Khadija Ismayilova protiv Azerbejdžana

U predmetu Khadija Ismayilovaprotiv Azerbejdžana, Evropski sud za ljudska prava (Peto odeljenje) na zasedanju veća u sastavu:

Angelika Nußberger (Angelika Nusberger), predsednik,
André Potocki,
Síofra O’Leary (Šifra O’Liri),
Mārtiņš Mits (Martinš Mits),
Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer (Gabriela Kučko-Štadlmajer),
Lәtif Hüseynov (Letif Husejnov),
Lado Chanturia (Lado Čanturija),sudije,
i Claudia Westerdiek (Klaudija Vesterdik), sekretar veća,

Posle većanja na zatvorenoj sednici 27. novembra 2018, Donosi sledeću presudu koja je usvojena navedenog dana:

POSTUPAK

1. Predmet je formiran na osnovu dveju predstavki (br. 65286/13 i 57270/14) koje je protiv Republike Azerbejdžan Evropskom sudu na osnovu člana 34. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: Konvencija) podnela državljanka Azerbejdžana Khadija Rovshan qizi Ismayilova(Xədicə Rövşən qızı İsmayılova/ Hadidža Rovšan kizi Ismajilova – u daljem tekstu: podnositeljka predstavke), 26. septembra 2013, odnosno 31. jula 2014. godine.

2. Podnositeljku predstavke zastupale su A. Vermeer (A. Vermer),Y.-O. Jansen (J.-O. Jansen) i L. Talsmaiz Media Legal Defence Initiative (Inicijativa za pravnu odbranu medija), advokatske organizacije iz Londona, L. Crain (L. Krein) iz De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek (De Brojv Blekstoun Vesbruk), advokat iz Holandije, Y. Imanov (J. Imanov), advokat iz Azerbejdžana i S. Finizio (S. Finicio), advokat iz Londona. Azerbejdžansku vladu (u daljem tekstu: Država) zastupao je njen zastupnik . Ç. Asgarov (Dž. Asgarov).

3. Podnositeljka predstavke je naročito navela da su bila povređena njena prava po članovima 6, 8, 10. i 13. Konvencije zato što su vlasti propustile da je zaštite odneopravdanog mešanja u njen privatni život koje je bilo povezano s njenom novinarskom profesijom.

4. Država je 17. decembra 2015. obaveštena o podnetim predstavkama. I podnositeljka predstavke i Država dostavili su podneske sa pismenim izjavama o prihvatljivosti i o meritumu predstavki. Podnesci sa zapažanjima dobijeni su i od organizacija PEN International, Privacy International („Privasi internešenel”), Article 19 („Član 19”), Committee to Protect Journalists (Komitet za zaštitu novinara), Index on Censorship („Indeks cenzure”), International Media Support („Međunarodna podrška medijima”), The Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety(Institut za slobodu i bezbednost novinara), International Partnership for Human Rights („Međunarodno partnerstvo za ljudska prava”), PEN American Center (Američki centarPEN), Front Line Defenders („Branioci prve linije”), Canadian Journalists for Free Expression („Kanadski novinari za slobodu izražavanja”),International Federation for Human Rights (Međunarodna federacija za ljudska prava), World Organisation Against Torture (Svetska organizacija protiv mučenja), Norwegian Helsinki Committee (Norveški Helsinški odbor) i Human Rights House Foundation (Fondacija „Kuća ljudskih prava”) kojima je predsednik dozvolio da u pismenom postupku intervenišu kao treća lica – umešači (član 36. stav 2. Konvencije i Pravilo 44. stav 3. Poslovnika Suda).

ČINJENICE

I.OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA

5. Podnositeljka predstavke rođena je 1976.godine i živi u Bakuu.

A.Predistorija

6. Podnositeljka predstavke radi kao istraživački novinar od 2005. godine. Bila je redakcijski izveštač i direktor azerbejdžanskog servisa Radio Slobodna Evropa/Radio sloboda (Azadliq Radio), čije su emisije često bile u kritičkom tonu prema vlasti, a u njima se izveštavalo o različitim temama, uključujući korupciju i povrede ljudskih prava. Pored toga, radila je i kao regionalni koordinator Projekta za izveštavanje o organizovanom kriminalu i korupciji, u okviru koga je obučavala novinare tehnikama istraživačkog novinarstva i prekograničnog izveštavanja. Za svoje novinarske aktivnosti dobitnica je određenog broja međunarodnih nagrada.

7. U avgustu 2010. i junu 2011. godine,pre no što su se zbili događaji na koje se odnosi ovaj predmet, podnositeljka predstavke je objavila članke ili je sarađivala na pisanju članaka o navodnoj umešanosti kćerki predsednika Azerbejdžana u različite komercijalne poduhvate. Početkom 2012. godine podnositeljka predstavke je tvrdila da je istraživanjem otkrila da predsednička porodica kontroliše jedan rudarski konzorcijum, kome je azerbejdžanska vlada upravo izdala dozvolu za lukrativan posao vađenja rude.

8. Tokom događaja na osnovu kojih je formiran ovaj predmet podnositeljka predstavke je nastavila da izveštava o gore navedenim pitanjima. Tako je 3. maja 2012. godine objavila članak o gore pomenutom rudarskom konzorcijumu. Potom je 7. maja 2012. objavila članak pod naslovom „Predsednikova porodica ima materijalnu korist od Evrovizijske dvorane”. O navodnim ulaganjima predsednikove porodice pisala je u članku pod naslovom „Azerbejdžanska enklava u Češkoj Republici”, koji je objavila 11. oktobra 2012. godine. Potom je 3. aprila 2013. objavila izveštaj o svojim istraživanjima pod naslovom „Ofšor preduzeća održavaju vezu između korporativnog mogula i predsednika Azerbejdžana”.

9. Prema navodima podnositeljke predstavke, otkako je počela kritički da izveštava o vlastima, na različite načine su joj pretili i zastrašivali je.

B.Preteće pismo i objavljivanje video zapisa sa prizorima iz intimnog života podnositeljke predstavke

10. Podnositeljka predstavke je 7. marta 2012. dobila pismo sašest fotografija napravljenih na osnovu video-snimka, a taj video-snimak snimljen je u njenoj spavaćoj sobi pomoću skrivene kamere. Na tim slikama vidi se ona u seksualnom odnosu samuškarcem koji je, po rečima podnositeljke predstavke, bio njen tadašnji mladić. Uz fotografije je stajala poruka: „Droljo, prestani da radiš to što radišda te ne bismo obrukali!J” („Qəhbə, özüvü yığışdır. Əks halda rüsvay olacaqsan!J”). Pismo je poslato poštom sa neke adrese u Moskvi. Ime pošiljaoca, prema podacima sa koverte, glasilo je „Valerij Mardanov”.

11. Iste te fotografije poslate su i dvama opozicionim listovima Yeni Müsavati Azadliq, koji ih nisu objavili.

12. Istog dana podnositeljka predstavke je dala izjavu da ne namerava da prekine sa svojim novinarskim aktivnostima i da je niko neće ućutkati i tu izjavu je podelila preko društvenih mreža.

13. Podnositeljka predstavke je 9. marta 2012. obavestila tužilaštvo o gore navedenom pismu i podnela je zvanični zahtev za pokretanje istrage, tvrdeći da to pismo predstavlja ucenu zbog njenih nedavnih novinarskih aktivnosti. Takođe je tražila da se preduzmu mere kako bi se zaštitila njena bezbednost. Istraga je formalno pokrenuta 15. marta 2012. godine (vidi odeljak C, dole).

14. U međuvremenu, 13. marta 2012. godine list Yeni Azərbaycan (zvanično glasilo vladajuće Nove partije Azerbejdžana) objavio je članak pod naslovom „Khadija Ismayilova – kako se predstavljaa kakva je u stvari”. Članak je počeo pozivanjem na izjavu podnositeljke predstavke o tome da je dobila preteće pismo. U nastavku teksta kritikuju se podnositeljka predstavke i oni koji su ustali da joj pruže podršku. Naročitose kritikuju ona i njene kolege u Radiju Azadliqzbog toga što im navodno nedostaje profesionalizam i što imaju predrasude o vlasti. Osim toga, pozivajući se na reči jednog drugog bivšeg zaposlenog u RadijuAzadliq, list Yeni Azərbaycantakođe insinuira da je podnositeljka predstavke osoba nemoralnog ponašanja koja veliki deo svog vremena provodi u barovima i noćnim klubovima iredovno odlazi na celonoćne zabave i „orgije” sa svojim prijateljima s posla. Isti taj članakobjavio je 15. marta 2012. godine i list İki Sahil.

15. Na veb-sajtu pod nazivom musavat.tv, 14. marta 2012. godine postavljen je video-snimak sa prizorima seksualne prirode iz života podnositeljke predstavke i njenog tadašnjeg mladića; ti prizori su snimljeni istom onom skrivenom kamerom u njenoj spavaćoj sobi. Müsavatje opoziciona politička stranka koja je saopštila da nema nikakve veze s navedenim veb-sajtom i osudila je objavljivanje tog video-zapisa. Po rečima podnositeljke predstavke, domen pod nazivom „musavat.tv” je očigledno izabran samo za postovanje tog video-zapisa kako bi se stvorio utisak da je taj domen u nekoj vezi sa strankom Müsavatili sa glasilom te stranke listom Yeni Müsavat.

16. List Səs je 16. marta 2012. objavio članak pod naslovom „Nikakvo iznenađenje”. U članku se govori o jednom broju skandala u koje su bili umešani različiti opozicioni političari. Na kraju se kratko aludira na incident sa podnositeljkom predstavke, bez ulaženja u mnogo detalja, ali uz konstataciju da nije nikakvo iznenađenje to što su mnogi opoziciono orijentisani građani umešani u „seks skandale”.

17. List Səsje 5. aprila 2012. godine objavio novi članak pod naslovom „Koga Khadija treba da tuži?”, napadajući podnositeljku predstavke zbog „nemoralnog ponašanja” i sugerišući da su video-skandal zapravo inscenirali ona sama i njeni prijatelji u „musavat.tv”.

18. Kasnije je u listu Səsobjavljeno još nekoliko članaka u kojima se napada podnositeljka predstavke.

19. U aprilu 2013. godine pojavio se novi video-zapis na komeje navodno prikazana podnositeljka predstavke u seksualnim aktivnostima; taj snimak je postavljen na veb-sajt „ictimaipalatka.com”,na kome su se ranije, po rečima podnositeljke predstavke, pojavili slični video-zapisi sa snimcima drugih aktivista i antivladinih pobornika. Međutim, na tom konkretnom video-snimku zapravo se nije nalazila podnositeljka predstavke, već neka žena koja je trebalo da liči na nju.

20. Dok je istraga u vezi s pretećim pismom i objavljivanjem prvog video-snimka još bila u toku (vidi dole), u julu 2013. godine na sajtu „ictimaipalatka.com” pojavio se novi video-snimak podnositeljke predstavke i njenog tadašnjeg mladića snimljen u njenoj spavaćoj sobi. Na tom video-snimku zaista se videla podnositeljka predstavke i snimak je napravljen pomoću iste skrivene kamere kao i prvi video-zapis. Po rečima podnositeljke predstavke, veb-stranica na kojoj se nalazio taj video-zapis bila je u okviru koji je označen kao „SəsTV Player”.

C.Krivičnopravna istraga

1.Otvaranje krivičnopravne istrage i koraci koji su preduzeti

21. Kao što je gore već navedeno, 9. marta 2012. godine podnositeljka predstavke je prijavila Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova i Državnom javnom tužilaštvu da jedobila preteće pismo 7. marta 2012; pritom se pritužila da je reč o uceni kojoj je izložena zbog svojih novinarskih aktivnosti i zatražila je od organa tužilaštva da joj osiguraju bezbednost, da istraže to pitanje i da povedu postupakprotiv lica koja su odgovorna za pretnju i video-snimak.

22. Nedelju dana nakon što je podnositeljka predstavke zvanično podnela prijavu i jedan dan pošto je video-snimak postavljen na veb-sajt, Državno javno tužilaštvo je pokrenulo krivični postupak saglasno članu 156. (povreda nepovredivosti privatnog života) Krivičnog zakonika na temelju zahteva podnositeljke predstavke i poverilo je taj predmet Gradskom tužilaštvu u Bakuu.

23. Podnositeljku predstavke je 17. marta 2012. saslušao N.A., istražitelj u Gradskom tužilaštvu u Bakuu.

24. Podnositeljka predstavke je 17. marta 2012. uz pomoć prijateljaotkrila da pored kamere koja je bila instalirana u spavaćoj sobi u njenom stanu ima još kamera koje su tajno postavljene. Osim toga, ustanovili su da postoji i novoinstalirana druga telefonska linija, a našli su i informatičke kablove koji su očigledno bili korišćeni za prenos snimaka napravljenih skrivenim kamerama.

25. Po rečima podnositeljke predstavke, ona i njeni prijatelji su se sutradan vratili u stan i otkrili su nekoliko znakova koji su im ukazali na to da je neko tokom noći boravio u tom stanu.

26. Podnositeljka predstavke je 19. marta 2012. otišla u Gradsko tužilaštvo u Bakuu da bi zatražila da se njen stan pregleda. Po rečima podnositeljke predstavke, istražitelji su posetili njen stan, ali su odbili da bilo šta komentarišu u vezi sa svrhom i svrhom pronađenih kablova, već su samo kazali da ne poseduju tehničko znanje koje bi im omogućilo da to učine. Takođe su odbili da organizuju da neko stručno lice pregleda stan, ali su se složili da sama podnositeljka predstavke stupi u kontakt sa Automatskom telefonskom stanicom br. 538 (u daljem tekstu: ATS), čiji je operater Baktelekom, državna telekomunikaciona kompanija koja je odgovorna za telefonski uređaj koji se nalazi izvan stana podnositeljke predstavke, a s kojim su ti kablovi bili povezani.

27. Podnositeljki predstavke je u ATS-u rečeno da je inženjer koji je zadužen za njenu zgradu N.J., službenik ATS. Podnositeljka predstavke je uspela da pronađe N.J. i uredila je da se s njim sastane istog dana u svom stanu. Takođe je organizovala da istražitelji iz gradskog tužilaštva u Bakuu N.A. i njegov pomoćnik prisustvuju tom susretu.

28. Po rečima podnositeljke predstavke, tokom sastanka u njenom stanu 19. marta 2012. godine N.J. je priznao, u prisustvu istražitelja, podnositeljke predstavke, njenog advokata i još troje njenih prijatelja, da je u julu 2011, jedne subote kada je bio slobodan (to je mogao biti ili 2. ili 9. jul 2011) na osnovu uputstva svog pretpostavljenog instalirao drugu telefonsku liniju i povezao kablove iz ATS sa telefonskim uređajem koji se nalazi neposredno izvan stana podnositeljke predstavke. Neki nepoznati čovek koga je sreo van stana zatražio je od njega da ostavi još dodatnih 15 metara žice kako bi sve to moglo da bude povezano u samom stanu. Takođe je čuo druge ljude kako rade sa kablovima u stanu. Po rečima podnositeljke predstavke, tokom tog razgovora istražitelj N.A. je, kako se činilo, beležio izjave dotičnog inženjera. Međutim, on je kasnije pocepao svoj rukom vođeni zapisnik i sačinio je novi dokument u kome nije bilo tog iskaza inženjera. Takođe je zatražio od inženjera da ukloni drugu telefonsku liniju, ali to uklanjanje nije dokumentovano. Po rečima podnositeljke predstavke, uprkos njenim primedbama N.A. nije uključio izjave N.J. u istražni spis, niti je u zapisniku o istrazi pomenuo da je uopšte došlo do susreta sa N.J. u stanu podnositeljke predstavke.

29. Podnositeljka predstavke je 21. marta 2012. zatražila od Državnog javnog tužilaštva i Gradskog tužilaštva u Bakuu da saslušaju N.J. Potom je 3. aprila i 12. aprila 2012. posetila Gradsko javno tužilaštvo u Bakuu da bi dobila najnovije podatke o statusu istrage, ali ta njena nastojanja nisu urodila plodom.

30. Prema dokumentima koje je dostavila Država, 30. marta 2012. je N.A., istražitelj u Gradskom tužilaštvu u Bakuu, doneo zvaničnu odluku kojom se prihvata zahtev podnositeljke predstavke da se sasluša N.J. i da se preduzmu istražne radnje kako bi ustanovilo ko mu je dao uputstvo da postavi kablove koji su vodili ka stanu podnositeljke predstavke. Država nije dostavila nijedan zapisnik sa saslušanja N.J., niti bilo kakvu dalju odluku koju su organi tužilaštva s tim u vezi doneli.

31. U međuvremenu, 19. marta 2012. istražitelj je naložio da veštaci stručno ispitaju rukavice, komade novinske hartije i bravu pronađenu u stanu podnositeljke predstavke.

32. U periodu između aprila 2012. i avgusta 2013. godine istražitelj je doneo niz odluka kojima je izdavao naloge veštacima da stručno ispitaju sledeće stvari: fotografije napravljene na osnovu snimaka koje su poslate podnositeljki predstavke i listu Yeni Müsavat; kablove pronađene u stanu podnositeljke predstavke; disk na kome se nalazio video-zapis objavljen na „mustavat.tv”; poštansku omotnicu u kojoj se nalazilo preteće pismo zajedno s fotografijama koje su poslate podnositeljki predstavke i listuYeni Müsavat; kao i disk na kome se nalazio video-snimak objavljen na sajtu „ictimaipalatka.com”.

33. Država nije dostavila nijedan izveštaj veštaka niti bilo kakav drugi dokument koji bi se odnosio na gore pomenute odluke. Stranke nisu dostavile Sudu nijedan dodatni dokument koji bi se odnosio na istražne radnje koje su preduzete.

2.Pritužbe podnositeljke predstavke u vezi s navodnom neefikasnošću istrage

34. Podnositeljka predstavke je 4. aprila 2012. objavila saopštenje za štampu u kome je kritikovala Gradsko tužilaštvo u Bakuu zbog toga što nije sprovelo odgovarajuću istragu i u kome je navela da je njen pristup materijalu iz istrage „krajnje ograničen”.

35. Podnositeljka predstavke je 13. aprila 2012. podnela pritužbu Državnom javnom tužilaštvu protiv zvaničnika Gradskog tužilaštva u Bakuu, navodeći da oni odbijaju da preduzmu očigledne i jednostavne istražne radnje.

36. Državno javno tužilaštvo nije postupilo po pritužbi podnositeljke predstavke. Umesto toga, 26. aprila 2012. Državno javno tužilaštvo i Gradsko tužilaštvo u Bakuu objavili su zajedničko saopštenje za javnost o statusu istrage (u daljem tekstu: Izveštaj o statusu). Sadržaj tog izveštaja o statusu i postupak koji je vođen dok se do njega nije došlo opisanisu u odeljku D, dole.

37. Podnositeljka predstavke je 12. novembra 2012. zatražila od Državnog javnog tužilaštva i Gradskog tužilaštva u Bakuu informacije o statusu istrage i kopije svih dotad doneti odluka, ako ih je bilo. Po rečima podnositeljke predstavke, odgovorilo joj je Gradsko tužilaštvo u Bakuu pismimaod 14. i 21. novembra 2012. i navelo da se istraga sprovodi i da su odluke povodom različitih zahteva podnositeljke predstavke bile donete 31. marta i 3. aprila2012. (u spisu predmeta nema kopija tih pisama ni tih odluka). Po rečima podnositeljke predstavke, ona je 28. novembra 2012. poslala pismo tražeći kopije tih odluka, budući da ih nije dobila.

38. Pošto nije dobila nikakav dalji odgovor, podnositeljka predstavke je 2. aprila 2013. ponovo zatražila informacije od organa tužilaštva o statusu istrage. Gradsko tužilaštvo u Bakuu joj je 4. aprila 2013. odgovorilo da su joj odluke koje su donete povodom njenih zahteva poslate 30. marta 2012. i 3. decembra 2012. (u spisu predmeta nema nijednog primerka odluke od tog datuma). U pismu je dalje navedeno da je preduzet izvestan broj istražnih radnji, uključujući i različita ispitivanja koja sprovode veštaci. Pismom od 30. aprila 2013. Državno javno tužilaštvo je podnositeljki predstavke uputilo sličan odgovor.

39. Podnositeljka predstavke je 12. avgusta 2013, nakon što je u julu 2013. objavljen drugi video-zapis snimljen skrivenom kamerom (vidi stav 20, gore) podnela pritužbu protiv organa tužilaštva Okružnom sudu u Sabailu (Sabail –predgrađe Bakua, prim. prev.) zahtevajući da se sprovede postupak sudskog nadzora i konstatujući da više od godinu dana nije sprovedena delotvorna istraga, kao i da su se organi tužilaštva ograničili na nejasne nagoveštaje o tome u kom pravcu se istraga odvija. Zatražila je od suda da tu neaktivnost organa tužilaštva proglasi nezakonitom i da odredi iznos materijalne naknade koju ona za to treba da dobije.

40. Okružni sud u Sabailu je svojom odlukom od 13. avgusta 2013. odbio da razmatra pritužbu podnositeljke predstavke, zaključivši da nije nadležan da razmotri tu pritužbu na osnovu postupka sudskog nadzora, jer se pitanje koje je predmet njene pritužbe ne nalazi na isključivoj listi vrsta odluka i radnji tužilačkih organa, koja je utvrđena članovima 449. stav 3. tačka 1. do 449. stav 3. tačka 7. Zakonika o krivičnom postupku (u daljem tekstu: ZKP) koje se mogu osporiti u postupku sudskog nadzora. Sud je konstatovao da pritužba koja se odnosi na navodnu neaktivnost organa tužilaštva treba da bude podneta shodno pravilima upravnog postupka.

41. Gradsko tužilaštvo Bakua je 16. avgusta 2013, rešavajući po zahtevu podnositeljke predstavke, odbilo da joj dozvoli pristup istražnom spisu dok istraga ne bude okončana i pritom se pozvalo na članove 87, 281. stav 3. i284–286. ZKP. Istog dana, Gradsko tužilaštvo u Bakuu je odbilo zahtev podnositeljke predstavke da krivično delo povodom koga se istraga vodi bude prekategorizovano u delo koje je predviđenočlanom163. stav 1.(ometanje zakonite profesionalne aktivnosti novinara) Krivičnog zakonika.

42. Podnositeljka predstavke je 28. avgusta 2013. podnela još jednu pritužbu Okružnom sudu u Sabailu u skladu s postupkom sudskog nadzora, i ta pritužba je bila sličnog sadržaja onoj prethodnoj od 12. avgusta 2013. Okružni sud u Sabailu je 30. avgusta 2013. odbacio tu pritužbu iz istih razloga na kojima je bila zasnovana njegova odluka od 13. avgusta 2013. Na tu odluku podnositeljka predstavke je 9. septembra 2013. izjavila žalbu.Apelacioni sud u Bakuu je 18. septembra 2013. potvrdio odluku Okružnog suda u Sabailu o neprihvatljivosti pritužbe.

43. Podnositeljka predstavke je 18. septembra 2013. podnela treću pritužbu Okružnom sudu u Sabailu saglasno postupku sudskog nadzora i ta pritužba je ponovo odbijena odlukom Okružnog suda 30. septembra 2013, koja je potvrđena odlukom Apelacionog suda u Bakuu od 17. oktobra 2013. godine.

44. U međuvremenu, na preporuku Okružnog suda u Sabailu, podnositeljka predstavke je 28. avgusta 2013. podnela pritužbu na rad organa tužilaštva Privrednom upravnom sudu br. 1. u Bakuu, u skladu s pravilima upravnog postupka.

45. Privredni upravni sud br. 1. u Bakuu je 19.septembra 2013. odbio da razmatra tu pritužbu zaključivši na osnovu Zakonika o upravnom postupku i Zakona o upravnim postupcima da nije nadležan da razmatra pritužbe koje se odnose na aktivnosti organa koji se bave krivičnopravnom istragom u krivičnim postupcima.

46. Podnositeljka predstavke je 14. oktobra 2013. izjavila žalbu na tu odluku, navodeći da ju je Okružni sud u Sabailu uputio da sledi upravni postupak.

47. Apelacioni sud u Bakuu je 4. decembra 2013. odbacio žalbu podnositeljke predstavke i potvrdio odluku Privrednog upravnog suda br. 1. u Bakuu.

48. Podnositeljka predstavke je 20. decembra 2013. tim povodom izjavila žalbu Vrhovnom sudu, a ta njena žalba je odbijena 6. februara 2014. godine.

D.Objavljivanje Izveštaja o statusu i parnični postupak protiv organa tužilaštva

49. Kao što je gore navedeno, u odgovor na pritužbu podnositeljke predstavke od 13. aprila 2012. Državno javno tužilaštvo i Gradsko tužilaštvo u Bakuu objavili su 26. aprila 2012. Izveštaj o statusu istrage (vidi stav 36, gore). U tom izveštaju je istaknuto da su podnositeljka predstavke i njen advokat širili lažne informacije po medijima o navodnoj neadekvatnosti istrage i da su na taj način pokušali da „stvore negativnomišljenje” u javnosti u vezi s tom istragom. Osim toga, navodi se da su istražni organi preduzeli određeni broj istražnih radnji, a naročito sledeće:

Na zahtev [podnositeljke predstavke], Državno javno tužilaštvo je 15. marta 2012. godine otvorilo krivičnopravnu istragu saglasno članu 156. stav 1. Krivičnog zakonika i poverilo tu istragu istražnom odeljenju Gradskog tužilaštva u Bakuu. U početnim fazama istrage [podnositeljka predstavke] je saslušana u prisustvu svog pravnog zastupnika A. Ismayilova;u istrazi je označena kao žrtva krivičnog dela i pritom su joj objašnjena njena prava i obaveze.

Posle toga, kako bi otkrili tragove krivičnog dela i materijalne dokaze i kako bi utvrdili ostale okolnosti važne za taj slučaj, [istražni organi] su sproveli, uz učešće veštaka, kriminologa [podnositeljke predstavke], njenog pravnog zastupnika i svedoka očevidaca, inspekciju mesta na kome se incident dogodio, konkretno stana koji se nalazi na adresi... a u vlasništvu je... u kome je podnositeljka predstavke živela kao zakupac stana, uzeli su relevantne materijalne dokaze sa mesta događaja, naručili izradu i dobili izveštaje veštaka i sproveli relevantna ispitivanja i izdali uputstva u vezi sa predmetom.

50. Potom su u Izveštaju o statusu navedene informacije o periodu tokom koga je podnositeljka predstavke iznajmljivala taj stan, a navedeni su i podaci o identitetu lica kojima je kasnije izdavala taj stan u pazakup, kao i informacije o finansijskim aranžmanima između nje i tih lica.

51. U Izveštaju o statusu dalje se navodi sledeće:

Pored toga, istragom je takođe utvrđeno da su koverti koji su sadržali fotografije [podnositeljke predstavke] poslati sa imenom pošiljaoca Valeriy Mardanov iz Moskve na registrovanu adresu [podnositeljke predstavke] koja glasi... i naredakciju listaYeni Müsavat. Istražitelji su zaplenili koverte i stavili ih među dokazni materijal predmeta.

Zahtev [podnositeljke predstavke] da još neka lica budu ispitana u svojstvu svedoka, koji su istražni organi primili 28. marta 2012. odobren je i ta lica su saslušana.

52. U Izveštaju o statusu potom se navodi da je pored toga što su preduzete gore navedene istražne radnje saslušan još jedan broj lica. U tom izveštaju su otkrivena imena i prezimena tih lica, kao i njihova zanimanja i podaci o odnosu sa podnositeljkom predstavke. Tu je pomenut muškarac sa kojim je, prema Izveštaju, podnositeljka predstavke bila „u vezi”, njena sestra, njen brat, njeni prijatelji i kolege koji su je posećivali u stanu. Sve u svemu, u tom izveštaju su navedeni kompletni lični podaci 15 lica, kao i podaci o profesiji većine njih.

53. Na kraju Izveštaja o statusu stoji kako sledi:

[Podnositeljka predstavke] je 13. i 17. aprila 2012. pozvana u istražno odeljenje u vezi sa neophodnim istražnim radnjama, ali se ona tom pozivu nije odazvala; pojavila se na saslušanju 26. aprila 2012.

Od početka istrage, pored toga što su [podnositeljki predstavke] i njenom pravnom zastupniku istražni organi upućivali pozive 17. marta, 3. aprila i 14. aprila 2012, u upravu Gradskog tužilaštva u Bakuu dolazili su i ona i njen predstavnik kako bi iznosili zahteve i davali konkretna uputstva istražnom timu u vezi sa kompletnim, nepristrasnim i sveobuhvatnim vođenjem istrage.

54. Kada je reč o informacijama pomenutim u stavovima 50. i 52, gore, podnositeljka predstavke kaže da je ona sama nerado i sa oklevanjem dala istražiteljima glavninu tih podataka na zahtev tužioca kako bi pomogla istrazi, očekujući da će te informacije biti čuvane u tajnosti. Zvaničnici Gradskog tužilaštva u Bakuu su joj obećali daće poštovati tajnost tih podataka.

55. Predstavnik Gradskog tužilaštva u Bakuu je 27. aprila 2012. u jednom intervjuu ukazao na to da je Izveštaj o statusu objavljen da bi se odgovorilo na pritužbe koje je podnositeljka predstavke iznosila u javnosti o navodnom nepostojanju delotvorne istrage. Taj predstavnik Gradskog tužilaštva je takođe rekao da nema ničeg nezakonitog u sadržaju Izveštaja o statusu.

56. Podnositeljka predstavke je 21. juna 2012. podnela odštetni zahtev Okružnom sudu u Sabailu protiv Državnog javnog tužilaštva, Gradskog tužilaštva u Bakuu, N.A. (istražitelja u Gradskom tužilaštvu u Bakuu) i A.A. (zamenika javnog tužioca u Bakuu). U zahtevu je navela da je objavljivanje detaljnih informacija iz njenog privatnog života u Izveštaju o statusu 26. aprila 2012. predstavljalo nezakonito i neopravdano mešanje u njeno pravo na poštovanje privatnog života i slobodu izražavanja, te daIzveštaj o statusu predstavlja sastavni deo „klevetničke kampanje” koja se vodi protiv nje i koja takođe obuhvata objavljivanje „video-zapisa seksualne sadržine” i članaka u novinama. Tvrdila je da su objavljivanjem tih informacija, između ostalog, prekršeni član 32. Ustava, član 199. Zakonika o krivičnom postupku, kao i član 8. Konvencije. Tražila je da joj se na ime naknade za duševni bol isplati iznos od 40.000 azerbejdžanskih manata (AZN) i da joj svi tuženi upute javno izvinjenje.

57. Presudom od 27. jula 2012. Okružni sud u Sabailu odbacio je odštetni zahtev podnositeljke predstavke,zaključivši da je svrha Izveštaja o statusu bila da se otkloni mogućnost da se formira negativno javno mnjenje o istražnim organima zbog javnih pritužbi podnositeljke predstavke da je istraga neefikasna. Taj sud je stao na stanovište da su informacije koje su objavljene u Izveštaju o statusu bile „opšteg karaktera” i da njima nije prekršen zahtev domaćeg zakonodavstva u pogledu zaštite privatnosti pojedinca. Konkretno, taj sud je utvrdio sledeće:

[Izveštaj o statusu istrage] sadržao je informacije opšteg karaktera kako bi se sprečilo stvaranje negativnog javnog mnjenja; kada su te informacije napisane, nisu prekršene odredbe domaćeg zakonodavstva u vezi sa zaštitom poverljivosti privatnih i porodičnih podataka Khadije Ismayilove. Prema tome, informacije sadržane u [Izveštaju o statusu] ne mogu se smatrati informacijama kojima se nanosi šteta ugledu podnositeljke predstavke niti njenom privatnom i porodičnom životu.

58. Taj sud je takođe stao na stanovište da podnositeljka predstavke nije mogla da dokaže da je pretrpela bilo kakvu nematerijalnu štetusaglasno odredbama Građanskog zakonika i Zakonika o parničnom postupku, prema tumačenjuOpšte sednice Vrhovnog suda.

59. Podnositeljka predstavke je 24. septembra 2012. izjavila žalbu na tu presudu i ponovo je istakla svoju argumentaciju, dodatno se pritužujući da se prvostepeni sud oglušio o njene zakonske i činjenične argumente i da se nije pozvao ni na jednu zakonsku odredbu kao osnov za donošenje te odluke.

60. Apelacioni sud u Bakuu je 20. novembra 2012. odbio žalbupodnositeljke predstavke i potvrdio presudu prvostepenog suda, saglasivši se sa obrazloženjem koje je taj sud dao.

61. Vrhovni sud je 29. marta 2013. odbio žalbu kojom je podnositeljka predstavke osporila primenu materijalnog ili procesnog prava, zaključivšida objavljivanjeIzveštaja o statusu istrage nije predstavljalo mešanje u pravo na zaštitu privatnog ili porodičnog života podnositeljke predstavke i da njime nisu bile prekršene merodavne odredbe domaćeg zakonodavstva.

E.Hapšenje podnositeljke predstavke i krivični postupci koji su protiv nje vođeni

62. U decembru 2014. godine podnositeljkapredstavke je uhapšena i držana u pritvoru pod optužbom da je jednog bivšeg kolegu podstakla na samoubistvo. U februaru 2015. dodatno je optužena za krivično delo protivpravnog prisvajanja novčanih sredstava velikih razmera, nezakonito preduzetništvo, izbegavanje plaćanja poreza i zloupotrebu službenog položaja u vezi sa aktivnostima koje je obavljala kao direktor RadijaAzadliqod 1. jula 2008. do 1. oktobra 2010. godine. Događaji koji su doveli do njenog hapšenja i rešenja o pritvoru predmet su posebne predstavke (br. 30778/15), u kojoj je podnositeljka izrazila pritužbe po članu 5, članu 6. stav 2 i članovima 10. i 18. Konvencije.

63. Podnositeljka predstavke je 1. septembra 2015. osuđena na kaznu zatvora u trajanju od sedam i po godina. Posle niza žalbi, 25. maja 2016. ona je delimično oslobođena optužbi, a kazna joj je smanjena na tri godine i šest meseci zatvora, uslovno na pet godina. Istog dana je puštena na slobodu.

II.MERODAVNO UNUTRAŠNJE I MEĐUNARODNO PRAVO

A.Ustav

64. Član 32. Ustava koji je bio na snazi u predmetnom vremenu glasi kako sledi:

Član 32.Pravo na neprikosnovenost ličnosti

I.Svako ima pravo na neprikosnovenost ličnosti.

II.Svako ima pravo na zaštitu tajnosti ličnog i porodičnog života. Zabranjeno je mešanje u privatni ili porodični život, osim u slučajevima utvrđenim zakonom. Svako ima pravo na zaštitu od nezakonitog mešanja u svoj privatni i porodični život.

III.Niko nema pravo da prikuplja, čuva, koristi i saopštava informacije o privatnom životu nekog lica bez pristanka tog lica. Izuzev u slučajevima propisanim zakonom, niko ne može biti podvrgnut praćenju, snimanju video-materijala ili fotografija, zvučnih zapisa, niti može biti podvrgnut bilo kakvom sličnom postupku bez sopstvenog pristanka i protiv svoje volje.

IV.Država svakome jemči pravo na tajnost prepiske, telefonskih razgovora, poštanskog i telefonskog komuniciranja i informacija poslatih nekim drugim putem.To pravo može biti ograničeno u skladu s postupkom koji je predviđen zakonom, u cilju sprečavanja kriminala ili otkrivanja istinitih činjenica u istrazi nekog krivičnog dela.

V.Svako ima pravo da bude obavešten o prikupljenim podacima o svojoj ličnosti, osim u slučajevima koji su propisani zakonom. Svako ima pravo da traži da se isprave ili uklone podaci koji se odnose na njega, a ne odgovaraju istini, nepotpuni su ili prikupljeni na način kojim su prekršene zakonske odredbe.

B.Krivični zakonik

65. Član 156. Krivičnog zakonika koji je bio na snazi u predmetno vreme, glasi kako sledi:

Član 156.Kršenje odredbe o nepovredivosti privatnog života

156.1.Nezakonito prikupljanje i saopštavanje podataka o privatnom životu nekog lica, koji predstavljaju njegovu ličnu ili porodičnu tajnu, kao i prodaja ili predaja drugom licu dokumenata,video-zapisa i fotografskog materijala i zvučnih zapisa s takvim informacijama -

kazniće se novčanom kaznom u iznosu od hiljadu do dve hiljade manata ili društveno korisnim radom u periodu od dvesta četrdeset sati do četiristo osamdeset sati ili vaspitnopopravnim radom u trajanju do jedne godine.

156.2.Isti postupci, ako ih počini službeno lice koristeći pritom svoj službeni položaj -

kazniće se kazneno-popravnim radom u trajanju do dve godine ili kaznom zatvora u trajanju do jedne godine, uz gubitak ili bez gubitka prava na obavljanje određenih dužnosti ili bavljenje određenom profesijom u trajanju do tri godine.

66. Član 163. Krivičnog zakonika glasi kako sledi:

Član163.Ometanje zakonite profesionalne delatnosti novinara

163.1.Ometanje zakonite profesionalne delatnosti novinara, tj. primoravanje novinara da saopšte ili da ne saopšte informacije, primenom sile ili pretnjom primenom -

kazniće se novčanom kaznom u iznosu od petsto do hiljadu manata ili vaspitno-popravnim radom u trajanju do godinu dana.

163.2.Isti postupak,ako ga počini službeno lice koristeći svoj službeni položaj -

kažnjava se vaspitno-popravnim radom u trajanju do dve godine ili kaznom zatvora u trajanju do godinu dana, uz gubitak ili bez gubitka prava na obavljanje određenih dužnosti ili bavljenje određenim aktivnostima u trajanju do tri godine.

C.Zakonik o krivičnom postupku

67. Član 199. Zakonika o krivičnom postupku (ZKP) glasi kako sledi:

Član 199.Zaštita lične i porodične tajne

199.1.Tokom krivičnog postupka preduzimaju se mere za zaštitu podataka koji čine ličnu i porodičnu tajnu predviđenu ovim kodeksom i drugim zakonima Republike Azerbejdžan.

199.2.Tokom procesnih radnji zabranjeno je nepotrebno prikupljanje, saopštavanje ili korišćenje informacija koje se odnose na privatni život bilo kog lica, kao i drugih podataka o ličnosti za koje to lice smatra da moraju biti čuvani u tajnosti. Na zahtev istražitelja, tužioca ili suda, učesnici u istražnom i sudskom postupku dužni su da se pismeno obavežu da neće širiti takve podatke o ličnosti.

199.3.Ako organ koji vodi krivični postupak zatraži na osnovu odgovarajuće sudske odluke podatke od bilo kog lica o njegovom privatnom životu, to lice ima pravo da dobije uveravanja da je prikupljanje tih podatakaneophodno u krivičnom postupku koji se vodi, odnosno u protivnom ima pravo da odbije da ih saopšti. Ako organ koji vodi krivični postupak zatraži od lica da iznese podatke o svom privatnom životu ili privatnom životu nekog drugog lica po osnovu neophodnosti tih podataka, onda je taj organ dužan da u zapisnik saslušanja ili nekog drugog istražnog postupka unese potvrdu o neophodnosti da se dobiju te informacije.

199.4.Dokazi kojima se otkrivaju lične ili porodične tajne moraju se razmatrati na zatvorenoj sednici suda.

199.5.Šteta koja se nekom licu nanese povredom neprikosnovenosti ličnog života ili obelodanjivanjem lične ili porodične tajne podleže naknadi u skladu sa postupkom predviđenim u zakonodavstvu Republike Azerbejdžan.

68. Član 449. ZKP, koji je bio na snazi u predmetnom vremenu, glasi kako sledi:

Član 449.Izjavljivanje žalbe sudu zbog procesnih postupaka ili odluka organa koji je vodio krivični postupak

...

449.2.Sledeća lica imaju pravo da izjave žalbu zbog procesnih postupaka ili odluka organa koji je vodio krivični postupak:

...

449.2.2.žrtva krivičnog dela i njen zakoniti predstavnik;

...

449.3.Lica iz stava 449. 2 ovog kodeksa imaju pravo da izjave žalbu sudu zbog procesnih postupaka ili odluka organa koji je vodio krivični postupak u vezi sa sledećim pitanjima:

449.3.1.odbijanja da se prihvati predstavka o krivičnom delu;

449.3.2.zadržavanja u policijskom pritvoru ili pretkrivičnom pritvoru;

449.3.3.povreda prava lica koje je lišeno slobode;

449.3.4.mučenje ili drugo surovo postupanje prema licu lišenom slobode;

449.3.5.otvaranja krivičnog postupka i suspendovanje ili obustava krivičnog postupka;

449.3.6.prinudno vođenje krivičnog postupka, primena procesnih mera prinude ili sprovođenje pretresa bez sudskog naloga;

449.3.7.odstranjenje advokata odbrane optuženog (ili osumnjičenog) lica iz krivičnog postupka.

D.Dokumenti Saveta Evrope

69. Slede izvodi iz Preporuke CM/Rec(2016)4Komiteta ministara zemljamačlanicama o zaštiti novinarstva i bezbednosti novinara i ostalih medijskih aktera (tu preporuku je usvojio Komitet ministara 13. aprila 2016. godine na 1.253. sastanku zamenika ministara):

1.Alarmantno je i neprihvatljivo da su novinari i ostali medijski akteri u Evropi sve češće izloženi pretnjama, uznemiravanju, stavljanju pod nadzor, zastrašivanju, proizvoljnom lišavanju slobode, fizičkim napadima, mučenju, čak i ubistvima zbog svog istraživačkog rada, svojih mišljenja ili izveštavanja, a naročito kada se u svom radu usredsrede na zloupotrebu ovlašćenja, korupciju, kršenje ljudskih prava, kriminalne aktivnosti, terorizam i fundamentalizam. Ta zlostavljanja i krivična dela opsežno su dokumentovana u zvaničnim izveštajima koje objavljuju mediji, nevladine organizacije i branioci ljudskih prava.

2.Novinari i ostali medijski akteri često su direktna meta napada zbog svog pola, rodnog identiteta, seksualne orijentacije, etničkog identiteta, pripadnosti nekoj manjinskoj grupi, veroispovesti ili zbog nekih drugih posebnih karakteristika koje ih mogu izložiti diskriminaciji i opasnostima prilikom obavljanja njihovog posla. Novinarke i druge žene koje su medijski akteri suočavaju se s posebnim, rodno zasnovanim opasnostima, uključujući seksističko i mizogino zlostavljanje i ponižavanje, pretnje, zastrašivanje, uznemiravanje, seksualnu agresiju i nasilje. Takva vrsta uznemiravanja sve seviše odvija na internetu. Zato postoji potreba da se preduzimaju hitni, odlučni i sistemski odgovori.

3.Gore opisana zlostavljanja i krivična dela, koja u praksi čine i državni i nedržavni akteri, imaju ozbiljan negativni uticaj odvraćanja (efekat zamrzavanja) na slobodu izražavanja, koja je zajamčena članom 10. Evropske konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (ETS br. 5, u daljem tekstu: Konvencija), uključujući negativan uticaj na mogućnost pristupa informacijama, na ulogu novinara i ostalih medijskih aktera kao čuvara javnog interesa i na otvorenu i energičnu javnu raspravu, što je sve suštinski važno u demokratskom društvu. Na ta zlostavljanja i krivična dela često se odgovara nedovoljnim naporima nadležnih državnih organa da se počinioci izvedu pred lice pravde, što dovodi do stvaranja kulture nekažnjavanja i može podstaći dodatne pretnje i nasilje i narušiti poverenje javnosti u vladavinu prava.

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6.Kako bi se uspostavilo okruženje koje je povoljno i podsticajno za slobodu izražavanja, zajemčenu članom 10. Konvencije, i kako bi se to okruženje zaštitilo, države moraju da ispune niz pozitivnih obaveza utvrđenih u relevantnim presudama Evropskog suda za ljudska prava i navedenih u načelima koja su priložena uz tekst ove preporuke. Te obaveze dužne su da ispune izvršne, zakonodavne i sudske vlasti, kao i druga državna tela, uključujući agencije koje se bave očuvanjem javnog poretka i nacionalne bezbednosti, i to na svim nivoima – saveznom, nacionalnom, regionalnom i lokalnom.

7.U skladu sa uslovima utvrđenim u članu 15.b Statuta Saveta Evrope (ETS br. 1), Komitet ministara preporučuje da vlade zemalja članica:

i.hitno i pomoću svih grana vlasti sprovedu smernice utvrđene u aneksu ove preporuke, pri čemu će u potpunosti uvažavati načela koja su u njoj navedena;

ii.preispitaju relevantne domaće zakone i da ih, po potrebi, izmene, kako bi se osigurala njihova usklađenost sa obavezama država preuzetih po Evropskoj konvenciji za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda;

iii.promovišu ciljeve ove preporuke na nacionalnom nivou, kao i da se povežu i sarađuju sa svim zainteresovanim stranama da bi se navedeni ciljevi ostvarili.

70. U Aneksu Preporuke CM/Rec(2016)4, Komitet ministara iznosi detaljne smernice zemljama članicama o tome kako daispune svoje relevantne obaveze u pogledu delotvorne zaštite novinarstva i bezbednosti novinara i drugih medijskih aktera, kombinujući zakonske, upravne i praktične mere, koje su organizovane u vidu četiri „stuba”: sprečavanje, zaštita, krivično gonjenje (uključujući posebnu usredsređenost na problem nekažnjivosti) i promovisanje informisanja, obrazovanja i podizanja nivoa svesti. Smernice su zasnovane naopsežnom korpusu načela, koja počivaju na Evropskoj konvenciji za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda i na relevantnim presudama i odlukama Evropskog suda za ljudska prava.

71. Slede izvodi iz Izveštaja komesara za ljudska prava Saveta Evrope (CommDH(2013)14, koji nosi datum 6. avgust 2013), a napisan je po završetku njegove posete Azerbejdžanu od 22. do 24. maja 2013:

I.Sloboda izražavanja

7.Situacija u vezi sa slobodom izražavanja, uključujući slobodu medija u Azerbejdžanu, odavno predstavlja razlog za zabrinutost nacionalnih i međunarodnih posmatrača. Među međunarodnim posmatračima nalazi se i Thomas Hammarberg, prethodnik sadašnjeg komesara (Nilsa) Muižnieksa, i on je takođe posebno naglasio značajne nedostatke u tim oblastima u svom Izveštaju o Azerbejdžanu iz 2010. godine, kao i u komentarima objavljenim 2011. Kako je dalje u tekstu detaljnije objašnjeno, komesar ističe da je većina tih nedostataka do dana-današnjeg ostala neotklonjena, a da se u nekim područjima mogu uočiti i očigledna pogoršanja.

1.Pravosudno zlostavljanje, zastrašivanje i nasilje nad novinarima

8.Komesar je ozbiljno zabrinut zbog očigledne intenzifikacije prakse na koju je posebno ukazao njegov prethodnik 2010. i 2011. godine i koja se svodi na neopravdano ili selektivno krivično gonjenje novinara i drugih lica koja izraze kritičko mišljenje. Poslednjih godina nekoliko medijskih aktera bilo je krivično gonjeno i/ili osuđeno za podsticanje na nacionalnu, rasnu ili versku mržnju i, u nekim slučajevima, za podsticanje na terorizam, kao i za huliganstvo, izbegavanje plaćanja poreza, posedovanje narkotika i nezakonito posedovanje oružja, s tim što je kredibilitet relevantnih optužbi bio umnogome osporen. Usled takvog postupanja jedan broj novinara je osuđen na dugogodišnje kazne zatvora ili na vaspitno-popravni rad i/ili plaćanje visokih novčanih kazni. Prema podacima iz popisa zatvorenika koji je sproveo Komitet za zaštitu novinara (Committee to Protect Journalists –CPJ) u decembru 2012. godine Azerbejdžan se visoko kotira na spisku zemalja koje su novinare poslale u zatvor jer trenutno ima devet novinara u zatvoru.

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11.Pored toga što su suočeni sa optužbama i mogućim zatvorskim kaznama, novinari dokumentovano dokazuju i da oni koji izveštavaju o povredama ljudskih prava ponekad bivaju izloženi fizičkim napadima. Prema podacima azerbejdžanskog Instituta za slobodu i bezbednost novinara (Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety –IRFS), od 2005. godine izvršeno je više od 200 nasilničkih napada na novinare, i pritom je samo 2011. godine maltretirano više od 50 domaćih i stranih novinara. Osim toga, preovladava nekažnjivost pa oni koji su odgovorni za te napade retko, ako ikada, ugledaju lice pravde. Ubistvo urednika časopisa Monitor Elmara Huseinova (Huseynov), 2005. godine i fatalne ubodne rane nanete nožem novinaru i piscu Rafiku Tagiju (Rafiq Tagi) u 2011. godini do danas su ostali nerešeni slučajevi. Komesar takođe ističe da nije bila sprovedena nikakva delotvorna i nezavisna istraga povodom smrti u zatvoru Novruzalija Mamadova.

12.Drugi nedavni incident odnosi se na foto-reportera Mehmana Huseinova (Huseynov), kome preti kazna zatvora do pet godina pod optužbom za huliganstvo zbog svađe koju je, kako se saznaje, imao sa policijskim službenicima dok je izveštavao sa demonstracija održanih u Bakuu u maju 2012. godine.

13.Neki azerbejdžanski novinari dokumentovano govore o stalnom uništavanju imovine koje ih je sprečilo da obavljaju svoje profesionalne dužnosti, a pritom ukazuju i da su bili izlagani fizičkim napadima. Idraka Abasova (Idrak Abbasov)i druge novinare 18. aprila 2012. napalo je oko 20 policajaca i čuvara državne naftne kompanije kada su pokušali da snime rušenje kuća u predgrađu Bakua. Idrak Abasov, novinar zaposlen u listu Zerkalo i u IRFS, odveden je u bolnicu u besvesnom stanju i konstatovani su mu prelomi rebara, povrede unutrašnjih organa i povrede očiju.

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16.Pored fizičkih napada, novinari i medijski akteri u Azerbejdžanu ukazuju na to da su izloženi raznim oblicima zastrašivanja. U martu 2012. godine, na primer, nepoznata lica su pokušala da ucene Hadidžu Ismailovu (Khadija Ismayilova), novinarku radio-stanice Radio Slobodna Evropa/Radio Sloboda (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty –RFE/RL),koja je poznata po tome što je izveštavala o poslovnim holdinzima porodice predsednika Alijeva (Aliyev). Budući da je odbila da bude ućutkana,na internet je postavljen intimni video-snimak napravljen skrivenom kamerom na kome se ona videla.

17.U svim gore pomenutim oblastima čini se da je nasušno potrebno potpuno nezavisno i nepristrasno sudsko preispitivanje u slučajevima u kojima se radi o novinarima i drugim medijskim akterima koji su digli svoj kritički glas. Komesar posebno ukazuje na to da je u poslednjem Izveštaju o monitoringu Parlamentarne skupštine Saveta Evrope takođe ukazano na nepostojanje nezavisnosti pravosudnog sistema u Azerbejdžanu; u Izveštaju je posebno naglašeno da izvršna grana vlasti i dalje bitno utiče na pravosuđe, čime doprinosi nastavljanju, a ne rešavanju problema...

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Zaključci i preporuke

19.Komesar sa zabrinutošćukonstatuje da je poslednjih meseci pojačano maltretiranje novinara i drugih lica koja izražavaju kritičke stavove, a protiv njih se podižu optužnice za sve teža krivična dela. Komesar ponovo naglašava da puštanje na slobodu svih lica koja su lišena slobode zbog stavova koje imaju treba da bude prioritetno pitanje za azerbejdžanske vlasti ako se želi da se zaštiti sloboda izražavanja.

20.Komesar poziva azerbejdžanske vlasti da u svakom pojedinačnom slučaju poštuju svoju obavezu da pokrenu hitnu, temeljitu i transparentnu istragu kad god se primeni nasilje prema novinarima ili im se upute pretnje nasiljem i da počinioce tih dela izvedu pred lice pravde; kažnjavanje bi u svakom slučaju trebalo da odrazi težinu tog krivičnog dela. Osim toga, komesar podseća azerbejdžanske vlasti ne smeju sprečavati rad novinara, naročito ne onih koji izveštavaju sa demonstracija, odnosno koji šire dokumentuju povrede ljudskih prava...

III.PODNESCI TREĆIH LICA KAO UMEŠAČA

72. Treća lica kao umešači pobrojana u stavu 4, gore, dostavila su sledeće zajedničke podneske.

73. Podnesci trećih lica kao umešača sastoje se od dva dela: oni prvo iznose pregled opšte situacije u kojoj se nalaze nezavisni novinari i medijski akteri u Azerbejdžanu; drugo, u drugom delu podnesaka oni ukazuju na to da članovi 8. i 10. Konvencije nameću tuženoj državi pozitivne obaveze u pogledu zaštite novinara kroz preduzimanje mera za sprečavanje ponašanja kojim se ograničava novinarska aktivnost, kao što je to ovde slučaj, i mere za istragu takvog ponašanja.

74. Treća lica kao umešači primećuju da Azerbejdžan ima jedno od najrestriktivnijih okruženja kada je reč o slobodi štampe u svetu i da je državna represija novinara, medija, blogera i boraca za zaštitu ljudskih prava široko rasprostranjena i teška. Poslednjih godina vlasti su se angažovale idalje se angažuju u sistematskoj represiji slobode izražavanja u zemlji, primenjujući u te svrhe zastrašivanje, pretvaranje u metu i progon novinara i svih onih koji dignu kritički glas protiv vlasti. Nezavisni novinari i aktivisti suočavaju se sa hapšenjima, osuđujućim presudama i dugotrajnim kaznama zatvora donetim na osnovu lažnih, politički motivisanih optužbi. Takođe su neprestano suočeni s nasiljem i represalijama, čiji su počinioci kako državni, tako i nedržavni akteri, a svaki takav postupak prolazi nekažnjeno.

75. U vreme podnošenja komentara trećih lica jedanaest novinara, blogera i drugih aktivista koji su kritikovali vlasti nalazilo se u zatvoru. Osim toga, novinari su podvrgnuti žestokim napadima od kojih su treća lica kao umešači izdvojila sledeće primere; ti primeri su ilustrativni, ali nisu iscrpni:

(a)Uzeyir Jafarov (Uzeir Džafarov), novinar jednog lista žestoko je napadnut 2007. godine; nepoznati počinioci su taj napad izvršili nakon što je on objavio članak u kome je jednog visokog vojnog oficira optužio za korupciju i protivzakonite aktivnosti (vidi, s tim u vezi, Uzeyir Jafarovprotiv Azerbejdžana, br. 54204/08, 29. januara2015);

(b)Agil Khalil (Agil Halil), istraživački novinar, bio je izložen napadu agenata Ministarstva nacionalne bezbednosti zbog toga što je pokušao da snimi neke fotografije u sklopu priprema za jedan istraživački članak. Nije sprovedena nikakva delotvorna istraga povodom tog napada. U postupku koji je tim povodom vođen pred ESLJP, Država je priznala, u vidu jednostranog saopštenja, povrede prava koje su i bile predmet pritužbe tog podnosioca predstavke (vidi, s tim u vezi,Khalil protiv Azerbejdžana (dec.), br. 60659/08, 38175/09 i 53585/09, 6. oktobar 2010);

(c)Afghan Mukhtarly (Afgan Muhtarli) bio je navodno izložen napadu uniformisanih policijskih službenika u januaru 2009. godine, kada je izveštavao sa jednog mitinga u Bakuu, iako se identifikovao kao pripadnik štampe. Pokrenuta je zvanična istraga, ali se od nje odustalo zbog nedostatka dokaza;

(d)Elmina Badalova, novinara reportera pretukla su sedmorica neidentifikovanih ljudi u julu 2010. godine, kada je snimao fotografije u sklopu novinarskog istraživanja o luksuznoj nekretnini koju poseduje ministar saobraćaja. Istraga nije pokrenuta;

(e)Idrak Abbasov (Idrak Abasov), dopisnik IRFS, bio je navodno teško pretučen od dvadesetak pripadnika policije i obezbeđenja Državne naftne kompanije Azerbejdžana (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan –SOCAR) u aprilu 2012. godine, kada je pokušao da na filmsku traku zabeleži kako SOCAR ruši kuće lokalnog stanovništva. Tim povodom nije sprovedena nikakva delotvorna istraga;

(f)U oktobru 2013. godine jedna grupa novinara koja je izveštavala o događaju iz predizborne kampanje bila je izložena napadu posmatrača koji su im naneli teške povrede. Tvrdilo se da su policijski službenici prisustvovali tom događaji, ali nisu intervenisali. Nije pokrenuta istraga uprkos tome što je predstavnik OEBS za slobodu medija uputio poziv vlastima da istraže incident;

(g)Emin Huseynov (Emin Husejnov), direktor IRFS, bio je zlostavljan u pritvoru (vidi Emin Huseynovprotiv Azerbejdžana, br. 59135/09, 7. maj 2015), potom je bio primoran da beži iz zemlje i lišen je državljanstva.

76. Osim toga, i nezavisne medijske organizacije su izložene napadima. Kao primer su treća lica kao umešači pomenula slučajeve maltretiranja reportera inapade naslužbene prostorije IRFS, RadijaAzadliqi TV Meydan.

77. Prema navodima trećih lica kao umešača, zbog toga što Država ne istražuje i ne kažnjava napade na one koji kritikuju vlast, stvorena je i ukorenila se atmosfera nekažnjivosti. Kada bi i došlo do kažnjavanja ili kada bi bila izrečena neka sankcija, ona je uglavnom pogađala onoga ko je bio žrtva napada, a ne onoga ko je bio napadač.

78. Treća lica kao umešači su takođe istakla da su različite međunarodne i regionalne organizacije za zaštitu ljudskih prava, uključujući Savet Evrope, OEBS i UN, u više navrata pozivale azerbejdžanske vlasti da poboljšaju nivo poštovanja prava na slobodu izražavanja, bilo tako što će osloboditi zatočene novinare, bilo tako što će stati na kraj represalijama zbog kritikovanja vlasti.

79. U vezi s konkretnim obavezama država po Konvenciji, pozivajući se na presude u predmetimaPalomo Sánchez i drugi protiv Španije ([GC], br. 28955/06 i tri druge, stav 59, ECHR 2011,Özgür Gündemprotiv Turske (br. 23144/93, stav 43, ECHR 2000‑III);Dink protiv Turske (br. 2668/07 i četiri druge, stav 137, 14. septembar 2010),kao i na nekoliko drugih presuda ESLJP, treća lica kao umešači su iznela tvrdnju da prema članu 10. Konvencije postoji pozitivna obaveza visokih strana ugovornica da preduzmu neophodne mere kako bi sprečile i istražile ponašanje kojem je cilj ograničenje novinarske aktivnosti. Osim toga, pozivajući se na presude u predmetima Von Hannover protiv Nemačke (br. 59320/00, ECHR 2004‑VI), Von Hannover protiv Nemačke (br. 2) ([GC], br. 40660/08 i 60641/08, ECHR 2012,Sciacca protiv Italije (br. 50774/99, ECHR 2005‑I),X i Y protiv Holandije (26. mart 1985, Series A,br. 91),kao i na jedan broj drugih presuda i odluka ESLJP, oni su istakli da prema članu 8. postoji pozitivna obaveza da se preduzmu mere u sklopu unutrašnjeg polja slobodne procene država, uključujući delotvornu istragu povodom krivičnih dela u nekim slučajevima, kako bi se osigurala zaštita prava na privatni život, čak i u sferi odnosa između samih pojedinaca. Konačno, kada je reč o zaštiti podataka o ličnosti, država ima negativnu obavezu premačlanu 8. Konvencije i ta obaveza se ogleda u kontekstu konkretnih dužnosti policije i organa tužilaštva u vezi sa zaštitom podataka o ličnosti do kojih dođu tokom istraga koje vode.

80. Treća lica kao umešači su zastupala stanovište da se na osnovu kombinovanog dejstva gore navedenih primera iz sudske prakse, u slučajevima u kojima dolazi do mešanja u privatnost novinara zbog njihovog novinarskog rada, otvara pitanje obaveza visokih strana ugovornica i po članu 8. i po članu 10. Konvencije.

81. Stoga su treća lica kao umešači zatražila da ESLJP ovaj predmet procenjuje u kontekstu težine položaja novinara u toj zemlji i sistematskog propusta Države da istraži ili da spreči povrede prava novinara, usled čega je nastupila opšta atmosfera nekažnjivosti kada je reč o napadima na novinare. U kontekstu mešanja u privatni život novinara insistirali su na tome da se pozitivne obaveze po članu 10. moraju nužno proširiti na stvarna ili zaprećena kršenja prava po članu 8. Konvencije, kao i da Evropski sud mora posebno pomno analizirati pozitivne obaveze po članu 8. tamo gde je otvoreno pitanje prava po članu 10.Mogućnost novinara da obavljaju svoju ulogu „čuvara javnog interesa” zavisi od njihove slobode od zastrašivanja, proganjanja, nezakonitog nadzora i praćenja i slobode od namernog zadiranja u njihov privatni život. To što nije obezbeđeno poštovanje i zaštita privatnih života novinara imalo je „efekat zamrzavanja” po njihov novinarski rad, a to je nanelo štetu društvu u celini.

PRAVO

I.SPAJANJE PREDSTAVKI

82. ESLJP smatra da shodno Pravilu 42. stav 1. Poslovnika Suda predstavke treba spojiti s obzirom na njihov sličan činjenični i pravni osnov.

II.NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 8. KONVENCIJE U VEZI SA PRETEĆIM PISMOM I TAJNIM SNIMANJEM I EMITOVANJEM VIDEO-ZAPISA INTIMNOG SADRŽAJA

83. U vezi s pretećim pismom, tajnim postavljanjem skrivenih kamera u stanu podnositeljke predstavke i emitovanjem tajno snimljenih video-zapisa sa prizorima iz njenog privatnog života, podnositeljka predstavke se pritužila po članovima8. i 13. Konvencije da je: (a) tužena država prekršila svoju negativnu obavezu time što je neposredno odgovorna za gore pomenuta dela i time što je organizovala klevetničku kampanju protiv nje u štampi; ili je (b), alternativno, tužena država propustila da ispuni svoju pozitivnu obavezu da zaštiti pravo podnositeljke predstavke na poštovanje njenog doma i privatnog života, što obuhvata njen fizički i moralni integritet, time što nije sprovela delotvornu istragu kako bi identifikovala one koji su odgovorni i time što joj nije pružila pravni lek koji bi mogla da iskoristi zbog neaktivnosti organa tužilaštva.

ESLJP smatra da tu pritužbu treba razmotriti isključivo po članu 8. Konvencije, koji glasi kako sledi:

1.Svako ima pravo na poštovanje svog privatnog i porodičnog života, doma i prepiske.

2.Javne vlasti neće se mešati u vršenje ovog prava sem ako to nije u skladu sa zakonom i neophodno u demokratskom društvu u interesu nacionalne bezbednosti, javne bezbednosti ili ekonomske dobrobiti zemlje, radi sprečavanja nereda ili kriminala, zaštite zdravlja ili morala,ili radi zaštite prava i sloboda drugih.

A.Prihvatljivost

84. ESLJP konstatuje da ova pritužba nije očigledno neosnovana u smislu člana 35. stav 3. tačka (a) Konvencije. On dalje konstatuje da predstavka nije neprihvatljiva ni po jednom drugom osnovu. S tih razloga ona mora biti proglašena prihvatljivom.

B.Meritum

1.Argumentacija stranaka

(a)Podnositeljka predstavke

85. Podnositeljka predstavke je tvrdila da je tužena država prekršila svoju negativnu obavezu po članu 8. zato što se jedan broj entiteta koji su okvalifikovani kao „javne vlasti” zbog svoje institucionalne i operativne zavisnosti od Države neopravdano umešao u njeno pravo na poštovanje njenog doma i privatnog života. Alternativno, podnositeljka predstavke je zastupala stanovište da je, u svakom slučaju, tužena država propustila da ispuni svoju pozitivnu obavezu i zaštiti njeno prvo na poštovanje njenog doma i privatnog života.

86. U pogledu negativne obaveze, podnositeljka predstavke je tvrdila da su predstavnici Države instalirali skrivene kamere u njenoj spavaćoj sobi, snimili video-zapise intimnog sadržaja i plasirali ih onlajn. Naročito je istakla da je drugu telefonsku liniju i dodatne kablove preko koga su ti tajno snimljeni video-zapisi emitovani iz njenog stana povezao s njenim stanom službenik ATS, koja pripada Baktelekomu, telefonskoj kompaniji koju u potpunosti poseduje i kontroliše Država, tako da ona predstavlja deo zvanične strukture Ministarstva za komunikacije i informacione tehnologije. Pored toga, Ministarstvo nacionalne bezbednosti takođe imakompletan pristup ATS-u. Bilo je potpuno jasno da je kompanija koju poseduje i kontroliše Država bila odgovorna za instaliranje druge telefonske linije i njeno povezivanje sa stanom podnositeljke predstavke.

87. Osim toga, podnositeljka predstavke je tvrdila da je Država imala jasan motiv da pokrene klevetničku kampanju protiv nje. Postavljanje skrivenih kamera i kablova dogodilo se svega nekoliko dana nakon što je podnositeljka predstavke objavila izveštaj o aktivnostima predsednikovih kćerki (vidi stavove 7. i 28, gore). Vreme u kome joj je upućeno preteće pismo i emitovanje prvog video-snimka sa intimnim sadržajem bilo je takođe povezano sa njenim izveštavanjem o predsednikovoj porodici. Konkretno, preteće pismo joj je poslato i video-snimak je objavljen otprilike mesec dana nakon što je podnositeljka predstavke počela da radi na pripremi članka o konzorcijumu za rudnik zlata (vidi stavove 7, 10. i 15, gore).

88. Podnositeljka predstavke je takođe primetila da je, nakon što je ona objavila tekstove o navodnoj korupciji, Narodna skupština donela izmene zakona kojim je komercijalnim preduzećima odobreno da ne obelodanjuju informacije o svojoj registraciji, vlasništvu i strukturi, čime se ograničava mogućnost novinara koji se bave istraživačkim novinarstvom „da identifikuju privatnu imovinu javnih ličnosti”. Narodna skupština je takođe donela zakon kojim se svim bivšim predsednicima injihovim suprugama određuje doživotni imunitet.

89. Osim toga, tada su listovi Yeni Azərbaycan, İki Sahil i Səspočeli da objavljuju članke ovideo-snimcima s prizorima iz njenog intimnog života, u sklopu sistematske kampanje blaćenja koju su vlasti vodile protiv podnositeljke predstavke od 2011. do 2013. godine. Ti članci su bili uvredljivi po svojoj prirodi, u njima se javno raspravljalo o njenom seksualnom životu i iznošene su uvrede na račun njenog morala, što je sve nanelo štetu njenim ličnim i profesionalnim odnosima u konzervativnom azerbejdžanskom društvu. Podnositeljka predstavke je tvrdila da su sva ta tri lista pod državnom kontrolom zato što funkcionišu kao medijski organi vladajuće stranke YAP (Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyasi – Nova partija Azerbejdžana)i izražavali su jasnu lojalnost YAP i Vladi. Naročito to važi za list Yeni Azərbaycan,koji je potpuno u vlasništvu YAP, a jedan član političkog saveta YAP je glavni urednik tih novina. List İki Sahil je u vlasništvu SOCAR, državne naftne kompanije, a glavni urednik tog lista je član političkog saveta YAP. List Səsje u vlasništvu dobrotvornog društva „Alinja”, koje je bilo jedan od osnivača YAP, a glavni urednik tog lista je jedan visoki funkcioner YAP.

90. Prema navodima podnositeljke predstavke, drugi video-snimak koji je emitovan u julu 2013. prikazan je u čitaču okvira (browser frame)koji sadrži reči „SəsTV Player”,što ukazuje na to da jeprodukcija izvedena u studiju Səs.

91. Podnositeljka predstavke je tvrdila da gore navedeni dokazi upućuju na to da se mešanje o kome je reč može pripisati Državi zato što javne vlasti ne obuhvataju samo institucije vlasti, nego i zasebna pravna lica koja ne uživaju dovoljnu institucionalnu i operativnu nezavisnost od Države. Osim toga, to mešanje je bilo neopravdano u smislu člana 8. stav 2. Prema argumentaciji podnositeljke predstavke, takav model maltretiranja nije predstavljao nikakvu novinu i taktika snimanja i emitovanja video-zapisa i fotografija sa prizorima iz seksualnog života u medijima kako bi se ponizili i zastrašili novinari koji kritikuju predsednika korišćena je i ranije, kao što je to bilo u slučaju kolege novinara N. Adilova,koji je takođe radio u Radiju Azadliq.

92. Podnositeljka predstavke je dalje navela da je, alternativno, ako ESLJP ustanovi da nije bilo mešanja koje bi se moglo neposredno pripisati Državi, tužena država u svakom slučaju prekršila svoju pozitivnu obavezu prema članu 8. time što je propustila da preduzme adekvatne mere da bi osigurala poštovanje njenog privatnog života.

93. U tom slučaju, trebalo je da Država deluje kako bi sprečila ili okončala povredu prava podnositeljke predstavke tako što bi primenila postojeće krivično pravo sprovodeći delotvornu istragu i krivično gonjenje. Međutim, istraga je bila nedelotvorna.

94. Prvo, Gradsko tužilaštvo u Bakuu nije blagovremeno otvorilo krivičnopravnu istragu. Nakon što je podnositeljka predstavke podnela krivičnu prijavu u vezi s pretećim pismom koje je dobila, prošla je čitava nedelja dok nije otvorena istraga, a za to vreme je video-snimak sa intimnim sadržajem procurio na internet i neki članci o tome su se već pojavili u novinama.

95. Drugo, u više navrata su istražni organi propustili da prikupe i obezbede dokaze koji su relevantni za ovu pritužbu. Pre svega, istražitelji nisu blagovremeno prikupili preteća pisma i fotografije koje su uz njih dostavljene od drugih primalaca takvih pošiljki (vidi stav 11, gore), usled čega je nestalo pismo koje je dobio Azadlıq. Pored toga, uprkos činjenici da je na koverti bila marka sa poštanskim žigom Moskve, istražitelji nisu sledili taj trag. Oni su takođe odbili da izvrše inspekciju druge telefonske linije i dokaze o postojanju skrivenih kamera u njenom stanu tvrdeći da ne poseduju odgovarajuću tehničku stručnost da to učine, ali su u isto vreme odbili da organizuju dolazak veštaka.

96. Osim toga, kada je, na sastanku koji je podnositeljka predstavke organizovala u svome stanu 19. marta 2012. godine inženjer iz Baktelekoma priznao da je instalirao drugu telefonsku liniju u stanu podnositeljke predstavke na zahtev svog poslodavca (vidi stav 28, gore), istražitelj ne samo da je odbio da iskaz tog svedoka unese u spis predmeta već je aktivno nastojao da to uništi. On je pocepao vlastitu rukom napisanu zabelešku o sadržaju iskaza tog inženjera i sačinio je novi dokument u kome nije bilo tog iskaza. Takođe je zatražio od inženjera da ukloni drugu telefonsku liniju bez dokumentovanja tog uklanjanja. Pored svojih zapažanja upućenih Evropskom sudu,podnositeljka predstavke je dostavila i iskaze troje svojih prijatelja koji su prisustvovali sastanku u njenom stanu 19. marta 2012. godine i koji su potvrdili da istražitelj nije pomenuo prisustvo inženjera na sastanku, niti je to uopšte pomenuto u zapisniku iz istrage. Kada je podnositeljka predstavke zatražila da taj inženjer bude zvanično saslušan, istražni organi na njen zahtev uopšte nisu odgovorili.

97. Treće, Gradsko tužilaštvo u Bakuu je u više navrata propustilo da obavesti podnositeljku predstavke o statusu istrage.

98. Štaviše, zbog toga što istražni organi nisu bez odlaganja istražili postojeće tragove i prikupili dokaze, istraga je produžena na nekoliko godina, čime je neopravdano prolongiran krivični postupak.

99. Na kraju, podnositeljka predstavke je tvrdila da joj je u postupku pred domaćim sudovima uskraćena mogućnost da koristi delotvoran pravni lek u odnosu na pritužbe koje je iznela u vezi sa neaktivnošću istražnih organa i nedelotvornošću istrage jer su domaći sudovi odbili da ispitaju meritum njenih pritužbi podnetih kako u sklopu postupka za sudski nadzor koji je predviđen odredbama ZKP, tako i u sklopu upravnog postupka koji je predviđen Zakonikom o opštem upravnom postupku.

(b)Država

100. Država je tvrdila da nije bilo nikakvog državnog mešanjau prava podnositeljke predstavke po osnovu člana 8. stav 1. Konvencije u vezi sa pretnjama koje su joj bile upućene, instaliranjem skrivenih kamera i kablova u njenom stanu, objavljivanja tajno snimljenih video-zapisa intimnog sadržaja, članaka u štampi koji su s tim bili povezani i drugih povezanih incidenata. U istrazi o gore pomenutim incidentima nije identifikovano lice ili lica koja su za te incidente odgovorna. Ipak,nije otkrivena ni bilo kakva veza između incidenata i Države i njenih agenata.

101. Država je navela da protiv podnositeljke predstavke nije bila organizovana nikakva klevetnička kampanja zbog njenih članaka o predsedniku i ukazala je da su postojala dva velika vremenska razmaka između trenutka u kome su se pojaviličlanci podnositeljke predstavke istavljanja video-zapisa na internet. Tako je Država navela da su članci podnositeljke predstavke objavljeni u avgustu 2010, junu 2011, maju 2012, oktobru 2012. i aprilu 2013, a ona je preteće pismo i video-zapis dobila u martu 2012, što znači godinu i sedam meseci po objavljivanju prvog članka, devet meseci po objavljivanju drugog članka i jedan i po mesec pre no što se pojavio sledeći članak podnositeljke predstavke.

102. Kada je reč o donošenju ustavnog zakona kojim se utvrđuju garancije za bivšeg predsednika i njegove članove porodice i o izmeni zakona o poverljivosti komercijalnih podataka, Država je istakla da, suprotno tvrdnji podnositeljke predstavke (vidi stav 88, gore), nije bilo nikakve veze između donošenja tih zakonodavnih akata i predmeta ove podnositeljke predstavke. Prvo glasanje Narodne skupštine o Predlogu ustavnog zakona dogodilo se u novembru 2011. godine, gotovo šest meseci pre no što će podnositeljka predstavke objaviti svoje članke u maju 2012. Tim ustavnim zakonom, koji je usvojen 12. juna 2012. godine, priznat je imunitet bivšem predsedniku Mutalibovu, čime mu je dozvoljeno da se vrati u Azerbejdžan posle višegodišnjeg boravka u egzilu. Kada je reč o izmenama Zakona o poverljivosti komercijalnih podataka, koji je donet 12. juna 2012. godine, njegov cilj je bio promovisanje i zaštita preduzetničke aktivnosti i rad na toj izmeni zakona započeo je pre objavljivanja članaka podnositeljke predstavke u maju 2012.

103. Što se tiče članaka o podnositeljki predstavke koji su objavljeni u jednom broju listova,Država je navela da je podnositeljka predstavke javna ličnost i da nije nimalo iznenađujuće što je jedan broj domaćih medija u različitim prilikama komentarisao stvari koje su se na nju odnosile. Ti članci su bili podstaknuti video-snimkom podnositeljke predstavke sa prizorima intimnog sadržaja koji je bio postavljen na internet. Država je osporila tvrdnju podnositeljke predstavke da su medijski izvori o kojima je reč bili „pod kontrolom Države” ili „provladini”. Osim toga, Država je navela da veb-sajt „ictimaipalatka.com” više ne funkcioniše i da nije mogućno identifikovati lice ili lica koja su njime upravljala.

104. Što se tiče pozitivne obaveze Države po osnovu člana 8, Država je istakla da je, nakon što je podnositeljka predstavke podnela pritužbu,nadležni organ preduzeo neophodne istražne mere, uključujući pregled njenog stana, prikupljanje dokaza iz stana, saslušavanje svedoka, forenzičko, kompjutersko i fonoskopsko ispitivanje, fizičko i hemijsko ispitivanje, tehničku i grafološku analizu dokumenata i uputio je zahteve za uzajamnu pravnu pomoć različitim organima. Podnositeljka predstavke je propisno informisana o toku istrage. Kada je reč o njenoj pritužbi naistražne vlasti zbog navodne nedelotvornosti istrage, domaći sudovi nisu bili nadležni da ispitaju tu pritužbu podnositeljke predstavke u okviru postupka sudskog nadzora.

2.Ocena ESLJP

(a) Primenjivost člana 8.

105. ESLJP konstatuje da je podnositeljka predstavke, poznati istraživački novinar, dobila preteće pismo u kome su od nje zahtevali da prekine svoje aktivnosti,u njenom stanu su nepoznata lica bez njenog znanja i pristanka postavila skrivene kamere, tajno su snimani video-zapisi sa prizorima iz njenog intimnog života i emitovani na internetu, a tu činjenicu su potom dalje oglašavali mediji.

106. Prema tome, ovdenema spora o primenljivosti člana 8: činjenice na kojima počiva predstavka, a koje obuhvataju tajno snimanje podnositeljke predstavke u njenom sopstvenom domu i video-zapise sa krajnje intimnim prizorima iz njenog života očigledno spadaju u „privatni život”. Taj pojam obuhvata i fizički i moralni integritet ličnosti, kao i njen seksualni život (uporedi K.U. protiv Finske, br. 2872/02, stav 41, ECHR 2008; vidi takođe presude u predmetima Peck protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva,br. 44647/98, stav 57, ECHR 2003‑I; E.B. protiv Francuske [GC], br. 43546/02, stav 43, 22. januar 2008; A, B i C protiv Irske [GC], br. 25579/05, stav 212, ECHR 2010.i Söderman protiv Švedske [GC], br. 5786/08, stav 86, ECHR 2013).

107. Podnositeljka predstavke se takođe pritužila na povredu njenog prava na poštovanje njenog doma i Sud potvrđuje da se ta vrsta upada u nečiji dom karakteriše izuzetnom silovitošću. Sud, međutim, smatra da se ukupnost činjenica na kojima počiva ova pritužba može načelno ispitati u svetlu zahteva za zaštitu „privatnog života”.

(b)Pozitivna ili negativna obaveza

108. Podnositeljka predstavke se u svojoj predstavci izričito pritužila na to da je tužena država prekršila svoju pozitivnu obavezu po članu 8. da osigura poštovanje njenog privatnog života, tako što nije sprovela delotvornu istragu, iako je ona sama takođe ukazala na to da je tajno postavljanje kablova i video-kamera mogao izvršiti „neko ko je u vezi sa vlastima ili deluje po nalogu vlasti”, čime je implicirala da su dela o kojima je reč mogli da izvrše predstavnici Države, što bi predstavljalo povredu negativne obaveze Države prema članu 8. Konvencije.

109. U svojoj daljoj argumentaciji, podnositeljka predstavke je razradila tu pritužbu, tvrdeći da se ovde radilo ili o povredi negativne obaveze ili, alternativno, u svakom slučaju, o povredi pozitivne obaveze.

110. Kada je reč o negativnoj obavezi, podnositeljka predstavke je tvrdila da su se lica ili entiteti koji se mogu smatrati „predstavnicima Države” neopravdano umešali u njena prava po članu 8. Konvencije, čime su podrili poštovanje njenog privatnog života, povezano s njenim istraživačkim novinarskim radom u vezi s navodnom korupcijom predsednikove porodice.

111. Međutim, imajući u vidu argumentaciju podnositeljke predstavke kojom je ona potkrepila tvrdnju o navodnoj povredi negativne obaveze (vidi, naročito, stavove 86–91, gore), ESLJP smatra da se ti argumenti zasnivaju ili na posrednim dokazima ili na tvrdnjama koje treba potkrepiti i dodatno istražiti. Mada Sud mora imati sluha za potencijalne teškoće u pogledu pribavljanja dokaza s kojima se jedna stranka suočava, nije mogućno, na osnovu raspoloživog materijala, utvrditi u ovom predmetu postojanje potrebnog standarda dokaza „van razumne sumnje”(vidi Presudu u predmetu Nuri Kurt protiv Turske, br. 37038/97, stav 101, 29. novembar 2005)da se ovde radilo o neopravdanom mešanju koje se može pripisati Državi.

112. ESLJP ponavlja da, iako je suštinski gledano cilj člana 8. da se zašiti pojedinac od proizvoljnog mešanja javnih vlasti, ne može se reći da taj član obavezuje državu da se uzdrži od takvog mešanja: pored te primarno negativne obaveze, mogu postojati i pozitivne obaveze koje su inherentne delotvornom poštovanju privatnog ili porodičnog života. Te obaveze mogu obuhvatiti donošenje mera kojima je cilj osiguranje poštovanja privatnog i porodičnog života, čak i u sferi odnosa među samim pojedincima (vidi Söderman, gore navedeno, stav 78). Štaviše, granice između pozitivnih i negativnih obaveza države prema članu 8. ne dopuštaju uvek da se precizno definišu. Važeća načela su ipak slična. Posebno se i u jednom i u drugom slučaju mora voditi računa o pravičnoj ravnoteži koja mora biti uspostavljena između konkurentnih interesa (vidi presude u predmetima Dickson protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [GC], br. 44362/04, stav 70, ECHR 2007‑V;Odièvre protiv Francuske [GC],br. 42326/98, stav 40, ECHR 2003‑III i Dubská i Krejzová protiv Češke Republike [GC], br. 28859/11 i 28473/12, stavovi 164–165, 15. novembar 2016).

U ovom predmetu identitet onih koji su počinili različita dela na koja se podnositeljka predstavke pritužuje nije poznat i ostaje otvoreno pitanje da li su oni bili povezani s predstavnicima Države koji su zloupotrebili svoja zvanična ovlašćenja i moć. Ipak, s obzirom na verodostojne navode podnositeljke predstavke,kontekstualne informacije koje su predočila treća lica kao umešači, kao i s obzirom na brižljivo planiranje i sprovođenje operacije tajnog nadzora (vidi stav 121, dole), ESLJP naglašava da ima razloga za zabrinutost u pogledu odgovora na to pitanje.

114. U svetlu svih gore navedenih razmatranja i imajući u vidu argumentaciju koju su iznele stranke, činjenične okolnosti i raspoloživi materijal, ESLJP smatra da se ova pritužba mora ispitati sa stanovišta pozitivnih obaveza Države prema članu 8. Konvencije.

(c)Ispunjenje pozitivne obaveze

115. Izbor sredstava pomoću kojih će se obezbediti ispunjenje obaveze iz člana 8. Konvencije u sferi odnosameđu samim pojedincima, u načelu, stvar je koja spada u unutrašnje polje slobodne procene visokih strana ugovornica. Postoje različiti načini da se osigura poštovanje privatnog života, a priroda obaveze države zavisi od konkretnog aspekta privatnog života o kome je reč. Kada se radi o nekom posebno važnom aspektu egzistencije ili identiteta pojedinca ili kada se radi o aktivnostima koje se odnose na neki od najintimnijih aspekata privatnog života, unutrašnje polje slobodne procene koje je dopušteno državi srazmerno se sužava (vidi Söderman, gore navedeno, stav 79, s daljim referencama na koje se tu upućuje).Naročito, delotvorno odvraćanje od dela velike težine, kada se dovode u pitanje osnovne vrednosti i suštinski aspekti privatnog života, zahteva od država da obezbede da postoje delotvorne krivičnopravne odredbe (vidi presude u predmetima X i Y protiv Holandije, gore navedeno, stavovi 23–24. i 27;M.C. protiv Bugarske,br. 39272/98, stav 150, ECHR 2003‑XII; K.U. protiv Finske, gore navedeno, stav 43;A, B i C protiv Letonije, br. 30808/11, stav 148, 31. mart 2016.i M.S. protiv Ukrajine, br. 2091/13, stav 62, 11. jul 2017).Kada je reč o tako teškim delima, pozitivne obaveze države prema članu 8. u pogledu osiguranja fizičkog i moralnog integriteta pojedinca mogu se takođe proširiti na pitanja koja se odnose na delotvornost krivičnopravne istrage (vidi, između ostalih pravnih autoriteta, presude u predmetima M.C. protiv Bugarske, gore navedena, stav 152; C.A.S. i C.S. protiv Rumunije, br. 26692/05, stav 72, 20. mart 2012.i M.P. i drugi protiv Bugarske, br. 22457/08, stav 109–110, 15. novembar 2011).

116. ESLJP smatra da su dela koja su predmet pritužbe bila teška i da su predstavljala nasrtaj na ljudsko dostojanstvo: upad u dom podnositeljke predstavke u vidu neovlašćenog ulaska u njen stan i instaliranje kablova i skrivenih video-kamera u stanu; teško, flagrantno i izuzetno silovito zadiranje u njen privatni život u vidu neovlašćenog snimanja najintimnijih aspekata njenog privatnog života, što se sve dogodilo u svetosti njenog doma, kao i potonje plasiranje u javnost tih video-zapisa; pismo u kome joj je zaprećeno javnim poniženjem i sramoćenjem. Osim toga, podnositeljka predstavke je poznata novinarka i postojala je uverljiva veza između njene profesionalne aktivnosti i gore pomenutih upada, čija je svrha bila da se ona ućutka (vidi stav 119, dole).

117. Takva vrsta zadiranja u privatni život kažnjiva je po članu 156. Krivičnog zakonika i domaće vlasti su, u suštini, u datom slučaju povele krivični postupak. Imajući u vidu težinu gore pomenutih radnji (uporedi na primer sa K.U. protiv Finske, gore pomenuto, stavovi 45. i 49), kao i metod zaštite koji su stvarno odabrale domaće vlasti (vidi Alković protiv Crne Gore, br. 66895/10, stav 67, 5. decembar 2017), ESLJP smatra da je praktična i delotvorna zaštita podnositeljke predstavke zahtevala da budu preduzeti delotvorni koraci u okviru krivičnopravne istrage kako bi se identifikovao i krivično gonio počinilac ili počinioci tih dela.

118. Da bi jedna istraga mogla biti smatrana „delotvornom”, ona, u načelu, treba da bude u stanju da dovede do toga da se utvrde činjenice predmeta i identifikuju i kazne odgovorna lica. To nije obaveza koja se odnosi na rezultat, nego obaveza koja se odnosi na sredstva, instrumente koji se primenjuju (vidi Alković, gore navedeno, stav 65). Prilikom razmatranja delotvornosti krivičnopravne istrage u kontekstu pozitivnih obaveza prema, između ostalog, članu 8. Konvencije u predmetima koji su analogni ovom predmetu, ESLJP je ranije koristio test „značajnog nedostatka”. Zadatak je Suda prema tom testu da utvrdi da li su navodni nedostaci u istrazi bili toliko značajni da je njima tužena država prekršila svoje pozitivne obaveze prema članu 8. Konvencije. ESLJP se ne upušta u navode o manjim greškama ili izolovanim propustima u istrazi; on ne može da zameni domaće vlasti kada je reč o proceni činjenica datog predmeta; isto tako, on ne može da odluči o mogućim navodnim počiniocima niti o njihovoj krivičnoj odgovornosti (vidi M.C. protiv Bugarske, gore navedeno, stavovi 167–168.i M. i C. protiv Rumunije, br. 29032/04, stavovi 112–113, 27. septembar 2011).

119. ESLJP je do sada morao da rešava u jednom broju predmetau kojima se radilo o obavezama tuženih država da istraže krivična dela protiv novinara (vidi na primerAdalı protiv Turske, br. 38187/97, stav 231, 31. mart 2005; Gongadze protiv Ukrajine, br. 34056/02, stavovi 8–15. i 179, ECHR 2005‑XI; Uzeyir Jafarovprotiv Azerbejdžana, br. 54204/08, stav 52, 29. januar 2015; Huseynova protiv Azerbejdžana, br. 10653/10, stav 115, 13. april 2017.i Mazepa i drugi protiv Rusije,br. 15086/07, stav 73, 17. jul 2018). Iako je krivično delo koje je počinjeno protiv podnositeljke predstavke u ovom slučaju bilo različito po svojoj prirodi, a relevantne pritužbe odnose se na različite odredbe Konvencije iz kojih proističu procesne obaveze koje nisu u potpunosti identične, sličnost s navedenim predmetima ogleda se u tome da je krivično delo bilo počinjeno protiv veoma poznate istraživačke novinarke, koja je bila krajnje kritičnau ocenjivanju vlasti. Ta karakteristična odlika dodatno je naglašena činjenicom da je u pretećem pismu koje je podnositeljka predstavke dobila zahtevano da se ona uzdrži od onoga čime se bavi, što se može shvatiti u opštem kontekstu predmeta kao pozivanje najverovatnije na njenu profesionalnu aktivnost. U situaciji u kojoj je podnositeljka predstavke biladobro poznata u društvu upravo zbog svog novinarskog rada i samo zbog tog novinarskog rada, teško je izdvojiti bilo koji drugi motiv za pretnju javnim sramoćenjem koje je ona dobila osim motiva koji je povezan s tom njenom novinarskom aktivnošću. Nepostojanje takvog motiva moglo bi se dokazati samo da je uverljivo i na osnovu dokaza utvrđeno kao rezultat delotvorne istrage.

120. Prema tome, gore navedeni aspekt predmeta doveo je do toga da je bilo krajnje važno istražiti da li je pretnja bila povezana sa profesionalnom aktivnošću podnositeljke predstavke i ko je tu pretnju uputio (vidi, mutatis mutandis,Huseynova, gore navedeno, stav 115.i Mazepa i drugi, gore navedeno, stavovi 73. i 75).

121. ESLJP primećuje da su dela koja su počinjena protiv podnositeljke predstavke na prvi pogled predstavljala rezultat brižljivo planirane i sprovedene operacije koja je podrazumevala koordinisan napor izvesnog broja pojedinaca. Preteće pismo sfotografijama„zamrznutim” savideo-snimka koji je kasnije objavljen navodno joj je poslato iz Moskve; kablovi skrivene video-kamere unapred su bili postavljeni u njenom stanu – to je učinjeno spolja i to je učinilo više od jednog lica (po svemu sudeći, kablove i za koje se pokazalo da su spolja vodili ka njenom stanu postavio je inženjer Baktelekoma, dok su kablove i kamere u samom stanu postavila neka druga, nepoznata lica); veb-sajt sa znakom koji, po svemu sudeći, namerno dovodi u zabludu napravljen je u svrhu postavljanja tog video-zapisa na internetu; u novinama se pojavilo nekoliko članaka o toj temi otprilike u vreme kada je video-snimak postavljen na tom veb-sajtu.

122. Osim toga, iako navodi podnositeljke predstavke da su predstavnici Države mogli biti počinioci krivičnih dela protiv nje nisu potkrepljeni dokazima koji zadovoljavaju standard dokazivanja potreban da bi se ustanovila povreda negativne obaveze prema članu 8. Konvencije (vidi stav 111, gore), njeni argumenti u tom smislu su ipak snažni i ne mogu se odbaciti kao prima facieneodbranljivi. S tih razloga, ti argumenti su nalagali da se u istrazi potraže dokazi koji bi mogli da ih potkrepe.

123. Od samog početka, na osnovu gore navedenih činjenica i raspoloživih dokaza, istražni organi su već imali nekoliko različitih i očiglednih tragova. Međutim, iz gore navedenih razloga, ESLJP smatra da nije dokazano da su istražni organi preduzeli dovoljno koraka u tom smislu.

124. ESLJP primećuje da je Država dostavila samo mali broj dokumenata iz istražnog spisa i da on stoga raspolaže sa malobrojnim informacijama u vezi sa spornom istragom. Jedini materijali koje je Država dostavila jesu kopije nekoliko odluka istražitelja kojima se nalaže da se preduzmu određene procene radnje (vidi stavove 30–32, gore) koje obuhvataju prihvatanje zahteva podnositeljke predstavke da se ispita inženjer Baktelekoma i pribavljanje jednog broja analiza veštaka. U Izveštaju ostatusuistrage, koji je objavljen 26. aprila 2012, istražni organi su, pored toga, ukazali na to da su ispitali i jedan broj drugih svedoka koji su uglavnom bili prijatelji, društveni ili profesionalni kontakti i članovi porodice podnositeljke predstavke (vidi stavove49–53, gore). Slične opšte izjave o procesnim radnjama koje su preduzete date su u pismima istražnih organa koja su kasnije upućena podnositeljki predstavke (vidi stavove 37–38, gore). Međutim, Država nije predočila nijedan dokument kojim bi dokazala da su te istražne radnje zaista sprovedene, kao što su zapisnici sa saslušanja, izveštaji veštaka i zapisnici sa ispitivanja fizičkih dokaza. Država nije pružila nikakvo objašnjenje o tome zašto nije dostavilakompletan sadržaj istražnog spisa. U takvim okolnostima, bitno je umanjena sposobnost ESLJP da procenjuje prirodu i obim istrage.

125. Kada je reč o saslušanju važnog svedoka N. J., službenika Baktelekoma, koga je identifikovala sama podnositeljka predstavke, Država nije uverljivo dokazala da je u istrazi njegov iskaz pribavljen na adekvatan način ili da je praćen ijedan trag na koji je njegov iskaz upućivao. Iz dostupnog materijala i na osnovu argumenata koje je iznela podnositeljka predstavke, a koje je Država izričito osporila, čini se da je, po svemu sudeći, prilikom njihovog prvog susreta 19. marta 2012. istražitelj propustio da valjano unese u zapisnik pa je možda čak i aktivno izbegao da evidentira iskaz g. N.J., a taj iskaz je bio izuzetno relevantan za ceo predmet. Država je dostavila potonji nalog istražitelja od 30. marta 2012, kojim je on prihvatio zahtev podnositeljke predstavke da se formalno ispita N.J. Međutim,Država nije predočila nikakve druge dokumente, kao što bi bio zvanični zapisnik sa tog ispitivanja. Prema onome što se nalazi u spisu predmeta, nije dokazano da je N.J. biopropisno saslušan. Vrlo je verovatno da bi informacije koje je on mogao da pruži u svom iskazu dodatno osvetlile identitet lica koje mu je moglo narediti da dovede kablove do stana podnositeljke predstavke, kao i vezu tog lica sa „intelektualnim tvorcem” krivičnog dela. Taj iskaz je takođe mogao pomoći da se utvrdi da lije N.J. postupao po službenom nalogu svog državnog poslodavca ili je to bio neki vid „nezvaničnog” zahteva njegovih pretpostavljenih. To je moglo da razjasni jedan broj pitanja u vezi s mogućom umešanošću predstavnika Države u operaciju koja je sprovedena u stanu podnositeljke predstavke.

126. Drugi trag koji je trebalo istražiti bio je identitet lica koje je iz Moskve poslalo preteće pismo podnositeljki predstavke. Na koverti upućenoj podnositeljki predstavke nalazili su se ime i adresa tog pošiljaoca. U spisu predmeta nema nikakvog materijala koji bi ukazao na to da su preduzete istražne radnje da bi se pratio taj trag i da bi se identifikovao taj pojedinac; na primer, mogao je biti upućen zvanični zahtev ruskim vlastima za pružanje uzajamne pravne pomoći u tom smislu (uporedi sa presudom u predmetu Huseynova, gore navedenom, stavovi 100–111).

127. Osim toga, imajući na umu činjenicu da su prvi i drugi video-snimak postavljeni onlajn na dva različita veb-sajta (musavat.tv iictimaipalatka.com), sledeća istražna radnja koja je trebalo neposredno da usledi bila bi da se identifikuju vlasnici i/ili operateri tih veb-sajtova i da se ustanovi izvor video-snimaka i identitet onih koji su te video-snimke postavili. U spisu predmeta nema informacija koje bi ukazale na to da su istražni organi s tim u vezi preduzeli bilo kakve radnje.

128. Iako Država tvrdi da se ne može uspostaviti očigledna veza između spornih dela i vremena objavljivanja članaka podnositeljke predstavke, kao i donošenja novog domaćeg zakonodavstva (vidi stavove 101–102, gore), nije dokazano da su istražni organi preduzeli radnje da bi utvrdili da li je bilo mogućno uspostaviti vezu između spornih dela i bilo kog članka podnositeljke predstavke (bilo da je reč o onim tekstovima na koje je ona posebno ukazala ili tekstovima na koje su ukazali drugi). U kontekstu čitavog niza krivičnih dela za koja je moguće da su bila povezana sa novinarskom aktivnošću podnositeljke predstavke, čini se da je takva linija istrage bila neophodna.

129. ESLJP takođe obraća pažnju na navode podnositeljke predstavke o tome da je čitačokvira (browser frame) drugog video-snimka, plasiranog na veb-sajtu ’ictimaipalatka.com’, bio označen rečima ’SəsTV Player’; to je takođe moglo biti istraženo kako bi se, između ostalog, utvrdilo da li postoji neka veza sa listom Səs.

130. Konačno, ESLJP primećuje da je istraga vođena sa znatnim kašnjenjem i danije dokazano da je ikakav napredak u istrazi ostvaren posle avgusta 2013. godine uprkos tome što je podnositeljka predstavke s tim u vezi pokušavala da izjavi žalbe. Sudovi te njene žalbe nisu prihvatili.

131. Imajući na umu značajne nedostatke u načinu na koji su vlasti vodile istragu u datom predmetu, kao i ukupnu dužinu postupka, ESLJP zaključuje da vlasti nisu ispunile svoju pozitivnu obavezu da obezbede adekvatnu zaštitu privatnog života podnositeljke predstavke tako što će sprovesti delotvornu krivičnopravnu istragu veoma teških mešanja u njen privatni život. S obzirom na to da je doneo taj zaključak, Sud ne smatra da je potrebno da ispituje i druge argumente koje je podnositeljka predstavke u tom smislu iznela.

132. Prema tome, došlo je do povrede člana 8. Konvencije.

III. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 8. KONVENCIJE U VEZI SA OBJAVLJIVANJEM IZVEŠTAJA VLASTI O STATUSU ISTRAGE

133. Podnositeljka predstavke se pritužila po članu 8. Konvencije da je javno obelodanjivanje podataka o ličnosti u Izveštaju o statusuistrage, koji su vlasti saopštile 26. aprila 2012. predstavljalo nezakonito i neopravdano mešanje u njeno pravo na poštovanje njenog privatnog i porodičnog života.

Član 8. Konvencije glasi kako sledi:

1. Svako ima pravo na poštovanje svog privatnog i porodičnog života, doma i prepiske.

2. Javne vlasti neće se mešati u vršenje ovog prava sem ako to nije u skladu sa zakonom i neophodno u demokratskom društvu u interesu nacionalne bezbednosti, javne bezbednosti ili ekonomske dobrobiti zemlje, radi sprečavanja nereda ili kriminala, zaštite zdravlja ili morala, ili radi zaštite prava i sloboda drugih.

A. Prihvatljivost

134. ESLJP konstatuje da ova pritužba nije očigledno neosnovana u smislu člana 35. stav 3. tačka (a) Konvencije. On dalje konstatuje da predstavka nije neprihvatljiva ni po jednom drugom osnovu. S tih razloga ona mora biti proglašena prihvaćenom.

B. Meritum

1. Argumenti stranaka

135. Podnositeljka predstavke je navela da je Izveštaj o statusuistrage, iako je navodno trebalo da pruži uvid u najnovije stanje istrage, obelodanio prekomernu količinu osetljivih podataka o ličnosti prikupljenih tokom istrage. U te podatke spadala je adresa njenog stana, identitet njenog tadašnjeg mladića koji se takođe vidi i na video-snimku sa prizorima iz intimnog života, kao i imena i profesije njenih prijatelja i kolega. Priroda i sam obim tih obelodanjenih informacija pružaju kompletan uvid u njen privatni život.

136. Podnositeljka predstavke je navela da je obelodanjivanje adrese njenog stana dodatno pojačalo njen osećaj da je lično ugrožena, da je u opasnosti. Obelodanjivanje identiteta i profesija njenih poslovnih kontakata i prijatelja predstavljalo je mešanje u njenu slobodnu komunikaciju sa njima, čime je dodatno ometen njen novinarski rad. Osim toga, time što je obelodanjeno da ima intimnu vanbračnu vezu naneta je šteta njenom ugledu i dostojanstvu u pretežno konzervativnom azerbejdžanskom društvu.

137. Podnositeljka predstavke je tvrdila da je obelodanjivanje gore navedenih informacija predstavljalo mešanje državnih organa, Državnog javnog tužilaštva i Gradskog tužilaštva Bakua, u njeno pravo na privatni i porodični život. Tvrdila je takođe da to mešanje nije bilo u skladu sa zakonom: unutrašnje pravo zabranjuje da se obelodanjuju informacije koje se odnose na privatni život nekog pojedinca (vidi stavove 64. i 67, gore). Osim toga, u svakom slučaju, to mešanje nije bilo sprovedeno ni u jednom od legitimnih ciljeva koji su utvrđeni u članu 8. stav 2. Konvencije i nije bilo neophodno.

138. Država je navela da je Izveštaj o statusu istrageod 26. aprila 2012. objavljen kao odgovor na javne izjave i pritužbe podnositeljke predstavke i njenog advokata da je istraga nedelotvorna. Prilikom objavljivanja tog izveštaja namera je bila da se javnost obavesti o napretku istrage, kao i da se otkloni mogućnost da se u javnosti formira negativno javno mnjenje o istražnim organima, što se moglo dogoditi zbog javnih pritužbi podnositeljke predstavke. Domaći sudovi, koji su razmatrali pritužbe podnositeljke predstavke u vezi sa Izveštajem o statusu istrageizveli su istovetan zaključak. I oni su zaključili da podaci koji su navedeni u Izveštaju o statusu istragenisu predstavljali povredu zahteva unutrašnjeg prava u vezi sa zaštitom privatnosti pojedinca, kao i da podnositeljka predstavke nije dokazala da je pretrpela bilo kakvu nematerijalnu štetu.

2. Ocena ESLJP

139. ESLJP primećuje da je pojam „privatnog života” širok pojam koji ne podleže iscrpnoj definiciji. Kako je naznačeno u stavu 106, gore, to je pojam koji obuhvata fizički i psihološki integritet jedne ličnosti i on stoga može sadržati višestruke aspekte fizičkog i socijalnog identiteta osobe. Član 8. nije ograničen samo na zaštitu „uskog kruga” u kome pojedinac može živeti svoj lični život po sopstvenom izboru i potpuno isključiti iz tog kruga spoljni svet koji u njega ne spada. Taj član takođe štiti i pravo na uspostavljanje i razvoj odnosa s drugim ljudskim bićima i sa spoljnim svetom (vidi Bărbulescu protiv Rumunije [GC], br. 61496/08, stav 70, 5. septembar 2017, sa daljim referencama koje su tamo naznačene). Privatni život može obuhvatiti čak i aktivnosti profesionalne ili poslovne prirode (vidi Denisov protiv Ukrajine [GC], br. 76639/11, stavovi 100–101, 25. septembar 2018). ESLJP takođe stoji na stanovištu da svako ima pravo da živi privatno, daleko od neželjene pažnje (vidi Smirnova protiv Rusije,br. 46133/99 i 48183/99, stav 95, ECHR 2003‑IX (izvodi), kao i Bărbulescu, gore navedeno, stav 70).

140. Osim toga, ESLJP primećuje da adresa stana nekog lica predstavlja podatak o ličnosti koji spada u njen privatni život i kao takva uživa zaštitu koju u tom smislu pruža član 8. Konvencije (vidi Alkaya protiv Turske, br. 42811/06, stav 30, 9. oktobar 2012).

141. 141. Skladištenje i saopštavanje informacija koje se odnose na privatni život nekog lica spada u polje dejstva člana 8. stav 1. Javne informacije mogu biti u polju dejstva privatnog života onda kada se prikupljaju sistematski i skladište u dosijeima koje čuvaju vlasti (vidi Rotaru protiv Rumunije [GC], br. 28341/95, stav 43, ECHR 2000‑V, i Association „21 December 1989” i drugi protiv Rumunije , br. 33810/07 i 18817/08, stav 168, 24. maj 2011).

142. U ovom konkretnom predmetu, Izveštaj o statusu istragekoji su u štampi objavili organi tužilaštva obelodanio je kućnu adresu podnositeljke predstavke, činjenicu o postojanju njenog odnosa s njenim tadašnjim mladićem i njegovo puno ime i prezime i profesiju, ime i prezime njenog stanodavca i članova njene porodice, kao i imena i prezimena i zanimanje njenih prijatelja i kolega. Taj izveštaj je takođe obelodanio informacije o pojedincima kojima je podnositeljka predstavke izdavala stan u pazakup u različitim periodima, kao i podrobnosti o njihovim finansijskim aranžmanima. ESLJP smatra da sve gore navedene informacije, sagledane u celini, spadaju u domen „privatnog života” podnositeljke predstavke. Država to nije izričito osporila. Dok se stanovište podnositeljke predstavke o gore navedenim informacijama odnosi i na njen „porodični život”, ESLJP smatra da, u kontekstu konkretnog slučaja, celinu tih obelodanjenih informacija treba sagledavati isključivo u svetlu zahteva za zaštitu „privatnog života”.

143. ESLJP primećuje da su gore navedeni podaci pribavljeni tokom krivičnopravne istrage. Podnositeljka predstavke se ne pritužuje na samo prikupljanje tih informacija i Sud ne vidi da se otvara bilo kakvo pitanje po članu 8. u vezi s tako rutinskim istražnim radnjama, kao što je, na primer, identifikovanje lica koja su posećivala stan podnositeljke predstavke ili saslušavanje tih lica u svojstvu svedoka.

144. Međutim, obelodanjivanje gore navedenih podataka u saopštenju za štampu koje su izdali Državno javno tužilaštvo i Gradsko tužilaštvo u Bakuu očigledno je predstavljalo mešanje u pravo podnositeljke predstavke na poštovanje njenog privatnog života.

145. Da bi bilo opravdano po članu 8. stav 2. Konvencije, svako mešanje mora biti u skladu sa zakonom, njime se mora težiti ostvarenju jednom od utvrđenih legitimnih ciljeva i ono mora biti neophodno u demokratskom društvu.

146. Što se tiče zakonitosti, podnositeljka predstavke zastupa stanovište da je to mešanje predstavljalo povredu člana 32. Ustava i domaćeg zakonodavstva, naročito člana 199. ZKP, kojim se istražnim organima zabranjuje da obelodanjuju informacije koje predstavljaju privatnu tajnu. Država nije bliže komentarisala pitanje zakonitosti, ističući samo da su domaći sudovi zaključili kako time što je objavljen Izveštaj o statusu istragenisu bili prekršeni zahtevi utvrđeni u unutrašnjem pravu u vezi sa zaštitom privatnosti pojedinca. U okolnostima ovog konkretnog slučaja, ESLJP ne smatra da je neophodno da utvrdi da li je mešanje bilo „u skladu sa zakonom”, jer ono, u svakom slučaju, nije bilo opravdano po drugim osnovama.

147. Pre svega, Država nije mogla da dokaže ni legitimni cilj, ni neophodnost mešanja o kome je reč. Država je tvrdila da je svrha Izveštaja o statusu istragebila „da se obavesti javnost o napretku istrage, kao i da se otkloni mogućnost da se u javnosti formira negativno javno mnjenje o istražnim organima, što se moglo dogoditi zbog javnih pritužbi podnositeljke predstavke”. Međutim, u ovom konkretnom slučaju, podnositeljka predstavke se ne pritužuje zbog činjenice da su organi tužilaštva obavestili javnost o napretku istrage (što, samo po sebi, nije stvar mešanja u prava po članu 8), već se pritužuje zbog prekomernog i suvišnog obelodanjivanja osetljivih podataka o ličnosti u Izveštaju o statusuistrage. ESLJP smatra da je bilo moguće obavestiti javnost o prirodi istražnih radnji koje su preduzele vlasti (saslušavanje svedoka, ispitivanje materijalnih dokaza i tako dalje), a da se u isto vreme poštuje privatnost podnositeljke predstavke. Država nije objasnila kom se legitimnom cilju težilo objavljivanjem adrese i identiteta partnera nekoga ko je bio tajno i nezakonito snimljen u privatnosti svoga doma u trenutku intimnih odnosa i kome je docnije prećeno da će ti video-snimci biti obelodanjeni u javnosti, što je i učinjeno.

148. Zaštita privatnosti podnositeljke predstavke bila je najvažnija u opštem kontekstu ovog predmeta s obzirom da je i sama krivičnopravna istraga, o kojoj su vlasti nastojale, kako su navele, da obaveste javnost, bila pokrenuta u vezi s neopravdanim i flagrantnim zadiranjem u njen privatni život. Ta situacija je sama po sebi nalagala vlastima da ispolje pažnju kako ne bi dodatno produbile postojeći nasrtaj na privatnost podnositeljke predstavke.

149. S obzirom na sve gore navedene razloge i razmatranja, ESLJP zaključuje da to mešanje nije bilo opravdano.

150. Sa svih navedenih razloga, u datom slučaju radilo se o povredi člana 8. Konvencije.

IV. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 10. KONVENCIJE

151. U vezi sa incidentima koji su obuhvatili preteće pismo, neovlašćeno postavljanje kablova i skrivenih kamera u njenom stanu, distribucijom tajno snimljenih video-zapisa i objavljivanjem s tim u vezi novinskih članaka u provladinim listovima, neefikasnošću istrage i nepostojanjem pravnih lekova koji bi se mogli primeniti zbog neaktivnosti organa tužilaštva, kao i u vezi s tim što je objavljen Izveštaj o statusu istrage, podnositeljka se dalje pritužila da je tužena država prekršila svoje obaveze po članovima 10. i 13. Konvencije.

ESLJP smatra da pritužbu treba razmatrati isključivo sa stanovišta člana 10. Konvencije, koji glasi kako sledi:

1. Svako ima pravo na slobodu izražavanja. Ovo pravo uključuje slobodu posedovanja sopstvenog mišljenja, primanja i saopštavanja informacija i ideja bez mešanja javne vlasti i bez obzira na granice. Ovaj član ne sprečava države da zahtevaju dozvole za rad televizijskih, radio i bioskopskih preduzeća.

2. Pošto korišćenje ovih sloboda povlači za sobom dužnosti i odgovornosti, ono se može podvrgnuti formalnostima, uslovima, ograničenjima ili kaznama propisanim zakonom i neophodnim u demokratskom društvu u interesu nacionalne bezbednosti, teritorijalnog integriteta ili javne bezbednosti, radi sprečavanja nereda ili kriminala, zaštite zdravlja ili morala, zaštite ugleda ili prava drugih, sprečavanja otkrivanja obaveštenja dobijenih u poverenju, ili radi očuvanja autoriteta ili nepristrasnosti sudova.

A. Prihvatljivost

152. ESLJP konstatuje da ova pritužba nije očigledno neosnovana u smislu člana 35. stav 3. tačka (a) Konvencije. Dalje konstatuje da ona nije neprihvatljiva ni po jednom drugom osnovu. Stoga predstavka mora biti proglašena prihvatljivom.

B. Meritum

1. Argumenti stranaka

153. Podnositeljka predstavke je navela da je uznemiravanje koje je ona pretrpela bilo samo jedan slučaj u obrascu politički motivisanih klevetničkih kampanja koje se sprovode prema novinarima u Azerbejdžanu. Mnoge međunarodne nevladine organizacije i posmatračke organizacije svrstavaju tu zemlju u red onih u kojima postoje najteže povrede slobode govora u svetu. Novinari koji rade u Azerbejdžanu često su izloženi nasilnim napadima, ili ih krivično gone po neosnovanim optužbama. Druga taktika koja se koristi protiv novinara i aktivista jeste objavljivanje video-snimaka ili fotografija intimnog sadržaja, kako bi se oni osramotili. Navela je nekoliko primera novinara koji su bili žrtve tajnog snimanja video-zapisa intimnog sadržaja ili žrtve nasilja.

154. U vezi sa činjenicama koje se odnose na incidente koji su predmet pritužbe u ovom slučaju (osim onoga što se odnosi na objavljivanje Izveštaja o statusuistrage), podnositeljka predstavke je tvrdila da je tužena država prekršila ili svoju negativnu obavezu da se ne meša u njenu slobodu izražavanja ili je, alternativno, prekršila svoju pozitivnu obavezu da preduzme korake kako bi je zaštitila od sistematske kampanje blaćenja koja je vođena protiv nje ili kako bi joj omogućila pravno zadovoljenje s tim u vezi. Njene pritužbe su u tom smislu bile slične pritužbama koje je iznela po članu 8.

155. Kada je reč o objavljivanju Izveštaja o statusuistrage, podnositeljka predstavke je tvrdila da je time Država prekršila svoju negativnu obavezu. Činjenica da su istražni organi objavili podatke o ličnosti koji su daleko prevazišli ono što je bilo potrebno za navedenu svrhu dokazuje da je njihov cilj bilo nešto drugo, a ne ono što su saopštili da im je cilj. Po mišljenju podnositeljke predstavke, obelodanjivanje tih informacija bilo je izvršeno kako u vidu odmazde za pritužbe koje je ona iznela o istražnim organima, tako i upozorenje protiv njenih daljih kritika. Prema tome, radilo se o mešanju u njenu slobodu izražavanja, što je protivno članu 10. stav 2. Konvencije.

156. Država je navela da u tekstu pretećeg pisma koje je podnositeljka predstavke dobila nije jasno naznačeno da joj se preti konkretno zbog njene novinarske aktivnosti. Ipak, organi tužilaštva su preduzeli neophodne korake kako bi istražili pretnje upućene podnositeljki predstavke. Međutim, oni nisu mogli da identifikuju lice ili lica koja su za to bili odgovorna.

157. Što se tiče Izveštaja o statusuistrage, od 26. aprila 2012, Država je još jednom ponovila da je cilj objavljivanja tog izveštaja bilo to da se obavesti javnost o napretku postignutom u istrazi i da se otkloni mogućnost da se formira negativno javno mnjenje o istražnim organima zbog javnih pritužbi podnositeljke predstavke. Izveštaj nije bio objavljen da bi se kaznila podnositeljka predstavke zbog kritika koje je uputila organima tužilaštva; isto tako, objavljivanje tog izveštaja nije bilo „deo aktivnih napora vlasti da stvore atmosferu u kojoj podnositeljka predstavke neće moći da radi slobodno kao istraživački novinar”.

2. Ocena ESLJP

158. ESLJP je često naglašavao suštinski važnu ulogu slobode izražavanja u demokratskom društvu, naročito tamo gde, kroz štampu, sloboda izražavanja služi saopštavanju informacija i ideja od opšteg interesa za koje javnost, štaviše, ima pravo da ih prima (vidi na primer Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy i Satamedia Oy protiv Finske [GC], br. 931/13, stavovi 124–126, 27. jun 2017. i Magyar Helsinki Bizottság protiv Mađarske [GC], br. 18030/11, stav 165, 8. novembar 2016). ESLJP takođe naglašava da je ključni značaj slobode izražavanja kao jednog od preduslova za funkcionisanje demokratije toliki da istinsko, delotvorno ostvarivanje te slobode ne zavisi samo od dužnosti države da se ne meša već može zahtevati da se primene pozitivne mere zaštite, čak i u sferi odnosa među ljudima (vidi Fuentes Bobo, gore navedeno, stav 38; Özgür Gündem, gore navedeno, stavovi 42–43. i Palomo Sánchez i drugi [GC], gore navedeno, stav 59). Pre svega, pozitivne obaveze po članu 10. Konvencije zahtevaju od država da stvore, uspostavljajući delotvoran sistem zaštite novinara, povoljnu atmosferu za učestvovanje u javnoj debati svih zainteresovanih lica kako bi im se omogućilo da svoja mišljenja i ideje izražavaju bez straha, čak i onda kada su ta mišljenja i ideje u suprotnosti sa onima koje zastupaju zvanične vlasti ili znatan deo javnog mnjenja, pa čak i iritiraju ili šokiraju javno mnjenje (vidi Dink, gore navedeno, stav 137).

159. Osim toga, ESLJP je u više navrata naglašavao da mešanje u slobodu izražavanja može imati „efekat zamrzavanja” na ostvarivanje te slobode (vidi, između ostalih pravnih autoriteta, Baka protiv Mađarske [GC], br. 20261/12, stav 160, 23. jun 2016), a to je još izraženije u predmetima u kojima se radi o teškim krivičnim delima počinjenim nad novinarima, zbog čega je presudno važno da vlasti provere moguće postojanje veze između tog krivičnog dela i profesionalne aktivnosti novinara (vidi Huseynova, gore navedeno, stav 115. i Mazepa i drugi, gore navedeno, stav73).

160. Pošto je razmotrio argumente stranaka i okolnosti predmeta, ESLJP smatra da celina pritužbe podnositeljke predstavke treba da bude sagledana sa stanovišta pozitivnih obaveza tužene države prema članu 10. Konvencije.

161. ESLJP je uzeo u obzir izveštaje o opštoj situaciji u Azerbejdžanu u pogledu slobode izražavanja i bezbednosti novinara, kako su ih opisali komesar za ljudska prava Saveta Evrope (vidi stav 71, gore), treća lica kao umešači (vidi stavove 74–78, gore) i sama podnositeljka predstavke (vidi stav 153, gore). On naročito uzima u obzir izveštaje o fizičkim napadima i drugim vrstama navodnog progona novinara, kao i pretpostavljenu atmosferu nekažnjivosti takvih dela budući da, po svemu sudeći, oni koji ih počine retko bivaju izvedeni pred lice pravde – ako uopšte i budu izvedeni. ESLJP smatra da takvo okruženje može imati težak „efekat zamrzavanja” na slobodu izražavanja, što se mora odraziti i na ulogu „čuvara javnog interesa”, koju imaju novinari i drugi medijski akteri, kao i na odvažnu javnu debatu, a sve te stvari su suštinski važne u demokratskom društvu (vidi takođe, s tim u vezi, Preporuku CM/Rec(2016)4, koja je citirana u stavovima 69–70, gore).

162. Podnositeljka predstavke u ovom predmetu je dobro poznati istraživački novinar, dobitnica nekoliko međunarodnih nagrada. Kao što je gore istaknuto, dela koja su po svojoj prirodi kriminalna i koja su počinjena protiv podnositeljke predstavke bila su očigledno povezana sa njenom novinarskom aktivnošću; iz spisa predmeta ne može se izvesti nijedan drugi prihvatljiv motiv za uznemiravanje s kojim je morala da se suoči (vidi stav 119, gore).

163. Sama podnositeljka predstavke strahovala je da je žrtva usredsređene kampanje koja je orkestrirana u znak odmazde za njen novinarski rad, a na te strahove i brige u više navrata je skrenula pažnju vlasti (uporedi Özgür Gündem, gore navedeno, stav 41).

164. U takvim okolnostima, imajući u vidu izveštaje o opštoj situaciji u pogledu slobode izražavanja u zemlji i konkretne okolnosti ovog predmeta, ESLJP smatra da su pretnja javnim poniženjem i akti koji su doveli do flagrantnog i neopravdanog zadiranja u privatnost podnositeljke predstavke bili ili povezani s njenom novinarskom aktivnošću ili je trebalo da im vlasti pristupe tako kao da je ta veza mogla postojati kada su sprovodile istragu. U takvoj situaciji, član 10. Konvencije zahtevao je od tužene države da preduzme pozitivne mere radi zaštite novinarske slobode izražavanja podnositeljke predstavke, pored toga što je trebalo da ostvari svoju pozitivnu obavezu prema članu 8. Konvencije – da je zaštite od nasrtaja na njen privatni život.

165. Međutim, kako je ESLJP već gore ustanovio, iako su vlasti pokrenule krivičnopravnu istragu u vezi sa aktima počinjenim protiv podnositeljke predstavke, u načinu na koji su istražile taj slučaj bilo je značajnih nedostataka i kašnjenja (vidi stav 131, gore). Osim toga, članci koji su objavljeni u novinama za koje podnositeljka predstavke tvrdi da su provladine, kao i neopravdano javno obelodanjivanje dodatnih informacija koje se odnose na privatni život podnositeljke predstavke, čemu su vlasti pribegle tokom istrage, dodatno je pogoršalo situaciju (vidi stavove 148–149, gore), što je u suprotnosti sa duhom okruženja koje štiti novinarstvo.

166. Iz svega toga sledi da tužena država nije ispunila svoju pozitivnu obavezu da zaštiti podnositeljku predstavke u ostvarivanju njene slobode izražavanja. Prema tome, radilo se o povredi člana 10. Konvencije.

V. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 6. KONVENCIJE

167. Podnositeljka predstavke se dalje pritužila da su u parničnom postupku povodom Izveštaja o statusuistrage, od 26. aprila 2013, domaći sudovi propustili da se bave suštinski važnim pitanjima koja je ona pokrenula i nisu naveli dovoljno razloga kojima bi obrazložili te svoje odluke. Relevantni deo člana 6. glasi kako sledi:

Svako, tokom odlučivanja o njegovim građanskim pravima i obavezama... ima pravo na pravičnu... raspravu... pred... sudom...

168. Država je osporila argumente podnositeljke predstavke.

169. ESLJP primećuje da je ova pritužba povezana s drugom pritužbom po članu 8. i sa pritužbom po članu 10. Konvencije koja je gore razmotrena, pa stoga kao i one mora biti proglašena prihvatljivom.

170. Imajući u vidu zaključke donete po članovima 8. i 10. (vidi stavove 149–150. i 165, gore), ESLJP smatra da nije neophodno da razmatra da li je u ovom slučaju došlo do povrede člana 6. Konvencije.

VI. PRIMENA ČLANA 41. KONVENCIJE

171. Član 41. Konvencije glasi kako sledi:

Kada Sud utvrdi prekršaj Konvencije ili Protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo delimičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj stranci.

A. Odšteta

172. Podnositeljka predstavke je tražila da joj se isplati 85.000 evra (EUR) na ime nematerijalne štete.

173. Država je tvrdila da je taj zahtev preteran.

174. Sud se pozvao na svoje zaključke o tome da su povređeni članovi 8. i 10. Konvencije. Dela koja su predmet pritužbe izuzetno su teška (vidi stav 116, gore), a vlasti nisu ispunile svoje pozitivne obaveze u pogledu preduzimanja delotvornih istražnih i zaštitnih mera, umesto što su obelodanile dodatne podatke o ličnosti, čime su povredile privatnost podnositeljke predstavke. Sud smatra da je ona usled toga morala pretrpeti znatan duševni bol i da je naneta šteta njenom ličnom i profesionalnom životu. U takvim okolnostima, presuđujući na ravnopravnoj osnovi, ESLJP dosuđuje podnositeljki predstavke iznos od 15.000 EUR na ime nematerijalne štete.

B. Troškovi i izdaci

175. Podnositeljka predstavke je takođe tražila da joj se isplati 3.000 azerbejdžanskih manata (AZN) na ime pravnih troškova za usluge Y. Imanova u postupku pred Evropskim sudom. Kako bi potkrepila taj svoj zahtev ona je dostavila primerak ugovora zaključenog sa Y. Imanovom 14. decembra 2015. godine. U tom ugovoru se utvrđuje da taj iznos treba isplatiti po završetku postupka. Podnositeljka predstavke je takođe navela da je, na dan zaključenja ugovora, iznos od 3.000 AZN otprilike odgovarao iznosu od 2.605 evra.

176. Država je navela da iznos koji dosuđuje ESLJP treba da bude naveden u valuti u kojoj je sklopljen ugovor sa advokatom, to jest u azerbejdžanskim manatima.

177. Prema sudskoj praksi ESLJP, podnosilac predstavke ima pravo na naknadu troškova i izdataka samo u meri za koju je dokazano da su ti troškovi stvarno i nužno podneti i da su naznačeni u razumnom iznosu.

178. ESLJP takođe primećuje da, u načelu, shodno svojoj sudskoj praksi, on dosuđuje naknade na ime pravičnog zadovoljenja po svim stavkama, uključujući stavku troškova i izdataka, u evrima. Kada se iznos potražuje u nekoj drugoj valuti, a ne u evrima, on se prvo konvertuje u evre pre no što se dosudi konkretna svota (vidi Shukurov protiv Azerbejdžana, br. 37614/11, stav 32, 27. oktobar 2016).

179. U ovom slučaju sam zahtev je izražen u azerbejdžanskim manatima. Podnositeljka predstavke je takođe navela koliko je to iznosilo u evrima na dan zaključenja ugovora o pravnim uslugama sa advokatom, 14. decembra 2015. godine.

180. Međutim, u slučajevima u kojima se zahtevi za pravično zadovoljenje (po različitim stavkama) navode u nacionalnoj valuti i u situacijama u kojima je reč o potraživanju koje je znatno izgubilo na vrednosti u trenutku kada Sud donosi svoju odluku zbog devalvacije valute, ESLJP, po pravilu, konvertuje te iznose potraživanja u evre na dan podnošenja zahteva (ibid., stavovi 32–33, uz ostale reference koje su tu navedene).

181. U ovom konkretnom predmetu podnositeljka predstavke je podnela zahtev izražen u nacionalnoj valuti 7. jula 2016. te taj iznos stoga, prema opštem pravilu koje je gore navedeno, treba konvertovati u evre prema vrednosti od tog datuma. Prema deviznom kursu koji je važio na dan 7. jula 2016, zahtev podnositeljke predstavke odgovara iznosu od oko 1.750 evra.

182. Uzimajući u obzir dokumente koji su mu predočeni i gore navedene kriterijume, ESLJP smatra da je razumno da na ime troškova postupka pred Sudom dosudi iznos od 1.750 EUR.

C. Zatezna kamata

183. Sud smatra da je primereno da zatezna kamata bude zasnovana na najnižoj kamatnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke uz dodatak od tri procentna poena.

IZ SVIH NAVEDENIH RAZLOGA, SUD JEDNOGLASNO

1. Odlučuje da spoji predstavke

2. Proglašava predstavke prihvatljivima;

3. Smatra da je povređen član 8. Konvencije u vezi s propustom domaćih vlasti da ispune svoju pozitivnu obavezu i delotvorno istraže veoma ozbiljne nasrtaje na privatni život podnositeljke predstavke;

4. Smatra da je povređen član 8. Konvencije u vezi sa obelodanjivanjem podataka o ličnosti objavljenim u izveštaju vlasti o statusu istrage;

5. Smatra da je prekršen član 10. Konvencije;

6. Smatra da nema potrebe da posebno razmatra pritužbu po osnovu člana 6. Konvencije;

7. Utvrđuje

(a) da je tužena država dužna da plati podnositeljki predstavke, u roku od tri meseca od datuma kada ova presuda postane pravnosnažna u skladu sa članom 44. stav 2. Konvencije, sledeće iznose, koje treba konvertovati u azerbejdžanske manate prema kursu važećem na dan isplate:

(i) 15.000 evra (petnaest hiljada evra), zajedno sa svim porezom koji se može naplatiti na taj iznos, na ime nematerijalne štete;

(ii) 1.750 evra (hiljadu sedamsto pedeset evra), zajedno sa svim porezom koji se može naplatiti na taj iznos, na ime sudskih troškova i izdataka;

(b) da po isteku gore navedena tri meseca do isplate treba platiti običnu kamatu na gore navedene iznose po stopi koja je jednaka najnižoj kamatnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke uz dodatak od tri procentna poena;

8. Odbija preostali deo zahteva podnositeljke predstavke za pravično zadovoljenje.

Sastavljeno na engleskom jeziku i dostavljeno u pismenoj formi 10. januara 2019, saglasno Pravilu 77. stavovi 2. i 3. Poslovnika Suda.

Claudia Westerdiek                                                           Angelika Nußberger
        Sekretar                                                                             Predsednik

Ova presuda je prevedena na srpski jezik u okviru zajedničkog programa Evropske unije i Saveta Evrope „Horizontal Facility za Zapadni Balkan i Tursku 2019-2022” i projekta „Sloboda izražavanja i sloboda medija u Srbiji (JUFREX)”. Ovaj nezvanični prevod se objavljuje uz podršku Evropske unije i Saveta Evrope, ali pod isključivom odgovornošću prevodioca (Alpha Team One). Izraženi stavovi ne izražavaju nužno mišljenja Evropske unije.

 FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF KHADIJA ISMAYILOVA v. AZERBAIJAN

(Applications nos. 65286/13 and 57270/14 

JUDGMENT 

STRASBOUR 

10 January 2019

FINA 

10/04/2019

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Angelika Nußberger, President,
André Potocki,
Síofra O’Leary,
Mārtiņš Mits,
Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,
Lәtif Hüseynov,
Lado Chanturia, judges,
and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 27 November 2018,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in two applications (nos. 65286/13 and 57270/14) against the Republic of Azerbaijan lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Azerbaijani national, Ms Khadija Rovshan qizi Ismayilova (Xədicə Rövşən qızı İsmayılova – “the applicant”), on 26 September 2013 and 31 July 2014 respectively.

2. The applicant was represented by Ms A. Vermeer, Ms Y.-O. Jansen and Ms L. Talsma of the Media Legal Defence Initiative, lawyers based in London, Mr L. Crain of De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, a lawyer practising in the Netherlands, Mr Y. Imanov, a lawyer practising in Azerbaijan, and Mr S. Finizio, a lawyer practising in London. The Azerbaijani Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Ç. Asgarov.

3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that her rights under Articles 6, 8, 10 and 13 of the Convention had been breached, owing to the authorities’ failure to protect her from unjustified intrusions into her private life linked to her work as a journalist.

4. On 17 December 2015 the applications were communicated to the Government. The applicant and the Government each submitted written observations on the admissibility and merits of the applications. Observations were also received from PEN International, Privacy International, Article 19, Committee to Protect Journalists, Index on Censorship, International Media Support, the Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety, International Partnership for Human Rights, PEN American Center, Front Line Defenders, Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, International Federation for Human Rights, World Organisation Against Torture, Norwegian Helsinki Committee, and Human Rights House Foundation, to whom the President had given leave to intervene as third parties in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3 of the Rules of Court).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Baku.

A. Background

6. The applicant worked as an investigative journalist since 2005. She worked as a staff reporter and director at the Azerbaijani service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (“Azadliq Radio”), whose broadcasts were often critical of the government, covering various topics, including corruption and violations of human rights. In addition, she worked as a regional coordinator for the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, where she trained journalists in investigation techniques and cross-border reporting. She has received a number of international awards for her journalistic activity.

7. In August 2010 and June 2011, before the events giving rise to the present case, the applicant had published and contributed to articles concerning the alleged involvement of the President’s daughters in various commercial ventures. In early 2012 the applicant claimed that her research had uncovered that the presidential family controlled a mining consortium which had just been awarded a lucrative extraction licence by the Azerbaijani government.

8. During the events giving rise to the present case, the applicant continued to report on the above matters. In particular, on 3 May 2012 she published an article on the above-mentioned mining consortium. On 7 May 2012 she published an article entitled “President’s family benefits from Eurovision Hall”. On 11 October 2012 she wrote about the alleged investments of the presidential family in an article entitled “Azerbaijani enclave in the Czech Republic”. On 3 April 2013 she published an investigative report entitled “Offshore companies provide link between corporate mogul and Azerbaijan’s president”.

9. According to the applicant, since she began reporting critically on the government she has been threatened and intimidated in various ways.

B. Threatening letter and publication of videos depicting the applicant’s intimate life

10. On 7 March 2012 the applicant received a letter enclosing six still images from a video taken in her bedroom with a hidden camera. Those images showed her engaged in sexual intercourse with a man who, according to the applicant, was her then boyfriend. The message accompanying the images stated: “Whore, refrain from what you are doing, otherwise you will be shamed! ” (“Qəhbə, özüvü yığışdır. Əks halda rüsvay olacaqsan! ”). The letter had been sent by post from an address in Moscow. The sender’s name as noted on the envelope was “Valeriy Mardanov”.

11. The same images were also sent to two opposition newspapers, Yeni Müsavat and Azadliq, which did not publish them.

12. On the same day the applicant made a statement, distributed through social media, that she would not cease her journalistic activity and would not be silenced.

13. On 9 March 2012 the applicant reported the above-mentioned letter to the prosecution authorities and lodged a formal request for an investigation, arguing that the letter amounted to blackmail related to her recent journalistic activities. She also requested measures to protect her safety. The investigation was formally launched on 15 March 2012 (see section C below).

14. In the meantime, on 13 March 2012 the newspaper Yeni Azərbaycan (the official newspaper of the ruling New Azerbaijan Party) published an article titled “Khadija Ismayilova as she seems and as she is”. The article began with a reference to the applicant’s statement about receiving the threatening letter. It further criticised the applicant and those who had spoken in her support. In particular, it criticised both her and a colleague at Azadliq Radio for lack of professionalism and anti-government bias. Moreover, citing another former employee of Azadliq Radio, it also insinuated that the applicant was a person of immoral behaviour who spent a great deal of her time in bars and clubs and regularly held all-night parties and “orgies” with her friends in her office. The same article was published in the newspaper İki Sahil on 15 March 2012.

15. On 14 March 2012 a video was posted online on a website named “musavat.tv”, featuring scenes of a sexual nature involving the applicant and her then boyfriend, taken with the same camera hidden in her bedroom. Müsavat is a political opposition party, which indicated that it had nothing to do with the website and condemned the posting of the video. According to the applicant, the domain name “musavat.tv” was apparently chosen solely for the posting of the video, to create the suggestion of a link with the Müsavat party or its newspaper, Yeni Müsavat.

16. On 16 March 2012 the newspaper Səs published an article titled “Not surprising”. The article spoke about a number of scandals in which various opposition politicians had been involved. At the end, the article briefly alluded to the incident involving the applicant, without going into much detail about it, but stating that it was not surprising that many opposition-oriented individuals were involved in “sex scandals”.

17. On 5 April 2012 Səs published another article titled “Who should Khadija sue?” attacking the applicant for “immoral behaviour” and suggesting that the video scandal had been created by herself and her friends at “musavat.tv”.

18. Several more articles attacking the applicant were published later in Səs.

19. In April 2013 another video purporting to show the applicant engaged in sexual activities was posted on a website named “ictimaipalatka.com” where, according to the applicant, similar videos of other activists and anti-government figures had been posted previously. This particular video did not in fact involve the applicant, but rather a woman meant to resemble her.

20. While the investigation in connection with the threatening letter and the posting of the first video was under way (see below), in July 2013 another video of the applicant and her then boyfriend filmed in the applicant’s bedroom was posted on “ictimaipalatka.com”. This video actually featured the applicant, and had been taken with the same hidden camera used for the first video. According to the applicant, the webpage of the video was contained in a frame marked “SesTV Player”.

C. Criminal investigation

1. Opening of the criminal investigation and steps taken

21. As noted above, on 9 March 2012 the applicant reported the threatening letter received on 7 March 2012 to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General’s Office, complaining that it was blackmail in connection with her journalistic activity, and asking the prosecution authorities to ensure her safety, to investigate the matter, and to hold those responsible for the threat and the video accountable.

22. On 15 March 2012, one week after the applicant’s formal complaint and a day after the video was posted, the Prosecutor General’s Office launched criminal proceedings under Article 156 (breach of inviolability of private life) of the Criminal Code on the basis of the applicant’s request, and assigned the case to the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office.

23. On 17 March 2012 the applicant was questioned by Mr N.A., an investigator of the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office.

24. On 17 March 2012 the applicant found out, with the help of friends, that as well as the camera in the bedroom there were multiple other hidden cameras installed in her flat. Moreover, they found a newly installed second telephone line and data wires which had evidently been used for transmitting the footage shot with the hidden cameras.

25. According to the applicant, she and her friends returned to the flat the next day and discovered several signs indicating that someone had been in it overnight

26. On 19 March 2012 the applicant went to the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office to request an inspection of her flat. According to the applicant, the investigators visited her flat, but refused to comment on the purpose or implications of the wires, indicating that they did not possess the technical expertise to do so. They also refused to arrange for an inspection by an expert, but agreed that the applicant would herself contact the Automatic Telephone Station No. 538 (ATS), operated by Baktelekom, a State-owned communications company, which was responsible for the telephone box outside the flat to which the wires were connected.

27. The applicant was told at the ATS that the designated service engineer for the applicant’s building was Mr N.J., an employee of the ATS. The applicant managed to track down Mr N.J. and arranged to meet him in her flat the same day. She also arranged for two investigators from the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, Mr N.A. and his assistant, to be present during the meeting.

28.According to the applicant, during the meeting in her flat on 19 March 2012, Mr N.J. admitted, in the presence of the investigators, the applicant, her lawyer and three of her friends, that in July 2011, on a day off work, Saturday (either 2 or 9 July 2011), on the instructions of his supervisor, he had installed a second telephone line and connected the wires from the ATS to the telephone box outside the applicant’s flat. He had been asked by an unknown man he had met outside the flat to leave an extra fifteen metres of wire so that they could be connected inside the flat. He had also heard other people at work with the wires inside the flat. According to the applicant, during the conversation the investigator Mr N.A. appeared to be recording the engineer’s statements. However, he later tore up his handwritten investigation record and made a new document that did not contain the engineer’s account. He also asked the engineer to remove the second phone line, without documenting its removal. According to the applicant, despite her objections, he did not include Mr N.J.’s statements in the investigation case file and did not mention in the investigation record that there had been a meeting with Mr N.J. at the applicant’s flat.

29. On 21 March 2012 the applicant asked the Chief Prosecutor’s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office to question Mr N.J. Then, according to her, on 3 April and 12 April 2012 she visited the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office to get an update on the status of the investigation, but to no avail.

30. According to the documents submitted by the Government, on 30 March 2012 Mr N.A., the investigator of the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, took a formal decision granting the applicant’s request to have Mr N.J. questioned and to take investigative steps to determine who had instructed him to install wires leading to the applicant’s flat. The Government did not submit any records of Mr N.J.’s questioning or any further decisions by the prosecuting authorities taken in this regard.

31. In the meantime, on 19 March 2012 the investigator ordered an expert examination of gloves, pieces of newspaper and a lock found in the applicant’s flat.

32. Between April 2012 and August 2013, the investigator issued a series of decisions ordering expert examinations of the following items: the still images sent to the applicant and the Yeni Müsavat newspaper; wires found in the applicant’s flat; a disc containing the video recording published on “mustavat.tv”; the postal packaging in which the threatening letter and the still images had been sent to the applicant and the Yeni Müsavat newspaper; and a disc containing the video recording published on “ictimaipalatka.com”.

33. The Government did not submit any expert reports or other documents relating to the above-mentioned decisions. No further documents concerning the investigative steps taken have been made available to the Court by the parties.

2. The applicant’s complaints concerning the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation

34. On 4 April 2012 the applicant published a press release in which she criticised the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office for failing to conduct an adequate investigation, and stated that her access to the investigation material was “extremely limited”.

35. On 13 April 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office against the officials of the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, complaining that the latter were refusing to take obvious and simple investigative steps.

36. The Prosecutor General’s Office did not act on the applicant’s complaint. Instead, on 26 April 2012 the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office published a joint public statement on the status of the investigation (“the status report”). The content of the status report and the proceedings relating to it are described in section D below.

37. On 12 November 2012 the applicant requested from the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office information on the status of the investigation, and copies of any decisions taken. According to the applicant, by letters of 14 and 21 November 2012 the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office replied that the investigation was being conducted and that decisions on the applicant’s various requests had been taken on 31 March and 3 April 2012 (no copies of those letters or decisions are available in the case file). According to the applicant, she wrote a letter dated 28 November 2012 asking for copies of those decisions, since she had not received them.

38. Having received no further replies, on 2 April 2013 the applicant again requested information from the prosecuting authorities on the status of the investigation. On 4 April 2013 the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office replied that decisions taken in respect of her requests had been sent to her on 30 March 2012 and 3 December 2012 (no copy of a decision taken on the latter date is available in the case file). The letter further stated that a number of investigative steps, including various expert examinations, had been taken, and that the investigation was under way. By a letter of 30 April 2013 the Prosecutor General’s Office gave the applicant a similar reply.

39. On 12 August 2013, after the publication of the second hidden video recording in July 2013 (see paragraph 20 above), the applicant lodged a complaint against the prosecuting authorities with the Sabail District Court under the judicial supervision procedure, noting that there had been no effective investigation for over a year, and that the prosecuting authorities had limited themselves to vague indications to the effect that the investigation was ongoing. She asked the court to find the prosecuting authorities’ inactivity unlawful, and sought monetary compensation.

40. By a decision of 13 August 2013 the Sabail District Court refused to examine the complaint, finding that it had no competence to examine it under the judicial supervision procedure, because the matter complained of was not among the exclusive list of types of decisions and steps by the prosecuting authorities, established by Articles 449.3.1 to 449.3.7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”), that could be challenged under the judicial supervision procedure. The court noted that a complaint concerning the alleged inactivity of the prosecuting authorities should be made under the rules of administrative procedure.

41. On 16 August 2013 the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, ruling on a request by the applicant, refused to allow her access to the investigation case file until the investigation was complete, relying on Articles 87, 281.3 and 284-286 of the CCrP. On the same day, it refused her request for the criminal offence to be reclassified as falling under Article 163.1 (hindrance of a journalist’s lawful professional activity) of the Criminal Code.

42. On 28 August 2013 the applicant lodged another complaint with the Sabail District Court under the judicial supervision procedure, with content similar to that of the previous complaint of 12 August 2013. On 30 August 2013 the Sabail District Court rejected the complaint, for the same reasons as in the decision of 13 August 2013. On 9 September 2013 the applicant appealed. On 18 September 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Sabail District Court’s inadmissibility decision.

43. On 18 September 2013 the applicant lodged a third complaint with the Sabail District Court under the judicial supervision procedure, which was again rejected by that court on 30 September 2013, and by the Baku Court of Appeal on 17 October 2013 

44. In the meantime, as recommended by the Sabail District Court, on 28 August 2013 the applicant lodged a complaint against the prosecuting authorities with the Baku Economic Administrative Court no. 1 under the rules of administrative procedure.

45. On 19 September 2013 the Baku Economic Administrative Court no. 1 refused to hear the complaint, finding that under the Code of Administrative Procedure and the Law on Administrative Proceedings it had no competence to examine complaints concerning the activities of criminal prosecution authorities in criminal proceedings.

46. On 14 October 2013 the applicant appealed, stating that she had been instructed to pursue the administrative procedure by the Sabail District Court.

47. On 4 December 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the Baku Economic Administrative Court no. 1.

48. On 20 December 2013 the applicant lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court, which was rejected on 6 February 2014.

D. Publication of the status report and the civil proceedings against the prosecuting authorities

49. As mentioned above, in response to the applicant’s complaint of 13 April 2012, on 26 April 2012 the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office published a status report on the investigation (see paragraph 36 above). The status report noted that the applicant and her lawyer had been spreading false information in the media about the alleged inadequacy of the investigation and, as such, had attempted to “create a negative opinion” among the public concerning the investigation. It further noted that the investigating authorities had taken a number of investigative steps, in particular:

“ the request of [the applicant], on 15 March 2012 the Prosecutor General’s Office opened a criminal case under Article 156.1 of the Criminal Code and assigned the investigation to the Investigation Department of the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office. At the initial stages of the investigation [the applicant] was questioned in the presence of her representative A. Ismayilov; she was designated a victim of crime, and her rights and obligations were explained to her.

Thereafter, in order to discover the traces of crime and material evidence and to determine other circumstances important for the case, [the investigating authorities] conducted, with the participation of an expert, a criminalist, [the applicant], her representative and attesting witnesses, an inspection of the place of the incident, namely the flat located at ..., and owned by ..., where the applicant lived as a tenant, took relevant material evidence from the place of the incident, ordered and obtained expert reports, and made relevant inquiries and issued instructions relating to the case.”

50. The status report then provided information about the period during which the applicant had rented the flat, as well as the identities of individuals to whom she had subsequently sublet the flat, and the financial arrangements between them.

51. The status report proceeded as follows:

“In addition to this, the investigation also established that envelopes containing photographs of [the applicant] were mailed under the name of Valeriy Mardanov from Moscow to [the applicant’s] registered address at ... and to the editorial office of the Yeni Müsavat newspaper. The envelopes were seized by the investigation and added to the case material.

[The applicant’s] request for additional persons to be questioned as witnesses, received by the investigation on 28 March 2012, was granted, and those persons were questioned.”

52. The status report then noted that in addition to the above steps being taken, a number of other persons were also questioned. The report disclosed the full names of those individuals, as well as their professional occupations or their relation to the applicant. They included reference to the man with whom, according to the report, the applicant was “in a liaison”, her sister, her brother, her friends and her colleagues who had visited her flat. In all, the report gave the full names of fifteen people, as well as the professional occupations of most of them.

53. The status report concluded as follows:

“On 13 and 17 April 2012 [the applicant] was invited to the investigation department in connection with the necessary investigative steps, but she did not appear; she only appeared for questioning on 26 April 2012.

Since the beginning of the investigation, in addition to [the applicant] and her representative being summoned by the investigation, on 17 March, 3 April and 14 April 2012 the administration of the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office received visits from her and her representative during which they heard her requests and gave specific instructions to the investigation team for full, impartial and comprehensive conduct of the investigation.”

54. As to the information mentioned in paragraphs 50 and 52 above, according to the applicant she herself had reluctantly provided much of the above information to the investigators at the request of a prosecutor, in order to assist the investigation, expecting that the information would be kept confidential. She had been promised by officials of the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office that the information would remain confidential.

55. On 27 April 2012 the spokesman of the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office indicated in an interview that the status report had been released in response to the applicant’s public complaints about the lack of an effective investigation. He also stated that there was nothing unlawful in the contents of the status report.

56. On 21 June 2012 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Sabail District Court against the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, Mr N.A. (an investigator at the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office) and Mr A.A. (the Baku City Deputy Prosecutor). She argued that the publication of detailed information concerning her private life in the status report of 26 April 2012 constituted an unlawful and unjustified interference with her right to respect for private life and freedom of expression, arguing that the status report was an integral part of the “slander campaign” against her, which also included the release of the “sex video” and the newspaper articles. She argued that the publication of this information had been in breach of, inter alia, Article 32 of the Constitution, Article 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and Article 8 of the Convention. She sought compensation for distress in the amount of 40,000 Azerbaijani manats (AZN) and a public apology by the defendants.

57. By a judgment of 27 July 2012 the Sabail District Court dismissed the applicant’s claims, finding that the purpose of the status report had been to counter the possibility of the public forming a negative opinion about the investigating authorities as a result of the applicant’s public complaints that the investigation was ineffective. The court found that the information in the status report was of a “general character”, and had not breached the requirements of the domestic law concerning individuals’ privacy. Specifically, it found as follows:

“[The status report] contained information of a general character in order to prevent creation of a negative opinion among the public; when the information was written, the requirements of the domestic legislation concerning the protection of Khadija Ismayilova’s private and family confidentiality were not breached. Therefore, the information in [the status report] cannot be considered damaging to the plaintiff’s reputation or her private and family life.”

58. The court also held that the applicant had been unable to demonstrate that she had suffered any non-pecuniary damage under the provisions of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure as interpreted by the Plenum of the Supreme Court.

59. On 24 September 2012 the applicant appealed, reiterating her arguments and complaining further that the first-instance court had ignored her legal and factual arguments and had failed to rely on any legal provisions in arriving at its decision.

60. On 20 November 2012 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance court’s judgment, agreeing with its reasoning.

61. On 29 March 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and upheld the lower courts’ judgments, finding that the publication of the status report had not interfered with the applicant’s private or family life and had not been in breach of the relevant domestic legal provisions.

E. The applicant’s arrest and the criminal proceedings against her

62. In December 2014 the applicant was arrested and detained on the charge that she had incited a former colleague to commit suicide. In February 2015 she was additionally charged with the criminal offences of large-scale misappropriation, illegal entrepreneurship, large-scale tax evasion and abuse of power in connection with her activity as the director of Azadliq Radio during the period from 1 July 2008 to 1 October 2010. The events relating to her arrest and detention are the subject of a separate application (no. 30778/15), in which the applicant raised complaints under Articles 5, 6 § 2, 10 and 18 of the Convention.

63. On 1 September 2015 the applicant was sentenced to seven and a half years’ imprisonment. After a series of appeals, on 25 May 2016 she was acquitted in part and her sentence was reduced to three and a half years’ imprisonment, conditionally suspended for five years. She was released from prison on the same day.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS

A. Constitution

64. Article 32 of the Constitution, as in force at the material time, provided as follows:

Article 32. Right to personal inviolability

“I. Everyone has the right to personal inviolability.

II. Everyone has the right to keep secret private and family life. It is prohibited to interfere with private or family life, except in cases established by law. Everyone has the right to be protected from unlawful interference in his or her private and family life.

III. No one may collect, keep, use and disseminate information about a person’s private life without his or her consent. Except in cases prescribed by law, no one may be subjected to being followed, videotaped or photographed, tape recorded or subjected to other similar actions without his or her knowledge and against his or her objection.

IV. The State guarantees everyone the right to confidentiality of correspondence, telephone communications, post, telegraph messages and information sent by other communication means. This right may be restricted, in accordance with a procedure provided by law, in order to prevent crime or to discover the true facts when investigating a criminal case.

V. Except in cases prescribed by law, everyone may become familiar with the information collected concerning him or her. Everyone has a right to demand correction or elimination of information concerning him or her which does not correspond to the truth, is incomplete or has been collected by means of violation of the requirements of the law.”

B. Criminal Code

65. Article 156 of the Criminal Code, as in force at the material time, provided as follows:

“Artic 156. Breach of inviolability of private life

156.1. The illegal collecting of information constituting private and family secrets, and disseminating, selling and sharing with others of documents, video and photo materials and sound recordings of such information –

is punishable by a fine in the amount of one thousand to two thousand manats, or community work for a period of two hundred and forty hours to four hundred and eighty hours, or corrective work for a period of up to one year.

156.2. The same acts, committed by a public official using his position –

is punishable by restriction of liberty for a period of up to two years, with or without deprivation of the right to hold a certain position or engage in certain activities for a period of up to three years.”

66. Article 163 of the Criminal Code provided as follows:

“Article 163. Hindrance of journalists’ lawful professional activities

163.1. Hindering journalists in their lawful professional activities, that is forcing them to disseminate or refuse to disseminate information by applying violence or by threatening to apply violence –

is punishable by a fine in the amount of five hundred to one thousand manats or by corrective works for a period of up to one year.

163.2. The same act committed by a public official using his position –

is punishable by corrective works for a period of up to two years or by imprisonment for a period of up to one year, with or without deprivation of the right to hold a certain position or to engage in certain activities for a period of up to three years.”

C. Code of Criminal Procedure

67. Article 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”) provided as follows:

“Article 199. Protection of personal and family secrets

199.1. During criminal proceedings measures shall be taken under this Code and other laws of the Republic of Azerbaijan to protect information constituting personal and family secrets.

199.2. In the course of procedural activities, it shall be prohibited to unnecessarily collect, disseminate or use information relating to the private life of any person and other information of a personal nature which that person considers must be kept secret. At the request of the investigator, prosecutor or court, the participants in investigative and court procedures shall be under an obligation not to disseminate such information, and shall give a written undertaking to this effect.

199.3. If the prosecuting authority asks any person for details of his private life on the basis of a relevant court decision, he shall have the right to ensure that there is a need to collect this information for the purposes of the ongoing criminal case; otherwise he shall have the right to refuse to divulge it. If the prosecuting authority asks the person for information concerning his own or another person’s private life on the grounds that it is necessary, the authority shall include observations confirming the need for this information in the record of the questioning or of other investigative activity.

199.4. Evidence which discloses personal or family secrets shall be examined by the court in camera.

199.5. Damage caused to any person as a result of a breach of the inviolability of private life or the dissemination of personal or family secrets shall be compensated under the procedure provided by the legislation of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”

68. Article 449 of the CCrP, as in force at the material time, provided as follows:

“Article 449. Complaints to the court concerning procedural acts or decisions of the prosecuting authority

...

449.2. The following persons shall have the right to lodge a complaint concerning procedural acts or decisions of the prosecuting authority 

..

449.2.2. the victim of the criminal offence and his legal representative;

...

449.3. The persons referred to in Article 449. 2 of this Code shall have the right to lodge a complaint with the court concerning the procedural acts or decisions of the prosecuting authority in connection with the following matters:

449.3.1. refusal to accept an application concerning a criminal offence;

449.3.2. being in police custody or detention in remand;

449.3.3. violations of the rights of an arrested person;

449.3.4. torture or other cruel treatment of a detained person;

449.3.5. opening of a criminal case and suspension or discontinuation of criminal proceedings;

449.3.6. the compulsory conduct of an investigative procedure, the application of a coercive procedural measure, or the conduct of a search operation without a court order;

449.3.7. the removal of defence counsel for the accused (or suspect) from the criminal proceedings.”

D. Council of Europe documents

69. The following are extracts from Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 13 April 2016 at the 1,253rd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies):

“1. It is alarming and unacceptable that journalists and other media actors in Europe are increasingly being threatened, harassed, subjected to surveillance, intimidated, arbitrarily deprived of their liberty, physically attacked, tortured and even killed because of their investigative work, opinions or reporting, particularly when their work focuses on the misuse of power, corruption, human rights violations, criminal activities, terrorism and fundamentalism. These abuses and crimes have been extensively documented in authoritative reports published by the media, non-governmental organisations and human rights defenders.

2. Journalists and other media actors are often specifically targeted on account of their gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, ethnic identity, membership of a minority group, religion, or other particular characteristics which may expose them to discrimination and dangers in the course of their work. Female journalists and other female media actors face specific gender-related dangers, including sexist, misogynist and degrading abuse; threats; intimidation; harassment and sexual aggression and violence. These violations are increasingly taking place online. There is a need for urgent, resolute and systemic responses

3. The abuses and crimes described above, which in practice are committed by both State and non-State actors, have a grave chilling effect on freedom of expression, as safeguarded by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, ‘the Convention’), including on the ability to access information, on the public watchdog role of journalists and other media actors and on open and vigorous public debate, all of which are essential in a democratic society. They are often met with insufficient efforts by relevant State authorities to bring the perpetrators to justice, which leads to a culture of impunity and can fuel further threats and violence, and undermine public trust in the rule of law.

 ...

6. Iorder to create and secure a favourable environment for freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention, States must fulfil a range of positive obligations, as identified in the relevant judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and set out in the principles appended to this recommendation. Such obligations are to be fulfilled by the executive, legislative and judicial branches of governments, as well as all other State authorities, including agencies concerned with maintaining public order and national security, and at all levels – federal, national, regional and local.

7. Under the terms of Article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 1), the Committee of Ministers recommends that governments of member States:

i. implement, as a matter of urgency and through all branches of State authorities, the guidelines set out in the appendix to this recommendation, taking full account of the principles included there;

ii. review relevant domestic laws and practice and revise them, as necessary, to ensure their conformity with States’ obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights;

iii. promote the goals of this recommendation at the national level and engage and co-operate with all interested parties to achieve those goals.”

 the Appendix to Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4, the Committee of Ministers offers detailed guidelines to member States on how to fulfil their relevant obligations on the effective protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors, combining legal, administrative and practical measures, which are organised into four “pillars”: prevention, protection, prosecution (including a specific focus on impunity) and promotion of information, education and awareness-raising. The guidelines are based on an extensive body of principles anchored in the European Convention on Human Rights and in the relevant judgments and decisions of the Court.

71. The following are extracts from the Report by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (CommDH(2013)14, dated 6 August 2013), following his visit to Azerbaijan from 22 to 24 May 2013:

“I. Freedom of expression

7. The situation of freedom of expression, including freedom of the media, in Azerbaijan has been a long-standing concern among national and international observers. The latter include Commissioner Muižnieks’ predecessor, Mr Thomas Hammarberg, who also highlighted important shortcomings in these areas in a report on Azerbaijan released in 2010, as well as in observations published in 2011. As detailed below, the Commissioner notes that most of these shortcomings remain unaddressed today and that in certain areas, a clear deterioration can also be observed.

1. Judicial harassment, intimidation and violence against journalists

8. The Commissioner is seriously concerned at the apparent intensification of the practice, highlighted by his predecessor in 2010 and 2011, of unjustified or selective criminal prosecution of journalists and others who express critical opinions. In recent years, several media workers have been prosecuted and/or sentenced for incitement to national, racial or religious hatred and in some instances terrorism, as well as for hooliganism, tax evasion, drug possession and illegal possession of weapons, with the credibility of the relevant charges being widely challenged. As a result, a number of journalists have to serve long prison terms or carry out corrective labour and/or pay heavy fines. According to the prison census conducted by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) in December 2012, Azerbaijan ranked among the top countries jailing journalists with nine imprisoned journalists.

...

11. In addition to facing charges and imprisonment, journalists documenting and reporting human rights violations are reported to be sometimes subjected to physical attacks. According to the Azerbaijani Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety (IRFS), there have been more than 200 violent attacks against journalists since 2005 and more than 50 domestic and foreign journalists were harassed or attacked in 2011 alone. Moreover, impunity prevails and those responsible are reportedly rarely, if ever, brought to justice. The murder of the editor of Monitor magazine, Elmar Huseynov, in 2005, and the fatal stabbing of the journalist and writer Rafiq Tagi in 2011 remain unsolved to date. The Commissioner also notes that no effective and independent investigation into the death in prison of Novruzali Mammadov has been conducted.

12. Another recent incident concerns the photo-journalist Mehman Huseynov, who faces up to five years’ imprisonment on hooliganism charges over an argument he reportedly had with law enforcement officers while covering a demonstration in Baku in May 2012.

13. Some Azerbaijani journalists documenting on-going demolitions of properties have been prevented from carrying out their professional activities, and have also been subjected to physical attacks. On 18 April 2012, Idrak Abbasov and other journalists were attacked by approximately 20 policemen and security guards of the State oil company as they attempted to film house demolitions in the outskirts of Baku. Idrak Abbasov, a journalist with the Zerkalo newspaper and the IRFS, was taken to hospital unconscious and suffered from broken ribs, damage to his internal organs and injuries to his eyes.

...

16. In addition to physical attacks, journalists and media workers in Azerbaijan have reported having been subject to various forms of intimidation. In March 2012, for instance, unknown persons attempted to blackmail Khadija Ismayilova, a journalist with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) who had notably investigated the business holdings of the family of President Aliyev. As she refused to be silenced, an intimate video of her, filmed by hidden camera, was posted on the Internet.

17. Across the aforementioned areas, the need for a fully independent and impartial review by the judiciary of cases involving journalists and others expressing critical voices appears urgent. The Commissioner notes that a lack of independence of the justice system in Azerbaijan was highlighted in the last monitoring report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which stressed that the executive branch continues to exert influence on the judiciary, thus contributing to the continuation of the problem ...

...

Conclusions and recommendations

19. The Commissioner notes with concern that harassment of journalists and others expressing critical views has heightened in recent months, with charges being brought against them for increasingly serious crimes. The Commissioner reiterates that releasing all persons who are in detention because of the views they hold and express should be a priority for the Azerbaijani authorities in order to protect freedom of expression.

20. The Commissioner calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to respect in all cases their obligation to initiate prompt, thorough and transparent investigations when violence or threats of violence against journalists occur, and to bring the perpetrators to justice, where punishments should reflect the seriousness of this crime. He furthermore recalls that the Azerbaijani authorities must not hamper the work of journalists, especially those covering demonstrations or more generally documenting human rights violations. ...”

 THIRD-PARTY SUBMISSIONS

72. The third party interveners listed in paragraph 4 above made the following joint submissions.

73. The interveners’ submissions consist of two parts: firstly, they provide an overview of the general situation of independent journalists and media actors in Azerbaijan; secondly, they submit that Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention impose positive obligations on the respondent State to protect journalists by taking measures to prevent and to investigate conduct designed to restrict journalistic activity such as that in the present case.

74. The third-party interveners noted that Azerbaijan had one of the most restrictive environments for freedom of expression in the world and that State repression of journalists, media outlets, bloggers and human rights defenders was widespread and severe. In recent years, the authorities had engaged, and continued to engage, in systematic repression of freedom of expression in the country, including through intimidation, targeting and persecution of journalists and voices critical of the government. Independent journalists and activists faced arrest, conviction and extended jail periods on spurious, politically motivated charges. They also countenanced violence and reprisals from State and non-State actors alike, which were treated with impunity.

75. At the time of the submission of the third-party comments, eleven journalists, bloggers and other activists critical of the government were imprisoned. Moreover, journalists had been subjected to violent attacks, in respect of which the third-party interveners mentioned the following examples, which were illustrative but not exhaustive:

(a) Uzeyir Jafarov, a newspaper journalist, was violently attacked in 2007 by unknown assailants after publishing an article accusing a senior military officer of corruption and illegal activities (see, in this connection, Uzeyir Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, no. 54204/08, 29 January 2015);

(b) Agil Khalil, an investigative journalist, was attacked by agents of the Ministry of National Security for trying to take photographs as part of an investigative story. No effective investigation into the attack was carried out. In the related proceedings before the Court, the Government acknowledged, by way of a unilateral declaration, breaches of the rights that were the subject of the applicant’s complaints (see, in this connection, Khalil v. Azerbaijan (dec.), nos. 60659/08, 38175/09 and 53585/09, 6 October 2010);

(c) Afghan Mukhtarly was allegedly attacked by uniformed police officers in January 2009 while covering a rally in Baku, despite identifying himself as a member of the press. An official investigation was subsequently abandoned for lack of evidence

(d) Elmin Badalov, a newspaper reporter, was beaten by seven unidentified men in July 2010 while taking photographs as part of an investigation into luxury property owned by the Minister of Transport. No investigation was carried out;

(e) Idrak Abbasov, a correspondent of IRFS, was allegedly severely beaten by approximately twenty police and security guards of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) in April 2012 when he attempted to film the demolition of local houses by SOCAR. No effective investigation was carried out;

(f) In October 2013 a group of journalists covering a campaign event were attacked and seriously injured by onlookers. It was alleged that police officers were present at the event but did not intervene. No investigation was carried out, despite a call to the authorities by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media;

(g) Emin Huseynov, director of IRFS, was ill-treated in detention (see Emin Huseynov v. Azerbaijan, no. 59135/09, 7 May 2015), forced to flee the country and stripped of his citizenship.

76. Furthermore, independent media organisations had likewise come under attack. As examples, the third-party interveners mentioned cases of harassment of reporters and raids on the offices of IRFS, Azadliq Radio and Meydan TV.

77. According to the third party interveners, the State’s failure to investigate or punish attacks on critical voices had created and entrenched a climate of impunity. Where punishment or sanction had ensued, it had largely targeted the attacked rather than their attacker.

78. The third-party interveners also noted that various international and regional human rights organisations, including the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN, had repeatedly called upon the Azerbaijani authorities to improve respect for the right to freedom of expression, both through the release of imprisoned journalists and the end of reprisals against voices critical of the government.

79. In respect of the States’ specific obligations under the Convention, referring to Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain ([GC], nos. 28955/06 and 3 others, § 59, ECHR 2011); Özgür Gündem v. Turkey (no. 23144/93, § 43, ECHR 2000‑III); Dink v. Turkey (nos. 2668/07 and 4 others, § 137, 14 September 2010); and a number of other judgments of the Court, the third-party interveners argued that there was a positive obligation under Article 10 on member States to take necessary measures to prevent and investigate conduct designed to restrict journalistic activity. Moreover, referring to Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004‑VI), Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) ([GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, ECHR 2012); Sciacca v. Italy (no. 50774/99, ECHR 2005‑I); X and Y v. the Netherlands (26 March 1985, Series A no. 91), and a number of other judgments and decisions of the Court, they noted that there was a positive obligation under Article 8 to take measures within States’ margin of appreciation, including in certain cases an effective investigation into crimes, to secure protection of the right to private life even in the sphere of relations between individuals themselves. Lastly, as to protection of personal data, a State’s negative obligation under Article 8 of the Convention was engaged in the context of the police and prosecution authorities’ specific obligations relating to the protection of personal information that they obtained in the course of their investigation.

80. The third-party interveners argued that the combined effect of the above-mentioned case-law was that, where the privacy of journalists was interfered with as a result of their journalistic work, a member State’s obligations under both Articles 8 and 10 were engaged.

81. They therefore requested the Court to consider the present case in the context of the gravity of the situation of journalists in the country and the systemic failure by the State to investigate or prevent the infringements of their rights, resulting in a general culture of impunity for attacks on journalists. They argued that in the context of interference with journalists’ private lives, positive obligations under Article 10 must necessarily extend to actual or threatened breaches of Article 8 rights, and the positive obligations under Article 8 must be subjected to particularly close review by the Court where Article 10 rights were engaged. The ability of journalists to perform their role as “public watchdogs” depended on their freedom from intimidation, harassment, unlawful surveillance and deliberate intrusions into their private affairs. Failure to ensure respect for journalists’ private lives had a chilling effect upon their journalism, working to the detriment of society as a whole.

THE LAW

I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

82. The Court considers that, in accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court, the applications should be joined, given their similar factual and legal background.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE THREATENING LETTER AND THE SECRET FILMING AND DISSEMINATION OF INTIMATE VIDEOS

83. In connection with the threatening letter, the secret installation of hidden cameras in her flat and the dissemination of secretly filmed videos depicting her private life, the applicant complained under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention that: (a) the respondent State had breached its negative obligation by being directly responsible for the above-mentioned acts and by arranging a smear campaign against her in the press; or (b) alternatively, the respondent State had failed to meet its positive obligation to protect her right to respect for her home and private life, which included her physical and moral integrity, by failing to conduct an effective investigation in order to identify those responsible, and by not affording her a remedy against the investigating authorities’ inactivity.

The Court considers that the complaint falls to be examined solely under Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

A. Admissibility

84. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submissions

(a) The applicant

85. The applicant argued that the respondent State had breached its negative obligation under Article 8, because there had been an unjustified interference with her right to respect for her home and private life by a number of entities which qualified as “public authorities” owing to their institutional and operational dependence from the State. In the alternative, she argued that, in any event, the respondent State had failed to comply with its positive obligation to protect her right to respect for her home and private life.

86. In respect of the negative obligation, the applicant claimed that State agents had installed the hidden cameras in her bedroom, recorded the intimate videos and posted them online. In particular, she noted that the second phone line and additional wires, through which hidden videos were transmitted out of her flat, had been connected to her flat by an employee of ATS belonging to Baktelekom, a telephone services company fully owned and controlled by the State, forming part of the official structure of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technologies. Additionally, the Ministry of National Security also had full access to the ATS. It was clear that a company which was owned and controlled by the Government was responsible for the installation of the second telephone line to the applicant’s flat.

87. Moreover, the applicant argued that the Government had had a clear motive to instigate a smear campaign against her. The installation of the hidden cameras and wires had occurred just a few days after the applicant had published a report on the activities of the President’s daughters (see paragraphs 7 and 28 above). The timing of the threatening letter and the release of the first intimate video was also linked to the applicant’s reporting on the presidential family. Specifically, the threatening letter had been sent, and the video released, approximately one month after the applicant had started working on an article concerning the gold-mining consortium (see paragraphs 7, 10 and 15 above).

88. The applicant also noted that, following her publications on alleged corruption, the National Assembly had adopted legislative amendments allowing commercial enterprises to withhold information about their registration, ownership and structure, limiting the ability of investigative journalists “to identify private assets of public figures”. It had also passed a law granting all former presidents and first ladies lifelong legal immunity.

89. Furthermore, the Yeni Azərbaycan, İki Sahil and Səs newspapers had then run stories about the intimate videos, as part of a systematic smear campaign conducted by the authorities against the applicant in 2011 to 2013. The articles were offensive in nature, publicly discussing her sex life and insulting her morality, which was damaging to her personal and professional relationships in conservative Azerbaijani society. The applicant argued that all three newspapers were State-controlled, because they operated as media organs of the ruling party, YAP, and expressed clear allegiance to YAP and the ruling Government. In particular, Yeni Azərbaycan was owned by YAP, and a member of YAP’s political council was the chief editor of the newspaper. İki Sahil was owned by SOCAR, the State-owned oil company, and a member of YAP’s political council was the chief editor of the newspaper. Səs was owned by Alinja Charitable Society, which was one of the founders of YAP, and a senior YAP official was the newspaper’s chief editor.

90. According to the applicant, the second video, released in July 2013, was displayed in a browser frame containing the words “SesTV Player”, indicating that it was produced in the studio of Səs.

91. The applicant argued that the above evidence indicated that the interference in question was attributable to the State, because public authorities included not only government institutions, but also separate legal entities that did not enjoy sufficient institutional and operational independence from the State. Moreover, the interference was unjustified within the meaning of Article 8 § 2. According to the applicant, such a pattern of harassment was nothing new and the tactic of filming and disseminating videos and photographs of sexual activity through the media to embarrass and intimidate journalists critical of the President had been used before, such as in the case of a fellow journalist, N. Adilov, who had also worked at Azadliq Radio.

92. The applicant further submitted that, in the alternative, should the Court find that there was no interference directly attributable to the State, the respondent State had in any event breached its positive obligation under Article 8 by failing to take adequate measures to secure respect for her private life.

93. In this case, the State should have acted to prevent or put an end to the breach of the applicant’s rights by applying the existing criminal law through effective investigation and prosecution. However, the investigation had been ineffective.

94. Firstly, the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office had not opened the criminal investigation in a timely manner. Following the applicant’s complaint concerning the threatening letter, it had taken a week to open the investigation, during which time the intimate video had been leaked on the internet and some articles about it had appeared in the newspapers.

95. Secondly, on several occasions the investigation authorities had failed to collect and secure evidence relevant to the complaint. In particular, the investigators had failed to collect threatening letters and accompanying images from the other recipients (see paragraph 11 above) in a timely manner and, as a consequence, the letter received by Azadlıq had disappeared. Moreover, despite the fact that the envelope bore the stamp of a Moscow post office, the investigators had not pursued this lead. They had also refused to inspect the second phone line and evidence of hidden cameras in her flat, claiming that they lacked the technical expertise to do so, while also refusing to arrange for an expert.

96. Furthermore, when, during a meeting organised by the applicant in her flat on 19 March 2012, the Baktelekom engineer had admitted to installing the second phone line to the applicant’s flat at his employer’s request (see paragraph 28 above), the investigator had not only refused to include the witness testimony in the case file, but had actively sought to destroy it. He had torn up his handwritten investigation record, on which he had recorded the engineer’s statement, and had made a new document that did not contain the engineer’s account. He had also asked the engineer to remove the second phone line, without documenting its removal. Together with her observations to the Court she had enclosed witness statements by her three friends who had been present at the meeting in her flat on 19 March 2012, all of whom had confirmed that the investigator had not mentioned the engineer’s presence at the meeting, nor had it been mentioned in the investigation record. When the applicant had asked for the engineer to be formally questioned, the investigation authorities had not responded.

97. Thirdly, the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office had repeatedly failed to inform the applicant about the status of the investigation.

98. Moreover, the investigation authorities’ failure to promptly investigate leads and collect evidence had dragged the investigation out for several years, unjustifiably protracting the criminal proceedings.

99. Lastly, the applicant argued that she had been denied an effective remedy at domestic level with respect to her complaints regarding the inaction on the part of the investigating authorities and the ineffectiveness of the investigation, as the domestic courts refused to examine on the merits her complaints lodged both under the procedure of judicial supervision provided by the CCrP and the administrative procedure provided by the CAP.

(b) The Governmen

100. The Government submitted that there was no interference by the State with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the threats against her, installation of hidden cameras and wires in her flat, publication of secretly filmed videos, related press articles, and other related incidents. The investigation of the above-mentioned incidents has not identified the person or persons responsible for those incidents. Nevertheless, it has not revealed any link between the incidents and the State or its agents either.

101. The Government submitted that no smear campaign was organised against the applicant in retaliation for her articles about the President, noting that there were large time gaps between the applicant’s articles and the posting of the video. They noted that the applicant’s articles were published in August 2010, June 2011, May 2012, October 2012 and April 2013, while the threatening letter was received and the video posted in March 2012, that is a year and seven months after the first article, nine months after the second article, and a month and a half before the applicant’s next articles appeared.

102. As to the adoption of the Constitutional Law on guarantees for ex-President and his or her family members and the amendment to the Law on commercial confidentiality, the Government noted that, contrary to the applicant’s argument (see paragraph 88 above), there was no connection between the passing of those legislative acts and the applicant’s case. The first vote by the National Assembly on the draft Constitutional Law had taken place in November 2011, almost six months before the applicant’s articles had been published in May 2012. Following its passing on 12 June 2012, this Constitutional Law had granted immunity to ex-President Mutalibov, allowing him to return to Azerbaijan after many years in exile. As regards the amendment to the Law on commercial confidentiality, passed on 12 June 2012, it was aimed at promoting and protecting entrepreneurial activity and work on that amendment had started before the publication of the applicant’s articles in May 2012.

103. As to the articles about the applicant published in a number of newspapers, the Government submitted that the applicant was a public figure and that it was not surprising that a number of domestic media should on various occasions comment on matters related to her. The articles had been triggered by the intimate video of the applicant posted on the internet. The Government disputed the applicant’s assertion that the media sources in question were “State-controlled” or “pro-Government”. They further noted that the website “ictimaipalatka.com” was no longer operational and it was not possible to identify the person or persons who had run it.

104. As concerns the positive obligation of the State under Article 8, the Government noted that, following the applicant’s complaint, the relevant authority had taken the necessary investigative steps, including an examination of her flat, collection of evidence from the flat, questioning of witnesses, forensic, computer and phonoscopic examinations, physical and chemical examinations, technical and graphological examination of documents and requests for mutual legal assistance to various authorities. The applicant had been properly informed about the course of the investigation. As to the applicant’s complaint against the investigation authorities concerning the ineffectiveness of the investigation, the domestic courts had no competence to examine the applicant’s complaint within the judicial supervision procedure.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) Applicability of Article 8

105. The Court notes that the applicant, a well-known investigative journalist, received a threatening letter demanding that she cease her activities, had hidden cameras installed in her flat by unknown persons without her knowledge and consent, and had intimate videos of her taken secretly and disseminated on the internet, which fact was subsequently further publicised by the media.

106. There is thus no dispute as to the applicability of Article 8: the facts underlying the application, which included covert filming of the applicant in her own home and highly intimate aspects of her life, clearly concern a matter of “private life”. The latter concept covers the physical and moral integrity of the person, as well as his or her sexual life (compare K.U. v. Finland, no. 2872/02, § 41, ECHR 2008; see also Peck v. the United Kingdom, no. 44647/98, § 57, ECHR 2003‑I; E.B. v. France [GC], no. 43546/02, § 43, 22 January 2008; A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], no. 25579/05, § 212, ECHR 2010; and Söderman v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786/08, § 86, ECHR 2013).

107. The applicant also complained in terms of a breach of her right to respect for her home and the Court recognises the extraordinary intensity of an intrusion into a person’s home of the type complained of. It considers, however, that the totality of the facts giving rise to the present complaint can be examined principally in the light of the requirements of protection of “private life”.

(b) Positive or negative obligation

108. In her application form, the applicant complained expressly of a breach by the respondent State of its positive obligation under Article 8 to secure respect for her private life, by failing to conduct an effective investigation, although she also noted that the secret installation of wires and video cameras might have been carried out by “someone related to or at the orders of the authorities”, implying that the acts in question might have been committed by State agents in breach of the State’s negative obligation under Article 8.

109. In her further submissions, the applicant elaborated on her complaint, arguing that there had been a breach of either the negative obligation or, alternatively, and in any event, the positive obligation.

110. In respect of the negative obligation, she argued that there had been an unjustified interference with her Article 8 rights by persons or entities that could be considered “State agents”, undermining respect for her private life and connected to her journalistic investigative work concerning alleged corruption by the President’s family.

111. However, having regard to the applicant’s arguments in support of the alleged breach of the negative obligation (see, in particular, paragraphs 86-91 above), the Court considers that they are based either on circumstantial evidence or on assertions requiring corroboration and further investigation. While the Court must remain sensitive to the potential evidentiary difficulties encountered by a party, it has not been possible, on the basis of the material available, to establish in the present case to the requisite standard of proof, “beyond reasonable doubt” (see Nuri Kurt v. Turkey, no. 37038/97, § 101, 29 November 2005), that there was unjustified interference attributable to the State.

112. The Court reiterates that, although the object of Article 8 is essentially to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private and family life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves (see Söderman, cited above, § 78). Moreover, the boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obligations under Article 8 do not always lend themselves to precise definition. The applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In particular, in both instances regard must be had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the competing interests (see Dickson v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 44362/04, § 70, ECHR 2007‑V; Odièvre v. France [GC], no. 42326/98, § 40, ECHR 2003‑III; and Dubská and Krejzová v. the Czech Republic [GC], nos. 28859/11 and 28473/12, § 164-65, 15 November 2016).

113. In the present case the identity of those who committed the various acts of which the applicant complains is unknown and the question whether they were linked to State agents abusing their official power remains an open one. Nevertheless, given the applicant’s credible allegations, the contextual information provided by the third party interveners and the careful planning and execution of the covert surveillance operation (see paragraph 121 below), the Court would emphasise that it has concerns as regards the answer to that question.

114. In the light of the above considerations, and having had regard to the parties’ arguments, the factual circumstances and the available material, the Court considers that the present complaint must be examined from the standpoint of the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention.

(c) Compliance with the positive obligation

115. The choice of the means calculated to secure compliance with Article 8 of the Convention in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves is in principle a matter that falls within the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation. There are different ways of ensuring respect for private life, and the nature of the State’s obligation will depend on the particular aspect of private life that is in issue. Where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, or where the activities at stake involve a most intimate aspect of private life, the margin allowed to the State is correspondingly narrowed (see Söderman, cited above, § 79, with further references). In particular, effective deterrence against grave acts, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, requires the States to ensure that efficient criminal-law provisions are in place (see X and Y v. the Netherlands, cited above, §§ 23‑24 and 27; M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272/98, § 150, ECHR 2003‑XII; K.U. v. Finland, cited above, § 43; A, B and C v. Latvia, no. 30808/11, § 148, 31 March 2016; and M.S. v. Ukraine, no. 2091/13, § 62, 11 July 2017). Concerning such serious acts, the State’s positive obligation under Article 8 to safeguard the individual’s physical or moral integrity may also extend to questions relating to the effectiveness of the criminal investigation (see, among other authorities, M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 152; C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, no. 26692/05, § 72, 20 March 2012; and M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 22457/08, § 109-10, 15 November 2011).

116. The Court considers that the acts complained of were grave and an affront to human dignity: an intrusion into the applicant’s home in the form of unauthorised entry into her flat and installation of wires and hidden video cameras inside the flat; a serious, flagrant and extraordinarily intense invasion of her private life in the form of unauthorised filming of the most intimate aspects of her private life, which had taken place in the sanctity of her home, and subsequent public dissemination of those video images; and receipt of a letter threatening her with public humiliation. Furthermore, the applicant is a well-known journalist and there was a plausible link between her professional activity and the aforementioned intrusions, whose purpose was to silence her (see further paragraph 119 below).

117. This kind of invasion of private life was punishable under Article 156 of the Criminal Code, and the domestic authorities did, in fact, institute criminal proceedings in the present case. Having regard to the gravity of the above-mentioned acts (compare, for example, K.U. v. Finland, cited above , §§ 45 and 49), and the method of protection actually chosen by the domestic authorities (see Alković v. Montenegro, no. 66895/10, § 67, 5 December 2017), the Court considers that practical and effective protection of the applicant required that effective steps be taken in the framework of the criminal investigation with a view to identifying and prosecuting the perpetrator or perpetrators of those acts.

118. For an investigation to be regarded as “effective”, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but one of means (see Alković, cited above, § 65). In examining the effectiveness of criminal investigations in the context of the positive obligations under, inter alia, Article 8 of the Convention in cases analogous to the present case, the Court has previously used the “significant flaw” test. The Court’s task under that test is to determine whether the alleged shortcomings in the investigation had such significant flaws as to amount to a breach of the respondent State’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court is not concerned with allegations of minor errors or isolated omissions in the investigation; it cannot replace the domestic authorities in the assessment of the facts of the case; nor can it decide on possible alleged perpetrators or their criminal responsibility (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, §§ 167-68, and M. and C. v. Romania, no. 29032/04, §§ 112-13, 27 September 2011).

119. The Court has had to deal with a number of cases concerning respondent States’ obligations to investigate criminal offences against journalists (see, for examples, Adalı v. Turkey, no. 38187/97, § 231, 31 March 2005; Gongadze v. Ukraine, no. 34056/02, §§ 8-15 and 179, ECHR 2005‑XI; Uzeyir Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, no. 54204/08, § 52, 29 January 2015; Huseynova v. Azerbaijan, no. 10653/10, § 115, 13 April 2017; and Mazepa and Others v. Russia, no. 15086/07, § 73, 17 July 2018). Even though in the present case the criminal offence committed against the applicant was of a different nature, and the relevant complaints concern different Convention provisions giving rise to procedural obligations which are not entirely identical, the similarity with those cases is that the offence was committed against a well-known investigative journalist highly critical of the government. This distinctive feature is highlighted by the fact that the threatening letter received by the applicant demanded that she refrain from what she was doing, which can be understood in the overall context of the case as referring most likely to her professional activity. In a situation where the applicant was well known in society specifically for her journalistic activity and for that activity only, it is difficult to discern any motive for threats of public humiliation received by her other than a motive connected to that activity. The absence of such a motive could be demonstrated only if it was conclusively and convincingly ruled out as a result of an effective investigation.

120. Accordingly, the above-mentioned aspect of the case made it of the utmost importance to investigate whether the threat was connected to the applicant’s professional activity and by whom it had been made (see, mutatis mutandis, Huseynova, cited above, § 115, and Mazepa and Others, cited above, §§ 73 and 75).

121. The Court notes that the acts committed against the applicant appeared at first sight to have been the result of a carefully planned and executed operation involving a coordinated effort by a number of individuals. A threatening letter with still pictures from the subsequently published video was allegedly sent to her from Moscow; wires and hidden video cameras had been installed in her flat in advance by more than one person (apparently, the wires were traced to her flat from outside by a Baktelekom engineer, while the wires and cameras inside the flat were installed by other, unknown individuals); a website with what appears to be a deliberately misleading name was created for the purpose of posting the video on the internet; and a number of newspaper articles were published about the subject at around the same time as the video was posted on that website.

122. Furthermore, although the applicant’s allegations that State agents might have been behind the criminal offence committed against her are not supported by evidence meeting the standard of proof required for finding a breach of the negative obligation under Article 8 of the Convention (see paragraph 111 above), her arguments in this respect were nevertheless strong and could not be discarded as being prima facie untenable. Therefore, those arguments required the investigation to seek out corroborative evidence.

123. From the outset, based on the above facts and available evidence, the investigation authorities already had several different and obvious leads. However, for the reasons set out below, the Court considers that it has not been shown that the investigating authorities have taken sufficient steps in that regard.

124. The Court notes that the Government submitted only a few documents from the investigation file and that it therefore possesses little information regarding the impugned investigation. The only materials they submitted were copies of several decisions by the investigator ordering various procedural steps (see paragraphs 30-32 above), which included granting the applicant’s request to question the Baktelekom engineer and obtaining a number of expert examinations. In the status report published on 26 April 2012, the investigating authorities noted, in addition, that they had questioned a number of other witnesses who were mostly the applicant’s friends, social or professional contacts and family members (see paragraphs 49-53 above). Similar general statements about procedural steps taken were made in the investigating authorities’ letters addressed to the applicant (see paragraphs 37-38 above). However, the Government did not submit any documents showing that all of those investigative steps had been carried out, such as records of questioning, expert reports, and records of examination of physical evidence. The Government did not put forward any explanation as to their failure to provide full copies of the investigation file. In such circumstances, the Court’s capacity to assess the nature and extent of the investigation is greatly diminished.

125. As to the questioning of an important witness identified by the applicant herself, Mr N.J., an employee of Baktelekom, it has not been shown convincingly by the Government that the investigation obtained his statement in an adequate manner or that they pursued any leads arising from that statement. From the material available and from the applicant’s submissions, which have not been expressly disputed by the Government, it appears that, on their first encounter on 19 March 2012, the investigator failed to properly record and possibly even actively avoided recording Mr N.J.’s statements, which were highly relevant to the case. The Government submitted the investigator’s subsequent order of 30 March 2012 granting the applicant’s request to formally question Mr N.J. However, no further documents, such as a formal record of questioning, were submitted by the Government. As the case file stands, it has not been shown that Mr N.J. had been properly questioned. The information that he could provide in his statement was very likely to shed further light on the identity of the person who might have ordered him to trace wires to the applicant’s flat and that person’s link to the “intellectual author” of the crime. It might also have assisted in establishing whether Mr N.J. had been acting on official orders from his State-owned employer, or whether it was some form of “unofficial” request by his superiors. This could have clarified a number of questions as to the possible involvement of State agents in the operation carried out in the applicant’s flat.

126. Another lead to be investigated was the identity of the person who sent the threatening letter to the applicant from Moscow. The envelope addressed to the applicant bore his name and address. There is no material in the case file showing that steps were taken to investigate this lead and to identify that individual; for example, a formal request could have been made to the Russian authorities for legal assistance in this matter (compare Huseynova, cited above, §§ 100-11).

127. Furthermore, given that both the first and the second videos were posted online on two different websites (musavat.tv and ictimaipalatka.com), a further immediate investigative step would have been to identify the owners and/or operators of those websites and to determine the source of the videos and the identity of their uploaders. There is no information in the case file showing that anything had been done in this respect by the investigative authorities.

128. While the Government argued that no obvious connection could be made between the impugned acts and the time of publication of the applicant’s articles, as well as new domestic legislation (see paragraphs 101-02 above), it has not been shown that the investigating authorities took steps to determine whether a link could be established between the impugned acts and any of the applicant’s publications (either those she specifically highlighted or others). In the context of a series of criminal acts possibly linked to the applicant’s journalistic activity, such a line of inquiry seems necessary.

129. The Court also takes note of the applicant’s submission that the frame of the second video, posted on “ictimaipalatka.com”, was marked with the words “SesTV Player”; this matter could have been investigated to see, inter alia, whether there was any connection to the Səs newspaper.

130. Lastly, the Court notes that the investigation was handled with significant delays, and it has not been shown that any progress was made after August 2013, despite the applicant’s attempted complaints in this regard. Those complaints were not admitted by the courts.

131. Having regard to the significant flaws in the manner in which the authorities investigated the case, as well as the overall length of the proceedings, the Court finds that the authorities failed to comply with their positive obligation to ensure the adequate protection of the applicant’s private life by carrying out an effective criminal investigation into the very serious interferences with her private life. Having reached this finding, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine the applicant’s other arguments raised in this respect.

132. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE PUBLICATION OF THE AUTHORITIES’ REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE INVESTIGATION

133. The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the public disclosure of the personal information in the Status Report published by the authorities on 26 April 2012 constituted an unlawful and unjustified interference with her right to respect for her private and family life.

Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

A. Admissibility

134. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submissions

135. The applicant submitted that, although the status report purported to give an update on the status of the investigation, it disclosed an excessive amount of sensitive personal information collected during the course of the investigation. That information included the address of her flat, the identity of her then boyfriend who also featured in the intimate videos, and the names and occupations of her friends and colleagues. The nature and sheer extent of the information disclosed provided a complete picture of her private life.

136. The applicant submitted that the disclosure of her home address had added to her feeling of being in personal danger. The disclosure of the identity and occupations of her business relations and friends had interfered with her free communications with them, amounting to a further hindrance of her journalistic work. Furthermore, revealing that she had had an intimate relationship outside marriage had caused harm to her reputation and dignity in the largely conservative Azerbaijani society.

137. The applicant argued that the disclosure of the above-mentioned information constituted interference by the State authorities, the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, with her right to private and family life. She argued that the interference had not been in accordance with the law: the domestic legislation actually prohibited disclosing information relating to a person’s private life (see paragraphs 64 and 67 above). Furthermore, in any event, the interference had not pursued any of the legitimate aims listed in paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention, and had not been necessary.

138. The Government submitted that the status report of 26 April 2012 had been published in response to the applicant’s and her lawyer’s public statements and complaints that the investigation was ineffective. It had been intended to inform the public about the progress of the investigation, and also to counter the possibility of the public forming a negative opinion about the investigating authorities as a result of the applicant’s public complaints. The domestic courts, which had examined the applicant’s complaints related to the status report, had come to the same conclusion. They had also concluded that the information in the status report had not breached the requirements of the domestic law concerning individuals’ privacy, and that the applicant had failed to prove that she had suffered any non-pecuniary damage.

2 The Court’s assessment

139. The Court notes that the concept of “private life” is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. As indicated in paragraph 106 above, it is a concept which covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, and can therefore embrace multiple aspects of the person’s physical and social identity. Article 8 is not limited to the protection of an “inner circle” in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. It also protects the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world (see Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], no. 61496/08, § 70, 5 September 2017, with further references). Private life may even include activities of a professional or business nature (see Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no. 76639/11, §§ 100-01, 25 September 2018). The Court has also held that everyone has the right to live privately, away from unwanted attention (see Smirnova v. Russia, nos. 46133/99 and 48183/99, § 95, ECHR 2003‑IX (extracts), and Bărbulescu, cited above, § 70).

140. Furthermore, the Court notes that the home address of a person constitutes personal information that is a matter of private life and, as such, enjoys the protection afforded in that respect by Article 8 of the Convention (see Alkaya v. Turkey, no. 42811/06, § 30, 9 October 2012).

141. The storing and the release of information relating to an individual’s private life come within the scope of Article 8 § 1. Public information can fall within the scope of private life where it is systematically collected and stored in files held by the authorities (see Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 43, ECHR 2000‑V, and Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania, nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, § 168, 24 May 2011).

142. In the present case, the status report published in the press by the prosecution authorities disclosed the applicant’s home address, the fact of her relationship with her then boyfriend and his full name and occupation, the full names of her landlord and her family members, and the full names and occupations of her friends and colleagues. It also disclosed information about individuals to whom the applicant had sublet the flat during various periods, and the details of the financial arrangements between them. The Court considers that all of the above information, taken as a whole, related to the applicant’s “private life”. The Government did not expressly dispute this. While in the applicant’s view the above information also related to her “family life”, the Court considers that, in the context of the present case, the entirety of the information disclosed should be examined in the light of the requirements of protection of “private life” only.

143. The Court notes that the above information was obtained in the course of the criminal investigation. The applicant did not complain about the collection of the information, and the Court sees no issue arising under Article 8 in connection with such routine investigative steps as, for example, identifying the people who had visited the applicant’s flat or questioning them as witnesses.

144. However, the public disclosure of the above-mentioned information in a press release by the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office clearly constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her private life.

145. In order to be justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, any interference must be in accordance with the law, pursue one of the listed legitimate aims, and be necessary in a democratic society.

146. As to lawfulness, the applicant argued that the interference was in breach of Article 32 of the Constitution and the domestic legislation, in particular Article 199 of the CCrP, which prohibited disclosure by the investigating authorities of information constituting private secrets. The Government did not comment in detail on the issue of lawfulness, noting merely that the domestic courts had concluded that the publication of the status report had not breached the requirements of the domestic law concerning individuals’ privacy. In the circumstances of the present case, the Court does not consider it necessary to determine whether the interference was “in accordance with the law”, because in any event it lacked justification on other grounds 

147. In particular, the Government have not been able to demonstrate either a legitimate aim or the necessity for the interference in question. They argued that the purpose of the status report was “to inform the public about the progress of the investigation, and also to counter the possibility of the public forming a negative opinion about the investigating authorities as a result of the applicant’s public complaints”. However, in the present case, the applicant complained not about the fact that the investigating authorities had informed the public about the progress of the investigation (which, in itself, is not a matter of interference with Article 8 rights), but about the excessive and superfluous disclosure of sensitive private details in the status report. The Court considers that it would have been possible to inform the public about the nature of the investigative steps taken by the authorities (questioning of witnesses, examination of material evidence, and so on), while also at the same time respecting the applicant’s privacy. The Government did not explain what legitimate aim was pursued by the publication of the address and the identity of the partner of someone who had been secretly and unlawfully filmed in the privacy of their own home when engaged in intimate acts and who had subsequently been threatened and subjected to the public dissemination of those videos.

148. The protection of the applicant’s privacy was paramount in the overall context of the case, given that the criminal investigation itself, which the authorities purportedly aimed to inform the public about, had been launched in connection with the unjustified and flagrant invasion of her private life. The situation itself called for the authorities to exercise care in order not to compound further the already existing breach of the applicant’s privacy.

149. Having regard to the above considerations, the Court finds that the interference was not justified

150. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION

151. In connection with the incidents involving the threatening letter, the unauthorised installation of wires and hidden cameras in her flat, the dissemination of the covertly filmed videos and related newspaper articles in pro-government newspapers, the ineffectiveness of the investigation and lack of remedies against the inaction of prosecuting authorities, as well as the publication of the status report by the investigating authorities, the applicant further complained that the respondent State had breached its obligations under Articles 10 and 13 of the Convention.

The Court considers that the complaint falls to be examined solely under Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

A. Admissibility

152. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submission

153. The applicant submitted that the harassment she had suffered was just one case in a pattern of politically-motivated smear campaigns conducted against journalists in Azerbaijan. The country was ranked by many international NGOs and observer organisations as having one of the worst freedom-of-speech records in the world. Journalists working in the country were often violently attacked, or prosecuted on baseless criminal charges. Another tactic used against journalists and activists was publication of intimate videos or photographs in order to harass them. She gave several examples of journalists who had been the victims of covert filming of intimate videos or of violence.

154. In connection with the facts relating to the incidents complained of in the present case (except the publication of the status report), the applicant argued that the respondent State had breached either its negative obligation not to interfere with her freedom of expression or, in the alternative, its positive obligation to take steps to prevent or redress the systematic smear campaign against her. Her submissions in this regard were similar to those in relation to her Article 8 complaint.

155. With respect to the publication of the status report, she argued that there had been a breach of the negative obligation. The fact that the investigating authorities had published information of a personal nature that went far beyond what would be required for its stated purpose demonstrated that their goal was something other than what they had stated it to be. In the applicant’s opinion, the disclosure of this information was intended both as retribution for her complaints about the investigating authorities and as a warning against further criticism. It therefore constituted an interference with her freedom of expression, which was not justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.

156. The Government submitted that the wording of the threatening letter received by the applicant did not clearly indicate that she was being threatened specifically because of her journalistic activity. Nevertheless, the prosecuting authorities had taken the necessary steps to investigate the threats against the applicant. However, they had been unable to identify the person or persons responsible.

157. As to the status report of 26 April 2012, the Government reiterated that it had had the purpose of informing the public about the progress of the investigation and countering the possibility of the public forming a negative opinion about the investigating authorities as a result of the applicant’s public complaints. The report had not been published to punish the applicant for her criticism of the prosecuting authorities; neither had it been “a part of the active effort by the authorities to create an environment where the applicant could not freely work as an investigative journalist”.

2. The Court’s assessment

158. The Court has frequently stressed the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a democratic society, in particular where, through the press, it serves to impart information and ideas of general interest which the public is, moreover, entitled to receive (see, for example, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], no. 931/13, §§ 124‑26, 27 June 2017, and Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], no. 18030/11, § 165, 8 November 2016). The Court also reiterates that the key importance of freedom of expression as one of the preconditions for a functioning democracy is such that the genuine, effective exercise of this freedom is not dependent merely on the State’s duty not to interfere, but may call for positive measures of protection, even in the sphere of relations between individuals (see Fuentes Bobo, cited above, § 38; Özgür Gündem, cited above, §§ 42-43; and Palomo Sánchez and Others [GC], cited above, § 59). In particular, the positive obligations under Article 10 of the Convention require States to create, while establishing an effective system of protection of journalists, a favourable environment for participation in public debate by all the persons concerned, enabling them to express their opinions and ideas without fear, even if they run counter to those defended by the official authorities or by a significant part of public opinion, or even irritating or shocking to the latter (see Dink, cited above, § 137).

159. Moreover, the Court has repeatedly stressed that interference with freedom of expression may have a “chilling effect” on the exercise of that freedom (see, among other authorities, Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 160, 23 June 2016), and this is more so in cases of serious crimes committed against journalists, making it of utmost importance for the authorities to check a possible connection between the crime and the journalist’s professional activity (see Huseynova, cited above, § 115, and Mazepa and Others, cited above, § 73).

160. Having had regard to the parties’ submissions and the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the entirety of the applicant’s complaint falls to be examined from the standpoint of the positive obligations of the respondent State under Article 10 of the Convention.

161. The Court takes note of the reports on the general situation in Azerbaijan concerning the freedom of expression and safety of journalists, as described by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (see paragraph 71 above), the third-party interveners (see paragraphs 74-78 above), and the applicant herself (see paragraph 153 above). In particular, it takes note of the reports of physical attacks and other types of alleged persecution of journalists, and the perceived climate of impunity for such acts, as those responsible were reportedly rarely, if ever, brought to justice. The Court considers that such an environment may produce a grave chilling effect on freedom of expression, including on the “public watchdog” role of journalists and other media actors and on open and vigorous public debate, all of which are essential in a democratic society (see also, in this regard, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4, cited in paragraphs 69-70 above).

162. The applicant in the present case is a well-known investigative journalist who has received a number of international awards. As noted above, the acts of a criminal nature committed against the applicant were apparently linked to her journalistic activity; no other plausible motive for the harassment she had to face has been advanced or can be discerned from the case file (see paragraph 119 above).

163. The applicant herself had concerns and fears that she was the victim of a concerted campaign orchestrated in retaliation for her journalistic work, and those concerns and fears were repeatedly brought to the attention of the authorities (compare Özgür Gündem, cited above, § 41).

164. In such circumstances, having regard to the reports on the general situation concerning freedom of expression in the country and the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that the threat of public humiliation and the acts resulting in the flagrant and unjustified invasion of the applicant’s privacy were either linked to her journalistic activity or should have been treated by the authorities when investigating as if they might have been so linked. In this situation Article 10 of the Convention required the respondent State to take positive measures to protect the applicant’s journalistic freedom of expression, in addition to its positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention to protect her from intrusion into her private life.

165. However, as the Court has found above, although the authorities launched a criminal investigation in connection with the acts committed against the applicant, there were significant flaws and delays in the manner in which they investigated the case (see paragraph 131 above). Moreover, the articles published in the newspapers, which the applicant claimed were pro-government, as well as the unjustified public disclosure by the authorities during the investigation of the additional information relating to the applicant’s private life, further compounded the situation (see paragraphs 148-49 above), contrary to the spirit of an environment protective of journalism.

166. It follows that the respondent State has failed to comply with its positive obligation to protect the applicant in the exercise of her freedom of expression. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.

V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION

167. The applicant further complained that in the civil proceedings concerning the status report of 26 April 2013 the domestic courts had failed to address essential issues raised by her and had failed to provide sufficient reasons for their decisions. The relevant part of Article 6 provides:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

168. The Government contested the applicant’s arguments.

169. The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the second complaint under Article 8 and the complaint under Article 10 examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.

170. Having regard to its findings under Articles 8 and 10 (see paragraphs 149-50 and 165 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether, in this case, there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

171. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

172. The applicant claimed 85,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

173. The Government argued that the claim was excessive.

174. The Court refers to its findings of violations of Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. The acts complained of were of particular gravity (see paragraph 116 above) and the authorities failed to comply with their positive obligations to take effective investigative and protective measures, instead disclosing further personal information in breach of the applicant’s privacy. The Court considers that she must have suffered significant distress and damage to her personal and professional life as a result. In such circumstances, ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 15,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

B. Costs and expenses

175. The applicant also claimed 3,000 Azerbaijani manats (AZN) in respect of legal fees for the services of Mr Y. Imanov incurred in the proceedings before the Court. In support of her claim, she submitted a copy of the contract concluded with Mr Y. Imanov on 14 December 2015. The contract specifies that the amount is to be paid after the conclusion of the proceedings. The applicant also noted that, on the date of conclusion of the contract AZN 3,000 was equivalent to approximately EUR 2,605.

176. The Government submitted that the amount awarded by the Court should be indicated in the currency specified in the contract concluded with the lawyer, namely Azerbaijani manats.

177. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum.

178. The Court also notes that, in principle, according to its practice, it makes awards of just satisfaction under all heads, including in respect of costs and expenses, in euros. When a claim is expressed in a currency other than the euro, it is first converted into euros before the award is made (see Shukurov v. Azerbaijan, no. 37614/11, § 32, 27 October 2016).

179. In the present case, the claim itself is expressed in Azerbaijani manats. The applicant also noted its equivalent in euros as of the date of conclusion of the contract for legal services with the lawyer, which was 14 December 2015.

180. However, in cases where just satisfaction claims (under various heads) are made in the national currency and in situations where a claim has lost considerable value when the Court reaches its decision owing to currency depreciation, the Court, as a general rule, converts such claims into euros as of the date of submission of the claims (ibid., §§ 32-33, with further references).

181. In the present case, the applicant submitted the claim expressed in the national currency on 7 July 2016 and therefore, according to the general rule stated above, it should be converted into euros as of that date. As per the exchange rate on 7 July 2016, the applicant’s claim was equivalent to approximately EUR 1,750.

182. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,750 for the proceedings before the Court.

C. Default interest

183. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Decides to join the applications;

2. Declares the applications admissible;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in connection with the domestic authorities’ failure to comply with their positive obligation to investigate effectively very serious intrusions into the applicant’s private life;

4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in connection with the disclosure of the private information published in the authorities’ report on the status of the investigation;

5. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention;

6. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention;

7. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Azerbaijani manats at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) EUR 15,000 (fifteen thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 1,750 (one thousand seven hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

8. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 January 2019, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Claudia Westerdiek                        Angelika Nußberger
Registrar                                         President