidi zapisnik sa sjednice 3. oktobra 2007). U relevantnim dijelovima njegovog odgovora stoji sljedeće (Registrarov prevod sažetka zapisnika sa sjednice 3. oktobra 2007., na francuski jezik):

“G-din Gül je objasnio da je prag od 10% uveden da bi se otklonile nestabilnosti koje su obilježile prethodne godine, u kojima je bilo mnogo vladajućih koalicija koje su slijedile jedna drugu u vrlo kratkom vremenu. Izborni prag nije spriječio nezavisne kandidate da se kandidiraju. Na posljednjim parlamentarnim izborima, u julu 2007., odaziv birača je bio 85%, što je pokazalo koliko je Parlament bio reprezentativan. Sada, kada je ponovo uspostavljena politička, izborni prag od 10% bi trebalo ponovo razmotriti.”

C.  Komparativno pravo

61. Premda ne postoji jedinstvena klasifikacija vrsta glasačkog listića i izbornih sistema, obično se razlikuju tri glavna tipa: sistemi glasačke većine, proporcionalni sistemi i mješoviti sistemi. U sistemima glasačke većine pobjednik je onaj kandidat ili lista kandidata koja osvoji većinu glasova u odlučujućem krugu glasanja. Ova vrsta glasačkog listića omogućava glasanje u vladama u kojima postoje jasne parlamentarne većine, ali ona istovremeno sprječava zastupljenost manjinskih političkih stranaka. Tako je, na primjer, u Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu već više decenija u primjeni jedan krug glasanja u većinskom izbornom sistemu (“first past the post”), koji, u kombinaciji sa postojeće dvije dominantne stranke, drugim strankama ostavlja malo poslaničkih mjesta u odnosu na broj glasova koji su dobile. Postoje i drugi, slični slučajevi, u Francuskoj, na primjer, gdje se većinski izborni sistem odvija u dva kruga glasanja. S druge strane, cilj sistema proporcionalne zastupljenosti je da osigura da se osvojeni glasovi odražavaju u proporcionalnom broju poslaničkih mjesta. Sistem proporcionalne zastupljenosti se općenito smatra najpravičnijim sistemom jer nastoji pobliže odraziti različite političke struje. Međutim, nedostatak ovog sistema je u tome što on vodi ka fragmentaciji onih koji nastoje dobiti izbornu podršku, i tako otežava uspostavljanje stabilnih parlamentarnih većina.
62. Proporcionalni sistemi su, trenutno, u najširoj upotrebi u Evropi. Primjera radi, Bugarska, Češka Republika, Danska, Estonija, Irska, Luksemburg, Malta, Moldavija, Norveška, Poljska, Portugal, Rumunija, Rusija, Španija, Švedska i Turska su se opredijelile za jednu ili drugu varijantu proporcionalne zastupljenosti. Postoje, također, i mješoviti sistemi koji podrazumijevaju različite kombinacije dvije vrste glasačkih listića (u Njemačkoj, Italiji i Litvaniji, na primjer).
63. U nekim proporcionalnim sistemima zakonski pragovi se koriste da bi se ispravili negativni efekti proporcionalnog glasanja, a naročito da bi se osigurala veća parlamentarna stabilnost. Ovi pragovi, koji su najčešće izraženi u procentima osvojenih glasova, su “granice, fiksne ili varijabilne, definirane u smislu izbornog rezultata, koji određuje udio liste ili kandidata u raspodjeli zastupničkih mjesta.” Međutim, uloga ovih pragova varira zavisno od njihove visine i partijskog sistema u svakoj pojedinačnoj zemlji. Nizak prag isključuje samo vrlo male grupe, što otežava formiranje stabilnih većina, dok visoki pragovi u veoma fragmentiranim partijskim sistemima lišavaju mnoge birače zastupljenosti.
64. Analiza izbornih pragova usvojenih u zemljama članicama koje imaju sistem proporcionalne zastupljenosti pokazuje da su se samo četiri zemlje članice opredijelile za visoke pragove: Turska ima najviši prag, 10%; Lihtenštajn ima prag od 8%; a Ruska Federacija i Gruzija koriste prag od 7%. Trećina zemalja je nametnula prag od 5%, a 13 zemlja se opredijelilo čak i za niže pragove. Postoje i zemlje članice (sedam njih) koje uopće ne koriste pragove. Štaviše, u mnogim sistemima pragovi se primjenjuju samo za ograničen broj zastupničkih mjesta (u Norveškoj i na Islandu, na primjer). Pragovi za stranke i pragovi za koalicije mogu biti različiti. U Češkoj Republici, na primjer, prag za jednu stranku je 5%, a u slučaju koalicije taj prag se podiže za 5% za svaki sastavni dio koalicije. U Poljskoj, prag za koaliciju je 8%, bez obzira na sastavne dijelove koalicije. Slične varijacije su i kod pragova za nezavisne kandidate: u Moldaviji, na primjer, taj prag je 3%.

PRAVO

I. OPSEG NADLEŽNOSTI VELIKOG VIJEĆA

65. Sud primjećuje da je, u presudi Vijeća (stav 40), tužba formulirana na sljedeći način:

“Podnositelji predstavke tvrde da nametanje izbornog praga od 10% predstavlja miješanje u slobodu izražavanja mišljenja naroda u izboru zakonodavnih tijela.”

66. U postupku pred Vijećem, oslanjajući se uglavnom na rezultate izbora 3. novembra 2002. podnositelji predstavke su se žalili na izborni prag od 10%. U tom smislu, opsežno su ispitali izbore u Turskoj od 1946., kada je u Republici uveden višestranački sistem. Kasnije, u svom zahtjevu za upućivanje, koji je podnesen 20. aprila 2007., kritizirajući, naročito, analizu turskog izbornog sistema koju je vijeće napravilo u svojoj presudi, tvrdili su da je presudom tuženoj državi dato isuviše široko polje slobodne procjene u pogledu uvođenja i djelovanja izbornog sistema.
67. Nakon 9. jula 2007., datuma kada je vijeće od petoro sudija dopustilo da se zahtjev podnositelja predstavke uputi Velikom vijeću, u Turskoj su se desili prijevremeni parlamentarni izbori.
68. Premda su se u svojim opažanjima dostavljenim Velikom vijeću 7. septembra 2007. vrlo široko osvrnuli na izbore 22. jula 2007., advokat podnositelja predstavke je pojasnio, na saslušanju 21. novembra 2007., da je predstavka podnesena kako bi se osigurala odluka da je na izborima 3. novembra 2002., a ne na izborima 22. jula 2007., došlo do povrede.
69. Vlada je na ročištu navela da tužbe podnositelja predstavke, koje se odnose na ustavnu strukturu Turske, treba smatrati narodnom tužbom, actio popularis, i ustvrdila da su opći rezultati izbora 22. potvrdili nalaze Vijeća od 30. januara 2007.
70. Sud, stoga, mora odrediti opseg ispitivanja predmeta koje treba provesti, odlučujući naročito da li se u ispitivanju može ograničiti na rezultate izbora 3. novembra 2002., ne uzimajući u obzir događaje nakon donošenja presude Vijeća.
71. Sud ponavlja da, prema ustanovljenoj sudskoj praksi, “predmet” upućen Velikom vijeću neophodno obuhvata sve aspekte predstavke koje je prethodno Vijeće ispitalo u svojoj presudi, te da ne postoji osnov za samo djelomično upućivanje predmeta (vidi Cumpǎnǎ i Mazǎre protiv Rumunije [GC], br. 33348/96, stav 66, ECHR 2004-XI, i i T. protiv Finske [GC], br. 25702/94, stavovi 140 i 141, ECHR 2001-VII)
72. “Predmet” upućen Velikom vijeću je predstavka, koja je proglašena prihvatljivom. To ne znači, međutim da Veliko vijeće ne može također ispitivati, tamo gdje bude potrebno, pitanja vezana za prihvatljivost predstavke, baš kao što je to moguće u redovnom postupku Vijeća, na primjer, temeljem člana 35 na kraju Konvencije (koji ovlašćuje Sud da “odbaci svaku predstavku koju smatra neprihvatljivom ... u bilo kojoj fazi postupka”), ili tamo gdje su takva pitanja pridružena pitanjima osnovanosti ili u bilo kojoj drugoj relevantnoj fazi utvrđivanja osnovanosti (vidi i T. protiv Finske, citiran gore, stav 141).
73. Sud na počeku primjećuje da nema nadležnost za ispitivanje domaćeg izbornog zakona u teoriji, i da su, u prvom redu državni organi vlasti, naročito sudovi koji su posebno osposobljeni za taj posao, odgovorni da tumače i primjenjuju domaće pravo (vidi, na primjer, Gitonas i drugi protiv Grčke, presuda od 1. jula 1997., Izvještaji o presudama i odlukama 1997-IV, stav 44, i Briķe protiv Latvije (dec.), br. 47135/99, 29. juni 2000.). Međutim, u konkretnom slučaju, predmet podnositelja predstavke ne predstavlja actio popularis. Na izborima 3. novembra 2002. oni su bili direktno i odmah pogođeni spornim pragom (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Serge Moureaux i drugi protiv Belgije, br. 9267/81, Odluka Komisije od 12. jula 1983., Odluke i izvještaji (DR) 33, str. 127). Budući da je Vijeće donijelo presudu prije izbora 22. jula 2007., ono je uglavnom uzimalo u obzir rezultate izbora 3. novembra 2002. i kontekst Turske u to vrijeme. Sud će sada ispitivati predmet u svjetlu rezultata parlamentarnih izbora 3. novembra 2002., ne zanemarujući izbore 22. jula 2007., na kojima se podnositelji predstavke, doduše, nisu kandidirali, ali koji ipak imaju određeni uticaj na ocjenu učinka izbornog praga na koji su se žalili podnositelji predstavke.

II. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 3 PROTOKOLA BR. 1

74. Podnositelji predstavke tvrde da je nametanje izbornog praga od 10% na parlamentarnim izborima predstavljalo miješanje u slobodu izražavanja mišljenja naroda pri izboru zakonodavne vlasti. Pozvali su se na član 3 Protokola br. 1, koji kaže:

“Visoke strane ugovornice se obavezuju da u primjerenim vremenskim razmacima održavaju slobodne izbore s tajnim glasanjem, pod uvjetima koji osiguravaju slobodno izražavanje mišljenja naroda pri izboru zakonodavnih tijela. ”

A.  Presuda Vijeća

75. Vijeće je utvrdilo da je izborni prag od 10% za parlamentarne izbore nametnut sa ciljem da osnaži stabilnost države tako što će spriječiti prekomjernu i oslabljujući fragmentaciju parlamenta. Također se može smatrati da je taj prag neophodan i proporcionalan ostvarivanju tog cilja. Prema tome, zaključilo je da “Turska [nije] prekoračila svoje široko polje slobodne procjene u smislu člana 3 Protokola br. 1, bez obzira na visinu praga koji je predmetom ove tužbe” (vidi stavove 66-79 presude Vijeća).

B.  Argumenti strana u postupku

1.  Podnositelji predstavke

76. Podnositelji predstavke su osporavali razmatranja Vijeća, tvrdeći da je Vijeće dalo vrlo restriktivno i ishitreno tumačenje prava na slobodne izbore.
77. U prvom redu, budući da prag od 10% sprječava veliki dio stanovništva da izrazi svoj izbor glede zastupljenosti u parlamentu, podnositelji predstavke su smatrali da on očigledno predstavlja ozbiljno zadiranje u pravo na učešće i da ne doprinosi ostvarivanju legitimnog cilja u smislu člana 3 Protokola br. 1.
78. S tim u vezi, podnositelji predstavke su osporavali argument da je mjera uvedena radi jačanja parlamentarne stabilnosti. Tvrdili su da su vojne vlasti, koje su državnim udarom 1980. preuzele vlast, okrivile upravo izborni sistem koji je bio na snazi u to vrijeme za socijalne i politične nevolje u Turskoj u periodu između 1970. i 1980., koje su u konačnici rezultirale nestabilnošću vlade. Po njihovom mišljenju, uspostavljena je vještačka uzročno-posljedična veza između izbornog praga i političke situacije u Turskoj 1970-ih godina, kao što je ocijenjeno u presudi Vijeća.
79. Podnositelji predstavke su naglasili činjenicu da su dva, od ukupno četiri izborna procesa gdje se proporcionalna zastupljenost nije ostvarivala kroz izborni prag (na izborima 1965. i 1969.) rezultirala jednostranačkim vladama; a druga dva (1973. i 1977.) koalicijskim vladama.
80. Štaviše, iako nije isključeno da bi smanjenje ili ukidanje nacionalnog izbornog praga dovelo do koalicijske vlade, takav ishod ne mora biti nužno sinonim državne nestabilnosti. Koalicijske vlade su ponekad stabilnije od jednostranačkih vlada.
81. Podnositelji predstavke su ustvrdili da je teško odbraniti tvrdnju da je sporna izuzetna mjera osnažila reprezentativnu demokratiju. Vijeće Evrope je formirano radi jačanja demokratije i demokratskih vrijednosti. Iako zemlje ugovornice zasigurno imaju široko polje slobodne procjene u ovoj stvari, one se ne mogu pozivati na tu širinu bezgranično ili nesrazmjerno, ne vodeći pri tom računa o pravu na pravičnu zastupljenost, za isključivanje posebno odvojenog segmenta stanovništva iz političkog života države.
82. Tako visok nacionalni prag učinio je zastupljenost veoma nepravičnom i doveo je do krize legitimnosti vlade, budući da parlament treba biti slobodni predstavnik svake demokratije. Jasno je da parlament u čijem sastavu je zastupljeno samo oko 55% glasova nije u stanju osigurati reprezentativni legitimitet koji je temelj svake demokratije. S tim u vezi, podnositelji predstavke su naglasili da je na parlamentarnim izborima 1987., 1991., 1995. i 1999. udio glasova datih strankama koje nisu bile zastupljene u parlamentu iznosio, redom 19.4% (oko 4.5 miliona glasova), 0.5% (oko 140,000 glasova), 14% (oko 4 miliona glasova) i 18.3% (oko 6 miliona glasova). Rezultati izbora iz 2002. doveli su do “krize zastupljenosti”, budući da 45.3% glasova, – odnosno oko 14.5 miliona glasova – nije uzeto u obzir i nisu se ogledali u sastavu parlamenta.
83. Podnositelji predstavke su ustvrdili da bi Sud trebao uzeti u obzir sljedeće faktore: prvo, ključnu ulogu pluralizma kao stuba demokratije i, shodno tome, važnost političkih stranaka, naročito onih koje nastoje osigurati da se glas određenog regiona zemlje čuje u parlamentu; drugo, činjenicu da je izborni prag koji se koristi u Turskoj najviši među svim zemljama članicama Vijeća Evrope i, budući da nije bilo nikakvih korektivnih mjera, činjenicu da je taj prag onemogućio izražavanje određenih društvenih grupa; treće, i posljednje, posebnu situaciju u Turskoj i efekte izbornog praga u praksi, konkretno nemogućnosti stranke koja ima sjedište u jednoj regiji da bude zastupljena u Narodnoj skupštini. Ukoliko se ovi faktori ne uzmu u razmatranje, pravo na slobodne izbore će biti prepušteno samovoljnom tumačenju pojedinačnih zemlja članica, koje upravo tu činjenicu mogu iskoristiti da opravdaju i izborne pragove veće od 10%.
84. Podnositelji predstavke su također ustvrdili da prag od 10% nije u skladu sa zajedničkim evropskim standardom. Nacionalni prag koji je usvojen u Turskoj je najviši prag u Evropi, ili možda čak i u svijetu. Da se taj prag primjenjivao u drugim zemljama, mnoge dobro ustanovljene stranke više ne bi učestvovale u vlasti; to bi se desilo, na primjer, Slobodnim demokratama u Njemačkoj, strankama centra i kršćanskim strankama u Skandinaviji, Zelenima u Holandiji, te strankama lijevog centra i desnice u Italiji. U većini zemlja koje su se opredijelile za uvođenje praga, on iznosi 5% (2001. prosječni prag u Centralnoj i Istočnoj Evropi je bio 4.25%). Čak ni zemlje koje su se suočile sa ozbiljnim problemom u pogledu integracije i koje su morale stabilizirati stranačku zastupljenost, s obzirom na postojanje nezavisnih kandidata ili veoma malih stranaka, nisu smatrale prikladnim uvesti duplo veći izborni prag. Podnositelji predstavke su istakli kao primjer, da je na izborima 2002. izborni prag bio 5%, osam stranaka (od ukupno 18 koje su se kandidirale), među kojima i DEHAP, osvojilo bi zastupnička mjesta u turskom parlamentu, umjesto samo dvije glavne nacionalne stranke.
85. Argument da su podnositelji predstavke ili drugi članovi njihove stranke mogli učestvovati na izborima kao nezavisni kandidati – što je jedan od glavnih argumenata Vlade i argument na kojem je Vijeće temeljilo svoju odluku – zanemaruje ulogu stranaka u kontekstu političkog sistema. Ni nezavisna kandidatura niti formiranje alijansi ne mogu zamijeniti nezavisne političke stranke, koje imaju ključnu ulogu kao temeljni elementi demokratije. Bilo je očigledno da se kandidati, koji su se kandidirali u svoje ime i koji su mogli računati samo na svoje ograničene, lične i finansijske resurse, nisu mogli natjecati sa strankama koje su imale značajnu logističke i finansijske resurse.
86. Štaviše, u Turskoj su nezavisni kandidati izloženi brojnim nepovoljnim ograničenjima i uvjetima. Na primjer, imena nezavisnih kandidata nisu odštampana na glasačkim listićima koji se distribuiraju u pograničnim područjima, što znači da osobe koje uđu na teritoriju Turske sa namjerom da glasaju u pograničnim biračkim mjestima ne mogu glasati za nezavisne kandidate, čime se značajno smanjuju šanse takvih kandidata da budu izabrani. Nemogućnost nezavisnih kandidata da učestvuju u izbornim emisijama, iako sve političke stranke imaju izričito pravo na medijski prostor na radiju i televiziji, također predstavlja ozbiljan nedostatak (vidi stav 39 gore). Na kraju, prvo birača da izaberu, slobodno i jednako, da ih predstavljaju stranke – a ne nezavisni kandidati, na primjer - i pravo svih stranaka da se natječu, ravnopravno, bitni su principi u smislu člana 3 Protokola br. 1.
87. Što se tiče mogućnosti formiranja koalicije sa drugim političkim strankama u cilju prelaska praga od 10%, podnositelji predstavke su naglasili da član 16 Zakona br. 2839 sprječava stranke da predstave zajedničke liste i učestvuju u parlamentarnim izborima kroz formiranje savršeno zakonitih koalicija. Nadalje, ustvrdili su da je politička klima, koju je obilježilo jačanje nacionalizma, onemogućila formiranje takvih alijansi.
88. Podnositelji predstavke su dodatno pojasnili da, prema članu 36 Zakona o političkim strankama, politička stranka koja nema sjedište u zemlji ne može kandidirati svoje kandidate za izbore (vidi stav 36 gore). Štaviše, prema istom zakonu, zabranjeno je formirati političku stranku na temelju određene etničke grupe ili regije (vidi stav 37 gore). Ovo pravilo se ogleda u prevladavajućoj službenoj ideologiji u Turskoj. Apsolutno odbacivanje regionalnih stranaka očigledno predstavlja ozbiljnu povredu načela koje je Sud ranije naveo, odnosno načela da “nema demokratije bez pluralizma”. U obzir je trebalo uzeti i ogromnu, multikulturalnu prirodu turskog društva, a podnositelji predstavke i njihove stranke su bili kažnjeni jer su, iako su tražili podršku u čitavoj zemlji braneći nacionalne politike, uglavnom dobili podršku određenog segmenta populacije.
89. U podnescima podnositelja predstavke se navodi da je jedan od glavnih ciljeva demokratije, koja se temelji na sistemu izabranih stranaka, da osigura da političke stranke, čije biračko tijelo je u cijelosti ili uglavnom smješteno u određenom regionu može djelovati i biti birano slobodno, bez ograničenja, i da birači koji su glasali za njih mogu biti zastupljeni na ravnopravnoj osnovi. Ako se to načelo primjenjuje, onda je jasno da nemogućnost DEHAP-a da uđe u parlament nakon što je osvojio preko 45% (oko dva miliona glasova) glasova u jugoistočnoj Turskoj, predstavlja značajno izobličenu zastupljenost. Osim toga, obavezu djelovanja na državnom nivou treba posmatrati u kontekstu političke kulture, koja je sistematski ignorirala raspravu o “kurdskom pitanju”, jasno blokirajući slobodu izražavanja volje velikog dijela populacije u jugoistočnoj Turskoj, kršeći time utemeljenu sudsku praksu Suda. Prema tome, slobodno izražavanje volje većine biračkog tijela u dotičnoj regiji je bilo namjerno spriječeno.
90. Konkretnije, podnositelji predstavke su tvrdili da zbog primjene izbornog praga na parlamentarnim izborima 2002. godine DEHAP, koji je poznat po intresovanju i zalaganju za kurdsko pitanje, nije osvojio ni jedno zastupničko mjesto u parlamentu iako je ostvario veoma visoke rezultate u brojnim izbornim jedinicama. Po njihovom mišljenju, ne može se smatrati da su parlamentarni izbori od 22. jula 2007. riješili problem, iako je DTP, nasljednik DEHAP, predstavio nezavisne kandidate. Činjenica da su političke stranke koje uživaju podršku nastupile sa nezavisnim kandidatima je već sama po sebi hendikep.
91. Stoga, po mišljenju podnositelja predstavke, činjenica da oni nisu bili izabrani u Narodnu skupštinu zbog nacionalnog praga od 10%, na izborima 3. novembra 2002. na kojima je DEHAP-ova lista – na kojoj su i oni bili – dobila 45.95% glasova u izbornoj jedinici Şırnak, nespojiva je sa članom 3 Protokola br. 1. Tvrdili su da je pretjerano visok prag suprotan cilju i svrsi ove odredbe, koja jamči pravo na slobodu izražavanja mišljenja naroda pri izboru zakonodavnih tijela. Lišavanjem jednog cijelog segmenta stanovništva mogućnosti da jednog dana budu zastupljeni u parlamentu od stranke koja izražava njihovo mišljenje, nacionalni izborni prag je ukinuo samu bit tog prava. Tako ozbiljno i sistematsko miješanje u prava čitave jedne grupe, ma kako jedinstven izborni sistem bio među svim evropskim izbornim sistemima, ne može se opravdati poljem slobodne procjene koje je dato državama, i stoga očigledno predstavlja povredu Konvencije.

2.  Vlada

92. Vlada je zatražila od Velikog vijeća da potvrdi nalaz Vijeća da nije bilo povrede člana 3 Protokola br. 1.
93. Ustvrdili su da je prag od 10% izračunat da bi se osigurala politička stabilnost u državi sprečavanjem prekomjerne fragmentiranosti sastava parlamenta, te da bi se ojačala demokratija i političke stranke kroz ohrabrivanje stranaka da predlažu politike koje će biti, manje-više, općeprihvaćene u čitavoj zemlji. Prag nije narušio temeljna načela demokratije kao što je pluralizam. Naprotiv, omogućavajući izbor nezavisnih kandidata, na način da su oni izuzeti iz praga od 10%, stvoren je prostor da pluralizam duboko usadi svoje korijene u društvu. S tim u vezi, Vlada naglašava da je između 1961. i 1980., kada Turska nije primjenjivala izborni prag, u devetnaest godina bilo dvadeset promjena vlasti, dok je u periodu između 1983. i 2007., kada je prag od 10% bio na snazi, u toku sedam izbora bilo tri koalicijske i tri jednostranačke vlade. Ove brojke pokazuju da je izborni prag imao pozitivne učinke na državnu stabilnost.
94. Vlada je nadalje tvrdila da se odbijanje stranaka da predlože politike koje bi bile, manje-više općeprihvaćene u cijeloj zemlji i izoliranje od ostatka zemlje kroz predstavljanje samo jedne regije ili nekog posebnog biračkog tijela ne može smatrati usklađenim sa unitarnom strukturom države. U tom pogledu, Turska nije sama. Presuda u predmetu MathieuMohin i Clerfayt protiv Belgije pokazuje da čak i u Belgiji, gdje postoje jezičke grupe, parlamentarni zastupnici i senatori predstavljaju belgijski narod. Isto tako, član 80 Ustava Turske propisuje da zastupnici u parlamentu predstavljaju društvo u cjelini.
95. Vlada je smatrala da je prag bio srazmjerna mjera, koja uglavnom bila u okviru polja slobodne procjene. Tvrdili su naročito, a što je i potvrđeno na izborima 22. jula 2007., da su podnositelji predstavke mogli biti izabrani na izborima 3. novembra 2002. Da su se natjecali kao nezavisni kandidati ili da je DEHAP formirao izbornu koaliciju sa jednom ili više većih stranaka.
96. U tom smislu, Vlada je navela da su rezultati parlamentarnih izbora od 22. jula 2007. potvrdili nalaze Vijeća predočene u presudi od 30. januara 2007. Članovi DTP-a – stranke koja je, prema navodima podnositelja predstavke, zamijenila stranku kojoj su oni pripadali – natjecali su se kao nezavisni kandidati na izborima 2007. i lako su bili izabrani jer kao nezavisni kandidati nosi bili obavezani pragom od 10%. Nekoliko dana nakon njihovog izbora, ponovo su se pridružili DTP-u i formirali parlamentarnu grupu (vidi stav 25 gore). Shvativši da ne mogu preći prag od 10% na izborima 2007., DTP je pozvao svoje članove da nastupe kao nezavisni kandidati i tako su uspjeli osvojiti dvadeset zastupničkih mjesta u parlamentu. Važno je napomenuti da je ukupan broj glasova koji su osvojili nezavisni kandidati DTP-a predstavljao samo 2,4% ukupnih glasova na državnom nivou, što znači da DTP ne bi dostigao ni prag od 5%, koji, po mišljenju podnositelja predstavke, predstavlja izraz “zajedničke demokratske političke tradicije” evropskih zemalja. Da je prag bio niži – recimo 2% - DTP, sa 2.04% osvojenih glasova, osvojio bi samo jedno zastupničko Osvojivši 20 zastupničkih mjesta, ili 3,6% ukupnih zastupničkih mjesta u Velikoj narodnoj skupštini, DTP je uspio maksimalno povećati svoju zastupljenost u parlamentu.
97. Štaviše, političke stranke mogu sarađivati pod parolom veće stranke, čak iako je formiranje zajedničkih listi zabranjeno članom 16 Zakona br. 2839 o izboru zastupnika u parlament. DSP, na primjer, stranka koja je bila članica vladajuće koalicije od 1999. do 2002., nije bila u stanju preći prag od 10% na izborima 2002. godine. Prema tome, prije izbora 2007., sarađivala je sa CHP-om, svojim rivalom, i na taj način je uspjela osvojiti trinaest mjesta na listi te stranke. Izabrani zastupnici su potom napustili CHP i ponovo se pridružili svojoj izvornoj stranci, DSP-u. Na izborima 1991. godine, HEP, stanka koja je bila prvi avatar grupe koja je u konačnici postala stranka podnositelja predstavke, također je uspjela isposlovati izbor nekih svojih kandidata kroz listu druge stranke.
98. Ove dvije mogućnosti, koje su već oprobane u praksi na izborima 2007. godine – nastupanje u svojstvu nezavisnog kandidata ili saradnja sa drugom strankom u smislu biranja sa njihovih listi – konkretni su primjeri postojećih korektivnih mehanizama. Pribjegavanjem ovim korektivima na posljednjim izborima, za 85% od ukupnog biračkog tijela omogućena je neka vrsta zastupljenosti u parlamentu. Vlada je tvrdila, da su ove opcije korištene na izborima 2002. godine i rezultati bi bili slični.
99. U svom zahtjevu za upućivanje podnositelji predstavke su ustvrdili da je prag od 10% zadržan na izborima 2002. i 2007. godine sa ciljem da se njihova politička stranka, kao i njen nasljednik DTP, isključe iz parlamenta. Međutim, rezultati izbora 2007. godine su pokazali da je ova tvrdnja neutemeljena. DTP je imao parlamentarnu grupu od dvadeset zastupnika, i u tom smislu njihovo učešće na narednim izborima je zajamčeno temeljem člana 36 Zakona br. 2820 o političkim strankama, čak iako ne ispune uvjet nacionalnog ustanovljavanja. Član 36 propisuje da političke stranke koje imaju parlamentarnu grupu mogu učestvovati na narednim izborima čak iako nisu ispunile uvjet ustanovljenja na državnom nivou.
100. Vlada je odbacila argument podnositelja predstavke da je presudom Vijeća od 30. januara 2007. državama dozvoljeno da podignu izborni prag u skladu sa rezultatima javnog mnijenja. U obrazloženju Vijeća jasno stoji da su u obzir uzete postojeće alternative nametanju izbornog praga kao i analiza, koju je Ustavni sud proveo temeljem načela “pravične zastupljenosti” i “državne stabilnosti”, koja se uzajamno nadopunjuju. U svjetlu postojećih alternativa, Vijeće je također smatralo da slobodno izražavanje mišljenja naroda nije bilo narušeno i da Vlada nije prekoračila svoje polje slobodne procjene. Rezultati izbora 2007. godine jasno su potvrdili nalaze iznesene u presudi Vijeća.
101. Što se tiče rezultata izborne ankete iz 2007. godine, budući da je 85% svih birača sada zastupljeno u parlamentu, Vlada je smatrala da je načelo pravične zastupljenosti u zadovoljavajućoj mjeri ispoštovano. Nadalje, u manjim pokrajinama, naročito onim gdje se natjecala većina nezavisnih kandidata DTP-a na izborima 22. jula 2007., šanse da budu izabrani bile su veće nego u većim pokrajinama ili izbornim jedinicama. Na primjer, da bi bio izabran u prvoj izbornoj jedinici u Istambulu kandidat mora osvojiti oko 111,750 glasova, dok u pokrajini Hakkari (jugoistok Turske) treba 34,000. Raspodjela zastupničkih mjesta između pokrajina očigledno je povoljnija za manje pokrajine, što je omogućilo da se osigura poštivanje načela pravične zastupljenosti.
102. U zaključku, Vlada je ustvrdila da, tamo gdje slobodno izražavanje mišljenja naroda pri izboru zakonodavnih tijela nije opstruirano, pitanje uređenje izbornog sistema i sistema političke zastupljenosti države članice Konvencije pada izvan opsega člana 3 Protokola br. 1. Prag od 10%, koji se primjenjuje na političke stranke na parlamentarnim izborima, nije spriječio narod da slobodno izrazi svoje mišljenje pri izboru svojih zastupnika u parlament. To je i dokazano na izborima održanim 22. jula 2007. Zaključci presude Vijeća od 30. januara 2007., stoga, su tačni. Vijeće nije odstupilo of sudske prakse Suda niti je dalo novo tumačenje člana 3 Protokola br. 1.

C.  Izjašnjenja treće strane umješača

103. Nevladina organizacija, Međunarodna grupa za prava manjina, složila se sa podnositeljima predstavke. Naveli su da je prag od 10% navjeći nacionalni prag u Evropi. Uveden je bez ikakvih popratnih, korektivnih mjera koje bi mogle ispraviti probleme koje taj prag prouzrokuje. S obzirom na prag, za stranke koje djeluju na regionalnoj osnovi apsolutno je nemoguće da budu zastupljene u parlamentu. U kontekstu Turske, preciznije rečeno, to znači da ni jedna kurdska stranka ne može ući u parlament, iako u svojim regijama te stranke redovno ostvaruju rezultate slične onima koji su ostvarili podnositelji predstavke 2002. godine (45% glasova). Jasno je da su sve mjere koje je Vlada poduzela, a naročito nametanje praga od 10%, bile rezultat namjernog političkog isključivanja. Štaviše, čak i da politika nije bila namjerna, efekti bi ipak bili isti.
104. Osim toga, prekomjerno visok prag u suprotnosti je sa ciljem i svrhom člana 3 Protokola br. 1, koji jamči pravo slobodnog izražavanja mišljenja naroda pri izboru zakonodavnih tijela. Lišavanjem jednog cijelog segmenta stanovništva mogućnosti da jednog dana budu zastupljeni u parlamentu od stranke koja izražava njihovo mišljenje, nacionalni izborni prag je ukinuo samu bit tog prava. Tako ozbiljno i sistematsko zadiranje u prava čitave jedne grupe, ma kako jedinstven izborni sistem bio među svim evropskim izbornim sistemima, ne može se opravdati poljem slobodne procjene koje je dato državama, i stoga očigledno predstavlja povredu Konvencije.

D.  Ocjena Suda

1. Opća načela utemeljena sudskom praksom institucija Konvencije

(a)  Kriteriji koje je Sud primjenjivao u odnosu na član 3 Protokola br. 1

105. Sud ističe, u prvom redu, da član 3 Protokola br. 1 čuva karakteristično načelo učinkovite demokratije, i da je, stoga, suštinski bitan u sistemu Konvencije (vidi Mathieu-Mohin i Clerfayt protiv Belgije, presuda od 2. marta 1987., serija A br. 113, stav 47). Demokratiju čini fundamentalni element “evropskog javnog reda”, i prava zajamčena članom 3 Protokola br. 1 suštinski su važna za uspostavljanje i održavanje temelja učinkovite i svrsishodne demokratije koja se rukovodi vladavinom prava (vidi, najnoviji i među ostalim izvorima, Ždanoka protiv Latvije [GC], br. 58278/00, stavovi 98 i 103, ECHR 2006-IV).
106. Sud često naglašava ulogu države kao krajnjeg garantora pluralizma i navodi da je kod obavljanja te uloge država obavezna donijeti pozitivne mjere i “organizirati” demokratske izbore “pod uvjetima koji će osigurati slobodno izražavanje mišljenja naroda pri izboru zakonodavnih tijela” (vidi Mathieu-Mohin i Clerfayt, citiran gore, stav 54; vidi, također, mutatis mutandis, Informationsverein Lentia i drugi protiv Austrije, presuda od 24. novembra 1993., serija A br. 276, stav 38.
107. Slobodni izbori i sloboda izražavanja, a naročito sloboda političke debate, čini temelje svake demokratije (vidi Mathieu-Mohin i Clerfayt, citiran gore, p. 22, stav 47, i Lingens protiv Austrije, presuda od 8. jula 1986., serija A br. 103, stavovi 41 i 42). “Slobodno izražavanje mišljenja naroda pri izboru zakonodavnog tijela” pitanje je na koje utiče i član 11 Konvencije, koji jamči slobodu udruživanja, a time posredno i slobodu političkih partija, koje predstavljaju vid udruživanja koji je suštinski bitan za pravilno funkcioniranje demokratije. Izražavanje mišljenja naroda nezamislivo je bez pomoći većeg broja političkih stranaka, koje predstavljaju određene struje prisutne među stanovništvom u zemlji. Odražavajući te struje unutar političkih institucija, ali, zahvaljujući medijima, i u svim sferama društvenog života, one daju nezamjenjiv doprinos političkoj debati koja je u samom središtu koncepta demokratskog društva (vidi Lingens, citiran gore, str. 26, stav 42; Castells protiv Španije, presuda od 23. aprila 1992., serija A br. 236, str. 23, stav 43; i Ujedinjena komunistička partija Turske i drugi protiv Turske, presuda od 30. januara 1998., Izvještaji 1998-I, stav 44).
108. Kao što je Komisija u više navrata primijetila, riječi “slobodno izražavanje mišljenja naroda” znače da se izbori ne mogu provoditi pod bilo kakvim pritiskom u smislu izbora jednog ili više kandidata, i da se na birače ne smije vršiti nikakav neprimjeren uticaj u smislu glasanja za jednu ili drugu stranku (vidi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, br. 7140/75, Odluka Komisije od 8. oktobra 1976., DR 7, str. 96). Prema tome, na glasače se ne smije vršiti nikakav oblik prisile u pogledu njihovog izbora kandidata ili stranke. Riječ “izbor” znači da se različitim političkim strankama mora osigurati razumna prilika da predstave svoje kandidate na izborima (ibid.; vidi također X. protiv Islanda, br. 8941/80, Odluka Komisije od 8. decembra 1981., DR 27, str. 156).
109. što se tiče općeg tumačenja člana 3 Protokola br. 1, Sud je u svojoj sudskoj praksi postavio sljedeća glavna načela (vidi, između ostalih izvora, Mathieu-Mohin i Clerfayt, citiran gore, str. 22 i 23, stavovi 46-51; Ždanoka, citiran gore, stav 115; Podkolzina protiv Latvija, br. 46726/99, stav 33, ECHR 2002-II; i Hirst protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (br. 2) [GC], br. 74025/01, stav 61, ECHR 2005-IX):

1. Član 3 Protokola br. 1 na prvi pogled se čini drugačijim od ostalih odredbi Konvencije i njezinih protokola, koji jamče prava, jer je formuliran kao obaveza nametnuta visokim ugovornim stranama da održe izbore koji će omogućiti slobodno izražavanje mišljenja naroda a ne kao neko posebno pravo ili sloboda. Međutim, uzimajući u obzir pripremne radove člana 3 Protokola i način na koji je odredba tumačena u kontekstu Konvencije u cjelini, Sud je utvrdio da član 3 Protokola br. 1 jamči individualna prava, uključujući i pravo na glasanje i kandidiranje na izborima (vidi MathieuMohin i Clerfayt, citiran gore).
2. Prava sadržana u članu 3 Protokola br. 1 nisu apsolutna. Ostavljen je prostor za “implicitna ograničenja”, i zemljama ugovornicama se mora dati široko polje slobodne procjene u ovoj oblasti. (vidi, između ostalih izvora, Matthews protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [GC], br. 24833/94, stav 63, ECHR 1999-I, i Labita protiv Italije [GC], br. 26772/95, stav 201, ECHR 2000-IV).
3. Koncept “implicitnih ograničenja” prema članu 3 Protokola br. 1 veoma je važan za ocjenjivanje važnosti ciljeva koji se nastoje postići ograničavanjem prava zajamčenih ovom odredbom. Budući da član 3 nije ograničen konkretnom listom “legitimnih ciljeva” kao što je to slučaj sa članovima 8-10, zemlje ugovornice su, stoga, slobodne, kod opravdavanja nametnutog ograničenja, pozvati se na cilj koji nije sadržan na toj listi, pod uvjetom da se dokaže da je taj cilj, u konkretnim okolnostima predmeta, u skladu sa vladavinom prava i općim ciljevima Konvencije. To također znači da Sud ne primjenjuje tradicionalne testove “nužnosti” ili “hitne društvene potrebe”, koji se koriste u kontekstu članova 8-11. Kod ispitivanja usklađenosti sa članom 3 Protokola br. 1, Sud se, uglavnom, fokusirao na dva kriterija: da li je bilo proizvoljnosti ili neproporcionalnosti, i da li je ograničenje uticalo na slobodno izražavanje mišljenja naroda.
4. Međutim, na Sudu je da utvrdi, u krajnjoj nuždi, da li su ispoštovani uvjeti člana 3 Protokola br. 1. Sud se mora uvjeriti da ograničenja ne umanjuju ova prava u tolikoj mjeri da ugrožavaju njihovu bit i da ih ne lišavaju učinkovitosti, odnosno da su nametnuta radi ostvarivanja legitimnog cilja i da primijenjene mjere nisu nesrazmjerne tom cilju (vidi Mathieu-Mohin i Clerfayt, citiran gore, stav 52). Konkretno, nikakvo ograničenje ne smije osujetiti slobodno izražavanje naroda pri izboru zakonodavnih tijela – drugim riječima, ona moraju odražavati, odnosno ne smiju biti u suprotnosti nastojanju da se održi integritet i učinkovitost izbornog postupka čiji je cilj utvrđivanje volje naroda kroz univerzalno biračko pravo (vidi Hirst (br. 2), citiran gore, stav 62; Hilbe protiv Lihtenštajna (dec.), br. 31981/96, ECHR 1999-VI, i Melnychenko protiv Ukrajine, br. 17707/02, stav 56, ECHR 2004-X). Svako odstupanje od načela univerzalnog biračkog prava nosi rizik od podrivanja demokratske valjanosti tako izabranog zakonodavnog tijela, kao i zakona koje to tijelo usvaja (vidi Hirst (br. 2), citiran gore, stav 62).
5. Što se tiče prava na kandidiranje na izborima, odnosno tzv. “pasivnog” aspekta prava zajamčenih članom 3 Protokola br. 1, Sud je bio mnogo oprezniji kod ocjenjivanja ograničenja u tom kontekstu nego kad je bio pozvan da ispita ograničenja na pravo glasa, odnosno tzv. “aktivnog” elementa prava zajamčenih članom 3 Protokola br. 1. U presudi u predmetu Melnychenko citiranoj gore (stav 57), Sud je primijetio da su uvjeti za podobnost za kandidiranje na izborima za parlament mnogo strožiji od uvjeta za podobnost za glasanje. U tom smislu, Sud je zauzeo stav da, iako države, u teoriji, imaju široko polje slobodne procjene kod utvrđivanja uvjeta podobnosti, načelo koje kaže da prava moraju biti djelotvorna zahtijeva da postupak ocjene podobnosti sadrži dovoljne mjere zaštite protiv proizvoljnih odluka (ibid. stav 59; vidi također mutatis mutandis, Podkolzina, citiran gore, stav 35).
6. Isto tako, Sud je presudio da, nakon što su želje naroda slobodno i na demokratski način izražene, nikakve naknadne izmjene organizacije izbornog sistema ne mogu taj izbor dovesti u pitanje, osim ako ne postoje uvjerljivi razlozi bitni za demokratski poredak (vidi Lykourezos protiv Grčke, br. 33554/03, stav 52, ECHR 2006-VIII).

(b)  Izborni sistemi i pragovi

110. Sud je ponovo naglasio da države ugovornice imaju veoma široko polje slobodne ocjene u pogledu utvrđivanja vrste glasačkih listića kroz koje će se realizirati sloboda izražavanja mišljenja naroda pri izboru zakonodavnih tijela. U to smislu, član 3 Protokola br. 1 propisuje samo “slobodne” izbore koji se održavaju u “primjerenim vremenskim razmacima”, “tajnim glasanjem” i “pod uvjetima koji osiguravaju slobodno izražavanje mišljenja naroda”. Uz tu rezervu, on ne nameće nikakvu “obavezu uvođenja specifičnog sistema” kao što je proporcionalna zastupljenost ili većinsko glasanje sa jednim ili da glasačka listića (vidi Mathieu-Mohin i Clerfayt, citiran gore, stav 54).
111. Pravila u ovoj oblasti variraju zavisno od historijskih i političkih faktora specifičnih za svaku pojedinačnu zemlju; Širok spektar situacija predviđenih izbornim zakonima brojnih zemalja članica Vijeća Evrope pokazuju raznolikost mogućih opcija. U kontekstu primjene člana 3 Protokola, svaki izborni zakon treba ocjenjivati u svjetlu političkog razvoja dotične zemlje, jer karakteristike koje su u kontekstu jednog sistema neprihvatljive mogu biti opravdane u kontekstu drugog (vidi Py protiv Francuske, br. 66289/01, stav 46, ECHR 2005-I (izvodi)), sve dok izabrani sistem osigurava “slobodno izražavanje mišljenja naroda pri izboru zakonodavnog tijela.”
112. Štaviše, ne treba zaboraviti da se izbornim sistemima nastoje ostvariti ciljevi koji jedva da su uzajamno kompatibilni: s jedne strane trebaju odražavati, što vjerodostojnije, mišljenje javnosti, a s druge strane kanalisati političke struje na način da se dođe do dovoljno jasne i koherentne političke volje. Član 3 Protokola br. 1 ne podrazumijeva da svi glasovi moraju biti neophodno iste težine glede ishoda izbora niti da svi kandidati moraju imati jednake izglede za pobjedu. Dakle, ni jedan izborni sistem ne može eliminirati “izgubljene glasove” (vidi Mathieu-Mohin i Clerfayt, citiran gore, stav 54).
113. Što se tiče visine izbornih pragova, valja napomenuti da je u predmetu Silvius Magnago i Südtiroler Volkspartei protiv Italije (br. 25035/94, Odluka Komisije od 15. aprila 1996., DR 85-A, str. 116), čije činjenice najbliže sliče okolnostima ovog konkretnog predmeta, Komisija izrazila mišljenje da su prag “od 4% za izbor preostalih 25% zastupnika u Zastupničkom domu”, pa čak i “sistem koji postavlja relativno visok prag” stvari koje su u domeni širokog polja slobodne procjene dotične zemlje. Komisija je u nastavku navela da slični pragovi postoje u drugim evropskim pravnim sistemima (vidi Etienne Tête protiv Francuske, br. 11123/84, Odluka Komisije od 9. decembra 1987., DR 54, str. 68, koji se odnosi na prag od 5% za raspodjelu mjesta na izborima za Evropski parlament). Na koncu, Komisija je smatrala da je namjera izbornih pragova da promovira pojavu dovoljno reprezentativnih struja.
114. U predmetu Federación nacionalista Canaria protiv Španije ((dec.), br. 56618/00, ECHR 2001-VI) Sud je ispitivao pragove koji su bili sastavnim dijelom sistema proporcionalne zastupljenosti koji se koristio u Autonomnoj Zajednici Kanarskih Otoka. Postojala su dva uvjeta koja su postavljena kao alternativa: kandidat je morao ostvariti ili najmanje 30% važećih glasova u jednoj biračkoj jedinici ili najmanje 6% važećih glasova u Autonomnoj Zajednici u cjelini. Sud je primijetio da takav jedan sistem, “ne samo da ne ometa izborne kandidate kao što su oni koji nastupaju u okviru federacije, već manjim političkim grupama osigurava (i osiguravala je) određeni dio zaštite.”
115. Na koncu, u skorijoj odluci koja se ticala inter alia praga od 5% koji se primjenjivao na parlamentarne izbore (Partija “Jaunie Demokrāti” i Partija “Mūsu Zeme” protiv Latvije (dec.), br. 10547/07 i 34049/07, 29. novembar 2007.), Sud je smatrao da se za taj prag ne može reći da je protivan zahtjevima člana 3 Protokola br. 1 jer je isti u dovoljnoj mjeri poticao dovoljno reprezentativne političke struje i omogućio izbjegavanje prekomjerne fragmentacije parlamenta.

2.  Primjena gore navedenih načela na predmetni slučaj

116. U ovom predmetu Sud opaža da su se podnositelji predstavke žalili na povredu člana 3 Protokola br. 1 temeljem činjenice da nisu izabrani u Narodnu skupštinu na parlamentarnim izborima 3. novembra 2002. uprkos činjenici da je DEHAP, stranka na čijoj listu su bili, osvojila 45.95% glasova u izbornoj jedinici Şırnak. Objasnili su da njihova stranka, koja je osvojila 6.22% glasova na državnoj razini, nije uspjela dosegnuti izborni prag od 10% i da im je zbog toga uskraćena zastupljenost u parlamentu.
117. Sud primjećuje da je predmetni državni prag utvrđen zakonom, u članu 33 Zakona br. 2839, i da određuje kako će se zastupnička mjesta u parlamentu podijeliti na nacionalnoj razini između različitih listi i različitih kandidata. Jasno je da se isti miješa u izborna prava podnositelja predstavke koja su zajamčena članom 3 Protokola br. 1, ali to nije predmet spora strana u postupku.
118. U svjetlu gore navedenih načela, Sud prvo mora provjeriti da li mjera koja je predmetom žalbe, a čiju predvidljivost nije osporavala ni jedna strana, služi legitimnom cilju. Zatim, mora utvrditi da li je bila prisutna ikakva proizvoljnost i da li je postojao razuman odnos proporcionalnosti između korištenih sredstava i cilja ka kojem se težilo. Primjenom ova dva kriterija, nastojaće utvrditi da li je predmetno ograničenje umanjilo samu suštinu prava ljudi na slobodno izražavanje u kontekstu člana 3 Protokola br. 1.

(a)  Legitimni cilj

119. Sud primjećuje da, za razliku od drugih odredbi Konvencije, član 3 Protokola br. 1 ne određuje niti ograničava ciljeve zbog kojih ograničenja mogu biti nametnuta. Prema tome, spektar tih ciljeva može veoma širok, sve dok su ti ciljevi, u okolnostima konkretnog slučaja, u skladu sa načelom vladavine prava i općim ciljevima Konvencije.
120. Prema navodima podnositelja predstavke, nametanje praga nije služilo legitimnom cilju, obzirom da je spriječio veliki dio stanovništva da izrazi svoj izbor zastupnika u parlamentu. Vlada je odbacila ovaj argument, tvrdeći da je svrha praga da se izbjegne prekomjerna fragmentacija parlamenta i da se time osnaži stabilnost vlade.
121. Što se tiče izbornih sistema, zadatak Suda je da utvrdi da li su pravila kojima se rukovode parlamentarni izbori uticala na isključivanje nekih osoba ili grupa osoba iz sudjelovanja u političkom životu zemlje (vidi Aziz protiv Kipra, br. 69949/01, stav 28, ECHR 2004-V) i da li se razlike, koje je kreirao određeni izborni sistem, mogu smatrati proizvoljnim ili uvrjedljivim ili da li sistem ima tendenciju da favorizira jednu političku stranku ili kandidata, dajući im prednost na uštrb drugih (vidi protiv Islanda, citiran gore).
122. Sud prihvata da visoki izborni pragovi mogu lišiti dio biračkog tijela zastupljenosti. Međutim, sama ta okolnost nije odlučujuća. Takvi pragovi mogu djelovati kao nužna korektivna prilagodba proporcionalnog sistema, za koji se oduvijek smatralo da dozvoljava slobodno izražavanje mišljenja naroda, iako u slučaju visokih pragova to može ići na štetu manjih stranaka (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Liberalna stranka, g-đa R. i g-din P. protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, br. 8765/79, Odluka Komisije od 18. decembra 1980., DR 21, str. 225)
123. U Turskoj, prag od 10% je opće pravilo koje se primjenjuje, bez razlike, na kandidate svih političkih partija bez obzira u kojoj izbornoj jedinici se natječu. Od 1983., kada je ovaj prag uveden, mnoge stranke sa vrlo raznolikim političkim strujama nisu bile osvojiti ni jedno zastupničko mjesto u Parlamentu jer nisu uspjele dostići ovaj prag. Izbori 3. novembra 2002. to ilustriraju. Pored DEHAP-a, stranke podnositelja predstavke, ni mnoge druge stranke, a naročito DYP, MHP, GP i ANAP (koje su osvojile redom 9.54%, 8.36%, 7.25% i 5.13% glasova), nisu uspjele osvojiti mjesta u parlamentu (vidi stav 18 gore). Na izborima 1991. i 2007. određeni broj kandidata koji slijede iste političke struje kao i DEHAP uspjele su osvojiti zastupnička mjesta, bilo preko drugih političkih stranaka ili u svojstvu nezavisnih kandidata (vidi stavove 15 i 25 gore).
124. Osim toga, turski izborni sistem, poput izbornih sistema u drugim zemljama članicama, počiva na kontekstu unitarne države. Temeljem člana 80 Ustava, zastupnici u parlamentu predstavljaju “cijelu naciju”, a ne “regije ili osobe koje su ih izabrale” (vidi stav 29 gore); upravo zbog unitarne prirode turske države. Svaku pokrajinu u parlamentu zastupa barem jedan zastupnik. Preostala mjesta se dijele prema broju stanovnika, čime se, dakle, osigurava zastupljenost čitave teritorije države (vidi stav 32 gore). To je rezultat izbora zakonodavnog tijela, koji odražava ustavnu strukturu države i koji je utemeljen na političkim i institucionalnim kriterijima. Kao takav, on nije u suprotnosti sa članom 3 Protokola br. 1, koji, u načelu, ne nameće državama ugovornicama obavezu da donesu izborni sistem koji će jamčiti parlamentarnu zastupljenost strankama koje su suštinski regionalno bazirane bez obzira na broj osvojenih glasova u drugim dijelovima zemlje. S druge strane, problem može nastati ukoliko je relevantno zakonodavstvo sklono da takvim strankama uskrati zastupljenost u parlamentu (vidi stav 121 gore).
125. Na koncu, institucije Konvencije su općenito prihvatile da se izborni pragovi uglavnom koriste da promoviraju dovoljno zastupljene političke struje u zemlji (vidi Silvius Magnago i Südtiroler Volkspartei, citiran gore, i Etienne Tête, citiran gore; vidi također, u istom smislu, Partija “Jaunie Demokrāti” i Partija “Mūsu Zeme”, citiran gore). Shodno tome, Sud se slaže sa nalazima Vijeća da je sporno miješanje imalo legitimni cilj, tj. izbjegavanje prekomjernog fragmentiranja parlamenta, a time i jačanja državne stabilnosti.

(b)  Proporcionalnost

126. Pozivajući se na presudu Ustavnog suda od 18. novembra 1995., Vijeće je smatralo da, iako je izborni prag visok, to ne izlazi iz okvira polja slobodne procjene državnih vlasti u ovom pitanju, jer kao takav nije mogao ometati pojavu političkih alternativa unutar društva. Podnositelji predstavke su osporavali zaključak Vijeća, dok je Vlada je tražila od Suda da ga potvrdi.
127. Sud primjećuje da je nacionalni izborni prag od 10% koji se primjenjuje u Turskoj najviši izborni prag u Evropi (vidi stav 64 gore). Da bi se uvjerio da nije nesrazmjeran, Sud će, stoga, prvo, procijeniti razinu ovog praga u odnosu na pragove koji se primjenjuju u drugim evropskim zemljama. Potom će ispitati korektive i druge zaštitne mjere koje se odnose na njega.

i) Elementi usporednog prava

128. Podnositelji predstavke su tvrdili da prag, koji se primjenjuje u ovom predmetu, nije u skladu sa “zajedničkom demokratskom političkom tradicijom” evropskih zemalja.
129. Sud primjećuje da izborni pragovi nisu nepoznati ni u drugim evropskim izbornim sistemima i da postoje različite vrste istih koje se razlikuju ovisno o vrsti izbora i kontekstu u kojem se koriste. Analiza izbornih pragova koji se primjenjuju u zemljama članicama pokazuje, da se, pored Turske, visoki izborni pragovi primjenjuju u još samo tri druge države. Lihtenštajn ima prag od 8%, a Ruska Federacija i Gruzija od 7%. Trećina zemalja je nametnula prag od 5%, a 13 zemlja se opredijelilo čak i za niže pragove. Postoje i zemlje članice (sedam njih) koje uopće ne koriste pragove. Pragovi također variraju ovisno o tome da li se primjenjuju na stranke ili koaliciju, a neke zemlje su nametnule pragove i za nezavisne kandidate (vidi stavove 60-63 gore).
130. Sud također pridaje značaj iznesenim stavovima organa Vijeća Evrope, koji se slažu da je nacionalni izborni prag u Turskoj izuzetno visok i koji su pozvali da se isti smanji. U svojoj Rezoluciji od 18. aprila 2007., u kojoj je naglasila neraskidivu vezu između zastupljenosti i pragova, Parlamentarna skupština Vijeća Evrope istakla je da u “etabliranim demokratijama pragovi za parlamentarne izbore ne bi trebali biti veći od 3%.” Ovo mišljenje je ponovljeno u preporuci Parlamentarne skupštine 1791 (2007) (vidi stavove 52 i 53 gore). Osim toga, u tekstovima koji se tiču Turske, konkretno u rezolucijama Parlamentarne skupštine 1380 (2004) i 1547 (2007) i izvještaju o “Posmatranju parlamentarnih izbora u Turskoj (22 Jula 2007)”, koji je sačinio ad hoc Komitet Parlamentarne skupštine, organi Vijeća Evrope pozvali su Tursku da, među ostalim preporukama, izmijeni svoj izborni zakon u smislu smanjenja izbornog praga od 10% (vidi stavove 58 i 59 gore).
131. Međutim, učinci nekog konkretnog izbornog sistema mogu varirati od zemlje do zemlje, a izbornim sistemima se mogu nastojati ostvariti različiti, a ponekad čak i antagonistički, politički ciljevi. Dok se neki izborni sistem može više koncentrirati na pravičnu zastupljenost partija u parlamentu, drugi može biti više okrenut ka izbjegavanju fragmentacije partijskog sistema i poticanju na formiranje vladajuće većine jedne stranke u parlamentu (vidi stav 55 gore). Ni jedan od tih ciljeva ne može se, samo po sebi, smatrati nerazumnim. Štaviše, uloga koju pragovi imaju varira zavisno od visine praga i partijskog sistema svake pojedinačne zemlje. Nizak prag isključuje samo veoma male grupe, što otežava formiranje stabilne većine, dok u slučajevima gdje je stranački sistem veoma fragmentiran visok prag lišava mnoge birače zastupljenosti (vidi stavove 58 i 59 gore).
132. Širok spektar situacija predviđenih izbornim zakonima brojnih zemalja članica Vijeća Evrope pokazuju raznolikost mogućih opcija. Isto tako pokazuje da Sud ne može ocjenjivati neki konkretan prag ako u obzir ne uzme izborni sistem, premda se Sud složio da tvrdnjom podnositelja predstavke da izborni prag od 5% bliže odgovara uobičajenoj praksi zemalja članica. Međutim, kao što je ranije istaknuto, svaki izborni zakon treba ocjenjivati u svjetlu političkog razvoja dotične zemlje, jer karakteristike koje su u kontekstu jednog sistema neprihvatljive mogu biti opravdane u kontekstu drugog, sve dok izabrani sistem osigurava “slobodno izražavanje mišljenja naroda pri izboru zakonodavnog tijela” (vidi, između ostalih izvora, Mathieu-Mohin i Clerfayt, citiran gore, stav 54). To je razlog zašto Sud sada mora procijeniti uticaje korektiva i drugih zaštitnih mjera koji su prisutni u spornom sistemu.

ii) Korektivi i druge zaštitne mjere

133. Vlada je tvrdila da turski izborni sistem ima korektive koji balansiraju negativne efekte pragova. U tom smislu, oni tvrde, kao što su potvrdili i izbori od 22. jula 2007., da su podnositelji predstavke mogli biti izabrani na izborima 3. novembra 2002. da su nastupili kao nezavisni kandidati ili da je njihova stranka, DEHAP, ušla u izbornu koaliciju sa nekom od većih stranki.
134. Sud primjećuje da podnositelji predstavke nisu osporavali vladinu tvrdnju da bi im pribjegavanje nekoj od gore spomenutih izbornih strategija dalo priliku da budu izabrani u parlament. Međutim, naglasili su važnost političkih stranaka u reprezentativnim demokratijama, tvrdeći da ni nezavisna kandidatura niti formiranje alijansi ne mogu zamijeniti nezavisne političke stranke, koje su oduvijek imale ključnu ulogu osnovnih elemenata demokratije.
135. Sud, stoga, mora utvrditi da li se alternative na koje je Vlada ukazivala mogu smatrati sredstvom koje ublažava negativne učinke praga.
136. Kad je u pitanju mogućnost kandidiranja u svojstvu nezavisnog kandidata, slično kao i Vijeće u stavu 71 svoje presude, Sud ističe da su političke stranke dale nezamjenjivi doprinos političkoj debati. One su istovremeno instrument putem kojeg građani mogu učestvovati u izbornoj debati i predstavnik preko kojeg mogu izraziti svoju podršku različitim političkim programima (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Ujedinjena Komunistička Partija Turske i drugi, citiran gore, str. 17, stav 25). One se, dakle, mogu razlikovati od drugih političkih aktera kao što su nezavisni kandidati, koji su uglavnom fokusirani na lokalni nivo. Slično tome, Sud primjećuje da su u Turskoj nezavisni kandidati podvrgnuti brojnim nepovoljnim ograničenjima i uvjetima, koji se ne primjenjuju na političke stranke. Oni moraju deponirati garanciju, njihova imena se ne mogu štampati na glasačke listiće koji se distribuiraju na graničnim prelazima i na većim aerodromima i nemaju dodijeljen medijski prostor za emitiranje svojih izbornih poruka, dok sve političke stranke imaju izričito pravo na medijski prostor na radiju i televiziji (vidi stavove 36 i 39 gore).
137. Sud primjećuje da se ovaj metod u praksi ne može smatrati neučinkovitim. Na izborima 22. jula 2007., naročito, male stranke su bile u stanju izbjeći uticaj praga tako što su nominirale nezavisne kandidate, i na taj način su uspjele dobile mjesta. Primjera radi, DTP, koji je nasljednik DEHAP-a, dobivši dvadeset mjesta u parlamentu mogao je formirati parlamentarnu grupu (vidi stav 25 gore).
138. Istina je da je ovaj rezultat ostvaren zahvaljujući činjenici da su se stranke opozicije opredijelile da, umjesto da kandidiraju svoje kandidate ispred stranke, izađu sa strategijom koja bi se mogla nazvati “podrška stranke nezavisnim kandidatima” (vidi stav 23 gore). Činjenica da se izborni prag ne odnosi na nezavisne kandidate uveliko je olakšala usvajanje takve izborne strategije, uprkos gore navedenim ograničenjima (vidi stavove 36 i 39). Ipak, ovo je privremeno rješenje u odnosu na položaj kandidata koje zvanično promovira njihova politička stranka.
139. Isto vrijedi i kada je u pitanju mogućnost formiranja izborne koalicije sa drugim političkim grupama. Sud primjećuje, u tom kontekstu, da član 16 Zakona br. 2839 sprečava stranke da izlaze sa zajedničkim listama i da učestvuju u parlamentarnim izborima kroz formiranje sasvim zakonitih koalicija. Kao što je Vlada istakla, političke stranke su razvile izborne strategije kojima zaobilaze ovu zabranu. Upotrebom ove strategije ostvaruju se opipljivi rezultati, a to se posebno pokazalo na izborima 1991. i 2007. godine. Prije izbora 20. oktobra 1991. formirane su dvije alijanse pod zastavom dvije velike političke stranke. A ovaj način neke manje stranke, uključujući HEP – prethodnik DEHAP-a – uspjele su osvojiti osamnaest mjesta u parlamentu (vidi stav 15 gore). Ista izborna strategija urodila je plodom i na izborima 22. jula 2007. (vidi stav 24 gore).
140. Ali kao što je poznato, obzirom da je 45.3% glasova na izborima 3. novembra 2002. (oko 14.5 miliona) povjereno neuspješnim kandidatima, ove izborne strategije mogu imati vrlo ograničen učinak. Kao što je Vijeće istaklo u stavu 73 svoje presude, činjenica da je tako veliki dio biračkog tijela ostao bez zastupnika u parlamentu teško da je konzistentna sa ključnom ulogom koju bi parlament trebao imati u reprezentativnoj demokratiji, kao glavni instrument demokratske kontrole i političke odgovornosti i tijelo koje mora odražavati, što vjerodostojnije, želju za istinski demokratskim političkim režimom.
141. Međutim, treba napomenuti, kao što su brojni analitičari istakli, izbori novembra 2002. održani su u atmosferi obojenoj krizom do koje je došlo zbog mnogih i različitih razloga (ekonomska i politička kriza, zemljotresi, itd. – vidi stavove 12 i 20 gore). U tom smislu, posebno je važna činjenica da tri stranke koje su formirale vodeću koaliciju nakon izbora 1999. nisu uspjele dostići prag od 10% i da, stoga, nisu bile zastupljene u parlamentu (vidi stav 20 gore).
142. Pored toga, sveobuhvatna analiza parlamentarnih izbora održanih od 1983. naovamo pokazuje da je zastupnički deficit koji se bilježi od novembarskih izbora 2002., dijelom rezultat konteksta, a ne isključivo visokog izbornog praga. U tom smislu, treba naglasiti da, sa izuzetkom tih izbora, udio glasova koji je povjeren kandidatima, koji na koncu nisu bili uspješni, nikada nije prešao 19.4% (19.4% u 1987., 0.5% u 1991., 14% u 1995. i 18% u 1999.). Udio glasova koji je otišao kandidatima koji nisu uspjeli osigurati zastupničko mjesto pao je na 13.1% na izborima 22. jula 2007. (vidi stav 49 gore).
143. Shodno tome, Sud primjećuje da su političke stranke koje su pogođene visokim pragom od 10% uspjele u praksi razviti strategije kojima umanjuju neke od njegovih učinaka, premda su takve strategije oprečne jednom od ciljeva koji se želio postići definiranjem praga, tj. izbjegavanju parlamentarne fragmentacije (vidi stavove 60 i 125 gore).
144. Sud također pridaje važnost ulozi Ustavnog suda u ovoj stvari. U vrijeme kada je Ustav iz 1961. bio na snazi Ustavni sud je, temeljeći svoju odluku na načelima demokratske države i pluralizma, odbacio ideju primjene “običnog praga” unutar svake izborne jedinice (vidi stav 40 gore). Kasnije, nakon usvajanja Ustava iz 1982., odlučujući o pitanju izbornih sistema, Ustavni sud je presudio da zakonodavac nije imao neograničeno polje slobodne procjene u tom pitanju i da nije mogao usvojiti “mjere kojima se nastojalo ograničiti slobodno izražavanje mišljenja naroda, ili podvrgnuti politički život hegemoniji neke određene političke stranke, ili uništiti višestranački sistem” (vidi stav 41 gore).
145. U svojoj presudi od 18. novembra 1995. Ustavni sud je promijenio svoju sudsku praksu iz 1986. (vidi stav 40 gore), ispitujući osnov za postojanje spornog praga kao korektiva općeg principa proporcionalnosti kojim se izbjegava prekomjerna i oslabljujuća fragmentacija parlamenta. Premda je prihvatio da pragovi ograničavaju “pravo lica da bira i bude biran”, Ustavni sud je smatrao da pragovi prihvatljivi dok god ne prekorače normalnu granicu, pa je sukladno tome presudio da je prag od 10% u skladu sa ustavnim načelima. S druge strane, citirajući načelo “pravične zastupljenosti”, proglasio je ništavnim izborni prag od 25% za raspodjelu mjesta unutar pokrajina. Ustvrdio je, dakle, da ustavna načela pravične zastupljenosti i državne stabilnosti treba nužno iskombinirati na način da se osigura da su uravnoteženi i uzajamno komplementarni. (vidi stav 43 gore).
146. Iz gore navedenih razmatranja se može vidjeti da Ustavni sud, koji budno prati da ne dođe do prekomjernog učinka osporavanog izbornog praga kroz nastojanje da ostvari ravnotežu između načela pravične zastupljenosti i državne stabilnosti, jamči da će zaustaviti prag koji bude narušavao bit prava zajamčenih u članu 3 Protokola br. 1.

iii) Zaključak

147. U zaključku, Sud smatra da se, općenito gledano, izborni prag od 10% čini prekomjernim. U tom smislu, dijeli mišljenje organa Vijeća Evrope, koji su naglasili da se radi o izuzetno visokom pragu i preporučili da se isti spusti (vidi stavove 57 i 130 gore). Taj prag prisiljava političke stranke da se služe taktiziranjem koje ne doprinose transparentnosti izbornog procesa. U ovom konkretnom slučaju, međutim, Sud nije uvjeren da je izborni prag, kad se ocijeni u svjetlu specifičnog političkog konteksta dotičnih izbora i kad se uzmu u obzir korektivi i druge garancije koje ograničavaju njegov učinak u praksi, suštinski povrijedio prava podnositelja predstavke zajamčena članom 3 Protokola br. 1.
148. Prema tome, nije došlo do povrede te odredbe.

IZ OVIH RAZLOGA, SUD

Zaključuje sa trinaest glasova za i četiri glasa protiv da nije došlo do povrede člana 3 Protokola br. 1.

Presuda, napisana na engleskom i francuskom jeziku, donesena je na javnom saslušanju u Zgradi ljudskih prava u Strazburu, 8. jula 2008.

Vincent Berger                          Boštjan M. Zupančič

Pravnik                                    Predsjednik

U skladu sa članom 45, stav 2 Konvencije i pravilom 74, stav 2 Pravila Suda, u prilogu ove presude dostavlja se zajedničko izdvojeno mišljenje sudija Tulkensa, Vajića, Jaegera i Šikute.

___________________________________
Prevod presude preuzet sa https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/

Ovaj prevod je finansiran uz podršku Human Rights Trust-a Vijeća Evrope  (www.coe.int/humanrightstrustfund.).

GRAND CHAMBER

CASE OF YUMAK AND SADAK v. TURKEY

(Application no. 10226/03)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG 

8 July 2008

In the case of Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:

Boštjan M. Zupančič, President,
Peer Lorenzen,
Françoise Tulkens,
Josep Casadevall,
Rıza Türmen,
Corneliu Bîrsan,
Volodymyr Butkevych,
Nina Vajić,
Anatoly Kovler,
Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Javier Borrego Borrego,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Renate Jaeger,
Ján Šikuta,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
Päivi Hirvelä, judges,
and Vincent Berger, Jurisconsult,

Having deliberated in private on 21 November 2007 and 4 June 2008, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 10226/03) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Turkish nationals, Mr Mehmet Yumak and Mr Resul Sadak (“the applicants”), on 1 March 2003.

2.  The applicants, who had been granted legal aid, were represented by Mr T. Elçi, a lawyer practising in Diyarbakır. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.

3.  The applicants alleged that the electoral threshold of 10% imposed nationally for parliamentary elections interfered with the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. They relied on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

4.  The application was allocated to the Second Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 9 May 2006 it was declared partly admissible by a Chamber of that Section composed of Jean-Paul Costa, Ireneu Cabral Barreto, Rıza Türmen, Mindia Ugrekhelidze, Antonella Mularoni, Elisabet Fura-Sandström and Dragoljub Popović, judges, and Sally Dollé, Section Registrar.

5.  A hearing on the merits (Rule 54 § 3) was held in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 5 September 2006.

6.  In its judgment of 30 January 2007 (“the Chamber judgment”), the Chamber held by five votes to two that there had been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The joint dissenting opinion of Judges Ireneu Cabral Barreto and Antonella Mularoni was annexed to the judgment.

7.  On 21 April 2007 the applicants asked for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber by virtue of Article 43 of the Convention. On 9 July 2007 a panel of the Grand Chamber granted the request.

8.  The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24.

9.  The applicants and the Government each filed observations on the merits. Observations were also received from Minority Rights Group International, a non-governmental organisation based in London, which the President had authorised to intervene in the written proceedings (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 24).

10.  A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 21 November 2007 (Rule 59 § 3).

There appeared before the Court:

(a)  for the Government
MrM. Özmen,Co-Agent,
MrH. Hünler,Counsel,
MsA. Özdemir,
MsV. Sirmen,
MsY. Renda,
MsÖ. Gazialem,Advisers;

(b)  for the applicants
MrT. Elçi,Representative,
MrT. Fisher,
MsE. Frank,Advisers,
MrR. Sadak,Applicant.

The Court heard addresses by Mr Elçi and Mr Özmen and replies from Mr Fisher and Mr Özmen to questions from several judges.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

11.  The applicants were born in 1962 and 1959 respectively and live in Şırnak. They stood for election in the parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002 as candidates of the People’s Democratic Party (DEHAP) in the province of Şırnak, but neither of them was elected.

A.  The parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002

12.  Following the 1999 earthquakes, Turkey went through two serious economic crises in November 2000 and February 2001. There then followed a political crisis, due, firstly, to the state of health of the then Prime Minister and, secondly, to the numerous internal divisions within the governing coalition, a grouping of three political parties.

13.  It was in that context that on 31 July 2002 the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (“the National Assembly”) decided to bring forward the date of the next parliamentary elections to 3 November 2002.

14.  In early September three left-wing political parties, the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), the Labour Party (EMEP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (SDP), decided to form a “Labour, Peace and Democracy Block” and to form a new political party, DEHAP. The applicants began their electoral campaign as the new party’s leading candidates in the province of Şırnak.

15.  Such pre-electoral alliances had already been formed in 1991: the Nationalist Labour Party (MÇP – the successor to and predecessor of the MHP) and the Reformist Democracy Party (IDP) had secured seats for their candidates by joining the list presented by the Welfare Party (RP); and the People’s Labour Party (HEP – the predecessor of DEHAP) had won eighteen seats in Parliament by placing candidates on the list of the People’s Social Democrat Party (SHP). In that way some parties not likely to obtain 10% of the national vote sometimes manage to obtain parliamentary representation: they join the list of a larger party and then, once elected, leave it and go their own way, either with independent MPs or under the banner of another party.

16.  The results of the elections of 3 November 2002 in the province of Şırnak gave the DEHAP list 47,449 of the 103,111 votes cast, a score of about 45.95%. However, as the party had not succeeded in passing the national threshold of 10%, the applicants were not elected. The three seats allocated to Şırnak province were shared as follows: two seats for the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma – the Justice and Development Party, a party of the conservative right), which had polled 14.05% (14,460 votes), and one seat for Mr Tatar, an independent candidate who had polled 9.69% (9,914 votes).

17.  Of the eighteen parties which had taken part in the elections, only the AKP and the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – the People’s Republican Party, a left-wing party) succeeded in passing the 10% threshold. With 34.26% of the votes cast, the AKP won 363 seats, 66% of those in the National Assembly. The CHP, which polled 19.4%, obtained 178 seats, or 33% of the total. Nine independent candidates were also elected.

18.  However, not only DEHAP, which polled 6.22%, but many other political parties were unable to obtain seats in Parliament. These included the True Path Party (DYP, centre-right), the National Action Party (MHP, nationalist), the Young Party (GP, centrist) and the Motherland Party (ANAP, centre-right), which polled 9.54%, 8.36%, 7.25% and 5.13% of the votes cast respectively.

19.  The results of these elections were generally interpreted as a huge political upheaval. Not only did the proportion of the electorate not represented in Parliament reach a record level in Turkey (approximately 45%) but in addition the abstention rate (22% of registered voters) exceeded 20% for the first time since 1980. As a result, the National Assembly which emerged from the elections was the least representative since 1946, the year in which a multiparty system was first introduced. Moreover, for the first time since 1954, only two parties were represented in Parliament.

20.  To explain the National Assembly’s unrepresentativeness, some commentators have referred to the cumulative effect of a number of factors over and above the existence of a high national threshold. For example, because of the protest-vote phenomenon linked to the economic and political crisis, the five parties which had obtained seats in the 1999 parliamentary elections – including the three which had formed the governing coalition between 1999 and 2002 – were unable to reach the 10% threshold in 2002 and were accordingly deprived of representation in Parliament. Similarly, electoral fragmentation had an effect on the results in that numerous attempts to form pre-electoral coalitions had come to nothing.

21.  After these elections the AKP, which had an absolute majority in Parliament, formed a government.

B.  The parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007 (subsequent to the Chamber judgment)

22.  In early May 2007 the Turkish Parliament decided to hold early parliamentary elections, choosing 22 July 2007 as the date. The decision followed a political crisis resulting from Parliament’s inability to elect a new President of the Republic to follow on from Ahmet Necdet Sezer before the expiry of his single seven-year term of office, on 16 May 2007. In the normal course of events, these elections should have been held on 4 November 2007.

23.  Fourteen political parties took part in the elections, which were marked by two characteristics. Firstly, a strong mobilisation of the electorate was observed following the presidential crisis, since the participation rate rose to 84%. Secondly, political parties used two pre-electoral strategies to circumvent the national 10% threshold. The Party of the Democratic Left (DSP) took part in the poll under the banner of the CHP, a rival party, and by that means managed to win thirteen seats. The Party for a Democratic Society (DTP, pro-Kurdish, left-leaning) presented its candidates as independents using the slogan “A thousand hopes”; it also supported certain left-wing Turkish candidates. This movement was backed by other small left-wing groups such as the EMEP, the SDP and the ÖDP (the Liberty and Solidarity Party, socialist). More than sixty independent candidates stood for election in about forty provincial constituencies.

24.  In the elections the AKP, the CHP and the MHP managed to get over the 10% threshold. With 46.58% of the votes cast, the AKP won 341 seats, 62% of the total. The CHP, with 20.88% of the votes, won 112 seats, 20.36% of the total; however, the thirteen MPs mentioned in paragraph 23 above subsequently resigned from the CHP and went back to the DSP, their original party. The MHP, which polled 14.27% of the votes, won seventy‑one seats, or 12.9% of the total.

25.  The strong showing by independent candidates was one of the main features of the elections of 22 July 2007. There were none in the National Assembly in 1980 but 1999 saw them return, when there were three. In 2002 nine independent MPs were elected from a national total of 260 independent candidates. In the elections of 22 July 2007, twenty-seven independent MPs were elected. In particular, more than twenty “thousand hopes” candidates were elected, after obtaining approximately 2.23% of the votes cast, and joined the DTP after the elections. The DTP, which had twenty MPs, the minimum number to be able to form a parliamentary group, was thus able to do so. The independents also included a socialist MP (the former president of the ÖDP), a nationalist MP (the former president of the Great Union Party – BBP, nationalist) and a centrist MP (the former president of ANAP).

26.  A government was formed by the AKP, which again secured an absolute majority in Parliament.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE

A.  The constitutional and legislative context

1.  The Constitution

27.  Article 67 of the Constitution, as amended on 23 July 1995, provides:

“Citizens shall have the right to vote, to stand for election, to engage in political activities independently or as members of a political party and to take part in referenda in accordance with the rules laid down by law.

Elections and referenda shall be conducted under the administration and supervision of the judiciary and in accordance with the principles of free, equal, secret and universal suffrage, in a single round of voting, the votes cast being counted and recorded in public. Nevertheless, the law shall make suitable provision for Turkish citizens resident abroad to be able to exercise their right to vote.

Every Turkish citizen of at least eighteen years of age shall have the right to vote and to take part in referenda.

Exercise of these rights shall be regulated by law.

Serving members of the armed forces, officer cadets and persons serving prison sentences, other than those convicted of an unintentional offence, shall be deprived of the right to vote.

The National Electoral Commission shall determine the measures to be taken to guarantee the security of the operations to count and record the votes in prisons and remand centres, and those operations shall be conducted in the presence of the competent judge, who shall take charge of and supervise them.

Electoral laws must reconcile fair representation with governmental stability.

Amendments to electoral laws shall not be applicable to elections taking place during the year following their entry into force.”

28.  Article 80 of the Constitution provides:

“Members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey shall represent the whole nation and not the regions or persons which have elected them.”

29.  Under the terms of Article 95 of the Constitution and section 22 of Law no. 2820 on political parties, a political party which has at least twenty MPs may form a parliamentary group.

2.  The electoral system

30.  Law no. 2839 on the election of members of the National Assembly, published in the Official Gazette on 13 June 1983, lays down the rules of the system for parliamentary elections.

31.  Turkey’s Grand National Assembly is a single-chamber parliament which currently has 550 members elected to serve for five years. The elections are held in the constituencies formed by the eighty-one provinces in a single round of voting. They take place throughout the national territory, on the same day; suffrage is free, equal, universal and secret. Counting the votes and recording the results is done in public. Each province is represented in Parliament by at least one MP. The other seats are allocated in proportion with the local population. Provinces which have between one and eighteen MPs form a single constituency; those with between nineteen and thirty-five MPs are divided into two constituencies; while Istanbul, which has more than thirty-five seats, is divided into three constituencies.

32.  Section 16 of Law no. 2839 provides:

“... [P]olitical parties may not present joint lists ...”

33.  Section 33 of Law no. 2839 (as amended on 23 May 1987) provides:

“In a general election parties may not win seats unless they obtain, nationally, more than 10% of the votes validly cast ... An independent candidate standing for election on the list of a political party may be elected only if the list of the party concerned obtains sufficient votes to take it over the 10% national threshold ...”

34.  In allocating seats the D’Hondt system of proportional representation is used. That method – under which the votes cast for each list are first divided by a series of whole numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc.) and seats then allocated to the lists which have the highest quotients – tends to favour the majority party.

35.  Sections 21(2) and 41(1) of Law no. 2839 read as follows:

Section 21(2)

“Persons wishing to stand as independent candidates shall deposit with the competent Treasury authorities, as a guarantee, a sum equal to the gross monthly salary of a civil servant of the highest rank, and shall place a receipt for payment of that sum in the file presenting their candidature in the parliamentary election.”

Section 41(1)

“... if, in a parliamentary election, an independent candidate has not obtained sufficient votes to win a seat, the sum deposited as a guarantee shall be forfeited to the Treasury.”

36.  Section 36 of Law no. 2820 on political parties (published in the Official Gazette of 24 April 1983) provides:

“In order to be able to take part in an election, a political party must have a seat in at least half the provinces and have held its general meeting at least six months before polling day, or must have a group within the Grand National Assembly.”

37.  Section 81 of Law no. 2820 provides:

“Political parties are not entitled to assert that there exist within the territory of the Republic of Turkey minorities based on a race, religion, sect, culture or language.”

38.  Under the relevant legislation the name of independent candidates is not printed on the voting slips provided near the Turkish borders. That means that Turkish electors resident abroad may vote for only a political party when using the ballot boxes placed at border crossing-points or large airports. Similarly, whereas political parties have time allocated on television and radio for electioneering broadcasts, independent candidates do not.

3.  Constitutional case-law

39.  The Constitutional Court’s case-law on the compatibility of electoral thresholds with the principle of a democratic State has been contradictory.

40.  At first, in a judgment delivered on 6 May 1968 (E. 1968/15, K. 1968/13), the Constitutional Court held to be contrary to the principle of a democratic State the “ordinary threshold” introduced by Parliament in order to correct the effects of the proportional representation system. This is a threshold which varies in accordance with the number of seats to be filled in each parliamentary constituency. The threshold applied in a constituency is calculated by dividing the number of votes cast by the number of seats to be filled, and seats are awarded only to candidates who pass it. The Constitutional Court held in particular that such a threshold, which could enable the representatives of a minority of electors to form a government, was likely to hinder the representation of all currents of thought.

41.  Later, after the adoption of the 1982 Constitution, the Constitutional Court gave its views on the question of electoral systems in a judgment delivered on 1 March 1984 (E. 1984/1, 1984/2), ruling as follows:

“The first paragraph of Article 67 of the Constitution provides that citizens are entitled to vote and stand for election in accordance with rules laid down by law. However, it does not grant an unlimited margin of appreciation to the legislature. By virtue of Article 67, elections are conducted under the administration and scrutiny of the judicial power and according to the principles of free, equal, secret and universal suffrage in a single ballot, the votes being counted and recorded in public. Provided those rules are complied with, the legislature may therefore adopt whatever electoral system it deems most appropriate. If the constituent assembly had had a particular system in mind, it would have adopted a binding rule. As it did not do so, the legislature is free to adopt the system it considers best adapted to the country’s political and social conditions ...

Provided that it does not enact measures tending to restrict the free expression of the people, or subject political life to the hegemony of a single party, or destroy the multiparty system, Parliament can put in place one of the existing electoral systems.”

42.  In a judgment of 18 November 1995 (E. 1995/54, K. 1995/59), the Constitutional Court had the opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of section 34/A of Law no. 2839. That section, which referred to section 33 of the same Law, also imposed the electoral threshold of 10% for the allocation of the seats for Assembly members elected in the “national constituency”. The Constitutional Court declared the provisions establishing the national constituency null and void, but held that the 10% national threshold could be regarded as compatible with Article 67 of the Constitution.

The relevant passages of the judgment read as follows:

“... [T]he Constitution defines the Turkish State as a Republic ... The constitutional structure of the State, which is based on national sovereignty, is a product of the nation’s will, mediated through free elections. That choice, emphasised in the various Articles of the Constitution, is set forth clearly and precisely in Article 67, entitled ‘The right to vote, to be elected and to engage in political activities’. Paragraph 6 of Article 67, as amended, provides that electoral laws must be framed in such a way as to strike a balance between the principles of ‘fair representation’ and ‘governmental stability’. The aim is to ensure that the electors’ will is reflected as far as possible [in] the legislature. ... [In order to] choose the system the methods of which are most conducive to the expression of the collective will and the taking of collective decisions in the legislature, ... enacting the appropriate legislation in the light of the country’s specific circumstances and the requirements of the Constitution, it is necessary to opt for [the system] which is most compatible with the Constitution or to reject any system incompatible with it.

The impact of a representative democracy is visible in various fields. The effect of unfair systems adopted with the intention of ensuring stability is to hamper social developments. ... Where representation is concerned, the importance attached to fairness is the main condition for governmental stability. Fairness ensures stability. However, the idea of stability, in the absence of fairness, creates instability. The principle of ‘fair representation’ with which the Constitution requires [compliance] consists in free, equal, secret and universal [suffrage], with one round of voting and public access to the counting of votes and the recording of results, and produces a number of representatives proportional to the number of votes obtained. The principle of ‘governmental stability’ is perceived as a reference to methods designed to reflect votes [within] the legislature so as to guarantee the strength of the executive power. The ‘governmental stability’ which it is sought to ensure through the threshold (described as a ‘hurdle’), just like ‘fair representation’ ..., is protected by the Constitution. In elections ... importance must be attached to combining these two principles, which seem antinomic in certain situations, in such a way [as to ensure] that they counterbalance and complement each other ...

In order to achieve the goal of ‘governmental stability’, set forth in the Constitution, a national [threshold] has been introduced ...

Clearly, the [threshold] of 10% of the votes cast nationally laid down in section 33 of Law no. 2839 ... came into force with the approval of the legislature. Electoral systems must be compatible with constitutional principles ..., and it is inevitable that some of these systems should contain strict rules. Thresholds which result from the nature of the systems and [are expressed] in percentages, and [which] at national level restrict the right to vote and to be elected, are applicable [and] acceptable ... provided that they do not exceed normal limits ... The [threshold] of 10% is compatible with the principles of governmental stability and fair representation ...”

Three judges of the Constitutional Court out of eleven disagreed with the arguments of the majority, considering that the 10% national threshold was incompatible with Article 67 of the Constitution.

43.  In the same judgment, however, the Constitutional Court declared null and void an electoral threshold of 25% for the allocation of seats within provinces (provincial threshold). Holding that such a threshold was inconsistent with the principle of fair representation, it observed:

“Although a national threshold is imposed in parliamentary elections in accordance with the principle of ‘governmental stability’, imposing in addition a threshold for each electoral constituency is incompatible with the principle of ‘fair representation’.”

4.  Brief account of past parliamentary elections

44.  The elections of 1950, 1954 and 1957 – in which the majority representation system was used – were unable to ensure an institutional balance between the majority in Parliament and the opposition. This imbalance was one of the main reasons for the 1960 coup d’état. Following the intervention of the armed forces, Parliament adopted proportional representation, using the D’Hondt method, to strengthen pluralism and the political system. As a result, the elections in 1965 and 1969 produced stable majorities in the National Assembly while enabling small parties to be represented. However, in the elections of 1973 and 1977 the main political movements were unable to establish stable governments, although they had wide electoral support. That period of government instability was marked by the formation of one coalition after another, each made fragile by the disproportionate influence of the small parties on government policy.

45.  Following the military regime between 1980 and 1983, Law no. 2839 on the election of members of the National Assembly, enacted on 13 June 1983, re-established proportional representation, with two electoral thresholds. To the 10% national threshold was added a provincial threshold (the number of electors divided by the number of seats to be filled in each constituency); in 1995 the Constitutional Court declared the provincial threshold null and void. In the 1983 parliamentary elections the Motherland Party (ANAP) obtained an absolute majority in Parliament.

46.  The parliamentary elections of 29 November 1987 likewise enabled the ANAP, with 36.31% of the vote, to form a stable parliamentary majority. Two other parties also won seats. In the elections of 20 October 1991, five parties gained seats in Parliament. This result was due in particular to the fact that three small political parties (MÇP, IDP and HEP) had taken part in the elections under the banner of other political parties with the aim of circumventing section 16 of Law no. 2839, which makes it illegal to form joint lists before elections. The government was based on a coalition of two parties. In those elections the eighteen candidates of the HEP (People’s Labour Party, pro-Kurdish) were elected to Parliament on the list of the (social-democratic) SHP; they later resigned from the SHP to join the ranks of their own party, the HEP.

47.  In the general election of 24 December 1995, five parties gained seats in Parliament. However, as none of them had a parliamentary majority, a coalition was formed.

48.  The 1999 parliamentary elections again resulted in no party having a parliamentary majority. Five political parties won seats in the National Assembly. A coalition of three parties formed a government.

49.  Before the election on 3 November 2002, the year which had seen the highest proportion of votes going to parties not ultimately represented in Parliament was 1987, with 19.4% of the votes cast. In 1991, owing to the participation of two pre-electoral coalitions, one between the RP, the MÇP and the IDP and the other between the SHP and the HEP, that proportion was brought down to 0.5%. After the elections on 22 July 2007 it was 13.1%.

50.  As indicated above (see paragraphs 12-21), the elections of 3 November 2002 enabled the AKP to form a stable government which lasted until 22 July 2007, notwithstanding the fact that 45.3% of the votes – approximately 14,500,000 votes – were not reflected in the composition of Parliament.

B.  Relevant Council of Europe documents

51.  The Council of Europe has not laid down binding rules on the question of electoral thresholds.

1.  Documents of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

52.  The relevant part of Resolution 1547 (2007) on the state of human rights and democracy in Europe, adopted by the Assembly on 18 April 2007, reads as follows:

“58.  In well-established democracies, there should be no thresholds higher than 3% during the parliamentary elections. It should thus be possible to express a maximum number of opinions. Excluding numerous groups of people from the right to be represented is detrimental to a democratic system. In well-established democracies, a balance has to be found between fair representation of views in the community and effectiveness in Parliament and government.”

53.  In its Recommendation 1791 (2007) on the state of human rights and democracy in Europe, adopted on 18 April 2007, the Assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers take measures to remedy the deficiencies noted in the above-mentioned Resolution. With regard to electoral thresholds, it recommended that the Committee of Ministers urge member States to:

“17.10  consider decreasing thresholds over 3% for parliamentary elections and ... consider the balance between fair representation and effectiveness in Parliament and government.”

2.  Documents of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission)

54.  The Code of good practice in electoral matters, adopted by the Venice Commission in 2002, emphatically states: “The five principles underlying Europe’s electoral heritage are universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage.” “Within the respect of” those principles, “any electoral system may be chosen”.

55.  The relevant part of the Venice Commission’s Report on electoral law and electoral administration in Europe, of 12 June 2006, reads as follows:

“[T]he effects of one particular electoral system can be different from country to country, [and] we must appreciate that electoral systems can pursue different, sometimes even antagonistic, political aims. One electoral system might concentrate more on a fair representation of the parties in Parliament, while another one might aim to avoid a fragmentation of the party system and encourage the formation of a governing majority of one party in Parliament. One electoral system encourages a close relationship between voters and ‘their’ constituency representatives, while another makes it easy for the parties to specifically introduce women, minorities or specialists into Parliament by way of closed party lists. In some countries, complicated electoral systems are accepted in order to combine several political aims. In other countries, it is seen as a priority that the electoral system be not too difficult for the electorate and the administration to understand and operate. The appropriateness of an electoral system is determined according to whether it will do justice, bearing in mind the local conditions and problems. In particular, transparency of the elaboration of the list should be ensured. Thus, the electoral system and proposals to reform should be assessed in each individual case.”

56.  In its Report on electoral rules and affirmative action for national minorities’ participation in decision-making process in European countries, of 15 March 2005, the Venice Commission, having analysed the practices of certain member States, recommended five specific measures to promote the representation of minorities. Two of the measures concerned have a bearing on the question of electoral thresholds:

“...

d.  Electoral thresholds should not affect the chances of national minorities to be represented.

e.  Electoral districts (their number, the size and form, the magnitude) may be designed with the purpose to enhance the minorities’ participation in the decision-making processes.”

3.  Documents specifically relating to elections in Turkey

(a)  Report of the ad hoc Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

57.  The Government referred to the report of the ad hoc Committee for the Observation of Parliamentary Elections in Turkey (3 November 2002), produced on 20 December 2002. The relevant parts of the report read as follows:

“As widely reported by the media, two parties only out of eighteen found their way into the new TBMM [the Grand National Assembly of Turkey]: the AKP (Justice and Development [Party]) and CHP (Republican People’s Party), leaving out all other parties, which had been represented so far in the Parliament because they could not meet the 10% threshold. The party in government until the elections received only 1% of the votes. Economic and corruption problems were determining in the elections.

A clear and absolute majority has emerged with 362 seats for the AKP, 179 seats for the opposition and 9 seats for independent members. (These independent members are elected in small towns where they have a good reputation.) It should be recalled that AKP had 59 seats in the previous Parliament, and the CHP 3 (1999 elections).

This situation might create probably greater stability in the country by avoiding complicated and unstable coalitions. On Monday 4 November 2002 the Turkish Stock Exchange went up by 6.1%.

However, it also means that approximately 44% of the voters have no representation in the Parliament.

The results must thus be considered as a clear protest vote against the Establishment as a whole, since none of the three parties in the old governing coalition got enough votes for a single seat!”

(b)  The Parliamentary Assembly’s Resolution 1380 (2004)

58.  Paragraphs 6 and 23 of Resolution 1380 (2004) on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Turkey, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 22 June 2004, are worded as follows:

“6.  With regard to pluralist democracy, the Assembly recognises that Turkey is a functioning democracy with a multiparty system, free elections and separation of powers. The frequency with which political parties are dissolved is nevertheless a real source of concern and the Assembly hopes that in future the constitutional changes of October 2001 and those introduced by the March 2002 legislation on political parties will limit the use of such an extreme measure as dissolution. The Assembly also considers that requiring parties to win at least 10% of the votes cast nationally before they can be represented in Parliament is excessive and that the voting arrangements for Turkish citizens living abroad should be changed.

...

23.  The Assembly therefore invites Turkey, as part of its authorities’ current reform process, to:

...

ii.  amend the electoral code to lower the 10% threshold and enable Turkish citizens living abroad to vote without having to present themselves at the frontier;

...”

(c)  Report on observation of the parliamentary elections in Turkey (22 July 2007)

59.  The relevant parts of the Report on observation of the parliamentary elections in Turkey, produced by an ad hoc Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, read as follows:

“XII.  Conclusions and recommendations

55.  The parliamentary elections in Turkey, on 22 July 2007, were generally in compliance with Turkey’s Council of Europe commitments and European standards for free elections.

56.  Overwhelmingly, the voting was well organised and conducted in an orderly and professional fashion, which testifies to a long-standing tradition of democratic elections in Turkey.

57.  The high voter turnout shows that confidence in the democratic process exists in Turkey.

58.  Electoral administrators at all levels dispatched their duties effectively and in good faith.

59.  However, the Rapporteur believes that Turkey could do more in terms of organising even better elections that would guarantee a genuinely representative parliament. The 10% threshold requirement could be lowered, in accordance with Assembly Resolutions 1380 (2004) and 1547 (2007). The fact that the new Parliament elected on 22 July 2007 is far more representative than the outgoing Parliament, representing about 90% of the opinions of the electorate, is due to the fact that three instead of two parties are represented and to the ploy of opposition parties to launch party-sponsored independent candidates and not to any steps taken by the Turkish authorities themselves.

60.  The Turkish authorities may wish to consider seizing the Venice Commission on this issue, as well as on simplifying electoral legislation.”

60.  Moreover, in reply to a question from a parliamentarian following his address to the Parliamentary Assembly on 3 October 2007, the President of the Republic of Turkey said that the 10% threshold met a real need, but might in due course be dispensed with (see the verbatim record of the sitting on 3 October 2007). The relevant parts of his reply read as follows (Registry translation of summary in French in the verbatim record of the sitting on 3 October 2007):

“Mr Gül explained that the 10% threshold had been introduced to remedy the instability of previous years, in which there had been a large number of coalition governments in close succession. The threshold did not prevent independent candidates from standing. In the latest parliamentary elections, in July 2007, voter turnout had been 85%, which showed how representative Parliament was. Now that political stability had been restored the 10% threshold could be reconsidered.”

C.  Comparative law

61.  Although there is no uniform classification of types of ballot and electoral systems, it is usual to distinguish three main types: majority vote systems, proportional systems and mixed systems. In majority vote systems, the winner is the candidate or list of candidates obtaining the majority of the votes in the decisive round of voting. This type of ballot makes it possible to vote in governments with clear parliamentary majorities, but at the same time it militates against the representation of minority political parties. Thus, for example, in the United Kingdom the use over many decades of a single round of voting in a single-member majority vote system (“first past the post”), combined with the existence of two dominant political parties, has had the effect of giving few seats to other parties in relation to the number of votes that they obtain. There are other similar cases, in France for instance, where there is a majority vote system spread over two rounds of voting. At the opposite extreme, the aim of the proportional representation system is to ensure that the votes cast are reflected in a proportional number of seats. Proportional representation is generally considered to be the fairest system because it tends to reflect more closely the various political forces. However, the disadvantage of proportional representation is that it tends to lead to fragmentation among those seeking electoral support and thus makes it more difficult to establish stable parliamentary majorities.

62.  Currently, proportional systems are the most widely used in Europe. By way of example, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden and Turkey have opted for one or other variant of proportional representation. There are also mixed systems containing various combinations of the two types of ballot (in Germany, Italy and Lithuania, for example).

63.  In some proportional systems statutory thresholds are used to correct the negative effects of proportional voting, and in particular to ensure greater parliamentary stability. These thresholds, generally expressed as a percentage of the votes cast, are “limits, fixed or variable, defined in terms of the electoral result, which determine the share of a list or candidate in the distribution of seats”. However, the role played by thresholds varies in accordance with the level at which they are set and the party system in each country. A low threshold excludes only very small groupings, which makes it more difficult to form stable majorities, whereas in cases where the party system is highly fragmented a high threshold deprives many voters of representation.

64.  Analysis of the electoral thresholds adopted in the member States which have proportional representation shows that only four States have opted for high thresholds: Turkey has the highest, at 10%; Liechtenstein has an 8% threshold; and the Russian Federation and Georgia a 7% one. A third of the States impose a 5% threshold and thirteen of them have chosen a lower figure. The other member States (seven in number) do not use thresholds. Moreover, in several systems the thresholds are applied only to a restricted number of seats (in Norway and Iceland, for example). Thresholds for parties and thresholds for coalitions may be set at different levels. In the Czech Republic, for example, the threshold for one party is 5%, whereas in the case of a coalition it is raised by 5% for each of the constituent parties. In Poland, the threshold for coalitions is 8% whatever the number of constituent parties. There are similar variations among the thresholds for independent candidates: in Moldova, for example, the relevant threshold is 3%.

THE LAW

I.  SCOPE OF THE GRAND CHAMBER’S JURISDICTION

65.  The Court observes that in the Chamber judgment (paragraph 40) the complaint was formulated as follows:

“The applicants alleged that the imposition of an electoral threshold of 10% in parliamentary elections interfered with the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. ...”

66.  During the proceedings before the Chamber the applicants, relying mainly on the results of the elections held on 3 November 2002, complained of the 10% threshold. To that end, they carried out a comprehensive review of elections in Turkey since 1946, the year in which a multiparty system was introduced under the Republic. Later, in their referral request submitted on 20 April 2007, criticising in particular the analysis of the Turkish electoral system made by the Chamber in its judgment, they submitted that that judgment gave the Contracting Party an extremely wide margin of appreciation as regards the introduction and operation of the electoral system.

67.  After 9 July 2007, the date on which a panel of five judges allowed the applicants’ request for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber, early parliamentary elections took place in Turkey.

68.  Whereas they had commented at some length on the elections of 22 July 2007 in the observations they submitted to the Grand Chamber on 7 September 2007, the applicants’ representatives made it clear at the hearing on 21 November 2007 that the application had been lodged in order to secure a ruling that there had been a violation resulting from the elections of 3 November 2002, not those of 22 July 2007.

69.  The Government argued at the hearing that, in so far as the applicants’ complaints related to Turkey’s constitutional structure, they should be considered to be an actio popularis, and maintained that the general results of 22 July 2007 had confirmed the Chamber’s findings in its judgment of 30 January 2007.

70.  The Court must therefore determine the scope of the examination of the case it is required to make, deciding in particular whether it can restrict itself to studying the results of the elections on 3 November 2002, without taking into account events after the Chamber judgment.

71.  The Court reiterates that, according to its settled case-law, the “case” referred to the Grand Chamber necessarily embraces all aspects of the application previously examined by the Chamber in its judgment, there being no basis for a merely partial referral of the case (see Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, § 66, ECHR 2004‑XI, and K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, §§ 140-41, ECHR 2001‑VII).

72.  The “case” referred to the Grand Chamber is the application as it has been declared admissible. This does not mean, however, that the Grand Chamber may not also examine, where appropriate, issues relating to the admissibility of the application, just as is possible in normal Chamber proceedings, for example by virtue of Article 35 in fine of the Convention (which empowers the Court to “reject any application which it considers inadmissible ... at any stage of the proceedings”), or where such issues have been joined to the merits or where they are otherwise relevant at the merits stage (see K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 141).

73.  The Court observes at the outset that it does not have jurisdiction to examine a domestic electoral law in the abstract, and that it is primarily for the national authorities, and in particular the courts, which are specially qualified for the task, to construe and apply domestic law (see, for example, Gitonas and Others v. Greece, 1 July 1997, § 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑IV, and Briķe v. Latvia (dec.), no. 47135/99, 29 June 2000). However, in the present case, the applicants’ case does not amount to an actio popularis. In the elections of 3 November 2002 they were affected directly and immediately by the impugned threshold (see, mutatis mutandis, Moureaux and Others v. Belgium, no. 9267/81, Commission decision of 12 July 1983, Decisions and Reports (DR) 33, p. 97). Since the Chamber gave judgment before the elections of 22 July 2007, it mainly took into account the results of the elections of 3 November 2002 and the context in Turkey at that time. The Court will now examine the case in the light of the results of the parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002, but without neglecting the elections of 22 July 2007, in which the applicants were admittedly not candidates, but which nevertheless have some bearing on the assessment of the effects of the electoral threshold complained of by the applicants.

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF PROTOCOL No. 1

74.  The applicants alleged that the imposition of an electoral threshold of 10% in parliamentary elections interfered with the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. They relied on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which provides:

“The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”

A.  The Chamber judgment

75.  The Chamber found that the aim of the 10% electoral threshold imposed in parliamentary elections was to strengthen governmental stability by preventing excessive and debilitating parliamentary fragmentation. It could also be considered necessary to achieve that aim and proportionate. It accordingly concluded that “Turkey [had not] overstepped its wide margin of appreciation with regard to Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, notwithstanding the high level of the threshold complained of” (see paragraphs 66-79 of the Chamber judgment).

B.  The parties’ submissions

1.  The applicants

76.  The applicants contested the Chamber’s considerations, arguing that it had made a restrictive and cursory interpretation of the right to free elections.

77.  In the first place, the applicants considered that, as the 10% threshold prevented a large part of the population from expressing its choice regarding its parliamentary representation, it quite evidently constituted a serious interference with the right to participation and served no legitimate aim for the purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

78.  In that connection, the applicants challenged the argument that the measure complained of was intended to strengthen parliamentary stability. They asserted that the military authorities, who had taken power in the 1980 coup d’état, placed the full blame for the social and political agitation in Turkey between 1970 and 1980, and the governmental instability it had led to, on the electoral system then in force. In their opinion it was artificial to establish a causal link between the threshold and the political situation in Turkey in the 1970s, as assessed in the Chamber’s judgment.

79.  The applicants laid emphasis on the fact that two of the four elections in which proportional representation was used without recourse to the electoral threshold (those of 1965 and 1969) had produced single-party governments; the other two (those of 1973 and 1977) had led to coalition governments.

80.  Moreover, though it was not excluded that lowering or abolishing the national electoral threshold would lead to a coalition government, such an outcome was not necessarily synonymous with governmental instability. Coalition governments were sometimes more stable than single-party governments.

81.  The applicants contended that it was difficult to defend the view that the exceptional measure in question strengthened representative democracy. The Council of Europe had been created to strengthen democracy and democratic values. Although the Contracting States certainly had a broad margin of appreciation in the matter, they could not rely on that latitude – without taking into account the right to fair representation – to an unlimited or disproportionate extent, namely by excluding from the political life of the country a particular discrete segment of the population.

82.  Such a high national threshold made representation very unfair and led to a crisis of legitimacy for the government, since Parliament ought to be the free tribune of any democracy. Clearly, a Parliament whose composition reflected only about 55% of the votes cast was not capable of supplying the representative legitimacy on which any democracy is based. In that connection, the applicants pointed out that in the parliamentary elections of 1987, 1991, 1995 and 1999 the proportion of the votes cast in favour of parties not represented in Parliament had been, respectively, 19.4% (about 4,500,000 votes), 0.5% (about 140,000 votes), 14% (about 4,000,000 votes) and 18.3% (about 6,000,000 votes). The results of the 2002 election had led to a “crisis of representation”, since 45.3% of the votes – that is, about 14,500,000 votes – had not been taken into consideration and were not reflected in the composition of Parliament.

83.  The applicants submitted that the Court should take account of the following factors: firstly, the crucial role of pluralism as a pillar of democracy and the consequent importance of political parties, particularly those which act to ensure that a particular region of a country can make its voice heard in Parliament; secondly, the fact that the electoral threshold used in Turkey was the highest among the member States of the Council of Europe and, since there were no corrective measures, the fact that it hindered the expression of certain social groups; thirdly, and lastly, the special situation in Turkey and the effects of the threshold in practice, namely the impossibility for any party based in one region to be represented in the National Assembly. If those factors were not taken into consideration, the right to free elections would be left to the arbitrary interpretation of individual States, which could use that fact to plead justification for thresholds higher than 10%.

84.  The applicants also argued that the 10% threshold was not in conformity with the common European standard. The national threshold adopted in Turkey was the highest in Europe, or possibly in the world. If that threshold had been applied in other countries, a number of well-established parties would no longer participate in government; that would apply, for example, to the Free Democrats in Germany, the centrist and Christian parties in Scandinavia, the Greens in the Netherlands and the centre-left and the right in Italy. In most countries which had introduced a threshold, the level chosen was 5% (in 2001 the average was 4.25% in central and eastern Europe). Even countries which were experiencing serious problems regarding integration and which needed to stabilise party representation, in view of the existence of independent or very small parties, had not seen fit to impose thresholds twice as high. The applicants pointed out, by way of example, that in the 2002 elections an electoral threshold of 5% would have enabled eight parties (out of the eighteen which put up candidates), including DEHAP, to win seats in the Turkish Parliament, instead of just the two main national parties.

85.  The argument that the applicants or other members of their party could have participated in the elections as independent candidates – one of the Government’s main arguments and one of the grounds on which the Chamber had based its decision – disregarded the role of parties in the context of the political system. Neither independent candidatures nor the formation of alliances could take the place of independent political parties, since these played an essential role as fundamental elements of democracy. It was obvious that candidates who stood in their own name and were able to count only on their own limited personal and financial resources could not compete with parties which had considerable logistical and financial resources.

86.  Moreover, in Turkey independent candidates were subject to a number of unfavourable restrictions and conditions. For example, the names of independent candidates were not printed on the ballot slips supplied to border areas, which meant that persons entering Turkish territory for the precise purpose of taking part in an election in a frontier polling station could not vote for independent candidates, a fact which considerably reduced such candidates’ chances of being elected. The impossibility for independent candidates to make electoral broadcasts, although all political parties had an express entitlement to air time on television and radio, was also a serious disadvantage (see paragraph 38 above). Lastly, the right of electors to choose, freely and equally, to be represented by parties – rather than independents, for example – and the right of all parties to compete on an equal footing were essential principles for the purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

87.  As regards the possibility of forming a coalition with other political parties with the aim of getting across the 10% threshold, the applicants pointed out that section 16 of Law no. 2839 prevented parties from presenting joint lists and from participating in parliamentary elections by forming perfectly legal coalitions. Further, they submitted that the political climate, marked by the rising strength of nationalism, made it impossible to form such alliances.

88.  The applicants further explained that under section 36 of the Law on political parties a political party could not put up candidates for election if it was not implanted in the country (see paragraph 36 above). Moreover, under the same law, it was forbidden to create a party based on a particular ethnic group or region (see paragraph 37 above). That rule reflected the prevailing official ideology in Turkey. The absolute rejection of regional parties manifestly constituted a serious infringement of the principle previously stated by the Court that there is “no democracy without pluralism”. Account needed to be taken of the vast, multicultural nature of Turkish society, and the applicants and their party were bound to be penalised because, even if they sought support throughout the country by defending national policies, it was mainly a particular segment of the population which supported them.

89.  In the applicants’ submission, one of the main aims of a democracy based on a system of elected parties was to ensure that political parties whose electorate was implanted wholly or mainly in a particular region could function and be elected freely, without restrictions, and that the electors who voted for them should be represented on an equal footing. If that principle was applied, it was obvious that the impossibility for DEHAP to enter Parliament when it had obtained more than 45% (about 2,000,000) of the votes cast in south-eastern Turkey significantly distorted representation. In addition, the obligation to operate at national level was to be seen in the context of a political culture which systematically ignored debate about “the Kurdish question”, manifestly blocking the free expression of the will of a large proportion of the people of south-eastern Turkey, in breach of the Court’s settled case-law. Accordingly, the free expression of the will of the majority of the electorate in the region concerned had been deliberately hindered.

90.  More concretely, the applicants submitted that on account of the application of the electoral threshold in the 2002 parliamentary elections DEHAP, which was known for its interest in and commitment to the Kurdish question, had not obtained a single seat in Parliament although it had achieved very high scores in a number of constituencies. In their opinion it could not be considered that the parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007 had solved the problem, even though the DTP, the successor to DEHAP, had presented independent candidates. The fact that political parties supported by Kurds had presented independent candidates was in itself a handicap.

91.  Consequently, in the applicants’ submission, the fact that they were not elected to the National Assembly on account of the national 10% threshold when in the parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002 the DEHAP list – to which they belonged – had obtained 45.95% of the votes cast in the constituency of Şırnak was incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. They argued that the excessively high threshold was in conflict with the object and purpose of the provision concerned, which was to guarantee the right to the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. By depriving a whole segment of the population of the possibility of one day being represented in Parliament by a party which voiced its opinions, the national threshold removed the very essence of that right. Such a serious and systematic interference with the rights of a whole group, unique as it was among all European electoral systems, could not be justified by the margin of appreciation left to the State and therefore manifestly constituted a violation of the Convention.

2.  The Government

92.  The Government asked the Grand Chamber to endorse the Chamber’s finding that there had been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

93.  They submitted that the 10% threshold was calculated to ensure the country’s political stability by preventing excessive fragmentation of the composition of Parliament, and to strengthen democracy and political parties by encouraging the latter to propose policies accepted more or less generally throughout the country. The threshold did not infringe the fundamental principles of democracy such as pluralism. On the contrary, facilitating the election of independent candidates by exempting them from the 10% threshold made it possible for pluralism to put down deep roots in society. In that connection, the Government emphasised that between 1961 and 1980, when Turkey did not apply any threshold, there had been twenty changes of government in nineteen years, whereas between 1983 and 2007, the period when the 10% threshold was in force, seven elections had produced three coalition governments and three single-party governments. These figures showed that the threshold had positive effects on governmental stability.

94.  The Government further submitted that the refusal to propose policies accepted more or less generally throughout the country and cutting oneself off from the rest of the country by representing only one region or a particular constituency could not be considered compatible with the unitary structure of the State. On that point, Turkey was not alone. The Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt judgment showed that even in Belgium, where there were different language groups, MPs and senators represented the Belgian nation. Similarly, Article 80 of the Turkish Constitution provided that MPs represented society as a whole.

95.  The Government considered that the threshold was a proportionate measure which mainly fell within its margin of appreciation. They argued in particular that, as had been confirmed by the elections on 22 July 2007, the applicants could have been elected on 3 November 2002 if they had stood as independents or if DEHAP had formed an electoral coalition with one or more of the large parties.

96.  In that connection, they submitted that the results of the parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007 corroborated the Chamber’s findings in its judgment of 30 January 2007. The members of the DTP – the party which, according to the applicants, had taken the place of the one they were members of – had stood as independent candidates in the 2007 elections and had been elected easily because as independents they were not subject to the national threshold. A few days after their election they had rejoined the DTP and formed a parliamentary group (see paragraph 25 above). Having decided that it could not cross the threshold in the 2007 elections, the DTP had urged its members to stand as independent candidates and had managed to obtain twenty seats in Parliament. It was important to note that the total number of votes obtained by the DTP’s independent candidates represented only 2.04% of the national vote, which meant that the DTP would not even have been able to reach the 5% threshold which, according to the applicants, was the expression of a “common democratic political tradition” among European countries. If the threshold had been lower – say 2% – the DTP, with 2.04% of the votes cast, would have won only one seat, or two at the most. By winning twenty seats, or 3.6% of the total number of seats in the Grand National Assembly, the DTP had managed to raise its representation in Parliament to the maximum.

97.  Moreover, political parties could collaborate under the banner of a large party, even though forming joint lists was prohibited by section 16 of Law no. 2839 on the election of members of the National Assembly. The DSP, for instance, a party which had been a member of the ruling coalition from 1999 to 2002, had been unable to get over the 10% threshold in the 2002 elections. Before the 2007 elections, therefore, it had collaborated with the CHP, its rival, managing in that way to obtain thirteen seats on that party’s lists. The MPs elected as a result then left the CHP and rejoined their first party, the DSP. In the 1991 elections the HEP, which was the first avatar of the group which ultimately became the applicants’ party, had also managed to get some of its candidates elected from the lists of another party.

98.  The two possibilities which had been put into practice in the 2007 elections – standing as an independent candidate or collaborating with another party with a view to being elected from its lists – were very concrete examples of the existing correctives. Recourse to these correctives in the latest elections had made it possible to offer 85% of all voters some representation in Parliament. The Government submitted that if these options had been used in 2002, the results would have been similar.

99.  In their referral request the applicants had asserted that the 10% threshold had been kept with a view to excluding from Parliament their political party and its successor, the DTP, in 2002 and 2007 respectively. But the results of the 2007 elections proved that that allegation was without foundation. The DTP had a parliamentary group of twenty MPs, and on that account its participation in the next elections was guaranteed by virtue of section 36 of Law no. 2820 on political parties, even if it did not satisfy the condition of national implantation. Section 36 provided that political parties which had a parliamentary group could take part in the following elections even if they did not satisfy the national implantation condition.

100.  The Government rejected the applicants’ argument that the judgment given by the Chamber on 30 January 2007 permitted States thenceforth to raise the participation threshold in accordance with opinion poll results. The Chamber’s reasoning clearly indicated that it had properly taken into account the existing alternatives to the threshold and the review carried out by the Constitutional Court on the basis of the principles of “fair representation” and “governmental stability”, which had to complement each other. In the light of the possible alternatives, the Chamber had also held that the free expression of the opinion of the people had not been hindered and that the Government had not overstepped their margin of appreciation. The results of the 2007 elections clearly confirmed the findings of the Chamber judgment.

101.  As regards the results of the 2007 poll, given that 85% of all voters in the country were now represented in Parliament, the Government considered that the principle of fair representation had been respected satisfactorily. Furthermore, in the smaller provinces, particularly those where most of the DTP’s independent candidates were standing on 22 July 2007, the chances of being elected were higher than in larger provinces or constituencies. For example, to be elected in the first Istanbul constituency a candidate had to obtain about 111,750 votes, whereas in Hakkari province (south-eastern Turkey) 34,000 were needed. The distribution of seats among the provinces was manifestly more favourable to the smaller provinces, which made it possible to ensure that the principle of fair representation was respected.

102.  In conclusion, the Government submitted that, where the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature was not hindered, regulation of the electoral system and the system of political representation of a State Party to the Convention fell outside the purview of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The 10% threshold applied to political parties in parliamentary elections did not prevent the people from expressing their opinion freely on the choice of their representatives in Parliament. That had been proved by the elections held on 22 July 2007. The conclusions of the Chamber’s judgment of 30 January 2007 were therefore correct. The Chamber had not departed from the Court’s case-law nor given a new interpretation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

C.  The third-party intervener’s submissions

103.  The non-governmental organisation Minority Rights Group International agreed with the applicants. They said that the 10% threshold was the highest national threshold in Europe. It had been introduced without being accompanied by the slightest corrective measure which might have remedied the problems it caused. On account of the threshold it was absolutely impossible for a party operating on a regional basis to be represented in Parliament. In Turkey that meant more precisely that none of the Kurdish parties could enter Parliament even though in their own regions these parties regularly achieved scores comparable with that reached by the applicants in 2002 (over 45% of the votes cast). It was clear that all the measures taken by the Government, centring on the 10% threshold, were the result of a deliberate policy of exclusion. Moreover, even if the policy had not been deliberate, the effects would have been the same.

104.  In addition, the excessively high threshold ran counter to the object and purpose of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, namely guaranteeing the right to the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. By depriving a whole segment of the population of the possibility of one day being represented in Parliament by a party which voiced its opinions, the national threshold removed the very essence of that right. Such a serious and systematic interference with the rights of a whole group, unique as it was among all European electoral systems, could not be justified by the margin of appreciation left to the State and therefore manifestly constituted a violation of the Convention.

D.  The Court’s assessment

1.  General principles established by the case-law of the Convention institutions

(a)  Criteria applied by the Court in relation to Article 3 of Protocol No. 1

105.  The Court emphasises in the first place that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 enshrines a characteristic principle of an effective democracy and is accordingly of prime importance in the Convention system (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 47, Series A no. 113). Democracy constitutes a fundamental element of the “European public order”, and the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law (see, most recently and among many other authorities, Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, §§ 98 and 103, ECHR 2006‑IV).

106.  The Court has often emphasised the role of the State as ultimate guarantor of pluralism and stated that in performing that role the State is under an obligation to adopt positive measures to “organise” democratic elections “under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 54; see also, mutatis mutandis, Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 24 November 1993, § 38, Series A no. 276).

107.  Free elections and freedom of expression, and particularly the freedom of political debate, form the foundation of any democracy (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 47, and Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, §§ 41-42, Series A no. 103). The “free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” is a matter on which Article 11 of the Convention also has a bearing, guaranteeing as it does freedom of association, and thus indirectly the freedom of political parties, which represent a form of association essential to the proper functioning of democracy. Expression of the opinion of the people is inconceivable without the assistance of a plurality of political parties representing the currents of opinion flowing through a country’s population. By reflecting those currents, not only within political institutions but also, thanks to the media, at all levels of life in society, they make an irreplaceable contribution to the political debate which is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society (see Lingens, cited above, § 42; Castells v. Spain, 23 April 1992, § 43, Series A no. 236; and United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 44, Reports 1998‑I).

108.  As the Commission has observed on a number of occasions, the words “free expression of the opinion of the people” mean that elections cannot be conducted under any form of pressure in the choice of one or more candidates, and that in this choice the elector must not be unduly induced to vote for one party or another (see X. v. the United Kingdom, no. 7140/75, Commission decision of 6 October 1976, DR 7, p. 95). Accordingly no form of compulsion must be brought to bear on voters as regards their choice of candidates or parties. The word “choice” means that the different political parties must be ensured a reasonable opportunity to present their candidates at elections (ibid.; see also X. v. Iceland, no. 8941/80, Commission decision of 6 December 1981, DR 27, p. 145).

109.  As regards the general interpretation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has set out in its case-law the following main principles (see, among other authorities, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, §§ 46‑51; Ždanoka, cited above, § 115; Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 33, ECHR 2002‑II; and Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 61, ECHR 2005‑IX):

(i)  Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 seems at first sight different from the other provisions of the Convention and its Protocols which guarantee rights, as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Parties to hold elections which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, having regard to the travaux préparatoires of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and the way the provision has been interpreted in the context of the Convention as a whole, the Court has established that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and the right to stand for election (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above).

(ii)  The rights enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for “implied limitations”, and Contracting States must be given a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere (see, among other authorities, Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999‑I, and Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 201, ECHR 2000‑IV).

(iii)  The concept of “implied limitations” under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is of major importance for the determination of the relevance of the aims pursued by the restrictions on the rights guaranteed by this provision. Given that Article 3 is not limited by a specific list of “legitimate aims” such as those enumerated in Articles 8 to 11, the Contracting States are therefore free to rely on an aim not contained in that list to justify a restriction, provided that the compatibility of that aim with the principle of the rule of law and the general objectives of the Convention is proved in the particular circumstances of a case. It also means that the Court does not apply the traditional tests of “necessity” or “pressing social need” which are used in the context of Articles 8 to 11. In examining compliance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has focused mainly on two criteria: whether there has been arbitrariness or a lack of proportionality, and whether the restriction has interfered with the free expression of the opinion of the people.

(iv)  However, it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that limitations do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence, and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52). In particular, any such conditions must not thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature – in other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage (see Hirst (no. 2), cited above, § 62; Hilbe v. Liechtenstein (dec.), no. 31981/96, ECHR 1999‑VI; and Melnychenko v. Ukraine, no. 17707/02, § 56, ECHR 2004‑X). Any departure from the principle of universal suffrage risks undermining the democratic validity of the legislature thus elected and the laws which it promulgates (see Hirst (no. 2), cited above, § 62).

(v)  As regards the right to stand as a candidate for election, that is, the so‑called “passive” aspect of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has been even more cautious in its assessment of restrictions in that context than when it has been called upon to examine restrictions on the right to vote, that is, the so-called “active” element of the rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. In Melnychenko (cited above, § 57), the Court observed that stricter requirements may be imposed on eligibility to stand for election to Parliament than is the case for eligibility to vote. On that point, it took the view that, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires that the eligibility procedure contain sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions (ibid. § 59; see also, mutatis mutandis, Podkolzina, cited above, § 35).

(vi)  Similarly, the Court has held that, once the wishes of the people have been freely and democratically expressed, no subsequent amendment to the organisation of the electoral system may call that choice into question, except in the presence of compelling grounds for the democratic order (see Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, § 52, ECHR 2006‑VIII).

(b)  Electoral systems and thresholds

110.  The Court reiterates that the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when it comes to determination of the type of ballot through which the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature is mediated. In that regard, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 goes no further than prescribing “free” elections held at “reasonable intervals” “by secret ballot” and “under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people”. Subject to that reservation, it does not create any “obligation to introduce a specific system” such as proportional representation or majority voting with one or two ballots (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 54).

111.  The rules in this area vary in accordance with the historical and political factors specific to each State; the large variety of situations provided for in the electoral legislation of numerous member States of the Council of Europe shows the diversity of the possible options. For the purposes of applying Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, any electoral legislation must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned, so that features that would be unacceptable in the context of one system may be justified in the context of another (see Py v. France, no. 66289/01, § 46, ECHR 2005‑I), at least so long as the chosen system provides for conditions which will ensure the “free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”.

112.  Moreover, it should not be forgotten that electoral systems seek to fulfil objectives which are sometimes scarcely compatible with each other: on the one hand to reflect fairly faithfully the opinions of the people, and, on the other, to channel currents of thought so as to promote the emergence of a sufficiently clear and coherent political will. Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not imply that all votes must necessarily have equal weight as regards the outcome of the election or that all candidates must have equal chances of victory. Thus no electoral system can eliminate “wasted votes” (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 54).

113.  With regard to the level fixed by electoral thresholds, it should be noted that in Magnago and Südtiroler Volkspartei v. Italy (no. 25035/94, Commission decision of 15 April 1996, DR 85-A, p. 112), in which the facts most closely resemble the circumstances of the present case, the Commission expressed the opinion that “the 4% threshold required for the election of the remaining 25% of the members of the Chamber of Deputies” and even “a system which fixe[d] a relatively high threshold” fell within the wide margin of appreciation left to States in the matter. The Commission went on to say that similar thresholds existed in other European legal systems (see Tête v. France, no. 11123/84, Commission decision of 9 December 1987, DR 52, p. 68, which concerned a 5% threshold applied to the allocation of seats in elections to the European Parliament). Lastly, the Commission considered that electoral thresholds were intended to promote the emergence of sufficiently representative currents of thought.

114.  In Federación nacionalista Canaria v. Spain ((dec.), no. 56618/00, ECHR 2001‑VI) the Court examined the thresholds which formed part of a system of proportional representation used in the Autonomous Community of the Canary Islands. There were two conditions framed as alternatives: candidates had to obtain either at least 30% of the valid votes cast in an individual island constituency or at least 6% of the valid votes cast in the Autonomous Community as a whole. The Court observed that such a system, “far from hindering election candidates such as those put forward by the applicant federation, afford[ed] smaller political groups a certain degree of protection”.

115.  Lastly, in its very recent decision concerning, inter alia, a 5% threshold applicable in parliamentary elections (see Partija “Jaunie Demokrāti” and Partija “Mūsu Zeme” v. Latvia (dec.), nos. 10547/07 and 34049/07, 29 November 2007), the Court took the view that the threshold concerned could not be held to be contrary to the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in that it encouraged sufficiently representative currents of thought and made it possible to avoid an excessive fragmentation of Parliament.

2.  Application of the above principles in the present case

116.  In the present case the Court notes that the applicants alleged a breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the fact that they had not been elected to the National Assembly in the parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002 despite the score of 45.95% of the votes cast in the constituency of Şırnak achieved by DEHAP, the party on whose list they had stood for election. They explained that their party, which had polled 6.22% of the national vote, had failed to reach the electoral threshold of 10% and had accordingly been deprived of parliamentary representation.

117.  The Court observes that the national threshold concerned is laid down by statute, in section 33 of Law no. 2839, and determines how the seats in Parliament are to be shared nationally among the different lists and different candidates. It clearly constitutes interference with the applicants’ electoral rights as provided in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, a point which is not in dispute between the parties.

118.  In the light of the principles set out above, the Court must first verify whether the measure complained of – whose foreseeability is not in dispute between the parties – serves a legitimate aim. Secondly, it must ascertain whether there was any arbitrariness and whether there was a reasonable relation of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued. In applying those two criteria, it will seek to determine whether the limitation in question impaired the very essence of the right to the free expression of the people, within the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

(a)  Legitimate aim

119.  The Court observes that, unlike other Convention provisions, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not specify or limit the aims which a restriction must be intended to serve. A great variety of aims may accordingly be compatible with it, provided that the compatibility of any particular aim with the principle of the rule of law and the Convention’s general objectives is established in the specific circumstances of a given case.

120.  In the applicants’ submission, the threshold served no legitimate aim since it prevented a large part of the population from expressing its choice regarding its representation in Parliament. The Government rejected that argument, contending that the purpose of the threshold was to avoid excessive parliamentary fragmentation and thus strengthen governmental stability.

121.  With regard to electoral systems, the Court’s task is to determine whether the effect of the rules governing parliamentary elections is to exclude some persons or groups of persons from participating in the political life of the country (see Aziz v. Cyprus, no. 69949/01, § 28, ECHR 2004‑V) and whether the discrepancies created by a particular electoral system can be considered arbitrary or abusive or whether the system tends to favour one political party or candidate by giving them an electoral advantage at the expense of others (see X. v. Iceland, cited above).

122.  The Court accepts that high thresholds may deprive part of the electorate of representation. However, that circumstance alone is not decisive. Such thresholds can work as a necessary corrective adjustment to the proportional system, which has always been accepted as allowing for the free expression of the opinion of the people even though it may operate to the detriment of small parties when accompanied by a high threshold (see, mutatis mutandis, Liberal Party, Mrs R. and Mr P. v. the United Kingdom, no. 8765/79, Commission decision of 18 December 1980, DR 21, p. 211)

123.  In Turkey the 10% threshold is a general rule which applies without any distinction to all political party candidates whatever electoral constituency they are standing in. Since 1983, when the threshold was introduced, numerous parties with very varied political lines have been unable to obtain any seats in Parliament, having failed to reach it. The elections of 3 November 2002 illustrate the point: not only DEHAP, the applicants’ party, but several other parties, in particular the DYP, the MHP, the GP and the ANAP (who obtained 9.54%, 8.36%, 7.25% and 5.13% of the votes cast respectively), failed to win any seats in Parliament (see paragraph 18 above). In 1991 and 2007 a number of candidates following the same political line as DEHAP managed to win seats, either on the ticket of another political party or by standing as independents (see paragraphs 15 and 25 above).

124.  In addition, the Turkish electoral system, like that of many member States, is predicated on the context of a unitary State. In accordance with Article 80 of the Constitution, MPs represent “the whole nation”, not “the regions or persons which have elected them” (see paragraph 29 above); that is precisely because of the unitary nature of the Turkish State. Each province is represented in Parliament by at least one MP. The remaining seats are distributed in accordance with the number of inhabitants, thus ensuring the representation of the whole national territory (see paragraph 32 above). That is the result of a choice made by the legislature reflecting the country’s constitutional structure and grounded on political and institutional criteria. It is not as such incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which does not in principle impose on Contracting States the obligation to adopt an electoral system guaranteeing parliamentary representation to parties with an essentially regional base irrespective of the votes cast in other parts of the country. On the other hand, a problem might arise if the relevant legislation tended to deprive such parties of parliamentary representation (see paragraph 121 above).

125.  Lastly, the Convention institutions have generally accepted that electoral thresholds are intended in the main to promote the emergence of sufficiently representative currents of thought within the country (see Magnago and Südtiroler Volkspartei, cited above, and Tête, cited above; see also, to the same effect, Partija “Jaunie Demokrāti” and Partija “Mūsu Zeme”, cited above). Consequently, the Court agrees with the Chamber’s finding that the interference in question had the legitimate aim of avoiding excessive and debilitating parliamentary fragmentation and thus of strengthening governmental stability.

(b)  Proportionality

126.  Referring to the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 18 November 1995, the Chamber considered that although the threshold was high it did not go beyond a level within the margin of appreciation of the national authorities in the matter, since it could not as such hinder the emergence of political alternatives within society. The applicants contested the Chamber’s conclusion, whereas the Government asked the Court to uphold it.

127.  The Court observes that the national 10% threshold applied in Turkey is the highest of all the thresholds applied in Europe (see paragraph 64 above). In order to verify that it is not disproportionate, the Court will therefore first assess its level in comparison with the threshold applied in other European countries. It will then examine the correctives and other safeguards with which it is attended.

(i)  Elements of comparative law

128.  The applicants submitted that the threshold applied in the present case was not in conformity with “the common democratic political tradition” of European countries.

129.  The Court observes that electoral thresholds are not unknown among European electoral systems and that there are different kinds which vary according to the type of election and the context within which they are used. Analysis of the electoral thresholds adopted in the member States shows that, apart from Turkey, only three States have opted for high thresholds. Liechtenstein has fixed the level at 8%, and the Russian Federation and Georgia at 7%. A third of the States impose a 5% threshold and thirteen of them have chosen a lower figure. The other States which have a proportional representation system do not use thresholds. Thresholds also vary according to whether they apply to a party or a coalition, and some countries have adopted thresholds for independent candidates (see paragraphs 61‑64 above).

130.  The Court also attaches importance to the views expressed by the organs of the Council of Europe, which agree as to the exceptionally high level of the Turkish national threshold and have called for it to be lowered. In its Resolution of 18 April 2007, in which it stressed the indissoluble link between the representativeness of democracy and thresholds, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe pointed out that “in well-established democracies, there should be no thresholds higher than 3% during the parliamentary elections”. That opinion was reiterated in the Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendation 1791 (2007) (see paragraphs 52-53 above). In addition, in texts concerning Turkey, namely the Parliamentary Assembly’s Resolutions 1380 (2004) and 1547 (2007) and the Report on observation of the Parliamentary elections in Turkey (22 July 2007), produced by an ad hoc Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly, the organs of the Council of Europe urged Turkey, among other recommendations, to amend its electoral code to lower the 10% threshold (see paragraphs 58-59 above).

131.  However, the effects of an electoral threshold can differ from one country to another and the various systems can pursue different, sometimes even antagonistic, political aims. One system might concentrate more on a fair representation of the parties in Parliament, while another one might aim to avoid a fragmentation of the party system and encourage the formation of a governing majority of one party in Parliament (see paragraph 55 above). None of these aims can be considered unreasonable in itself. Moreover, the role played by thresholds varies in accordance with the level at which they are set and the party system in each country. A low threshold excludes only very small groupings, which makes it more difficult to form stable majorities, whereas in cases where the party system is highly fragmented a high threshold deprives many voters of representation (see paragraphs 58-59 above).

132.  The large variety of situations provided for in the electoral legislation of the member States of the Council of Europe shows the diversity of the possible options. It also shows that the Court cannot assess any particular threshold without taking into account the electoral system of which it forms a part, although the Court can agree with the applicants’ contention that an electoral threshold of about 5% corresponds more closely to the member States’ common practice. However, it has already been pointed out that any electoral legislation must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned, so that features that would be unacceptable in the context of one system may be justified in the context of another, at least so long as the chosen system provides for conditions which will ensure the “free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see, among other authorities, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 54). That is why the Court must now assess the effects of the correctives and other safeguards with which the impugned system is attended.

(ii)  Correctives and other safeguards

133.  The Government submitted that the Turkish electoral system has correctives which tend to counterbalance the threshold’s negative effects. In that connection, they argued that, as the elections of 22 July 2007 had confirmed, the applicants could have been elected in the elections of 3 November 2002 if they had stood as independent candidates or if their party, DEHAP, had entered an electoral coalition with one of the large parties.

134.  The Court notes that the applicants did not really contest the Government’s assertion that recourse to the above types of electoral strategy could have given them a real chance of being elected to Parliament. However, they emphasised the importance of political parties in representative democracies, arguing that neither independent candidatures nor the formation of alliances could take the place of independent political parties, which played a crucial role as fundamental elements of democracy.

135.  The Court must therefore determine whether the alternatives referred to by the Government can be regarded as means to attenuate the threshold’s negative effects.

136.  As regards the possibility of standing as an independent candidate, the Court, like the Chamber in paragraph 71 of its judgment, emphasises the irreplaceable contribution made by parties to political debate. They act as both an instrument which citizens can use to participate in electoral debate and a tribune through which they can express their support for various political programmes (see, mutatis mutandis, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, cited above, § 25). They can thus be distinguished from other political actors such as independent candidates, who in general are locally based. Similarly, the Court notes that in Turkey independent candidates are subject to a number of unfavourable restrictions and conditions not applicable to political parties. They must deposit a guarantee, their names are not printed on the ballot slips supplied to frontier posts and large airports, and they are not able to broadcast electoral messages whereas all political parties have an express entitlement to air time on television and radio (see paragraphs 35 and 38 above).

137.  The Court notes however that this method cannot be considered to be ineffective in practice. In the elections of 22 July 2007 in particular, the small parties were able to avoid the impact of the threshold by putting up independent candidates, by which means they succeeded in obtaining seats. The DTP, for example, DEHAP’s successor, was able to form a parliamentary group after winning twenty seats in Parliament (see paragraph 25 above).

138.  It is true that this result was essentially due to the fact that, instead of putting up their own candidates in their own name, the opposition parties opted for a strategy which might be called “independents supported by a party” (see paragraph 23 above). The fact that independents were not required to reach any threshold greatly facilitated the adoption of that electoral strategy, despite the restrictions listed above (see paragraphs 35 and 38). Nevertheless, this was a makeshift solution compared with the position of a candidate officially sponsored by his or her political party.

139.  The same applies to the possibility of forming an electoral coalition with other political groups. The Court notes in that regard that section 16 of Law no. 2839 prevents parties from presenting joint lists and from participating in parliamentary elections by forming perfectly legal coalitions. As the Government pointed out, political parties have developed an electoral strategy whereby they can circumvent this prohibition. Use of this strategy has produced tangible results, particularly in the 1991 and 2007 elections. Before the elections of 20 October 1991, two alliances were formed under the banner of two large political parties. By that means some small parties, including the HEP – DEHAP’s predecessor – managed to obtain eighteen seats in Parliament (see paragraph 15 above). The same electoral strategy bore fruit in the elections of 22 July 2007 (see paragraph 24 above).

140.  Admittedly, since 45.3% of the votes in the elections of 3 November 2002 (about 14,500,000) were cast for unsuccessful candidates, these electoral strategies can have only a limited effect. As the Chamber pointed out in paragraph 73 of its judgment, the fact that such a large part of the electorate was not ultimately represented in Parliament was hardly consistent with the crucial role played in a representative democracy by Parliament, which is the main instrument of democratic control and political responsibility, and must reflect as faithfully as possible the desire for a truly democratic political regime.

141.  However, it should be noted that, as numerous analysts have remarked, the elections of November 2002 took place in a crisis climate with many different causes (economic and political crises, earthquakes, etc. – see paragraphs 12 and 20 above). In that connection, the fact that the three parties which had formed the governing coalition after the 1999 elections were unable to reach the 10% threshold and were thus deprived of parliamentary representation (see paragraph 20 above) appears significant.

142.  In addition, an overall analysis of the parliamentary elections held since 1983 shows that the representation deficit observed after the elections of November 2002 could be partly contextual in origin and not solely due to the high national threshold. On that point, it should be noted that, with the exception of those elections, the proportion of the votes cast for ultimately unsuccessful candidates never exceeded 19.4% (19.4% in 1987, 0.5% in 1991, 14% in 1995 and 18% in 1999). The proportion of votes for candidates who failed to secure a seat even fell to 13.1% in the elections of 22 July 2007 (see paragraph 49 above).

143.  Consequently, the Court notes that the political parties affected by the high 10% threshold have managed in practice to develop strategies whereby they can attenuate some of its effects, even though such strategies also run counter to one of the threshold’s declared aims, which is to avoid parliamentary fragmentation (see paragraphs 60 and 125 above).

144.  The Court also attaches importance to the role of the Constitutional Court in the matter. At the time when the 1961 Constitution was in force the Constitutional Court, grounding its decision on the principles of a democratic State and pluralism, rejected the idea of applying an “ordinary threshold” within each electoral constituency (see paragraph 40 above). Later, after the adoption of the 1982 Constitution, when ruling on the question of electoral systems, the Constitutional Court held that the legislature did not have an unlimited margin of appreciation in the matter and could not adopt “measures tending to restrict the free expression of the opinion of the people, or subject political life to the hegemony of a political party, or destroy the multiparty system” (see paragraph 41 above).

145.  In its judgment of 18 November 1995, the Constitutional Court varied its 1968 case-law (see paragraph 42 above), examining the basis for the existence of the threshold complained of as a corrective to the general principle of proportionality whereby excessive and debilitating parliamentary fragmentation could be avoided. While accepting that thresholds restricted “the right to vote and to be elected”, the Constitutional Court held that they were acceptable provided that they did not exceed normal limits and accordingly ruled that the 10% threshold was compatible with constitutional principles. On the other hand, citing the principle of “fair representation”, it declared null and void an electoral threshold of 25% for the distribution of seats within provinces. It thus asserted that the constitutional principles of fair representation and governmental stability should necessarily be combined in such a way that they counterbalanced and complemented each other (see paragraph 43 above).

146.  It can be seen from the foregoing considerations that the Constitutional Court, in exercising vigilance to prevent any excessive effects of the impugned electoral threshold by seeking the point of equilibrium between the principles of fair representation and governmental stability, provides a guarantee calculated to stop the threshold concerned impairing the essence of the right enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

(iii)  Conclusion

147.  In conclusion, the Court considers that in general a 10% electoral threshold appears excessive. In that connection, it concurs with the organs of the Council of Europe, which have stressed the threshold’s exceptionally high level and recommended that it be lowered (see paragraphs 58 and 130 above). It compels political parties to make use of stratagems which do not contribute to the transparency of the electoral process. In the present case, however, the Court is not persuaded that, when assessed in the light of the specific political context of the elections in question, and attended as it is by correctives and other guarantees which have limited its effects in practice, the threshold has had the effect of impairing in their essence the rights secured to the applicants by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

148.  There has accordingly been no violation of that provision.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

Holds by thirteen votes to four that there has been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 8 July 2008.

Vincent Berger                       Boštjan M. Zupančič
Jurisconsult                            President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Tulkens, Vajić, Jaeger and Šikuta is annexed to this judgment.

B.M.Z.
V.B.

JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES TULKENS, VAJIĆ, JAEGER AND ŠIKUTA

(Translation)

We do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that there has been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, although we take the same principles as our starting-point (paragraphs 105-15 of the judgment).

1.  In a proportional system the requirement of some kind of threshold cannot in itself be held to be contrary to the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, in that it encourages sufficiently representative currents of thought and makes it possible to avoid an excessive fragmentation of Parliament. However, there is no doubt that the current system in Turkey of a 10% threshold set up in 1980 – which is the highest in Europe – deprives a large proportion of the population of the possibility of being represented in Parliament.

As established in the parliamentary elections of 1987, 1991, 1995 and 1999, the proportion of the votes cast in favour of parties not represented in Parliament was, respectively, 19.4% (about 4,500,000 votes), 0.5% (about 140,000 votes), 14% (about 4,000,000 votes) and 18.3% (about 6,000,000 votes). The results of the 2002 election led to a “crisis of representation”, since 45.3% of the votes – about 14,500,000 votes – had not been taken into consideration and were not reflected in the composition of Parliament[1]. According to an OSCE report, the 10% national threshold in Turkey’s electoral system virtually eliminates the possibility of regional or minority parties entering the Turkish Grand National Assembly and distorts the essential purpose of a proportional system[2]. In fact, the high 10% threshold tends to suppress parliamentary criticism and debate, which are the essence of representative democracy. And as the Court has repeatedly observed, there can be no democracy without pluralism (see Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey [GC], no. 23885/94, §§ 39 and 41, ECHR 1999‑VIII).

2.  The Government argued that the 10% electoral threshold served the legitimate aim of ensuring governmental stability. A proportional voting system in Turkey without this threshold, it was submitted, would not lead to stable majorities. The Court endorsed that argument without analysing it or

subjecting it to any criticism. Some have argued, however, that a study of the historical background in Turkey casts doubt on this objective, since under an electoral system without such a high threshold it was also possible for solid governments to be formed[3]. Conversely, such a threshold brings more polarisation than stability.

Moreover, in practice, smaller groups are now represented in Parliament by means of circumvention (see point 4 below). Thus the purpose of the law can no longer be considered to be the exclusion of smaller parties or groups from Parliament, as the only remaining effect seems to be that it weakens within the election process the chances of all smaller parties which are not sure to pass the threshold. They have either to find allies or disappear during elections by having their candidates stand as independents.

3.  As regards the proportionality of the interference, the majority’s first argument is that the elections of 3 November 2002 took place in a crisis of tension caused by a number of different factors (economic pressure, political crises and earthquakes – see paragraph 141 of the judgment). In other words, an exceptional solution was needed for an exceptional situation.

However, that argument – which at first sight appears reasonable – is rendered considerably less persuasive by the fact that it was not just in those elections of November 2002 that the high threshold of 10% was used. Firstly, the system was adopted much earlier, in 1983, and since then numerous political parties following extremely varied political lines have been unable to secure seats in Parliament, having failed to get over the threshold (see paragraph 123 of the judgment). Secondly, the threshold was also applied after the 2002 elections, during the parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007. It is true that reforms of the electoral system have been discussed, but to date an invisible hand seems to have prevented these from coming to fruition. In those circumstances, we consider that the argument which the majority found decisive, namely the specific context of the 2002 elections, is not relevant.

4.  The majority’s second argument lies in the importance it attaches to what it calls “correctives and other safeguards” capable of limiting the effects of the 10% electoral threshold, which the majority, in any event and in general terms, found to be excessive (see paragraph 147 of the judgment).

But what are the safeguards concerned? The Court itself acknowledges that they amount to “stratagems” which political parties are compelled to make use of and which do not contribute to the transparency of the electoral process (ibid.). A stratagem is literally a ruse, as in the phrase ruse de guerre. Can a democratic system which does not function properly be corrected by “stratagems” and thus made compatible with the Convention?

In concrete terms, Turkish political parties have developed electoral techniques to “by-pass” the obstacles; these include in particular putting up independent candidates supported by a party (but who immediately rejoin their original party once elected) and adding candidates from one party to the list of another party. The Court had no hesitation in finding that this was only a makeshift solution (see paragraph 138 of the judgment). It also drew attention to all the difficulties in such a system, inasmuch as these candidates are subject to a number of unfavourable restrictions and conditions compared with political parties (see, for instance, paragraph 35 of the judgment). The Court nevertheless accepted these “stratagems” on account of what was presented as their result in practice. In other words, the end justified the means.

Apart from the obvious problem of political morality that such a position raises, it seems to us to be logically difficult to accept, since the Court itself acknowledges that these “stratagems” run counter to the legitimate aim of fixing such a high threshold, namely preventing parliamentary fragmentation. Furthermore, these correctives and safeguards are exclusively the result of political considerations and agreements and there can be no certainty that they will remain available in the future. These practices, which are in any case themselves contrary to the Turkish Constitution and Turkish electoral legislation (section 16 of Law no. 2839 on the election of members of the National Assembly), may be changed and disappear from one day to the next. That being the case, it is difficult to accept that such correctives may be described as safeguards for the purposes of the Convention. Lastly, the Court did not consider the detrimental effect of these techniques on the party system as such when parties have to seek and find protection from other parties for the purpose of slipping through the 10% threshold. In themselves, parties represent and unite different currents of thought. Any interference with their independent participation in elections curtails the free expression of the opinion of the people – whether the interference is direct or indirect. Certainly, this is the case when different parties form hidden alliances during the elections, by-passing the legislation in place as interpreted by the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 42 of the judgment). To achieve such alliances, candidates from one party have to be accepted, even approved of, by another party, which undermines the independence of parties especially in respect of their representatives standing as candidates on other parties’ lists. In other words, it means playing “hide and seek” with voters, thus undermining essential democratic principles.

5.  The voting system in the instant case, which has the highest threshold in Europe, which fails to accommodate the interests and opinions of a large part of the electorate that identifies strongly with a particular region, or with a national or other minority (see paragraphs 114-15 of the judgment), and in which forming open coalitions with other political parties is prohibited (see judgment of the Constitutional Court – paragraph 42 of the present judgment), clearly exceeds the very wide margin of appreciation left to the State and runs counter to the object and purpose of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. As Professor I. Budge has written, “[w]hat might have been justified then as an exceptional measure to buttress a still fragile democracy can hardly be justified now when the democracy is considered sufficiently stable and mature to seek membership of the European Union”[4].

6.  We are, therefore, not satisfied that these limitations of the voting system do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 52, Series A no. 113). It would seem, however, that by admitting that the system in place can be seen as being in accordance with Convention standards only if corrected, and at the same time accepting that these corrections are due to “stratagems”, the majority itself to a certain degree accepts a similar view.

Free elections are one of the foundations of justice and peace in Europe; they are indispensable for the development of an effective political/pluralist democracy and thus of the rule of law and observance of human rights. It is difficult to see how these fundamental goals, underlying not only the Convention but the whole Council of Europe system, can be achieved if based on electoral rules that need to be circumvented (see paragraphs 133‑46 of the judgment, in particular 139 and 143) in order to be compatible with the Convention. Changes in this direction, by introducing the necessary reforms of the electoral system in a clear and transparent way, would thus – in our opinion – be the only appropriate way to improve the present situation in accordance with the Convention.

[1].  R. Zimbron, “The Unappreciated Margin: Turkish Electoral Politics Before the European Court of Human Rights”, 49 Harvard International Law Journal Online 10 (2007), http://www.harvardilj.org/online/125, p. 18.
[2].  OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Assessment Report: Republic of Turkey Parliamentary Elections (2002), 4 December 2002.
[3].  R. Zimbron, op. cit., p. 13.
[4].  Observations of the applicants, received at the Registry on 29 October 2007, point 4.