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Praktični vodič za primenu Evropske konvencije o ljudskim pravima
Priručnici i vodiči kroz praksu Evropskog suda za ljudska prava
Evropski sud za ljudska prava u 50 pitanja
Glosar Evropske Konvencije o ljudskim pravima
Nacionalna mreža sudija i tužilaca za primenu standarda Evropskog suda za ljudska prava
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EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
DRUGO ODELJENJE
PREDMET SIDABRAS I DŽIAUTAS PROTIV LITVANIJE
(Predstavke br. 55480/00 i br. 59330/00)
PRESUDA
STRAZBUR
27. jul 2004.
PRAVOSNAŽNA
27. oktobar 2004.
U predmetu Sidabras i Džiautas protiv Litvanije, Evropski sud za ljudska prava (Drugo odeljenje) zasedajući u veću u čijem su sastavu učestvovali:
G. L. LUKAIDES (L. LOUCAIDES), predsednik,
G. Ž.-P. Kosta (J.P. COSTA),
G. Č. BIRSAN (C. BIRSAN),
G. K. JUNGVIRT (K. JUNGWIERT),
G. V. BUTKEVIČ (V. BUTKEVYCH),
Gđa. V. TOMASEN (W. THOMASSEN),
Gđa. A. MULARONI, sudije,
i Gđa. S. Dole (S. DOLLE), sekretar odeljenja,
koji je zasedao na zatvorenim sednicama 1. jula 2003, 21. oktobra 2003. i 6. jula 2004.godine, izriče sledeću presudu koja je usvojena poslednjeg navedenog datuma:
POSTUPAK
Predmet je potekao iz predstavki (br. 55480/00 i br. 59330/00) koje su protiv Republike Litvanije podnela Sudu, na osnovu člana 34 Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: Konvencija), dvojica litvanskih državljana, g. Juozas Sidabras i g. Kenstutis Džiautas (u daljem tekstu: podnosioci) dana 29. novembra 1999, odnosno 5. jula 2000. godine.
Podnosioce zastupaju g. E. Morkunjas, advokat s praksom u gradu Šiauliai i g. V. Barkauskas, advokat s praksom u Viljnusu. Litvansku vladu (u daljem tekstu: država) zastupaju njeni zastupnici, g. G. Švedas i gđa. D. Jočiene, iz Ministarstva pravde.
Podnosioci predstavke su posebno naglasili da su izgubili poslove koje su obavljali i da su im mogućnosti zapošljavanja sužene zbog primene Zakona o oceni delovanja Državnog komiteta za bezbednost SSSR (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) i o sadašnjim aktivnostima bivših stalno zaposlenih u toj organizaciji, što predstavlja povredu članova 8, 10 i 14 Konvencije.
Predstavke su prosleđene Trećem odeljenju Suda (pravilo 52 st. 1 Poslovnika). U okviru tog odeljenja konstituisano je veće koje će razmotriti ovaj predmet (član 27 st. 1 Konvencije) u skladu s pravilom 26 stav 1 G. P. Kiris (Kuris) sudija koji je izabran s liste Litvanije, povukao se iz postupanja po ovom predmetu (pravilo 28). Država je u skladu s tim imenovala g. Ž. P. Kostu, sudiju izabranog s liste Francuske, da postupa umesto njega (član 27 st. 2 Konvencije i pravilo 29 st. 1 Poslovnika).
Sud je 1. novembra 2001. promenio sastav svojih odeljenja (pravilo 25 st. 1). Ovaj predmet je poveren novoformiranom Drugom odeljenju (pravilo 52 st. 1). U okviru tog odeljenja sastavljeno je veće koje će razmatrati predmet (član 27 st. 1 Konvencije) u skladu s pravilom 26 stav 1.
Veće je donelo odluku o spajanju predstavki (pravilo 42 st. 1).
U zgradi Suda u Strazburu 1. jula 2003. održano je javno ročište (pravilo 59 st. 3).
Pred Sudom su se pojavili:
(a) u ime Države
Gđa. D. JOČIENE, zastupnik
(b) u ime podnosilaca predstavke
E. Morkunjas,
G.V. Barkauskas advokati.
Sud je saslušao njihova obraćanja.
ČINJENIČNO STANJE
I OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA
Okolnosti predmeta, onako kako su ih predstavile stranke u sporu, mogu se rezimirati na sledeći način:
A. Prvi podnosilac
Prvi podnosilac je diplomirao na litvanskom Institutu za fizičku kulturu 1974. godine i stekao diplomu ovlašćenog instruktora sporta.
Od 1975. do 1986. godine prvi podnosilac je bio zaposlen u litvanskom ogranku Sovjetske službe bezbednosti (u daljem tekstu “KGB”). Pošto je Litvanija proglasila nezavisnost 1990. godine prvi podnosilac predstavke našao je zaposlenje kao poreski inspektor u Upravi prihoda.
Dva organa vlasti - Litvansko odeljenje za državnu bezbednost i Centar za istraživanje genocida i otpora litvanskog naroda - dana 31. maja 1999. godine zajednički su zaključila da prvi podnosilac predstavke podleže ograničenjima propisanim delom 2 Zakona o proceni Komiteta za državnu bezbednost SSSR (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) i sadašnjim aktivnostima bivših stalno zaposlenih u toj organizaciji (u daljem tekstu: “Zakon o KGB”, vidi dole stav 24). U zaključku je potvrđeno da je prvi podnosilac predstavke imao status “bivšeg oficira KGB” (vidi dole stav 27). Prvi podnosilac predstavke je otpušten 2. juna 1999. godine iz Uprave prihoda upravo na temelju tog zaključka.
Prvi podnosilac predstavke pokrenuo je administrativni spor protiv obaveštajno bezbednosnih organa, tvrdeći da se tokom svog rada u KGB bavio samo kontraobaveštajnim i ideološkim radom, te da nije učestvovao u kršenju ljudskih prava pojedinaca. Zastupao je stav da je njegovo otpuštanje na osnovu dela 2 Zakona o KGB i potonja nemogućnost da nađe posao zato bilo nezakonito.
Viši upravni sud presudio je 9. septembra 1999. godine da je zaključak od 31. maja 1999. godine bio pravno utemeljen i da prvi podnosilac predstavke zaista podleže ograničenjima propisanim delom 2 Zakona o KGB. U tom smislu Sud je zaključio da je podnosilac predstavke imao status “bivšeg oficira KGB” u smislu Zakona o KGB, budući da je obavljao jedan od poslova uvrštenih u spisak od 26. januara 1999. godine.
Dana 19. oktobra 1999. godine Apelacioni sud odbacio je žalbu prvog podnosioca predstavke. Apelacioni sud je zaključio da prvi podnosilac predstavke nije u KGB obavljao posao koji se ticao isključivo krivičnih istraga, te da stoga nije mogao da se pozove na pravo na korišćenje olakšica propisanih spiskom izuzetaka sadržanim u delu 3 Zakona o KGB.
B. Drugi podnosilac predstavke
Drugi podnosilac predstavke diplomirao je na Univerzitetu u Viljnusu tokom 80-ih godina (datum nepoznat) i stekao zvanje pravnika.
Od 11. februara 1991. godine drugi podnosilac predstavke radio je kao tužilac u Kancelariji državnog tužioca Litvanije, baveći se prevashodno istragom predmeta u vezi s organizovanim kriminalom i korupcijom.
Litvansko Odeljenje za državnu bezbednost i Centar za istraživanje genocida i otpora litvanskog naroda 26. maja 1999. godine zajednički su zaključili da je od 1985. do 1991. godine drugi podnosilac predstavke bio zaposlen u litvanskom ogranku KGB, da ima status “bivšeg oficira KGB” i da stoga podleže ograničenjima propisanim delom 2 Zakona o KGB. Drugi podnosilac predstavke je 31. maja 1999. godine otpušten s posla koji je obavljao u Kancelariji državnog tužioca upravo na temelju tog zaključka.
Drugi podnosilac predstavke pokrenuo je upravni spor protiv obaveštajnobezbednosnih organa i Kancelarije državnog tužioca. Tvrdio je da je od 1985. do 1999. godine samo pohađao specijalnu školu KGB u Moskvi i da je od 1990. do 1991. godine radio u KGB kao informator litvanskih obaveštajno-bezbednosnih organa i da bi stoga trebalo da uživa beneficije propisane spiskom izuzetaka navedenim u delu 3 Zakona o KGB. On je tvrdio je da su nezakoniti kako njegovo otpuštanje na osnovu Zakona o KGB, tako i nemogućnost da nađe drugi posao.
Viši administrativni sud je 6. avgusta 1999. godine prihvatio i uvažio žalbu drugog podnosioca predstavke, ukinuo presudu od 26. maja 1999. godine i naredio da podnosilac predstavke bude vraćen na posao. Viši sud je zaključio da period tokom koga je drugi podnosilac predstavke pohađao školu KGB 1985. do 1990. godine ne treba uzimati u obzir u smislu Zakona o KGB, da je drugi podnosilac predstavke radio u periodu od pet meseci tokom 1990-1991, kao i da u KGB nije bio na položaju koji je imao bilo kakve veze s političkim istragama i da je, u svakom slučaju, bio tajni informator litvanskih vlasti. Viši sud je zaključio da izuzeci propisani delom 3 Zakona o KGB treba da budu primenjeni na drugog podnosioca predstavke i da je stoga njegovo otpuštanje s posla bilo nezakonito.
Apelacioni sud je, međutim, prihvatio i uvažio žalbu državnih obaveštajnobezbednosnih organa i 25. oktobra 1999. godine poništio presudu od 6. avgusta 1999. Apelacioni sud je zaključio da, mada je niža sudska instanca valjano utvrdila da je drugi podnosilac predstavke radio u KGB samo tom perioda od pet meseci, ta instanca nije dokazala da je drugi podnosilac predstavke tamo radio kao tajni informator litvanskih vlasti. Prema tome, zaključio je Apelacioni sud, drugi podnosilac predstavke ne može podlegati izuzecima propisanim delom 3 Zakona o KGB.
II RELEVANTNO DOMAĆE PRAVO I PRAKSA
Deo 1
Proglašenje Komiteta za državnu bezbednost SSSR zločinačkom organizacijom
“Komitet za državnu bezbednost SSSR (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB - u daljem tekstu “SSC”) proglašava se zločinačkom organizacijom koja je počinila ratne zločine, genocid, represiju, teror i političko proganjanje na teritoriji Litvanije dok je Litvanija bila pod okupacijom SSSR”.
Deo 2
Ograničenja za postojeće aktivnosti osoba stalno zaposlenih u SSC
“U periodu od deset godina od dana stupanja na snagu ovog Zakona, bivši službenici SSC ne mogu raditi kao javni funkcioneri ili državni službenici u Vladi, organima lokalne ili vojne vlasti, Odeljenju državne bezbednosti, policiji, Tužilaštvu, sudovima ili diplomatskoj službi, Carini, državnim nadzornim organima i drugim organima vlasti koji obavljaju nadzor nad radom javnih ustanova, kao pravnici ili beležnici, kao bankarski službenici ili službenici drugih kreditnih institucija, ne mogu biti angažovani na strateškim ekonomskim projektima, u strukturama kompanija koje se bave bezbednošću, u strukturama drugih kompanija koje pružaju detektivske usluge, u sistemu komunikacija, niti u obrazovnom sistemu kao nastavnici, vaspitači ili čelnici institucija [;] niti mogu obavljati poslove koji zahtevaju nošenje oružja”.
Deo 3
Slučajevi u kojima se neće primenjivati navedeno ograničenje
“1. Ograničenja propisana delom 2 neće se primenjivati na bivše stalno zaposlene u SSC koji su se, dok su radili u SSC, bavili isključivo istragom krivičnih dela i koji su najdalje do 11. marta 1990. godine prestali da rade u SSC.
2. Centar za istraživanje genocida i otpora litvanskog naroda i litvansko Odeljenje za državnu bezbednost mogu [preporučiti] dokumentovanim podneskom da se ograničenja propisana ovim zakonom ne primenjuju na nekadašnje stalno zaposlene u SSC koji se, u roku od tri meseca od dana stupanja na snagu ovog zakona, prijave Odeljenju državne bezbednosti i predoče sve informacije koje poseduju ... o svom pređašnjem radu u SSC i svojim sadašnjim odnosima sa bivšim službenicima i agentima SSC. O tome će odlučivati tročlana komisija koju će osnovati predsednik Republike. Nijedan službenik Centra za istraživanje genocida i otpora litvanskog naroda, niti Odeljenja za državnu bezbednost ne može imenovan za člana te komisije. Poslovnik o radu Komisije potvrdiće predsednik Republike”.
Deo 4
Postupak primene ovog Zakona
“Postupak primene ovog Zakona biće regulisan [posebnim zakonom].”
Deo 5
Stupanje Zakona na snagu
“Ovaj Zakon stupa na snagu 1. januara 1999. godine”.
Posle rasprave vođene u Ustavnom sudu o usklađenosti Zakona o KGB s Ustavom (vidi dole stav 28), dana 5. maja 1999. godine deo 3 Zakona o KGB je izmenjen i dopunjen u tom smislu da čak i oni pojedinci koji su radili za KGB posle 11. marta 1990. godine mogu potpadati pod izuzetke propisane delom 3 Zakona o KGB.
Poseban zakon o primeni Zakona o KGB donet je 16. jula 1998. godine. Na osnovu tog zakona Centar za istraživanje genocida i otpora litvanskog naroda i Odeljenje državne bezbednosti ovlašćeni su da donose zaključkeo statusu pojedinaca kao “bivših stalnih službenika KGB” u smislu Zakona o KGB.
Država je 26. januara 1999. godine usvojila spisak (u daljem tekstu: Spisak) položaja i radnih mesta u raznim ograncima KGB na litvanskoj teritoriji kojim se potvrđuje status nekog lica kao “bivšeg stalno zaposlenog u KGB” (u daljem tekstu: bivši oficir KGB) u smislu Zakona o KGB. Na tom spisku je navedeno 395 raznih zvanja.
Ustavni sud je 4. marta 1999. godine razmatrao pitanje usklađenosti Zakona o KGB s Ustavom. Ustavni sud je pre svega zaključio da je Zakon o KGB donet kako bi se obavile mere “bezbednosne provere” bivših sovjetskih oficira bezbednosti za koje se smatralo da nisu u dovoljnoj meri lojalni litvanskoj državi. Ustavni sud je presudio da je zabrana izrečena bivšim agentima KGB da obavljaju javne funkcije u skladu s Ustavom. Sud je dalje zaključio da je statutarna zabrana bivšim službenicima KGB da rade na radnim mestima u određenim privatnim sektorima takođe kompatibilna s ustavnim načelom slobodnog izbora profesije u tom smislu što je država vlasna da postavlja specifične zahteve za lica koja se prijave na rad u najvažnijim ekonomskim sektorima kako bi osigurala zaštitu nacionalne bezbednosti i valjano funkcionisanje obrazovnog i finansijskog sistema. Ustavni sud je takođe zaključio da ograničenja propisana Zakonom o KGB ne predstavljaju optužbu za krivično delo protiv bivših agenata KGB.
Iako Zakon o KGB ne sadrži konkretnu odredbu kojom bi se garantovalo pravo lica da se obrati sudu kako bi osporilo zaključak obaveštajno-bezbednosnih organa, domaći sudovi su smatrali da, sa stanovišta pravne prakse, otpuštanje s radnog mesta u javnom sektoru na temelju tog zaključka daje osnov za pokretanje upravnog spora (i za dalji žalbeni postupak) u skladu sa opštim postupkom koji se primenjuje u radnim sporovima i u slučajevima kada navodno dođe do toga da javne vlasti krše ljudska prava, u skladu sa članovima 4, 7, 8, 26, 49, 50, 59, 63 i 64 Zakona o upravnom postupku, članom 222 Građanskog zakonika i članom 336. Zakona o građanskom postupku (važećima u navedenom vremenu).
III ODREDBE MEĐUNARODNOG PRAVA I ODREĐENI NACIONALNI PRAVNI SISTEMI U VEZI S OGRANIČENJEM ZAPOŠLJAVANJA NA POLITIČKOJ OSNOVI
U mnogim postkomunističkim zemljama uvedena su ograničenja kako bi se obavljala provera prilikom zapošljavanja bivših agenata bezbednosti ili aktivnih saradnika bivših režima. U tom smislu, međunarodni organi za poštovanje ljudskih prava povremeno su zaključivali da ima grešaka u sličnim zakonskim aktima tamo gde nedostaju preciznost ili proporcionalnost, te su takva pravila okarakterisali kao diskriminaciju prilikom zapošljavanja ili obavljanja posla na temelju političkog mišljenja (vidi dole). Smatralo se da sama mogućnost žalbe sudu predstavlja značajnu meru zaštite, mada ona sama po sebi nije dovoljna da ispravi eventualne manjkavosti u zakonodavstvu.
“U nameri da obezbede delotvorno ostvarivanje prava na rad, strane ugovornice se obavezuju:
...
2) da efikasno štititi pravo radnika da zarađuje za život na poslu koji je slobodno izabrao [.]”[1]
Ova odredba koja je doslovno zadržana u tekstu Revidirane povelje iz 1996. (koja je, kada je reč o Litvaniji, stupila na snagu 1. avgusta 2001) dosledno je u tumačenju Evropskog komiteta za socijalna prava (u daljem tekstu: ECSR) tumačena kao odredba koja propisuje pravo ma kog lica da ne bude diskriminisano prilikom zapošljavanja. Jemstvo protiv diskriminacije propisano je članom E Revidirane povelje na sledeći način:
“Uživanje prava predviđenih ovom Poveljom biće obezbeđeno bez razlike po bilo kom osnovu rase, boje, pola, jezika, vere, političkog ili drugog mišljenja, nacionalnog ili socijalnog porekla, zdravlja, pripadnosti nacionalnoj manjini, rođenju ili drugom statusu”.[2]
Pitanje otpuštanja državnih službenika po osnovu njihovih aktivnosti u totalitarnim režimima tretirano je u svetlosti tih zakonskih odredaba, barem kada je reč o Nemačkoj. U svom najnovijem razmatranju načina na koji Nemačka poštuje član 1 stav 2 (objavljenom u novembru 2002) ECSR uzeo je u obzir one odredbe Ugovora o ponovnom ujedinjenju (Nemačke) koje omogućuje otpuštanje državnih činovnika po osnovu njihovog rada za službe bezbednosti bivše Nemačke Demokratske Republike (u daljem tesktu: DDR). ECSR je zaključio da Nemačka ne poštuje te obaveze. To je obrazloženo na sledeći način:
“Komitet konstatuje da ne postoji precizna definicija funkcija iz kojih pojedinci mogu biti isključeni, bilo tako što će biti odbijeno njihovo regrutovanje ili što će biti otpušteni, po osnovu ranijih političkih aktivnosti ili aktivnosti u institucijama bivše DDR koje su se bavile bezbednosnim pitanjima. Komitet je ispitao usklađenost ovih odredaba u svetlosti člana 31 Povelje. Na osnovu te odredbe, ograničenje prava zajamčenih Poveljom dopušteno je ukoliko je zakonom propisano, ukoliko je nužno u demokratskom društvu i ukoliko služi jednoj od svrha navedenih u tom članu. Mada je priznao da su odredbe propisane zakonom bile u okviru značenja člana 31 i da su imale za cilj da služe jednoj od tamo navedenih svrha, konkretno zaštiti nacionalne bezbednosti, Komitet je konstatovao da one nisu bile nužne u smislu značenja člana 31 u toliko što se ne odnose isključivo na one službe koje su nadležne u oblasti reda, zakona i nacionalne bezbednosti ili na funkcije koje podrazumevaju taj vid odgovornosti”.
ECSR je svoje zaključke o načinu na koji Litvanija primenjuje revidiranu Povelju doneo 28. maja 2004. godine. Ti zaključci će javnosti biti predočeni nekog kasnijeg datuma.
“Komitet ne prihvata argument da je u slučajevima u kojima su lica bila optužena da su obavljala političke aktivnosti u bivšoj DDR, to lice bilo u većoj meri diskriminisano utoliko što se, preuzimanjem određenih funkcija, više identifikovalo s nepravičnim režimom, te je samim tim još manje opravdano da takvo lice zauzima neki položaj u sadašnjoj administraciji”.
Nedavno je, međutim, CEACR izrazio zadovoljstvo načinom na koji nemački sudovi poštuju načelo proporcionalnosti u predmetima u kojima državni činovnici ulažu žalbe zbog otpuštanja s posla (vidi stav 3 Pojedinačnog mišljenja o Nemačkoj na osnovu Konvencije br. 111. iz 2000. godine). U pregledu za 1996. godinu identifikovane su uporedive odredbe u nacionalnim zakonodavstvima i izvesnog broja drugih evropskih država.
U Bugarskoj, delom 9 Prelaznih i Završnih odredaba Zakona o bankarskom i kreditnom poslovanju iz 1992. godine, licima koja su u prethodnom režimu radila na određenim poslovima onemogućuje se zapošljavanje u bankama. Bugarski Ustavni sud je 1992. godine presudio da ova odredba predstavlja kršenje Ustava i Konvencije MOR br. 111. U bivšoj Čehoslovačkoj 1991. godine donet je takozvani Zakon o proveri kojim se licima koja su u prethodnom režimu radila u izvesnom broju poslova i svojstava zabranjuje da se zaposle u državnoj službi ili u delovima privatnog sektora. Slovački Ustavni sud je 1996. godine ovaj zakon proglasio neustavnim, zaključivši takođe da se taj zakon kosi sa Konvencijom br. 111. Zakon je, međutim, ostao na snazi u Češkoj Republici, dok je CEACR apelovao na vlasti Češke da u primeni Zakona o KGB posvete dužnu pažnju načelu proporcionalnosti. U Letoniji se Zakonom o državnoj službi iz 2000. godine i Zakonom o policiji iz 1999. godine zabranjuje zapošljavanje lica koja su radila za sovjetske službe bezbednosti ili su radila u tim službama. CEACR je 2003. godine na sledeći način izrazio nezadovoljstvo navedenim zakonskim tekstovima:
“6. Komitet podseća da zahtevi političke prirode mogu biti postavljeni za jedan određeni posao, ali, kako bi se obezbedilo da ti zahtevi ne budu u suprotnosti sa Konvencijom, oni moraju biti ograničeni na karakteristike datog posla ili položaja i moraju biti proporcionalni radnim zahtevima koje taj posao odnosno položaj nalaže. Komitet konstatuje da pomenuta isključenja koja proističu iz razmatranih odredaba važe generalno za celokupnu državnu službu i policiju umesto da se primenjuju samo na određene poslove, funkcije ili radne zadatke. Komitet je zabrinut zbog toga što te odredbe, po svemu sudeći, premašuju opravdana isključenja kada je reč o mogućnosti dobijanja određenih poslova isključivo na temelju inherentnih zahteva tih poslova kako je to propisano članom 1 (st. 2) Konvencije. Komitet podseća da, kako mere ne bi bile smatrane diskriminatornima na osnovu člana 4, one moraju pogađati lice po osnovu aktivnosti za koje se ono osnovano sumnjiči da ih je obavljalo ili je pak dokazano da ih je obavljalo, a te aktivnosti nanose štetu bezbednosti države. Član 4 Konvencije ne isključuje iz definicije diskriminacije one mere koje su donete iz razloga članstva u nekoj grupi ili zajednici. Komitet takođe konstatuje da u slučajevima u kojima se za neka lica opravdano sumnja da su se bavila aktivnostima koje nanose štetu bezbednosti države, lice o kome je reč ima pravo žalbe nadležnom organu u skladu sa nacionalnom praksom.
7. U svetlosti svega navedenog, Komitet smatra da onemogućavanje kandidature za bilo koji položaj u državnoj službi i za zaposlenje u policiji nije dovoljno dobro definisano i ograničeno kako bi se osiguralo da to onemogućavanje ne preraste u diskriminaciju pri zapošljavanju i obavljanju profesije na temelju političkog mišljenja...”
PRAVO
I NAVODNO KRŠENJE ČLANA 8 KONVENCIJE SAGLEDANOG ZASEBNO I U VEZI SA ČLANOM 14
Član 8 Konvencije glasi:
“1. Svako ima pravo na poštovanje svog privatnog i porodičnog života, doma i prepiske.
2. Javne vlasti neće se mešati u vršenje ovog prava sem ako to nije u skladu sa zakonom i neophodno u demokratskom društvu u interesu nacionalne bezbednosti, javne bezbednosti ili ekonomske dobrobiti zemlje, radi sprečavanja nereda ili kriminala, zaštite zdravlja ili morala, ili rad0i zaštite prava i sloboda drugih”.
Član 14 glasi:
“Uživanje prava i sloboda predviđenih u ovoj Konvenciji obezbeđuje se bez diskriminacije po bilo kom osnovu, kao što su pol, rasa, boja kože, jezik, veroispovest, političko ili drugo mišljenje, nacionalno ili socijalno poreklo, veza s nekom nacionalnom manjinom, imovno stanje, rođenje ili drugi status”.
Država je dostavila mišljenje da član 8 nije primenjiv u ovom predmetu, budući da ta odredba ne jemči pravo na zadržavanje radnog mesta niti na izbor profesije. Država je dalje navela da je, u svakom slučaju, primena Zakona o KGB na ove podnosioce predstavki služila legitimnoj svrsi zaštite nacionalne bezbednosti i da je kao takva neophodna u demokratskom društvu. Po mišljenju Države, Zakon o KGB nije ništa drugo do opravdana mera bezbednosne provere čiji je cilj sprečavanje da bivši službenici tajne službe bezbednosti rade ne samo u državnim institucijama, već i u drugim oblastima delatnosti koje su važne za nacionalnu bezbednost države. Zakon o KGB sam po sebi ne uvodi kolektivnu odgovornost za sve bivše pripadnike KGB bez izuzetka. On obezbeđuje mogućnost individualizovanih ograničenja u pogledu perspektive zapošljavanja pomoću “spiska” funkcija (radnih mesta) u bivšoj KGB koje nalažu ograničenja koja proističu iz dela 2 Zakona o KGB (vidi gore stav 27). Činjenica da podnosioci predstavki nisu imali pravo da se pozovu na izuzetke propisane u delu 3 Zakona o KGB pokazuje da je postojala valjano osnovana sumnja da podnosioci predstavke nisu u dovoljnoj meri lojalni državi Litvaniji. S obzirom na to da Zakonom o KGB nisu pogođeni svi bivši službenici KGB, u ovom slučaju nije primenjiv član 14 Konvencije. Prema tome, nema ni povrede člana 8. Konvencije, bilo samog za sebe, bilo u vezi sa članom 14.
Podnosioci predstavke osporili su podneske Države. Oni su pre svega izneli pritužbu na to da su lišeni mogućnosti da traže posao u raznim oblastima privatnog sektora sve do 2009. godine na osnovu toga što su imali status bivših pripadnika KGB. Podnosioci predstavki su u svojim podnescima naveli da im na osnovu Zakona o KGB nije data mogućnost ni da predoče svoje lične slučajeve kako bi oni bili procenjeni i kako bi bila utvrđena njihova lojalnost državi, niti da izbegnu da se na njih primene ograničenja u pogledu zapošljavanja propisana delom 3 Zakona. Prvi podnosilac predstavke posebno je naglasio da je on napustio KGB 1986. godine, dok je drugi podnosilac takođe naglasio da je on napustio KGB 1990. godine, znači 13, odnosno 9 godina pre stupanja na snagu Zakona o KGB. Sem toga, prvi podnosilac predstavke isticao je da se od tada aktivno angažovao u različitim vidovima delatnosti na podsticanju i unapređenju nezavisnosti Litvanije. Drugi podnosilac predstavke je, sa svoje strane, predočio podatke o tome da je bio odlikovan kao tužilac za svoj rad na istrazi različitih krivičnih dela, uključujući tu i zločine protiv države. Međutim, nijednu od navedenih činjenica nisu ispitali domaći sudovi, koji su uveli ograničenja za njihovo buduće zapošljavanje isključivo na temelju njihovog pređašnjeg angažmana u KGB. Konačno, podnosioci predstavke su predočili da su, usled negativnog publiciteta koji je izazvao Zakon o KGB i njegova primena na njih, oni svakodnevno bili izlagani neprijatnostima zbog svoje prošlosti.
A. Opseg žalbi podnosilaca predstavki
Sud konstatuje da se predstavke ove dvojice podnosilaca i žalbe zbog kršenja člana 8 koje su u njima sadržane, bilo da se član 8 uzima zasebno ili u vezi sa članom 14, ne odnose na to što su otpušteni s poslova koje su obavljali kao poreski inspektor, odnosno tužilac. Sem toga, ovaj deo predstavke nije usmeren protiv njihove nemogućnosti da nađu zaposlenje kao državni činovnici. Pritužba koju su podnosioci predstavke izneli povodom člana 8 Konvencije, glasila da se taj član shvaćen sam za sebe ili u vezi sa članom 14, odnosi samo na zabranu koja im je nametnuta za period od 2009. godine i koja se odnosi na traženje zaposlenja u raznim oblastima u privatnom sektoru. Ta zabrana koja je na snazi od 1999. godine odnosi se na sledeće aktivnosti u privatnom sektoru koje spadaju u domen onoga što je predviđeno delom 2 Zakona o KGB: “Pravnici ili beležnici, službenici banaka ili drugih kreditnih institucija, (zaposleni) na strateškim ekonomskim projektima, u bezbednosnim kompanijama (strukturama) u drugim kompanijama (strukturama) koje pružaju detektivske usluge, u komunikacionim sistemima ili u obrazovnom sistemu kao nastavnici, vaspitači ili šefovi institucija (;) ... na poslovima koji zahtevaju nošenje oružja”.
Podnosioci predstavke su se žalili da im je ograničenje mogućnosti zaposlenja nametnuto na osnovu toga što su ranije radili u KGB. U suštini, oni se u ovom smislu žale na diskriminaciju. Zato će sud prvo razmotriti njihove pritužbe koje se tiču člana 14 Konvencije, uzetog u vezi sa članom 8, a potom će razmotriti njihove pritužbe koje se odnose samo na član 8.
B. Primenjivost člana 14
Sud ponovo ističe svoj stav da član 14 Konvencije štiti pojedince koji se nalaze u sličnim situacijama od toga da budu bez opravdanja tretirani različito u uživanju prava i sloboda koja im jemči Konvencija. Ova odredba ne može postojati nezavisno, budući da ima efekta samo u odnosu na prava i slobode koji se čuvaju zahvaljujući drugim suštinski važnim odredbama Konvencije i protokola. Međutim, primena člana 14 ne pretpostavlja kršenje jedne ili više takvih odredaba i u tom smislu ona je autonomna. Da bi član 14 postao primenjiv, dovoljno je da okolnosti slučaja spadaju u sferu druge suštinski važne odredbe Konvencije ili njenih protokola (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Ince (Ince) protiv Austrije, presuda od 28. oktobra 1987, serija A, br. 126, st. 36).
Sud će zato prvo utvrditi da li je bilo razlike u tretmanu podnosilaca predstavke i, ako je tako, da li činjenice ovog predmeta spadaju u sferu člana 8 Konvencije, kako bi doneo presudu o primenljivosti člana 14.
1. Da li je postojao različit tretman
Sud uočava da, po mišljenju Države, činjenica da istorijat rada u KGB koji imaju podnosioci predstavke ne može biti osnov za pokretanje pritužbe na osnovu člana 14, zbog toga što se ograničenja koja proističu iz Zakona o KGB ne odnose na sve bivše službenike te institucije. Država je kao razlog za primenu Zakona o KGB i za ograničenje u pogledu mogućnosti zapošljavanja navela odsustvo lojalnosti državi kod tih podnosilaca, inače bivših službenika KGB. Sud smatra da Zakon o KGB nije ograničio mogućnosti zapošljavanja svih bivših saradnika sovjetske obaveštajne službe. Prvo, samo oni koji su bili na položajima pomenutim na spisku od 26. januara 1999. godine smatraju se su licima koja imaju status “bivših oficira KGB” (vidi gore stav 27). Drugo, čak i [ona] lica za koja se smatralo da imaju taj status mogla su iskoristiti pravilo o amnestiji pomenuto u delu 3 Zakona o KGB, ukoliko su se bavili samo krivičnim, a ne i političkim istragama za vreme koje su proveli radeći u KGB (vidi gore stav 24). Treće, postojala je mogućnost da se prijave specijalnoj Predsedničkoj komisiji u roku od tri meseca posle stupanja na snagu Zakona o KGB 1. januara 1990. godine, sa zahtevom da ta Komisija, ostvarujući svoje diskreciono pravo, ukine sve restrikcije koje su na njih mogle da budu primenjene (vidi gore stav 24). Konačno, kako se vidi iz otvorenog postupka pred domaćim sudovima u datom slučaju, domaći sudovi su takođe uzimali u obzir to da li su podnosioci predstavke bili informatori litvanskih vlasti neposredno posle proglašenja nezavisnosti 1990. godine, što bi moglo da predstavlja eventualnu osnovu za njihovo oslobađanje od ograničenja u pogledu zapošljavanja koja su im bila nametnuta (vidi gore stav 22).
2. Da li činjenice zbog kojih su optuženi uputili pritužbe spadaju u sferu člana 8
Ostaje da se ispita da li se nemogućnost podnosilaca predstavki da konkurišu za različite poslove u privatnom sektoru koja je nastupila kao rezultat delovanja dela 2. Zakona o KGB kosi sa njihovim “privatnim životom”, onako kako je on zaštićen članom 8 Konvencije.
Sud je u nekoliko navrata presudio da je “privatni život” široki pojam koji ne podleže iscrpnoj definiciji (vidi, kao noviji pravni autoritet, presudu u predmetu Pek protiv Velike Britanije (Peck) br. 44647/98, st. 57). Međutim, Sud je takođe primetio da član 8 štiti moralni i fizički integritet pojedinca (vidi predmet X i Y protiv Holandije, presuda od 26. marta 1985, Series A br. 91, stavovi 22-27), uključujući i pravo pojedinca da vodi privatni život daleko od neželjene pažnje. Time se takođe obezbeđuje sfera u kojoj pojedinac može slobodno da teži sopstvenom razvoju i ispunjenju svoje ličnosti (vidi predmet Brigeman i Šojten protiv Nemačke (Bruggeman, Scheuten) br. 6959/75, Izveštaj Komisije 12. jula 1977, Decisions and Reports (DR) 10, str. 115, st. 55).
“Bilo bi isuviše restriktivno ako bi se ovaj pojam sveo na ‘uži krug’ u kome pojedinac živi svoj lični život onako kako sam odabere i ako bi se iz toga u potpunosti isključio spoljni svet koji nije obuhvaćen tim krugom. Poštovanje privatnog života mora se takođe u izvesnoj meri sastojati od prava na uspostavljanje i razvoj odnosa sa drugim ljudskim bićima. Sem toga, sve ukazuje na to da ne postoji nijedan načelni razlog zbog koga bi ovakvo poimanje pojma ‘privatni život’ trebalo da isključuje aktivnosti profesionalne ili poslovne prirode budući da, na kraju krajeva, većina ljudi upravo u svom radnom životu ima značajne, ako ne i najveće, mogućnosti za razvoj odnosa sa spoljnim svetom. Ovakvo mišljenje podržano je činjenicom da ... nije uvek mogućno jasno razlučiti koje aktivnosti pojedinca predstavljaju deo njegovog profesionalnog i poslovnog života, a koje pak u taj profesionalni i poslovni život ne spadaju. Zato, posebno u slučaju da se lice bavi nekom liberalnom profesijom, njegov rad u tom kontekstu može predstavljati deo njegovog života u tolikoj meri da je nemoguće znati u kom svojstvu ono deluje u datom vremenskom trenutku”.
U nedavnom predmetu Smirnova protiv Rusije (br. 46133/99 i br 48183/99, stavovi od 96 do 97, ECHR 2003) Sud je razmotrio kakav je uticaj na “privatni život” pojedinca imalo to što su vlasti tom licu oduzele jedan zvanični dokument (unutrašnji pasoš) čak i ako taj pojedinac nije naveo da je usled same zaplene došlo do nekog konkretnog mešanja Sud je presudio da je činjenica da to lice više nije imalo pasoš u njegovom svakodnevnom životu izazvala brojne neugodnosti, sagledane u celosti, kao i da je licu bio potreban taj dokument čak i onda kada je obavljalo tako obične zadatke kao što je zamena deviznih sredstava za domaću valutu ili kupovina voznih karata. Takođe je posebno naglašeno da je pasoš bio potreban tom licu za neke egzistencijalnije potrebe kao što je nalaženje posla ili dobijanje zdravstvene zaštite. Sud je zaključio da je lišenje pasoša u predmetu Smirnova predstavljalo trajno mešanje u “privatni život” podnosioca predstavke.
Sud je takođe presudio da nemogućnost pristupa državnoj službi kao takav ne može predstavljati osnovu za podnošenje predstavke na osnovu Konvencije (vidi predmet Glazenap i Kosjek protiv Nemačke (Glasenapp, Kosiek) presude od 28. avgusta 1986. (Series A br. 104, stav. 49 i br. 105 stav 35); navedeno načelo takođe je istaknuto u predmetu Fogt protiv Nemačke (Vogt) od 26. septembra 1995. (Series A br. 323, stavovi 43. i 44). U predmetu Tlimenos protiv Grčke (Thlimmenos) presuda od 29. marta 2001. ((GC), br. 34369/97, stav 41, ECHR 2000-IV), gde je podnosiocu predstavke odbijena registracija kao ovlašćenog računovođe zbog ranije presude, Sud je isto tako presudio da pravo na izbor određene profesije takođe nije, kao takvo, zajamčeno Konvencijom.
Međutim, imajući na umu pre svega teze i predstave koje danas preovlađuju u demokratskim državama, Sud smatra da dalekosežna zabrana zapošljavanja u privatnom sektoru zaista utiče na “privatni život”. U tom smislu Sud pridaje poseban značaj tekstu člana 1 stav 2 Evropske socijalne povelje i tumačenju koje je s tim u vezi dao Evropski Komitet za socijalna prava (vidi gore stav 31), kao i tekstovima koje je usvojio MOR (vidi gore stav 32). Sud ponovo potvrđuje da ne postoji potpuno precizna i jasna podela koja bi razdvojila sferu socijalnih i ekonomskih prava od oblasti obuhvaćene Konvencijom (vidi predmet Ejri protiv Irske (Airey), presuda od 9. oktobra 1979, Series A br. 32, st. 26).
Vraćajući se na okolnosti ovog slučaja, Sud primećuje da je, kao rezultat primene dela 2. Zakona o KGB, podnosiocima predstavke bilo zabranjeno da se od 1999. do 2009. godine bave profesionalnim aktivnostima u raznim oblastima privatnog sektora po osnovu toga što imaju status “bivših oficira KGB” (vidi gore, stav 27). Tačno je da ta zabrana nije uticala na mogućnost da podnosioci predstavke tragaju za izvesnim vidovima profesionalnih aktivnosti. Zabrana je, međutim, uticala na njihovu mogućnost da razvijaju odnose sa spoljnim svetom i to u vrlo značajnoj meri i izazvala im je izvesne teškoće kada je reč o mogućnosti da zarade za život, što ima očigledne reperkusije po ostvarivanje njihovog privatnog života.
Sud je takođe uočio argument podnosilaca predstavke da su oni, usled publiciteta izazvanog donošenjem Zakona o KGB i njegovom primenom na njih, bili izlagani svakodnevnim neprijatnostima zbog svojih pređašnjih aktivnosti. Sud prihvata da status “bivših oficira KGB” i dalje predstavlja teret podnosiocima predstavke i da sama ta činjenica po sebi može biti smatrana preprekom za uspostavljanje kontakata sa spoljnim svetom - bilo da je reč o profesionalnim ili kakvim drugim odnosima - kao i da ta situacija bez svake sumnje ne utiče samo na njihov ugled, već ima i znatno više posledica; ona takođe utiče na mogućnost ostvarivanja njihovog “privatnog života”. Sud prihvata da se pojedinac ne može pozvati na član 8 kako bi uputio pritužbu zbog gubitka ugleda, pošto je reč o rezultatu predvidljivih posledica čovekovih akcija, kao što je, na primer, i čovekova odluka da počini neko krivično delo. Sem toga, može se opravdano pretpostaviti da podnosioci predstavke tokom dugog vremenskog perioda koji je protekao između pada bivšeg Sovjetskog Saveza (i političkih promena koje je to izazvalo u Litvaniji) i stupanja na snagu osporenog zakona iz 1999. godine podnosioci predstavke nisu mogli da predvide posledice koje će im doneti bivše zaposlenje u KGB. U svakom slučaju, u ovom predmetu se, kada je reč o podnosiocima predstavke, ne radi samo o odbrani ugleda i časti. Oni su u očima društva obeleženi svojom pređašnjom povezanošću sa represivnim režimom. Samim tim, kao i s obzirom na širok spektar ograničenja u pogledu zapošljavanja sa kojima podnosioci predstavke moraju da se suoče, Sud smatra da se moguća šteta naneta njihovoj mogućnosti da vode normalan lični život mora uzeti u obzir kao relevantan faktor prilikom odlučivanja da li činjenice na koje se oni žale spadaju u sferu člana 8 Konvencije.
S obzirom na sve što je navedeno, Sud smatra da osporena zabrana u znatnoj meri utiče na mogućnost podnosilaca predstavke da se bave raznim profesionalnim aktivnostima i da postoje posledične reperkusije po njihovu mogućnost da ostvare svoje pravo na poštovanje “privatnog života” u značenju koje se podrazumeva u članu 8. Stoga sledi da je član 14 Konvencije primenjiv u okolnostima ovog slučaja u vezi sa članom 8.
C. Poštovanje člana 14
Prema precedentnom pravu Suda, razlika u tretmanu je diskriminativna ukoliko “nema nikakvo objektivno i razumno opravdanje”, to jest, ukoliko se njome ne teži “legitimnom cilju” ili ukoliko ne postoji “opravdani odnos proporcionalnosti između primenjenih sredstava i cilja čijem se ostvarenju teži” (vidi gore navedenu presudu u predmetu Ince (Inze), st. 41).
Sud smatra da, načelno gledano, države imaju legitimni interes da regulišu uslove zapošljavanja u državnoj službi kao i u privatnom sektoru. U tom smislu, Sud ponavlja da Konvencija ne garantuje kao takvo pravo na pristup određenoj profesiji (vidi gore, mutatis mutandis, presudu u predmetu Fogt, st. 43; vidi takođe gore presudu u predmetu Tlimenos, st. 41). U nedavno donetim odlukama u predmetima Folkmer (Volkmer) i Petersen koje se odnose na Nemačku (br. 39799/98 i br. 39793/98. od 22. novembra 2001. godine) Sud je takođe presudio u kontekstu člana 10. Konvencije da demokratska država ima legitiman interes da zahteva od svih državnih službenika da ispoljavaju lojalnost prema ustavnim načelima na kojima je društvo utemeljeno.
Sud primećuje da je presuda Ustavnog suda Litvanije od 4. marta 1999. godine, u kojoj je navedeno da je Zakon o KGB, koji je ograničio mogućnosti zapošljavanja bivših službenika KGB, imao za cilj da obezbedi zaštitu nacionalne bezbednosti i valjano funkcionisanje obrazovnog i finansijskog sistema (vidi gore stav 28). Opravdavajući ovu zabranu pred Sudom, Država je navela da razlog za uvođenje ograničenja u pogledu zapošljavanja propisanih Zakonom o KGB nije bio kagebeovski istorijat podnosilaca predstavke, već činjenica da oni nisu bili lojalni državi, što se vidi iz toga što su svojevremeno radili za KGB.
S tim u vezi, Sud mora uzeti u obzir iskustvo Litvanije pod sovjetskom vlašću, koja je okončana proglašenjem nezavisnosti 1990. godine. Podnosioci predstavki ne spore da su aktivnosti KGB bile u suprotnosti s načelima zajamčenim Ustavom Litvanije ili samom Konvencijom. Litvanija je želela da izbegne ponavljanje svog pređašnjeg iskustva tako što je, između ostalog, svoju nezavisnu državu utemeljila na uverenju da ona treba da bude demokratska zemlja kadra da se odbrani. Takođe je u ovom kontekstu potrebno naglasiti da su sistemi koji su slični onome propisanom Zakonom o KGB, kojim se ograničavaju mogućnosti zapošljavanja bivših agenata bezbednosti ili aktivnih saradnika bivšeg režima, uspostavljeni u jednom broju visokih strana ugovornica koje su se uspešno formirale rušenjem totalitarne vladavine (vidi gore stavove od 30 do 32).
S obzirom na sve navedene razloge Sud prihvata da je ograničenje mogućnosti zapošljavanja, pa samim tim i razlika u tretmanu koji je je na njih primenjen, uvedeno na osnovu Zakona o KGB kojim se težilo legitimnim ciljevima zaštite nacionalne bezbednosti, javne bezbednosti, ekonomskog blagostanja zemlje i prava i sloboda drugih (vidi, mutatis mutandis, presudu u predmetu Rekvenji protiv Mađarske (Rekvenyi), (GC), br. 25390/94, st. 41, ECHR 1999-III).
Preostaje da se utvrdi da li je osporena distinkcija predstavljala proporcionalnu meru. Glavni argument podnosilaca predstavke pred Sudom glasio je da ni Zakonom o KGB ni u postupcima pred domaćim sudovima po njihovim predmetima nije utvrđivana njihova stvarna lojalnost državi Litvaniji. Oni su tvrdili da su osporene restrikcije uvedene apstraktno i da su oni sami kažnjeni isključivo na osnovu statusa bivših oficira KGB koji su imali, a da se uopšte nije vodilo računa o specifičnim odlikama njihovih slučajeva. Sud, međutim, iz sledećih razloga ne smatra da je neophodno da donosi presudu o pitanju da li je podnosiocima predstavke pružena mogućnost da predoče dokaze svoje lojalnosti državi ili je taj nedostatak lojalnosti kod njih stvarno dokazan.
Čak i ako pretpostavimo da je odsustvo lojalnosti kod njih bilo nesporno, mora se uočiti da su mogućnosti zapošljavanja podnosilaca predstavke bile ograničene i to ne samo u državnoj službi, već i u raznim oblastima u privatnim sektorima. Sud ponovo naglašava da je zahtev koji se zaposlenima postavlja u pogledu lojalnosti državi inherentni uslov zapošljavanja u državnim organima u čiju nadležnost spadaju zaštita i obezbeđivanje opštih interesa. Međutim, takav zahtev se ne postavlja kao neminovni zahtev za zapošljavanje u privatnim kompanijama. Mada ekonomske aktivnosti aktera u privatnom sektoru bez svake sumnje utiču na funkcionisanje države ili doprinose tom funkcionisanju, privatna preduzeća nisu nosioci suverene vlasti koju ostvaruje država. Sem toga, privatna preduzeća se mogu potpuno legitimno angažovati u aktivnostima, prevashodno finansijskim i ekonomskim, koje su konkentne ciljevima što su ih postavile javne vlasti državnih preduzeća.
Po mišljenju Suda, ograničenja koja država nameće nekom licu u pogledu njegovih mogućnosti za iznalaženje posla u privatnom preduzeću, a koja za razlog imaju odsustvo lojalnosti državi, ne mogu se opravdati sa stanovišta Konvencije na isti onaj način na koji se mogu opravdati ograničenja pristupa zapošljavanju u javnom sektoru, bez obzira na to koliki je značaj nekog privatnog preduzeća za ekonomski, politički ili bezbednosni interes države.
Sem toga, u odlučivanju o tome da li su mere na koje su se žalili podnosioci predstavki bile proporcionalne, Sud ne može prenebregnuti neodređen način na koji se Zakon o KGB s jedne strane bavi pitanjem odsustva lojalnosti bivših oficira KGB kao što su ovi podnosioci - bez obzira na to da li to čini na osnovu njihove prošlosti vezane za KGB ili je njihova prošlost na neki drugi način činjenično dokazana - i, s druge strane, potrebu da se ograničenja na zapošljavanje primene za neke poslove u privatnom sektoru. Posebno se u delu 2 Zakona o KGB veoma koncizno nabrajaju aktivnosti u privatnom sektoru iz kojih podnosioce predstavke, kao ljude za koje se smatra da nisu u dovoljnoj meri lojalni državi, treba isključiti (vidi gore stavovi 22 do 40). Međutim, s izuzetkom pominjanja “pravnika” i “beležnika”, Zakon o KGB ne sadrži definiciju konkretnih poslova, funkcija ili zadataka koji su zabranjeni podnosiocima predstavke. Rezultat je to da je nemoguće utvrditi ma kakvu opravdanu vezu između položaja odnosno radnih mesta o kojima je reč i legitimnih ciljeva kojima se teži zabranjivanjem obavljanja tih poslova. Po mišljenju Suda, za ovakvu zakonsku konstrukciju mora se smatrati da ne sadrži dovoljno zaštitnih mehanizama da bi se izbegla diskriminacija i da bi se garantovao odgovarajući i primeren sudski nadzor nad uvođenjem takvih restrikcija (vidi između ostalog, zaključke u vezi sa mogućnošću pristupa državnoj službi, koje je doneo Komitet eksperata MOR za primenu konvencija kao i preporuke u vezi sa sličnim zakonom usvojenim u Letoniji; ti zaključci se pominju u ovom tekstu u stavu 32).
Konačno, Sud primećuje da je Zakon o KGB stupio na snagu 1999. godine, to jest gotovo jednu deceniju pošto je Letonija proglasila nezavisnost 17. marta 1990; drugačije rečeno, ograničenja na obavljanje profesionalnih aktivnosti ovim podnosiocima predstavke su nametnuta 13 godina, odnosno devet godina pošto su i jedan i drugi otišli iz KGB. Činjenica da je Zakon o KGB donet ovoliko kasno, mada sama po sebi nije odlučujuća, ipak može biti smatrana relevantnom za opštu procenu proporcionalnosti donetih mera.
S obzirom na sve navedeno, Sud zaključuje da je zabrana podnosiocima predstavke da traže posao u raznim oblastima privatnog sektora, uvedena primenom dela 2 Zakona o KGB, predstavljala neproporcionalnu meru, čak i ako se uzme u obzir legitimnost ciljeva kojima se tom zabranom teži.
Prema tome, došlo je do povrede člana 14 Konvencije u vezi sa članom 8.
D. Pritužbe podnosilaca predstavke na osnovu člana 8 uzetog zasebno
II NAVODNO KRŠENJE ČLANA 10 KONVENCIJE, UZETOG POJEDINAČNO ILI U VEZI SA ČLANOM 14
Član 10. glasi:
“1. Svako ima pravo na slobodu izražavanja. Ovo pravo uključuje i slobodu posedovanja sopstvenog mišljenja, primanja i saopštavanja informacija i ideja bez mešanja javne vlasti i bez obzira na granice. Ovaj član ne sprečava države da zahtevaju dozvole za rad televizijskih, radio i bioskopskih preduzeća.
2. Pošto korišćenje ovih sloboda povlači za sobom dužnosti i odgovornosti, ono se može podvrgnuti formalnostima, uslovima, ograničenjima ili kaznama propisanim zakonom i neophodnim u demokratskom društvu u interesu nacionalne bezbednosti, teritorijalnog integriteta ili javne bezbednosti, radi sprečavanja nereda ili kriminala, zaštite zdravlja ili morala, zaštite ugleda ili prava drugih, sprečavanja otkrivanja obaveštenja dobijenih u poverenju, ili radi očuvanja autoriteta i nepristrasnosti sudstva.”
Država je predočila stav da član 10 nije primenjiv na ovaj predmet. U svakom slučaju, država smatra da je primena Zakona o KGB na podnosioce predstavki poslužila legitimnoj svrsi zaštite nacionalne bezbednosti i da je bila neophodna u demokratskom društvu s obzirom na to da podnosioci predstavke nisu u dovoljnoj meri lojalni državi. Podnosioci predstavke nisu bili kažnjeni zbog svojih mišljenja ili stavova, bilo da je reč o mišljenjima koja imaju danas ili mišljenjima koja su možda imali u prošlosti. Zakon o KGB ne utvrđuje niti nameće kolektivnu odgovornost svim bivšim oficirima KGB bez izuzetka. Činjenica da podnosioci predstavke nisu imali pravo da se pozovu ni na jedan od izuzetaka propisanih delom 3 Zakona o KGB pokazuje da je postojala veoma osnovana sumnja da kod njih nije bilo dovoljno lojalnosti državi Litvaniji. Prema tome, nije prekršen član 10 Konvencije, ni uzet sam za sebe, ni u vezi sa članom 14.
Podnosioci predstavke osporili su tvrdnje iznete u ovom podnesku države. Oni su pre svega naglasili da su izgubili posao i da su lišeni ma kakve mogućnosti da nađu odgovarajuće zaposlenje zbog stavova koje su ranije imali, što se odrazilo u činjenici da su bili zaposleni u KGB. Njihova lojalnost državi Litvaniji nikada nije bila ispitivana tokom postupka pred domaćim sudovima; isto tako, nije im bila pružena mogućnost da domaćim sudovima predoče argumente kojima bi dokazali svoju lojalnost. Zakon o KGB je samovoljno i kolektivno kaznio sve bivše oficire KGB bez obzira na njihovu ličnu istoriju. Njihovo otpuštanje u takvim okolnostima bilo je neproporcionalno ostvarivanju ma kakvog javnog interesa kome je zakonodavac mogao da teži kada je donošen Zakon o KGB. Za vreme dok su bili zaposleni kao poreski inspektor, odnosno kao tužilac, obojica su bili lojalni ideji litvanske nezavisnosti i demokratskim načelima na kojima počiva Ustav Litvanije. Podnosioci predstavke su zaključili da njihovo otpuštanje s posla i aktuelna zabrana da traže posao u raznim oblastima u javnom i privatnom sektoru predstavlja kršenje člana 10 i člana 14 Konvencije.
Stranke su osporile pitanje primenjivosti člana 10. Konvencije. Sud u tom smislu ponavlja da to što je nekome onemogućen pristup u državnoj službi kao takvo ne može predstavljati osnovu za pritužbu na osnovu Konvencije (vidi navedenu presudu u predmetu Glazenap i Kosjek, st. 49. i st. 35; navedeno načelo takođe je potvrđeno u presudi u već pomenutom predmetu Fogt, st. 43-44). U pomenutoj presudi Tlimenos, gde je podnosiocu predstavke odbijena registracija ovlašćenog računovođe zbog ranijih presuda, Sud je takođe zaključio da pravo na izbor određene profesije nije, kao takvo, zajamčeno Konvencijom (ibid, st. 41).
Tačno je da je Sud takođe doneo zaključak da otpuštanje državnog službenika ili državnog funkcionera na političkim osnovama može predstavljati osnov za pritužbu na osnovu člana 10 Konvencije (vidi već pomenute presude Fogt; takođe i pomenute odluke u predmetima Folkmer i Petersen, ibid.). Sud, međutim, primećuje da ograničenja za zapošljavanje kojima su podvrgnuti podnosioci predstavke u tim slučajevima imaju veze samo sa specifičnim aktivnostima koje su ta lica obavljali kao član Komunističke Partije u Zapadnoj Nemačkoj (Fogt) ili kao saradnik režima u bivšem DDR (Folkmer i Petersen).
Nasuprot tome, u ovom slučaju, obojica podnosilaca predstavke podvrgnuta su ograničenju u pogledu zapošljavanja ne kao rezultat ishoda običnih radnih sporova, već usled toga što je na njih primenjen specijalni domaći zakon kojim se uvode mere provere zbog toga što su svojevremeno radili za KGB. S obzirom na odluke domaćih sudova u njihovim predmetima, sve ukazuje na to da su domaći sudovi bili isključivo zainteresovani za utvrđivanje prirode bivšeg zaposlenja podnosilaca predstavke u KGB, a ne za to da konkretno razmotre okolnosti slučaja svakog od ovih podnosilaca, na primer, da utvrdi kakve su stavove oni imali ili kakva su mišljenja izražavali za vreme svog rada u KGB ili posle tog zaposlenja.
Pored toga, u navedenim predmetima protiv Nemačke utvrđeno je da postoji mešanje u prava zajamčena članom 10, usled toga što su ti podnosioci predstavki bili otpušteni s posla nastavnika koji po svojoj prirodi podrazumeva prenošenje ideja i informacija na svakodnevnoj osnovi. Sud nije ubeđen da otpuštanje ove dvojice podnosilaca predstavke s njihovih radnih mesta, poreskog inspektora i tužioca, ili njihova navodna nemogućnost da nađu posao u skladu sa svojim stručnim i obrazovnim kvalifikacijama profesionalnog instruktora sporta, odnosno pravnika, predstavlja ograničenje njihove mogućnosti da izražavaju svoja mišljenja ili stavove u istoj onoj meri u kojoj je to bio slučaj u prethodno pomenutim predmetima protiv Nemačke.
Stoga Sud ne smatra da je primena ograničenja na zapošljavanje ove dvojice podnosilaca predstavke na osnovu Zakona o KGB ugrozila njihovo pravo na slobodu izražavanja. Iz toga sledi da u ovom predmetu nije primenjiv član 10.
U meri u kojoj podnosioci predstavke pominju član 14 Konvencije, Sud ponovo ističe da ta odredba ne može da postoji nezavisno, budući da se odnosi isključivo na prava i slobode zajamčene drugim suštinskim odredbama Konvencije i njenih protokola. Međutim, primena člana 14 ne pretpostavlja kršenje jedne ili više takvih odredaba i u tom smislu ona jeste autonomna. Da bi član 14 postao primenjiv dovoljno je da okolnosti slučaja spadaju u sferu neke druge suštinske odredbe Konvencije ili njenih protokola (vidi navedeni predmet Tlimenos, st. 40). Budući da je Sud utvrdio kako se u ovom predmetu ne može primeniti član 10, onda nema prostora ni za primenu člana 14 u vezi sa pritužbama podnosilaca predstavki na osnovu člana 10.
Prema tome, nije došlo do kršenja člana 10, Konvencije ni uzetog samostalno, ni u vezi sa članom 14.
III PRIMENA ČLANA 41 KONVENCIJE
“Kada Sud utvrdi prekršaj Konvencije ili Protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo delimičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj stranki”.
A. Šteta
Prvi podnosilac predstavke tražio je da mu se isplati 257.154 litvanska litasa (LTL), što iznosi oko 74.365 evra (EUR) na ime materijalne štete koju je pretrpeo zbog toga što je bio podvrgnut ograničenjima na zapošljavanje na osnovu Zakona o KGB. On je takođe tražio isplatu 500.000 LTL (144.592 EUR) na ime nematerijalne štete.
Drugi podnosilac predstavke tražio je 201.508,54 LTL (58.273 EUR) na ime materijalne štete i 75.000 LTL (21.689 EUR) na ime nematerijalne štete.
Država je smatrala da su ti iznosi preterani.
Sud je ponovio da je utvrdio kako je došlo do kršenja člana 14 u vezi sa članom 8 Konvencije u pogledu ograničenja na zapošljavanje koje su podnosiocima predstavke nametnuta na osnovu Zakona o KGB. Sud smatra da se u tom pogledu može smatrati kako su podnosioci predstavke pretrpeli izvesnu materijalnu i nematerijalnu štetu. Procenjujući okolnosti na pravičnoj osnovi Sud svakom podnosiocu predstavke odobrava iznos od po 7.000 EUR na ime štete.
B. Troškovi suđenja
Prvi podnosilac predstavke tražio je 40.000 LTL (11.567 EUR) na ime troškova koje je imao u vezi sa sudskim postupkom u pogledu Konvencije. Drugi podnosilac predstavke tražio je 31.860 LTL (9.213 EUR).
Država smatra da su ti zahtevi prekomerni.
Prema utvrđenom precedentnom pravu Suda, troškovi po osnovu člana 41 neće biti odobreni za isplatu ukoliko se ne utvrdi da ih je podnosilac predstavke stvarno podneo, da su bili nužni i da su bili opravdani sa stanovišta obima. Pored toga, pravni troškovi su nadoknadivi samo u meri u kojoj se odnose na utvrđenu povredu Konvencije (vidi predmet Bivši kralj Grčke i drugi protiv Grčke (pravično zadovoljenje) (GC), br. 25701/94, st. 105).
Sud primećuje da je podnosiocima predstavke data pravna pomoć u okviru sudskog programa pravne pomoći, tako da je advokatu prvog podnosioca isplaćena svota od 2.318,63 evra, a advokatu drugog podnosioca predstavke isplaćena je svota od 2.225,95 evra, kako bi se pokrili troškovi primedaba i dodatnih komentara podnetih u ime podnosilaca predstavke, pojavljivanja advokata na ročištu i vođenja pregovora o prijateljskom poravnanju.
Donoseći procenu na pravičnoj osnovi, Sud svakom od podnosilaca predstavke odobrava po 5.000 evra na ime troškova suđenja, od čega treba odbiti svotu već isplaćenu u okviru sudskog programa pravne pomoći (u prvom slučaju to je svoga od 2.318,63 evra, a u drugom svota od 2.225,95 evra). Prema tome, Sud odobrava konačnu svotu od 2.681,37 evra na ime pokrića sudskih troškova prvom podnosiocu predstavke, odnosno 2.774,05 evra na ime pokrića troškova drugom podnosiocu predstavke.
C. Važeća kamatna stopa
IZ TIH RAZLOGA, SUD
Zaključuje, s pet glasova naspram dva glasa, da je prekršen član 14 Konvencije u vezi sa članom 8 konvencije;
Zaključuje, s pet glasova naspram dva glasa, da nije potrebno donositi posebnu odluku o pritužbama podnosilaca predstavki na osnovu člana 8 Konvencije, uzetog zasebno;
Zaključuje, jednoglasno, da nije prekršen član 10 Konvencije shvaćen zasebno ili u vezi sa članom 14 Konvencije;
Zaključuje, sa pet glasova prema dva glasa,
(a) da tužena država ugovornica treba da plati svakom podnosiocu predstavke, u roku od tri meseca od dana kada ova presuda postane konačna i pravosnažna, u skladu sa članom 44 stav 2 Konvencije:
(i) 7.000 evra (sedam hiljada evra) svakom od podnosilaca predstavke na ime materijalne i nematerijalne štete;
(ii) 2.681,37 evra (dve hiljade šest stotina osamdeset jedan evro i trideset sedam centi) prvom podnosiocu predstavke na ime sudskih i ostalih troškova;
(iii) 2.774,05 evra (dve hiljade sedam stotina sedamdeset četiri evra i pet centi) drugom podnosiocu predstavke na ime sudskih i ostalih troškova; i
(iv) svaki porez koji bi eventualno mogao biti zaračunat, s tim što ove iznose treba konvertovati u valutu tužene visoke strane ugovornice po kursu primenjivom na dan isplate;
(b) da će od dana isteka pomenuta tri meseca do isplate na navedenu svotu biti zaračunavata kamata koja se plaća samo na glavnicu po stopi koja odgovara povećanoj kreditnoj i kamatnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke, dodatno uvećanoj za tri procentna poena;
Presuda je sročena na engleskom jeziku i overeni prepisi su poslati strankama 27. jula 2004. godine, u skladu sa pravilom 77 stavovi 2 i 3 Poslovnika Suda.
S. Dole L. Lukaides
Sekretar Predsednik
U skladu sa članom 45 stav 2 Konvencije i pravilom 74 stav 2 Poslovnika Suda, ovoj presudi su priložena sledeća izdvojena mišljenja:
(a) delimično saglasno mišljenje gđe Mularoni;
(b) delimično nesaglasno mišljenje g. Lukaidesa;
(c) delimično nesaglasno mišljenje gđe Tomasen.
L.L.
S.D.
DELIMIČNO SAGLASNO MIŠLJENJE SUDIJE GĐE MULARONI
Više bih volela da je Sud razmotrio pritužbe podnosilaca predstavki na osnovu člana 8 Konvencije shvaćenog zasebno i da je zaključio kako uopšte nije neophodno da donosi presudu o njihovim pritužbama na osnovu člana 14 Konvencije u vezi sa članom 8. Pristala sam, međutim, da glasam zajedno sa većinom budući da sam smatrala da je važno da se presudi kako je u ovom slučaju prekršen član 8 Konvencije.
U potpunosti se slažem sa razlozima navedenim u stavovima od 52. do 61. presude. Ne slažem se, međutim, sa razlozima iznetim u stavu 49.
Smatram da argument podnosilaca predstavke o tome da su oni, zbog publiciteta izazvanog stupanjem na snagu “Zakona o KGB” 16. jula 1998. godine i njegove primene na sebe svakodnevno izloženi neprijatnostima zbog posla koji su ranije obavljali jednostavno ne zaslužuje pažnju Suda. Podnosioci predstavke su radili za KGB i nikada nisu osporili to da su aktivnosti KGB bile suprotne načelima zajamčenim litvanskim Ustavom ili Konvencijom (vidi stav 54). Sud je prihvatio argument da ograničenje na mogućnost zapošljavanja podnosilaca predstavke na osnovu osporenog zakona ima legitiman cilj zaštite nacionalne bezbednosti, javne bezbednosti, ekonomskog blagostanja zemlje i prava i slobode drugih (vidi gore, stav 55).
Svako mora da prihvati posledice svojih akcija u životu te je činjenica da podnosioci predstavke i dalje snose teret svog statusa “bivših oficira KGB” i opterećeni su njime po mom mišljenju potpuno irelevantna za pitanje primenjivosti (i kršenja) člana 8 Konvencije. Argument da ih društvo stigmatizuje zbog toga što su u prošlosti bili povezani sa opresivnim režimom, po mom mišljenju nema nikakve veze sa odgovornošću visoke strane ugovornice za kršenje člana 8 Konvencije.
Ja takođe smatram da argument po kome podnosioci predstavke nisu mogli da predvide posledice što će ih njihovo nekadašnje zaposlenje u KGB imati po njih nije ni od kakvog značaja za pitanje primenjivosti (i kršenja) člana 8. Ako bi se takav argument prihvatio, onda bi svaki ljudski čin, makar bio i najstrašniji i zasluživao najveću osudu, koji bi počinio neki diktator na vlasti, mogao da opravda utvrđivanje kršenja Konvencije po uspostavljanju demokratskog režima. Ne sme se smetnuti s uma, s tim u vezi, da član 17. Konvencije glasi da se “ništa u ovoj Konvenciji ne može ... tumačiti tako da podrazumeva pravo bilo koje države, grupe ili lica da se upuste u neku delatnost ili izvrše neki čin koji je usmeren na poništavanje bilo kog od navedenih prava i sloboda ... predviđenih Konvencijom”.
Po mom mišljenju, logično sledi zaključak da je zabrana konkurisanja na određena radna mesta u izuzetno velikoj meri uticala na mogućnosti podnosilaca predstavke da teže ostvarenju različitih profesionalnih aktivnosti i da je to posledično uticalo na ostvarenje njihovog prava na poštovanje privatnog života u smislu člana 8 Konvencije. Saglasna sam s većinom kolega da je činjenica da je podnosiocima predstavke bilo onemogućeno da traže posao u raznim oblastima privatnog sektora zbog statutarne zabrane predstavljala neproporcionalnu meru, čak i ako se ima na umu legitimnost ciljeva kojima se tom zabranom težilo. To je, samo po sebi, trebalo da bude sasvim dovoljno da navede Sud na zaključak da je član 8 Konvencije bio prekršen u slučaju ovih podnosilaca predstavki.
DELIMIČNO IZDVOJENO MIŠLJENJE SUDIJE LUKAIDESA
Ne slažem se sa većinom da član 14 nije primenjiv u ovom slučaju i to iz sledećih razloga:
Utvrđeno je precedentno pravo Suda da član 14 jamči pojedincima koji se nađu u “analognim” ili “sličnim” ili “relevantno sličnim” situacijama (vidi predmet Marks protiv Belgije (Marckx), presuda od 13, juna 1979, Series A br. 31, st. 32; Van der Misel protiv Belgije (Van der Mussele), presuda od 23. novembra 1983, Series A br. 70, st. 46; Fredin protiv Švedske (br. 1), presuda od 18. februara 1991, Series A br. 192, st. 60; Stabings i drugi protiv Velike Britanije (Stubbings) presuda od 22. oktobra 1996, Reports 1996-IV, st. 72). Zato, kako je već istaknuto u tim precedentnim slučajevima:
“Da bi tvrdnja da je prekršen ovaj član bila sudski potvrđena, mora biti utvrđeno, inter alia, da se situacija u kojoj se našla navodna žrtva može smatrati sličnom situaciji onih lica koja su bila na bolji način tretirana” (videti presude u predmetima Fredin i Stabings, nav.del).
Prilikom razmatranja ovog pitanja mora se voditi računa o cilju i posledicama zakona ili mere o kojima je reč. Zakon koji se ovde razmatra uveo je ograničenja na profesionalne aktivnosti lica koja su u prošlosti radila za KGB, aktivnosti koje su bile suprotne načelima zajamčenim Ustavom Litvanije i ovom Konvencijom. Cilj Zakona o KGB bila je zaštita nacionalne bezbednosti, javne bezbednosti i prava i sloboda drugih, izbegavanje ponavljanja pređašnjih iskustava do čega bi moglo da dođe ukoliko bi ljudi koji su ranije radili za KGB ponovo obavljali slične aktivnosti. Stoga je evidentno da su osporena ograničenja propisana zakonom o kome je ovde reč u neposrednoj vezi sa činjenicom da podnosioci predstavke uživaju status bivših oficira KGB
Većina je zaključila da je član 14 primenjiv u ovom slučaju zbog toga što su podnosioci predstavke tretirani različito od drugih lica u Litvaniji, onih koja nisu radila za KGB (vidi gore, stav 41). Međutim, u svetlosti svega što je navedeno, ne vidim kako se može reći da su ljudi koji nisu radili za KGB u “analogno”, “slično” ili “relevantno sličnoj” situaciji sa onima koji jesu radili za KGB.
Mada ja smatram da član 14 nije primenjiv u ovom slučaju, verujem da su ograničenja nametnuta na profesionalne aktivnosti podnosilaca predstavke, u okolnostima slučaja onako kako su te okolnosti objašnjene u presudi, bile toliko teške i neproporcionalne cilju kome se težilo da predstavljaju potpuno neopravdano mešanje u privatni život podnosilaca. Prema tome, smatram da je došlo do kršenja člana 8 Konvencije.
DELIMIČNO IZDVOJENO MIŠLJENJE SUDIJE GĐE TOMASEN
Glasala sam protiv zaključka većine da je prekršen član 14 Konvencije u vezi sa članom 8.
Teško mi je da razmatram opravdanje mera preduzetih prema bivšim službenicima KGB u smislu “diskriminacije”. Načelo nediskriminacije, onako kako ga priznaju evropski ustavi i međunarodni ugovori, pre svega se odnosi na to da se ljudima odriču mogućnosti na temelju ličnih izbora u tom smislu da te izbore treba poštovati kao elemente nečije ličnosti kao što je veroispovest, političko uverenje, seksualna orijentacija ili rodni identitet, ili, nasuprot tome, na temelju ličnih odlika u odnosu na koje nemamo nikakvog izbora kao što su pol, rasa, invaliditet i životno doba.
Po mom mišljenju, rad u KGB ne spada ni u jednu od ovih kategorija.
Mada je tačno da su bivši službenici KGB tretirani različito od “drugih lica u Litvaniji koja nisu radila za KGB” (vidi gore, stav 41) ova razlika ne spada u okvire člana 14. u meri u kojoj se odnosi na pristup određenim profesijama, budući da pravo na slobodan izbor profesije nije zajamčen Konvencijom (vidi, mutatis mutandis, navedenu presudu u predmetu Tlimenos, stav 41).
Ja se, međutim, slažem da je primena zakona, koji sam po sebi teži ostvarenju legitimnog cilja, bila tako opšteg karaktera da je uticala na mogućnost podnosilaca predstavke da razvijaju odnose sa spoljnim svetom što je inače zaštićeno članom 8 (videti predmet Priti protiv Velike Britanije (Pretty), br. 2346/02, st. 61, ECHR 2002-III) u znatnoj meri i da je stoga predstavljala mešanje u njihov privatni život. S obzirom na okolnosti sadašnje primene, kao što je recimo činjenica da je zakon primenjen pošto je prošlo mnogo godina otkako su podnosioci predstavke napustili KGB i mnogo godina pošto je Litvanija stekla nezavisnost, a da pritom nisu uzete u obzir specifične okolnosti njihovih pojedinačnih slučajeva, ovo mešanje se ne može smatrati proporcionalnim. Samim tim, prekršen je član 8 ove Konvencije.
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Prevod presude preuzet sa https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
Prevod presude Beogradski centar za ljudska prava
SECOND SECTION
CASE OF SIDABRAS AND DŽIAUTAS v. LITHUANIA
(Applications nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
27 July 2004
FINAL
27/10/2004
In the case of Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
MrL. Loucaides, President,
MrJ.-P. Costa,
MrC. Bîrsan,
MrK. Jungwiert,
MrV. Butkevych,
MrsW. Thomassen,
MrsA. Mularoni, judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 1 July 2003, 21 October 2003 and 6 July 2004,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in applications (nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Lithuanian nationals, Mr Juozas Sidabras and Mr Kęstutis Džiautas (“the applicants”), on 29 November 1999 and 5 July 2000 respectively.
2. The applicants were represented by Mr E. Morkūnas, a lawyer practising in Šiauliai, and Mr V. Barkauskas, a lawyer practising in Vilnius. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Mr G. Švedas and Mrs D. Jočienė, of the Ministry of Justice.
3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that they had lost their jobs and that their employment prospects had been restricted as a result of the application of the Law on the evaluation of the USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) and the present activities of former permanent employees of the organisation, in breach of Articles 8, 10 and 14 of the Convention.
4. The applications were allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1. Mr P. Kūris, the judge elected in respect of Lithuania, withdrew from sitting in the case (Rule 28). The Government accordingly appointed Mr J.-P. Costa, the judge elected in respect of France, to sit in his place (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1).
5. On 1 November 2001 the Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly composed Second Section (Rule 52 § 1). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.
6. The Chamber decided to join the applications (Rule 42 § 1).
7. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 1 July 2003 (Rule 59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
MrsD. Jočienė, Agent;
(b) for the applicants
MrE. Morkūnas,
MrV. Barkauskas, Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by them.
8. By a decision of 1 July 2003, following the hearing on admissibility and the merits (Rule 54 § 3), the Court declared the applications partly admissible.
9. The applicants and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
10. The first applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Šiauliai. The second applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Vilnius.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
A. The first applicant
11. In 1974 the first applicant graduated from the Lithuanian Physical Culture Institute, qualifying as a certified sports instructor.
12. From 1975 to 1986 he was an employee of the Lithuanian branch of the Soviet Security Service (the KGB). After Lithuania declared its independence in 1990, he found employment as a tax inspector at the Inland Revenue.
13. On 31 May 1999 two authorities – the Lithuanian State Security Department and the Centre for Research into the Genocide and Resistance of the Lithuanian People – jointly concluded that the first applicant was subject to the restrictions provided under section 2 of the Law on the evaluation of the USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) and the present activities of former permanent employees of the organisation (“the KGB Act” – see paragraph 24 below). The conclusion confirmed that the first applicant had the status of a “former KGB officer” (see paragraphs 26-27 below). On 2 June 1999 the first applicant was dismissed from the Inland Revenue on the basis of that conclusion.
14. The first applicant brought an administrative action against the security intelligence authorities, claiming that he had been engaged only in counterintelligence and ideology work while employed by the KGB, and that he had not been involved in the violation of individual rights by that organisation. He argued that his dismissal under section 2 of the KGB Act and the resultant inability to find employment were therefore unlawful.
15. On 9 September 1999 the Higher Administrative Court found that the conclusion of 31 May 1999 had been substantiated and that the first applicant was subject to the restrictions provided under section 2 of the KGB Act. In this respect, the court held that the applicant had the status of a “former KGB officer” within the meaning of the KGB Act, since he had occupied one of the positions mentioned in the list of 26 January 1999.
16. On 19 October 1999 the Court of Appeal dismissed the first applicant’s appeal. It found that he had not occupied a KGB position dealing only with criminal investigations and could not therefore benefit from the exceptions listed under section 3 of the KGB Act.
B. The second applicant
17. On an unspecified date in the 1980s, the second applicant graduated from Vilnius University as a qualified lawyer.
18. From 11 February 1991 he worked as a prosecutor at the Office of the Prosecutor General of Lithuania, investigating primarily cases of organised crime and corruption.
19. On 26 May 1999 the Lithuanian State Security Department and the Centre for Research into the Genocide and Resistance of the Lithuanian People jointly concluded that from 1985 to 1991 the second applicant had been an employee of the Lithuanian branch of the KGB, that he had the status of a “former KGB officer” and that he was thereby subject to the restrictions provided under section 2 of the KGB Act. On 31 May 1999 the second applicant was dismissed from his job at the Office of the Prosecutor General on the basis of that conclusion.
20. The second applicant brought an administrative action against the security intelligence authorities and the Office of the Prosecutor General. He claimed that from 1985 to 1990 he had merely studied at a special KGB school in Moscow and that from 1990 to 1991 he had worked in the KGB as an informer for the Lithuanian security intelligence authorities and should therefore be entitled to benefit from the exceptions under section 3 of the KGB Act. He claimed that his dismissal under the Act and his resultant inability to find employment were unlawful.
21. On 6 August 1999 the Higher Administrative Court allowed the second applicant’s claim, quashed the conclusion of 26 May 1999 and ordered him to be reinstated. The court found that the period of the second applicant’s studies at the KGB school from 1985 to 1990 was not to be taken into account for the purposes of the KGB Act, that he had worked in the KGB for a period of five months in 1990-91, that he had not occupied a KGB position dealing with political investigations and that, in any event, he had been a secret informer for the Lithuanian authorities. The court concluded that the exceptions under section 3 of the KGB Act applied to the second applicant and that his dismissal had therefore been unlawful.
22. Following an appeal by the security intelligence authorities, on 25 October 1999 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 6 August 1999. It held that, although the first-instance court had properly found that the second applicant had worked at the KGB for only five months, it had not been established that he had worked there as a secret informer for the Lithuanian authorities. Accordingly, he could not benefit from the exceptions under section 3 of the KGB Act.
23. The second applicant appealed against the Court of Appeal’s judgment. By a decision of 28 January 2000, the President of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal. However, by a final decision of 20 April 2000, the full Supreme Court refused to examine the appeal and discontinued the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
24. The Law on the evaluation of the USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) and the present activities of former permanent employees of the organisation (Įstatymas dėl SSRS valstybės saugumo komiteto (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) vertinimo ir šios organizacijos kadrinių darbuotojų dabartinės veiklos – “the KGB Act”) was enacted on 16 July 1998 by the Seimas (the Lithuanian parliament) and promulgated by the President of the Republic. The KGB Act reads as follows:
Section 1
Recognition of the USSR State Security Committee as a criminal organisation
“The USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB – hereinafter ‘the SSC’) is recognised as a criminal organisation which was responsible for war crimes, genocide, repression, terror and political persecution in the territory of Lithuania when occupied by the USSR.”
Section 2
Restrictions on the present activities of permanent employees of the SSC
“For a period of ten years from the date of entry into force of this Act, former employees of the SSC may not work as public officials or civil servants in government, local or defence authorities, the State Security Department, the police, the prosecution, courts or diplomatic service, customs, State supervisory bodies and other authorities monitoring public institutions, as lawyers or notaries, as employees of banks and other credit institutions, on strategic economic projects, in security companies (structures), in other companies (structures) providing detective services, in communications systems, or in the educational system as teachers, educators or heads of institutions[;] nor may they perform a job requiring the carrying of a weapon.”
Section 3
Cases in which the restrictions shall not be applied
“(1) The restrictions provided for in section 2 shall not be applied to former permanent employees of the SSC who, while working at the SSC, investigated only criminal cases and who discontinued their work at the SSC not later than 11 March 1990.
(2) The Centre for Research into the Genocide and Resistance of the Lithuanian People and the State Security Department may [recommend by] a reasoned application that no restrictions under this law be applied to former permanent employees of the SSC who, within three months of the date of the entry into force of this Law, report to the State Security Department and disclose all information in their possession ... about their former work at the SSC and their current relations with former SSC employees and agents. A decision in this respect shall be taken by a commission of three persons set up by the President of the Republic. No employees of the Centre for Research into the Genocide and Resistance of the Lithuanian People or the State Security Department may be appointed to the commission. The commission’s rules shall be confirmed by the President of the Republic.”
Section 4
Procedure for implementation of the Act
“The procedure for implementation of the Act shall be governed by [a special law].”
Section 5
Entry into force of the Act
“This Act shall come into force on 1 January 1999.”
25. Following the examination by the Constitutional Court of the compatibility of the KGB Act with the Constitution (see paragraph 28 below), on 5 May 1999 section 3 of the KGB Act was amended to the effect that even those individuals who had worked for the KGB after 11 March 1990 could be eligible for the exceptions under section 3 of that Act.
26. On 16 July 1998 a separate law on the implementation of the KGB Act was enacted. Under that law, the Centre for Research into the Genocide and Resistance of the Lithuanian People and the State Security Department were empowered to reach a conclusion on an individual’s status as a “former permanent employee of the KGB” (“former KGB officer”) for the purposes of the KGB Act.
27. On 26 January 1999 the Government adopted a list (“the list”) of positions in various branches of the KGB on Lithuanian territory attesting to a person’s status as a “former KGB officer” for the purposes of the KGB Act. A total of 395 different positions were listed in this respect.
28. On 4 March 1999 the Constitutional Court examined the issue of the KGB Act’s compatibility with the Constitution. The Constitutional Court held in particular that the KGB Act had been passed in order to carry out “security screening” measures on former KGB officers, who were deemed to be lacking in loyalty to the Lithuanian State. The Constitutional Court decided that the prohibition on former KGB officers occupying public posts was compatible with the Constitution. It further ruled that the statutory ban on the holding by former KGB officers of jobs in various branches of the private sector was compatible with the constitutional principle of a free choice of profession in that the State was entitled to lay down specific requirements for persons applying for work in the most important economic sectors in order to ensure the protection of national security and proper functioning of the educational and financial systems. The Constitutional Court also held that the restrictions under the KGB Act did not amount to a criminal charge against former KGB officers.
29. While the KGB Act does not specifically guarantee a right of access to a court to contest the security intelligence authorities’ conclusion, it was recognised by the domestic courts that, as a matter of practice, a dismissal from employment in the public service on the basis of that conclusion gave rise to an administrative court action (and a further appeal) under the general procedure governing industrial disputes and alleged breaches of personal rights by the public authorities, under Articles 4, 7, 8, 26, 49, 50, 59, 63 and 64 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, Article 222 of the Civil Code and Article 336 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as in force at the material time)
III. PROVISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CERTAIN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS RELATING TO EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL GROUNDS
30. Restrictions have been imposed in many post-communist countries with a view to screening the employment of former security agents or active collaborators in the former regimes. In this connection, international human rights bodies have at times found fault with such legislation where it has lacked precision or proportionality, and have characterised it as discrimination in employment or the exercise of a profession on the basis of political opinion (see below). The possibility of appealing to the courts has been considered a significant safeguard, although not sufficient in itself to rectify shortcomings in the legislation.
31. Article 1 § 2 of the European Social Charter provides:
“With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to work, the Parties undertake:
...
2. to protect effectively the right of the worker to earn his living in an occupation freely entered upon[.]”
This provision, retained word for word in the revised Charter of 1996 (which came into force with regard to Lithuania on 1 August 2001), has been consistently interpreted by the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) as establishing a right not to be discriminated against in employment. The non-discrimination guarantee is stipulated in Article E of the revised Charter in the following terms:
“The enjoyment of the rights set forth in this Charter shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national extraction or social origin, health, association with a national minority, birth or other status.”
The question of the dismissal of public servants on account of their activities under totalitarian regimes has been addressed in the light of these provisions, at least as regards Germany. In its most recent examination of Germany’s compliance with Article 1 § 2 of the Charter (published in November 2002), the ECSR took note of the provisions of the reunification treaty that allow for the dismissal of public servants on the basis of their activities on behalf of the security services of the German Democratic Republic. It concluded that Germany was not complying with its obligations. This was expanded upon in the following terms:
“The Committee observes that there is no precise definition of the functions from which individuals can be excluded, either in the form of a refusal to recruit or a dismissal, on the grounds of previous political activities or activities within the former GDR institutions competent in security matters.
The Committee has examined the conformity of these provisions in the light of Article 31 of the Charter. Under this provision, restriction of a right enshrined in the Charter is permitted if it is prescribed by law, is necessary in a democratic society and serves one of the purposes listed in the Article. Whilst recognising that the provisions were prescribed by law within the meaning of Article 31 and served one of the purposes listed therein, namely the protection of national security, the Committee considered that they were not necessary within the meaning of Article 31 in that they did not apply solely to services which had responsibilities in the fields of law and order and national security or to functions involving such responsibilities.”
The ECSR adopted its conclusions in regard to Lithuania’s implementation of the revised Charter on 28 May 2004. They will be made public at a later date.
32. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has also adopted a number of relevant international legal instruments. The most pertinent text is ILO Convention no. 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) of 1958. In its 1996 General Survey, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) restated its interpretation of Convention no. 111, drawing upon examples taken from national law. Regarding Germany, the CEACR’s position was the following (§ 196):
“The Committee does not accept the argument that in cases in which persons had been accused of having carried out political activities in the former German Democratic Republic, the more the person had, by the assumption of certain functions, identified himself or herself with that unjust regime, the more incriminated he or she was, and the less reasonable it was that this person hold a position in the current administration.”
More recently, however, the CEACR has expressed satisfaction with the German courts’ observance of the principle of proportionality in cases where civil servants challenge their dismissal (see paragraph 3 of the Individual Observation to Germany under Convention no. 111 in 2000).
A 1996 survey identifies comparable provisions in the domestic law of a number of other European States.
In Bulgaria, section 9 of the Preceding and Concluding Provisions of the Banks and Credit Activity Act of 1992 excluded persons who had served the previous regime in certain capacities from employment in banks. The Bulgarian Constitutional Court ruled in 1992 that this provision was in violation of the Constitution and of ILO Convention no. 111.
In the former Czechoslovakia, the so-called Screening Act was passed in 1991, preventing persons who had served the previous regime in a number of capacities from taking up employment in the civil service or parts of the private sector. This legislation was declared unconstitutional by the Slovak Constitutional Court in 1996, which further found it to be incompatible with Convention no. 111. However, it remained in force in the Czech Republic, while the CEACR urged the Czech authorities to have due regard to the principle of proportionality in the application of the Act.
In Latvia, the State Civil Service Act of 2000 and the Police Act of 1999 prohibit the employment of persons who worked for or with the KGB. In 2003 the CEACR expressed its dissatisfaction with the above texts in the following terms:
“6. The Committee recalls that requirements of a political nature can be set for a particular job, but to ensure that they are not contrary to the Convention, they should be limited to the characteristics of a particular post and be in proportion to its labour requirements. The Committee notes that the above-established exclusions by the provisions under examination apply broadly to the entire civil service and police rather than to specific jobs, functions or tasks. The Committee is concerned that these provisions appear to go beyond justifiable exclusions in respect of a particular job based on its inherent requirements as provided for under Article 1 (2) of the Convention. The Committee recalls that for measures not to be deemed discriminatory under Article 4, they must be measures affecting an individual on account of activities he or she is justifiably suspected or proved to be engaged in which are prejudicial to the security of the State. Article 4 of the Convention does not exclude from the definition of discrimination measures taken by reason of membership of a particular group or community. The Committee also notes that in cases where persons are deemed to be justifiably suspected of or engaged in activities prejudicial to the security of the State, the individual concerned shall have the right to appeal to a competent body in accordance with national practice.
7. In the light of the above, the Committee considers the exclusions from being a candidate for any civil service position and from being employed by the police are not sufficiently well defined and delimited to ensure that they do not become discrimination in employment and occupation based on political opinion ...”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION, TAKEN ALONE AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 14
33. The applicants stated that the current ban under section 2 of the KGB Act on their finding employment in various branches of the private sector breached Article 8 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14.
Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
Article 14 states:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
34. The Government submitted that Article 8 was not applicable in the present case as that provision did not guarantee a right to retain employment or to choose a profession. They further stated that, in any event, the application of the KGB Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of protecting national security and was necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, the KGB Act constituted no more than a justified security screening measure intended to prevent former employees of a foreign secret service from working not only in State institutions but also in other spheres of activity which were important to the State’s national security. The KGB Act itself did not impose collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. It provided for individualised restrictions on employment prospects by way of the list of positions in the former KGB which warranted application of the restrictions under section 2 of the KGB Act (see paragraph 27 above). The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in section 3 of the KGB Act showed that there existed a well-founded suspicion that the applicants lacked loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Given that not all former employees of the KGB were affected by the KGB Act, Article 14 of the Convention was not applicable. Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 8 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.
35. The applicants contested the Government’s submissions. They complained in particular that they had been deprived of the possibility of seeking employment in various branches of the private sector until 2009 on the basis of their status as former KGB officers. They submitted that they had been given no opportunity under the KGB Act either to present their personal cases for evaluating and establishing their loyalty to the State or to avoid the application to them of the employment restrictions provided under section 2. In particular, the first applicant stressed that he had left the KGB in 1986 and the second applicant that he had left in 1990, thirteen and nine years respectively before the entry into force of the KGB Act. Furthermore, the first applicant contended that thereafter he had been actively involved in various activities promoting Lithuania’s independence. For his part, the second applicant submitted that he had been decorated as a prosecutor for his work in investigating various offences, including crimes against the State. However, none of those facts had been examined by the domestic courts, which had imposed restrictions on their future employment solely on the ground of their former employment in the KGB. Finally, the applicants submitted that as a result of the negative publicity caused by the enactment of the KGB Act and its application to them, they had suffered constant embarrassment on account of their past.
A. Scope of the applicants’ complaints
36. The Court notes that the applicants’ complaints under Article 8, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14, do not concern their dismissal from their former employment as, respectively, a tax inspector and prosecutor. Furthermore, this part of the application is not directed against their inability to find employment as public servants. The applicants’ complaints under Article 8 of the Convention, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14, concern only the ban imposed on them until 2009 on applying for jobs in various branches of the private sector. This ban, effective since 1999, relates to the following private sector activities listed in section 2 of the KGB Act: “[work] as lawyers or notaries, as employees of banks and other credit institutions, on strategic economic projects, in security companies (structures), in other companies (structures) providing detective services, in communications systems or in the educational system as teachers, educators or heads of institutions[;] ... [work] requiring the carrying of a weapon.”
37. The applicants complained that employment restrictions had been imposed on them on the basis of their former employment with the KGB. They essentially alleged discrimination in this respect. Therefore, the Court will first examine their complaints under Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8, and will then examine their complaints under Article 8 alone.
B. Applicability of Article 14
38. The Court reiterates that Article 14 of the Convention protects individuals in similar situations from being treated differently without justification in the enjoyment of their Convention rights and freedoms. This provision has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. However, the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of one or more of such provisions and to this extent it is autonomous. For Article 14 to become applicable, it suffices that the facts of a case fall within the ambit of another substantive provision of the Convention or its Protocols (see, mutatis mutandis, Inze v. Austria, judgment of 28 October 1987, Series A no. 126, p.17, § 36).
39. The Court will therefore establish, firstly, whether there has been a difference in treatment of the applicants, and, if so, whether the facts of the case fall within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention, in order to rule on the applicability of Article 14.
1. Whether there has been a difference of treatment
40. The Court observes that, according to the Government, the fact of the applicants’ KGB history cannot give rise to a complaint under Article 14 because not all former KGB officers were subjected to restrictions under the KGB Act. The Government stated that the reason for the enactment of the KGB Act and the employment restrictions imposed on the applicants was the lack of loyalty to the State on the part of former KGB officers. The Court observes that the KGB Act did not restrict the employment prospects of all former collaborators of the Soviet Security Service. Firstly, only those persons who had occupied the positions mentioned in the list of 26 January 1999 were considered to have the status of “former KGB officers” (see paragraph 27 above). Secondly, even those persons deemed to have that status could benefit from the amnesty rule mentioned in section 3 of the KGB Act if they had been engaged only in criminal, as opposed to political, investigations during their time at the KGB (see paragraph 24 above). Thirdly, there was the option of applying to the special presidential commission within a three-month period following the KGB Act’s entry into force on 1 January 1999, asking the commission, in the exercise of its discretion, to lift any restrictions which may have been applied (see paragraph 24 above). Finally, it also appears from the impugned domestic proceedings in the instant case that the domestic courts took into consideration whether the applicants had been informers for the Lithuanian authorities immediately after the declaration of independence in 1990 as a possible ground for relieving them of the employment restrictions imposed on them (see paragraph 22 above).
41. However, the fact remains that the applicants were treated differently from other persons in Lithuania who had not worked for the KGB, and who as a result had no restrictions imposed on them in their choice of professional activities. In addition, in view of the Government’s argument that the purpose of the KGB Act was to regulate the employment prospects of persons on the basis of their loyalty or lack of loyalty to the State, there has also been a difference of treatment between the applicants and other persons in this respect. For the Court, this is the appropriate comparison in the instant case for the purposes of Article 14.
2. Whether the facts complained of fall within the ambit of Article 8
42. It remains to be examined whether the applicants’ inability to apply for various jobs in the private sector as a result of section 2 of the KGB Act has impinged on their “private life” as protected by Article 8 of the Convention.
43. The Court has on a number of occasions ruled that “private life” is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition (see, as a recent authority, Peck v. the United Kingdom, no. 44647/98, § 57, ECHR 2003-I). It has nevertheless also observed that Article 8 protects the moral and physical integrity of the individual (see X and Y v. the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91, pp. 11-13, §§ 22-27), including the right to live privately, away from unwanted attention. It also secures to the individual a sphere within which he or she can freely pursue the development and fulfilment of his or her personality (see Brüggeman and Scheuten v. Germany, no. 6959/75, Commission’s report of 12 July 1977, Decisions and Reports 10, p.115, § 55).
44. In Niemietz v. Germany,(judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 251-B, pp. 33-34, § 29), the Court stated in regard to the notion of “private life”:
“... it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an ‘inner circle’ in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings.
There appears, furthermore, to be no reason of principle why this understanding of the notion of ‘private life’ should be taken to exclude activities of a professional or business nature since it is, after all, in the course of their working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world. This view is supported by the fact that ... it is not always possible to distinguish clearly which of an individual’s activities form part of his professional or business life and which do not. Thus, especially in the case of a person exercising a liberal profession, his work in that context may form part and parcel of his life to such a degree that it becomes impossible to know in what capacity he is acting at a given moment of time.”
45. In the recent case of Smirnova v. Russia (nos. 46133/99 and 48183/99, §§ 96-97, ECHR 2003-IX), the Court examined the effect on an applicant’s “private life” of the seizure by the authorities of an official document (internal passport), even though no specific interference had been alleged by that applicant as a result of the seizure. The Court ruled that the absence of the passport itself caused a number of everyday inconveniences taken in their entirety, as the applicant needed the passport when performing such mundane tasks as exchanging currency or buying train tickets. It was also noted in particular that the passport was required by that applicant for more crucial needs such as finding employment or receiving medical care. The Court concluded that the deprivation of the passport in Smirnova had represented a continuing interference with that applicant’s “private life”.
46. The Court has also ruled that lack of access to the civil service as such cannot be the basis for a complaint under the Convention (see Glasenapp and Kosiek v. Germany, judgments of 28 August 1986 (Series A no. 104, p.26, § 49, and no. 105, p.20, § 35); the above principle was also reiterated in Vogt v. Germany (judgment of 26 September 1995, Series A no. 323, pp. 22-23, §§ 43-44). In Thlimmenos v. Greece, ([GC], no. 34369/97, § 41, ECHR 2000-IV), where an applicant had been refused registration as a chartered accountant because of a previous conviction, the Court also stated that the right to choose a particular profession was not as such guaranteed by the Convention.
47. Nevertheless, having regard in particular to the notions currently prevailing in democratic States, the Court considers that a far-reaching ban on taking up private sector employment does affect “private life”. It attaches particular weight in this respect to the text of Article 1 § 2 of the European Social Charter and the interpretation given by the European Committee of Social Rights (see paragraph 31 above) and to the texts adopted by the ILO (see paragraph 32 above). It further reiterates that there is no watertight division separating the sphere of social and economic rights from the field covered by the Convention (see Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, pp. 14-16, § 26).
48. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that, as a result of the application of section 2 of the KGB Act to them, the applicants have been banned from 1999 until 2009 from engaging in professional activities in various branches of the private sector on account of their status as “former KGB officers” (see paragraph 27 above). Admittedly, the ban has not affected the applicants’ ability to engage in certain types of professional activity. The ban has, however, affected their ability to develop relationships with the outside world to a very significant degree and has created serious difficulties for them in terms of earning their living, with obvious repercussions on the enjoyment of their private lives.
49. The Court also notes the applicants’ argument that, as a result of the publicity caused by the adoption of the KGB Act and its application to them, they have suffered constant embarrassment as a result of their past activities. It accepts that the applicants continue to be burdened with the status of “former KGB officers” and that fact may in itself be considered an impediment to the establishment of contacts with the outside world – be they employment-related or other – and that this situation undoubtedly affects more than just their reputation; it also affects the enjoyment of their “private life”. The Court accepts that Article 8 cannot be relied on in order to complain of a loss of reputation which is the foreseeable consequence of one’s own actions such as, for example, the commission of a criminal offence. Furthermore, during the considerable period which elapsed between the fall of the former Soviet Union (and the ensuing political changes in Lithuania) and the entry into force of the impugned legislation in 1999, it can reasonably be supposed that the applicants could not have envisaged the consequences their former KGB employment would entail for them. In any event, in the instant case there is more at stake for the applicants than the defence of their good name. They are marked in the eyes of society on account of their past association with an oppressive regime. Hence, and in view of the wide-ranging scope of the employment restrictions the applicants have to endure, the Court considers that the possible impediment to their leading a normal personal life must be taken to be a relevant factor in determining whether the facts complained of fall within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention.
50. In the light of the above, the Court considers that the impugned ban affected, to a significant degree, the applicants’ ability to pursue various professional activities and that there were consequential effects on the enjoyment of their right to respect for their “private life” within the meaning of Article 8. It follows that Article 14 of the Convention is applicable in the circumstances of this case taken in conjunction with Article 8.
C. Compliance with Article 14
51. According to the Court’s case-law, a difference of treatment is discriminatory if it “has no objective and reasonable justification”, that is, if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised” (see Inze, cited above, p.18, § 41).
52. The Court considers that, as a matter of principle, States have a legitimate interest in regulating employment conditions in the public service as well as in the private sector. In this respect, it reiterates that the Convention does not guarantee as such the right to have access to a particular profession (see, mutatis mutandis, Vogt, cited above, pp. 22-23, § 43; see also Thlimmenos, cited above, § 41). In the recent Volkmer (no. 39799/98, 22 November 2001) and Petersen (no. 39793/98, ECHR 2001-XII) decisions concerning Germany, the Court also ruled in the context of Article 10 of the Convention that a democratic State had a legitimate interest in requiring civil servants to show loyalty to the constitutional principles on which the society was founded.
53. The Court notes the decision of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court of 4 March 1999, which stated that the KGB Act restricting the employment prospects of former KGB officers was intended to ensure the protection of national security and proper functioning of the educational and financial systems (see paragraph 28 above). In their justification of this ban before the Court, the respondent Government have submitted that the reason for the imposition of employment restrictions under the KGB Act on the applicants was not their KGB history as such, but their lack of loyalty to the State as evidenced by their former employment with the KGB.
54. The Court must have regard in this connection to Lithuania’s experience under Soviet rule, which ended with the declaration of independence in 1990. It has not been contested by the applicants that the activities of the KGB were contrary to the principles guaranteed by the Lithuanian Constitution or indeed by the Convention. Lithuania wished to avoid a repetition of its previous experience by founding its State, inter alia, on the belief that it should be a democracy capable of defending itself. It is to be noted also in this context that systems similar to the one under the KGB Act, restricting the employment prospects of former security agents or active collaborators of the former regime, have been established in a number of Contracting States which have successfully emerged from totalitarian rule (see paragraphs 30-32 above).
55. In view of the above, the Court accepts that the restriction on the applicants’ employment prospects under the KGB Act, and hence the difference of treatment applied to them, pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the country and the rights and freedoms of others (see, mutatis mutandis, Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC], no. 25390/94, § 41, ECHR 1999-III).
56. It remains to be established whether the impugned distinction constituted a proportionate measure. The applicants’ principal argument before the Court was that neither the KGB Act nor the domestic proceedings in their cases established their actual loyalty to the Lithuanian State. They argued that the impugned restrictions were imposed in the abstract and that they were punished solely on the basis of their status as former KGB officers without any account being taken of the special features of their own cases. For the following reasons, however, the Court does not consider it necessary to rule on the question of whether the applicants were given an opportunity to provide evidence of their loyalty to the State or whether their lack of loyalty was indeed proved.
57. Even assuming that their lack of loyalty had been undisputed, it must be noted that the applicants’ employment prospects were restricted not only in the State service but also in various branches of the private sector. The Court reiterates that the requirement of an employee’s loyalty to the State is an inherent condition of employment with State authorities responsible for protecting and securing the general interest. However, there is not inevitably such a requirement for employment with private companies. Although the economic activities of private sector players undoubtedly affect and contribute to the functioning of the State, they are not depositaries of the sovereign power vested in the State. Moreover, private companies may legitimately engage in activities, notably financial and economic, which compete with the goals fixed for public authorities or State-run companies.
58. In the Court’s view, State-imposed restrictions on a person’s opportunity to find employment with a private company for reasons of lack of loyalty to the State cannot be justified from the Convention perspective in the same manner as restrictions on access to their employment in the public service, regardless of the private company’s importance to the State’s economic, political or security interests.
59. Furthermore, in deciding whether the measures complained of were proportionate, the Court cannot overlook the ambiguous manner in which the KGB Act deals with, on the one hand, the question of the lack of loyalty of former KGB officers such as the applicants – be it assumed on the basis of their KGB past or duly proved on the facts – and, on the other hand, the need to apply the restrictions to employment in certain private sector jobs. In particular, section 2 of the KGB Act lists very concisely the private sector activities from which the applicants, as persons deemed to be lacking in loyalty, should be excluded (see paragraphs 24 and 40 above). However, with the exception of references to “lawyers” and “notaries”, the KGB Act contains no definition of the specific jobs, functions or tasks which the applicants are barred from holding. The result is that it is impossible to ascertain any reasonable link between the positions concerned and the legitimate aims sought by the ban on holding those positions. In the Court’s view, such a legislative scheme must be considered as lacking the necessary safeguards for avoiding discrimination and for guaranteeing adequate and appropriate judicial supervision of the imposition of such restrictions (see, inter alia, the conclusions pertaining to access to the public service reached in regard to similar legislation in Latvia by the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, referred to in paragraph 32 above).
60. Finally, the Court observes that the KGB Act came into force in 1999, that is, almost a decade after Lithuania declared its independence on 11 March 1990; in other words, the restrictions on the applicants’ professional activities were imposed on them thirteen years and nine years respectively after their departure from the KGB. The fact of the KGB Act’s belated timing, although not in itself decisive, may nonetheless be considered relevant to the overall assessment of the proportionality of the measures taken.
61. In view of the above, the Court concludes that the ban on the applicants seeking employment in various branches of the private sector, in application of section 2 of the KGB Act, constituted a disproportionate measure, even having regard to the legitimacy of the aims pursued by that ban.
62. There has therefore been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8.
D. The applicants’ complaint under Article 8 taken alone
63. The Court considers that since it has found a breach of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8, it is not necessary to consider whether there has been a violation of Article 8 taken alone.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION, TAKEN ALONE AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 14
64. The applicants complained that their dismissal from their jobs in State institutions and the other restrictions imposed on their finding employment were in breach of Article 10 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 14.
Article 10 provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
65. The Government submitted that Article 10 was not applicable in the present case. In any event they stated that the application of the KGB Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of the protection of national security and was necessary in a democratic society in view of the applicants’ lack of loyalty to the State. The applicants had not been punished for their views, be they views which they hold at present or views that they might have held in the past. The KGB Act had not imposed a collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in section 3 of the KGB Act showed that there had been a well-founded suspicion that the applicants had been lacking in loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.
66. The applicants contested the Government’s submissions. They stated in particular that they had lost their jobs and had been deprived of all possibility of finding proper employment on account of their past views as reflected in their employment with the KGB. Their own loyalty to the Lithuanian State had never been questioned during the domestic proceedings; nor had they had the opportunity to submit arguments to the domestic courts proving their loyalty. The KGB Act had arbitrarily and collectively punished all former KGB officers regardless of their personal history. Their dismissal in the circumstances had been disproportionate to the attainment of any public-interest aim which might have been pursued by the KGB Act. Throughout their work as, respectively, a tax inspector and a prosecutor, they had been loyal to the idea of Lithuanian independence and to the democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution. The applicants concluded that their dismissal from their jobs and the current ban on their finding employment in various public and private sector activities had violated Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention.
67. The issue of the applicability of Article 10 of the Convention is in dispute between the parties. The Court reiterates in this respect that lack of access to the civil service as such cannot be a basis for a complaint under the Convention (see Glasenapp and Kosiek, both cited above, p.26, § 49 and p.20 § 35; the above principle was also reiterated in Vogt ,cited above, pp. 22-23, §§ 43-44). In Thlimmenos, cited above, where an applicant had been refused registration as a chartered accountant because of his previous conviction, the Court also stated that the right to choose a particular profession was not as such guaranteed by the Convention (ibid., § 41).
68. Admittedly, the Court has also held that the dismissal of a civil servant or a State official on political grounds may give rise to a complaint under Article 10 of the Convention (see Vogt, cited above; see also Volkmer and Petersen, cited above). It notes, however, that the employment restrictions suffered by the applicants in those cases related to their specific activities as a member of the Communist Party in West Germany (Vogt) or as collaborators of the regime in the former German Democratic Republic (Volkmer and Petersen).
69. By contrast, in the present case both applicants suffered employment restrictions not as a result of the outcome of ordinary labour law proceedings, but as a result of the application to them of special domestic legislation which imposed screening measures on the basis of their former employment with the KGB. Having regard to the domestic decisions given in their cases, it appears that the national courts were solely concerned with establishing the nature of the applicants’ former employment with the KGB, rather than giving specific consideration to the particular circumstances of each of the applicants’ cases, for example the views they held or expressed during or after their employment with the KGB.
70. In addition, in the aforementioned cases against Germany, an interference with the right guaranteed by Article 10 was found as a result of the fact that those applicants had been dismissed from teaching posts, which by their nature involve the imparting of ideas and information on a daily basis. The Court is not convinced that the applicants’ dismissal from their positions as, respectively, a tax inspector and a prosecutor, or their alleged inability to find employment in line with their academic qualifications as, respectively, a sports instructor and a lawyer, amount to a restriction on their ability to express their views or opinions to the same extent as in the above-mentioned cases against Germany.
71. The Court does not find, therefore, that the application of the employment restrictions to the applicants under the KGB Act encroached upon their right to freedom of expression. It follows that Article 10 of the Convention is not applicable in the instant case.
72. To the extent that the applicants’ complaints relate to Article 14 of the Convention, the Court reiterates that that provision has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. However, the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of one or more of such provisions and to this extent it is autonomous. For Article 14 to become applicable, it suffices that the facts of a case fall within the ambit of another substantive provision of the Convention or its Protocols (see Thlimmenos, cited above, § 40). Since the Court has found that Article 10 does not apply in the present case, there can be no scope for the application of Article 14 in conjunction with the applicants’ complaints under Article 10.
73. There has therefore been no breach of Article 10 of the Convention, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
74. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
75. The first applicant claimed 257,154 litai (LTL), approximately 74,365 euros (EUR), for pecuniary damage as a result of being subjected to employment restrictions under the KGB Act. He also claimed LTL 500,000 (approximately EUR 144,592) for non-pecuniary damage.
76. The second applicant claimed LTL 201,508.54 (approximately EUR 58,273) for pecuniary damage and LTL 75,000 (approximately EUR 21,689) for non-pecuniary damage.
77. The Government considered the claims to be exorbitant.
78. The Court notes that it has found a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 as regards the employment restrictions that were imposed on the applicants under the KGB Act. It considers in this respect that they can be considered to have sustained a certain amount of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards each of the applicants EUR 7,000 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
79. The first applicant claimed LTL 40,000 (approximately EUR 11,567) for costs and expenses in respect of the Convention proceedings. The second applicant claimed LTL 31,860 (approximately EUR 9,213).
80. The Government considered the claims to be exaggerated.
81. According to the Court’s established case-law, costs and expenses will not be awarded under Article 41 unless it is established that they were actually and necessarily incurred, and are also reasonable as to quantum. In addition, legal costs are only recoverable in so far as they relate to the violation found (see The former King of Greece and Others v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 25701/94, § 105, 28 November 2002).
82. The Court notes that the applicants were granted legal aid under the Court’s legal aid scheme, under which the sum of EUR 2,318.63 has been paid to the first applicant’s lawyer, and the sum of EUR 2,225.95 to the second applicant’s lawyer, to cover the submission of the applicants’ observations and additional comments, the lawyers’ appearance at the hearing, and the conduct of the friendly-settlement negotiations.
83. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards each of the applicants EUR 5,000 for legal costs and expenses, less the sums already paid under the Court’s legal aid scheme (respectively, EUR 2,318.63 and EUR 2,225.95). Consequently, the Court awards the final amount of EUR 2,681.37 in respect of the first applicant’s costs and expenses, and EUR 2,774.05 in respect of the second applicant’s costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
84. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Holds, by five votes to two, that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8;
2. Holds, by five votes to two, that it is not required to rule on the applicants’ complaints under Article 8 of the Convention taken alone;
3. Holds, unanimously, that there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14;
4. Holds, by five votes to two,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention:
(i) EUR 7,000 (seven thousand euros) to each of the applicants in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,681.37 (two thousand six hundred and eighty-one euros thirty-seven cents) to the first applicant in respect of costs and expenses;
(iii) EUR 2,774.05 (two thousand seven hundred and seventy-four euros five cents) to the second applicant in respect of costs and expenses; and
(iv) any tax that may be chargeable, these amounts to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable on the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 July 2004, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
S. Dollé L. Loucaides
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) partly concurring opinion of Mrs Mularoni;
(b) partly dissenting opinion of Mr Loucaides;
(c) partly dissenting opinion of Mrs Thomassen.
L.L.
S.D.
PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE MULARONI
I would have preferred the Court to have examined the applicants’ complaints under Article 8 of the Convention taken alone and to have concluded that it was unnecessary for it to rule on their complaint under Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8. However, I agreed to vote with the majority as I considered it important to rule that Article 8 has been violated in this case.
I fully share the considerations set out in paragraphs 52 to 61 of the judgment.
However, I disagree with those contained in paragraph 49.
I consider that the applicants’ argument, that because of the publicity caused by the enactment of the KGB Act on 16 July 1998 and its application to them they have suffered constant embarrassment as a result of their past activities, does not deserve the Court’s attention. The applicants worked for the KGB and they never contested that the KGB’s activities were contrary to the principles guaranteed by the Lithuanian Constitution or by the Convention (see paragraph 54 of the judgment). The Court accepted that the restriction on the applicants’ employment prospects under the impugned Act pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the country and the rights and freedoms of others (see paragraph 55 of the judgment).
Everyone has to accept the consequences of his or her actions in life and the fact that the applicants continue to be burdened with the status of “former KGB officers” is, in my view, totally irrelevant to the question of the applicability (and the violation) of Article 8 of the Convention. The argument that they are stigmatised by society on account of their past association with an oppressive regime has, to my mind, nothing to do with the respondent State’s responsibility for the violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
I also consider that the argument that the applicants could not have envisaged the consequences their former KGB employment would entail for them is equally irrelevant to the issue of the applicability (and violation) of Article 8. If such an argument were accepted, any act, even the most reprehensible, committed by a dictator when in power could justify a finding of a violation of the Convention following the establishment of a democratic regime. It should not be overlooked in this connection that Article 17 of the Convention provides that “[n]othing in [the] Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth ... in the Convention”.
In my opinion, it is conclusive that the ban on seeking employment affected to an extremely significant degree the applicants’ opportunity to pursue various professional activities and that there were consequential effects on the enjoyment of their right to respect for their private life within the meaning of Article 8. I agree with the majority that the fact that the applicants were prevented from seeking employment in various branches of the private sector on account of the statutory ban constituted a disproportionate measure, even having regard to the legitimacy of the aims pursued by that ban. That in itself should have been sufficient to have led the Court to a conclusion that Article 8 was violated in the applicants’ case.
PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LOUCAIDES
I do not agree with the majority that Article 14 is applicable in the present case, for the following reasons.
It is established case-law that Article 14 safeguards individuals placed in an “analogous” or “similar” or “relevantly similar” situation (see Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, pp. 15-16, § 32; Van der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A no. 70, pp. 22-23, § 46; Fredin v. Sweden (no. 1), judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, p.19, § 60; and Stubbings and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, p. 1507, § 72). Therefore, as pointed out in the case-law: “For a claim of a violation of this Article to succeed, it has therefore to be established, inter alia, that the situation of the alleged victim can be considered similar to that of persons who have been better treated” (see Fredin and Stubbings and Others, loc. cit.).
In examining this question, account should be taken of the aim and effects of the law or measure in issue. The Act under consideration imposed restrictions on the professional activities of persons who had in the past worked for the KGB, the activities of which were contrary to the principles guaranteed by the Lithuanian Constitution and by the Convention. The KGB Act aimed to protect national security, public safety and the rights and freedoms of others, by avoiding a repetition of previous experience which could occur if former KGB employees were to engage in activities similar to those of that organisation. It is therefore evident that the impugned restrictions provided by the law in question were directly connected to the status of “former KGB officers” of persons such as the applicants.
The majority found that Article 14 was applicable in this case because the applicants were treated differently from other persons in Lithuania who had not worked for the KGB (see paragraph 41 of the judgment). However, in the light of the above, I do not see how the people who had not worked for the KGB were in an “analogous”, “similar” or “relevantly similar” situation to those who had.
Although I find that Article 14 is not applicable in the present case, I do find that the restrictions imposed on the professional activities of the applicants were, in the circumstances of the case as explained in the judgment, so onerous and disproportionate to the aim pursued that they amounted to an unjustified interference with the private lives of the applicants. Consequently, I find that there has been a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.
PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE THOMASSEN
I voted against the finding of the majority that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8.
I have some problems in examining the justification of the measures taken in respect of former employees of the KGB in terms of “discrimination”. The principle of non-discrimination, as it is recognised in European constitutions and in international treaties, refers above all to a denial of opportunities on grounds of personal choices in so far as these choices should be respected as elements of someone’s personality, such as religion, political opinion, sexual orientation and gender identity, or, on the contrary, on grounds of personal features in respect of which no choice at all can be made, such as sex, race, disability and age.
Working for the KGB in my opinion does not fall within either of these categories.
While it is true that former KGB employees were treated differently from “other persons in Lithuania who had not worked for the KGB” (see paragraph 41 of the judgment), this difference does not come within the scope of Article 14 in so far as it relates to access to particular professions, as the right to a free choice of profession is not guaranteed by the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Thlimmenos [GC], no. 34369/97, § 41, ECHR 2000-IV).
I do agree, however, that the application of the law, which in itself pursued a legitimate aim, was of such a general character that it affected the applicants’ ability to develop relationships with the outside world as protected by Article 8 (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 61, ECHR 2002-III) to a significant extent and therefore interfered with their private lives. In view of the circumstances of the present applications, such as the fact that the law was applied many years after the applicants had left the KGB and many years after the date of Lithuania’s independence, without any account being taken of the special features of their individual cases, this interference cannot be considered proportionate. Consequently, Article 8 of the Convention has been violated.
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