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Glosar Evropske Konvencije o ljudskim pravima
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EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
PRVO ODELJENJE
PREDMET P.B I JS. PROTIV AUSTRIJE (CASE OF P.B. AND J.S. v. AUSTRIA)
(predstavka br. 18984/02)
PRESUDA
STRAZBUR 22. jul 2010.
PRAVOSNAŽNA
22/10/2010
Ova presuda je postala pravosnažna u skladu sa članom 44, stav 2 Konvencije ali može biti predmet redakcijskih izmena.
U predmetu P.B. i J.S. protiv Austrije, Evropski sud za ljudska prava (Prvo odeljenje), zasedajući u Veću u sastavu:
Kristos Rozakis (Christos Rozakis), predsednik,
Nina Vajić,
Anatolij Kovler (Anatoly Kovler),
Elizabet Štajner (Elisabeth Steiner),
Hanlar Hađijev (Khanlar Hajiyev),
Din Špilmen (Dean Spielmann),
Đorđo Malinverni (Giorgio Malinverni), sudije,
i Soren Nilsen (Søren Nielsen), sekretar odeljenja,
Nakon većanja zatvorenog za javnost 1. jula 2010. godine, Izriče sledeću presudu usvojenu tog datuma:
POSTUPAK
Ovaj predmet je formiran na osnovu predstavke (br. 18984/02) koju su Sudu 24. aprila 2002. godine podneli državljanin Mađarske P.B. i državljanin Austrije J.S. (u daljem tekstu: podnosioci predstavke) shodno članu 34 Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: Konvencija). Predsednik Veća je uslišio zahtev podnosilaca predstavke da njihova imena ne budu obelodanjena (u skladu sa pravilom 47, stav 3 Poslovnika Suda).
Podnosioce predstavke je zastupao advokat iz Beča, J. Unterveger (J. Unterweger). Austrijsku državu (u daljem tekstu: Država) je predstavljao njen zastupnik pred Sudom, ambasador H. Tiši (H. Tichy), načelnik Odeljenja za međunarodno pravo Saveznog ministarstva za spoljne poslove.
Sud je odlukom od 20. marta 2008. predstavku proglasio prihvatljivom.
Nakon što ju je sekretar obavestio da ima pravo da interveniše (u skladu sa članom 36, stav 1 Konvencije i pravilom 44, stav 1), Država Mađarska je obavestila Sud da nema nameru da interveniše.
I podnosioci predstavke i Država su podneli zapažanja o meritumu predstavke (shodno pravilu 59, stav 1).
ČINJENICE
I. OKOLNOSTI SLUČAJA
Podnosioci predstavke su rođeni 1963, odnosno 1959. godine i žive u Beču.
Podnosioci predstavke žive zajedno u homoseksualnoj vezi. Drugi podnosilac predstavke je državni službenik i osiguran je za slučaj bolesti ili povrede kod Korporacije za osiguranje državnih službenika (u daljem tekstu: KODS) (Versicherungsanstalt Öffentlicher Bediensteter). Prvi podnosilac predstavke je 1. jula 1997. godine podneo zahtev KODS da ga prizna kao izdržavano lice (Angehöriger) i kao osigurano lice po osnovu osiguranja drugog podnosioca predstavke. Tvrdio je da član 56, stav 6 Zakona o osiguranju državnih službenika za slučaj bolesti ili povrede (u daljem tekstu: ZODSBP) (Beamten-Kranken-und Unfallversicherungsgesetz) pominje samo osobe suprotnog pola koje žive sa osiguranikom i vode zajedničko domaćinstvo bez nadoknade. Međutim, član 56, stav 6 treba tumačiti tako da obuhvata i homoseksualne partnere jer ne postoje valjani razlozi zbog kojih bi lica u homoseksualnoj vezi bila lišena privilegije da budu osigurana lica.
KODS je 2. septembra 1997. odbila zahtev, zaključivši da zahtev prvog podnosioca predstavke mora da bude odbijen jer su on i drugi podnosilac predstavke istog pola. Ova odluka je uručena drugom podnosiocu predstavke, koji je na nju 1. oktobra 1997. podneo prigovor.
Gradonačelnik Beča je 21. novembra 1997. u svojstvu regionalnog guvernera ukinuo odluku iz proceduralnih razloga. Smatrao je da je KODS trebalo da uruči svoju odluku prvom podnosiocu predstavke.
KODS je 13. januara 1998. odbacila zahtev prvog podnosioca predstavke i ovaj put njemu uručila svoju odluku. Prvi podnosilac predstavke je podneo prigovore.
Gradonačelnik Beča je 19. marta 1998. potvrdio odluku KODS. Prvi podnosilac predstavke je zatim podneo žalbu Ustavnom sudu u kojoj je tvrdio da lišavanje homoseksualnih parova osiguranja koje bi mogli imati na osnovu činjenice da je jedan od partnera osiguranik shodno članu 56, stav 6 ZODSBP predstavlja povredu člana 14 u vezi sa članom 8 Konvencije i da je stoga neustavno.
Ustavni sud je 15. juna 1998. odbio da razmatra žalbu prvog podnosioca predstavke. Pozivajući se na svoju dotadašnju praksu, Ustavni sud je zaključio da je zakonodavac po ovom pitanju imao veoma široko polje slobodne procene u kojem je mogao da donese odluku i da pri donošenju te odluke nije izašao van okvira tog polja.
Ustavni sud je neutvrđenog dana odobrio zahtev prvog podnosioca predstavke da predmet prosledi Upravnom sudu. Prvi podnosilac predstavke je dopunio svoju žalbu Upravnom sudu 7. septembra 1998.
Upravni sud je 4. oktobra 2001. odbio žalbu prvog podnosioca predstavke. Našao je da su vlasti ispravno zaključile da se član 56, stav 6 ZODSBP odnosi samo na heteroseksualna partnerstva. Smatrao je da nije prekršen član 14 u vezi sa članom 8 Konvencije jer član 8 ne garantuje konkretna socijalna prava te slučaj o kojem je reč stoga ne potpada pod delokrug te odredbe. Izuzimanje homoseksualnih partnerstava iz domašaja člana 56, stav 6 ZODSBP je takođe u skladu sa načelom jednakosti jer je različito postupanje opravdano. Premda je istina da - u situaciji u kojoj lica različitog pola žive zajedno u domaćinstvu pri čemu jedno lice vodi domaćinstvo, a nije zaposleno - možemo, u načelu, zaključiti da ova lica žive u vanbračnoj zajednici, takav zaključak ne stoji u situaciji u kojoj dva lica istog pola žive u zajedničkom domaćinstvu. S obzirom na odsustvo bilo kakve mogućnosti za registraciju homoseksualnog partnerstva, bilo bi nužno sprovesti delikatna ispitivanja najintimnije sfere života lica o kom je reč. Različita činjenična stanja opravdavaju različito postupanje propisano zakonom.
U postupku koji je pokrenuo kako bi ispitao ustavnost dve odredbe slične članu 56, stav 6 ZODSBP, a koje su se odnosile na ostvarivanje prava na osiguranje srodnika osiguranika, Ustavni sud je 10. oktobra 2005. odlučio da ukine član 123, stav 8(b) Zakona o opštem socijalnom osiguranju (u daljem tekstu ZOSO) (Allgemeines Sozial-versicherungsgesetz) i član 83, stav 3 Zakona o socijalnom osiguranju u oblasti privrede i trgovine (u daljem tekstu ZSOPT) (Gewerbliches Sozialversicherungsgesetz). Ustavni sud se izričito pozvao na presudu Evropskog suda za ljudska prava u predmetu Karner protiv Austrije ([Karner v. Austria] br. 40016/98, od 24. jula 2003) i zaključio da su dve odredbe koje omogućavaju osiguranje lica koja žive sa osiguranikom a nisu sa njim u srodstvu diskriminatorne jer su ograničene na lica suprotnog pola.
Zakonom o izmenama i dopunama Zakona o socijalnim pravima (u daljem tekstu: ZIDZSP) (Sozialrechts-Änderungsgesetz), koji je stupio na snagu 1. avgusta 2006. godine, izmenjeni su ZOSO, ZSOPT, kao i član 56 ZODSBP. Drugi amandman na član 56 ZODSBP stupio je na snagu 1. jula 2007.
II. RELEVANTNO DOMAĆE PRAVO
„(1) Srodnici imaju pravo na ostvarivanje prava iz osiguranja, pod uslovom da imaju prebivalište u Austriji i da nemaju sopstveno zdravstveno osiguranje ni u skladu sa odredbama ovog Zakona ni u skladu sa bilo kojom drugom zakonskom odredbom
...
(6) Članom domaćinstva se smatra: lice koje je roditelj,... maćeha, očuh i hranitelji, deca... pastorčad i deca uzeta na izdržavanje, unučići ili braća i sestre osiguranika, ili lice suprotnog pola koje nije sa njim u srodstvu a koje sa njim živi u istom domaćinstvu najmanje deset meseci i koje za to vreme obavlja kućne poslove za osiguranika bez naknade, osim ukoliko u istom domaćinstvu živi supružnik koji je sposoban da radi. Samo se jedno lice ima smatrati članom domaćinstva u tom smislu.“
„Lice koje nije u srodstvu sa osiguranikom a živi sa njim u istom domaćinstvu najmanje deset meseci i koje za to vreme obavlja kućne poslove za osiguranika bez naknade, osim ukoliko u istom domaćinstvu živi supružnik koji je sposoban da radi, smatra se članom zajedničkog domaćinstva pod uslovom da:
(a) odgaja jedno ili više dece koja žive u istom domaćinstvu ... ili je to činilo najmanje četiri godine;
(b) ima pravo na naknadu za tuđu negu i pomoć (minimum 4. stepena) shodno članu 5 Saveznog zakona o naknadi za tuđu negu i pomoć ili u skladu sa odredbama Regionalnog zakona o naknadi za tuđu negu i pomoć;
(c) pruža negu i pomoć osiguraniku koji ima pravo na naknadu za tuđu negu i pomoć (minimum 4. stepena) shodno Saveznom zakonu o naknadi za tuđu negu i pomoć ili odredbama Regionalnog zakona o naknadi za tuđu negu i pomoć.“
„(6) Članom domaćinstva smatra se: lice koje je roditelj,... maćeha, očuh i hranitelji, deca, ... pastorčad i deca uzeta na izdržavanje, unučići ili braća i sestre osiguranika, koje s njim živi u istom domaćinstvu najmanje deset meseci i koje za to vreme obavlja kućne poslove za osiguranika bez naknade, osim ukoliko u istom domaćinstvu živi supružnik koji je sposoban da radi. To lice se smatra članom domaćinstva i kada više nije u stanju da obavlja kućne poslove. Samo se jedno lice ima smatrati članom domaćinstva u tom smislu.
(6a) Lice koje nije u srodstvu sa osiguranikom a živi sa njim u istom domaćinstvu najmanje deset meseci i koje za to vreme obavlja kućne poslove za osiguranika bez naknade, osim ukoliko u istom domaćinstvu živi supružnik koji je sposoban da radi, smatra se članom zajedničkog domaćinstva po uslovom da:
(a) odgaja jedno ili više dece koja žive u istom domaćinstvu ... ili je to činilo najmanje četiri godine; ili
(b) pruža negu i pomoć osiguraniku koji ima pravo na naknadu troškova za tuđu negu i pomoć, minimum 4. stepena shodno Saveznom zakonu o naknadi za tuđu negu i pomoć ili odredbama Regionalnog zakona o naknadi za tuđu negu i pomoć.“
„(3) Lica suprotnog pola koja nisu u srodstvu sa osiguranikom, a koja su imala pravo na pogodnosti kao srodnici shodno članu 56(6) koji je bio na snazi 30. juna 2007, a koja su do tog datuma navršila dvadeset i sedam godina života, i dalje imaju pravo na pogodnosti kao srodnici dok se relevantne okolnosti ne promene.
(4) Lica suprotnog pola koja nisu u srodstvu sa osiguranikom, a koja su imala pravo na pogodnosti kao srodnici shodno članu 56(6) koji je bio na snazi 30. juna 2007, a koja do tog datuma nisu navršila dvadeset i sedam godina života, i dalje imaju pravo na pogodnosti kao srodnici dok se relevantne okolnosti ne promene, a najkasnije do 31. decembra 2010.“
PRAVO
I. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 14 U VEZI SA ČLANOM 8 KONVENCIJE
Podnosioci predstavke su tvrdili da su žrtve diskriminacije po osnovu seksualne orijentacije jer je Upravni sud svojom odlukom od 4. oktobra 2001. godine potvrdio da samo heteroseksualni partner ima pravo na osiguranje po osnovu osiguranja drugog podnosioca predstavke u smislu člana 56(6) ZODSBP. Tvrdili su da je prekršen član 14 Konvencije u vezi sa članom 8.
Prema članu 14:
„Uživanje prava i sloboda predviđenih u [ovoj] Konvenciji obezbeđuje se bez diskriminacije po bilo kom osnovu, kao što su pol, rasa, boja kože, jezik, veroispovest, političko ili drugo mišljenje, nacionalno ili socijalno poreklo, veza sa nacionalnom manjinom, imovno stanje, rođenje ili drugi status.“
Relevantni delovi člana 8 predviđaju:
„1. Svako ima pravo na poštovanje svog privatnog i porodičnog žlivota [i], doma...
2. Javne vlasti se neće mešati u vršenje ovog prava sem ako to nije u skladu sa zakonom i neophodno u demokratskom društvu ... radi .. zaštite zdravlja ili morala ili radi zaštite prava i sloboda drugih.“
A. Podnesci strana u postupku
Podnosioci predstavke su tvrdili da su žrtve diskriminacije jer su austrijske vlasti odbile da prvom podnosiocu predstavke odobre ostvarivanje prava iz osiguranja za slučaj bolesti ili povrede na osnovu osiguranja drugog podnosioca predstavke zbog njihove seksualne orijentacije. Ovo je u suštini potvrdio i Ustavni sud u svojoj presudi od 10. oktobra 2005. Tvrdili su da i dalje predstavljaju žrtve uprkos presudi Ustavnog suda od 10. oktobra 2005. i kasnijim izmenama i dopunama ZODSBP, zato što istopolni partneri i dalje ne mogu da ostvaruju prava iz zajedničkog osiguranja ako ne odgajaju decu u zajedničkom domaćinstvu. Štaviše, prelazna odredba garantuje zajedničko osiguranje onim (muško- ženskim) parovima koji su na njega imali pravo pre amandmana, bez obzira na to da li su odgajali decu ili ne. S obzirom na to da se ova odredba ne odnosi i na istopolne partnere, oni neprekidno predstavljaju žrtve diskriminatornog zakonodavstva.
Država nije komentarisala meritum predstavke. Napomenula je da je, nakon što je Ustavni sud 10. oktobra 2005. ukinuo dve paralelne odredbe Zakona o opštem socijalnom osiguranju (ZOSO) i Zakona o socijalnom osiguranju u oblasti privrede i trgovine (ZSOPT) i zamenio ih članom 56, stav 6 ZODSBP, sprovedena opšta reforma u kojoj su preformulisane zakonske odredbe o ostvarivanju prava na osiguranje vanbračnih partnera kao osiguranih lica po osnovu osiguranja njihovih partnera. Amandmani na ZODSBP koji su stupili na snagu 1. avgusta 2006. i 1. jula 2007. na nediskriminatoran način regulišu veze partnera u šemama socijalnog osiguranja.
B. Ocena Suda
1. Primenjivost člana 14
U ovom predmetu nema spora da veza istopolnog para, kao što je ona između podnosilaca predstavke, potpada pod pojam „privatnog života“ u smislu člana 8. Međutim, Sud, imajući u vidu komentare strana u postupku, smatra da je primereno da se pozabavi pitanjem da li njihova veza takođe predstavlja „porodični život“.
Sud se poziva na stavove iz svoje prakse vezane za heteroseksualne parove, konkretno, da pojam porodice iz ove odredbe nije ograničen na bračne veze i da može obuhvatati i druge de facto „porodične“ veze u kojima nevenčana lica žive zajedno. Dete rođeno u takvoj zajednici je ipso jure deo te „porodične“ jedinice od trenutka rođenja i samom činjenicom rođenja (videti presude u predimetima Elsholc protiv Nemačke [Elsholz v. Germany] [GC], br. 25735/94, stav 43, ECHR 2000-VIII; Kigen protiv Irske [Keegan v. Ireland], od 26. maja 1994, stav 44, Serija A br. 290; kao i u predmetu Džonston i ostali protiv Irske [Johnston and Others v. Ireland] od 18. decembra 1986, stav 56, Serija A br. 112).
Nasuprot tome, Sud je u svojoj praksi prihvatio samo da emotivna i seksualna veza istopolnog para predstavlja „privatni život“ ali nije zaključio da ona predstavlja i „porodični život“ čak i kada je reč o dugotrajnoj vezi vanbračnih partnera. Sud je prilikom donošenja tog zaključka primetio da, s obzirom na postojanje malog broja dodirnih tačaka između Država ugovornica, ovo i dalje predstavlja oblast u kojoj Države ugovornice uživaju široko polje slobodne procene, uprkos sve jačoj tendenciji u većem broju evropskih Država ka pravnom i sudskom priznanju stabilnih de facto partnerstava između homoseksualaca (vidi odluku u predmetu Mata Estevez protiv Španije [Mata Estevez v. Spain] br. 56501/00, ECHR 2001-VI, i presude na koje se Sud u njoj poziva). U gore Karner (stav 33), u vezi sa nasleđivanjem prava zakupa pokojnog partnera iz istopolne zajednice, koji je potpadao pod pojam „dom“, Sud je izričito ostavio otvorenim pitanje da li se taj predmet odnosi i na „privatni i porodični život“ podnosioca predstavke.
Sud primećuje da je u mnogim Državama članicama došlo do brze evolucije društvenih stavova ka istopolnim parovima od 2001, kada je on doneo odluku u predmetu Mata Estevez. Od tada je značajan broj Država članica zakonom priznao istopolne parove (vidi gore, stavove 27-30). Određene odredbe zakona EU takođe odražavaju sve veću tendenciju podvođenja istopolnih parova pod pojam „porodice“ (vidi stav 26 gore).
S obzirom na ovakav razvoj događaja, Sud smatra da ne bi bilo prirodno da se drži stava da istopolni parovi, za razliku od heteroseksualnih parova, ne mogu da uživaju pravo na „porodični život“ u smislu člana 8. Shodno tome, veza istopolnog para koji živi u stabilnom de facto partnerstvu, potpada pod pojam „porodičnog života“ kao što bi potpadala i veza heteroseksualnog para u istoj situaciji.
U pogledu člana 14, na koji su se podnosioci predstavke pozvali u ovom predmetu, Sud ponavlja da taj član samo dopunjuje ostale materijalne odredbe Konvencije i Protokola uz nju. Taj član ne deluje samostalno jer ima dejstvo jedino u vezi sa „uživanjem prava i sloboda“ koje ove odredbe štite (vidi, među mnogim drugim relevantnim dokumentima, presudu u predmetu Sahin protiv Nemačke [Sahin v. Germany] [GC] br. 30943/96, st. 85, ECHR 2003-VIII). Primena člana 14 ne pretpostavlja nužno povredu jednog od materijalnih prava zaštićenih Konvencijom. Neophodno je ali i dovoljno da činjenice predmeta „potpadaju pod delokrug“ jednog ili više članova Konvencije (vidi presudu u predmetu Petrović protiv Austrije [Petrovic v. Austria], od 27. marta 1998, stav 22, Izveštaji o presudama i odlukama [Reports of Judgments and Decisions] 1998-II).
Zabrana diskriminacije zajemčena članom 14 je stoga šira od uživanja prava i sloboda koje po Konvenciji i Protokolima uz nju svaka Država mora da garantuje. Takođe se odnosi i na ona dodatna prava koja potpadaju pod opšti domašaj svakog člana Konvencije, a koja je Država dobrovoljno odlučila da pruža. Ovo načelo je čvrsto utemeljeno u praksi Suda (vidi presudu u predmetu E.B. protiv Francuske [E.B. v France] [GC] br. 43546/02, stav 48, ECHR 2008-... i druge presude na koje se Sud u njoj poziva).
Ovaj predmet se odnosi na mogućnost osiguranja vanbračnih partnera za slučaj bolesti ili povrede u skladu sa zakonom utvrđenom šemom osiguranja, mogućnost koju zakonske odredbe koje podnosioci predstavke osporavaju priznaju pod određenim uslovima. Štaviše, po mišljenju Suda, mogućnost osiguranja partnera mora da bude okvalifikovana kao mera koja ima za cilj poboljšanje privatne i porodične situacije osiguranika. Sud stoga smatra da osiguranje partnera o kojem je ovde reč potpada pod polje primene člana 8.
Shodno tome, Država, koja je u obezbeđivanju ovog prava otišla dalje od svojih obaveza iz člana 8 – što predstavlja mogućnost datu članom 53 Konvencije – u primeni tog prava ne može preduzimati diskriminatorne mere u smislu člana 14 (vidi, mutatis mutandis, presudu u gore navedenom predmetu E.B. protiv Francuske, stav 49).
2. Poštovanje člana 14 u vezi sa članom 8
Podnosioci predstavke su tvrdili da su žrtve diskriminacije jer nije postojala mogućnost da prvi podnosilac predstavke bude osiguran po osnovu osiguranja drugog podnosioca predstavke za slučaj bolesti ili povrede. Do toga je došlo jer su, prema članu 56, stav 6 ZODSBP, koji je bio na snazi do 1. avgusta 2006, na takvo osiguranje imali pravo samo partneri suprotnog pola i jer se ovakva diskriminatorna praksa u suštini nije promenila ni nakon stupanja na snagu izmena i dopuna relevantnih odredbi kojima su propisani uslovi koje oni ne mogu da ispune.
Država nije komentarisala situaciju u vezi sa zakonodavstvom do stupanja na snagu izmena i dopuna ZODSBP 1. avgusta 2006. odnosno 1. jula 2007 i tvrdila je da podnosioci predstavke od tada više ne mogu da tvrde da su žrtve diskriminacije, jer su izmenjene i dopunjene odredbe formulisane na rodno neutralan način.
Sud ponavlja da je u smislu člana 14 razlika u postupanju diskriminatorna ukoliko za nju nema objektivnog i razumnog opravdanja, to jest, ukoliko se njome ne teži ostvarivanju legitimnog cilja i ukoliko ne postoji razuman odnos srazmernostiizmeđu primenjenih sredstava i cilja čijem se ostvarenju težilo (vidi presudu u gore navedenom predmetu Petrović, str. 586, st. 30). Pored toga, Sudu moraju biti predočeni veoma ozbiljni razlozi kako bi mogao da smatra da je razlika u postupanju zasnovana isključivo na polu u skladu sa Konvencijom (vidi presude predmetu Burgharc protiv Švajcarske [Burghartz v. Switzerland], st. 27; i u predmetima Karlhajnc Šmit protiv Nemačke [Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany] od 18. jula 1994, st. 24, Serija A br. 291-B; Salžeiro da Silva Mouta protiv Portugala [Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal] br. 33290/96, st. 29, ECHR 1999-IX; Smit i Grejdi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom] br. 33985/96 i 33986/96, st. 94, ECHR 1999-VI; Frete protiv Francuske [Fretté v. France] br. 36515/97, st. 34 i 40, ECHR 2002-I; kao i u predmetu S.L. protiv Austrije [S.L. v. Austria], br. 45330/99, st. 36, ECHR 2003-I). Kao i u pogledu razlikovanja po osnovu pola, moraju da postoje izuzetno ozbiljni razlozi koji bi opravdali i razlikovanje po osnovu seksualne orijentacije (vidi predmet Karner protiv Austrije, br. 40016/98, st. 36, ECHR 2003-IX).
Sud će razmotriti svaki period ponaosob kako bi utvrdio da li je postojalo objektivno i razumno opravdanje za razliku u postupanju na koju su se podnosioci predstavke žalili.
(a) Prvi period: do stupanja na snagu člana 56, stav 6(a) ZODSBP 1. avgusta 2006. godine
Sud primećuje da je prvi podnosilac predstavke 1. jula 1997. podneo zahtev KODS da ga prizna kao lice koje izdržava drugi podnosilac predstavke i kao osigurano lice za slučaj bolesti ili povrede po osnovu osiguranja drugog podnosioca predstavke. KODS je 2. septembra 1997. odbacila zahtev, smatrajući da se prvi podnosilac predstavke ne može smatrati izdržavanim licem u smislu člana 56, stav 6 ZODSBP zato što je istog pola kao i drugi podnosilac predstavke. Nije se složila sa argumentom podnosilaca predstavke da član 56, stav 6 treba tumačiti tako da obuhvata i homoseksualne partnere. Drugostepene vlasti su takođe odbacile ovaj argument. Upravni sud je u svojoj odluci od 4. oktobra 2001. zaključio da je izuzimanje homoseksualnih partnerstava iz domašaja člana 56, stav 6 ZODSBP takođe u skladu sa načelom jednakosti jer je razlika u postupanju opravdana. Tvrdio je da, premda je istina da - u situaciji u kojoj lica različitog pola žive zajedno u domaćinstvu pri čemu jedno lice vodi domaćinstvo, a nije zaposleno - možemo, u načelu, zaključiti da ova lica žive u vanbračnoj zajednici, takav zaključak ne stoji u situaciji u kojoj dva lica istog pola žive u zajedničkom domaćinstvu.. S obzirom na odsustvo svake mogućnosti za registraciju homoseksualnog partnerstva, bilo bi nužno sprovesti delikatna ispitivanja najintimnije sfere života lica o kom je reč. Ta razlika u činjeničnom stanju opravdava različito postupanje propisano zakonom.
Sud nadalje primećuje da sama Država nije pružila nikakvo opravdanje za razliku u postupanju prema podnosiocima predstavke i vanbračnim partnerima suprotnog pola.
Sud ponavlja da je u predmetu Karner protiv Austrije, koji ima određenih sličnosti sa ovim predmetom, zaključio da u predmetima u kojima Države imaju usko polje slobodne procene, kao u slučaju gde postoji razlika u postupanju po osnovu pola ili seksualne orijentacije, načelo srazmernosti ne iziskuje samo da mera koja je izabrana u načelu bude primerena ostvarivanju željenog cilja. Mora se takođe dokazati da je bilo neophodno da se, radi ostvarenja tog cilja, iz opsega primene određene zakonske odredbe isključe određene kategorije ljudi - u ovom slučaju lica koja žive u homoseksualnoj vezi (vidi presudu u gore navedenom predmetu Karner, stav 41). Sud, međutim, smatra da Država ili nacionalne vlasti i sudovi nisu naveli nijedan argument koji bi omogućio donošenje takvog zaključka.
Shodno tome, došlo je do povrede člana 14 u vezi sa članom 8, u pogledu perioda o kojem je reč.
(b) Drugi period: od stupanja na snagu člana 56, stav 6(a) ZODSBP 1. avgusta 2006. do stupanja na snagu izmena i dopuna člana 56, stav 6 i stav (6a) ZODSBP 30. juna 2007. godine
Sud smatra da se diskriminatorna priroda ZODSBP koju je utvrdio gore u tekstu nije izmenila nakon prvih amandmana, jer su nevenčani muško-ženski parovi imali pravo na povlašćeni tretman, dok su nevenčani parovi iste seksualne orijentacije, bez obzira na svoju seksualnu orijentaciju, imali na njega pravo samo ako zajedno odgajaju decu. Premda se situacija poboljšala usvajanjem ovih izmena i dopuna, jer homoseksualni parovi više nisu u načelu bili izuzeti iz polja primene člana 56 ZODSPB, i dalje je postojala značajna razlika u postupanju za koju Država nije pružila dovoljno obrazloženje.
(c) Treći period: nakon stupanja na snagu izmena i dopuna člana 56, stav 6 i stav 6(a) ZODSBP 1. jula 2007. godine
Sud primećuje da najnovija verzija ZODSBP na snazi od 1. jula 2007. ne pominje izričito partnere suprotnog pola u članu 56, stav 6(a) kao i da ograničava polje primene člana 56, stav 6 na srodnike. Stoga je formulisana na neutralan način u pogledu seksualne orijentacije vanbračnih partnera.
Podnosioci predstavke su tvrdili da je pravna situacija diskriminatorna i nakon stupanja na snagu gore pomenutih izmena i dopuna zato što je mogućnost da prvi podnosilac predstavke bude osiguran za slučaj bolesti ili povrede po osnovu osiguranja drugog podnosioca predstavke od tada postala još komplikovanija jer su izmenama i dopunama uvedeni dodatni uslovi koje ne ispunjavaju ni svi parovi, a kamoli podnosioci predstavke. Štaviše, oni su takođe žrtve diskriminacije jer lica kojima je odobreno ostvarivanje prava iz osiguranja po osnovu osiguranja partnera pre stupanja na snagu ovih izmena i dopuna i dalje imaju mogućnost da ostvaruju prava iz osiguranja kao osigurana lica.
U pogledu prvog argumenta podnosilaca predstavke, Sud primećuje da član 14 Konvencije garantuje samo pravo na jednako postupanje prema licima u relativno sličnim situacijama ali ne garantuje pristup konkretnim pogodnostima. On dalje primećuje da je uslov na koji se podnosioci pozivaju, odgajanje dece u zajedničkom domaćinstvu, formulisan na neutralan način i da podnosioci predstavke nisu tvrdili da homoseksualci po austrijskom zakonu nemaju pravo da odgajaju decu.
U pogledu drugog argumenta podnosilaca predstavke, Sud primećuje da je prema prelaznoj odredbi u članu 217 ZODSBP, nastavak primene člana 56, stav 6(a) ograničen na lica koja su navršila određeni broj godina života ukoliko se relevantne okolnosti nisu promenile, i da se takođe odnosi i na one koji neće navršiti taj broj godina života do 31. decembra 2010. Sud ne može da zaključi da davanje dovoljno vremena za prilagođavanje izmenjenim okolnostima onima koji su ranije imali pravo na konkretnu pogodnost po zakonu koji je u to vreme bio na snazi nije u saglasnosti sa zahtevima člana 14.
Sud u tom kontekstu ukazuje na svoju praksu po kojoj načelo pravne sigurnosti, koje nužno predstavlja načelo prava uspostavljenog Konvencijom, može osloboditi Države obaveze da dovode u pitanje pravne akte ili situacije koji su prethodili presudama Suda kojima je utvrđeno da nacionalno zakonodavstvo nije kompatibilno sa Konvencijom. Isti argumenti važe i za situacije u kojima neki ustavni sud ukine domaće propise zato što nisu u skladu sa ustavom (vidi presudu u predmetu (Marks protiv Belgije [Marckx v. Belgium] od 13. juna 1979, stav 58, Serija A, br. 31). S obzirom na načelo pravne sigurnosti, Sud je, pored toga, bio mišljenja da neki ustavni sud može da odredi rok u kojem zakonodavac treba da usvoji novo zakonodavstvo pri čemu neustavna odredba ostaje na snazi tokom prelaznog perioda (vidi odluke u predmetu Volden protiv Lihtenštajna [Walden v. Liechtenstein], br. 33916/96, od 16. marta 2000; i u predmetu J.R. protiv Nemačke [J.R. v. Germany] br. 22651/93, Odluke i izveštaji [Decisions and Reports] 83-A).
Sud stoga smatra da podnosioci predstavke od 1. jula 2007. više nisu bili izloženi neopravdanoj razlici u postupanju u pogledu osiguranja prvog podnosioca predstavke po osnovu osiguranja drugog podnosioca predstavke za slučaj bolesti ili povrede. Shodno tome, nije došlo do povrede člana 14, u vezi sa članom 8, u pogledu ovog perioda.
II. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 14 KONVENCIJE U VEZI SA ČLANOM 1 PROTOKOLA Br. 1
„1. Svako fizičko i pravno lice ima pravo na neometano uživanje svoje imovine. Niko ne može biti lišen svoje imovine, osim u javnom interesu i pod uslovima predviđenim zakonom i opštim načelima međunarodnog prava.
Prethodne odredbe, međutim, ni na koji način ne utiču na pravo Države da primenjuje zakone koje smatra potrebnim da bi regulisala korišćenje imovine u skladu sa opštim interesima u skladu sa opštim interesima...“
III. PRIMENA ČLANA 41 KONVENCIJE
„Kada Sud utvrdi prekršaj Konvencije ili protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo Visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo delimičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj stranci.“
A. Šteta
Podnosioci predstavke su podneli zahtev za naknadu materijalne štete u iznosu od 28.375,12 evra (EUR) za period od 1993. do maja 2008, kao i za naknadu 81,52 evra mesečno od tog datuma nadalje. Tvrdili su da je usled nemogućnosti da bude osiguran za slučaj bolesti ili povrede po osnovu drugog podnosioca predstavke, prvi podnosilac predstavke morao da se prijavi na pojedinačno zdravstveno osiguranje za koje je uplaćivao premije u ukupnom iznosu od 11.375,12 evra od 1993. do maja 2008. kao i da plati ukupno 1.000 evra za nepokrivene troškove vakcinacije i troškove lečenja u inostranstvu u iznosu od 16.000 evra. Na kraju su podneli zahtev za naknadu 81,52 evra mesečno od maja 2008. nadalje, koliko je iznosila premija osiguranja za slučaj bolesti ili povrede koju je prvi podnosilac predstavke plaćao svakog meseca.
Država je tvrdila da je iznos previsok jer je prvi podnosilac predstavke mogao da izbegne veliki deo troškova navedenih u zahtevu u pogledu ugovora o pojedinačnom zdravstvenom osiguranju da se opredelio za opštu šemu zdravstvenog osiguranja. Mesečne premije po toj šemi su razumne i mogu čak i da budu umanjene u slučaju finansijskih teškoća. Štaviše, period za koji su podnosioci predstavke mogli da zahtevaju naknadu tih troškova je počeo da teče tek jula 1997. kada su podnosioci predstavke prvi put podneli zahtev da prvi podnosilac predstavke bude osiguran po osnovu osiguranja drugog podnosioca predstavke. Takođe se mora imati u vidu da bi, čak i da je prvom podnosiocu predstavke odobren zahtev da bude osiguran po osnovu osiguranja drugog podnosioca predstavke, oni morali da plaćaju dodatne premije za takvo osiguranje od januara 2001. nadalje. Takvi hipotetički troškovi bi morali da budu odbijeni od zahteva za naknadu podnosilaca predstavke. Zahtev za naknadu troškova vakcinacije je neutemeljen jer takve troškove u svakom slučaju ne pokriva šema osiguranja koju je prvi podnosilac predstavke želeo da ima. Ukupan iznos za naknadu troškova lečenja u inostranstvu je takođe neutemeljen jer je obično takvo lečenje takođe pokriveno klauzulom o lečenju u privatnom putnom osiguranju a, pored toga, podnosioci predstavke nisu ni potkrepili taj zahtev.
Sud prvo napominje da je utvrdio povredu člana 14, u vezi sa članom 8 samo u pogledu perioda do 30. juna 2007. On stoga ne može da dosudi naknadu za iznose u zahtevima koji se odnose na period koji je usledio posle tog datuma. Sud takođe zapaža da su podnosioci predstavke jednostavno naveli ukupan iznos u pogledu zahteva za naknadu troškova vakcinacije i troškova lečenja u inostranstvu i da nisu potkrepili svoj zahtev. Stoga u tom pogledu ne može da dosudi nikakav iznos za naknadu materijalne štete. Uprkos tome, Sud je uveren da su podnosioci predstavke pretrpeli finansijske gubitke zbog odbijanja zahteva da prvi podnosilac predstavke bude osiguran za slučaj bolesti ili povrede po osnovu osiguranja drugog podnosioca predstavke i posledične potrebe da se prijavi na drugu šemu osiguranja. Međutim, iznosi koje podnosioci predstavke potražuju su preterani jer argument Države - da se eventualna naknada može dodeliti samo za period u kojem su podnosioci predstavke načinili konkretan korak ka osiguranju prvog podnosioca predstavke po osnovu osiguranja drugog podnosioca predstavke 1997. i da od nje treba odbiti troškove koje bi podnosioci predstavke snosili da je njegov zahtev da obojica budu obuhvaćeni osiguranjem odobren - deluje razumno. Imajući ove razloge u vidu, Sud na pravičnoj osnovi dosuđuje iznos od 5.000 evra po ovoj stavci, kao i iznos svih poreza naplativih na taj iznos.
Podnosioci predstavke su podneli zahtev za naknadu nematerijalne štete u iznosu od 36.000 evra.
Država je ovaj zahtev smatrala preteranim i zaključila da utvrđivanje povrede samo po sebi predstavlja dovoljno obeštećenje u okolnostima ovog slučaja.
Sud smatra da su podnosioci predstavke sigurno pretrpeli nematerijalnu štetu. On im na pravičnoj osnovi dosuđuje iznos od 10.000 evra po ovoj stavci, kao i iznos svih poreza naplativih na taj iznos.
B. Sudski i ostali troškovi
Podnosioci predstavke su podneli zahtev za naknadu sudskih i ostalih troškova koje su pretrpeli u postupcima pred nacionalnim organima u iznosu od 5.408,62 evra, uključujući i porez na promet, kao i sudske i ostale troškove koje su pretrpeli u postupku pred Sudom u iznosu od 10.273,67 evra, uključujući i porez na promet. Podnosioci predstavke su pored toga podneli zahtev za naknadu u ukupnom iznosu od 2.500 evra za gotovinske troškove koje su pretrpeli i 500 evra za usluge prevoda.
Država je osporila ovaj zahtev kao preteran. Po njenom mišljenju, treba uzeti u obzir da su podnesci podneti domaćim vlastima i sudovima i oni podneti Sudu u velikoj meri identični.
Sud smatra da se ne može dosuditi nikakva naknada gotovinskih troškova i troškova prevoda jer podnosioci predstavke nisu podneli račune kojima bi potkrepili te zahteve.
U pogledu zahteva za naknadu sudskih i ostalih troškova pretrpljenih u postupcima pred domaćim organima i pred Sudom, Sud ponavlja da prema njegovoj praksi, podnosilac prestavke ima pravo na naknadu troškova i izdataka samo ako dokaže da su oni bili stvarni, neophodni i razumni u pogledu iznosa. U ovom predmetu, uzevši u obzir dokumenta u njegovom posedu i gore navedene kriterijume, Sud smatra razumnim da podnosiocima predstavke dosudi 4.500 evra naknade za troškove postupka pred domaćim organima i 5.500 evra naknade za troškove postupka pred Sudom. Shodno tome, Sud dosuđuje podnosiocima predstavke iznos od 10.000 evra naknade za sudske i ostale troškove, kao i iznos svih poreza naplativih na taj iznos.
C. Zatezna kamata
SUD IZ OVIH RAZLOGA
Utvrđuje sa pet glasova za i dva protiv da je došlo do povrede člana 14 u vezi sa članom 8 Konvencije u pogledu perioda do 1. avgusta 2006;
Zaključuje jednoglasno da je došlo do povrede člana 14 u vezi sa članom 8 Konvencije u pogledu perioda od 1. avgusta 2006. do 30. juna 2007;
Zaključuje jednoglasno da nije došlo do povrede člana 14 u vezi sa članom 8 Konvencije u pogledu perioda od 1. jula 2007 nadalje;
Zaključuje jednoglasno da nema potrebe da razmatra predstavku i u pogledu člana 14 Konvencije u vezi sa članom 1 Protokola br. 1;
Zaključuje jednoglasno
(a) da tužena Država treba da isplati 5.000 EUR (pet hiljada evra) kao i iznos svih naplativih poreza na taj iznos na ime materijalne štete, 10.000 EUR (deset hiljada evra) kao i iznos svih naplativih poreza na taj iznos na ime nematerijalne štete i 10.000 EUR (deset hiljada evra) kao i iznos svih naplativih poreza na taj iznos na ime sudskih i ostalih troškova u roku od tri meseca od dana pravosnažnosti presude u skladu sa članom 44, stav 2 Konvencije;
(b) da od isteka gore navedena tri meseca do isplate bude zaračunata zatezna kamata na navedene iznose po stopi jednakoj graničnoj aktivnoj kamatnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke uvećanoj za tri procentna poena;
Sačinjeno na engleskom i francuskom jeziku i prosleđeno pisanim putem22. jula 2010, u skladu sa pravilom 77 st. 2 i 3 Poslovnika Suda.
Soren Nilsen Kristos Rozakis
sekretar predsednik
Uz ovu presudu je u skladu sa članom 45, stav 2 Konvencije i pravilom 74, stav 2 Poslovnika Suda priloženo izdvojeno mišljenje sudija Vajić i Malinvernija.C.L.R.
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Prevod presude preuzet sa https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
Ovaj prevod je nastao uz podršku Fiducijarnog fonda za ljudska prava Saveta Evrope www.coe.int/humanrightstrustfund.
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF P.B. AND J.S. v. AUSTRIA
(Application no. 18984/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22 July 2010
22/10/2010
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of P.B. and J.S. v. Austria,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Christos Rozakis, President,
Nina Vajić,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Dean Spielmann,
Giorgio Malinverni, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 1 July 2010,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 18984/02) against the Republic of Austria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by one Hungarian national, Mr P.B. and one Austrian national, Mr J.S. (“the applicants”), on 24 April 2002. The President of the Chamber acceded to the applicants' request not to have their names disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court).
2. The applicants were represented by Mr J. Unterweger, a lawyer practising in Vienna. The Austrian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ambassador H. Tichy, Head of the International Law Department at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. By a decision of 20 March 2008 the Court declared the application admissible.
4. The Government of Hungary, having been informed by the Registrar of their right to intervene (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 1), indicated that they did not intend to do so.
5. The applicants and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
6. The applicants were born in 1963 and 1959 respectively and live in Vienna.
7. The applicants live together in a homosexual relationship. The second applicant is a civil servant and, for the purpose of accident and sickness insurance cover, he is insured with the Civil Servants Insurance Corporation (“the CSIC”) (Versicherungsanstalt Öffentlicher Bediensteter). On 1 July 1997 the first applicant asked the CSIC to recognise him as the dependent (Angehöriger) and to extend the second applicant's insurance cover to include him. He submitted that section 56(6) of the Civil Servants Sickness and Accident Insurance Act (“the CSSAIA”) (Beamten-Kranken- und Unfallversicherungsgesetz) only referred to persons of the opposite sex living with the principally insured person and running the common household without receiving any payment. But, because there were no good reasons for excluding persons living in a homosexual relationship from the privilege of extended insurance cover, section 56(6) should be interpreted as also including homosexual partners.
8. On 2 September 1997 the CSIC dismissed the request, holding that, because the first applicant was of the same sex as the second applicant, his request had to be dismissed. This decision was served on the second applicant who, on 1 October 1997, filed an objection.
9. On 21 November 1997 the Mayor of Vienna, acting as the Regional Governor, quashed the decision on procedural grounds. He held that the CSIC should have served its decision on the first applicant.
10. On 13 January 1998 the CSIC dismissed a request by the first applicant and this time served the decision on him. The first applicant filed objections.
11. The mayor of Vienna confirmed the CSIC's decision on 19 March 1998. Thereupon the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court in which he argued that the exclusion, under section 56(6) of the CSSAIA, of homosexual couples from the extension of insurance cover was in breach of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8, of the Convention and was therefore unconstitutional.
12. On 15 June 1998 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the first applicant's complaint. Referring to its previous case-law, the Constitutional Court found that, in the issue at hand, the legislator had had a very wide margin in which to reach a decision and the decision taken had been within that margin.
13. On an unspecified date the Constitutional Court granted a request by the first applicant for the case to be transferred to the Administrative Court. On 7 September 1998 the first applicant supplemented his complaint to the Administrative Court.
14. On 4 October 2001 the Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant's complaint. It found that the authorities had correctly concluded that section 56(6) of the CSSAIA only applied to heterosexual partnerships. There was no issue under Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8, of the Convention, because Article 8 did not guarantee specific social rights, and the case at issue did not therefore fall within the ambit of that provision. The exclusion of homosexual partnerships from the scope of section 56(6) of the CSSAIA also complied with the principle of equality because that difference in treatment was justified. While it was true that, where persons of different sex living together in a household in which one of them was running that household while not being gainfully employed, it was, as a rule, safe to conclude that they were cohabiting in a partnership, that was not the case if two persons of the same sex were living together in a household. In the absence of any possibility to register a homosexual partnership, it would have been necessary to undertake delicate enquiries into the most intimate sphere of the person concerned. That difference in the factual situation justified different treatment in law.
15. In proceedings instituted by the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of two similar provisions to section 56(6) of the CSSAIA relating to extending insurance cover to relatives, on 10 October 2005 the Constitutional Court decided to quash section 123(8b) of the General Social Security Act (“the GSSA”) (Allgemeines Sozial-versicherungsgesetz) and section 83(3) of the Social Security Act for Trade and Commerce (“the TCSSA”) (Gewerbliches Sozialversicherungsgesetz). The Constitutional Court explicitly referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Karner v. Austria (see Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, 24 July 2003) and held that the two provisions in which the extension of insurance cover to unrelated persons living with the insured were discriminatory because they were restricted to persons of the opposite sex.
16. On 1 August 2006 the Social Rights Amendment Act (“the SRAA”) (Sozialrechts-Änderungsgesetz) entered into force amending in particular the GSSA, the TCSSA and also section 56 of the CSSAIA. A second amendment to section 56 of the CSSAIA entered into force on 1 July 2007.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
17. Before 1 August 2006 section 56(6) of the Civil Servants Sickness and Accident Insurance Act (Beamten-, Kranken- und Unfallversicherungs-gesetz), in so far as relevant, provided as follows:
“(1) Relatives are entitled to benefits, if they have their ordinary residence in Austria and are neither health insured under the provisions of this Act nor any other provision of law ...
...
(6) A person belonging to the group of parents, ... step-parents and foster parents, children, ... stepchildren and foster children, grandchildren or brothers and sisters of the insured or a person of the opposite sex who is not related to him or her who has been living with him or her in the same household for at least ten months and since then has been doing the domestic work for the insured without payment, unless there is a spouse living in the same household who is able to work, shall be regarded as a member of the household. Only one person can be a member in this sense.”
18. After the amendment to the Civil Servants Sickness and Accident Insurance Act on 1 August 2006, section 56(6) remained the same, but a new paragraph (6a) was introduced. It read as follows;
“A person who is not a relative of the insured and who has been living with him or her in the same household for at least ten month and since then is doing the domestic work for him or her without payment, unless there is a spouse living in the same household who is able to work, shall be regarded as a member of the common household, if
(a) he or she is bringing up one or more children living in the same household ... or did so for at least four years;
(b) he or she is entitled to benefits for the payment of nursing care (at least level 4) pursuant to section 5 of the Federal Nursing Care Benefits Act or pursuant to the provisions of the Regional Nursing Care Benefits Act;
(c) he or she is doing nursing work for the insured who is entitled to benefits (at least level 4) for the payment of nursing care pursuant to the Federal Nursing Care Benefits Act or pursuant to the provisions of the Regional Nursing Care Benefits Act.”
19. On 1 July 2007 a further amendment to the Civil Servants Sickness and Accident Insurance Act entered into force. Section 56(6) no longer applied to non-related persons, but only to relatives of the insured. The newly introduced paragraph 6a was only slightly modified. These provisions, in so far as relevant, read as follows:
“(6) A person belonging to the group of parents, ... step-parents and foster parents, children, ... stepchildren and foster children, grandchildren or brothers and sisters of the insured who has been living with him or her in the same household for at least ten months and since then has been doing the domestic work for the insured without payment, unless there is a spouse living in the same household who is able to work, shall be regarded as a member of the household. He or she shall also be considered a member if he or she is no longer able to do the domestic work. Only one person can be a member in this sense.
(6a) A person who is not a relative of the insured and who has been living with him or her in the same household for at least ten month and since then has been doing the domestic work for him or her without payment, unless there is a spouse living in the same household who is able to work, shall be regarded as a member of the common household, if
(a) he or she is bringing up one or more children living in the same household ... or did so for at least four years, or
(b) he or she is doing nursing work for the insured who is entitled to public benefits at least level 4 pursuant to the Federal Nursing Care Benefits Act or pursuant to the provisions of the Regional Nursing Care Benefits Act.”
20. The last amendment to the Civil Servants Sickness and Accident Insurance Act which entered into force on 1 July 2007 was accompanied by a transitory provision. Section 217(3) and (4) read as follows:
“(3) Persons of the opposite sex and not related to the insured, who, pursuant to section 56(6) as in force on 30 June 2007, had been entitled to benefits as relatives and who on that date had already reached twenty-seven years of age remain entitled to benefits as relatives until the relevant circumstances change.
(4) Persons of the opposite sex and not related to the insured, who, pursuant to section 56(6) as in force on 30 June 2007, had been entitled to benefits as relatives and who on that date had not yet reached twenty-seven years of age remain entitled to benefits as relatives until the relevant circumstances change, but at most until 31 December 2010.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
21. The applicants claimed to be victims of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation in that the Administrative Court in its decision of 4 October 2001 upheld that the insurance cover of the second applicant only extended to heterosexual partners within the meaning of section 56(6) CSSAIA. They relied on Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8.
22. Article 14 reads as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
Article 8, in so far as relevant, provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life [and] his home ...
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
A. Submissions by the parties
23. The applicants submitted that they had been victims of discrimination because of the refusal of the Austrian authorities to extend the second applicant's health and accident insurance to the first applicant on grounds of their sexual orientation. This had also been acknowledged in substance by the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 10 October 2005. They maintained that, despite the Constitutional Court's judgment of 10 October 2005 and the subsequent amendment to the CSSAIA, they were still victims because same-sex partners were still excluded from joint insurance if they did not raise children in the common household. Moreover, the transitional provision guaranteed the joint insurance to those (male/female) couples who were entitled to it before the amendment, irrespective of whether they raised children or not. Given that this was not the case for same-sex partners they were continuously victims of discriminatory legislation.
24. The Government did not comment on the merits of the application. They noted that after the Constitutional Court had, on 10 October 2005, repealed the two parallel provisions of the General Social Security Act (GSSA) and the Social Security Act for Trade and Commerce (TCSSA) and replaced them with section 56(6) of the CSSAIA, a general reform reformulating the legal provisions on the extension of insurances to cohabitees had been enacted. On 1 August 2006 and 1 July 2007 amendments to the CSSAIA entered into force, which regulated the affiliation of a partner to a social security scheme in a non-discriminatory way.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Applicability of Article 14
25. The Court points out at the outset that the provision of Article 8 of the Convention does not guarantee as such a right to have the benefits deriving from a specific social security insurance scheme extend to a co‑habiting partner (see Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 65731/01, § 53, ECHR 2006‑VI).
26. It is undisputed in the present case that the relationship of a same-sex couple like the applicants' falls within the notion of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8. However, in the light of the parties' comments the Court finds it appropriate to address the issue whether their relationship also constitutes “family life”.
27. The Courts reiterates its established case-law in respect of different‑sex couples, namely that the notion of family under this provision is not confined to marriage-based relationships and may encompass other de facto “family” ties where the parties are living together out of wedlock. A child born out of such a relationship is ipso jure part of that “family” unit from the moment and by the very fact of his birth (see Elsholz v. Germany [GC], no. 25735/94, § 43, ECHR 2000-VIII; Keegan v. Ireland, 26 May 1994, § 44, Series A no. 290; and also Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 18 December 1986, § 56, Series A no. 112).
28. In contrast, the Court's case-law has only accepted that the emotional and sexual relationship of a same-sex couple constitutes “private life” but has not found that it constitutes “family life”, even where a long‑term relationship of cohabiting partners was at stake. In coming to that conclusion, the Court observed that despite the growing tendency in a number of European States towards the legal and judicial recognition of stable de facto partnerships between homosexuals, given the existence of little common ground between the Contracting States, this was an area in which they still enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation (see Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), no. 56501/00, ECHR 2001-VI, with further references). In the case of Karner (cited above, § 33), concerning the succession of a same‑sex couples' surviving partner to the deceased's tenancy rights, which fell under the notion of “home”, the Court explicitly left open the question whether the case also concerned the applicant's “private and family life”.
29. The Court notes that since 2001, when the decision in Mata Estevez was given, a rapid evolution of social attitudes towards same-sex couples has taken place in many member States. Since then a considerable number of member States have afforded legal recognition to same-sex couples (see above, paragraphs 27-30). Certain provisions of EU law also reflect a growing tendency to include same-sex couples in the notion of “family” (see paragraph 26 above).
30. In view of this evolution the Court considers it artificial to maintain the view that, in contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy “family life” for the purposes of Article 8. Consequently the relationship of the applicants, a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership, falls within the notion of “family life”, just as the relationship of a different-sex couple in the same situation would.
31. With regard to Article 14, which was relied on in the present case, the Court reiterates that it only complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto. It has no independent existence because it has effect solely in relation to “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms” safeguarded by those provisions (see, among many other authorities, Sahin v. Germany [GC], no. 30943/96, § 85, ECHR 2003‑VIII). The application of Article 14 does not necessarily presuppose the violation of one of the substantive rights protected by the Convention. It is necessary but also sufficient for the facts of the case to fall “within the ambit” of one or more of the Articles of the Convention (see Petrovic v. Austria, 27 March 1998, § 22, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑II).
32. The prohibition of discrimination enshrined in Article 14 thus extends beyond the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms which the Convention and the Protocols thereto require each State to guarantee. It also applies to those additional rights, falling within the general scope of any Convention Article, for which the State has voluntarily decided to provide. This principle is well entrenched in the Court's case-law (see E.B. v France [GC], no. 43546/02, § 48, ECHR 2008‑... with further references).
33. The present case concerns the possibility to extend accident and sickness insurance cover under a statutory insurance scheme to cohabiting partners, a possibility which the legal provisions impugned by the applicants recognise under certain conditions. Moreover, the possibility to extend insurance cover, in the Court's view, has to be qualified as a measure intended to improve the principally insured person's private and family situation. The Court therefore considers that the extension of insurance cover at issue falls within the ambit of Article 8.
34. Consequently, the State, which has gone beyond its obligations under Article 8 in creating such a right - a possibility open to it under Article 53 of the Convention - cannot, in the application of that right, take discriminatory measures within the meaning of Article 14 (see, mutatis mutandis, E.B. v. France, cited above, §49).
35. Because the applicants complain that they are victims of a difference in treatment which allegedly lacks objective and reasonable justification as required by Article 14 of the Convention, that provision, taken in conjunction with Article 8, is applicable.
2. Compliance with Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8
36. The applicants submitted that they had been victims of discrimination because it had been impossible to have the cover of the second applicant's health and accident insurance extended to include the first applicant. This was because, under section 56(6) of the CSSAIA, as in force until 1 August 2006, such an extension was only open to cohabitees of the opposite sex and because this discriminatory situation did not effectively change after the entry into force of an amendment to the relevant provisions which imposed conditions they could not fulfil.
37. The Government did not comment on the situation in law until the entry into force of the modifications of the CSSAIA on 1 August 2006 and 1 July 2007 respectively and argued that from that time on the applicants could no longer claim to be victims of discrimination, because the amended provisions were formulated in a gender-neutral way.
38. The Court reiterates that, for the purposes of Article 14, a difference in treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification, that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (see Petrovic, cited above, p. 586, § 30). Furthermore, very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference in treatment based exclusively on the ground of sex as compatible with the Convention (see Burghartz v. Switzerland, cited above, § 27; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 18 July 1994, § 24, Series A no. 291-B; Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, no. 33290/96, § 29, ECHR 1999-IX; Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, § 94, ECHR 1999-VI; Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97, §§ 34 and 40, ECHR 2002-I; and S.L. v. Austria, no. 45330/99, § 36, ECHR 2003-I). Just like differences based on sex, differences based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification (see Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, § 36, ECHR 2003‑IX).
39. In order to determine whether the difference in treatment that the applicants complained of had an objective and reasonable justification, the Court will consider each of the periods separately.
(a) First period: until the entry into force of section 56(6a) of the CSSAIA on 1 August 2006
40. The Court notes that on 1 July 1997 the first applicant asked the CSIC to recognise him as a dependent of the second applicant and to extend the latter's health and accident insurance cover to him. On 2 September 1997 the CSIC dismissed the request, holding that, because the first applicant was of the same sex as the second applicant, he did not qualify as a dependent within the meaning of section 56(6) of the CSSAIA. It did not accept the applicants' argument that section 56(6) should be interpreted so as to also include homosexual relationships. The appeal authorities also refuted this argument. The Administrative Court, in its judgment of 4 October 2001 found that the exclusion of homosexual partnerships from the scope of section 56(6) of the CSSAIA also complied with the principle of equality because that difference in treatment was justified. It argued that, while it was true that where persons of different sex living together in a household in which one of them was running that household and not being gainfully employed, it was, as a rule, safe to conclude that they were cohabiting in a partnership, that was not the case if two persons of the same sex were living together in a household. In the absence of any possibility to register a homosexual partnership, it would be necessary to undertake delicate enquiries into the most intimate sphere of the person concerned. That difference in the factual situation justified different treatment in law.
41. The Court further observes that the Government themselves have not given any justification for the difference in treatment experienced by the applicants and that experienced by cohabitees of the opposite sex.
42. The Court reiterates that in the case of Karner v. Austria, which bears certain similarities to the present case, it found that in cases in which the margin of appreciation afforded to States is narrow, as is the position where there is a difference in treatment based on sex or sexual orientation, the principle of proportionality does not merely require that the measure chosen is in principle suited for realising the aim sought. It must also be shown that it was necessary in order to achieve that aim to exclude certain categories of people - in this instance persons living in a homosexual relationship - from the scope of application of a specific provision of law (see Karner, cited above, § 41). It does not consider, however, that the Government or the domestic authorities and courts have advanced any arguments that would allow such a conclusion.
Accordingly, there was a breach of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8, in respect of the period in question.
(b) Second period: from the entry into force of section 56(6a) of the CSSAIA on 1 August 2006 until the entry into force of the amended section 56(6) and (6a) of the CSSAIA on 30 June 2007
43. The Court considers that the discriminatory character of the CSSAIA established above did not change after the first amendment, because unmarried male/female couples qualified for preferential treatment, whereas unmarried couples of the same sexual orientation, irrespective of their sexual orientation, only qualified if they were raising children together. Even though the situation improved as a result of that amendment because homosexual couples were in principle no longer excluded from the scope of application of section 56 of the CSSAIA, there remained a substantial difference in treatment for which no sufficient justification had been advanced by the Government.
44. Accordingly, there was also a breach of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8, in respect of this period.
(c) Third period: after the entry into force of the amended section 56(6) and (6a) of the CSSAIA on 1 July 2007
45. The Court observes that the newly amended version of the CSSAIA as in force from 1 July 2007 onwards omitted the explicit reference to partners of the opposite sex in section 56(6a) and restricted the scope of application of section 56(6) to relatives. It is thus formulated in a neutral way concerning the sexual orientation of cohabitees.
46. The applicants submitted that, following the above-mentioned amendment, the legal situation is still discriminatory, because the opportunity to extend health and accident insurance cover has become more difficult following the amendment because additional conditions were introduced which not all couples, and in particular the applicants, fulfil. Moreover, they were also victims of discrimination because persons to whom the extension of insurance cover had been granted before the entry into force of the amendment continued to benefit from an extension of the insurance cover.
47. As regards the applicants' first argument, the Court observes that Article 14 of the Convention only guarantees a right to equal treatment of persons in relatively similar situations but does not guarantee access to specific benefits. It further observes that the condition to which the applicants refer, the raising of children in the common household, is formulated in a neutral way and the applicants did not argue that under Austrian law homosexuals are excluded from caring for children.
48. As regards the applicants' second argument, the Court observes that, according to the transitory provision of section 217 of the CSSAIA, the continued application of section 56(6a) is restricted to persons having passed a certain age limit and where the relevant circumstances remain the same, and also applies to those who will not have yet reached the age limit by 31 December 2010. The Court cannot find that it is incompatible with the requirements of Article 14 for those who have previously been entitled to a specific benefit under the law in force at the time to be given sufficient time to adapt to changing circumstances.
49. In this context, the Court notes its case-law according to which the principle of legal certainty, which is necessarily inherent in the law of the Convention, may dispense States from questioning legal acts or situations that antedate judgments of the Court declaring domestic legislation incompatible with the Convention. The same considerations apply where a constitutional court annuls domestic legislation as being unconstitutional (see Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, § 58, Series A no. 31). Moreover, it has also been accepted, in view of the principle of legal certainty that a constitutional court may set a time-limit for the legislator to enact new legislation with the effect that an unconstitutional provision remains applicable for a transitional period (see Walden v. Liechtenstein (dec.), no. 33916/96, 16 March 2000; and J.R. v. Germany (dec.), no. 22651/93, Decisions and Reports 83-A).
50. The Court therefore considers that from 1 July 2007 the applicants were no longer subject to an unjustified difference in treatment as regards the benefit of extending health and accident insurance cover to the second applicant. Accordingly there was no breach of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8, in respect of this period.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 PROTOCOL No. 1
51. The applicants also complained under Article 14 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, that the Administrative Court's decision violated their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their property. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest ....”
52. The Court observes that neither the Government nor the applicants submitted any observations in this respect. Having regard to its finding under Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether, in this case, there has been a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
53. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
54. The applicants claimed pecuniary damage in the amount of 28,375.12 euros (EUR) for the period from 1993 until May 2008 plus EUR 81.52 per month from that date onwards. They submitted that, because it had been impossible to extend the second applicant's health and accident insurance cover to the first applicant, the first applicant had had to subscribe to an individual health insurance for himself which had cost him in contributions EUR 11,375.12 from 1993 until May 2008 plus a lump sum for non-reimbursed vaccination costs in the amount of EUR 1,000 and costs for medical care abroad in the amount of EUR 16,000. Lastly, they claimed EUR 81.52 per month, from May 2008 onwards, which was the monthly contribution of the first applicant to his health and accident insurance scheme.
55. The Government submitted that that claim was excessive because the first applicant could have avoided a large portion of the amount claimed for the individual health insurance contract by subscribing to the general social insurance scheme. The monthly contributions under that scheme were moderate and could even have been reduced in the event of hardship. Moreover, the period for which reimbursement of those costs could be claimed only started in July 1997, when the applicants first applied to include the first applicant in the second applicant's health insurance scheme. It must also be taken into account that even if the extension to the insurance cover had been granted, additional contributions for such an extension would have had to have been paid from January 2001 onwards. Such hypothetical costs would have had to have been offset against the applicants' reimbursement claim. The claim for vaccination costs was unfounded, because, in any event, such costs were not covered by the insurance scheme to which the first applicant wished to adhere. The lump sum claim for medical treatment abroad was equally unfounded because normally such treatment was also covered by a health clause in a private travel insurance contract and, in any event, the applicants failed to substantiate that claim.
56. The Court observes first that it has found a breach of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8, only in respect of the period until 30 June 2007. Thus, it cannot make any award for claims which relate to the subsequent period. The Court further observes that, as regards the claims for reimbursement of vaccination costs and costs of medical treatment abroad the applicants have merely indicated a lump sum and failed to substantiate their claim. Thus, no award for pecuniary damage can be made in this respect. Nevertheless, the Court is convinced that the applicants, as a consequence of the refusal of the request for extension of the second applicant's health and accident insurance cover to the first applicant and the ensuing necessity for him to subscribe to another insurance scheme, have suffered financial loss. However, the sums claimed by the applicants are excessive because it seems reasonable, as argued by the Government, to start the period for which reimbursement may in principle be granted only when the applicants made a concrete step to have the insurance cover extended in 1997 and to deduct costs the applicants would have incurred if the extension of the insurance cover had actually been granted. Having regard to the above considerations the Court grants, on an equitable basis, EUR 5,000 under this head plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.
57. The applicants claimed non-pecuniary damage in the amount of EUR 36,000.
58. The Government considered this claim excessive and found that, in the circumstances of the present case, the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient redress.
59. The Court considers that the applicants must have sustained non‑pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards them EUR 10,000 under this head plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.
B. Costs and expenses
60. The applicants claimed costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings in the amount of EUR 5,408.62, including Turnover Tax, and costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court in the amount of EUR 10,273.67, also including Turnover Tax. In addition, the applicants claimed a lump sum of EUR 2,500 for out of pocket expenses for them and EUR 500 for translation.
61. The Government disputed this claim as being excessive. In their view it should be taken into account that the submissions made before the domestic authorities and courts and those made before the Court were to a large extent identical.
62. The Court finds that no reimbursement of out of pocket expenses and costs for translation can be granted because the applicants have failed to submit receipts in order to substantiate these claims.
63. As regards the claim for costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings and before the Court, the Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred in order to prevent or redress the violation found and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants EUR 4,500 in respect of the domestic proceedings and EUR 5,500 in respect of the Convention proceedings. Consequently, the Court awards the applicants EUR 10,000 in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them.
C. Default interest
64. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Holds by five votes to two that there has been a violation of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, as regards the period until 1 August 2006;
2. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, as regards the period from 1 August 2006 until 30 June 2007;
3. Holds unanimously that there has been no violation of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, as regards the period from 1 July 2007 onwards;
4. Holds unanimously that it is not necessary to examine the application also under Article 14 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
5. Holds unanimously
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
6. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicants' claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 July 2010, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judges Vajić and Malinverni is annexed to this judgment.
C.L.R.
S.N.
JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES VAJIĆ AND MALINVERNI
(Translation)
We are unable to agree with the majority's opinion that, in the present case, there had been a violation of Article 8, taken together with Article 14 of the Convention, during the “first period”, running from 1 July 1997 to 1 August 2006, date of the entry into force of Article 56 (6a) of the CSSAIA (see paragraphs 36 to 38 of the judgment).
It was on 1 July 1997 that the first applicant asked the CSIC to recognise him as a dependant of the second applicant and to extend the latter's health and accident insurance cover to him (see paragraph 7 of the judgment).
We find it quite understandable that, at the material time, the Austrian authorities should have denied the first applicant's request on the ground that Article 56 (6) of the CSSAIA could not be interpreted so as to include homosexual relationships. To be sure, at that time very few European States had enacted legislation on registered partnerships (such as the French PACS), and there was also a very small number of States that treated on an equal footing, for social security purposes, two cohabiting persons of the opposite sex and two homosexuals living together.
At the present time, apart from the six member States that grant same-sex couples the right to marry, namely Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden (see the case of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, 24 June 2010, § 27), only thirteen countries have enacted a law on registered partnerships. Most of those have only done so since 2000: Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the United Kingdom in 2004, Estonia in 2005, and the Czech Republic in 2006. Only Denmark, Norway and Sweden had enacted such legislation in the 1990s.
It can thus be said that at the material time there was no European consensus as to whether homosexual couples should be treated on an equal footing with heterosexual couples, even unmarried ones, for various legal purposes in general, and for that of social security in particular.
In these conditions we find it difficult to accept that the decisions by the various competent Austrian authorities rejecting the applicants' request, all those decisions having been issued between 1997 and 2001 (see paragraphs 8 to 14), may be regarded as contrary to Articles 8 and 14 taken together. As the Constitutional Court found in its judgment of 15 June 1998, in the absence of a European consensus, “the legislator had had a very wide margin in which to reach a decision and the decision taken had been within that margin” (paragraph 12).
baza unakrsnih veza