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EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
TREĆE ODELJENJE
PREDMET TELEGRAAF MEDIA NEDERLAND LANDELIJKE MEDIA B.V.I DRUGI PROTIV HOLANDIJE
(Predstavka br. 39315/06)
PRESUDA
STRAZBUR
22. novembar 2012.
PRAVNOSNAŽNA
22. februar 2013.
Ova presuda je postala pravnosnažnasaglasno članu 44. stav 2. Konvencije. Ona može biti predmet redakcijskih izmena.
Ova presuda je prevedena na srpski jezik u okviru zajedničkog programa Evropske unije i Saveta Evrope „Horizontal Facility za Zapadni Balkan i Tursku 2019-2022” i projekta „Sloboda izražavanja i sloboda medija u Srbiji (JUFREX)”. Ovaj nezvanični prevod se objavljuje uz podršku Evropske unije i Saveta Evrope, ali pod isključivom odgovornošću prevodioca (Alpha Team One). Izraženi stavovi ne izražavaju nužno mišljenja Evropske unije.
U predmetu Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V.i drugi protiv Holandije, Evropski sud za ljudska prava (Treće odeljenje) na zasedanju veća u sastavu:
Josep Casadevall (Žozep Kasadeval),predsednik,
Egbert Myjer (Egbert Mejer),
Corneliu Bîrsan (Korneliju Bršan),
Alvina Gyulumyan (Alvina Gjulumjan),
Ineta Ziemele (Ineta Zjemele),
Luis López Guerra (Luis Lopez Gera),
Kristina Pardalos,sudije,
i Marialena Tsirli (Marialena Cirli), zamenik sekretara Odeljenja,
Posle većanja na zatvorenim sednicama 19. juna i 23. oktobra 2012, Donosi sledeću presudu koja je usvojena poslednjeg navedenog dana:
POSTUPAK
Predmet je formiran na osnovu predstavke (br. 39315/06)koju su protiv Kraljevine Holandije Evropskom sudu (u daljem tekstu: Sud ili ESLJP) po članu 34. Konvencije za zaštituljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: Konvencija) podneli preduzeće sa ograničenom odgovornošću (besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid) osnovano prema holandskom zakonodavstvu,Uitgeversmaatschappij De Telegraaf B.V.;dvojica holandskih državljanaJoost de Haas(Jost de Has) i Bart Mos;kao i dva udruženja koja prema holandskom unutrašnjem pravu imaju status pravnih lica Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisten (Holandsko udruženje novinara) i Nederlands Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren (Holandsko društvo glavnih urednika), 29. septembra 2006. godine.
Podnosioce predstavke zastupali su R.S. Le Poole (Le Pol) i M.A. de Kemp, advokati iz Amsterdama. Holandsku Vladu (u daljem tekstu: Država) zastupao je njeg agent R.A.A. Böcker(R.A.A. Beker) iz Ministarstva inostranih poslova.
Podnosioci predstavke su se pritužili daje merama koje su prema njima preduzete, uključujući korišćenje specijalnih ovlašćenja kako bi otkrili identitet svojih novinarskih izvora bio povređen član 10. Konvencije. Drugi i treći podnosilac predstavke, pored toga, pritužili su se da su bili žrtve povrede člana 8. Konvencije koja je nastupila usled korišćenja specijalnih ovlašćenja u oblasti nadzora i praćenja.
Svojom delimičnom odlukom od 18. maja 2010. Sud je odlučio da odloži razmatranje gore navedenih pritužbi De Haasai Mos-a(u daljem tekstu: podnosioci predstavke) u odnosu na Uitgeversmaatschappij De Telegraaf B. V. i proglasio je predstavku neprihvatljivom u odnosu na Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisteni Nederlands Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren. Takođe je odlučeno da Sud rešava o prihvatljivosti i meritumu predstavke u isto vreme (nekadašnji član 29. stav 3).
I podnosioci predstavke i Država dostavili su podneske sa pismenim izjavama (Pravilo 59. stav 1).
Javno ročište je održano u Sudu u Strazburu 19. juna 2012. godine (Pravilo 59. stav 3).
Pred Sudom su se pojavili:
(a) u ime Države
R. Böcker, Ministarstvo inostranih poslova, zastupnik,
Dr M. Kuijer (M. Kojer), Ministarstvo bezbednosti i pravde,
P. van Sasse van Ysselt (P. fan Sase fan Ejselt), Ministarstvounutrašnjih poslova i odnosa u Kraljevini,
R. Dielemans (R. Dilemans), Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova i odnosa u Kraljevini,
J. Jarigsma, Državno javno tužilaštvo, savetnici;
(b) u ime podnosilaca predstavke
R.S. Le Poole, advokat,
M. de Kemp, advokat, advokati,
J. de Haas,
B. Mos, zastupnici,
H.M.A. van Meurs-Bergsma (H.M.A. fan Mejers-Berksma), rukovodilac Pravnog odeljenjaTelegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V., savetnik.
Sudu su se obratili Böcker, De Kempi Le Poolea; on je saslušao ta izlaganja i njihove odgovore na pitanja.
ČINJENICE
I. OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA
Prvi podnosilac predstavke je preduzeće sa ograničenom odgovornošću osnovano u skladu sa holandskim zakonima. Njegova delatnost između ostalog obuhvata objavljivanje visokotiražnog dnevnog lista De Telegraaf.Prvobitni naziv preduzeća bio je Uitgeversmaatschappij De Telegraaf B.V., ali je 5. januara 2011. taj naziv promenjen u Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V.
Drugi podnosilac predstavke Joost de Haas, holandski je državljanin koji je rođen 1967. godine i živi u Bovenkarspelu. On je po zanimanju novinar.
Treći podnosilac predstavke Bart Mos, holandski je državljanin koji je rođen 1963. godine i živi u Riderkerku. On je takođe novinar.
A. Članci u novinama
Narko mafija poseduje tajne AIVD
Najokoreliji kriminalci iskoristili informacije
Pišu Joost De Haasi Bart Mos
Amsterdam, subota
Državne tajne (staatsgeheime informatie), do kojih je holandska tajna policijaAIVD [Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, Opšta obaveštajna i bezbednosna služba] došla tokom svojih istraga cirkulišu u kriminalnim krugovima Amsterdama.
Tako su kompletne istrage o dileru droge i narkotika Minku K., koji je označen kao „opasnost po državu”(staatsgevaarlijk), poznate pojedincima iz kriminalnog sveta podzemlja (onderwereld). To se može zaključiti iz dokumenata i izjava u koje je taj list imao uvid.
Iz tih dokumenata sledi da je tajna služba tokomniza godina vodila istragu i organizovala infiltriranje među amsterdamske kriminalce aktivne u poslovima s drogom. Intervencija tajne službe bila je, između ostalog, podstaknuta snažnim pretpostavkama da postoji korupcija u amsterdamskoj policiji i u Državnom javnom tužilaštvu (openbaar ministerie). Iz tog razloga tajna služba je krajem devedesetih godina odlučila da vrbuje doušnika iz neposrednog okruženja Minka K. Po rečima tog doušnika, korupcija je bila do te mere rasprostranjena da su likvidacije zapravo vršene pomoćuoružja koje je policija zaplenila.
Pretnja
Iz dokumenata se može videti da je AIVD smatrao da okoreli kriminalac Mink K. predstavlja pretnju po pravni poredak jer je on svake godine izdvajao milione da bi potkupljivao policijske zvaničnike i zvaničnike tužilaštva. Pored toga, smatralo se da K. ima na raspolaganju ogromne zalihe oružja, uključujući veliku količinu„semtexa” i „stotine protivtenkovskih projektila”. Uznemirujuće su bile veze za koje se smatralo da ih K. održava sa terorističkim grupama kao što su Hezbolah i ETA. List De Telegraafje te dokumente vratio službi AIVD.
Slučaj je hteo da [Ministarstvo] odbrane juče saopšti da jeizgubljena memorijska kartica koja je sadržala poverljive informacije vojne obaveštajne i bezbednosne službe (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, MIVD).
Na jednoj od unutrašnjih stranica u istom broju objavljen je članak iste dvojice autora, u kome su naveli detalje među kojima se, između ostalog, nalazio i pseudonim tog doušnika, kao i pseudonim drugogdoušnika koji je obavljao sporedne poslove u kriminalnoj organizaciji.
Sutradan, u nedelju, 22. januara 2006. godine, De Telegraafje objavio članak, ponovo iz pera De Haasai Mosa, u kome je sugerisano da su informacije visokog stepena tajnosti koje su se odnosile na istrageAIVD postale dostupne kriminalcima, među njima i Minku K.
U nedelju22. januara 2006. godine uveče javni televizijski radio-difuzni servis NOS emitovao je intervju sa tadašnjim ministrom pravde (Minister van Justitie)J.P.H. Donnerom (Doner), u emisiji vesti u dvadeset časova. Ministar Donnerje rekao sledeće:
Ovde se dakle radi o ljudima koji mogu biti uključeni u AIVD, a ovako objavljuju dokumenta u spoljnom svetu. To se apsolutno mora sprečiti. Razume se, kasnije možemo samo žaliti zbog toga što su državne tajne našle put do novina. Ponovo ću reći da smatram kako je De Telegraafcitirao [ta dokumenta] u vrlo uopštenom smislu a ne direktno. Kako zasad stoje stvari, oprezno su to upotrebili. Međutim, to je sasvim druga stvar. Ono osnovno što želim da naglasim jeste da se takve stvari ne smeju saopštavati javnosti.
U ponedeljak 23. januara 2006.De Telegraafje saopštio da je AIVD podneo krivičnu prijavu zbog nezakonitog obelodanjivanja državnih tajni. AIVD je navodno saopštio da nema dokaza da je Mink K. mogao da podmićuje policijske zvaničnike i zvaničnike Državnog javnog tužilaštva, kao i da je dokumente o kojima je reč „procurio“novinama jedan pripadnik AIVD.
Tokom narednih dana De Telegraaf je objavljivao nove materijale, uključujući navode o tome da je Mink K. imao sastanke sa ministrima u Vladi (uz demantije tih ministara koji su takođe objavljivani).
B. Parlamentarni dokumenti
Ministar unutrašnjih poslova i odnosa u Kraljevini (Minister van BinnenlandseZaken en Koninkrijksrelaties)poslao je 24. januara 2006. Belu knjigu predsedniku Donjeg doma Parlamenta (parlamentarna godina2005-06, 29876, br. 11). Tu je navedeno da je služba koja je bila prethodnik službe AIVD, nekadašnji BVD (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, Nacionalna služba bezbednosti), između 1997. i 2000. sprovela istragu povodom navoda o tome da je Mink K. podmićivao državne zvaničnike, ali danije otkriven nijedan takav slučaj korupcije. Još nije poznato kako su i kada dokumenti koji su nosili službenu oznaku tajnosti koji su bili vezani za tu istragu postali poznati van BVD/AIVDiako se smatra da nije bilo curenja iz policije niti iz Državnog javnog tužilaštva. De Telegraafje izvestio da su dokumenti, koji su već neko vreme kružili u svetu kriminala, dobijeni preko kontakata sa kriminalcima i sugerisao je da su te dokumente „procurili“ aktivni ili bivši agenti BVD ili AIVD. Dokumenti koje je De Telegraaf vratiosastojali su se od nepotpune zbirke sirovih, neobrađenih podataka iz kojih nije mogućno izvestizaključke.
Takođe je 24. januara 2006. Odbor za obaveštajne službe i službe bezbednosti Donjeg doma Parlamenta poverljivim pismom obavešten o podrobnostima tajnih operacija u okviru istrage koju je pokrenuo i sproveo AIVD.
To pitanje je poslužilo kao povod za debatu u Donjem domu Parlamenta, i to u nekoliko navratatokom 2006. godine. Pošto su završene te debate, ministar je 20. decembra 2006.uputio pismo Donjem domu. U tom pismu zaključio je kako sledi:
Došlo je do nečega što se sasvim ispravno može nazvati ozbiljnim incidentom (Er is sprake van een ernstig incident geweest): značajna zbirka kopiranih dokumenata iz zatvorenog radog dosijea BVD izneta je iz zgrade protivno pravilima. Operativno istraživanje koje je sproveo AIVD i istraga Odeljenja za interne istrage Nacionalne policije (rijksrecherche) ukazuje da je to verovatno uradio nekibivši zaposleni u BVD, koji je imaomogućnost da to učini do avgusta 2000. Verovatno preko trećih lica dokumenti su kasnije došli u posed lista De Telegraaf, koji jeinformacije o tome objavio u januaru ove godine. Želim da istaknem da će konačni zaključci o načinu na koji su se dogodile te kompromitujuće stvari moći formalno da budu izvedeni tek nakon što postupak protivosumnjičenog bivšeg pripadnika (BVD) bude priveden kraju.
Kompromitujući dokumenti pružaju uvid u nivo operativnog znanja BVD u to vreme u oblasti integriteta javnog sektora i radnih metoda BVD kada je reč o tom području aktivnosti. Šteta naneta istragama u toku i posledice u tom smislu da su obelodanjeni metodi rada koji su u to vreme primenjivani (modus operandi) relativno je ograničena. Rizici po agente i/ili doušnike ne mogu se, međutim, potpuno isključiti. Tamo gde je postojala potreba za tim, preduzete su operativne mere kako bi se ti rizici ograničili.
Ponovnaprocena u svetlu bezbednosnih pravila koja su važila onda i koja važe sada pokazuje da ne bi moglo mnogo toga da se dobije ako bi sepribeglo donošenju dodatnih propisa. Međutim, biće neophodno da sepojača poštovanje pravila i nadzor nad poštovanjempravila i propisa. To će biti obezbeđeno donošenjem ažuriranog bezbednosnog plana i internim komunikacijama o toj temi. Tehničke mere, kao što je uvođenje nove bezbednosne tehnologije u autorizovanim sistemima i mere u oblasti rukovođenja zaposlenima, kao što je nastavak redovnih i temeljnih bezbednosnih istraga ipreispitivanja lica koja su već zaposlena i onih koja se tek zapošljavaju takođe će doprineti daljem smanjenju bezbednosnih rizika. Krajnja budnost u odnosu na signale koji bi mogli da ukažu na bezbednosne rizike i bolja (socijalna) kontrola ponašanjaonih koji nisu svesni bezbednosnih rizika nezaobilazna je na tom planu.
Takođe na osnovu istraga zaključujem da nije mogućno ostvariti takvu bezbednost koja će u potpunosti sprečiti namerno kompromitovanje [tajnih informacija.] Nikada neće biti mogućno potpuno isključiti situaciju u kojoj zaposleni koji imaju ovlašćenje dasteknu uvid u državne tajne i koji namernonastoje da nanesu štetu smišljeno i neovlašćeno iznesu državne tajne izvan zgrade AIVD na ovaj ili onaj način.
Mora postojati ravnoteža između maksimalne bezbednosti i delotvornog procesa rada. Na osnovu propisai smernica i u skladu s postojećom regulativom mogu se,između ostalog, svesti na minimum rizici od kompromitovanja poverljivih informacija. Ipak, uprkos tome,uvek će postojati izvesna doza rizika koja je neposredno vezana za ljudski faktor.
C. Nalog za predaju dokumenata upućen prvom podnosiocu predstavke
Glavni inspektor Odeljenja za interne istrage Nacionalne policije (hoofdinspecteur vanpolitie‑rijksrecherche) izdao je 26. januara 2006. nalog upućen [jednoj podružnici] prvog podnosioca predstavke za predaju „dokumenta (dokumenata) i/ili kopije (kopija) koji sadrže državne tajne u vezi sa operativnim aktivnostima [BVD]i/ili [AIVD]”.
Pravni zastupnik prvog podnosioca predstavke je 30. januara 2006. sklopio sporazum s javnim tužiocem u cilju zaštite identiteta izvora gore navedenih informacija sve dotledok Regionalni sud ne proceni da li je bilo zabranjeno izdati nalog za predaju dokumenata iz razloga zaštite izvora. Budući da originali dokumenata o kojima je reč (kopije su već bile vraćene) mogu nositi otiske prstiju ili druge tragove na osnovu kojih je mogućno identifikovati to lice, sve to je stavljeno u sanduk kod javnog beležnika i zapečaćeno, da bi potom taj zapečaćeni sanduk s dokumentima bio predat istražnom sudiji kako bi ga čuvao u sefu, neotvoren, do ishoda postupka za rešavanje najavljenog prigovora.
Prvi podnosilac predstavke je u suštini uložio prigovor Regionalnom sudu u Hagu pismom od 23. februara 2006. (u pisarnicu Suda pismo je stiglo 28. februara). Pozivajući se na član 10. Konvencije, podnosilac se pozvao na ono što je smatrao novinarskom povlasticom u smislu neotkrivanja izvora. S tim u vezi podnosilac predstavke je, između ostalog, tvrdio da su De Haasi Mos ispoljili dužnu pažnju u tom smislu što nisu obelodanili ni identitet pripadnika AIVD, ni doušnika, ni specifičan modus operandite službe, ni postojeći nivo njene informisanosti.
Ročište u sudijskim odajama (raadkamer) održano je 17. marta 2006. Prvog podnosioca predstavke, koga je zastupaonjegov advokat Le Poole, predsedavajući sudija je obavestio o njegovom statusu osumnjičenog u krivičnom predmetu i podsetio ga je da ima pravo da odbije da odgovara na pitanja; podnosioci predstavke De Haasi Mos prisustvovali su ročištu kao zainteresovane stranke. Prvi podnosilac predstavke je ponudio da uništi dokumente o kojima je reč. U zvaničnom zapisniku sa ročišta nalazi se, između ostalog, sledeće:
Javni tužilac se ponovo obratio sudu i ukratko rekao sledeće:
- Ispitivanje dokumenata da bi se otkrio njihov izvor nije prvi prioritet, ali će ta mogućnost svakako biti iskorišćena ukoliko za to iskrsne prilika.
- Osim toga, AIVDsam treba da odluči da li su dokumenti koji se trenutno nalaze u kancelariji istražnog sudije zaista svi dokumenti koje je podnosilac predstavke mogao imati u svom posedu.
...
Advokat [prvog podnosioca predstavke] takođe je ukratko rekao sledeće:
- S obzirom na zaštitu izvora [prvi podnosilac predstavke] ne može sebi dozvoliti da rizikujeda se ispituju dokumenti.
- [Prvi podnosilac predstavke] je bio uzdržan (terughoudend) kada su se objavljivale informacije iz tih izvora [tj. dokumenata], a u svakom slučaju je poznato da Mink K. već neko vreme zna njihov sadržaj, tako da objavljivanje informacija iz tih dokumenata nije izazvalo nikakvu ozbiljnu opasnost.
- Po mom mišljenju, neprikladno je poređenje sa vatrenim oružjem koje koristi javni tužilac. Na kraju krajeva, [prvi podnosilac predstavke] nudi da smesta uništi dokumente i nije zainteresovan da ih zadrži u svom posedu.
- [Prvi podnosilac predstavke] nikada nije imao interes za sadržaj tih dokumenata. Činjenica da tako osetljive informacije AIVDkruže u kriminalnim krugovima svakako predstavlja novinsku vest koju je trebalo obelodaniti.U tom smislu je[prvi podnosilac predstavke] takođe ispunio svoju ulogu čuvara javnog interesa na vrlo oprezan način (op zeer omzichtige wijze).
Javni tužilac se još jednom obratio sudu i ukratko rekao sledeće:
- Izvor koji je predao dokumente[prvom podnosiocu predstavke]ne mora nužno biti osoba iz organizacije AIVD, koja je „procurila“ te podatke. Dokumenti koji su nosili oznaku službene tajne i pripadali AIVDu nekoliko navrata su nestajali u datom periodu, a ovi dokumenti mogu imati određenu ulogu u toj istrazi.
- Zaista je možda mogućno ustanoviti identitet izvora na osnovu pomnog pregleda dokumenata. Međutim, u kontekstu istrage curenja podataka iz AIVD, ispitivanje dokumenata nije nužno kako bi se ustanovio identitet osobe koja je informacije „procurila“, jer se to može otkriti već na osnovu sadržaja dokumenata o kojima je reč.
- Ovi dokumenti treba da budu vraćeni Državi prosto zato što sadrže tajne poverljive informacije koje ne smeju da cirkulišu u javnom domenu. Sve dok se ne utvrdi da je [prvi] podnosilac predstavke zaista vratio AIVD-u sve dokumente koje je imao u svom posedu, ne treba razmatrati mogućnost da se oni unište, kako je to predložio sam podnosilac predstavke.
- Osim toga, [prvi] podnosilac predstavke nije bio potpuno uzdržan kada je reč o objavljivanju dokumenata. Na krajukrajeva, nema potrebe da se štampaju citati iz dokumenata da bi se ukazalo na to da se oni nalaze u rukama kriminalaca.
Podnosioci predstavke gospoda De Haasi Mos izrazili su podršku prvom podnosiocu predstavke.
Činjenica da zaplenjeni dokumenti mogu imati na sebi otiske prstiju koji bi mogli navesti AIVD ili Državno javno tužilaštvo na saznanje o izvoru ili izvorima [prvog podnosioca predstavke] ne upućuje (Regionalni) sud na drugačiji zaključak. Kao što je [prvi podnosilac predstavke] ispravno naveo, član 10. Konvencije obuhvata i zaštitu novinarskih izvora kako bi se zaštitilo pravo na slobodno prikupljanje vesti (recht van vrije nieuwsgaring). Međutim, Regionalni sud ne smatra da je to pravo u ovom predmetu bilo povređeno. Regionalni sud naglašava da se od novinara o kojima je reč nije tražilo da aktivno sarađuju u istrazi identiteta izvora, već je sve što je od njih traženo u ovom konkretnom slučaju bilo da predaju materijal koji postoji nezavisno od volje novinara i koji je, pored toga, predmet krivičnog dela. Regionalni sud stoga smatra da nikakvo kažnjavanje akcija Državnog javnog tužilaštva u ovom predmetu neće osujetiti buduću razmenu informacija – mada će se ona možda odvijati u različitoj formi – između [prvog podnosioca predstavke] i njegovih izvora.
4.5Kada je stao na stanovište da su dokumenti koji su zaplenjeni potekli iz AIVD i da sadrže informacije o državnoj tajni i predmet su krivičnog dela koje je zabranjeno članom 98. tačka c Krivičnog zakonika, regionalni sud je izrazio činjenicu da se nalogom za predaju (dokumenata) štiti interes radi koga je ta odredba doneta, to jest štiti se državna tajna.
Potonje rezonovanje (Regionalnog suda) da u ovom predmetu nije bilo povređeno pravo na zaštitu izvora koje je zajemčeno članom 10. Konvencije, jezgrovito sažima zaključak, po kome je pretežni društveni interes da informacije koje predstavljaju državnu tajnu ne treba da cirkulišu u javnosti i da isto tako mešanje u pravo na zaštitu izvora – za koje je Regionalni sud jasno utvrdio da postoji, i to nije ni osporeno u ovoj žalbi – treba smatrati opravdanim u svetlu okolnosti datog predmeta.
To rezonovanje... ne ukazuje na nepravilno tumačenje primenljivog prava i nije neshvatljivo u svetlu postupka koji se odvijao iza zatvorenih vrata. Ovim svojim zaključkom, Vrhovni sud konstatuje
(a)da spis predmeta ne ostavlja prostor ni za kakav drugi zaključak osim zaključka da zaplenjeni dokumenti sadrže informacije koje predstavljaju državnu tajnu o operativnim istragama AIVDo mogućoj interakciji kriminalnog podzemlja i onog dela društva koji poštuje zakone (verwevenheid van onderwereld en bovenwereld) u cilju sprečavanja teških krivičnih dela, te su stoga te informacije važne u vezi sa zaštitom demokratskog pravnog poretka imogle bi ugroziti nacionalnu bezbednost i bezbednost drugih ako bi bile obelodanjene, i
(b)da je žalba koju upućuje [preduzeće koje je prvi podnosilac predstavke] u vezi s predajom dokumenata ograničena u smislu stepena verovatnoće otkrivanja izvora, na njegov strah da bi ispitivanje dokumenata moglo dovesti do identifikacije izvora zato što bi na tim papirima mogli biti nađeni otisci prstiju, a javni tužilac je s tim u vezi već saopštio da ispitivanje dokumenata, iako jeste izvodljivo, nije neophodno da bi se otkrio identitet osobe koja je „procurila“ podatke iz AIVD jer je to moguće na osnovu samog sadržaja dokumenata, a taj sadržaj je već poznat AIVD-u...
D. Parnični postupak
Advokat podnosioca predstavke Le Poole je 2. juna 2006. pisao ministru unutrašnjih poslova i odnosa u Kraljevini (kopiju pisma je prosledio načelniku AIVD) tražeći da se prekine istraga i korišćenje specijalnih ovlašćenja protiv drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke, da se unište sve informacije koje su na taj način pribavljene i da se donese rešenje da nijedna takva informacija neće biti korišćena u krivičnom postupku protiv drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke.
Generalni sekretar (secretaris-generaal) Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova i odnosa u Kraljevini uputio je 6. juna 2006, odgovarajući u ime ministra, pismo Le Poole-u kome odbija taj zahtev. Ako bi se potvrdilo ili demantovalo korišćenje specijalnih ovlašćenja, to bi značilo da se obelodanjuju informacije o specifičnim operacijama AIVD, a takve informacije moraju ostati tajna u interesu nacionalne bezbednosti.U pismu generalnog sekretara Ministarstva upućuje se na to da je na sličan način odgovoreno na pitanja koja su o tom predmetu bila postavljena u Parlamentu.
Tri podnosioca predstavke, kojima su se pridružili Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisteni Nederlands Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren (vidi stavove 1. i 4, gore), zatražila su 7. juna 2006. da se tužena država pojavi pred sudijom za privremene mere (voorzieningenrechter) Regionalnog suda (rechtbank) u Hagu u skraćenom postupku za donošenje privremene mere (kort geding). Oni su tvrdili da su upoznati s tim da su podnosioci predstavke De Haasi Mos podvrgnuti prisluškivanju telefona i praćenju, što najverovatnije čine agenti AIVD još od kraja januara 2006. nadalje. Takve mere, prema tvrdnji podnosilaca predstavke, preduzete su bez ikakve pravne osnove budući da AIVDkoristi ovlašćenja koja ima po osnovu člana 6. stav 2. tačka (a) Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten – vidi stav 51, dole) radi obavljanja dužnosti utvrđenih u članu 6. stav 2. tačka (c) tog zakona. Alternativno, budući da je jasno da cilj mera koje su preduzete protiv drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke nisu oni sami nego njihov novinarski izvor, time su prekršeni osnovni zahtevi supsidijarnosti i srazmernosti, utoliko pre što su pomenuta dvojica podnosilaca predstavke novinari pa im samim tim pripada pravo, saglasno članu 10. Konvencije, na zaštitu novinarskih izvora. Podnosioci predstavke su se takođe pozvali na nužnost zaštite privatnog i porodičnog života, doma i prepiske drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke po osnovu člana 8. Konvencije. Oni su, u suštini, tražili da sudija donese privremenu meru u formi rešenja da prestanu sve istražne radnje i korišćenje specijalnih ovlašćenja protiv drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke u meri u kojoj se te radnje odnose na tekstove u štampi na koje je prethodno ukazano; takođe su tražili da se unište svi podaci dobijeni primenom spornih mera; konačno, tražili su da sudija izda nalog kojim se sprečava da AIVDpreda te podatke Državnom javnom tužilaštvu kako bi ih ono koristilo u krivičnom postupku protiv drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke.
Sudija za privremene mere izrekao je presudu 21. juna 2006. godine. U vezis prethodnim pitanjem presudio je da su zahtevi podnosilaca predstavke za privremene mere prihvatljivi u građanskopravnim sudovima jer ne postoji alternativni postupak koji bi omogućio da se brzo reši to pitanja, niti zakon predviđa bilo kakav drugi pravni lek osim pokretanja parničnog postupka. Rezonujući dalje na osnovu pretpostavke da je AIVD,u suštini, iskoristio svoja ovlašćenja za nadzor i praćenje lica – što tuženik nije ni potvrdio ni osporio – sudija je stao na stanovište da je takva primena ovlašćenja u suprotnosti sa članom 10. Konvencije. Doneo je rešenje o privremenim merama uglavnom u smislu u kome su to tražili podnosioci predstavke.
Država je na tu odluku izjavila žalbu Apelacionom sudu u Hagu. Ponovo odbijajući da potvrdi ili negira korišćenje ovlašćenja za nadzor i praćenje protiv bilo kog od podnosilaca predstavke, Država je tvrdila da zaštita novinarskih izvora nije apsolutna i da svaki konflikt između zaštite novinarskih izvora i zaštite državnih tajni treba da bude rešen u korist očuvanja državne tajne. Država je takođe navela da su prvi, drugi i treći podnosilac predstavke prekoračili potrebu za informisanjem javnosti, naročito time što su nezakonito zadržali originalne primerke tajnih dokumenata u svom posedu što je samo po sebi krivično delo i što su obelodanili da AIVD koristi doušnike. Osim toga, postojali su adekvatni mehanizmi zaštite u vidu Nadzornog odbora za obaveštajne i bezbednosne službe (Commissie van toezicht voor de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, u daljem tekstu: Nadzorni odbor), u čijem su sastavu dva člana iz reda pripadnika pravosuđa; Nadzorni odbor vrši redovni nadzor, ali isto tako rešava po žalbama i u tom smislu ima pristup informacijama u koje građanskopravni sudovi ne mogu imati uvid. Saopšteno je da je Nadzorni odbor započeo istragu ovog predmeta na zahtev ministra unutrašnjih poslova i odnosa u Kraljevini.
Podnosioci predstavke su sa svoje strane izjavili žalbu navodeći daje sudija za privremene mere propustio da utvrdi krivicu AIVDzbog zloupotrebe ovlašćenja koja su namenjena isključivo za primenu protiv lica koja su identifikovana kao „mete”, to jest lica koja se smatraju opasnima po nacionalnu bezbednost.
Apelacioni sud je doneo presudu 31. avgusta 2006. godine. Taj sud jestao na stanovište da korišćenje ovlašćenja za nadzor i praćenje lica prema podnosiocima predstavke samo po sebi nije bilo nedopušteno, iako podnosioci predstavke u datom slučaju možda nisu bili mete. Apelacioni sud je prihvatio, s obzirom da je Država odbila dase izjasni o toj činjeničnoj stvari, da su prvi, drugi i treći podnosilac predstavke izneli uverljivu argumentaciju da su protiv njih primenjena ovlašćenja za nadzor i praćenje To je predstavljalo mešanje u njihova prava po osnovu člana 8. (privatni život) i po osnovu člana 10. i bilo je nezakonito u tom smislu što je korišćenje ovlašćenja o kojima je reč nastavljeno i nakon što je identifikovana druga meta, a ne podnosioci predstavke, s tim što se na tu drugu metu nije mogla primeniti potreba za zaštitom izvora. Apelacioni sud je dozvolioDržavi da podnese žalbu u vezi sa ostatkom predmeta; Državi je naloženo da Državnom javnom tužilaštvu ne preda nikakav materijal niti njegove kopije dobijene pomoću specijalnih ovlašćenja sve dotle dok Nadzorni odbor ne bude utvrdio da li je taj materijal pribavljen zakonito.
I podnosioci predstavke i Država su Vrhovnom sudu izjavili žalbe u kojima su osporili primenu materijalnog ili procesnog prava.
Vrhovni sud je doneo presudu 11. jula 2008. U njegovom rezonovanju je, između ostalog, navedeno sledeće:
3.5.3....Apelacioni sud je imao pravo da, ne kršeći član 6. Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine, zastupa stanovište o opasnosti koja ugrožava delotvornost i integritet AIVDusled „curenja” podataka iz same obaveštajne službe kada se radi o važnim državnim interesima, kao što je imao pravo da zaključi da je istraga koju je AIVD vodio protiv novinara bila, barem na početku, pokrivena podstavom a...
dalje
3.7.3....Apelacioni sud nije prenebregao činjenicu da interesi države da se pozove na jedan od izuzetaka utvrđenih u članu 8. stav 2. i članu 10. stav 2, ako se time može opravdati takav izuzetak, moraju pretegnuti (zwaarder zullen moeten wegen) nad interesima očuvanja prava i sloboda zajamčenih tim odredbama... [Zaključak Apelacionog suda] da „s obzirom na važnost zaštite novinarskih izvora za slobodu štampe u demokratskom društvu i na mogući ’efekat zamrzavanja’ (afschrikwekkende werking) koji proističe iz svesti o tome da AIVDkoristi navedena posebna ovlašćenja protiv novinara... takva upotreba je opravdana samo neporecivom potrebom u javnom interesu (onloochenbare behoefte in het algemeen belang)”nedvosmisleno implicira da je Apelacioni sud, primenjujući svoj test, vodio računa o uslovu koji je formulisao Evropski sud za ljudska prava o „pretežnom zahtevu javnog interesa”.
i
3.7.4.2.Deo 2.4.1. [sažetka pravnog osnova na koji se pozivaju podnosioci predstavke]sadrži pritužbu da je Apelacioni sud pogrešno primenio zakon u tom smislu što nije utvrdio, po isključivom osnovu krajnje uzdržanosti u pogledu korišćenja specijalnih ovlašćenja i njihovog trajanja u odnosu na pretežni interes zaštite novinarskih izvora... da mešanje u član 10. Konvencijeod samog početka nije bilo opravdano „pretežnim zahtevom javnog interesa”, umesto što je [to utvrdio] od trenutka kada je AIVDdetektovao jedno ili više drugih lica. Zaštita novinarskih izvora na taj način postaje potpuno iluzorna budući da će AIVD, time što svoju istragu počne od novinara, biti uvek u stanju da uđe u trag (licu koje će ga dovesti bliže) izvoru – tako glasi teza.
Ovaj deo ne možeda se održi zato što se njime, u suštini, nastoji poći od pretpostavke kako je zaštita novinarskih izvora apsolutna. Ona nije apsolutna. Zaštita novinarskih izvora doseže svoju granicu, između ostalog, kada nastupi potreba da se zaštiti nacionalna bezbednost i potreba da se spreči otkrivanje obaveštenja dobijenih u poverenju, kako je to utvrđeno u članu 10. stav 2. Konvencije. Apelacioni sud je, time što je naglasio važnost „krajnje uzdržanosti u pogledu korišćenja specijalnih ovlašćenja” bio u pravu što nije isključio [te mere].
i
3.7.4.3....Apelacioni sud je u dovoljnoj meri precizno odredio interes i opasnost [koja je tu na delu] time što je, kao cilj korišćenja specijalnih ovlašćenja, naveo sledeće: sprečavanje saopštavanja državnih tajni o kojima je reč tako što će se ući u trag curenju podataka i istraga, verovatno opet radi zaštite života drugih, posledica objavljivanja tih državnih tajni.
i
3.7.4.5....Protivargument koji su izneli De Telegraafi druga dvojica podnosilaca predstavke da su bila na raspolaganju i druga sredstva, to jest da je AIVD mogao da zatraži od novinara da navedu ime svog izvora, Apelacioni sud je odbacio pozivajući se, u suštini, na to da novinari u datom slučaju ili ne bi imenovali svoj izvor dovoljno precizno ili bi dali sve od sebe da svoje izvore zadrže u tajnosti. Drugu liniju odbranekoju su predočili De Telegraafi druga dvojica podnosilaca predstavke, po kojoj je AIVDmogao da sačeka ishod krivičnopravne istrage, Apelacioni sud je odbacio time što je istakao da između krivičnopravne istrage i istrage koju sprovodi AIVDuopšte nema nikakve uzajamne veze, čime je Apelacioni sud nameravao da naglasi kako te dve istrage imaju različite ciljeve i služe različitim interesima, pa je stoga ishod krivičnopravne istrage, načelno gledano, potpuno irelevantan za odgovor na pitanje da li primena specijalnih ovlašćenja ispunjava zahtev supsidijarnosti...
i
3.8.5....Apelacioni sud je odbacio osnovni zahtev pod 2 (B) [to jest zahtev da se donese rešenje kojim će se AIVDsprečiti da preda podatke Državnom javnom tužilaštvu za korišćenje u krivičnom postupku protiv drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke] zato što nije mogao da utvrdi koje su informacije pribavljene na zakonit, a koje na nezakonit način – što, jednostavno rečeno,znači da se ne zna koje se informacije na osnovu istraga mogu... smatrati i dalje zakonitim ili koje se ne mogu više smatrati zakonitima u odnosu na novinare –kao i zbog toga što se nije moglo unapred presuditi da su sve prikupljene informacije prikupljene nezakonitim putem, tako da Apelacioni sud nije mogao da utvrdi koje informacije treba odbaciti. Taj osnov za odlučivanje ne dovodi se u pitanje ničim što je navedeno u žalbi, i to je potpuno ispravno zato što je Apelacioni sud uskraćenom postupku za donošenje privremene mere imao dovoljan prostor da to ustanovi i donese odgovarajuću odluku.
Iz toga sledi da Apelacioni sud nije doneo svoju odluku na osnovu mišljenja Nadzornog odbora... Osim toga, Apelacioni sud u svom rezonovanju nije isključio mogućnost da De Telegraafi drugi podnosioci žalbe mogu, nakon što Nadzorni odbor iznese svoje mišljenje... još uvek da tražeod građanskopravnih sudova da donesu rešenje o predmetnoj zabrani ako u to vreme i dalje budu imali interes za to i ako mišljenje Nadzornog odbora (u meri u kojoj ono bude javno ili bude obelodanjeno posle parničnog postupka) bude sadržalo dovoljno činjeničnog osnova za obrazloženu odluku o takvom zahtevu.
Iz tog razloga pitanje da li žalbeni postupak utvrđen na osnovu Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine predstavlja „delotvoran pravni lek” u smislu člana 13. Konvencije uopšte ne treba razmatrati.
Vrhovni sud je odbacio i žalbu podnosilaca predstavke i žalbu Države.
E. Saslušavanje drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke kao svedoka u krivičnom postupku
Drugi i treći podnosilac predstavke su se 15. novembra 2006. pojavili pred istražnim sudijom (rechter-commissaris) Regionalnog suda u Hagu da bi bili saslušani kao svedoci u krivičnom postupku protiv tri lica osumnjičena za učešće u odavanju državnih tajni o kojima je ovde reč.Obojica podnosilaca predstavke odbila su da odgovore na određena pitanja, uključujući, u najmanju ruku, ona pitanja na osnovu kojih bi se mogao otkriti identitet lica od koga su dobili tajne dokumenteAIVD.
Istražni sudija je 27. novembra 2006. ponovo saslušavao drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke i oni su istrajali u svom odbijanju da odgovore na određena pitanja. Pravni zastupnik tri podnosioca predstavke,koji je u tom trenutku bio tu, zatražio je od istražnog sudije da naloži da se pritvore dvojica podnosilaca predstavke zbog toga što se nisu povinovali sudskoj naredbi (gijzeling). Istražni sudija je tako naložio.
Regionalni sud u Hagu, zasedajući 30. novembra 2006. godine iza zatvorenih vrata naložio je da podnosioci predstavke budu pušteni na slobodu. Regionalni sud je potvrdio važnost zaštite novinarskih izvora, kako je to utvrđeno u sudskoj praksi Vrhovnog suda (vidi dole) i zaključio je da s tim u vezi ne može iskrsnuti nikakvo pitanje državne bezbednosti budući da je činjenica da su dokumenti postali dostupni van AIVDveć bila opštepoznata medijima.
F. Presuda u krivičnom predmetu protiv H.
G. Postupak pred nadzornim odborom i odluka ministra
1. Zakonitost istrage
Ministar za unutrašnje poslove i odnose u Kraljevini je 21. juna 2006. godine obavestio Donji dom Parlamenta da je od Nadzornog odbora zatražio da po hitnom postupku ispita zakonitost istrage AIVD u vezi sa curenjem podataka. Zadatak istrage Nadzornog odbora bio je da se obuhvati kompletna istraga AIVDu vezi sa curenjem informacija koje su predstavljale državnu tajnu, uključujući navodno korišćenje specijalnih ovlašćenja u odnosu na drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke.
Nadzorni odbor je 15. novembra 2006. podneo ministru izveštaj u kome je izneo svoje zaključke i savete po tom osnovu. Izveštaj je označen kao državna tajna (Stg. Geheim, što je drugi stepen tajnosti materijala koji sadrže poverljive podatke). Država je odatle citirala sledeće:
[Član 9. stav 1. Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002 godine] utvrđuje da državni službenici koji rade u AIVDnemaju ovlašćenje da sprovode krivičnu istragu. AIVD prema tome nije vlastan da primenjuje nikakva specijalna ovlašćenja u cilju vođenja krivične istrage. Obaveštajna služba može da koristi ta ovlašćenja samo u kontekstu sopstvenih zadataka. Oblasti na koje obraćaju naročitu pažnju policije i [Državnog javnog tužilaštva],s jedne strane, i AIVD,s druge strane, ponekad se podudaraju. Istražni organi i AIVD, međutim, imaju različite pristupe istragama i postupaju iz različitih perspektiva. Cilj krivične istragejeste da se pribave dokazi za krivični postupak. Istraga koju vodi AIVD je, s druge strane, usmerena ka tome da se blagovremeno informišu organi koji su nadležni da postupaju u vezi s bilo kakvom pretnjom po demokratski pravni sistem ili pretnjom po bezbednost ili neki drugi vitalni interes države kako bi sprečili nanošenje štete tim interesima. Kada procure državne tajne, što je priča koju je objavio De Telegraaf, zadatak je istražnih službi da prikupe informacije otom pitanju – ko je ukrao državne tajne u BVD i koje neovlašćeno treće lice čuva ili je čuvalo u svom posedu taj materijal koji je procurio.Istraga koju sprovodi AIVDima drugačiji fokus zbog činjenice da AIVD istražuje u kojoj je meri bila, a možda i ostala, naneta šteta integritetu i delotvornom funkcionisanju AIVD. U situaciji u kojoj se radi o curenju informacija u ovolikim razmerama, neophodno je, osim toga, ustanoviti da li su možda procurili još neki dokumenti i gde se oni nalaze kako bi se identifikovala šteta po aktuelne operativne istrage, kao i opasnost po ljudske izvore i zaposlene u AIVD. Iako cilj istrageAIVD nije prikupljanje dokaza za krivični postupak, AIVD može, dok obavlja svoj zadatak, naići na informacije koje bi mogle biti važne i za krivičnu istragu i zakrivično gonjenje učinilaca krivičnih dela. U tom slučaju AIVD može [na osnovu člana 38. Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine] staviti te informacije na raspolaganje [Državnom javnom tužilaštvu] preko zvanične poruke upućene nacionalnom javnom tužiocu za antiterorističke aktivnosti. Tokom istrage o kojoj je reč nekoliko zvaničnih poruka poslato je [Državnom javnom tužilaštvu].
Država je na sledeći način rezimirala zaključke Nadzornog odbora: To što je AIVD koristio specijalna ovlašćenja u istrazi povodom curenja informacija koje su nosile oznaku službene tajne bilo je zakonito (to jest bilo je neophodno i u skladu sa zakonom i u skladu s kriterijumima srazmernosti i supsidijarnosti), osim kada je reč o malobrojnim izuzecima. Prisluškivanje telefona osobe koja nije bila meta istrage nije bilo u skladu sa zahtevom supsidijarnosti, a sačinjeni su i stenogrami različitih presretnutih telefonskih razgovora koji nisu bili u vezi sa slučajem i nisu bili značajni za AIVD u obavljanju dužnosti koje su mu poverene. Nadzorni odbor je takođe pronašao neke stenograme presretnutih telefonskih razgovora u slučajevima za koje ministar još nije bio dao odobrenje za elektronski nadzor. Pored toga, Nadzorni odbor je otkrio da su bila prisluškivana dva telefonska broja koja su pogrešno pripisanajednoj meti AIVD. Nadzorni odbor je zaključio da su uprkos tim propustima podaci koji su predočeni u zvaničnim izveštajima bili zakonito pribavljeni.
Ministar je 6. decembra 2006. dostavio Donjem domu Parlamenta verziju tog izveštaja iz koje su bile izbrisane sve tajne informacije. U pratećem pismu (parlamentarna godina 2006–2007, 29 876, br. 19) navodi se sledeće:
Istraga AIVDbila je prvenstveno sprovedena u nameri da se procene „procureni“ dosijeii ostali „procureni“ dokumenti. U tom okviru smatralo se daje neophodno, između ostalog, da se primene posebna ovlašćenja protiv novinara lista De Telegraafkoji su posedovali „procureni“ dosije. Korišćenje specijalnih ovlašćenja nije bilo usmereno neposredno ka identifikaciji novinarskih izvora, ali jeste predstavljalo indirektno mešanje u pravo novinara na zaštitu izvora. Nadzorni odbor je proveravao zakonitost odluka o kojima je reč u svetlu merodavnih zakonskih i podzakonskih akata i gore pomenutih zahteva za neophodnošću, srazmernošću i supsidijarnošću. Pritom je Nadzorni odbor uzeo u obzir sve relevantne aspekte predmeta, naročito uključujući one aspekte koji su gore pomenuti. Nadzorni odbor je tako zaključio da su odluke o korišćenju specijalnih ovlašćenja u odnosu na novinare bile zakonite.
i
Reagujući naizveštaj Nadzornog odbora ja sam vašem Parlamentarnom domu preneo informacije koje je Nadzorni odbor utvrdio utajnom delu svog izveštaja u skladu sa članom 8. stav 3. Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine. Tu je, između ostalog, navedena činjenica da su telefoni novinara bili zakonito prisluškivani. Ja nisam želeo ranije da navedem tu informaciju uhitnom postupku po zahtevu da se donesu privremene mere i žalbenom postupku koji su vođeni u vezi sa ovom istragom AIVD. Razlozi zbog kojih vam sada navodim ovu informaciju u vezi su s propustima koje je Nadzorni odbor utvrdio usprovođenju tih specijalnih ovlašćenja. S obzirom na interes koji u društvu postoji za pitanje o kojem je reč i kako bih sprečio spekulacije, smatram da je neophodno da javnost bude upoznata s navedenim činjenicama. Dodatne operativne informacije koje se odnose na novinare i operativne informacije koje se odnose na druga lica mogu predočiti samo Odboru za obaveštajne i bezbednosne službe (Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten) Donjeg doma Parlamenta.
2. Savetodavni žalbeni postupak
Dok su još bili u toku prvi i drugi postupak (krivičnopravni i parnični), advokat podnosilaca predstavke De Kemp je 3. jula 2006. pisao ministru unutrašnjih poslova i odnosa u Kraljevini kako bi ga obavestio o pritužbi u vezi sa postupanjem AIVD prema drugom i trećem podnosiocu predstavke. Saglasno članu 83. Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama (vidi dole) ministar je tu pritužbu prosledio Nadzornom odboru.
Ministar je 6. decembra 2006. pisao De Kemp-urezimirajući zaključke i savete Nadzornog odbora i izražavajući svoje stavove o celom pitanju (sam Izveštaj nije stavljen na uvid podnosiocima predstavke). U ministrovom pismu je između ostalog stajalo sledeće:
[Član 6. stav 2. podstav a)u odnosu na podstav c)]
Curenje informacija koje nose oznaku službene tajne iz AIVD nanosi štetu integritetu i funkcionisanju te službe i time može ugroziti nacionalnu bezbednost na čijem se unapređenju AIVD angažuje. Stoga je AIVD, po mišljenju Nadzornog odbora, s pravom pokrenuo operativnu istragu u smislu člana 6. stav 2. podstav a) Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine.
Specijalna ovlašćenja koja su korišćena
Nadzorni odbor smatra da je odluka o korišćenju specijalnih ovlašćenja protiv novinara lista De Telegraafispunila zahteve nužnosti, supsidijarnosti i srazmernosti. Po mišljenju Odbora, odluka o korišćenju specijalnih ovlašćenja ni u drugim aspektima nije mogla da posluži kao osnov za pokretanje pitanjaneprimerenog postupanja prema listu De Telegraafniti za bilo kakve druge pritužbe.
Nadzorni odbor smatra da je pritužba neosnovana u tim dvema glavnim tačkama.
Način na koji su specijalna ovlašćenja korišćena
Nadzorni odbor zaključuje da je postojalo nekoliko manjkavosti (onzorgvuldigheden) u načinu na koji se pribeglo prisluškivanju telefona novinara. Nadzorni odbor stoji na stanovištu da je prilikom izbora načina na koji je to urađeno trebalo razmotriti (podrazumevani) deo pritužbe lista De Telegraafi drugih žalilaca. Na kraju krajeva, pritužba se odnosi na primenu specijalnih ovlašćenja.Ta primena obuhvata, po mišljenju Nadzornog odbora, i pravljenje stenograma i zvučnih zapisa presretnutih razgovora. Nadzorni odbor zaključuje da su stenografisani i snimljeni neki razgovori novinara koji nisu imali nikakve veze sa istragom o curenju podataka iz AIVD i koji nemaju nikakav dalji značaj zaobavljanje zadataka AIVD. Čak je i prilikom početnog razmatranja to trebalo da bude jasno u vezi sa (velikim) delom ovih suviše dalekosežnih stenograma presretnutih razgovora. Nadzorni odbor takođe utvrđuje da te informacije nisu bile uništene nakon što su snimljene i bliže razmotrene.
Nadzorni odbor savetuje [ministra] da pritužbu proglasi osnovanom u odnosu na ovaj [podrazumevani] deo.
Nedozvoljeno uplitanje (vermenging) u istragu koju vodi Državno javno tužilaštvo
Nadzorni odbor smatra da je korišćenje specijalnih ovlašćenja u datom predmetu spadalo u domen zadatka AIVD onako kako je taj zadatakutvrđen u članu 2. stav 2. podstav a) Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednostnim službama iz 2002. godine. Prema tome, specijalna ovlašćenja nisu iskorišćena za potrebe krivičnopravne istrage. S tih razloga, Nadzorni odbor staje na stanovište da nije bilonedozvoljenog prebacivanja dokaza izistrage AIVD i njihovog korišćenja u krivičnoj istrazikoju vodi Državno javno tužilaštvo. Na osnovu toga što su u ovom predmetu podnošeni zvanični izveštaji (ambtsberichten) ne može se zaključiti da je došlo do brkanja zadataka i ovlašćenja između AIVD i Državnog javnog tužilaštva. Na kraju krajeva, ovde se radi oredovnom dostavljanju informacija –koje je AIVD pribavio obavljajući zadatke koji su mu povereni – Državnom javnomtužilaštvu u skladu sa važećim zakonom.
Nadzorni odbor savetuje [ministra] da pritužbu proglasi neosnovanom u ovoj glavnoj tački.
Zvanični izveštaj
Nadzorni odbor smatra da nedostaci koji su utvrđeni u pogledu stenografisanja ili snimanja presretnutih telefonskih razgovora ni na koji način ne utiču na zakonitost pribavljanja informacija – u meri u kojoj se te informacije odnose (takođe) na novinare –koje su učinjene dostupnima licimavan službe (extern zijn verstrekt) kroz zvanične izveštaje.
Moje viđenje predmeta
S obzirom na zaključke Nadzornog odbora i u skladu sa savetima tog odbora proglašavam pritužbu neosnovanom u glavnim tačkama, konkretno, neosnovanom u pogledu zadatka AIVD preduzetog na osnovu člana 6. stav 2. podstav a); neosnovanom u pogledu odluke da se koriste specijalna ovlašćenja protiv novinara lista De Telegraaf; neosnovanom u pogledu navoda o nezakonitom pribavljanju dokaza i njihovomprebacivanjuiz istrage koju je vodio AIVDu istragu Državnog javnog tužilaštva. Podrazumevani deo pritužbe, onaj koji se odnosi nastenografisanje i snimanje presretnutih telefonskih razgovora proglašavam delimično osnovanim.
Snimanje i stenografisanje razgovora započeto je jedan sat pre nego što je trebalo da započne po odobrenju i delimično su razgovori snimani istenografisani u prevelikoj meri. To je nanelo štetu interesima novinara jer je snimljeno isuviše mnogo informacija o njima i te informacije su isuviše dugo čuvane u AIVD. Nisam ustanovio da su postojale bilo kakve okolnosti koje bi me podstakle daodstupimod saveta Nadzornog odbora u vezi s bilo kojim delom pritužbe.
Informacije koje su nezakonito snimljene (ten onrechte vastgelegde gegevens) u međuvremenu su uklonjene i uništene. U skladu sa savetom Nadzornog odbora, ubuduće će se ispoljiti veća uzdržanost kada se budu stenografisali i snimalitelefonski razgovori sa novinarima, ukoliko bude iskrsla takva situacija.
Sada kada sam izneo svoje stanovište o vašoj pritužbi, vi možete, ukoliko želite, da izjavite žalbu Nacionalnom ombudsmanu (Nationale ombudsman)u skladu sa članom 83. Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine.
H. Žalba Nacionalnom ombudsmanu
Podnosioci predstavke i Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisteni Nederlands Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren, preko svog advokata De Kemp-a su 8. februara 2007. godine podneli žalbu Nacionalnom ombudsmanu tražeći da se otvori istraga povodom ponašanja AIVD. Pozvali su se na mišljenja koja je izrazio ministar unutrašnjih poslova i odnosa u Kraljevini u svom pismu koje im je uputio 6. decembra 2006. i koje, prema njihovim navodima, predstavlja priznanje dasu specijalna ovlašćenja zaista bila primenjena protiv drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke.
Nacionalni ombudsman je odgovorio 5. marta 2007. On je ukazao na to da su u toku žalbeni postupci na osnovu pravnog leka kojim se osporava primena procesnog prava započeti po žalbama i podnosilaca predstavke i Države pred Vrhovnim sudom te da on nije ovlašćen da sprovodi istragu ponašanja koje je već predmet postupka u toku u građanskopravnom sudu. Osim toga,kada Vrhovni sud izrekne svoju presudu, Nacionalni ombudsman je dužan da uzme u obzir osnov na kome je ta presuda doneta.
Podnosioci predstavke nisu dalje insistirali na žalbi pred Nacionalnim ombudsmanom.
I. Zvanični izveštaji koje su dostavili podnosioci predstavke
Podnosioci predstavke su dostavili kopije zvaničnih izveštaja (ambtsberichten) koje je načelnik AIVD uputionacionalnom javnom tužiocu za borbu protiv terorizma (Landelijke Officier van Justitie Terrorismebestrijding). Na kopijama koje su dostavljene Sudu nema datuma, a sve informacije na osnovu kojih bi bila mogućna identifikacija – osim informacija koje se odnose na podnosioce predstavke – izbeljene su u tekstu.
U prvom od tih izveštajapo imenu se označava jedan bivši član BVD, službe koja je bila prethodnik AIVD, kao lice koje je imalo u svom posedu dokumente sa oznakom državne tajne nakon što je napustilo službu i pominju se indicije da je to lice dobilo znatnu svotu novca od „kriminalnih krugova”. U drugom dokumentu navode se imena četvoro pripadnika i bivših pripadnika BVD i AIVD koji su mogli imati pristup kopijama ili originalima dokumenata koje je predao prvi podnosilac predstavke. U trećem izveštaju navodi se da su drugi i treći podnosilac predstavke bili u kontaktu s licima koja su povezana sa međunarodnom trgovinomnarkoticima. U četvrtom izveštaju navodi se da su, prema informacijama iz „pouzdanog izvora”, drugi i treći podnosilac predstavke, novinari, pokušali da uspostave kontakt sa H. (prema shvatanju ESLJP, to je lice koje je osumnjičeno za umešanost u iznošenje informacija iz AIVD) u nameri da objave članak o njemu koji bi bio ilustrovan fotografijom.
II. MERODAVNO UNUTRAŠNJE PRAVO
A. Krivični zakonik
Član 98.
1.Ko namerno prenese ili omogući drugome da stekne saznanje (inlichting) o stvarima koje treba da budu čuvane u tajnosti u interesu države ili njenih saveznika, a iz čega se mogu izvesti određeni podaci, ili ko takve informacije (gegevens) prenese licu ili telu koje nije ovlašćeno da te informacije sazna kazniće se ukoliko zna ili je razumno trebalo da zna da je to saznanje, taj materijal ili ta informacija tajna, kazniće se zatvorom od najviše šest godina ilinovčanom kaznom pete kategorije [to jest novčanom kaznom do iznosa od 74.000 evra(EUR)]...
Član 98c
1.Kaznom zatvora od najviše šest godina ili novčanom kaznom pete kategorije kazniće se svako lice...
i.koje namerno dođe u posed ili čuva saznanja, materijal ili informacije iz člana 98. bez propisnog ovlašćenja za to;
ii.ko preduzme bilo kakvu radnju u nameri da stekne saznanje, materijal ili informacije iz člana 98. ako za to nije propisno ovlašćen...
B. Zakonik o krivičnom postupku
Član 94.
1.Svi predmeti koji mogu poslužiti za utvrđivanje istine mogu biti zaplenjeni. ...
2.Pored toga, zaplenjeni mogu biti svi predmeti koji se mogu proglasiti oduzetima ili za koje može biti izdat nalog da budu povučeni iz prometa...
Član 96a
1.Ako se sumnja na izvršeno krivično delo iz člana 67. stav 1. [to jest delo za koje je zaprećena kazna zatvora od najmanje četiri godine – uključujući krivična dela iz članova 98. i 98c Krivičnog zakonika – ili za određeni broj drugih utvrđenih krivičnih dela koja nisu relevantna za ovaj konkretan predmet],svaki državni službenik kome su poverena istražna ovlašćenja (opsporingsambtenaar) svakom licu za koje se osnovano veruje da ima u posedu predmet koji podleže zapleni može naložiti da taj predmet u navedenu svrhu preda.
2.Takav nalog ne izdaje se osumnjičenom licu.
3.Na osnovu toga što imaju povlasticu neobelodanjivanja (bevoegdheid tot verschoning), sledeća lica nisu u obavezi da se povinuju takvom nalogu:
...
b.Lica iz člana 218, u meri u kojoj bi predaja podatakabila inkompatibilna sa njihovom dužnošću da čuvaju tajnu...
Član 218.
Lica koja su, usled položaja koji zauzimaju, profesije kojom se bave ili dužnosti koju obavljaju u obavezi da čuvaju tajnost podataka... odbiti da svedoče ili da odgovaraju na određena pitanja, ali samo u vezi sa saznanjima koja su im poverena u tom svojstvu.
Član 552a
1.Zainteresovane stranke mogu uložiti pismeni prigovor na odluku o zapleni predmeta, način na koji se zaplenjeni predmeti koriste, kao i na propust da se naloži vraćanje zaplenjenog predmeta...
7.Ako sud utvrdi da su pritužba ili zahtev osnovani, on će doneti odgovarajuće rešenje.
C.Zakon o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama
Član 6.
1.Postoji Opšta obaveštajna i bezbednosna služba [tj. AIVD].
2.Zadaci koje [AIVD] obavlja u interesu nacionalne bezbednosti su sledeći:
a. sprovođenje istraga u odnosu na organizacije i lica koji,na osnovu ciljeva koje nastoje da ostvare svojim aktivnostima,pružaju osnov za sumnju (het ernstige vermoeden) da predstavljaju opasnost za kontinuirano postojanje demokratskog pravnog poretka ili bezbednosti ili drugih pretežnih interesa Države;
b....
c.promovisanjem mera (het bevorderen van maatregelen) za zaštitu interesa iz podstava a, uključujući mere kojima je cilj obezbeđivanje informacija koje treba čuvati u tajnostiu interesu nacionalne bezbednosti i onih delova državnih službi i privatnih preduzeća (bedrijfsleven)koje, po oceni ministara nadležnih za to pitanje, imaju presudan značaj za održavanje društvenog života (de instandhouding van het maatschappelijk leven);
d.sprovođenje istraga koje su u u vezi s drugim zemljama, a koje su značajne za teme na koje ukažu predsednik Vlade, ministar za opšte poslove (Minister-President, Minister van Algemene Zaken [predsednik Vlade istovremeno obavlja obe funkcije]), u dogovoru s drugim nadležnim ministrima...
Član 8.
...
3.Podaci koji omogućuju uvid u sledeće moraju, kao minimum, biti izostavljeni iz objavljenog godišnjeg izveštaja [tj. iz izveštaja o aktivnostima AIVD, odnosno MIVD]:
a. sredstva koja su službe primenile u konkretnim slučajevima;
b.tajni izvori koje je služba koristila;
c. postojeći nivo znanja službe (actueel kennisniveau).
4.Nadležni ministar može preneti informacije iz trećeg stava ovog člana jednom ili obama domovima Parlamenta, u poverenju...
Član 9.
1.Zvaničnici [obaveštajnih i bezbednosnih] službi nemaju ovlašćenja za krivičnopravnu istragu (bezitten geen bevoegdheid tot het opsporen van strafbare feiten)...
Član 12.
1.Službe[obaveštajne i bezbednosne] imaju ovlašćenje (bevoegd) da obrađuju podatke uzimajući u obzir ograničenja (eisen) koja su utvrđena ovim zakonom...
2.Podaci se obrađuju isključivo ujasno određenu svrhu i samo u meri u kojoj je to neophodno za propisno sprovođenje ovog zakona...
3.Podaci se obrađuju u skladu sa zakonom,valjano i uz dužnu pažnju.
Član 15.
Načelnici [obaveštajnih i bezbednosnih] službi staraju se o:
a.čuvanju tajnosti podataka koji su označeni kao tajni (daarvoor in aanmerking komende gegevens);
b.čuvanju tajnosti izvora koji su označeni kao tajni, od kojih su podaci pribavljeni;
c.bezbednosti lica u saradnji s kojima se prikupljaju podaci.
Član 16.
Načelnici [obaveštajnih i bezbednosnih] službi takođe se staraju o:
a.sklapanju aranžmana neophodnih za obezbeđivanje tačnosti i potpunosti podataka koji treba da budu obrađeni;
b.sklapanju aranžmana tehničke i organizacione prirode koji su neophodni da bi se osigurala bezbednost obrade podataka u odnosu na gubitak ili štetu i u odnosu na neovlašćenu obradu;
c.imenovanju lica koja su ovlašćena, za razliku od drugih, da obavljaju zadatke koji su im povereni u okviru obrade podataka.
Član 18.
Ovlašćenje (bevoegdheid)na koje se ukazuje u ovom poglavlju [tj. specijalna ovlašćenja izčlanova 20. i 25, dole, između ostalog] može se izvršavati samo u meri u kojoj je to neophodno za valjano obavljanje zadataka iz člana 6, stav 2, podstavovi a. i d...
Član 19.
1.Ostvarivanje ovlašćenja iz ovog poglavlja [tj. specijalnih ovlašćenja iz članova 20. i 25] dopušteno je samo ako, pod uslovom da ovaj stavne utvrđuje drugačije, nadležni ministar ili, u njegovo ime, načelnik službe o kojoj je reč izda odgovarajuću dozvolu.
2.Načelnik službe može pismenom odlukom naznačiti službenike koji su mu potčinjeni i kojima je izdata dozvolaiz prvog stava ovog člana.Kopija odluke dostavlja se nadležnom ministru.
3.Osimako nije drugačijeodređeno ili u skladu sa zakonom, dozvola se izdaje na rok koji ne može biti duži od tri meseca, a taj rok se može, na zahtev, produžiti još jednom,opet za tri meseca.
Član 20.
1.Službe[obaveštajne i bezbednosne] ovlašćene su da:
a. opserviraju i u tomokviru evidentiraju informacije o ponašanju fizičkih lica ili informacije u vezi sa objektima (zaken) pomoću uređaja za osmatranje i snimanje ili bez tih uređaja;
b.prate i u tom okviru evidentiraju informacije o ponašanju fizičkih lica ili informacije u vezi sa objektima (zaken) pomoću uređaja za praćenje, aparata za lociranje i opreme za snimanje...
Član 25.
1.Službe[obaveštajne i bezbednosne] ovlašćene su da koriste tehničke aparate za ciljano prisluškivanje, primanje, snimanje i nadziranje (afluisteren) svakog oblika konverzacije, telefonskih razgovora iliprenosa informacija pomoću automatizovanogsistema (geautomatiseerd werk) bez obzira gde se ona odvija. Ovlašćenje utvrđeno u prvoj rečenici ovog stava obuhvata i ovlašćenje da sedešifruju razgovori, telefonski razgovori ili prenos informacija.
2.Ovlašćenja iz prvog stava ovog člana mogu se primeniti samo ako je za to izdato odobrenje na osnovu odgovarajućeg zahteva koji je nadležni ministar uputio načelniku [obaveštajne i bezbednosne] službe.
...
4.Zahtev za odobrenje iz [drugog stava ovog člana] podnosi načelnik službe i on, kao minimum, sadrži sledeće podatke:
a.vrsta ovlašćenja koju služba namerava da koristi i, u meri u kojoj je to primenljivo, broj o kome je reč [npr. telefonski broj itd.];
b.identitet lica ili organizacije u odnosu na koju treba da budu preduzete mere za koje se traži ovlašćenje;
c.razlog zbog koga se traži ovlašćenje...
Član 31.
1.Korišćenje ovlašćenja iz ovog poglavlja Zakona dopušteno je samoako se informacije koje se na taj način traže ne mogu prikupiti ili ne mogu blagovremeno prikupiti konsultovanjem izvora informacija koji su svima dostupni ili izvora informacijaza koje je služba dobila dozvolu da uzme u obzir informacije koje su u njima sadržane.
2.Ako je doneta odluka o prikupljanju informacija korišćenjem jednog ili više [navedenih] ovlašćenja...primenjuje se ono ovlašćenje za koje se, s obzirom na okolnosti, uključujući ozbiljnost pretnje nekom od interesa koje štite [obaveštajna služba ili služba bezbednosti], kao i u poređenju s drugim raspoloživim ovlašćenjima, smatra da će naneti najmanju štetu licu o kome je reč.
3.Ne mogu se koristiti ovlašćenja čija bi primena nanela nesrazmernu štetu licu o kome je reč u poređenju sa ciljemkome se teži.
4.Upotreba ovlašćenja mora biti srazmerna cilju kome se teži.
Član 32.
Korišćenje ovlašćenja iz ovog poglavlja Zakona prestaje čim se ostvari utvrđeni cilj ili čim može biti dovoljna primena sredstva koje je u manjoj meri intruzivno (minder ingrijpende bevoegdheid).
Član 34.
1.Nadležni ministar u roku od pet godina po završetku korišćenja specijalnih ovlašćenja iz... člana 25, stav 1... a potom svake godine,ispituje da li lice u odnosu na koje je primenjeno jedno od specijalnih ovlašćenja može da dobije izveštaj o tome. Ako je to moguće, izveštaj se podnosi bez odlaganja.
2.Ako nije moguće da lice u odnosu na koje je primenjeno jedno od specijalnih ovlašćenja iz prvog stava [ovog člana] dobije izveštaj o toj primeni, o tome se obaveštava nadzorni odbor...
Član35.
Podaci koje je obradila [obaveštajna služba ili služba bezbednosti] ili koji su [za obaveštajnu službu ili službu bezbednosti] obrađeni dostavljaju se nekom službeniku funkcioneruiz same službe... samo u meri u kojoj je to neophodno za valjano obavljanje zadatka koji je tom zvaničniku poveren.
Član 36.
1.Službe[obaveštajne i bezbednosne] nadležnesuda, u okviru redovnog obavljanja svojih dužnosti, o podacima koje te službe obrađuju ili koji se za njih obrađuju obaveste:
a.nadležne ministre;
b.ostale nadležnedržavne organe;
c.ostala nadležna lica ili organe;
d.označene(daarvoor in aanmerking komende) obaveštajne i bezbednosne službe drugih zemalja i druge u te svrhe označene međunarodne organe bezbednosti, organe za vezu i obaveštajne organe.
...
3.Ne dovodeći u pitanje dostavljanje informacija naznačenih u prvom stavu ovog člana, informacije o podacima koje obrađuju [obaveštajne i bezbednosne] službe u drugim slučajevima mogu biti date samo pod uslovima utvrđenim u ovom Zakonu.
Član 38.
1.Ako se ispostavi tokom obrade podataka koju sprovode [obaveštajne službe i službe bezbednosti] ili koji se obrađuju [za obaveštajne službe i službe bezbednosti] da ti podaci mogu biti važni i za otkrivanje ili gonjenje krivičnih dela, nadležni ministar ili načelnik službe o kojoj je reč u njegovo ime... mogu o tome u pismenoj formi obavestiti imenovanog pripadnika Državnog javnog tužilaštva...
Član 43.
1.Podaci koji su, imajući u vidu svrhu u koju se obrađuju, izgubili značaj brišu se.
2.Ako se ispostavi da su podaci netačni ili da su pogrešno obrađeni, oni se ispravljaju ili se, zavisno od situacije, brišu. Nadležni ministar dužan je da o tome bez odlaganja obavesti one kojima je prosledio predmetne podatke.
3.Podaci se brišu i uništavaju, osim ukoliko to nije onemogućeno opštim pravilima o čuvanju podataka...
Član 64.
1.Osniva se Nadzorni odbor za obaveštajne službe i službe bezbednosti.
2.Nadzorni odbor je zadužen za:
a. nadzor nad zakonitošću izvršenja odredaba ovog zakona...
c. savetovanje ministara u vezi sa istragom i postupanjem po žalbama;
...
Član 65.
1.Nadzorni odbor ima tri člana, od kojih je jedan predsednik.
2.Članovi se imenuju Kraljevskim ukazom (KoninklijkBesluit) s mandatom od šest godina, pre čega ih kolektivno kandiduju nadležni ministri; članovima Odbora mandat se može samo jednom produžiti. U postupku imenovanja članovi Donjeg doma Parlamenta kandiduju po tri lica za svaku upražnjenu funkciju, a jedno od tih lica biraju nadležni ministri. Kada bira kandidate, Donji dom Parlamenta uzima u obzir, ako smatra za potrebno, spisakpreporučenih lica od po najmanje tri lica za svaku upražnjenu funkciju koji su pripremili potpredsednik Državnog saveta (Raad van State), predsednik Vrhovnog suda i Nacionalni ombudsman.
3.Nadležni ministri mogu zatražiti od Donjeg doma da kandiduje nove kandidate...
Član 66.
Članovi Nadzornog odbora razrešavaju se Kraljevskim ukazom naosnovu kolektivne odluke nadležnih ministara:
...
g.ako prema stanovištu (oordeel) nadležnih ministara,nakon što su oni uzeli u obzir mišljenje Donjeg doma, lice o kome je reč svojim činjenjem ili nečinjenjem nanese ozbiljnu štetu poverenju koje mu je iskazano.
Član 72.
Sastanci Nadzornog odbora nisu otvoreni za javnost.
Član 78.
1.U sklopu svog nadzornog zadatka, utvrđenog u članu 64. stav 2. podstav a,Nadzorni odbor je ovlašćen da istražuje način na koji su sprovedena ovlašćenja utvrđena... ovim zakonom.
2.Nadležni odbor takođe može povesti istragu iz prvog stava na zahtev koji mu u tom smislu uputi jedan od dvaju domova Parlamenta.
3.Nadležni ministar i jedan ili oba doma Parlamenta obaveštavaju se o nameri da se pokrene istraga, ako treba uz čuvanje poverljivosti tog podatka.
Član 79.
1.Nadzorni odbor izrađuje izveštaj o nadzoru po završetku svoje istrage. Izveštaj o nadzoru je javni, osim kada je reč o informacijama na koje je ukazano u članu 8, stav 3. ovog zakona.
2.Pre no što završi izveštaj o nadzoru, Nadzorni odbor pruža nadležnom ministru mogućnost da reaguje na zaključke sadržane u nadzornom izveštaju u razumnom roku koji određuje sam Nadzorni odbor.
3.Pošto primi primedbe nadležnog ministra, Nadzorni odborzavršava izveštaj o nadzoru. Nadzorni odbor može, na osnovu svojih zaključaka, izneti preporuke nadležnom ministru u vezi s bilo kojom merom koja bi trebalo da bude preduzeta.
4.Kada završi izveštaj o nadzoru, Nadzorni odbor prosleđuje nadležnom ministru taj izveštaj.
5.Nadležni ministar dostavlja izveštaj o nadzoru i svoja reagovanja na taj izveštaj i jednom i drugom domu Parlamenta u roku od šest nedelja. U svakom slučaju se iz izveštaja izostavljajupodaci na koje je ukazano u članu 8. stav 3. ovog zakona. Te informacije mogu biti dostavljenejednom ili obama domovima Parlamenta kao poverljive informacije.
Član 81.
1.Podaci koje su nadležni ministri, načelnici [obaveštajnih i bezbednosnih] službi...kao i drugi zvaničnici uključeni u sprovođenje ovog zakona... dostavili Nadzornom odboru da bi mogao da obavi svoje zadatke i koje Odbor čuva ne mogu biti obelodanjeni...
Član 82.
Članovi 15. i 16. primenjuju se po analogiji i na Nadzorni odbor.
Član 83.
1.Svako može da podnese predstavku Nacionalnom ombudsmanu kako bi se pritužio na akcije ili pretpostavljene akcije nadležnih ministara, načelnika službi... i lica koja rade za službe u sprovođenju ovog zakona... prema (jegens) fizičkih ili pravnih lica.
2.Pre nego što podnese predstavku Nacionalnom ombudsmanu, podnosilac treba da obavesti nadležnog ministra o svojoj pritužbi i da mu pruži mogućnost da izrazi svoje stanovište o tom pitanju.
3.Ministar je dužan da, pre no što iznese svoje stanovište iz stava 2. ovog člana, dobije savet Nadzornog odbora... [Ministar] ne može da izdaje uputstva Nadzornom odboru.
4.U žalbenom postupku u kome su nadležni ministar, lica koja rade pod njegovim rukovodstvom ili Nadzorni odbor dužni da shodno članu 9:31 Zakona o opštem upravnom postupku (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) daju informacije ili predaju dokumenta Nacionalnom ombudsmanu, ne primenjuju se stavovi 5. i 6. tog člana [kojima se Nacionalni ombudsman ovlašćuje da odluči da li je opravdano odbiti da se predaju takve informacije ili dokumenti ili omogućiti uvid u njih, vidi dole] ne primenjuju se.
5.Ako su nadležni ministar, lica koja rade pod njegovim rukovodstvom ili Nadzorni odbor u obavezi da predaju dokumente, dovoljno jeda omoguće uvid u dokumente o kojima je reč. Ni u kom slučaju nije dozvoljeno da se kopiraju ti dokumenti.
Član 84.
1.Nacionalni ombudsman je dužan da pismenim putem obavesti podnosioca pritužbe o svom mišljenju o pritužbi i da navede razloge za svoje mišljenje u meri u kojoj bezbednost i drugi pretežni interesi države to dopuštaju.
2.Nacionalni ombudsman obaveštava pismenim putem nadležnog ministra o svom mišljenju o pritužbi. Nacionalni ombudsman može, u pismu ministru, izneti obrazložene preporuke ukoliko smatra da je to potrebno. Nacionalni ombudsman može dostaviti te preporuke i podnosiocu pritužbe ako sadržaj preporuka to opravdava.
3.Nadležni ministar dužan je da obavesti Nacionalnog ombudsmana u roku od šest nedelja u pismenoj formi oposledicama koje, po njegovom mišljenju, mogu izazvati mišljenje i preporuke Nacionalnog ombudsmana.
4.Nadležni ministar dužan je da mišljenje i savet Nacionalnog ombudsmana, kao i svoju ocenu o očekivanim posledicama tog mišljenja i saveta dostavi jednom ili obama domovima Parlamenta. Podaci na koje je ukazano u članu 8. stav 3. u svakom slučaju se izostavljaju. Ti podaci mogu biti dostavljeni jednom ili obama domovima Parlamenta kao poverljive informacije.
D. Zakon o opštem upravnom postupku
Član 9:17
Izraz „Ombudsman” označava:
a. Nacionalnog ombudsmana...
Član 9:18
1.Svako ima pravo da podnese pismeni zahtev Ombudsmanu da istraži načinna koji se neki upravni organ (bestuursorgaan) ponašao u konkretnom pitanju u odnosu na samo to lice ili u odnosu na nekog drugog.
...
3.Ombudsman je dužan da postupi po zahtevu iz stava 1. ovog člana, osim ukoliko se ne primenjuje član...9:22.
Član 9:20
1.Pre no što podnese zahtev Ombudsmanu, podnosilac zahteva (verzoeker) dužan je da podnese pritužbu nadležnom upravnom organu, osim ukoliko se to od njega ne može razumno očekivati...
Član 9:22
Ombudsman nije nadležan (bevoegd) da istražuje ili da nastavi istragu ako se zahtev odnosi na:
a. neko pitanje koje spada u opštu politiku Vlade, uključujući opštu politiku koja se odnosi na očuvanje pravnog poretka (rechtsorde) ili opštu politiku upravnog organa o kome je reč;
...
d.postupanje u odnosu na koje je neki upravni sud već doneo odluku (uitspraak);
e. postupanje koje je predmet postupka koji se vodi pred nekim drugim pravosudnim organom ili povodom koga je izjavljena žalba na odluku donetu u takvom postupku, zavisno od okolnosti;
f.postupanje koje je predmet pravosudnog nadzora.
Član 9:27
1.Ombudsman je dužan da razmotri da li je upravni organ postupao ispravno (behoorlijk) u pitanju koje je predmet istrage.
2.Ako je neki pravosudni organ doneo odluku u vezi s postupanjem na koje se odnosi istraga ombudsmana, ombudsman mora uzeti u obzir pravni osnov na kome je ta odluka u celosti ili delimično utemeljena.
3.Ombudsman može dati preporuke upravnom organu na osnovu (naar aanleiding van) svoje istrage.
Član 9:31
1.Upravni organ, lica koja rade pod njegovim rukovodstvom – čak i nakon što im prestanu aktivnosti – svedoci i podnosilac pritužbe dužni su da daju ombudsmanu sve neophodne informacije i da se pojave pred njim na njegov poziv. Istu obavezu ima svaki kolegijalni organ (college), s tim što se podrazumeva da kolegijalni organ određuje ko od njegovih pripadnika treba da izvrši tu obavezu, osim kada sam Ombudsman ukaže na jedno ili više određenih lica zaposlenih u tom organu. Ombudsman može naložiti da se lica o kojima je reč na poziv lično pojave pred njim.
2.Ombudsman može dobiti od lica i kolegijalnih organa o kojima je reč samo informacije koje se odnose na sektorsku politiku sprovođenu pod nadležnošću ministra ili drugog nadležnog organa na intervenciju tog ministra ili tog upravnog organa. Organ na čiju intervenciju se informacije dobijaju mogu na saslušanju predstavljatinjegovi službenici.
3.U roku koji odredi Ombudsman, dokumenti koje u svom posedu ima upravni organ, lice na čije se postupanje istraga odnosi i drugi moraju biti predati [Ombudsmanu] za potrebe istrage, nakon što sam Ombudsman to pismenim putem zahteva.
4.Lica pozvana kod Ombudsmana prema odredbama iz prvog stava ovog članaili lica koja su u obavezi da predaju dokumente saglasno trećem stavu ovog člana mogu, ako za to postoje uverljivi razlozi, da odbiju da daju informacije ili da predaju dokumente, zavisno od slučaja, ili da obaveste Ombudsmana da isključivo on sam može dobiti dozvolu da ima uvid u te informacije ili dokumente.
5.Ombudsman odlučujeda li je odbijanje ili ograničenje iz četvrtog stava ovog člana opravdano.
6.Ako Ombudsman odluči da je to odbijanje opravdano, obaveza se ukida.
E. Zakon o Nacionalnom ombudsmanu
Zakon o Nacionalnom ombudsmanu (Wet Nationale ombudsman) primenjuje se na postupanje upravnih organa, uključujući ministre u Vladi [član 1a(1)(a)].Postupanje svakog državnog službenika u obavljanju funkcija koje su mu poverene pripisuje senadležnom upravnom organu u kojem on ostvaruje te funkcije[član 1a(4)].
Nacionalnog ombudsmana imenuje Donji dom Parlamenta, koji se prema svom izboru opredeljuje između tri kandidata koje zajednički predlažu predsednik Vrhovnog suda, potpredsednik Državnog saveta i predsednik Revizorskog suda (Algemene Rekenkamer). Ombudsman se imenuje s mandatom od šest godina i postoji mogućnost ponovnog imenovanja [član 2 (2)-(4)].
Donji dom Parlamenta ovlašćen je da razreši nacionalnog ombudsmana po određenim konkretnim osnovima. Ti osnovi obuhvataju nesposobnost koja nastupi kao rezultat invalidnosti ili oboljenja; stupanje na neki zvanični položaj ili posao koji je inkompatibilan s položajem nacionalnog ombudsmana; gubitak holandskog državljanstva; osuđujuću presudu izrečenu za krivično delo koje podleže suđenju (misdrijf) ili izricanje bilo kakve mere koja podrazumeva lišenje slobode, pravnosnažnom i obavezujućom presudom; bankrotstvo, stečaj (curatele), postupak zaprilagođavanje duga (schuldsanering) i lišenje slobode (gijzeling) u vezi s dugovanjem na osnovu konačne i obavezujuće presude [član 3(2)]. Ako se postupak koji je po prirodi takav vodi protiv nacionalnog ombudsmana, ali još nije zaključen, Donji dom Parlamenta ima pravo da ga suspenduje i da donese rešenje po kome mu se za to vreme ne može isplaćivati plata (član 4).
F.Zakon o državnom budžetu 2001.
Član 6. Zakona o državnom budžetu iz 2001. godine(Comptabiliteitswet 2001) utvrđuje da budžet može sadržati i nepolitičke stavke (niet-beleidsartikelen),uključujući stavke koje se opisuju kao „tajne” i koje su predviđene za finansijske obaveze, troškove i prihode koji u interesu Države ne treba da budu obelodanjeni, tako što će im se pripisati neka stavka iz sektorske politike. Član 87. stav 3. utvrđuje da nadzorne zadatke Revizorskog suda u pogledu tih tajnih stavki, uključujući razmatranje informacija koje Vladina tela imaju u svom posedu (član 87. stav 1) i dobijanje informacija od ministara u Vladi – koje su ti ministri u obavezi da predaju – obavlja predsednik Revizorskog suda lično.
G.Relevantna domaća sudska praksa
Do 11. novembra 1977. Vrhovni sud Holandije nije priznavao nikakvu novinarsku privilegiju neotkrivanja, tj. zaštite izvora informacija. Tog dana je, međutim, Vrhovni sud izrekao presudu u kojoj je utvrdio da je novinar, kada je od njega u svojstvu svedoka zatraženo da otkrije svoj izvor informacija, bio u obavezi da to učini, osim ukoliko se može smatrati opravdanim u konkretnim okolnostima datog predmeta da interesneobelodanjivanja izvora preteže nad interesom kome bi takvo obelodanjivanje služilo.
To načelo je Vrhovni sud izmenio svojom precedentnom presudom od 10. maja 1996. godine donetom na osnovu načela utvrđenih u presudi Evropskog suda za ljudska prava od 27. marta 1996. u predmetu Goodwin protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II). U navedenoj presudi Vrhovni sud je prihvatio da novinar, saglasno članu 10. Konvencije ima pravo, u načelu, da ne saopšti izvor informacija osim ukoliko jesud, na osnovu svih argumenata koje predoči stranka koja traži obelodanjivanje izvora, uveren da je to obelodanjivanje neophodno u demokratskom društvu iz jednog ili više legitimnih razloga utvrđenih u članu 10. stav 2. Konvencije (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie – Holandska sudska praksa – 1996, br. 578).
U presudi od 2. septembra 2005. godine u vezi s pretresom prostorija izdavačke kuće izvršenim 3. maja 1996. (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2006, br. 291), Vrhovni sud je, između ostalog, stao na sledeće stanovište:
Pravo na slobodu izražavanja, onako kako je utvrđeno u članu 10. Konvencije, obuhvata i pravo da se slobodno prikupljaju vesti (vidi, između ostalih pravnih autoriteta, Presudu u predmetuGoodwin protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, od 27. marta 1996, NJ 1996, br. 577; takođe vidi Roemen i Schmit protiv Luksemburga,Presudu od 25. februara 2003. [ECHR 2003-IV]). Mešanje u pravo na slobodno prikupljanje vesti – uključujući interes zaštite novinarskih izvora – može biti opravdano po članu 10. stav 2. ukoliko su ispunjeni uslovi koji su utvrđeni u toj odredbi. To znači da pre svega mešanje o kome je reč mora imati osnovu u unutrašnjem pravu ida te odredbe unutrašnjeg prava moraju imati određenu preciznost. Drugo, mešanje mora služiti jednom od ciljeva pobrojanih u članu 10. stav 2. Treće, mešanje mora biti neophodno u demokratskom društvu da bi se takav cilj mogao ostvariti. Tu značajnu ulogu imaju načela supsidijarnosti i srazmernosti. U tom okviru mora se odmeriti da li je mešanje neophodno kako bi se ostvario interes o kome je u datom predmetu reč i, samim tim,da li zaista ne postoje nikakvi drugi, u manjoj meri dalekosežni putevi (minder bezwarende wegen) koji bi se mogli slediti, a da sepritom u dovoljnoj meri služi tom interesu. Kada je reč o krivičnopravnoj istrazi, mora se razmotriti da li je mešanje u pravo na slobodno prikupljanje vesti srazmerno interesu kome se služi u otkrivanju istine. U tom smislu, određenu ulogu mora imati težina dela koja su predmet istrage.
III.RELEVANTNI MEĐUNARODNI MATERIJALI
Postoji nekoliko međunarodnih instrumenata koji se odnose na zaštitu novinarskih izvora; između ostalog, to su Rezolucija o novinarskim slobodama i ljudskim pravima, koja je usvojena na Četvrtoj evropskoj ministarskoj konferenciji o politici prema masovnim medijima (Prag, 7–8. decembar 1994) i Rezolucija Evropskog parlamenta o poverljivosti novinarskih izvora (18. januar 1994, Official Journal of the European Communities/Službeni list Evropskih zajednica,br. C 44/34).
Osim toga, Komitet ministara Saveta Evrope je 8. marta 2000. doneo Preporuku br. R(2000) 7 o pravu novinara da ne otkriju svoje izvore informacija. U toj rezoluciji se, u relevantnom delu, utvrđuje sledeće:
„[Komitet ministara] Preporučuje vladama država članica da:
1. sprovode u okviru svog domaćeg prava i prakse načela priložena uz ovu preporuku,
2. šire ovu preporuku i priložena načela, zajedno sa prevodom, tamo gde je to potrebno, i
3. posebno skrenu na njih pažnju organima vlasti, policiji i sudstvu i da ih učine dostupnim novinarima, medijima i njihovim profesionalnim organizacijama.
Aneks Preporuke br. R (2000) 7
Načela vezana za pravo novinara da ne otkriju svoje izvore informacija
Definicije
Za potrebe ove Preporuke:
a) izraz „novinar” označava svako fizičko ili pravno lice koje se redovno ili profesionalno bavi prikupljanjem i širenjem informacija za javnost putem bilo kog sredstva masovnih komunikacija;
b) izraz „informacija” označava svako iznošenje činjenice, mišljenja ili ideje u vidu teksta, zvuka i/ili slike;
c) izraz „izvor” označava svako lice koje pruža informacije novinaru;
d) izraz „informacija koja identifikuje izvor” označava, u meri u kojoj to može dovesti do identifikacije izvora:
i. ime i podatke o ličnosti, kao i glas i lik izvora;
ii. konkretne činjenične okolnosti pod kojima je novinar došao do informacije od izvora;
iii. ne objavljeni sadržaj informacije koju je novinar dobio od izvora; i
iv. podatke o ličnosti koji se odnose na novinare i njihove poslodavce i vezani su za njihov profesionalni rad.
Načelo br. 1 (Pravo novinara na neotkrivanje informacija)
Unutrašnje pravo i praksa država članica treba da obezbede izričitu i jasnu zaštitu prava novinara da ne otkriju informacije koje bi mogle da ukažu na identitet izvora u skladu sa članom 10. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: Konvencija) i u skladu sa ovde utvrđenim načelima, koja se moraju smatrati minimalnim standardima za poštovanje tog prava.
Načelo br. 2 (Pravo drugih lica na neotkrivanje informacija)
Druga lica koja, preko svojih profesionalnih veza sa novinarima, steknu znanje o informacijama koje bi mogle da ukažu na identitet izvora putem prikupljanja, uredničke obrade ili objavljivanja informacija, takođe treba da uživaju istovetnu zaštitu na osnovu ovde utvrđenih načela.
Načelo br. 3 (Ograničenja prava na neotkrivanje informacija)
a) Pravo novinara da ne otkrije informacije koje identifikuju izvor ne sme da bude predmet drugih ograničenja osim onih ustanovljenih u članu 10. stav 2. Konvencije. Kada utvrđuju da li legitimni interes za otkrivanje informacija, koji spada u polje dejstva člana 10. stav 2. Konvencije, preteže nad javnim interesom da se informacija o identitetu izvora ne otkrije, nadležni organi država članica obraćaju posebnu pažnju na važnost prava na neotkrivanje informacija i prednost koja mu se daje u sudskoj praksi Evropskog suda za ljudska prava i mogu da narede otkrivanje informacija samo ako, saglasno stavu b) postoji viši imperativ u javnom interesu i ako postoje okolnosti koje su dovoljno značajne i ozbiljne po svojoj prirodi.
b) Otkrivanje informacija koje identifikuju izvor ne treba smatrati neophodnim osim ako se može ubedljivo utvrditi da:
i. ne postoje razumne mere koje predstavljaju alternativu otkrivanju informacija ili su ih već iscrpla lica ili organi vlasti koji traže njihovo otkrivanje, i
ii. legitimni interes za otkrivanje informacija očigledno odnosi prevagu nad javnim interesom za neotkrivanje informacija, s obzirom na to:
- da je dokazano postojanje višeg imperativa kada je reč o neophodnosti otkrivanja informacija,
- da su okolnosti dovoljno značajne i ozbiljne po svojoj prirodi,
- da se neophodnost otkrivanja informacija smatra odgovorom na akutnu društvenu potrebu, i
- da države članice uživaju određeno unutrašnje polje slobodne procene kada je reč o toj potrebi, ali to unutrašnje polje slobodne procene podleže nadzoru Evropskog suda za ljudska prava.
c) Gore navedeni zahtevi moraju se primenjivati u svim fazama svakog postupka u kome postoji mogućnost pozivanja na pravo na neotkrivanje informacija.
Načelo br. 4 (Dokazi koji su alternativa novinarskim izvorima)
U sudskom postupku koji se vodi protiv novinara zbog navodne povrede časti ili ugleda neke ličnosti, nadležni organi treba da razmotre, radi utvrđivanja istinitosti ili neistinitosti tih tvrdnji, sve dokaze koji im stoje na raspolaganju na osnovu unutrašnjeg procesnog prava i u tom cilju ne mogu zahtevati od novinara da obelodane informacije koje mogu ukazati na identitet izvora.
Načelo br. 5 (Uslovi vezani za otkrivanje informacija)
a) Predlog ili zahtev za pokretanje bilo kakve akcije nadležnih organa radi otkrivanja informacija koje identifikuju izvor mogu da podnesu samo ona lica ili javne vlasti u čijem je neposrednom legitimnom interesu otkrivanje tih informacija.
b) Nadležni organi treba da obaveste novinare o njihovom pravu da ne otkriju informacije koje identifikuju izvor, kao i o ograničenjima tog prava, pre nego što se zatraži otkrivanje tih informacija.
c) O izricanju sankcija novinarima zbog neotkrivanja informacija koje mogu da ukažu na identitet izvora mogu da odluče samo pravosudni organi u sudskom postupku koji predviđa saslušanje dotičnih novinara u skladu sa članom 6. Konvencije.
d) Novinari treba da imaju pravo da neki drugi pravosudni organ preispita odluku kojom im je izrečena sankcija zbog neotkrivanja informacija koje identifikuju izvor.
e) Kada se novinari odazovu zahtevu ili nalogu da otkriju informacije koje identifikuju izvor, nadležni organi treba da razmotre mogućnost primene mera kojima bi se ograničio obim otkrivanja traženih informacija, na primer, na taj način što će isključiti javnost i tako joj onemogućiti da prisustvuje otkrivanju, u skladu sa članom 6. Konvencije, tamo gde je to moguće, kao i na taj način što će sami poštovati poverljivost takvog otkrivanja informacija.
Načelo br. 6 (Presretanje komunikacija, prismotra i sudski pretres i zaplena)
a) Sledeće mere ne mogu e primenjivati ako je njihova svrha da se izbegne poštovanje prava novinara, u skladu s navedenim načelima, da ne otkriju informacije koje identifikuju njihove izvore:
i) nalozi ili akcije koji se odnose na presretanje komunikacija ili prepiske novinara i njihovih poslodavaca;
ii) nalozi ili akcije koji se odnose na prismotru nad novinarima, njihovim kontaktima ili kontaktima njihovih poslodavaca; ili
iii) nalozi za pretres ili zaplenu ili akcije pretresa ili zaplene koje se odnose na privatne ili službene prostorije, lične stvari ili prepisku novinara ili njihovih poslodavaca ili na podatke o ličnosti koji su vezani za njihov profesionalni rad.
b) Kada policija ili pravosudni organi na regularan način dođu do informacija koje identifikuju izvor informacija putem bilo koje od gore navedenih akcija, čak i ako to možda nije bio cilj tih akcija, treba preduzeti mere da se spreči kasnije korišćenje tih informacija kao dokaza na sudu, osim ako je otkrivanje tih informacija opravdano na osnovu Načela br. 3.
Načelo br. 7 (Zaštita od samooptuživanja)
Načela koja su ovde utvrđena ne smeju ni na koji način da ograniče nacionalne zakone kojima se uređuje pitanje zaštite od samooptuživanja u krivičnom postupku i, ukoliko se ti zakoni primenjuju, novinari treba da uživaju zaštitu kada je reč o otkrivanju informacija na osnovu kojih je mogućno identifikovati izvor.”
„c) Izvor
17. Svako lice koje novinaru daje informacije smatra se njegovim ili njenim ’izvorom’. Zaštita odnosa između novinara i izvora jeste cilj ove preporuke zbog ’potencijalnog efekta zamrzavanja’, odnosno obeshrabrujućeg dejstva koje bi nalog da se otkrije izvor imao na ostvarivanje slobode štampe (vidi Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Goodwin protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 27. mart 1996, stav 39). Novinari mogu da dobijaju informacije iz svih vrsta izvora. Stoga je neophodno da se taj izraz široko tumači. U praksi pružanja informacija novinarima može da bude rezultat akcije samog izvora, na primer onda kada izvor pozove novinara ili mu se pismenim putem obrati ili mu pošalje snimljene informacije ili slike. Takođe se može smatrati da je informacija ’data’ onda kada izvor ostaje pasivan i pristaje na to da novinar uzme informacije, recimo putem filmskog ili zvučnog zapisa uz saglasnost izvora.”
PRAVO
I. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANOVA 8. I 10. KONVENCIJE
Član 8.
1. Svako ima pravo na poštovanje svog privatnog i porodičnog života, doma i prepiske.
2. Javne vlasti neće se mešati u vršenje ovog prava sem ako to nije u skladu sa zakonom i neophodno u demokratskom društvu u interesu nacionalne bezbednosti, javne bezbednosti ili ekonomske dobrobiti zemlje, radi sprečavanja nereda ili kriminala, zaštite zdravlja ili morala, ili radi zaštite prava i sloboda drugih.
Član 10.
1. Svako ima pravo na slobodu izražavanja. Ovo pravo uključuje slobodu posedovanja sopstvenog mišljenja, primanja i saopštavanja informacija i ideja bez mešanja javne vlasti i bez obzira na granice. Ovaj član ne sprečava države da zahtevaju dozvole za rad televizijskih, radio i bioskopskih preduzeća.
2. Pošto korišćenje ovih sloboda povlači za sobom dužnosti i odgovornosti, ono se može podvrgnuti formalnostima, uslovima, ograničenjima ili kaznama propisanim zakonom i neophodnim u demokratskom društvu u interesu nacionalne bezbednosti, teritorijalnog integriteta ili javne bezbednosti, radi sprečavanja nereda ili kriminala, zaštite zdravlja ili morala, zaštite ugleda ili prava drugih, sprečavanja otkrivanja obaveštenja dobijenih u poverenju ili radi očuvanja autoriteta i nepristrasnosti sudstva.
A. Korišćenje „specijalnih ovlašćenja” protiv drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke
Podnosioci predstavke su tvrdili da upotreba specijalnih ovlašćenja protiv drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke nije bila „u skladu sa zakonom”, kako to nalaže član 8. stav 2. Konvencije, niti je bila „propisana zakonom”, kako to nalaže član 10. stav 2. Konvencije.
Država je negirala da je bio prekršen i jedan od dvaju navedenih članova.
1. Prihvatljivost
2. Argumentacija pred Sudom
(a) Država
Država je priznala da su drugi i treći podnosilac predstavke bili pod istragom i da su protiv njih primenjena specijalna ovlašćenja, uključujući ovlašćenje u pogledu presretanja i snimanja telefonskih razgovora. To je bez svake sumnje predstavljalo mešanje u njihovo pravo na poštovanje privatnog i porodičnog života, koje je zaštićeno članom 8; to se takođe može tumačiti kao mešanje u njihovu slobodu da primaju i saopštavaju informacije i ideje, koja je zajamčena članom 10. Konvencije.
Zakonski osnov za to mešanje predstavljao je član 6. stav 2. tačka (a) Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine, koji je – uz kompletan istorijat rada na njegovoj izradi – u svakom trenutku bio dostupan javnosti.
Pozivajući se na sudsku praksu ESLJP, naročito na predmet Weber i Saravia protiv Nemačke (dec.), br. 54934/00, ECHR 2006-XI, Država je saopštila da su situacije u kojima se može pristupiti primeni specijalnih ovlašćenja AIVD utvrđene u članu 6. Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine. Osim toga, AIVDje objavio godišnji izveštaj u kome je identifikovao područja na koja je u minuloj godini bio usredsređen, kao i područja na koja će biti usredsređen u predstojećoj godini. Obaveza da AIVDobjavljuje godišnji izveštaj izričito je utvrđena u zakonodavstvu upravo zato da bi se pojačala transparentnost u pogledu načina na koji AIVD koristi svoja ovlašćenja. Priroda „delikta” usled koje može doći do mešanja o kome je ovde reč bila je, prema tome, u najvećoj mogućoj meri predvidljiva. Država je zatražila od ESLJP da vodi računa o tome da izraz „delikt”, u kontekstu predmeta kao što je ovaj, ima konotaciju koja se razlikuje od osnovnog značenja tog izraza izvedenog iz krivičnog prava.
I pored toga, neminovno je da iskrsavaju situacije koje se nisu mogle predvideti, ali u kojima je očigledno neophodno da AIVD preduzme određene mere u cilju rešavanja zadatka koji mu je poveren i očuvanja interesa kojima služi. Ovaj predmet je upravo jedan takav slučaj.
Svi zaštitni mehanizmi su postojali i primenjeni su. Kako je ustanovio Nadzorni odbor, primena specijalnih ovlašćenja nije trajala ništa duže nego što je to bilo dopušteno u svetlu primenljivih odredaba. Obrada – ispitivanje, korišćenje i skladištenje – podataka odvijalo se u skladu sa zakonskim uslovima utvrđenim u članu 12. Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine. Pristupilo se otklanjanju nedostataka koje je identifikovao Nadzorni odbor, a podaci koji su pogrešno snimljeni bili su uklonjeni i uništeni (vidi stav 43, gore).
Član 38. Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine uređuje prenos informacija Državnom javnom tužilaštvu.Kako je to odraženo u pismu koje je ministar uputio 6. decembra 2006. advokatu podnosilaca predstavke (vidi stav 43, gore) svi ti zakonski uslovi su ispunjeni.
Postojao je i korišćen je sistem za nadzor i kontrolu, koji čine sledeći organi:
a) Gornji i Donji dom Parlamenta, kao i, u meri u kojoj se radilo o tajnim operacijama obaveštajnih i bezbednosnih službi, Odbor za obaveštajne i bezbednosne službe Donjeg doma;
b) Revizorski sud i – u delu koji se odnosio na tajne budžetske stavke za obaveštajne i bezbednosne službe – predsednik revizorskog suda lično;
c) Nacionalni ombudsman;
d) upravni sudovi koji su angažovani za odluke koje podležu sudskom preispitivanju, kao što su zahtevi za pristup podacima;
e) građanskopravni sudovi u situacijama u kojima su obaveštajne i bezbednosne službe počinile nezakonit akt u odnosu na neko lice ili neku organizaciju;
f) krivični sudovi kada je neki zvaničnik pozvan na odgovornost kao optuženi ili kada mu je upućen sudski poziv kao svedoku;
g) Nadzorni odbor.
Svi ti različiti organi za nadzor i kontrolu ne isključuju jedan drugog. Međutim, nadzor i kontrola koju svaki od tih organa sprovodi podleže određenim ograničenjima zavisno od vrste ovlašćenja i faze u kojoj se nalazi istraga. Ta ograničenja proističu iz suštinski tajne prirode aktivnosti obaveštajnih i bezbednosnih službi.
Da bi se koristila specijalna ovlašćenja, potrebno je prethodno odobrenje ministra unutrašnjih poslova i odnosa u Kraljevini. U zahtevu za ovlašćenje mora biti naveden poseban status, ako takav status postoji, lica koje je pod istragom – na primer, novinarski status.
Mešanje koje je predmet ove pritužbe imalo je „legitimni cilj” u tom smislu što je služilo interesima nacionalne bezbednosti koji su bili neposredno ugroženi curenjem informacija koje su označene kao službena tajna.
Što se tiče „neophodnosti u demokratskom društvu”, Država je istakla da je zaštita nacionalne bezbednosti jedna od glavnih funkcija države. Budući da je ustanovljeno da su iz AIVD procurile tajne informacije, sposobnost AIVD da pouzdano funkcioniše našla se na udaru, pa je samim tim na udaru bila i nacionalna bezbednost. Osim toga, u ovom slučaju, priroda i sadržaj „procurenih“ informacija bili su takvi da je istraga tog curenja bila neophodna s obzirom na zakonsku obavezu u pogledu brige o bezbednosti lica uz čiju su pomoć prikupljeni podaci i brige o tajnosti relevantnih podataka i njihovih izvora. Na primer, u listu De Telegraafsu objavljena operativna imena dva izvora zajedno sa kontekstualnim informacijama na osnovu kojih je bilo mogućno da opasni kriminalci otkriju pravi identitet lica o kojima je reč. Prema tome, u ovom slučaju je postojala zakonska obaveza da se preduzmu određene mere.
Alternativa korišćenju specijalnih ovlašćenja nije postojala s obzirom da su oni koji su bili odgovorni za curenje podataka imali veliki interes da prikriju sve činjenice i okolnosti.
Nije cilj AIVD bio da se identifikuju novinarski izvori podnosilaca predstavke; prema tome, ovde se ne radi o zaštiti izvora.
Samo unutrašnje pravo – to jest, članovi 31. i 32. Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine – utvrdilo je zahteve u pogledu supsidijarnosti i srazmernosti, uz nadzor koji sprovodi Nadzorni odbor i uz mogućnost da se uputi pritužba Nacionalnom ombudsmanu.
(b) Podnosioci predstavke
Podnosioci predstavke su saglasni s Državom da je korišćenje specijalnih ovlašćenja protiv drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke predstavljalo „mešanje” u njihova prava po članovima 8. i 10. Oni su, međutim, sugerisali da je priznanje Države o tome da su oni bili „mete” u smislu člana 6. stav 2. tačka (a) Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine bilo u neskladu sa stanovištem za koje su se opredelili domaći sudovi, naročito Apelacioni sud (vidi stav 31, gore).
Ako drugi i treći podnosilac predstavke nisu sami bili „mete” u smislu člana 6. stav 2. tačka (a), onda primena specijalnih ovlašćenja prema njima nije imala zakonski osnov. Ako, s druge strane, drugi i treći podnosilac predstavke jesu bili mete – što je stav koji su podnosioci predstavke ocenili kao „apsurdan”, jer bi to značilo da su oni predstavljali opasnost za opstanak demokratskog pravnog poretka – onda se moralo priznati da postoji zakonski osnov.
Međutim, mehanizmi zaštite od zloupotrebe nisu bili dovoljni s obzirom da nije postojalo prethodno sudsko preispitivanje primene specijalnih ovlašćenja. Nije bilo dovoljno to što je ministar unutrašnjih poslova i odnosa u Kraljevini dao odgovarajuće odobrenje zato što se ministar teško može oceniti nezavisnim i nepristranim.
Nije dokazana potreba za mešanjem u demokratskom društvu. Dokumenti AIVD koje su dobili podnosioci predstavke odnosili su se na period 1997–2000. godina; članci u novinama su svi bili objavljeni 2006. godine, otprilike šest godina po isteku tog perioda. Po oceni podnosilaca predstavke, nije, kako je izgledalo, bilo ničega što bi ukazivalo na neku opasnost u kojoj bi se nalazili doušnici, čiji identitet i nije otkriven u člancima objavljenim u novinama; isto tako, nisu bili objavljeni nikakvi podaci o operativnim postupcima AIVD. U svakom slučaju, same informacije koje su sadržane u dokumentima već dugo su bile u rukama kriminalaca.
3. Ocena ESLJP
(a) Mešanje
Podnosioci predstavke i tužena stranka saglasni su da je došlo do „mešanja” u prava drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke po osnovu članova 8. i 10. Konvencije, ali nisu saglasni u pogledu precizne prirode tog mešanja.
Država osporava stav podnosilaca predstavke da se ovde radi o zaštiti novinarskih izvora. Država tvrdi da je AIVD pribegao upotrebi specijalnih ovlašćenja ne zato da bi utvrdio identitet novinarskih izvora informacija podnosilaca predstavke, nego isključivo zato da bi identifikovao pripadnika AIVD koji je „procurio“ te dokumente.
ESLJP je spreman da prihvati da je svrha traženja AIVD da identifikuje lice ili lica koji su dostavili tajne dokumente podnosiocima predstavke bila podređena glavnom cilju te službe, a taj cilj je bio da se otkrije i potom zatvori kanal preko koga su procurile tajne informacije iz redova samog AIVD. Međutim, to nije odlučujuće u ovom predmetu (vidi Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. protiv Holandije [GC], br. 38224/03, § 66, 14. septembar 2010). ESLJP razume pojam novinarskog „izvora” u značenju „svako lice koje novinaru daje informacije”; prema poimanju ESLJP, „informacije na osnovu kojih se identifikuje izvor” obuhvataju, u meri u kojoj postoji verovatnoća da te informacije dovedu do identifikovanja izvora, kako „činjenične okolnosti u vezi s načinom na koji novinar dobija informacije od izvora”, tako i „neobjavljeni sadržaj informacija koje je izvor dostavio novinaru” (vidi Preporuku br. R(2000) 7 o pravu novinara da ne otkriju svoje izvore informacija (tekst Rezolucije citiran u stavu 61, gore); uporedi takođe presude u predmetima Sanoma, stavovi 65–66.i Weber i Saravia, stavovi 144–145).
Kao i u predmetima Roemen i Schmit protiv Luksemburga,br. 51772/99, stav 52, ECHR 2003‑IV; Ernst i drugi protiv Belgije,br. 33400/96, stav 100, 15. jul 2003; Tillack protiv Belgije, br. 20477/05, stav 64, 27. novembar 2007.i Sanoma, loc.cit., ESLJP i ovde stoga mora utvrditi da je AIVD nastojao, pribegavajući korišćenju svojih specijalnih ovlašćenja, da zaobiđe zaštitu novinarskih izvora (uporedi i sučeli s Presudom u predmetu Weber i Saravia, gore navedenom, stav 151).
Iako se pitanja koja se otvaraju primenom mera nadzora i praćenja obično razmatraju samo po članu 8. Konvencije, u ovom slučaju ta pitanja su do te mere ispreplitana sa pitanjem po članu 10. da ESLJP nalazi za shodno da predmet razmotri naporedo po osnovu članova 8. i 10.
(b) „U skladu sa zakonom / propisano zakonom”
ESLJP sada mora da odluči da li je mešanje bilo („u skladu sa zakonom” (član 8) ili je bilo „propisano zakonom” (član 10) – što su izrazi koji su, iako se u engleskom tekstu Konvencije razlikuju (oba ta engleska izraza odgovaraju prévue(s) par la loiu francuskoj verziji) identični po značenju (vidi presude u predmetima The Sunday Timesprotiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (br. 1), 26. april 1979, stav 48, Series A br. 30 i Silver i drugi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 25. mart 1983, stav 85, Series A br. 61).
ESLJP ovde ponovo naglašava svoju sudsku praksu prema kojoj izraz „u skladu sa zakonom” ne zahteva samo da sporna mera ima izvestan osnov u unutrašnjem pravu već se odnosi na kvalitet predmetnog zakona tako da zahteva da taj zakon bude dostupan licu o kojem je reč i da bude predvidljiv u pogledu svojih posledica. Zakon mora biti kompatibilan sa vladavinom prava, što znači da mora pružiti izvesnu meru pravne zaštite od proizvoljnog mešanja javnih vlasti u prava koja su zajemčena članom 8. stav 1. i članom 10. stav 1. To naročito važi onda kada se, kao što je ovde slučaj, moć izvršne vlasti ostvaruje u tajnosti, pa su rizici od proizvoljnosti očigledni. Budući da u praksi sprovođenje mera tajnog nadzora nije otvoreno za kontrolu koju bi vršila lica o kojima je reč ili javnost u celini, bilo bi protivno vladavini prava ako bi diskreciona ovlašćenja koja se daju izvršnoj vlasti bila izražena u smislu ničim nesputanih ovlašćenja. Sledstveno tome, zakon mora ukazati na obim svakog takvog diskrecionog ovlašćenja koje se prenese nadležnim vlastima, kao i na način na koji se to ovlašćenje može sprovoditi; to mora biti ukazano dovoljno jasno, imajući na umu legitimni cilj mere o kojoj je reč, a to je da se pojedincu pruži adekvatna zaštita od proizvoljnog mešanja (vidi Weber i Saravia, gore navedena, stavovi 93–95. i 145; Segerstedt-Wiberg i drugi protiv Švedske, br. 62332/00, stav 76, ECHR 2006‑VII; Liberty i drugi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, br. 58243/00, stavovi 62–63; 1. jul 2008; Kennedy protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, br. 26839/05, stav 152, 18. maj 2010).
Nema ničeg što bi sugerisalo da taj zakon nije bio dostupan.
Pisma koja je ministar unutrašnjih poslova i odnosa u Kraljevini poslao 6. decembra 2006. Donjem domu Parlamenta (stav 41, gore) i pravnom zastupniku podnosilaca predstavke (stav 43) pokazuju da se smatralo da je primena specijalnih ovlašćenja protiv drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke zakonita u smislu člana 6. stav 2. tačka (a) Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine. Presuda Vrhovnog suda (stav 3.5.3, vidi stav 33, gore) zasniva se na istom tom stanovištu, barem kada je reč o početnom periodu. Stoga ESLJP zaključuje da je zakonski osnov za mešanje o kome je ovde reč bio član 6. stav 2. tačka (a) Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine.
Mogućnost da podnosioci predstavke budu stavljeni pod dejstvo mera nadzora i praćenja nije bila predvidljiva u tom smislu da je njihova situacija odgovarala preciznom zakonskom određenju. Ipak, iako drugi i treći podnosilac predstavke mogu imati ozbiljne zamerke na sugestiju da su njihovi postupci predstavljali pretnju po demokratski pravni poredak Holandije, oni nisu mogli, razumno gledano, biti nesvesni činjenice da informacije koje su im pale u ruke predstavljaju autentične informacije koje su klasifikovane kao službena tajna i koje su nezakonito iznete iz arhive AIVD, kao i da će objavljivanje tih informacija verovatno provocirati akciju usmerenu ka otkrivanju njihovog porekla. Prema sopstvenom tumačenju člana 6. stav 2. tačke (a) i (c) Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine, Sud je spreman da prihvati tezu da je mešanje koje je ovde predmet pritužbe u tom smislu bilo predvidljivo.
Kada je reč o raspoloživim mehanizmima zaštite, podnosioci predstavke ne tvrde da je čitav spektar nadzornih procedura i procedura monitoringa koje opisuje Država (vidi stav 73) sam po sebi nedovoljan.
Pre bi se moglo reći da podnosioci predstavke smatraju da je njihov status novinara zahtevao posebne mehanizme zaštite koji bi obezbedili adekvatno čuvanje njihovih novinarskih izvora. ESLJP će se sada pozabaviti tim pitanjem.
U predmetu Weber i Saravia, mešanje u prava podnosilaca predstavke po osnovu članova 8. i 10. sastojalo se od presretanja telefonskih razgovora kako bi se identifikovale i unapred predupredile opasnosti, odnosno, tu se radilo o „strateškom nadzoru”, kako je ta mera još nazvana. Budući da je prva podnositeljka predstavke u tom predmetu bila novinarka, ESLJP je ustanovio da se tu radilo o njenom pravu na zaštitu novinarskih izvora (loc. cit., stavovi 144–145). Međutim, cilj strateškog nadzora tu nije bio da se identifikuju novinarski izvori. Generalno gledano, vlasti bi tek pošto ispitaju presretnute telefonske razgovore, ako uopšte i tada, mogle saznati da je presretnut razgovor jedne novinarke. Te mere nadzora nisu bile usmerene ka otkrivaju novinarskih izvora. Prema tome, mešanje u slobodu izražavanja pomoću strateškog nadzora nije se moglo okarakterisati kao posebno teško (loc. cit., stav 151). Iako je tačno da nije postojala posebna odredba o zaštiti slobode štampe i, naročito, odredba o neotkrivanju novinarskih izvora, onog trenutka kada su vlasti postale svesne da su presrele razgovor jedne novinarke, mehanizmi zaštite koji su tu postojali i za koje je utvrđeno da ispunjavaju uslove utvrđene u članu 8, ocenjeni su kao adekvatni i delotvorni za to da se otkrivanje novinarskih izvora svede na neizbežni minimum (loc. cit., stav 151).
Ovaj predmet se karakteriše upravo po tome što su u njemu ciljano nadzirani novinari kako bi se utvrdilo odakle su oni dobili informacije koje su posedovali. Stoga se u ovom predmetu ne može primeniti isto ono rezonovanje koje je primenjeno u predmetu Weber i Saravia.
ESLJP je ukazao, kada je razmatrao zakonsku regulativu kojom se uređuje pitanje tajnog nadzora u svetlu člana 8. Konvencije, da je u jednoj oblasti u kojoj je zloupotreba potencijalno tako lako ostvariva u pojedinačnim slučajevima i gde bi ona mogla da ima toliko pogubne posledice po demokratsko društvo u celini, načelno gledano, poželjno da se supervizija poveri nekom sudiji (vidi Klass i drugi protiv Nemačke, 6. septembar 1978, stav 56, Series A br. 28, i Kennedy, gore navedeno, stav 167). Međutim, i u jednom i u drugom predmetu, ESLJP je bio spreman da prihvati kao adekvatan nezavisni nadzor koji je bio na raspolaganju. U predmetu Klass i drugi,to se odnosilo na praksu po kojoj je trebalo tražiti prethodno odobrenje za mere nadzora i praćenja od Komisije G 10, nezavisnog tela na čijem je čelu kao predsednik bilo lice koje je imalo kvalifikacije za nosioca pravosudne funkcije i koje je, štaviše, imalo ovlašćenje da naloži da se bez odlaganja prekinu mere o kojima je reč (mutatis mutandis, Klass i drugi, stavovi 21. i 51; vidi takođe Weber i Saravia, stavovi 25. i 117).U predmetu Kennedy (loc. cit.) ESLJP je bio impresioniran interakcijom između Tribunala sa istražnim ovlašćenjima (Investigatory Powers Tribunal - IPT), nezavisnog organa sastavljenog od lica koja su bila nosioci ili koja su još uvek nosioci visokih pravosudnih funkcija i od iskusnih advokata; to telo je imalo ovlašćenje, između ostalog, da poništi naloge za presretanje komunikacija, i Komesara za presretanje komunikacija (Interception of Communications Commissioner), koji je takođe funkcioner koji je ranije obavljao ili koji još uvek obavlja visoku pravosudnu funkciju (Kennedy, stav 57) i koji je imao pristup svim nalozima za presretanje komunikacija i zahtevima da se izdaju nalozi za presretanje komunikacija (Kennedy, stav 56).
Nasuprot tome, u predmetu Sanoma, nalog koji se između ostalog odnosio na obelodanjivanje novinarskih izvora izdao je javni tužilac. ESLJP je odbacio kao neadekvatno u smislu člana 10. Konvencije učešće istražnog sudije budući da njegova intervencija, koju je dobrovoljno ustupio javni tužilac, nije imala osnov u zakonu, a njegov savet nije bio obavezujući. Sudsko preispitivanje post factum nije moglo da otkloni te nedostatke budući da to preispitivanje nije moglo da spreči otkrivanje identiteta novinarskih izvora od trenutka kada je ta informacija dospela u ruke javnog tužioca i policije (loc. cit., stavovi 96–99).
U ovom konkretnom predmetu, kako je odgovarajući na pitanje ESLJP na ročištu priznao zastupnik Države, odobrenje za upotrebu specijalnih ovlašćenjaizdao je, po svemu sudeći, ministar unutrašnjih poslova i odnosa u Kraljevini, ako ne načelnik AIVD ili čak neki njemu potčinjeni zvaničnik AIVD, ali je to, u svakom slučaju, učinjeno a da to nije prethodno razmotrio nezavisni organ koji bi imao pravo da spreči ili okonča primenu tih ovlašćenja (član 19. Zakona o obaveštajnim i bezbednosnim službama iz 2002. godine, vidi stav 51, gore).
Osim toga, kada se preispitivanje vrši post factum, bilo da to čini Nadzorni odbor, Odbor za obaveštajne i bezbednosne službe Donjeg doma Parlamenta ili Nacionalni ombudsman, njime se ne može ponovno uspostaviti poverljivost novinarskih izvora koja je već uništena.
Stoga ESLJP zaključuje da zakon nije pružio mehanizme zaštite koji bi bili primereni korišćenju ovlašćenja za nadzor i praćenje u odnosu na novinare radi otkrivanja njihovih novinarskih izvora. S tih razloga, u datom slučaju radilo se o povredi članova 8. i 10. Konvencije.
B. Nalog za predaju dokumenata
Podnosioci predstavke su tvrdili da je nalog da se predaju originalni dokumenti, koji je navodno donet da bi se oni vratili službi AIVD, u suštini izdat kako bi se mogao potvrditi identitet novinarskog izvora. Podnosioci predstavke su se pritužili da je time povređena njihova sloboda da, kao oni koji prenose vesti, saopštavaju informacije onako kako je to zajamčeno članom 10. Konvencije.
Država je negirala da je do takve povrede došlo.
1. Prihvatljivost
2. Argumentacija pred Sudom
(a) Država
U odeljku pod naslovom „Dužnosti i odgovornosti” Država je analizirala dve tačke.
Prvo, Država je zastupala stanovište da se ovaj predmet u suštinskim aspektima razlikuje od predmeta Voskuil protiv Holandije, br. 64752/01, 22. novembar 2007. Primarna svrha naloga za predaju dokumenata nije bila identifikacija novinarskih izvora podnosilaca predstavke, pa čak ni identifikacija onoga ko je podatke „procurio“ iz AIVD – a to lice se moglo identifikovati već na osnovu proučavanja samog sadržaja informacija koje su nezakonito „procurene“ – već je cilj bio da se dokumenti povuku iz javnosti. Osim toga, ustanovljeno je da podnosioci predstavke nisu odmah vratili sve dokumente; da su to učinili na samom početku, ne bi bilo nikakve potrebe da se donese nalog za predaju dokumenata.
Drugo, Država je navela da iako je sama činjenica da su tajni dokumenti zaštićeni oznakom službene tajnosti pali u ruke kriminalnih krugova bila nešto što je predmet javnog interesa, pa je samim tim vredno objavljivanja kao vest, podnosioci predstavke su otišli dalje od onoga što je bilo neophodno kada su objavili informacije koje su posedovali. Među objavljenim detaljima nalazili su se i pseudonimi dvojice doušnika, kao i kontekstualni podaci na osnovu kojih je te doušnike mogućno identifikovati, što je ugrozilo kako njihovu bezbednost (pa samim tim i bezbednost njihovih porodica i drugih iz njihovog neposrednog okruženja poznanika), tako i nacionalnu bezbednost.
Nalog da se predaju dokumenti je nesumnjivo predstavljao „mešanje”.
To mešanje je bilo „propisano zakonom”. Suštinska razlika između ovog predmeta i predmeta Sanoma ogleda se u tome što je zakonitost naloga da se predaju dokumenti procenio sud na osnovu svojih zakonskih ovlašćenja, pre no što su ti dokumenti predati na inspekciju.
„Legitimni ciljevi” kojima se navedenim mešanjem težilo bili su „nacionalna bezbednost” i „sprečavanje kriminala”.
Konačno, to mešanje je bilo „neophodno u demokratskom društvu” radi zalaganja za ostvarenje tih ciljeva. Kao što je gore već navedeno, bilo je neophodno obezbediti da svi ti dokumenti budu vraćeni u AIVD. Takođe je bilo važno istražiti da li je mogućno ustanoviti da li je bilo pristupa dokumentima i, ako jeste, ko je imao taj pristup (osim drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke i H., koji je u tom trenutku već bio osumnjičeni). Opet valja naglasiti, kao što je već istaknuto, da je takođe bila ugrožena bezbednost dvojice doušnika i članova njihovih porodica, kao i bezbednost njihovog neposrednog okruženja.
Nalog za predaju dokumenata bio je ponajmanje intruzivan od svih raspoloživih mera, pa je stoga bilo logično opredeliti se za njega, a ne za pretres prostorija podnosilaca predstavke, kao što je pretres koji su sprovele vlasti u predmetima Roemen i Schmiti Ernst i drugi, gore navedeni.
Konačno, što je ponavljanje onoga što je već rečeno, jedan sud je sproveo nezavisno preispitivanje pre nego što su dokumenti predati Odeljenju za interne istrage Nacionalne policije.
(b) Podnosioci predstavke
Podnosioci predstavke su se pritužili da je prvenstvena svrha naloga da se predaju dokumenti samo prividno bila to da se ti dokumenti povuku iz kruženja u javnosti, a da je, u stvari, prava je namera bila da se ti dokumenti podvrgnu tehničkom pregledu i da se na osnovu njih identifikuje izvor informacija podnosilaca predstavke. S tim u vezi podnosioci predstavke su posebno ukazali na priznanje javnog tužioca (vidi stav 22, gore), kao i priznanje Države da je identitet pripadnika AIVD koji je „procurio“dokumente bio poznat već na osnovu proučavanja sadržaja samih dokumenata i identifikovanja pripadnika AIVD koji su imali pristup tim dokumentima, kao i na presudu kojom je H. osuđen za curenje informacija (vidi stav 37, gore), što odražava činjenicu da su ti dokumenti zaista bili pomno pregledani.
Dokumenti koje su nabavili drugi i treći podnosilac predstavke sadržali su relativno stare informacije, koje su, povrh svega, već bile poznate u kriminalnim krugovima. Stoga na interes Države da sačuva tajnost tih informacija nije moglo negativno da utiče objavljivanje tekstova u listu De Telegraaf, već je to moglo da učini jedino curenje informacija iz samog AIVD; iz toga sledi da koraci koji su preduzeti protiv podnosilaca predstavke nisu imali nikakvu drugu svrhu do da se otkrije trag i po tom tragu stigne do samog izvora curenja informacija.
Pozivajući se na gore pomenutu presudu u predmetu Sanoma,podnosioci predstavke su zastupali stanovište da su nalozi da se otkrije izvor mogli pogubno da utiču, i to ne samo na izvor već i na sam list De Telegraaf, u koga potencijalni izvori ne bi mogli više da imaju poverenja, kao i na javnost, koja je imala interes da prima informacije dobijene iz anonimnih izvora. Pored toga, kako su tvrdili podnosioci predstavke pozivajući se na istu tu presudu, oni nisu imali na raspolaganju postupak koji bi podrazumevao adekvatne mehanizme pravne zaštite i omogućio da se nezavisno proceni da li su interesi krivičnopravne istrage bili pretežni nad javnim interesom u pogledu zaštite novinarskih izvora.
3. Ocena ESLJP
(a) Mešanje
(b) Propisano zakonom
Nema nikakvog spora da je nalog da se predaju dokumenti imao zakonski osnov, konkretno, član 96a Zakona o krivičnom postupku (vidi stav 50, gore). ESLJP tako zaključuje (vidi Sanoma, gore navedeno, stav 86).
Kada je reč o procesnim mehanizmima zaštite koji su bili na raspolaganju, ESLJP utvrđuje da se ovaj predmet u suštinskim aspektima razlikuje od predmeta Sanoma.Dokumente je javni beležnik stavio u sanduk i zapečatio, posle čega je sanduk s dokumentima predata istražnom sudiji, kako bi ih on čuvao u sefu, neotvorene, do ishoda postupka po prigovoru pred Regionalnim sudom (vidi stav 20, gore).Podnosioci predstavke su se složili s tim postupkom u kontaktu s javnim tužiocem. Osim toga, kako Država ispravno naglašava, takav postupak je imao zakonski osnov, konkretno član 552a Zakonika o krivičnom postupku, koji povrh toga ovlašćuje regionalni sud da izda svaki potreban nalog (vidi stav 50, gore; uporedi to i sapostavi s presudom u predmetu Sanoma, stavovi 96–97).
Prema tome, mešanje koje je ovde predmet pritužbe bilo je „propisano zakonom”.
(c) Legitimni cilj
(d) Neophodno u demokratskom društvu
Test „neophodnosti u demokratskom društvu” zahteva da ESLJP utvrdi da li je „mešanje” koje je predmet pritužbe odgovaralo „nasušnoj društvenoj potrebi”, da li je bilo srazmerno legitimnom cilju kome se težilo i da li su razlozi na koje su se nacionalne vlasti pozvale kako bi ga opravdale i obrazložile bili relevantni i dovoljni (vidi, između ostalih pravnih autoriteta, Presudu u predmetu The Sunday Times, gore navedenu, stav 62). Kada procenjuju da li takva „potreba” postoji i koje mere treba utvrditi da bi se ta potreba zadovoljila, nacionalne vlasti imaju na raspolaganju određeno unutrašnje polje slobodne procene. To ovlašćenje za slobodno procenjivanje nije, međutim, neograničeno, već je propraćeno evropskim nadzorom koji sprovodi ESLJP, čiji je zadatak da donese konačnu presudu o tome da li se ograničenje o kome je reč može pomiriti sa slobodom izražavanja zajemčenom članom 10. Konvencije [vidi, između mnogih drugih pravnih autoriteta, presude u predmetima Cumpǎnǎ i Mazǎre protiv Rumunije [GC], br. 33348/96, br. 88, ECHR 2004‑XI; Voskuil, gore navedeno, stav 63,kao iTV Vest AS i Rogaland Pensjonistparti protiv Norveške, br. 21132/05, stav 58, ECHR 2008 (izvodi)].
Nije zadatak ESLJP da, kada ostvaruje tu svoju nadzornu nadležnost, zauzme mesto nadležnih nacionalnih organa, već pre da na osnovu člana 10. Konvencije preispita odluke koje su ti organi doneli shodno svojoj nadležnosti procene. To ne znači da je nadzor ograničen na to da se utvrdi da li je tužena država razumno, pažljivo i u dobroj veri ostvarila svoja diskreciona ovlašćenja; ono što ESLJP mora da uradi jeste da sagleda mešanje koje je predmet pritužbe u svetlu predmeta u celini i da utvrdi da li su razlozi na koje se nacionalne vlasti pozivaju kao na opravdanje i obrazloženje svojih postupaka „relevantni i dovoljni” i da li su te mere bile „srazmerne legitimnom cilju kome se težilo”. Kada to čini, ESLJP treba da se uveri da su nacionalne vlasti primenile standarde koji su u skladu s načelima utvrđenim u članu 10. Konvencije i da su se, povrh toga, oslonile na prihvatljivu procenu relevantnih činjenica (vidi, između mnogih drugih pravnih autoriteta, presude u predmetima Hertel protiv Švajcarske, 25. avgust 1998, stav 46, Reports 1998‑VI; Cumpǎnǎ i Mazǎre, gore navedeno, stav 90; Pedersen i Baadsgaard protiv Danske [GC], br. 49017/99, stavovi 68–71, ECHR 2004‑XI; Steel i Morris protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, br. 68416/01, stav 87, ECHR 2005‑II; Mamère protiv Francuske, br. 12697/03, stav 19, ECHR 2006‑XIII; Lindon, Otchakovsky‑Laurens i July protiv Francuske [GC], br. 21279/02 i 36448/02, stav 45, ECHR 2007‑IV; Voskuil, gore navedeno, stav 63.i Guja protiv Moldavije [GC], br. 14277/04, stav 69, ECHR 2008).
Od 1985. godine ESLJP je često pominjao zadatak štampe kao prenosioca informacija i kao „čuvara javnog interesa” (vidi, između mnogih drugih pravnih autoriteta, presude u predmetima Barthold protiv Nemačke, 25. mart 1985, stav 58, Series A br. 90; Lingens protiv Austrije, 8. jul 1986, stav 44, Series A br. 103; Thorgeir Thorgeirson protiv Islanda, 25. jun 1992, stav 63, Series A br. 239; Cumpǎnǎ i Mazǎre, gore navedeno, stav 93; Voskuil, gore navedeno, stav 64; kao i Financial Times Ltd. i drugi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, br. 821/03, stav 59, 15. decembar 2009).
Saglasno odredbama člana 10. stav 2, ostvarivanje slobode izražavanja nosi sobom dužnosti i odgovornosti koje se primenjuju i na štampu. Član 10. štiti novinarsko pravo – i novinarsku dužnost – da saopštava informacije o pitanjima od javnog interesa ako taj novinar postupa u dobroj veri kako bi pružio tačne i pouzdane informacije u skladu sa etikom novinarstva (Fressoz i Roire protiv Francuske [GC], br. 29183/95, stav 54, ECHR 1999‑I; Bladet Tromsøi Stensaas protiv Norveške [GC], br. 21980/93, stav 65, ECHR 1999‑III,kao i Financial Times Ltd. i drugi, gore navedeno, stav 62).
Zaštita novinarskih izvora jedan je od osnovnih uslova slobode štampe i ona je priznata i izražena u raznim međunarodnopravnim instrumentima, uključujući Preporuku Komiteta ministara Saveta Evrope koja je citirana u stavu 61, gore. Bez takve zaštite izvori bi bili odvraćeni od pružanja pomoći štampi u obaveštavanju javnosti o pitanjima od javnog interesa. Kada te zaštite ne bi bilo, mogla biti podrivena životno značajna uloga čuvara javnog interesa koju štampa ima, kao što bi se to moglo negativno odraziti i na sposobnost štampe da pruži tačne i pouzdane informacije. S obzirom na važnost zaštite novinarskih izvora za slobodu štampe u demokratskom društvu i na potencijalni efekat zamrzavanja koji nalog za otkrivanje izvora ima na ostvarivanje te slobode, takva mera ne može biti kompatibilna sa članom 10. Konvencije, osim ukoliko je opravdana pretežnim zahtevom u javnom interesu (vidi presude u predmetima Goodwin, gore navedena, stav 39; Voskuil, gore navedena, stav 65; Financial Times Ltd. i drugi, gore navedena, stav 59.i Sanoma, gore navedena, stav 51).
Iako može biti tačno da javna percepcija načela neotkrivanja izvora ne bi pretrpela nikakvu stvarnu štetu ako bi to načelo bilo potisnuto u okolnostima u kojima izvor očigledno nastupa u zloj nameri i sa štetnim ciljem (na primer tako što namerno proizvodi i plasira lažne informacije), sudovi nikako ne bi trebalo da požure s pretpostavkom, kada za to nema ubedljivih dokaza, da ti činioci postoje u svakom konkretnom predmetu. U svakom slučaju, s obzirom na višestruke interese koji se ovde prepliću, ESLJP naglašava da ponašanje izvora nikada ne može biti odlučujući činilac za odluku o tome da li je trebalo doneti nalog za otkrivanje izvora, već to ponašanje može da posluži samo kao jedan, istina važan, ali ne i presudan činilac koji treba uzeti u razmatranje kod odmeravanja i uravnotežavanja koje nalaze član 10. stav 2. Konvencije (presuda u predmetu Financial Times Ltd. i drugi, gore navedena, stav 63).
Vraćajući se činjenicama ovog konkretnog predmeta, ESLJP primećuje da je pred Regionalnim sudom javni tužilac izjavio da je prvenstvena svrha naloga da se predaju dokumenti bila da se ti dokumenti vrate službi AIVD, iako bi mogućnost da se ti dokumenti ispitaju kako bi se na njima našli korisni tragovi bila iskorišćena ako bi iskrsla. Međutim, kako je sam javni tužilac priznao, čak i bez detaljnog tehničkog ispitivanja dokumenata lika koja su iznela dokumente mogu lako biti otkrivena već samim proučavanjem sadržaja dokumenata i identifikacijom pripadnika Službe koji su imali pristup tim dokumentima (vidi stav 22, gore). S obzirom na to, nalog da se predaju dokumenti ne može se obrazložiti samo potrebom da se identifikuje dotični pripadnik AIVD.
Iako šira javnost nije nikada upoznata s kompletnim sadržajem dokumenata, vrlo je verovatno da su te informacije odavno kružile van AIVD i da su s njima bila upoznata lica koja stranke opisuju kao kriminalce. Prema tome, povlačenjem dokumenata iz javnosti više se nije moglo sprečiti da informacije koje su u njima sadržane – uključujući pseudonime i druge podatke na osnovu kojih je bilo mogućno identifikovati doušnike AIVD – padnu u pogrešne ruke (vidi presude u predmetima The Sunday Timesprotiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (br. 2), 26. novembar 1991, stav 54, Series A br. 217; Observeri Guardianprotiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 26. novembar 1991, stav 68, Series A br. 216,kao i Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! protiv Holandije, 9. februar 1995, stav 45, Series A br. 306‑A).
Ostaje još i potreba da AIVDproveri da li su mu vraćeni svi dokumenti koji su uzeti iz njegove arhive povučeni. ESLJP prihvata da je to legitimni razlog za zabrinutost. Međutim, to nije dovoljno da se na osnovu toga ustanovi kako je reč o „pretežnom zahtevu u javnom interesu” koji opravdava otkrivanje novinarskih izvora podnosilaca predstavke. ESLJP staje na stanovište da stvarna predaja dokumenata nije bila neophodna budući da su – kako se može videti iz ministrovog pisma od 20. decembra 2006. upućenog Donjem domu (vidi stav 18, gore) – to bile kopije, a ne originali, bio bi sasvim dovoljan vizuelni pregled na osnovu koga bi se utvrdilo da li su dokumenti potpuni, posle čega bi oni bili uništeni (kako je u suštini predložio prvi podnosilac predstavke, vidi stav 22, gore).
Ukratko rečeno, nisu navedeni „relevantni i dovoljni” razlozi za mešanje koje je predmet pritužbe u ovom slučaju. Prema tome, bio je prekršen član 10. Konvencije.
II. PRIMENA ČLANA 41. KONVENCIJE
Kada Sud utvrdi prekršaj Konvencije ili protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo delimičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj stranci.”
A. Šteta
B. Troškovi i izdaci
Na ime troškova i izdataka podnosioci predstavke su ukupno zahtevali iznos od 168.888,47 evra, uključujući porez na dodatnu vrednost. Podneli su detaljan troškovnik i sve fakture.
Država je priznala da je predmet neuobičajeno obiman i složen, ali je ipak smatrala da je za troškovnik prema radnim satima tražen prekomeran iznos.
Prema doslednoj sudskoj praksi ESLJP, podnosioci predstavke imaju pravo na naknadu troškova i izdataka samo u meri u kojoj se dokaže da su ti troškovi stvarno i nužno podneti i da su razumni u pogledu iznosa; osim toga, sudski troškovi se mogu naplatiti samo u meri u kojoj se odnose na utvrđenu povredu prava po Konvenciji (vidi, kao nedavni pravni autoritet, presudu u predmetu S.T.S. protiv Holandije, br. 277/05, stav 73, ECHR 2011 i reference koje su u njoj navedene).
U ovom konkretnom predmetu, obraćajući pažnju na dokumente koje poseduje, ESLJP smatra da je razumno da dodeli iznos od 60.000 evra bez poreza na dodatnu vrednost, zajedno sa svakim porezom koji može biti naplaćen podnosiocima predstavke na taj iznos.
C. Zatezna kamata
IZ TIH RAZLOGA, SUD
1.Proglašava jednoglasno ostatak predstavke dopuštenim;
2.Utvrđuje jednoglasno da je došlo do povrede članova 8. i 10. Konvencije u pogledu korišćenja specijalnih ovlašćenja AIVDprotiv drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke;
3.Utvrđuje sa pet glasova prema dva da je došlo do povrede člana 10. Konvencije u pogledu naloga za predaju dokumenata koji je ispostavljen prvom podnosiocu predstavke;
4.Utvrđuje jednoglasno
(a) da je tužena država dužna da isplati podnosiocima predstavke, u roku od tri meseca od datuma kada ova presuda postane pravnosnažna u skladu sa članom 44. stav 2. Konvencije, iznos od 60.000 evra (šezdeset hiljada evra), zajedno sa porezom koji na taj iznos može biti naplaćen podnosiocima predstavke, na ime sudskih troškova i izdataka;
(b) da po isteku gore navedena tri meseca do isplate treba platiti običnu kamatu na gore navedene iznose po stopi koja je jednaka najnižoj kamatnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke u periodu docnje uz dodatak od tri procentna poena;
5.Odbija jednoglasno preostali deo zahteva podnosilaca predstavke za pravično zadovoljenje.
Sastavljeno na engleskom jeziku i pročitano na javnom ročištu u Sudu u Strazburu 22. novembra 2012. godine.
Marialena Tsirli Josep Casadevall
Zamenik sekretara Predsednik
U skladu sa članom 45. stav 2. Konvencije i Pravilom 74. stav 2. Poslovnika Suda uz Presudu se prilaže i izdvojeno mišljenje sudija Myjer i López Guerra.
J.C.M.
M.T.
IZDVOJENO, DELIMIČNO NESAGLASNO MIŠLJENJE KOJE SU ZAJEDNIČKI FORMULISALI SUDIJE MYJER I LÓPEZ GUERRA
1. Glasali smo zajedno sa većinom kada je reč o zaključku da je u ovom slučaju učinjena povreda prava u pogledu korišćenja „specijalnih ovlašćenja” protiv drugog i trećeg podnosioca predstavke.
2. Kada je reč o nalogu da se predaju dokumenti, mi, međutim, smatramo da tu nije bilo povrede prava. Prema našem stanovištu, postoji važna razlika koju treba uočiti između ovog predmeta i drugih predmeta u kojima je ESLJP morao da razmatra važnost zaštite novinarskih izvora.
3. Saglasni smo da državni službenici u određenim okolnostima imaju pravo, pa čak i dužnost, da obelodane spoljnom svetu informacije u javnom interesu[vidi na primer presude u predmetima Guja protiv Moldavije [GC], br. 14277/04, stavovi 72–97, ECHR 2008.i Heinisch protiv Nemačke, br. 28274/08, stavovi 62–93, ECHR 2011 (izvodi)]. Međutim, ni podnosioci predstavke ni tužena država nisu sugerisali da su takve okolnosti postojale u ovom predmetu. Stoga, po našem mišljenju, mora biti prihvaćeno da je tužena država bila, načelno gledano, vlasna da utvrdi identitet osobe koja je nezakonito uzela dokumente o kojima je reč i stavila ih u ruke licu ili licima koja bila ovlašćena da te dokumente prime.
4. Štaviše, način na koji su ti dokumenti nabavljeni i fotokopirani bio je u suprotnosti sa zakonom i time je počinjeno krivično delo. Kao takvi, dokumenti su zakonito mogli da budu zaplenjeni kao „predmeti... koji [mogu] poslužiti za utvrđivanje istine” (član 94. Zakonika o krivičnom postupku, vidi stav 50. Presude). Budući da je tako, nezamislivo je da bilo kome ko je (na taj način) pribavio dokumente treba dozvoliti da utvrđuje uslove za njihovo vraćanje licu ili instituciji koji na njih polažu pravo. Po našem mišljenju, to važi čak i ukoliko je reč o dokumentima koji su u posedu štampe.
5. Vraćajući se na činjenice ovog konkretnog predmeta, smatramo da je bilo opravdano da institucija koja polaže pravo na te dokumente – u datom slučaju, to je AIVD – sama odredi razloge zbog kojih će zahtevati da se vrate dokumenti. Ako dokumenti koji su pribavljeni krivičnim delom ili fotokopirani tako da je time učinjeno krivično delo više ne mogubiti oduzeti isključivo zato što je štampa došla u njihov posed, izuzev pod uslovima koje odredi sama ta štampa, onda se štampi daje privilegija za koju mi ne vidimo nikakvo opravdanje. Po našem mišljenju, pogrešno je odmeravati u odnosu na prava vlasnika dokumenata mogućnost da ti dokumenti budu ispitani kako bi se na njima našli tragovi na osnovu kojih je mogućno identifikovati lice koje je počinilo izvorno krivično delo. Po tome se ovaj konkretan predmet razlikuje od ostalih predmeta u kojima se radilo o zaštiti novinarskih izvora.
6. Ovde treba naglasiti da pravo na zaštitu poverljivosti novinarskih izvora nije apsolutno pravo. Kako je pomenuto u stavu 96. Presude, ESLJP je prihvatio da obelodanjivanje informacija kojima se identifikuju novinarski izvori može nastupiti neizbežno u postupku „strateškog nadzora”, uprkos razumnim merama koje vlasti preduzmu. Još bliže činjenicama ovog konkretnog predmeta, ESLJP je dosledno prihvatao, u frazi koju je ponovio više puta otkako ju je prvi put upotrebio u Presudi u predmetu Goodwin protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 27. mart 1996, stav 39, Reports of Judgments i Decisions 1996 II, da nalog koji vodi ka obelodanjivanju novinarskih izvora može biti kompatibilan sa članom 10. Konvencije ako – ali samo ako je opravdan „pretežnim zahtevom javnog interesa” (vidi Roemen i Schmit protiv Luksemburga, br. 51772/99, stav 46, ECHR 2003 IV; Ernst i drugi protiv Belgije, br. 33400/96, stav 91, 15. jul 2003; Tillack protiv Belgije, br. 20477/05, stav 53, 27. novembar 2007; Voskuil protiv Holandije, br. 64752/01, stav 65, 22. novembar 2007; Financial Times Ltd i drugi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, br. 821/03, stav 59, 15. decembar 2009.i Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. protiv Holandije [GC], br. 38224/03, stav 51, 14. septembar 2010. To je takođe odraženo u načelu br. 3. Preporuke br. R(2000) 7 o pravu novinara da ne otkrivaju svoje izvore informacija (vidi stav 61. Presude).
7. S obzirom na samu prirodu svog položaja, državni službenici često imaju pristup informacijama za koje država, iz različitih legitimnih razloga, može imati interes da sačuva njihovu poverljivost ili tajnost. Stoga je obaveza čuvanja poverljivosti (diskrecije) koju imaju državni službenici, po pravilu, veoma jaka (Guja, gore navedeno, stav 71). Po našem mišljenju, ta obaveza je još izraženija onda kada državni službenik pripada jednoj takvoj službi kakva je AIVD, koja po samoj prirodi svoje delatnosti mora da čuva tajnost informacija koje poseduje (vidi, mutatis mutandis, presude u predmetima Hadjianastassiou protiv Grčke, 16. decembar 1992, stav 46, Series A br. 252; Vereniging Weekblad Bluf!protiv Holandije, 9. februar 1995, stav 35, Series A br. 306 A; kao i Pasko protiv Rusije, br. 69519/01, stav 86, 22. oktobar 2009).
8. Ovaj predmet se razlikuje od pređašnjih predmeta kao što su The Sunday Timesprotiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (br. 2), 26. novembar 1991, Series A br. 217; Observer i Guardianprotiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 26. novembar 1991, Series A br. 216 i Vereniging Weekblad Bluf!, gore navedeni. U tim predmetima ESLJP je mogao da ustanovi povredu člana 10. Konvencije po tom osnovu što je već bila kompromitovana tajnost informacija radi čijeg su očuvanja navodno preduzete mere koje su bile predmet pritužbi. Nasuprot tome, u ovom slučaju nije se toliko radilo o zaštiti tajnosti samih informacija, već o činjenici da je, bez obzira da li su tajne ili nisu, te informacije pale u ruke licima koja nisu bila ovlašćena da ih poseduju usled povrede radne dužnosti nekog službenika AIVD.
9. Isto tako, ne možemo da zaključimo da je nerazumno to što su holandske vlasti odbile da prihvate ponudu prvog podnosioca predstavke da uništi dokumente. ESLJP je zaključio da se član 10. ne može tumačiti kao član kojim se zabranjuje da se u javnom interesu zaplene stvari čija je upotreba zakonito proglašena nezakonitom (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Handyside protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 7. decembar 1976, stav 63, Series A bre. 24.i Otto‑Preminger-Institut protiv Austrije, 20. septembar 1994, stav 57, Series A br. 295‑A). Ne vidimo zašto se slično rezonovanje ne bi primenilo u ovom predmetu. Stoga smatramo da holandska država ima puno pravo da joj stvarni dokumenti budu vraćeni u posed.
Ova presuda je prevedena na srpski jezik u okviru zajedničkog programa Evropske unije i Saveta Evrope „Horizontal Facility za Zapadni Balkan i Tursku 2019-2022” i projekta „Sloboda izražavanja i sloboda medija u Srbiji (JUFREX)”. Ovaj nezvanični prevod se objavljuje uz podršku Evropske unije i Saveta Evrope, ali pod isključivom odgovornošću prevodioca (Alpha Team One). Izraženi stavovi ne izražavaju nužno mišljenja Evropske unije.
THIRD SECTION
CASE OF TELEGRAAF MEDIA NEDERLAND LANDELIJKE MEDIA B.V. AND OTHERS v. THE NETHERLANDS
(Application no. 39315/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22 November 2012
FINAL
22/02/2013
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and Others v. the Netherlands, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Josep Casadevall, President,
Egbert Myjer,
Corneliu Bîrsan,
Alvina Gyulumyan,
Ineta Ziemele,
Luis López Guerra,
Kristina Pardalos, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 19 June and 23 October 2012,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that last‑mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 39315/06) against the Kingdom of the Netherlands lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a limited liability company (besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid) incorporated under Netherlands law, Uitgeversmaatschappij De Telegraaf B.V.; two Netherlands nationals, Mr Joost de Haas and Mr Bart Mos; and also by two associations with legal personality under Netherlands law, Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisten (Netherlands Association of Journalists) and Nederlands Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren (Netherlands Society of Editors‑in‑Chief), on 29 September 2006.
2. The applicants were represented by Mr R.S. Le Poole and Mr M.A. de Kemp, lawyers practising in Amsterdam. The Netherlands Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr R.A.A. Böcker of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
3. The applicants alleged a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in that measures including the use of special powers had been taken against them in order to identify their journalistic sources. The second and third applicants alleged in addition that they had been victims of violation of Article 8 of the Convention resulting from the use of special powers of surveillance.
4. By a partial decision of 18 May 2010, the Court decided to adjourn the examination of the above complaints in respect of Uitgeversmaatschappij De Telegraaf B.V., Mr De Haas and Mr Mos (hereafter “the applicants”) and declared the application inadmissible in respect of Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisten and Nederlands Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (former
Article 29 § 3).
5. The applicants and the Government each filed written observations (Rule 59 § 1).
6. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 19 June 2012 (Rule 59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
MrR. Böcker, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Agent,
DrM. Kuijer, Ministry of Security and Justice,
MrP. van Sasse van Ysselt, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations,
MrR. Dielemans, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations,
MsJ. Jarigsma, Public Prosecution Service,Advisers;
(b) for the applicants
MrR.S. Le Poole, Advocaat,
MrM. de Kemp, Advocaat,Counsel,
MrJ. de Haas,
MrB. Mos, Applicants,
MsH.M.A. van Meurs-Bergsma, Head of Legal Department, Telegraaf Media Nederland
Landelijke Media B.V.,Adviser.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Böcker, Mr De Kemp and Mr Le Poole, and also their answers to its questions.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
7. The first applicant is a limited liability company incorporated under Netherlands law. Its business includes publishing the mass-circulation daily newspaper De Telegraaf. Originally called Uitgeversmaatschappij De Telegraaf B.V., it changed its name to Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. on 5 January 2011.
8. The second applicant, Mr Joost de Haas, is a Netherlands national born in 1967 and resident in Bovenkarspel. He is a journalist.
9. The third applicant, Mr Bart Mos, is a Netherlands national born in 1963 and resident in Ridderkerk. He too is a journalist.
A. The newspaper articles
10. On Saturday 21 January 2006, the newspaper De Telegraaf published on its front page an article couched in the following terms:
“AIVD secrets in possession of drugs mafia
Top criminals made use of information
By Joost De Haas and Bart Mos
Amsterdam, Saturday
State secrets (staatsgeheime informatie), obtained from investigations of the Netherlands secret service AIVD [Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, General Intelligence and Security Service] circulate in the criminal circuit of Amsterdam.
Complete investigations into the drugs and weapons dealer Mink K., who is labelled ‘a danger to the State’ (staatsgevaarlijk), are thus known to individuals concerned in the criminal world (onderwereld). This appears from documents and statements with which this newspaper has been acquainted.
It appears from the documents that the secret service has over a period of years carried out investigations and directed infiltrations relating to Amsterdam drugs criminals. The intervention of the service was prompted by, among other things, strong presumptions of the existence of corruption within the Amsterdam police force and the Public Prosecution Service (openbaar ministerie). For that reason the secret service decided, in the late nineties, to recruit an informant in close proximity to Mink K. According to this informant, corruption was so rampant that liquidations were actually carried out using weapons seized by the police.
Threat
It appears from the documents that the AIVD considered top criminal Mink K. to be a threat to the legal order, as he reserved millions each year to bribe police and prosecution service officials. In addition, K. was thought to have enormous stocks of weapons at his disposal, including large quantities of semtex and ‘hundreds of anti-tank missiles’. The links which K. was thought to maintain with terror groups such as Hezbollah and ETA were disquieting. The documents have been returned to the AIVD by De Telegraaf.
Incidentally, [the Ministry of] Defence yesterday reported the loss of a memory stick containing confidential information of the Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, MIVD).”
11. On an inside page, the same issue carried an article by the same two authors giving details including the informant’s code name and that of a second informant operating in the periphery of the criminal organisation.
12. The following day, Sunday 22 January 2006, De Telegraaf published an article, again naming Mr De Haas and Mr Mos as authors, in which it was suggested that highly secret information concerning the AIVD’s investigations had been made available to criminals including Mink K.
13. In the evening of Sunday 22 January 2006 the public service television broadcaster NOS broadcast an interview with the then Minister of Justice (Minister van Justitie), Mr J.P.H. Donner, on the eight o’clock news. Minister Donner stated the following:
“So this is about people who may be involved in the AIVD who publish documents to the outside world in this way. That is what must absolutely be prevented. Of course it is afterwards to be deplored that State secrets find their way into the newspapers. Once again, I also find that De Telegraaf has cited [them] in very general terms and not directly. So as far as that goes, they have been circumspect in their use. But that is quite another matter. My point is that this kind of thing ought not to be made public.”
14. On Monday 23 January 2006 De Telegraaf announced that the AIVD had lodged a criminal complaint concerning the unlawful disclosure of State secrets. The AIVD had reportedly stated that they had no proof that Mink K. had been able to bribe police and Public Prosecution Service officials, and that the documents in question had been leaked by an AIVD member.
15. In the days that followed, De Telegraaf published further material including allegations that Mink K. had had meetings with Government ministers (as well as the latter’s denials).
B. Parliamentary documents
16. On 24 January 2006 the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties) sent a white paper to the Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament (parliamentary year 2005-06, 29876, no. 11). It was stated that the predecessor of the AIVD, the BVD (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, National Security Service), had undertaken an investigation between 1997 and 2000 into allegations of corruption of public officials by Mink K. but that no such cases of corruption had come to light. It was not yet known how and when classified documents pertaining to this investigation had become known outside the BVD/AIVD, although there was thought to be no leak from within the police or Public Prosecution Service. De Telegraaf had reported that the documents, which had been circulating in criminal circles for some time already, had been obtained from criminal contacts and suggested that they had been leaked by serving or former agents of the BVD or AIVD. The documents which De Telegraaf had returned comprised an incomplete collection of raw data from which no conclusions could be drawn.
17. Also on 24 January 2006 the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services of the Lower House of Parliament was informed by confidential letter about the secret operational particulars of the investigation instituted by the AIVD.
18. The matter gave rise to discussion in the Lower House on several occasions in the course of 2006. At the close of these, the Minister wrote to the Lower House on 20 December 2006. His letter concluded as follows:
“There has been what can properly be called a serious incident (Er is sprake van een ernstig incident geweest): a considerable collection of copied documents from a closed working file of the BVD has been taken out of the building in defiance of the rules. Operational AIVD research and research by the National Police Internal Investigations Department (rijksrecherche) indicate that this was probably done by a former BVD staff member, who would have had the opportunity to do so until August 2000. Possibly via third parties, the documents subsequently came into the possession of De Telegraaf, which published information about this in January of this year. I would point out that final conclusions about the way in which these compromising facts took place can formally be drawn only when the proceedings against the suspected former staff member have been brought to a close.
The compromised documents provide an insight into the BVD’s operational knowledge levels at that time within the task area of public-sector integrity and in the BVD’s working methods relating to that task area. Damage to investigations in process and the consequences of the working methods then in use (modus operandi) becoming known is relatively limited. Risks to agents and/or informants cannot however be excluded. Where necessary, operational measures have been taken to limit these risks.
A reassessment in the light of the security rules in force then and now shows that there is little to be gained from more regulation. Compliance and supervision of compliance with rules and regulations will however need to be strengthened. The updated security plan and internal communication on that subject will so ensure. Technical measures, such as the introduction of new security technology in authorised systems, and measures within the area of personnel management, such as the continuation of sound security investigations and reviews of new and existing staff, will also contribute to a further reduction of security risks. Extreme alertness to signals which might indicate security risks and better (social) control of non-security-conscious behaviour are indispensible in this connection.
I also conclude from the investigations that security which will completely prevent deliberate compromising [of secret information] is not achievable. It will never be possible to exclude that staff members who are authorised to take cognisance of State secrets and who deliberately seek to inflict harm will be able deliberately and unauthorised to carry State secrets outside the AIVD buildings by some means or other.
There has to be a balance between maximum security and an effective working process. Based on regulation and direction in compliance with regulation, among other things, risks of confidential information being compromised can be reduced to a minimum. Even so, a residual risk as regards the human factor will always exist.”
C. The surrender order addressed to the first applicant
19. On 26 January 2006 a detective chief superintendent of the National Police Internal Investigations Department (hoofdinspecteur van politie‑rijksrecherche) issued an order addressed to [a subsidiary of] the first applicant for the surrender of “document(s) and/or copy(ies), with State secrets concerning operational activities of the [BVD] and/or the [AIVD].”
20. On 30 January 2006 the first applicant’s legal counsel entered into an agreement with the public prosecutor aimed at protecting the identity of the source of the information set out above for as long as was necessary for the Regional Court to assess whether the surrender order was barred for reasons of source protection. Since the originals of the documents in question (copies had already been returned) might bear fingerprints or other traces capable of identifying this person, they were placed in a container by a notary and sealed, after which the container with the documents was handed over to the investigating judge to be kept in a safe unopened pending the outcome of objection proceedings intended to be brought.
21. The first applicant in fact lodged an objection with the Regional Court of The Hague by post on 23 February 2006 (received at that court’s registry on 28 February). Relying on Article 10 of the Convention, it invoked what it considered to be the journalistic privilege against the disclosure of sources. It argued in this connection, inter alia, that Mr De Haas and Mr Mos had exercised due care in that they had disclosed neither the identity of AIVD members or informants nor that service’s specific modus operandi or the current state of its information.
22. A hearing in chambers (raadkamer) took place on 17 March 2006. The first applicant, in the person of its counsel Mr Le Poole, was informed by the presiding judge of its status of suspect in a criminal case and reminded of its right to refuse to answer questions; the applicants Mr De Haas and Mr Mos attended as interested parties. The first applicant offered to destroy the documents in question. The official record of the hearing contains the following, inter alia:
“The public prosecutor again addressed the court and stated, in brief, as follows:
- Examining the documents to discover their source is not the first priority, but if the opportunity arises it will certainly be used.
- Moreover, it is up to the AIVD to decide whether the documents which are currently held in the office of the investigating judge are indeed all the documents which the applicant may have had in its possession.
...
Counsel for the [first applicant] also stated, in brief, as follows:
- In view of the protection of the source the [first applicant] cannot afford to risk an examination of the documents.
- [The first applicant] has been restrained (terughoudend) in publishing information from these sources [i.e. the documents], it is known in any case that Mink K. has known their content for some time already, so that publication has not led to any serious danger.
- In my view the public prosecutor’s comparison with a firearm is inapposite. After all, [the first applicant] offers to destroy the documents immediately and is not interested in possessing them.
- [The first applicant] has never had an interest in the content of these documents. The fact that such sensitive AIVD information is circulating in criminal circles is a news item that should be made known. In this sense also [the first applicant] has fulfilled its role as public watchdog in a very circumspect fashion (op zeer omzichtige wijze).
The public prosecutor addressed the court once more and stated, in brief, as follows:
- The source who supplied the documents to [the first applicant] need not necessarily have been the leak within the AIVD’s organisation. Secret classified documents belonging to the AIVD vanished on a number of occasions over a given period, and the present documents could play a role in this investigation.
- It might indeed be possible to determine the identity of the source from an examination of the documents. However, in the context of the investigation into the leak within the AIVD, examination of the documents is not necessary in order to establish the identity of the leak since this can be done simply on the basis of the content of the documents concerned.
- The present documents should be returned to the State for the simple reason that they contain secret classified information which should not be circulated in the public domain. Until such time as it is established that the [first] applicant has indeed returned all the documents in its possession to the AIVD, destruction of the documents, as proposed by the applicant, should not be considered.
- Moreover, the [first] applicant has not observed complete restraint in relation to the publication of the documents. After all, there is no need to quote from them in order to indicate that they are in criminal hands.”
The applicants Mr De Haas and Mr Mos expressed themselves in support of the first applicant.
23. The Regional Court gave a decision dismissing the objection on 31 March 2006. Its reasoning included the following:
“The fact that the seized documents may contain fingerprints which may lead the AIVD or the Public Prosecution Service to the [first applicant’s] source or sources does not lead the court to find otherwise. As the [first applicant] has correctly argued, Article 10 of the Convention also comprises the protection of journalistic sources in order to safeguard the right freely to gather news (recht van vrije nieuwsgaring). However, the Regional Court does not consider that that right has been violated in the instant case. The Regional Court stresses that the journalists concerned have not been required to give their active co-operation to the investigation into the identity of the source, but that in the instant case all that has been sought is the handover of material that exists independently from the will of the journalists and which, in addition, is the object of a criminal act. The Regional Court therefore considers that any sanctioning of the Public Prosecution Service’s actions in the present case will not hinder any future exchange of information – albeit perhaps in a different form – between the [first applicant] and its sources.”
24. The first applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatie) with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), which on 25 March 2008 dismissed it in a decision containing the following reasoning:
“4.5 In considering that the documents seized originate from the AIVD and contain State secret information and are the object of the criminal act proscribed by Article 98c of the Criminal Code, the Regional Court has expressed the fact that the surrender order protects the interest for which that provision was enacted, namely the protection of State secrets.
Its subsequent consideration that in the present case the right to protect sources, covered by Article 10 of the Convention, has not been violated, encapsulates the finding that it is a weighty social interest that State secret information should not circulate in public and also that the interference with the right to source protection – which the Regional Court has clearly found to exist, as is not contested in this appeal – is to be considered justified in light of the circumstances of the case.
These considerations do not ... disclose an incorrect view of the applicable law, and are not incomprehensible in light of the proceedings in chambers. In so finding, the Supreme Court notes
(a) that the case file does not admit of any other conclusion than that the documents seized contain State secret information about operational investigations of the AIVD into possible interaction between the criminal substratum and law-abiding society (verwevenheid van onderwereld en bovenwereld) for the purpose of preventing serious crime, this information being important in connection with the protection of the democratic legal order and liable to endanger national security and the safety of others if made public, and
(b) that the objection adduced by the [first applicant] against surrender of the documents has been limited, as regards the measure of probability of disclosure of the source, to its fear that examination of the documents might lead to identification of the source because fingerprints might be found on these papers, in which connection the Public Prosecutor has stated that an examination of the documents, although possible, is not necessary to determine the identity of the leak within the AIVD, that already being possible using the contents of these documents, which are already known to the AIVD.”
D. Civil proceedings
25. On 2 June 2006 the applicant’s counsel Mr Le Poole wrote to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, with a copy to the head of the AIVD, demanding an end to all investigations and to the use of special powers against the second and third applicants, an undertaking to destroy all information so obtained and a further undertaking that any such information should not be used in criminal proceedings against the second and third applicants.
26. On 6 June 2006 the Permanent Secretary (secretaris-generaal) of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, replying on behalf of the Minister, wrote to Mr Le Poole refusing to give such an undertaking. To confirm or deny the use of special powers would entail the disclosure of information on specific AIVD operations, such information having to remain secret in the interests of national security. It was noted in the Permanent Secretary’s letter that questions about the case asked in Parliament had been responded to similarly.
27. On 7 June 2006 the three applicants, joined by Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisten and Nederlands Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren (see paragraphs 1 and 4 above), summoned the respondent State to appear before the Provisional Measures Judge (voorzieningenrechter) of the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague in summary injunction proceedings (kort geding). They claimed to be aware that the applicants De Haas and Mos had been subject to telephone tapping and observation, presumably by AIVD agents, from late January 2006 onwards. Such measures, in the contention of the applicants, lacked a legal basis, since the AIVD was using powers granted it by section 6 (2)(a) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten – see paragraph 51 below) to carry out duties set out in section 6(2)(c) of that Act. In the alternative, since clearly the target of the measures was the second and third applicants’ journalistic source and not the applicants themselves, basic requirements of subsidiarity and proportionality had been disregarded, the more so since the said two applicants were journalists and therefore entitled pursuant to Article 10 of the Convention to protect their journalistic sources. The applicants also claimed the protection of the second and third applicants’ private and family life, home and correspondence under Article 8 of the Convention. They sought, in essence, a provisional measure in the form of an order for the cessation of all investigations and the use of special powers against the second and third applicants, in so far as these related to the press publications referred to above; the destruction of all data obtained by their use; and an order preventing the AIVD from handing over the data to the Public Prosecution Service for use in criminal proceedings against the second and third applicants.
28. The Provisional Measures Judge gave judgment on 21 June 2006. On a preliminary point, he ruled that the applicants’ claims for provisional measures were admissible in the civil courts since no alternative procedure offering a speedy resolution of the matter or any judicial remedy other than civil proceedings was available in law. Proceeding on the assumption that the AIVD had in fact made use of its surveillance powers – which the respondent had not confirmed or denied – he then went on to hold that such use was contrary to Article 10 of the Convention. He ordered provisional measures largely in the terms requested by the applicants.
29. The State appealed to the Court of Appeal of The Hague. Again refusing to confirm or deny the use of surveillance powers against any of the applicants, they argued that the protection of journalists’ sources was not absolute and any conflict between the protection of journalistic sources and the protection of State secrets should be decided in favour of the latter. They also stated that the first, second and third applicants had gone beyond the needs of informing the public, especially by unlawfully retaining original copies of secret documents the possession of which was in itself a crime and in exposing the AIVD’s use of informants. Moreover, adequate safeguards existed in the form of the Supervisory Board for Intelligence and Security Services (Commissie van toezicht voor de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, hereafter “Supervisory Board”), two of whose members including the chairman were members of the judiciary; the Supervisory Board exercised supervision on a regular basis but also entertained complaints, and in so doing had access to information denied the civil courts. It was stated that the Supervisory Board had begun investigations into the case at the request of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
30. For their part, the applicants appealed on the ground that the Provisional Measures Judge had failed to find the AIVD at fault for misusing powers intended only for use against persons identified as “targets”, that is, who were themselves considered dangerous for national security.
31. The Court of Appeal gave judgment on 31 August 2006. It held that the use of powers of surveillance against the applicants was not per se impermissible, even though the applicants might not be targets themselves. It accepted, in the face of the State’s refusal to declare itself on this factual point, that the first, second and third applicants had made out a credible case that powers of surveillance had been used against them. This interfered with their rights under Articles 8 (private life) and 10, and was unlawful in so far as the use of the powers concerned continued after the identification of a target other than the applicants, to whom moreover the need for source protection apparently did not apply. For the remainder it allowed the State’s appeal; the State was ordered not to hand any materials or copies thereof, obtained with the use of special powers, to the Public Prosecution Service as long as the Supervisory Board had not found those materials to have been lawfully obtained.
32. Both the applicants and the State lodged appeals on points of law with the Supreme Court.
33. The Supreme Court gave judgment on 11 July 2008. Its reasoning included the following:
“3.5.3. ... The Court of Appeal was entitled to hold, without violating section 6 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, that in view of the danger threatening the effectiveness and integrity of the AIVD as a result of a ‘leak’ within the security service itself, weighty State interests were at stake, and draw the conclusion that the AIVD’s investigations against the journalists were, at least initially, covered by sub-paragraph a. ...”
and
“3.7.3. ... The Court of Appeal has not overlooked the fact that the interests of the Government invoking one of the exceptions set out in Article 8 § 2 and Article 10 § 2, if they are to justify such an exception, must tip the balance (zwaarder zullen moeten wegen) against the interests in maintaining the rights and freedoms guaranteed by those provisions. ... [The Court of Appeal’s finding] that ‘in view of the importance of the protection of journalistic sources to the freedom of the press in a democratic society and the possible chilling effect (afschrikwekkende werking) which results from the knowledge that the AIVD is using the said special powers against the journalists, ... such use is only justified by an undeniable need in the public interest (onloochenbare behoefte in het algemeen belang)’ unambiguously implies that the Court of Appeal, in applying its test, has had regard to the condition, formulated by the European Court of Human Rights, of an ‘overriding requirement in the public interest’”
and
“3.7.4.2. Part 2.4.1. [of the applicants’ statement of grounds of appeal] complains that the Court of Appeal misapplied the law in that it did not find, on the sole ground of the extreme reticence in the use of special powers and their duration given the weighty interest of protecting journalistic sources ..., that the interference with Article 10 of the Convention was from the outset not justified by an ‘overriding requirement of public interest’, instead of [finding such to be the case] from the moment the AIVD caught sight of one or more other persons. The protection of journalistic sources thus becomes entirely illusory, since the AIVD, by starting its investigation with the journalist, will always be able to trace (a person leading closer to) the source, so it is argued.
This part fails, because it essentially purports to assume that the protection of journalistic sources is absolute. It is not. The protection of journalistic sources reaches its limits in, among other things, the protection of national security and the need to prevent the dissemination of confidential information, as set out in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The Court of Appeal, in stressing the importance of ‘extreme reticence in the use of special powers’, was right not to exclude [such measures].”
and
“3.7.4.3. ... the Court of Appeal sufficiently specified the interest and the danger [involved] by stating, as the aim of the use of the special powers: the prevention of dissemination of the State secrets at issue by tracing the leak and the investigation, possibly also in order to protect the lives of others, of the consequences of publication of these State secrets.”
and
“3.7.4.5. ... The counter-argument made by De Telegraaf and the other appellants that other means were available, namely that the AIVD might have asked the journalists to name their source, was rejected by the Court of Appeal on the ground, essentially, that the journalists would not have named their source in that case either precisely because they are doing their very best to keep their sources secret. The other defence submitted by De Telegraaf and the other appellants, that the AIVD could have awaited the outcome of the criminal investigation was rejected by the Court of Appeal by pointing out that the criminal investigation and the investigation by the AIVD are entirely unrelated to each other, by which the Court of Appeal meant to express that the two investigations pursue different aims and serve different interests, so that in order to answer the question whether the use of the special powers meets the requirement of subsidiarity the outcome of the criminal investigation is, in principle, irrelevant. ...”
and
“3.8.5. ... The Court of Appeal has dismissed the primary claim under 2 (B) [i.e. the claim for an order preventing the AIVD from handing over the data to the Public Prosecution Service for use in criminal proceedings against the second and third applicants] because it could not determine which information had and which had not been lawfully obtained – meaning, plainly, on the basis of investigations what ... can be considered still lawful, or no longer lawful, vis-à-vis the journalists – and because it could not be ruled out beforehand that all the information collected had been obtained unlawfully, so that the Court of Appeal could not in reason determine what information ought to be discarded. This ground of the decision is not called into question in the statement of points of appeal, and rightly so, because the Court of Appeal had the latitude in summary injunction proceedings to find and decide thus.
It follows that the Court of Appeal has not made its decision dependent on the opinion of the Supervisory Board. ... Moreover, the Court of Appeal’s considerations do not exclude the possibility that De Telegraaf and the other appellants may, after the Supervisory Board has given its opinion, ... yet seek an order or a prohibition as here at issue from the civil courts, if by that time they still have such an interest and if in the opinion of the Supervisory Board (in so far as that opinion is public or made public afterwards in the civil proceedings) provides sufficient factual grounds for a reasoned ruling on such a claim.
For that reason the question whether the complaints procedure provided by the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act is an ‘effective remedy’ in the sense of Article 13 of the Convention need not be discussed.”
The Supreme Court dismissed both the applicants’ and the State’s appeals.
E. Questioning of the second and third applicants as witnesses in criminal proceedings
34. On 15 November 2006 the second and third applicants appeared before the investigating judge (rechter-commissaris) of the Regional Court of The Hague to be questioned as witnesses in criminal proceedings against three individuals suspected of involvement in divulging to the outside world the State secrets here in issue. Both refused to answer certain questions, including at least those questions which would be capable of leading to the disclosure of the identity of the person from whom they had received secret AIVD documents.
35. On 27 November 2006 the second and third applicants were again questioned by the investigating judge and persisted in their refusal. The three defence counsel, present at the time, asked the investigating judge to order the two applicants detained for failure to comply with a judicial order (gijzeling). The investigating judge so ordered.
36. On 30 November 2006 the Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in chambers, ordered the applicants released. It recognised the importance of the protection of journalistic sources, as stated in the case-law of the Supreme Court (see below), and found that no issue of State security could arise since the fact of the documents having become available outside the AIVD had been made common knowledge in the media.
F. The judgment in the criminal case against H.
37. The three defendants were put on trial before the Regional Court of The Hague on charges under Articles 98 and 98c of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht) (see below). The applicants have submitted a judgment of the Regional Court of The Hague convicting one of these persons (one H.) at first instance of the crime defined in Article 98 of the Criminal Code, in which it is mentioned that the documents seized from the first applicant were examined by the Netherlands Forensic Institute (Nederlands Forensisch Instituut) but that no traces were found.
G. Proceedings of the Supervisory Board and the decision of the Minister
1. The lawfulness investigation
38. On 21 June 2006 the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations informed the Lower House of Parliament that he had requested the Supervisory Board to investigate as a matter of urgency the lawfulness of the AIVD’s investigation into the leak. Its task was to cover the entire AIVD investigation into the leaking of secret classified information, including the alleged exercise of special powers in relation to the second and third applicants.
39. On 15 November 2006 the Supervisory Board presented to the Minister a report containing its findings and its advice. This was classified State secret (Stg. Geheim, the second highest classification level for State secrets). The Government quote from it in the following terms:
“[Section 9(1) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act] provides that public servants of the AIVD do not have the power to conduct a criminal investigation. The AIVD is therefore not entitled to employ any special powers with the aim of a criminal investigation. The intelligence service may only use these powers within the context of its own tasks. The areas of attention of the police and the [Public Prosecution Service] on the one hand and of the AIVD on the other hand, are sometimes in line with one another. The investigative services and the AIVD however each have their own approach towards their investigations, they operate from different perspectives. A criminal investigation is aimed at obtaining evidence on behalf of criminal proceedings. An investigation of the AIVD is on the other hand aimed at timely informing the authorities that are competent to act on any threats against the democratic legal system or threats to the security or other vital interests of the state with the purpose of preventing the harming of these interests. In the case of the leaked state secrets, a story covered by De Telegraaf, it is the investigative services’ task to collect information about the question who stole the state secrets at the BVD and which unauthorised third parties keep or kept possession of the leaked material. The investigation by the AIVD has a different focus, owing to the fact that the AIVD investigates to what extent the integrity and effective functioning of the AIVD have been, and possibly still are being, harmed. In case of a leak of this extent it is, moreover, necessary to find out if possibly more documents have been leaked and where these are, in order to identify the damage for current operational investigations and the danger to human sources and staff of the AIVD. Although the AIVD investigation is not aimed at collecting evidence for criminal proceedings, in performing its task the AIVD may come across information that may also be important for the criminal investigation and prosecution of criminal offences. In that case the AIVD based on [section 38 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act] has the possibility to make available the information to the [Public Prosecution Service] via an official message to the National Public Prosecutor for Counter-terrorism. In the investigation in hand several official messages were issued to the [Public Prosecution Service].”
40. The Government summarise the Supervisory Board’s findings as follows: The exercise of special powers by the AIVD in its investigation into the leaking of secret classified information had been lawful (i.e. necessary and in accordance with the law and with the criteria of proportionality and subsidiarity), save for a few exceptions. The tapping of the telephone of one non-target was not in keeping with the requirement of subsidiarity, and transcriptions had been made of various intercepted telephone conversations that were unrelated to the case and were also of no relevance to the performance by the AIVD of its duties. The Supervisory Board also found some transcriptions of intercepted telephone conversations in cases where the Minister had not yet given consent for electronic surveillance. In addition, it discovered that two telephone numbers that had wrongly been attributed to a target of the AIVD had been tapped. The Supervisory Board concluded that despite these lapses the data that had been provided in the official reports had been lawfully obtained.
41. On 6 December 2006 the Minister transmitted a version of the report cleansed of secret information to the Lower House of Parliament. The forwarding letter (parliamentary year 2006-07, 29 876, no. 19) contains the following:
“The AIVD investigation was intended in the first place to make an assessment of the leaked file and any other leaked documents. Within that framework it was considered necessary, among other things, to use special powers against the journalists of De Telegraaf who were in possession of the leaked file. The use of special powers was not intended directly to identify the journalists’ sources but did indirectly interfere with the journalistic right of source protection. The Supervisory Board has tested the lawfulness of the decisions concerned in the light of the applicable laws and delegated legislation and the above-mentioned requirements of necessity, proportionality and subsidiarity. In so doing the Board has taken into consideration all relevant aspects of the case, including in particular those mentioned above. The Board thus concluded that the decisions to use special powers against the journalists were lawful.”
and
“In my reaction to the supervisory report I have transmitted to your House information which the Supervisory Board has set out in the secret part of its report in accordance with section 8, third paragraph, of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act. This includes the fact, among others, that journalists have lawfully had their telephones tapped. I did not wish to supply this information earlier in the summary injunction and appeal proceedings which have taken place with regard to the present AIVD investigation. My reasons for giving you this information now are connected with the failings found by the Board in the exercise of this special power. Given the interest existing in society for the matter in question and in order to prevent incorrect speculation I consider it necessary that the said facts should be known to the public. I can only provide further operational information concerning the journalists and operational information relating to other persons to the Committee for Intelligence and Security Services (Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten) of the Lower House of Parliament.”
2. The complaint advisory proceedings
42. On 3 July 2006, that is while the first and second (criminal and civil) sets of proceedings were still pending, the applicants’ counsel Mr De Kemp wrote to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations giving notice of a complaint concerning the AIVD’s actions relating to the second and third applicants. In accordance with section 83 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act (see below), the Minister forwarded the complaint to the Supervisory Board.
43. On 6 December 2006 the Minister wrote to Mr De Kemp summarising the Board’s findings and advice and expressing his views on the matter (the report itself was not disclosed to the applicants). His letter included the following:
“[Section 6, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph a versus sub-paragraph c]
The leaking of classified AIVD information damages the integrity and functioning of that service and can in so doing endanger the national security for which the AIVD labours. The AIVD has therefore, in the opinion of the Board, rightly initiated an operational investigation within the meaning of section 6, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph a of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act.
The special powers used
The Board considers that the decision to make use of special powers against the journalists of De Telegraaf met the requirements of necessity, subsidiarity and proportionality. In other respects too, the decision to use special powers did not, in the Board’s opinion, give rise to impropriety vis-à-vis De Telegraaf and the other complainants.
The Board is of the opinion that the complaint is unfounded on these two main points.
The way in which the special powers were used
The Board finds that there have been a few lapses (onzorgvuldigheden) in the way in which telephone tapping was resorted to against the journalists. The Board is of the opinion that the way in which this was done should be considered an (implied) part of the complaint of De Telegraaf and the other complainants. After all, the complaint relates to the application of special powers. Such application includes, in the Board’s opinion, the transcription and recording of intercepted conversations. The Board finds that several of the journalists’ conversations have been transcribed and recorded which did not relate to the investigation into the leak within the AIVD and which have no further relevance to the AIVD’s discharge of its duties. Even on initial consideration this ought to have been clear in respect of a (major) portion of these too far-reaching transcriptions. The Board also finds that this information has not been destroyed after having been recorded and considered more closely.
The Board advises [the Minister] to declare the complaint well-founded in respect of this [implied] part of the complaint.
Adulteration (vermenging) with the investigation headed by the Public Prosecution Service
The Board is of the opinion that the use of special powers in the present case fell within the task of the AIVD as set out in section 2, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph a of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act. The special powers have thus not been used for the purpose of the criminal investigation. The Board therefore takes the view that there has been no adulteration of the AIVD investigation with the criminal investigation headed by the Public Prosecution Service. The issuing of official reports (ambtsberichten) in this case cannot lead to the finding that there has been adulteration of tasks and powers between the AIVD and the Public Prosecution Service. After all, this concerns the regular provision of information – which the AIVD has obtained based on its own tasks – to the Public Prosecution Service in accordance with the law in force.
The Board advises [the Minister] to declare the complaint ill-founded on this main point.
Official reports
The Board is of the opinion that the shortcomings found as regards the transcription and recording of the intercepted telephone conversations have no bearing on the lawfulness of the obtention of the information – in so far as these concern (also) the journalists – which have been made available to persons foreign to the service (extern zijn verstrekt) by means of official reports.
My view of the matter
In view of the findings of the Board and in accordance with the advice of the Board I declare the complaint unfounded on the main points, namely as regards the AIVD’s task under section 6, sub-paragraph 2, sub-paragraph a; as regards the decision to use special powers against the journalists of De Telegraaf; and as regards the adulteration of the investigations of the AIVD and the Public Prosecution Service. An implied part of the complaint, namely the transcription and recording of intercepted telephone conversations, I declare well-founded in part.
The recording and transcribing of the conversations was begun one hour too early and the conversations have been partly recorded and transcribed to too great an extent. This has harmed the interests of the journalists because too much information about them has been recorded and this information has been kept by the AIVD for too long. I have not found any circumstances requiring me to deviate from the advice of the Board on any of the parts of the complaint.
The information unlawfully recorded (ten onrechte vastgelegde gegevens) have in the meantime been removed and destroyed. In accordance with the Board’s advice, greater reticence will be exercised in future in transcribing and recording telecommunication with journalists should the situation arise.
Now that I have stated my view of your complaint, you can, if you so wish, lodge your complaint with the National Ombudsman (Nationale ombudsman) in accordance with section 83 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act.”
H. Complaint to the National Ombudsman
44. On 8 February 2007 the applicants and Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisten and Nederlands Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren, through their counsel Mr De Kemp, lodged a complaint with the National Ombudsman asking for an investigation into the AIVD’s conduct. They relied on the views expressed by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in his letter to them of 6 December 2006, which in their submission constituted an admission that special powers had actually been used against the second and third applicants.
45. The National Ombudsman replied on 5 March 2007. He pointed out that the applicants’, and indeed the State’s, appeals on points of law were still pending before the Supreme Court and that he was not empowered to investigate conduct that was the subject of proceedings pending in the civil courts. Moreover, once the Supreme Court delivered its judgment the National Ombudsman was bound to take note of the grounds on which it was based.
46. The applicants have not pursued their complaint before the National Ombudsman.
I. Official reports submitted by the applicants
47. The applicants have submitted copies of official reports (ambtsberichten) addressed by the head of the AIVD to the National Public Prosecutor for Counter-terrorism (Landelijke Officier van Justitie Terrorismebestrijding). The copies submitted to the Court bear no dates and identifying information – other than pertaining to the applicants – has been blanked out.
48. The first of these reports names a former member of the BVD, the AIVD’s predecessor, as having been in possession of State secret documents after having left the service and mentions indications that this person has received a considerable sum of money from “criminal circles”. The second names four members and former members of the BVD and the AIVD who might have had access to copies or originals of the documents handed back by the first applicant. The third report states that the second and third applicants have been in contact with persons connected with the international trade in illegal drugs. The fourth states that, according to information from a “reliable source”, the second and third journalists have tried to establish contact with one H. (understood by the Court to be a person suspected of involvement in the disclosure of AIVD information) with a view to publishing an article about him with his photograph.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. The Criminal Code
49. Provisions of the Criminal Code relevant to the case before the Court are the following:
“Article 98
1. He who deliberately delivers or makes available knowledge (inlichting) which needs to be kept secret in the interest of the State or its allies, an object from which such information can be derived, or such information (gegevens) to a person or body not authorised to take cognisance of it, shall, if he knows or ought reasonably to be aware that it concerns such knowledge, such an object or such information, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six years or a fifth-category fine [i.e. up to 74,000 euros (EUR)]. ...
Article 98c
1. The following shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six years or a fifth-category fine:
i. he who deliberately takes or keeps knowledge, an object or information as referred to in Article 98 without being duly authorised;
ii. he who undertakes any action with intent to obtain knowledge, an object or information as referred to in Article 98 without being duly authorised; ...”
B. The Code of Criminal Procedure
50. Provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering) relevant to the case before the Court are the following:
“Article 94
1. All objects are liable to seizure which may serve to establish the truth ...
2. In addition, all objects are liable to seizure which may be declared forfeit or ordered withdrawn from circulation. ...
Article 96a
1. In case of suspicion of a criminal offence as described in Article 67 § 1 [i.e. an offence attracting a prison sentence of four years or more – including the offences defined in Articles 98 and 98c of the Criminal Code – or of a number of other specified criminal acts not relevant to the present case] every civil servant invested with investigative powers (opsporingsambtenaar) may order any person who is reasonably believed to hold an item eligible for seizure to surrender it for that purpose.
2. Such an order shall not be given to the suspect.
3. Based on their privilege of non-disclosure (bevoegdheid tot verschoning), the following shall not be obliged to comply with such an order:
...
b. the persons referred to in Article 218, in so far as surrender would be incompatible with their duty of secrecy; ...
Article 218
Persons who, by virtue of their position, their profession or their office, are bound to secrecy may ... decline to give evidence or to answer particular questions, but only in relation to matters the knowledge of which is entrusted to them in that capacity.
Article 552a
1. Interested parties may lodge an objection in writing against the seizure of an object, the use made of seized objects, the failure to order the return of a seized object, ...
7. If the court finds the complaint or request well-founded, it shall give the appropriate order.”
C. The Intelligence and Security Services Act
51. Provisions of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten) relevant to the case before the Court are the following:
“Section 6
1. There shall be a General Intelligence and Security Service [i.e. the AIVD].
2. The [AIVD]’s tasks, in the interest of national security, are the following:
a. to carry out investigations relative to organisations and persons who, by the aims which they pursue or their activities, give rise to serious suspicion (het ernstige vermoeden) that they constitute a danger to the continued existence of the democratic legal order or to the security or other weighty interests of the State;
b. ...
c. to promote measures (het bevorderen van maatregelen) for the protection of the interests mentioned in sub-paragraph a, including measures aimed at securing information which needs to be kept secret in the interest of national security and of those parts of Government service and private enterprise (bedrijfsleven) which in the judgment of the Ministers invested with responsibility in the matter are of vital importance for the maintenance of social life (de instandhouding van het maatschappelijk leven);
d. to carry out investigations concerning other countries relative to subject-matter indicated by the Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs (Minister-President, Minister van Algemene Zaken [the Prime Minister being both at the same time]), in agreement with other Ministers involved; ...
Section 8
...
3. Information providing an insight into the following, at least, shall be omitted from the published annual report [sc. of the activities of the AIVD and the MIVD respectively]:
a. the means applied by the service in specific cases;
b. the secret sources used by the service;
c. the service’s current state of knowledge (actueel kennisniveau).
4. The Minister concerned may communicate the information referred to in the third paragraph to one or both Houses of Parliament in confidence. ...
Section 9
1. Officials of the [intelligence and security] services are not invested with powers of criminal investigation (bezitten geen bevoegdheid tot het opsporen van strafbare feiten). ...
Section 12
1. The [intelligence and security] services are empowered (bevoegd) to process data taking into account the constraints (eisen) posed thereon by the present Act ...
2. Data shall be processed only for a particular purpose and only in so far as is necessary for the proper implementation of this Act ...
3. Data shall be processed in accordance with the law and properly and with due care.
Section 15
The heads of the [intelligence and security] services shall see to:
a. the maintenance of the secrecy of data so designated (daarvoor in aanmerking komende gegevens);
b. the maintenance of the secrecy of sources so designated from which data are obtained;
c. the safety of the persons with whose co-operation data are collected.
Section 16
The heads of the [intelligence and security] services shall also see to:
a. the making of the arrangements necessary to ensure the correctness and completeness of the data to be processed;
b. the making of the arrangements of a technical and organisational nature necessary to secure the safety of the processing of data against loss or damage and against unauthorised processing;
c. the appointment of persons who shall be authorised, to the exclusion of others, to carry out the tasks appointed in the framework of data processing.
Section 18
A power (bevoegdheid) referred to in this chapter [i.e. the special powers referred to in sections 20 and 25, quoted below, among others] may only be exercised in so far as necessary for the proper fulfilment of the tasks referred to in section 6, second paragraph, sub-paragraphs a and d ...
Section 19
1. The exercise of a power referred to in this chapter [i.e. including the special powers referred to in sections 20 and 25] shall be permitted only if, in so far as this paragraph does not provide otherwise, the Minister concerned or, in his name, the head of the service concerned has given his permission therefor.
2. The head of a service may indicate by a written decision officials subordinate to him to give the permission referred to in the first paragraph. A copy of the decision shall be sent to the Minister concerned.
3. Except as otherwise provided by or pursuant to statute, permission shall be given for a period no longer than three months, which may, upon request, be prolonged for a further period of that length.
Section 20
1. The [intelligence and security] services are empowered to:
a. observe, and in that framework record information concerning behaviour of natural persons or information concerning objects (zaken), with or without the use of observational and recording devices;
b. follow, and in that framework record information concerning behaviour of natural persons or information concerning objects (zaken), with or without the use tracking devices, locator apparatus and recording devices. ...
Section 25
1. The [intelligence and security] services are empowered to use technical appliances for the targeted tapping, receiving, recording and monitoring (afluisteren) of every form of conversation, telecommunication or transfer of information by means of an automated system (geautomatiseerd werk), regardless of where this takes place. The power set out in the first sentence shall include the power to undo the encryption of conversations, telecommunication or transfer of information.
2. The powers referred to in the first paragraph may be used only if permission to do so has been given on a request for that purpose by the Minister concerned to the head of the [intelligence and security] service.
...
4. The request for permission referred to in [the second paragraph] shall be submitted by the head of the service and shall contain, at least, the following information:
a. an indication of the power which the service wishes to use and, in so far as applicable, the number [i.e. telephone number etc.];
b. information concerning the identity of the person or organisation in respect of whom or which, as the case may be, the use of the power concerned is sought;
c. the reason why the use of the power concerned is sought. ...
Section 31
1. The use of a power as referred to in this chapter is permissible only if the information thereby sought cannot be collected, or cannot be collected in time, by consulting sources of information accessible to anyone or sources of information in respect of which a right to take cognisance of the information therein contained has been granted to the service.
2. If the decision has been taken to collect information by the use of one or more of the [said] powers ..., only that power shall be resorted to which considering the circumstances, including the seriousness of the threat to one of the interests to be protected by [an intelligence or security service], and also in comparison with other powers available, causes the least disadvantage to the person concerned.
3. No use shall be made of a power if its use would cause disproportionate harm to the person concerned compared to the aim thereby pursued.
4. The use of a power shall be proportionate to the aim pursued.
Section 32
The use of a power as referred to in this chapter shall be terminated immediately if the aim for which the power is used, is achieved, or the use of a less intrusive power (minder ingrijpende bevoegdheid) can suffice.
Section 34
1. The Minister concerned shall examine within five years after the end of the use of special powers as referred to in ... section 25, first paragraph ..., and thereafter every year, whether the person in respect of whom one of the special powers is used can receive a report thereof. If this is possible, it shall be done without delay.
2. If it is not possible for the person in respect of whom one of the special powers referred to in the first paragraph [of this section] is used to receive a report thereof, the Supervisory Board shall be informed accordingly. ...
Section 35
The provision of data processed by or for [an intelligence or security service] to an official within the service ... shall take place only in so far as that is necessary for the proper execution of the duty with which that official is charged.
Section 36
1. The [intelligence and security] services have competence, within the framework of the proper execution of their duties, to provide information about data processed by or for the service in question to:
a. the Ministers concerned;
b. other Government bodies concerned;
c. other persons or bodies concerned;
d. designated (daarvoor in aanmerking komende) intelligence and security services of other countries and other designated international security, liaison, intelligence and intelligence organs.
...
3. Without prejudice to the provision of information as referred to in the first paragraph, information of data processed by the [intelligence and security] services in other cases can be given only in the cases provided for by this Act.
Section 38
1. If it appears, in the course of the processing of data by or for [an intelligence and security service] that data may also be of importance for the detection or prosecution of criminal acts, the Minister concerned, or the head of the service concerned on his behalf .... can inform the appointed member of the Public Prosecution Service accordingly in writing. ...
Section 43
1. Data which, in view of the purpose for which they are processed, have lost their meaning shall be removed.
2. If it appears that data are incorrect or are wrongly processed, they shall be corrected or removed respectively. The Minister concerned shall inform those to whom he has forwarded the data concerned accordingly as soon as possible.
3. The data which have been removed shall be destroyed, unless legal rules on preservation prevent this. ...
Section 64
1. There shall be a Supervisory Board for the intelligence and security services.
2. The Supervisory Board shall be charged with:
a. supervision of the legality of the execution of the provisions of this Act ...
c. advising the Ministers concerned in relation to the investigation and consideration of complaints; ...
Section 65
1. The Supervisory Board shall consist of three members, including the chairman.
2. The members shall be appointed for six years by royal decree (Koninklijk Besluit) following collective nomination by the Ministers concerned and can be reappointed only once. For the appointment of the members the Lower House of Parliament shall nominate three persons for each vacancy, one of whom shall be chosen by the Ministers concerned. In making its nomination the Lower House shall take into account, as it thinks fit, a list of recommended persons naming at least three persons for each vacancy prepared by the Vice-President of the Council of State (Raad van State), the President of the Supreme Court and the National Ombudsman.
3. The Ministers concerned may request the Lower House to submit a new nomination. ...
Section 66
The members of the Supervisory Board shall be dismissed by royal decree following collective nomination by the Ministers concerned:
...
g. if in the judgment (oordeel) of the Ministers concerned collectively, having taken note of the opinion of the Lower House, the person concerned by his acts or omissions seriously damages the trust to be placed in him.
Section 72
The meetings of the Supervisory Board shall not be public.
Section 78
1. Within the framework of its supervisory task, referred to in Section 64, second paragraph, sub-paragraph a, the Supervisory Board is empowered to investigate the way in which that which is provided in or pursuant to this Act ... has been carried out.
2. The Supervisory Board may also carry out an investigation as referred to in the first paragraph in response to a request to that effect from either of the Houses of Parliament.
3. The Minister concerned and one or both Houses of Parliament shall be informed of intended investigations, in confidence if need be.
Section 79
1. The Supervisory Board shall draw up a supervision report following its investigations. The supervision report shall be public, save as regards information as referred to in section 8, third paragraph, of this Act.
2. Before finalising the supervision report, the Supervisory Board shall offer the Minister concerned the opportunity to react to the findings contained in the supervisory report within a reasonable time set by the board.
3. Having received the reaction of the Minister concerned, the Supervisory Board shall finalise the supervision report. It may, on the basis of its findings, make recommendations to the Minister concerned regarding any measures to be taken.
4. The supervisory report, once it is finalised, shall be transmitted to the Minister concerned by the Supervisory Board.
5. The Minister concerned shall forward the supervisory report and his reaction thereto to both Houses of Parliament within six weeks. Information as referred to in section 8, third paragraph, of this Act shall in all cases be omitted. That information may be communicated to one or both Houses of Parliament for their confidential information.
Section 81
1. Data which the Ministers concerned, the heads of the [intelligence and security] services, ... and other officials involved in the execution of this Act ... have submitted to the Supervisory Board for it to carry out its tasks and which are kept by it shall not be public. ...
Section 82
Sections 15 and 16 shall apply by analogy to the Supervisory Board.
Section 83
1. Any person may lodge a complaint with the National Ombudsman about the actions or presumed actions of the Ministers concerned, the heads of the services, ... and the persons working for the services in the execution of this Act ... against (jegens) natural or legal persons.
2. Before lodging a complaint with the National Ombudsman, the complainant shall give notice to the Minister concerned of the complaint and offer him the opportunity to express his views on the matter.
3. The Minister shall, before offering his views as referred to in the second paragraph, obtain the advice of the Supervisory Board. ... [The Minister] shall not be able to give instructions to the Supervisory Board.
4. In complaints proceedings in which the Minister concerned, persons working under his responsibility or the Supervisory Board are obliged pursuant to section 9:31 of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) to give information or surrender documents to the National Ombudsman, section 9:31, fifth and sixth paragraphs [which empower the National Ombudsman to decide whether any refusal to surrender or grant access to such information or documents is justified, see below] shall not apply.
5. If the Minister concerned, persons working under his responsibility or the Supervisory Board are obliged to surrender documents, it shall be sufficient to make the documents concerned available for inspection. The documents concerned shall not be copied in any way.
Section 84
1. The National Ombudsman shall inform the complainant of his opinion of the complaint in writing, giving reasons to the extent that the security or other weighty interests of the State admit of it.
2. The National Ombudsman shall inform the Minister concerned of his opinion of the complaint in writing. The National Ombudsman may, in his communication, make such reasoned recommendations as he sees fit. The National Ombudsman may, if in his view the purport of the recommendations so justifies, also communicate them to the complainant.
3. The Minister concerned shall inform the National Ombudsman within six weeks and in writing of the consequences which he attaches to the latter’s opinion and recommendations.
4. The Minister concerned shall forward the National Ombudsman’s opinion, his advice, and the consequences to be attached thereto by the Minister concerned to one or both Houses of Parliament. The information referred to in section 8, third paragraph, shall be omitted in all cases. This information may be communicated to one or both of the Houses of Parliament for their confidential information.”
D. The General Administrative Law Act
52. The General Administrative Law Act contains provisions specific to proceedings before an Ombudsman (Chapter 9, Title 2). As relevant to the case, these provide as follows:
“Section 9:17
The expression ‘Ombudsman’ shall mean:
a. the National Ombudsman, ...
Section 9:18
1. Any person shall have the right to lodge a written request with the Ombudsman to investigate the way in which an administrative organ (bestuursorgaan) has conducted itself in a specific matter vis-à-vis them or someone else.
...
3. The Ombudsman shall be obliged to comply with a request as referred to in the first paragraph, unless section 9:22 ... applies.
Section 9:20
1. Before lodging the request with an Ombudsman, the petitioner (verzoeker) shall lodge a complaint with the administrative organ concerned, unless this cannot reasonably be expected of them. ...
Section 9:22
The Ombudsman is not competent (bevoegd) to investigate or continue an investigation if the request concerns:
a. a matter which belongs to general Government policy, including general policy for the maintenance of the legal order (rechtsorde), or the general policy of the administrative organ in question;
...
d. conduct in relation to which a decision (uitspraak) has been given by an administrative tribunal;
e. conduct in relation to which proceedings are pending before a different jurisdictional body, or an appeal lies against a decision which has been given in such proceedings as the case may be;
f. conduct that is subject to supervision by the judiciary.
Section 9:27
1. The Ombudsman shall consider whether or not the administrative organ has conducted itself with propriety (behoorlijk) in the matter which he has investigated.
2. If a jurisdictional body has given a decision in relation to the conduct to which the Ombudsman’s investigation relates, the Ombudsman shall have regard to the legal grounds on which that decision is wholly or partially based.
3. The Ombudsman may make recommendations to the administrative organ following (naar aanleiding van) his investigations.
Section 9:31
1. The administrative organ, persons working under its responsibility – even after ceasing their activities – , witnesses and the petitioner shall give the Ombudsman the necessary information and shall appear before him when invited to do so. The same obligation is incumbent on every collegiate body (college), it being understood that the collegiate body shall determine which of its members shall comply with the obligations, unless the Ombudsman indicates one or more particular members. The Ombudsman may order persons concerned who have been summoned to appear in person.
2. The Ombudsman can only obtain information relating to policy conducted under the responsibility of a minister or another administrative organ from the persons and collegiate bodies concerned through the intervention of the Minister or that administrative organ as the case may be. The organ through whose intervention the information is to be obtained may be represented by civil servants at hearings.
3. Within a time-limit to be set by the Ombudsman, documents held by the administrative organ, the person to whose conduct the investigation relates and others shall be handed over to [the Ombudsman] for the purpose of the investigation after he has so requested in writing.
4. The persons summoned in accordance with the first paragraph, or the persons who are under an obligation to surrender documents in accordance with the third paragraph, may, if there are weighty reasons to do so, refuse to give information or surrender documents as the case may be or inform the Ombudsman that he and he only shall be allowed to take cognisance of the information or the documents.
5. The Ombudsman shall decide whether the refusal or restriction on taking cognisance referred to in the fourth paragraph is justified.
6. If the Ombudsman has decided that the refusal is justified, the obligation shall be cancelled.”
E. The National Ombudsman Act
53. The National Ombudsman Act (Wet Nationale ombudsman) is applicable to the conduct of administrative organs including Government Ministers (section 1a(1)(a)). Conduct of a civil servant in the exercise of his or her functions is imputed to the administrative organ responsible
(section 1a(4)).
54. The National Ombudsman is appointed by the Lower House of Parliament, which may take such notice as it sees fit of a recommendation of three persons submitted jointly by the President of the Supreme Court, the Vice-President of the Council of State and the President of the Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer). The appointment is for six years at a time; the incumbent may be reappointed (section 2 (2)-(4)).
55. The Lower House of Parliament has the power to dismiss the National Ombudsman on specific grounds. These include unfitness as a result of invalidity or disease; taking up an official position or occupation incompatible with the position of National Ombudsman; loss of Netherlands nationality; conviction of an indictable offence (misdrijf) or any measure entailing deprivation of liberty, by a final and binding judgment; and bankruptcy, receivership (curatele), debt adjustment proceedings (schuldsanering) and detention (gijzeling) in connection with a debt pursuant to a final and binding judgment (section 3(2)). If proceedings of such nature are pending against the National Ombudsman but have not yet been brought to a conclusion, the Lower House of Parliament has the power to suspend him and withhold his salary (section 4).
F. The Government Accounts Act 2001
56. Section 6 of the Government Account Act 2001 (Comptabiliteitswet 2001) provides that a Government budget can comprise non-policy items (niet-beleidsartikelen) including items described as “secret” for liabilities, expenses and income that in the interests of the State should not be made public by attribution to a policy item. Section 87(3) provides that the Court of Audit’s supervisory tasks with respect to secret items, including the examination of information held by Government bodies (section 87(1)) and the obtaining of information from Government Ministers – which the latter are bound to hand over – shall be carried out by the President of the Court of Audit in person.
G. Relevant domestic case-law
57. Until 11 November 1977, the Netherlands Supreme Court did not recognise any journalistic privilege of non-disclosure. On that date, it handed down a judgment in which it found that a journalist, when asked as a witness to disclose his source, was obliged to do so unless it could be regarded as justified in the particular circumstances of the case that the interest of non-disclosure of a source outweighed the interest served by such disclosure.
58. This principle was reversed by the Supreme Court in a landmark judgment of 10 May 1996 on the basis of the principles set out in the Court’s judgment of 27 March 1996 in the case of Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II). In this ruling, the Supreme Court accepted that, pursuant to Article 10 of the Convention, a journalist was in principle entitled to non-disclosure of an information source unless, on the basis of arguments to be presented by the party seeking disclosure of a source, the court was satisfied that such disclosure was necessary in a democratic society for one or more of the legitimate aims set out in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie – Netherlands Law Reports – 1996, no. 578).
59. In a judgment given on 2 September 2005 concerning the search of premises of a publishing company on 3 May 1996 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2006, no. 291), the Supreme Court held inter alia:
“The right of freedom of expression, as set out in Article 10 of the Convention, encompasses also the right freely to gather news (see, amongst others, Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 March 1996, NJ 1996, no. 577; and Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, judgment of 25 February 2003 [ECHR 2003-IV]). An interference with the right freely to gather news – including the interest of protection of a journalistic source – can be justified under Article 10 § 2 in so far as the conditions set out in that provision have been complied with. That means in the first place that the interference must have a basis in national law and that those national legal rules must have a certain precision. Secondly, the interference must serve one of the aims mentioned in Article 10 § 2. Thirdly, the interference must be necessary in a democratic society for attaining such an aim. In this, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality play a role. In that framework it must be weighed whether the interference is necessary to serve the interest involved and therefore whether no other, less far-reaching ways (minder bezwarende wegen) can be followed along which this interest can be served to a sufficient degree. Where it concerns a criminal investigation, it must be considered whether the interference with the right freely to gather news is proportionate to the interest served in arriving at the truth. In that last consideration, the gravity of the offences under investigation will play a role.”
III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS
60. Several international instruments concern the protection of journalistic sources; among others, the Resolution on Journalistic Freedoms and Human Rights, adopted at the 4th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy (Prague, 7-8 December 1994) and the Resolution on the Confidentiality of Journalists’ Sources by the European Parliament (18 January 1994, Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 44/34).
61. Moreover, Recommendation No. R(2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 8 March 2000 and states, in so far as relevant:
“[The Committee of Ministers] Recommends to the governments of member States:
1. to implement in their domestic law and practice the principles appended to this recommendation,
2. to disseminate widely this recommendation and its appended principles, where appropriate accompanied by a translation, and
3. to bring them in particular to the attention of public authorities, police authorities and the judiciary as well as to make them available to journalists, the media and their professional organisations.
Appendix to Recommendation No. R (2000) 7
Principles concerning the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information
Definitions
For the purposes of this Recommendation:
a. the term ‘journalist’ means any natural or legal person who is regularly or professionally engaged in the collection and dissemination of information to the public via any means of mass communication;
b. the term ‘information’ means any statement of fact, opinion or idea in the form of text, sound and/or picture;
c. the term ‘source’ means any person who provides information to a journalist;
d. the term ‘information identifying a source’ means, as far as this is likely to lead to the identification of a source:
i. the name and personal data as well as voice and image of a source,
ii. the factual circumstances of acquiring information from a source by a journalist,
iii. the unpublished content of the information provided by a source to a journalist, and
iv. personal data of journalists and their employers related to their professional work.
Principle 1 (Right of non-disclosure of journalists)
Domestic law and practice in member States should provide for explicit and clear protection of the right of journalists not to disclose information identifying a source in accordance with Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: the Convention) and the principles established herein, which are to be considered as minimum standards for the respect of this right.
Principle 2 (Right of non-disclosure of other persons)
Other persons who, by their professional relations with journalists, acquire knowledge of information identifying a source through the collection, editorial processing or dissemination of this information, should equally be protected under the principles established herein.
Principle 3 (Limits to the right of non-disclosure)
a. The right of journalists not to disclose information identifying a source must not be subject to other restrictions than those mentioned in Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Convention. In determining whether a legitimate interest in a disclosure falling within the scope of Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Convention outweighs the public interest in not disclosing information identifying a source, competent authorities of member States shall pay particular regard to the importance of the right of non-disclosure and the pre-eminence given to it in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, and may only order a disclosure if, subject to paragraph b, there exists an overriding requirement in the public interest and if circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature.
b. The disclosure of information identifying a source should not be deemed necessary unless it can be convincingly established that:
i. reasonable alternative measures to the disclosure do not exist or have been exhausted by the persons or public authorities that seek the disclosure, and
ii. the legitimate interest in the disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in the non-disclosure, bearing in mind that:
- an overriding requirement of the need for disclosure is proved,
- the circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature,
- the necessity of the disclosure is identified as responding to a pressing social need, and
- member States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing this need, but this margin goes hand in hand with the supervision by the European Court of Human Rights.
c. The above requirements should be applied at all stages of any proceedings where the right of non-disclosure might be invoked.
Principle 4 (Alternative evidence to journalists’ sources)
In legal proceedings against a journalist on grounds of an alleged infringement of the honour or reputation of a person, authorities should consider, for the purpose of establishing the truth or otherwise of the allegation, all evidence which is available to them under national procedural law and may not require for that purpose the disclosure of information identifying a source by the journalist.
Principle 5 (Conditions concerning disclosures)
a. The motion or request for initiating any action by competent authorities aimed at the disclosure of information identifying a source should only be introduced by persons or public authorities that have a direct legitimate interest in the disclosure.
b. Journalists should be informed by the competent authorities of their right not to disclose information identifying a source as well as of the limits of this right before a disclosure is requested.
c. Sanctions against journalists for not disclosing information identifying a source should only be imposed by judicial authorities during court proceedings which allow for a hearing of the journalists concerned in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention.
d. Journalists should have the right to have the imposition of a sanction for not disclosing their information identifying a source reviewed by another judicial authority.
e. Where journalists respond to a request or order to disclose information identifying a source, the competent authorities should consider applying measures to limit the extent of a disclosure, for example by excluding the public from the disclosure with due respect to Article 6 of the Convention, where relevant, and by themselves respecting the confidentiality of such a disclosure.
Principle 6 (Interception of communication, surveillance and judicial search and seizure)
a. The following measures should not be applied if their purpose is to circumvent the right of journalists, under the terms of these principles, not to disclose information identifying a source:
i. interception orders or actions concerning communication or correspondence of journalists or their employers,
ii. surveillance orders or actions concerning journalists, their contacts or their employers, or
iii. search or seizure orders or actions concerning the private or business premises, belongings or correspondence of journalists or their employers or personal data related to their professional work.
b. Where information identifying a source has been properly obtained by police or judicial authorities by any of the above actions, although this might not have been the purpose of these actions, measures should be taken to prevent the subsequent use of this information as evidence before courts, unless the disclosure would be justified under Principle 3.
Principle 7 (Protection against self-incrimination)
The principles established herein shall not in any way limit national laws on the protection against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings, and journalists should, as far as such laws apply, enjoy such protection with regard to the disclosure of information identifying a source.”
62. For the precise application of the Recommendation, the explanatory notes specified the meaning of certain terms. As regards the term “sources” the following was set out:
“c. Source
17. Any person who provides information to a journalist shall be considered as his or her ‘source’. The protection of the relationship between a journalist and a source is the goal of this Recommendation, because of the ‘potentially chilling effect’ an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of freedom of the media (see, Eur. Court H.R., Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 27 March 1996, para. 39). Journalists may receive their information from all kinds of sources. Therefore, a wide interpretation of this term is necessary. The actual provision of information to journalists can constitute an action on the side of the source, for example when a source calls or writes to a journalist or sends to him or her recorded information or pictures. Information shall also be regarded as being ‘provided’ when a source remains passive and consents to the journalist taking the information, such as the filming or recording of information with the consent of the source.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 8 AND 10 OF THE CONVENTION
63. Articles 8 and 10 provide as follows:
Article 8
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
Article 10
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent states from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
A. The use of “special powers” against the second and third applicants
64. The applicants argued that the use of special powers against the second and third applicants had not been “in accordance with the law”, as required by Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, or “prescribed by law”, as required by Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
65. The Government denied that there had been a violation of either Article.
1. Admissibility
66. The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3(a) of the Convention. Nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Argument before the Court
(a) Government
67. The Government recognised that the second and third applicants had been under investigation and that special powers had been used against them, including the power to intercept and record telecommunications. This had undoubtedly entailed interference with their right to respect for their private and family life, protected by Article 8; it could also be construed as an interference with their freedom to receive and impart information and ideas, protected by Article 10.
68. The statutory basis for the interference had been constituted by section 6(2)(a) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, which – along with its drafting history – was at all times accessible to the public.
69. Referring to the Court’s case-law, in particular Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), no. 54934/00, ECHR 2006-XI, the Government stated that the situations which might attract the use of the AIVD’s special powers were set out in section 6 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act. Moreover, the AIVD published annual reports in which it identified the areas on which it had focused in the past year and the areas on which it would focus in the year ahead. The duty to publish an annual report had been expressly included in the legislation precisely to enhance the transparency of the AIVD’s use of its powers. The nature of the “offences” which might give rise to the interference in question was thus as foreseeable as it could be. The Government asked the Court to bear in mind that the expression “offence”, in the context of cases such as the present, had a connotation different from its primary meaning derived from criminal law.
70. Even so, situations were bound to occur which were not foreseeable, but in which action by the AIVD was clearly necessary in view of its task and the interests which it served. The present case was one such.
71. Safeguards were in place. As the Supervisory Board had established, the use of special powers had not continued any longer than was permissible in the light of the applicable provisions. The processing – examination, use and storage – of data was subject to the statutory requirements set out in section 12 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act. Shortcomings identified by the Supervisory Board had been addressed and the data wrongly recorded had been removed and destroyed (see paragraph 43 above).
72. Statutory requirements set out in section 38 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act governed the transmission of information to the Public Prosecution Service. As was reflected in the Minister’s letter of 6 December 2006 to the applicants’ counsel (see paragraph 43 above), these had been complied with.
73. A monitoring and control system was in place, consisting of the following bodies:
a) the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament, and insofar as the covert operations of the intelligence and security services are concerned, the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services of the Lower House;
b) the Court of Audit and – in the case of the secret budget items of the intelligence and security services – the president of the Court of Audit personally;
c) the National Ombudsman;
d) the administrative courts in the case of decisions subject to judicial review, such as requests for access to data;
e) the civil courts where an intelligence or security service has committed an unlawful act in respect of a person or organisation;
f) the criminal courts where an official was called to account as a defendant or was summoned as a witness;
g) the Supervisory Board.
These various supervisory and monitoring bodies did not exclude one another. However, the supervision and monitoring by each of the bodies was subject to limitations depending on the type of authority and the stage of the investigation. These limitations followed from the intrinsically secret nature of the activities of intelligence and security services.
74. The use of special powers required the prior authorisation of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The request for authorisation had to mention the particular status, if any, of the person under investigation – for example, the status of journalist.
75. The interference complained of had had a “legitimate aim” in that it served the interests of national security, which had been directly compromised by the leaking of secret classified information.
76. As to “necessity in a democratic society”, the Government pointed out that protecting national security was one of the main functions of the State. If it was found that secret classified information had been leaked from the AIVD, its ability to operate reliably was at stake and hence national security as well. In this case, moreover, the nature and content of the leaked information had been such that an investigation into the leak had been necessary, taking into account the statutory duty of care in respect of the security of persons with whose help data were collected and the secrecy of the relevant data and sources. For example, the operational names of two sources had been published in De Telegraaf together with contextual information capable of enabling dangerous criminals to discover the true identity of the persons concerned. There had therefore been a statutory duty to take action.
77. An alternative to the use of special powers had not been available, given that those responsible for the leak had a vested interest in concealing the facts and circumstances.
78. The AIVD’s purpose had not been to identify the applicants’ journalistic sources; source protection was therefore not in issue.
79. Domestic law itself – to wit, sections 31 and 32 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act – laid down the requirements of subsidiarity and proportionality, subject to monitoring by the Supervisory Board and with the possibility of lodging a complaint with the National Ombudsman.
(b) Applicants
80. The applicants agreed with the Government that the use of special powers against the second and third applicants constituted an “interference” with their rights under Articles 8 and 10. They suggested, however, that the Government’s admission that they had been “targets” within the meaning of section 6(2)(a) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act was inconsistent with the position taken by the domestic courts, in particular the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 31 above).
81. If the second and third applicants had not themselves been “targets” within the meaning of section 6(2)(a), then the use of special powers against them had lacked a statutory basis. If, on the contrary view, the second and third applicants had been targets – a position which the applicants described as “preposterous”, since it would imply that they constituted a menace to the continued existence of the democratic legal order –, then a statutory basis had to be admitted.
82. However, safeguards against abuse were insufficient given that there was no prior judicial review of the use of special powers. Authorisation given by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations was not sufficient, since the Minister was hardly independent and impartial.
83. A necessity in a democratic society for the interference had not been shown. The AIVD documents received by the applicants related to the period 1997-2000; the newspaper articles concerned had all been published in 2006, approximately six years later. In the applicants’ submission, there was no appearance of any danger to informants, whose identity the newspaper publications did not reveal; nor had the AIVD’s operating procedures been divulged. At all events, the information itself contained in the documents had all been in the hands of criminals for a long time already.
3. The Court’s assessment
(a) Interference
84. The applicant and respondent parties agree that there has been an “interference” with the rights of the second and third applicants under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, but disagree on its precise nature.
85. The Government dispute the applicants’ position that the protection of journalistic sources is in issue. They argue that the AIVD resorted to the use of special powers not to establish the identity of the applicants’ journalistic sources of information, but solely to identify the AIVD staff member who had leaked the documents.
86. The Court is prepared to accept that the AIVD’s purpose in seeking to identify the person or persons who had supplied the secret documents to the applicants was subordinate to its main aim, which was to discover and then close the leak of secret information from within its own ranks. However, that is not decisive (see Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 38224/03, § 66, 14 September 2010). The Court’s understanding of the concept of journalistic “source” is “any person who provides information to a journalist”; it understands “information identifying a source” to include, as far as they are likely to lead to the identification of a source, both “the factual circumstances of acquiring information from a source by a journalist” and “the unpublished content of the information provided by a source to a journalist” (see Recommendation No. R(2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information (quoted in paragraph 61 above); compare also Sanoma, §§ 65-66, and Weber and Saravia, §§ 144-45).
87. As in Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, no. 51772/99, § 52, ECHR 2003‑IV; Ernst and Others v. Belgium, no. 33400/96, § 100, 15 July 2003; Tillack v. Belgium, no. 20477/05, § 64, 27 November 2007; and Sanoma, loc. cit., the Court must therefore find that the AIVD sought, by the use of its special powers, to circumvent the protection of a journalistic source (compare and contrast Weber and Saravia, cited above, § 151).
88. Although questions raised by surveillance measures are usually considered under Article 8 alone, in the present case they are so intertwined with the Article 10 issue that the Court finds it appropriate to consider the matter under Articles 8 and 10 concurrently.
(b) “In accordance with the law/prescribed by law”
89. The Court must now decide whether the interference was “in accordance with the law” (Article 8) or “prescribed by law” (Article 10) – expressions which, although they differ in the English text of the Convention (both correspond to prévue(s) par la loi in the French version), are identical in meaning (see The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 48, Series A no. 30, and Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1983, § 85, Series A no. 61).
90. The Court reiterates its case-law according to which the expression “in accordance with the law” not only requires the impugned measure to have some basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects. The law must be compatible with the rule of law, which means that it must provide a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by Article 8 § 1 and Article 10 § 1. Especially where, as here, a power of the executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. Since the implementation in practice of measures of secret surveillance is not open to scrutiny by the individuals concerned or the public at large, it would be contrary to the rule of law for the legal discretion granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference (see Weber and Saravia, cited above, §§ 93-95 and 145; Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden, no. 62332/00, § 76, ECHR 2006‑VII; Liberty and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 58243/00, §§ 62‑63; 1 July 2008; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, no. 26839/05, § 152, 18 May 2010).
91. There is no suggestion that the law was not accessible.
92. The letters which the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations sent on 6 December 2006 to the Lower House of Parliament (paragraph 41 above) and to the applicants’ counsel (paragraph 43) show that the use of special powers against the second and third applicants was considered lawful for the purposes of section 6(2)(a) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act. The Supreme Court’s judgment (§ 3.5.3, see paragraph 33 above) is based on the same view, at least for an initial period. The Court therefore finds that the statutory basis for the interference in question was section 6(2)(a) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act.
93. The possibility that the applicants might be placed under surveillance was not predictable in the sense that their situation corresponded to a precise statutory prescription. Nevertheless, even though the second and third applicants may resent the suggestion that their actions constituted a threat to the Netherlands democratic legal order, they could not reasonably be unaware that the information which had fallen into their hands was authentic classified information that had unlawfully been removed from the keeping of the AIVD and that publishing it was likely to provoke action aimed at discovering its provenance. On its own reading of section 6(2)(a) and (c) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, the Court is prepared to accept that the interference complained of was, in that sense, foreseeable.
94. As to the available safeguards, the applicants do not allege that the array of supervisory and monitoring procedures described by the Government (see paragraph 73 above) is in itself insufficient.
95. Rather, it is the applicants’ contention that their status as journalists required special safeguards to ensure adequate protection of their journalistic sources. The Court will now turn to this issue.
96. In Weber and Saravia, the interference with the applicants’ rights under Articles 8 and 10 consisted of the interception of telecommunications in order to identify and avert dangers in advance, or “strategic monitoring” as it is also called. The first applicant in that case being a journalist, the Court found that her right to protect her journalistic sources was in issue (loc. cit., §§ 144-45). However, the aim of strategic monitoring was not to identify journalists’ sources. Generally the authorities would know only when examining the intercepted telecommunications, if at all, that a journalist’s conversation had been monitored. Surveillance measures were, in particular, not directed at uncovering journalistic sources. The interference with freedom of expression by means of strategic monitoring could not, therefore, be characterised as particularly serious (loc. cit., § 151). Although admittedly there was no special provision for the protection of freedom of the press and, in particular, the non-disclosure of sources once the authorities had become aware that they had intercepted a journalist’s conversation, the safeguards in place, which had been found to satisfy the requirements of Article 8, were considered adequate and effective for keeping the disclosure of journalistic sources to an unavoidable minimum (loc. cit., § 151).
97. The present case is characterised precisely by the targeted surveillance of journalists in order to determine from whence they have obtained their information. It is therefore not possible to apply the same reasoning as in Weber and Saravia.
98. The Court has indicated, when reviewing legislation governing secret surveillance in the light of Article 8, that in a field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such harmful consequences for democratic society as a whole, it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge (see Klass and Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, § 56, Series A no. 28, and Kennedy, cited above, § 167). However, in both cases the Court was prepared to accept as adequate the independent supervision available. In Klass and Others, this included a practice of seeking prior consent to surveillance measures of the G 10 Commission, an independent body chaired by a president who was qualified to hold judicial office and which moreover had the power to order the immediate termination of the measures in question (mutatis mutandis, Klass and Others, §§ 21 and 51; see also Weber and Saravia, §§ 25 and 117). In Kennedy (loc. cit.) the Court was impressed by the interplay between the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (“IPT”), an independent body composed of persons who held or had held high judicial office and experienced lawyers which had the power, among other things, to quash interception orders, and the Interception of Communications Commissioner, likewise a functionary who held or had held high judicial office (Kennedy, § 57) and who had access to all interception warrants and applications for interception warrants (Kennedy, § 56).
99. In contrast, in Sanoma, an order involving the disclosure of journalistic sources was given by a public prosecutor. The Court dismissed as inadequate in terms of Article 10 the involvement of an investigating judge, since his intervention, conceded voluntarily by the public prosecutor, lacked a basis in law and his advice was not binding. Judicial review post factum could not cure these failings, since it could not prevent the disclosure of the identity of the journalistic sources from the moment when this information came into the hands of the public prosecutor and the police (loc. cit., §§ 96-99).
100. In the instant case, as the Agent of the Government admitted at the hearing in reply to a question from the Court, the use of special powers would appear to have been authorised by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, if not by the head of the AIVD or even a subordinate AIVD official, but in any case without prior review by an independent body with the power to prevent or terminate it (section 19 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, see paragraph 51 above).
101. Moreover, review post factum, whether by the Supervisory Board, the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services of the Lower House of Parliament or the National Ombudsman, cannot restore the confidentiality of journalistic sources once it is destroyed.
102. The Court thus finds that the law did not provide safeguards appropriate to the use of powers of surveillance against journalists with a view to discovering their journalistic sources. There has therefore been a violation of Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention.
B. The order to surrender the documents
103. The applicants argued that the order to surrender the original documents, ostensibly for the purpose of restoring the documents to the AIVD, had in fact been intended to make possible the positive identification of the journalistic source. The applicants alleged a violation of their freedom, as purveyors of news, to impart information as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention.
104. The Government denied that there had been any such violation.
1. Admissibility
105. The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3(a) of the Convention. Nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Argument before the Court
(a) Government
106. Under the head of “duties and responsibilities”, the Government raised two points.
107. Firstly, the Government considered the present case different in essential respects from Voskuil v. the Netherlands, no. 64752/01, 22 November 2007. The primary purpose of the surrender order had not been to identify the applicants’ journalistic sources, nor even the leak from within the AIVD – who was identifiable simply by studying the content of the information unlawfully leaked – but to withdraw the documents from public circulation. It was moreover found that the applicants had not returned all of the documents immediately; had they done so at the outset, there would have been no need for the surrender order.
108. Secondly, the Government submitted that although the fact itself that secret classified documents had fallen into the hands of the criminal classes was a matter of public interest and therefore newsworthy, the applicants had gone beyond what was necessary in publishing information which they contained. Details published had included the code names of two informants and contextual information capable of identifying them, which had compromised both their safety (and that of their families and others in their immediate circle of acquaintance) and national security.
109. The surrender order undoubtedly constituted an “interference”.
110. The interference had been “prescribed by law”. The crucial difference between the present case and Sanoma was that the lawfulness of the surrender order was assessed by a court by virtue of its statutory power before the documents were handed over for inspection.
111. The “legitimate aims” pursued by the interference had been “national security” and “the prevention of crime”.
112. Finally, the interference had been “necessary in a democratic society” for the furtherance of these aims. As stated above, it was necessary to ensure that all the documents should be returned to the AIVD. It was also important to investigate whether it was possible to determine if there had been access to the documents and if so, by whom (other than the second and third applicants and H., by then already a suspect). Again as already mentioned, the safety of two informants and members of their families and their immediate circle was in jeopardy as well.
113. A surrender order had been the least intrusive measure available, and therefore to be preferred to a search of the applicants’ premises such as those carried out by the authorities in the cases of Roemen and Schmit and Ernst and Others, cited above.
114. Finally, and again as already noted, there had been an independent review by a court before the documents were passed on to the National Police Investigations Department.
(b) Applicants
115. The applicants complained that although ostensibly the primary purpose of the surrender order had been to withdraw the documents from public circulation, in fact the intention had been to subject them to technical examination and identify the applicants’ source. They pointed to the public prosecutor’s admission (see paragraph 22 above) and that of the Government that the identity of the AIVD official who leaked the documents had already been known simply from studying the content of the documents and identifying the AIVD officials who had had access to them, and also to the judgment convicting H. of the leaks (see paragraph 37 above), which reflected the fact that the documents had actually been examined.
116. The documents obtained by the second and third applicants contained relatively old information, which moreover had already become known in criminal circles. The Government’s interest in keeping the information secret had therefore not been prejudiced by the publications in De Telegraaf, but by the leak from within the AIVD; it followed that the action taken against the applicants could have had no other purpose than to trace the path followed by the documents back to the leak.
117. Referring to the above-mentioned Sanoma judgment, they argued that orders to disclose sources might have a detrimental impact, not only on the source, but also on the newspaper itself, which would no longer be trusted by potential sources, and on the public, who had an interest in receiving information imparted through anonymous sources. In addition, they argued, referring to the same judgment, that there was no procedure attended by adequate legal safeguards for them to enable an independent assessment as to whether the interest of the criminal investigation overode the public interest in the protection of journalistic sources.
3. The Court’s assessment
(a) Interference
118. All agree that there has been an “interference” with the first applicant’s freedom to receive and impart information. The Court so finds (see Sanoma, cited above, § 72).
(b) Prescribed by law
119. It is not in dispute that the surrender order had a statutory basis, namely Article 96a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 50 above). The Court so finds (see Sanoma, cited above, § 86).
120. As regards the procedural safeguards available, the Court finds that the present case differs in essential respects from Sanoma. The documents were placed in a container by a notary and sealed, after which the container with the documents was handed over to the investigating judge to be kept in a safe unopened pending the outcome of objection proceedings in the Regional Court (see paragraph 20 above). The applicants agreed to this procedure with the public prosecutor. Moreover, as the Government correctly point out, it had a statutory basis, namely Article 552a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which moreover empowers the Regional Court to give any orders needed (see paragraph 50 above; compare and contrast Sanoma, §§ 96-97).
121. The interference complained of was therefore “prescribed by law”.
(c) Legitimate aim
122. It is not in dispute that the aims pursued by the interference were, at the very least, “national security” and “the prevention of crime” as the Government state. The Court so finds.
(d) Necessary in a democratic society
123. The test of “necessity in a democratic society” requires the Court to determine whether the “interference” complained of corresponded to a “pressing social need”, whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient (see, among many other authorities, The Sunday Times, cited above, § 62). In assessing whether such a “need” exists and what measures should be adopted to deal with it, the national authorities are left a certain margin of appreciation. This power of appreciation is not, however, unlimited but goes hand in hand with European supervision by the Court, whose task it is to give a final ruling on whether a restriction is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 (see, among many other authorities, Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, § 88, ECHR 2004‑XI; Voskuil, cited above, § 63; and TV Vest AS and Rogaland Pensjonistparti v. Norway, no. 21132/05, § 58, ECHR 2008 (extracts)).
124. The Court’s task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place of the competent national authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient” and whether it was “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”. In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they relied on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see, among many other authorities, Hertel v. Switzerland, 25 August 1998, § 46, Reports 1998‑VI; Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre, cited above, § 90; Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017/99, §§ 68-71, ECHR 2004‑XI; Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, § 87, ECHR 2005‑II; Mamère v. France, no. 12697/03, § 19, ECHR 2006‑XIII; Lindon, Otchakovsky‑Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, § 45, ECHR 2007‑IV; Voskuil, cited above, § 63; and Guja v. Moldova [GC], no. 14277/04, § 69, ECHR 2008).
125. Since 1985 the Court has frequently made mention of the task of the press as purveyor of information and “public watchdog” (see, among many other authorities, Barthold v. Germany, 25 March 1985, § 58, Series A no. 90; Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, § 44, Series A no. 103; Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, § 63, Series A no. 239; Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre, cited above, § 93; Voskuil, cited above, § 64; and Financial Times Ltd. and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 821/03, § 59, 15 December 2009).
126. Under the terms of Article 10 § 2, the exercise of freedom of expression carries with it duties and responsibilities which also apply to the press. Article 10 protects a journalist’s right – and duty – to impart information on matters of public interest provided that he is acting in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalism (Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, § 54, ECHR 1999‑I; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 65, ECHR 1999‑III; and Financial Times Ltd. and Others, cited above, § 62).
127. Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom, as is recognised and reflected in various international instruments including the Committee of Ministers Recommendation quoted in paragraph 61 above. Without such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result the vital public-watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected. Having regard to the importance of the protection of journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic society and the potentially chilling effect an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of that freedom, such a measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest (see Goodwin, cited above, § 39; Voskuil, cited above, § 65; Financial Times Ltd. and Others, cited above, § 59; and Sanoma, cited above, § 51).
128. While it may be true that the public perception of the principle of non-disclosure of sources would suffer no real damage where it was overridden in circumstances where a source was clearly acting in bad faith with a harmful purpose (for example, by intentionally fabricating false information), courts should be slow to assume, in the absence of compelling evidence, that these factors are present in any particular case. In any event, given the multiple interests in play, the Court emphasises that the conduct of the source can never be decisive in determining whether a disclosure order ought to be made but will merely operate as one, albeit important, factor to be taken into consideration in carrying out the balancing exercise required under Article 10 § 2 (Financial Times Ltd. and Others, cited above, § 63).
129. Turning to the facts of the case, the Court notes that before the Regional Court the public prosecutor stated that the primary purpose of the surrender order was to return them to the AIVD, although if the opportunity arose to examine them for usable traces it would be taken. However, as the public prosecutor admitted, even without detailed technical examination of the documents the culprits could be found simply by studying the contents of the documents and identifying the officials who had had access to them (see paragraph 22 above). That being so, the need to identify the AIVD official concerned cannot alone justify the surrender order.
130. Although the full contents of the documents had not come to the knowledge of the general public, it is highly likely that that information had long been circulating outside the AIVD and had come to the knowledge of persons described by the parties as criminals. Withdrawing the documents from circulation could therefore no longer prevent the information which they contained – including the code names and other information identifying AIVD informants – from falling into the wrong hands (see The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 2), 26 November 1991, § 54, Series A
no. 217; Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 26 November 1991, § 68, Series A no. 216; and Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v. the Netherlands, 9 February 1995, § 45, Series A no. 306‑A).
131. There remains the need for the AIVD to check whether all the documents removed from its keeping had been withdrawn from circulation. The Court accepts that this is a legitimate concern. However, that is not sufficient to find that it constituted “an overriding requirement in the public interest” justifying the disclosure of the applicant’s journalistic source. The Court takes the view that the actual handover of the documents taken was not necessary: since – as appears from the Minister’s letter of 20 December 2006 to the Lower House (see paragraph 18 above) – these were copies not originals, visual inspection to verify that they were complete, followed by their destruction (as was in fact proposed by the first applicant, see paragraph 22 above), would have sufficed.
132. In sum, “relevant and sufficient” reasons for the interference complained of have not been given. There has therefore been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
133. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
134. The applicants made no claims in respect of pecuniary or non‑pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
135. In respect of costs and expenses, the applicants claimed a total sum of EUR 168.888,47 including value-added tax. They submitted detailed invoices and time-sheets.
136. The Government acknowledged the unusual volume and complexity of the case but considered the hourly rates charged excessive.
137. According to the Court’s consistent case-law, applicants are entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum; furthermore, legal costs are recoverable only in so far as they relate to the violation found (see, as a recent authority, S.T.S. v. the Netherlands, no. 277/05, § 73, ECHR 2011, with further references).
138. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 60,000 not including value-added tax, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants on that amount.
C. Default interest
139. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Declares unanimously the remainder of the application admissible;
2. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention as regards the use by the AIVD of special powers against the second and third applicants;
3. Holds by five votes to two that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention as regards the order for the surrender of documents addressed to the first applicant;
4. Holds unanimously
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 60,000 (sixty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 22 November 2012.
Marialena Tsirli Josep Casadevall
Deputy Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judges Myjer and López Guerra is annexed to this judgment.
J.C.M.
M.T.
JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES MYJER AND LÓPEZ GUERRA
1. We voted with the majority finding that there was a violation in relation to the use of "special powers" against the second and third applicants.
2. As far as the order to surrender the documents is concerned, we are however of the opinion that there has been no violation. We consider that there are important distinctions to be made between the present case and other cases in which the Court has had to consider the importance of protecting journalistic sources.
3. We agree that civil servants may in certain circumstances have the right, and even the duty, to disclose information to the outside world in the public interest (see, for example, Guja v. Moldova [GC], no. 14277/04, §§ 72-97, ECHR 2008, and Heinisch v. Germany, no. 28274/08, §§ 62-93, ECHR 2011 (extracts)). However, neither the applicants nor the respondent Government have suggested that such circumstances obtained in the present case. It must therefore in our view be accepted that the respondent Government were in principle entitled to determine the identity of the person who had unlawfully taken the documents concerned and placed them in the hands of a person or persons not authorised to receive them.
4. The documents themselves, moreover, were criminally obtained or photocopied in the perpetration of a criminal act. As such, they could properly be seized as “objects ... which [might] serve to establish the truth” (Article 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, see paragraph 50 of the judgment). That being the case, it is unconscionable that whoever has obtained the documents should be allowed to set conditions for their return to the person or institution that has title to them. In our view, this holds true even if the documents happen to be in the possession of the press.
5. Turning to the facts of this case, we consider that it was properly for the institution which held title to the documents – the AIVD, as it happens – itself to determine the reasons for which to demand the return of the documents. If documents criminally obtained or photocopied in the perpetration of a criminal act can, for the sole reason that they have come into the possession of the press, no longer be seized except on conditions posed by the press itself, the press is granted a privilege for which we see no justification. It is in our view wrong to weigh against the rights of the owner of the documents the possibility that the documents may be examined for traces capable of identifying the person who committed the original crime. In this the present case differs from other cases concerning the protection of journalistic sources.
6. It should be pointed out at this juncture that the right to protect the confidentiality of journalists’ sources is not absolute. As mentioned in paragraph 96 of the judgment, the Court has accepted that the disclosure of information identifying journalistic sources may occur unavoidably in the process of “strategic monitoring” despite reasonable measures taken by the authorities. Closer to the facts of the present case, the Court has consistently accepted, in a phrase repeated many times since its first use in Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 27 March 1996, § 39, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 II, that an order leading to the disclosure of a journalistic source may be compatible with Article 10 if – but only if – it is justified by an “overriding requirement in the public interest” (see Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, no. 51772/99, § 46, ECHR 2003 IV; Ernst and Others v. Belgium, no. 33400/96, § 91, 15 July 2003; Tillack v. Belgium, no. 20477/05, § 53, 27 November 2007; Voskuil v. the Netherlands, no. 64752/01, § 65, 22 November 2007; Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 821/03, § 59, 15 December 2009; and Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 38224/03, § 51, 14 September 2010. This is also reflected in principle 3 of Recommendation No. R(2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information (see paragraph 61 of the judgment).
7. In view of the very nature of their position, civil servants often have access to information which the government, for various legitimate reasons, may have an interest in keeping confidential or secret. Therefore, the duty of discretion owed by civil servants will also generally be a strong one (Guja, cited above, § 71). In our opinion, this duty weighs even more heavily in the case of an official belonging to a service like the AIVD, which by its very nature has to guard the secrecy of its information (see, mutatis mutandis, Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, 16 December 1992, § 46, Series A no. 252; Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v. the Netherlands, 9 February 1995, § 35, Series A no. 306 A; and Pasko v. Russia, no. 69519/01, § 86, 22 October 2009).
8. The present case is distinguishable from earlier cases like The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 2), 26 November 1991, Series A no. 217; Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 26 November 1991, Series A no. 216; and Vereniging Weekblad Bluf!, cited above. In those cases the Court was able to find violations of Article 10 on the ground that the secrecy of the information which the measures complained of purported to protect was already compromised. In contrast, in the present case the issue is not so much the need to protect the secrecy of the information itself, but the very fact that, secret or not, information was allowed to fall into the hands of persons not authorised to receive it by the misconduct of an AIVD official.
9. Likewise, we cannot find it unreasonable that the Netherlands authorities refused to accept the first applicant’s offer to destroy the documents. The Court has held that Article 10 cannot be interpreted as prohibiting the forfeiture in the public interest of items whose use has lawfully been adjudged illicit (see, mutatis mutandis, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, § 63, Series A no. 24, and Otto‑Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, § 57, Series A no. 295‑A). We cannot see that similar reasoning should not apply in the present case. We therefore consider that the Netherlands State was entitled to have the possession of the actual documents restored to it.
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