Analiza slučaja pred Evropskim sudom za ljudska prava
Evropska Konvencija o ljudskim pravima
Praktični vodič za primenu Evropske konvencije o ljudskim pravima
Priručnici i vodiči kroz praksu Evropskog suda za ljudska prava
Evropski sud za ljudska prava u 50 pitanja
Glosar Evropske Konvencije o ljudskim pravima
Nacionalna mreža sudija i tužilaca za primenu standarda Evropskog suda za ljudska prava
Preuzmite presudu u pdf formatu
EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
VELIKO VEĆE
PREDMET VILE protiv LIHTENŠTAJNA
(Predstavka br. 28396/95)
PRESUDA
Strazbur,
28. oktobra 1999.
U predmetu Vile protiv Lihtenštajna, Evropski sud za ljudska prava, koji je, u skladu sa članom 27 Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: Konvencija), kako je izmenjena i dopunjena Protokolom br. 11,1 kao i odgovarajućim odredbama Poslovnika Suda,2 zasedao u Velikom veću u čijem su sastavu bili sudije:
gđa E. PALM (PALM), predsednik,
g. C. L. ROZAKIS (ROZAKIS),
g. L. Ferari BRAVO (Ferrari BRAVO),
g. G. RES (RESS),
g. L. KAFLIŠ (CAFLISCH),
g. I. Kabral BARETO (Cabral BARRETO),
g. J.-P. KOSTA (COSTA),
g. W. FURMAN (FUHRMANN),
g. K. JUNGVIRT (JUNGWIERT),
g. B. ZUPANČIČ (ZUPANČIČ),
gđa N. VAJIĆ,
g. J. HEDIGAN (HEDIGAN),
gđa W. TOMASEN (THOMASSEN),
gđa M. CACA-NIKOLOVSKA (TSATSA-NIKOLOVSKA),
g. T. PANTIRU (PANTÎRU),
g. E. LEVIC (LEVITS),
g. K. TRAJA,
a takođe i gđa M. de Boer-Bukikio (de Boer-Buquicchio), zamenik sekretara,
nakon većanja na zatvorenim sednicama zatvorenim, 2. juna i 13. oktobra 1999, izriče sledeću presudu, donetu poslednjeg navedenog datuma:
POSTUPAK
Predmet su Sudu, na osnovu nekadašnjeg člana 19 Konvencije, uputile Evropska komisija za ljudska prava (u daljem tekstu: Komisija) i država Lihtenštajn (u daljem tekstu: Država) 24. i 27. oktobra 1998, u okviru roka od tri meseca prema nekadašnjem članu 32 stav 1 i nekadašnjem članu 47 Konvencije. On proističe iz predstavke (br. 28396/95) protiv Kneževine Lihtenštajn koji je 25. avgusta 1995. na osnovu nekadašnjeg člana 25 Komisiji uputio državljanin Lihtenštajna g. Herbert Vile (Herbert Wille).
Zahtev Komisije odnosio se na nekadašnje članove 44 i 48 i izjavu u kojoj Lihtenštajn priznaje obaveznu nadležnost Suda (nekadašnji član 46); a pritužba Države odnosila se na nekadašnji član 48. Svrha zahteva i pritužbe bila je da se odluči da li činjenice slučaja ukazuju da je tužena Država prekršila svoje obaveze na osnovu članova 10 i 13 Konvencije.
Pošto je Protokol br. 11 stupio na snagu 1. novembra 1998, u skladu s odredbama njegovog člana 5 stav 5, predmet je upućen Velikom veću Suda. Veliko veće po službenoj dužnosti uključuje g. L. Kafliša, sudiju koji je izabran s liste Lihtenštajna (čl. 27 st. 2 Konvencije i pravilo 24, st. 4 Poslovnika Suda), gđu E. Palm i g. C. L. Rozakisa, potpredsednike Suda, i g. J.-P. Kostu i g G. Resa, potpredsednike odeljenja (čl. 27 st. 3 Konvencije i pravilo 24, st. 3 i 5 (a)). Ostali članovi, postavljeni da bi upotpunili Veliko veće, bili su g. L. Ferari Bravo, g. I. Kabral Bareto, g. V. Furman, g. K. Jungvirt, g. B. Zupančič, gđa N. Vajić, g. J. Hedigan, gđa V. Tomasen, gđa M. Caca-Nikolovska, g. T. Pantiru, g. E. Levic i g. K. Traja (pravilo 24, st. 3 i pravilo 100, st. 4).
Podnosilac predstavke je odredio advokate koji će ga zastupati (pravilo 36). Advokatima je predsednik Velikog veća, gđa Palm, dozvolila da koriste nemački jezik (pravilo 34, st. 3).
Kao predsednik Velikog veća, gđa Palm je konsultovala zastupnika Države, advokate podnosioca predstavke i delegata Komisije, preko zamenika sekretara, a u vezi s organizacijom pismenog postupka. Shodno redu koji je posle toga određen, sekretar je primio podnesak podnosioca predstavke 25. februara 1999. i podnesak Države 30. marta 1999.
U skladu s odlukom predsednika Velikog veća, rasprava je održana u zgradi Suda u Strazburu 2. juna 1999.
Pred Sudom su se pojavili:
(a) za Državu
g. H. Golsong (Golsong), advokat, kozastupnik,
g. N. Markser (Marxer),
g. T. Štajn (Stein),
g. M. Voker (Walker), advokat;
(b) za podnosioca predstavke
g. W. E. Zeger (Seeger),
g. A. Klej (Kley), advokat.
g. Vile je takođe bio prisutan.
Sudu su se obratili g. Zeger, g. Klej, g. Golsong i g. Štajn.
ČINJENICE
I. OKOLNOSTI PREMETA
Tokom 1992. godine došlo je do spora između Njegovog veličanstva kneza Hansa-Adama II od Lihtenštajna (u daljem tekstu: knez) i Vlade Lihtenštajna oko političkih nadležnosti u vezi s plebiscitom o pristupanju Lihtenštajna Evropskoj ekonomskoj zoni. U to vreme podnosilac predstavke bio je u vladi Lihtenštajna. Posle rasprave između kneza i članova vlade na sastanku od 28. oktobra 1992. to pitanje je rešeno na osnovu zajedničke izjave kneza, Parlamenta (Landtag) i Vlade.
Posle izbora i formiranja novog Parlamenta u maju 1993. došlo je do razgovora o različitim ustavnim pitanjima između kneza i Vlade, u vreme kada podnosilac predstavke više nije bio u vladi. Podnosilac predstavke nije učestvovao na izborima maja 1993. godine i decembra 1993. postavljen je za predsednika Upravnog suda Lihtenštajna (Verwaltungsbeschwerdeinstanz) s vremenski ograničenim mandatom (vidi dole stav 26).
U okviru niza predavanja o pitanjima ustavne nadležnosti i osnovnih prava, podnosilac predstavke je 16. februara 1995. održao javno predavanje na Institutu Lihtenštajn, istraživačkom institutu, na temu „Priroda i funkcije Ustavnog suda Lihtenštajna“ („Wesen und Aufgaben des Staatsgerichtshofes“). Tokom tog predavanja, podnosilac predstavke je izneo mišljenje da je Ustavni sud nadležan da odluči o „tumačenju Ustava u slučaju neslaganja između kneza (Vlade) i Parlamenta“ („Entscheidung über die Auslegung der Verfassung bei einem Auslegungsstreit zwischen Fürst (Regierung) und Landtag“).
Lihtenštajner folksblat (Liechtensteiner Volksblatt) je 17. februara 1995. godine objavio članak o predavanju koje je održao podnosilac predstavke, pominjući, između ostalog, njegova gledišta o nadležnostima Ustavnog suda.
Knez je 27. februara 1995. godine uputio pismo podnosiocu predstavke u vezi s gore pomenutim predavanjem, kako je rezimirano u članku koji je objavio Lihtenštajner folksblat.
„Zamak Vaduc, 27. februara 1995.
Dr Herbert Vile
Predsednik Upravnog suda Lihtenštajna
[privatna adresa podnosioca predstavke]
Poštovani gospodine,
Bio sam iznenađen kada sam u izdanju Lihtenštajner folksblata od 17. februara pročitao izveštaj o Vašem predavanju na temu ‘Priroda i funkcije Ustavnog suda Lihtenštajna’. Pretpostavljam da su izjave koje ste dali u vezi s oblastima odgovornosti Suda korektno reprodukovane u tom izveštaju, a naročito komentar da se Ustavnom sudu, kao sudu koji tumači zakon, može uložiti žalba u slučaju neslaganja između kneza i naroda.
Nesumnjivo ćete se setiti diskusije između Vlade i mene u periodu od pre 28. oktobra 1992, kojoj ste prisustvovali kao zamenik šefa Vlade. Tokom ove razmene mišljenja u zamku Vaduc skrenuo sam pažnju Vladi na činjenicu da se ona ne pridržava Ustava i pročitao sam njegove odgovarajuće članove. Vi ste odgovorili da se u svakom slučaju ne slažete (ili nešto u tom smislu) s tim delovima Ustava i da stoga ne smatrate da Vas oni obavezuju. Pošto Vam drugi članovi vlade nisu protivrečili, bio sam prinuđen da pretpostavim da čitava Vlada misli da dva tela koja imaju najvišu moć, narod i knez, moraju da se pridržavaju Ustava i običnih zakona, ali ne i članovi Vlade, koji su se zakleli na odanost Ustavu.
Vašu tadašnju izjavu i stav Vlade smatrao sam izuzetno arogantnim i stoga sam nedvosmisleno obavestio Vladu da je izgubila moje poverenje. Posle kompromisa koji je, na sreću, malo kasnije postignut između Vlade i Parlamenta, s jedne strane, i mene, s druge strane, izjavio sam da ponovo imam poverenje u Vladu, i to sam uradio u nadi da su njeni članovi shvatili da su zauzeli neoprostivu poziciju u odnosu na naš Ustav i da sada priznaju da ih on obavezuje. Kao što bih g. Brunharta postavio za šefa Vlade da je njegova stranka pobedila na izborima, Vas sam postavio za predsednika Upravnog suda na preporuku Parlamenta.
Na žalost, posle objavljivanja tog izveštaja u Lihtenštajner folksblatu morao sam da uvidim da Vi još uvek ne smatrate da Vas obavezuje Ustav i da imate mišljenja koja očigledno krše i njegov duh i njegov tekst. Svako ko pročita odgovarajuće članove Ustava moći će da se uveri da Ustavni sud nije nadležan za davanje tumačenja u slučaju spora između kneza i naroda (Parlamenta). U mojim očima Vas Vaše ponašanje, dr Vile, čini nepodobnim za javnu funkciju. Ne nameravam da se upuštam u dugu javnu ili privatnu raspravu s Vama, ali bih voleo da Vas blagovremeno obavestim da Vas neću ponovo imenovati na javnu funkciju ako Vas predloži Parlament ili neko drugo telo. Jedino se nadam da ćete u svojstvu predsednika Upravnog suda u svojim presudama poštovati Ustav i obične zakone tokom ostatka Vašeg mandata.
S poštovanjem,
Hans-Adam II
knez Lihtenštajna“
U pismu od 9. marta 1995. podnosilac predstavke je obavestio predsednika Parlamenta o pismu od 27. februara 1995. Rekao je da nikada ni u jednoj izjavi nije rekao da ne smatra da ga obavezuje Ustav ili njegovi delovi. Dalje je objasnio svoje istraživanje o nadležnostima Ustavnog suda za ustavna pitanja. Prema njemu, izražavanje mišljenja koje ne deli knez ne može da se smatra nepoštovanjem Ustava. Međutim, s obzirom na zaključke koje je knez doneo u navedenom pismu, dovedeno je u pitanje njegovo mesto predsednika Upravnog suda. Predsednik Parlamenta je dalje obavestio podnosioca predstavke da je Parlament na zatvorenoj sednici razgovarao o tom pitanju i da je jednoglasno zaključio da funkcija podnosioca predstavke nije dovedena u pitanje zbog njegovih pravnih mišljenja onako kako su navedena u kontekstu njegovog predavanja.
Podnosilac predstavke je 20. marta 1995. odgovorio na pismo koje je knez poslao 27. februara 1995, i priložio je primerak svog pisma predsedniku Parlamenta. Posebno je objasnio da on, kao pravnik, veruje da je njegova izjava s predavanja od 16. februara 1995. godine, izjava da je Ustavni sud nadležan za to da odlučuje o tumačenju Ustava u slučaju spora između kneza i naroda (Parlamenta), tačna i da ne krši Ustav. Podnosilac predstavke je zaključio da kneževa izjava da podnosioca predstavke ne namerava da postavi na neku javnu funkciju krši njegova prava na slobodu mišljenja i slobodu misli, kako je to zajemčeno Ustavom i Evropskom konvencijom o ljudskim pravima. Ona takođe dovodi u pitanje ustavno pravo na jednak pristup javnim funkcijama i predstavlja pokušaj da se utiče na nezavisnost sudstva.
U svom odgovoru u pismu od 4. aprila 1995, knez je naveo da je g. Vile dostavio pismo od 27. februara 1995. velikoj grupi ljudi. Knez je rekao da je imao nameru da izbegne javnu raspravu tako što će g. Vilea u privatnom pismu što pre obavestiti o svojoj odluci. On smatra da je duga rasprava između njih o pitanju kvalifikacije g. Vilea za funkciju sudije neumesna, pošto je g. Vile ostao na funkciji i kritika kneza nije bila usmerena na odluke Upravnog suda, već na opšti stav g. Vilea prema Ustavu.
Knez je dodao da je njegovo diskreciono pravo da li da nekog kandidata postavi na javnu funkciju i da nema obavezu da navodi nikakve razloge za takvu odluku. Međutim, pošto već mnogo godina poznaje g. Vilea, smatrao je umesnim da navede razloge za svoju odluku u vezi s njim. Pored toga, odluka da ga više ne postavlja na funkciju predsednika jednog od najviših sudova zbog njegovog stava u prošlosti, kao i mišljenja koje je izrazio, ne predstavlja kršenje prava g. Vilea na slobodu izražavanja i slobodu mišljenja. Svi građani su slobodni da predlažu i traže izmene i dopune ustavnih ili drugih pravnih odredbi. Međutim, g. Vile nije iskoristio takvo ustavno i demokratsko sredstvo tokom svog mandata u Vladi i u svom predavanju, već je jednostavno ignorisao one delove Ustava s kojima se ne slaže.
Knez je dalje objasnio da se odgovarajuća odredba, tj. član 112 Ustava, tiče nadležnosti Ustavnog suda za odlučivanje o tumačenju Ustava u slučaju spora između Vlade i Parlamenta. Mešanje termina „Vlada“ i „Parlament“ s „knezom“ ili „narodom“, što je g. Vile uradio, potkopalo bi vladavinu prava. Kao šef države on ima obavezu da čuva ustavni poredak i demokratska prava ljudi. On ne bi ispunjavao svoje dužnosti ako bi na jednu od najviših pravosudnih funkcija imenovao lice koje, zbog stava i izjava koje je dalo, ne bi mogao da smatra posvećenim poštovanju Ustava.
Knez je 2. juna 1995. podnosiocu predstavke, predsedniku Upravnog suda, poslao otvoreno pismo koje je objavljeno u lihtenštajnskim novinama. Knez je naveo da je g. Vile izneo u javnost najmanje jedan deo kneževog pisma od 27. februara 1995. godine. Pošto je ovo dovelo do različitih komentara, knez je smatrao neophodnim da objasni svoje gledište u otvorenom pismu.
Po njegovom mišljenju, u demokratskoj državi koja se zasniva na vladavini prava (demokratischer Rechtsstaat), mora da se napravi razlika između slobode izražavanja i sredstava koje u takvom društvu pojedinac koristi za nametanje svojih mišljenja. S tim u vezi, taj pojedinac treba da poštuje prava koja su definisana u Ustavu i drugim zakonskim odredbama. Knez je dalje izjavio da je pravo g. Vilea, na njegovom mestu sudije, da izrazi mišljenje da monarhija više nije oportuna; da član 7 Ustava treba da se izmeni i dopuni; da knez treba da bude pod nadležnošću lihtenštajnskog sudstva; i da Ustavni sud Lihtenštajna treba da dobije dodatne nadležnosti. Međuutim, g. Vile nije imao pravo da sebe stavi iznad postojećeg Ustava ili da pozove Ustavni sud da polaže pravo na nadležnosti koje mu nisu Ustavom poverene. Knez je smatrao da g. Vile, s obzirom na svoje obrazovanje i profesionalno iskustvo, zna da Ustav jasno definiše termine „narod“ („Volk“), „Parlament“ („Landtag“), „Vlada“ („Regierung“) i „knez“ („Fürst“) i njihova prava i obaveze. Tvrdnja podnosioca predstavke da su ovi termini međusobno zamenljivi ugrozila bi Ustav i ustavnu državu u celini
Knez je takođe pomenuo političke događaje iz jeseni 1992. i na kraju naveo da je, na osnovu članka iz jednih lihtenštajnskih novina od 17. februara 1995, bio prinuđen da zaključi da se produžila namera g. Vilea da se stavi iznad lihtenštajnskog Ustava. Objasnio je da je stoga nameravao da g. Vilea u privatnom pismu što pre moguće obavesti o svojoj odluci da ga u budućnosti ne postavlja na javne funkcije.
U proleće 1997. godine podnosiocu predstavke je istekao mandat predsednika Upravnog suda. Parlament Lihtenštajna je 14. aprila 1997. odlučio da podnosioca predstavke ponovo predloži za predsednika Upravnog suda.
U pismu predsedniku Parlamenta od 17. aprila 1997. knez je odbio da prihvati predloženo imenovanje. On je objasnio da je, s obzirom na svoja iskustva s g. Vileom, postao uveren da g. Vile smatra da ga ne obavezuje lihtenštajnski Ustav. Pod tim okolnostima, on ne bi ispunjavao svoje dužnosti šefa države ako bi g. Vilea postavio za predsednika Upravnog suda. Knez je dalje naveo da je g. Vile, zbog svojih drugih profesionalnih kvalifikacija, dao bitan doprinos kao sudija Upravnog suda i da on (knez) stoga može da u izvesnoj meri razume taj predlog. Ako Parlament ne deli njegove sumnje u vezi s g. Vileom, može da ga izabere za pridruženog sudiju Upravnog suda.
Podnosilac predstavke je trenutno zaposlen na Lihtenštajnskom institutu kao naučni radnik.
II. RELEVANTNO DOMAĆE PRAVO
Kneževina Lihtenštajn je nasledna ustavna monarhija zasnovana na demokratiji i Parlamentu; snaga države tesno je povezana s knezom i narodom, od njih proističe i oni je primenjuju u skladu s odredbama Ustava (čl. 2 Ustava od 24. oktobra 1921. godine).
Poglavlje II Ustava nosi naslov „Knez“. U članu 7 navodi se da je knez šef države i da vrši svoju suverenu vlast u skladu s odredbama Ustava i drugih zakona; i da je njegova ličnost sveta i nepovrediva. Dalje nadležnosti su navedene u članovima 8–13. Na osnovu člana 11, knez imenuje državne zvaničnike u skladu s odredbama Ustava (vidi čl. 79 koji se odnosi na šefa Vlade, članove Vlade i njihove zamenike; čl. 97 koji se odnosi na predsednika Upravnog suda i njegovog zamenika: čl. 99 u vezi sa Zakonom o organizaciji sudova, koji se odnosi na prvostepene sudije; čl. 102 st. 3 koji se odnosi na članove Visokog suda (Obergericht) i Vrhovnog suda (Oberster Gerichtshof)). U pismu od 28. aprila 1997. godine, knez je Vladu Lihtenštajna obavestio da je upućuje da u 1997. godini u okviru svoje nadležnosti nastavi s postavljanjem zvaničnika koje na osnovu člana 11 Ustava treba da postavi knez.
Poglavlje IV Ustava sadrži opšta prava i obaveze građana Kneževine. Član 31 predviđa jednakost svih građana pred zakonom, a navodi i da su javne funkcije prema njima jednako otvorene, podložno poštovanju pravnih propisa.
Na osnovu člana 97 Ustava, na sve odluke ili naredbe Vlade postoji mogućnost žalbe Upravnom sudu. Upravni sud sastoji se od predsednika, koji je pravne struke, i njegovog zamenika, koje imenuje knez na predlog Parlamenta, kao i od četvoro žalbenih sudija i njihovih zamena, koje bira Parlament. Predsednik i njegov zamenik moraju da budu državljani Lihtenštajna. Njihov mandat se poklapa s mandatom Parlamenta i završava se njihovom smenom.
Na osnovu člana 104 Ustava, Ustavni sud, između ostalog, nadležan je za zaštitu ustavnih prava. Član 23 Zakona o Ustavnom sudu (Staatsgerichtshofgesetz) predviđa da odluke nekog suda upravne nadležnosti mogu biti osporene pred Ustavnim sudom tako što će se navesti da je došlo do kršenja ustavnih prava ili prava zajemčenih Konvencijom za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda.
Shodno članu 105 Ustava, u vezi s članom 4 Zakona o Ustavnom sudu, sudije Ustavnog suda bira Parlament; izbor predsednika i zamenika predsednika potvrđuje knez.
Član 112 Ustava glasi kako sledi:
„Ako se pojavi sumnja u vezi s tumačenjem konkretnih odredaba Ustava i ako se ona ne može otkloniti na osnovu dogovora između Vlade i Parlamenta, Ustavni sud se poziva da odluči o tom pitanju.“
Lihtenštajnska Vlada je Parlamentu 1991. godine uputila nacrt zakona s ciljem izmene i dopune Zakona o Ustavnom sudu iz 1925. godine. U svojim komentarima odredaba koje se odnose na nadležnost Ustavnog suda da odlučuje o tumačenju konkretnih odredaba Ustava, Vlada je, između ostalog, iznela svoje gledište na tekst i svrhu člana 112 Ustava, a naročito termina „Vlada“ koji treba shvatiti tako da se odnosi na kneza. U pripremnoj fazi, knez je u pismu adresiranom na podnosioca predstavke, koji je u to vreme bio zamenik šefa lihtenštajnske Vlade, izneo svoje neslaganje s predloženim tumačenjem. Podnosilac predstavke obrazložio je predlog zakona kada je po prvi put predstavljen u Parlamentu u aprilu 1992. godine. Tokom razgovora, predsednik Parlamenta doveo je u pitanje tumačenje člana 112 Ustava, kako je navedeno u komentarima Vlade. Parlament je usvojio predlog zakona 11. novembra 1992. godine; međutim, knez ga nije potpisao, te nije stupio na snagu.
Na osnovu člana 20 Zakona o organizaciji sudova u Lihtenštajnu (G erichtsorganisationsgesetz, LGBl 1922 Nr. 16), sudije moraju da polože zakletvu, uključujući i onu na lojalnost knezu i poštovanje zakona i Ustava.
POSTUPAK PRED KOMISIJOM
G. Herbert Vile obratio se Komisiji 25. avgusta 1995. On je naveo da je, posle javnog predavanja koje je on održao na temu ustavnog prava, monarh Lihtenštajna, Njegovo veličanstvo Knez Hans-Adam II, kako je najavljeno u jednom pismu, odlučio da podnosioca predstavke ubuduće ne postavlja na javne funkcije. Ova mera krši njegova prava na osnovu članova 6, 10, 13 i 14 Konvencije.
Komisija je proglasila predstavku (br. 28396/95) prihvatljivom 27. maja 1997. U izveštaju od 17. septembra 1998. (nekadašnji član 31 Konvencije), izrazila je mišljenje da je došlo do kršenja člana 10 (petnaest glasova prema četiri); da nije neophodno odlučivati da li je došlo do kršenja člana 6 (sedamnaest glasova prema dva); da je prekršen član 13 u vezi sa članom 10 (šesnaest glasova prema tri); i da nema posebnih pitanja na osnovu člana 14 u vezi sa članom 10 (sedamnaest glasova prema dva). Pun tekst mišljenja Komisije i tri izdvojena mišljenja koja se nalaze u izveštaju navedeni su u aneksu ove presude.
POSLEDNJI PODNESCI SUDU
PRAVO
I. NAVODNO KRŠENJE ČLANA 10 KONVENCIJE
„1. Svako ima pravo na slobodu izražavanja. Ovo pravo uključuje slobodu posedovanja sopstvenog mišljenja, primanje i saopštavanja informacija i ideja bez mešanja javne vlasti i bez obzira na granice. Ovaj član ne sprečava države da zahtevaju dozvole za rad televizijskih, radio i bioskopskih preduzeća.
2. Pošto korišćenje ovih sloboda povlači za sobom dužnosti i odgovornosti, ono se može podvrgnuti formalnostima, uslovima, ograničenjima ili kaznama propisanim zakonom i neophodnim u demokratskom društvu u interesu nacionalne bezbednosti, teritorijalnog integriteta ili javne bezbednosti, radi sprečavanja nereda ili kriminala, zaštite zdravlja ili morala, zaštite ugleda ili prava drugih, sprečavanja otkrivanja obaveštenja dobijenih u poverenju, ili radi očuvanja autoriteta i nepristrasnosti sudstva.“
A. Primenljivosti člana 10 i postojanje mešanja
Podnosilac predstavke je naveo da odluka kneza da ga ubuduće ne postavlja na javne funkcije ako ga Parlament ili neko drugo telo predloži, kao što je rečeno u kneževom pismu od 27. februara 1995. predstavlja neposrednu reakciju na njegov akademski govor koji je održan nekoliko dana ranije i može se smatrati jedino sankcijom za izražavanje njegovog pravnog mišljenja. Iako Konvencija ne garantuje pravo pristupa državnoj službi, državni službenici su ipak zaštićeni članom 10.
Država je navela da govor podnosioca predstavke i kneževu reakciju na njega koja je izneta u njegovom pismu od 27. februara 1995. treba razmatrati u kontekstu postojeće političke debate u Lihtenštajnu koja se tiče kneževe nadležnosti i da je ne treba posmatrati izolovano. Tokom 1992. je došlo do neslaganja između kneza i vlade u vezi s datumom referenduma za pristupanje Evropskoj ekonomskoj zoni. Podnosilac predstavke je u to vreme bio član lihtenštajnske Vlade, zamenik šefa Vlade i zadužen za pravosuđe. Tokom tog neslaganja podnosilac predstavke je izneo gledište da je, na osnovu člana 112 Ustava, Ustavni sud nadležan da odlučuje o tumačenju Ustava u slučaju neslaganja između kneza i Parlamenta. U isto vreme, Parlament je razmatrao nacrt amandmana na Zakon o Ustavnom sudu. U njegovom obrazloženju podnosilac predstavke je izneo isto mišljenje. U oba slučaja knez se direktno usprotivio podnosiocu predstavke. Međutim, decembra 1993. postavio je podnosioca predstavke za predsednika Upravnog suda. Zbog toga je knez u svom pismu u suštini izrazio razočaranje i iznenađenje zbog toga što je podnosilac predstavke, bez obzira na prethodni kompromis u vezi s neslaganjem oko nadležnosti Ustavnog suda, održao javni govor na tu temu iako je morao znati da se knez nikako ne može slagati s izraženim mišljenjem.
Kneževo pismo podnosiocu predstavke od 27. februara 1995. bilo je privatno pismo koje nije bilo namenjeno opštoj javnosti i koje je poslato na privatnu adresu podnosioca predstavke. Ono nije predstavljalo državni akt, već je bilo obaveštenje o nameri da se kasnije donese jedna odluka. Pismo nije imalo direktan uticaj na pravni status podnosioca predstavke. On nije otpušten, niti je na bilo koji način ometena njegova profesionalna aktivnost u svojstvu predsednika Upravnog suda. Ali čak i kad bi kneževo pismo moglo biti smatrano državnim aktom, ova Konvencija ne bi mogla da se primeni na ovaj predmet. Pošto je sankcija bila odbijanje da se podnosilac predstavke postavi na konkretnu javnu funkciju, ona nije uticala ni na jedno od prava podnosioca predstavke pošto ni prema lihtenštajnskom zakonu ni na osnovu Konvencije ne postoji pravo na postavljanje na takvu funkciju. Član 10 se ne primenjuje kada je centralno pitanje pristup javnoj funkciji.
Komisija se u osnovi saglasila s podnosiocem predstavke. Zaključila je da kneževa odluka, kako je izražena u njegovom pismu od 27. februara 1995. godine, da ubuduće ne postavlja podnosioca predstavke na javne funkcije, predstavlja ometanje prava podnosioca predstavke na slobodu izražavanja, kako je zajemčeno članom 10 Konvencije.
Sud će se prvo baviti tvrdnjom Države da se u ovom predmetu u suštini radi o pristupu državnoj službi, pravu koje nije zajemčeno Konvencijom.
U vezi s tim Sud ističe da je pravo zapošljavanja u državnoj službi namerno izostavljeno iz Konvencije. Shodno tome, odbijanje da se neko lice postavi za državnog službenika kao takvo ne može da predstavlja osnovu za žalbu na osnovu Konvencije. Ovo, međutim, ne znači da lice koje radi u državnoj službi ne može da se žali na otpuštanje ako se time krši jedno od njegovih prava na osnovu Konvencije. Državni službenici nisu izvan domena Konvencije. U članovima 1 i 14 Konvencija predviđa da „svako u nadležnosti“ država ugovornica mora da uživa prava i slobode iz člana I „bez diskriminacije po bilo kom osnovu“. Pored toga, član 11 stav 2 in fine, koji državama dozvoljava da nametnu posebna ograničenja na slobodu okupljanja i udruživanja „pripadnicima oružanih snaga, policije ili državne uprave“, potvrđuje da se, kao opšte pravilo, garancije iz Konvencije odnose na državne službenike (vidi presude Glasenapp and Kosiek v. Germany od 28. avgusta 1986, Series A Nos. 104, str. 26, st. 49 i 105, str. 20, st. 35, kao i presudu Vogt v. Germany od 26. septembra 1995, Series A No. 323, str. 22–23, st. 43).
U skladu s tim, status državnog službenika koji je podnosilac predstavke dobio kada je postavljen za predsednika Upravnog suda Lihtenštajna nije mu uskratio zaštitu iz člana 10.
Da bi se odredilo da li je ova odredba prekršena prvo se mora utvrditi da li je sporna mera narušila slobodu izražavanja – u obliku „formalnosti, uslova, ograničenja ili kazni“ – ili da li se nalazi u oblasti prava pristupa državnoj službi, prava koje nije obezbeđeno Konvencijom. Da bi se odgovorilo na ovo pitanje, mora se odrediti obim mere tako što će se ona staviti u kontekst činjenica slučaja i odgovarajućih propisa (vidi gore citirane presude Glasenapp and Kosiek, str. 26, st. 50, i str. 20, st. 36).
U predmetima Glasenapp and Kosiek, Sud je analizirao postupak vlasti u smislu uskraćivanja pristupa državnoj službi podnosiocima predstavki zbog toga što ne poseduju jednu od potrebnih kvalifikacija. U predmetu Vogt, Sud je zaključio da je gospođa Vogt, sa svoje strane, bila stalno zaposleni državni službenik od februara 1979. Suspendovana je u avgustu 1986. i otpuštena 1987. On je zaključio da tu zaista postoji ometanje prava koje je zaštićeno članom 10 Konvencije (vidi gore citiranu presudu u predmetu Vogt, str. 23, st. 44). U tom slučaju, Sud takođe smatra da angažovanje u državnoj službi nije u središtu problema koji mu je predat. Iako je knez postavio pitanje mogućeg ponovnog postavljanja podnosioca predstavke za predsednika Upravnog suda u budućnosti, njegova komunikacija s podnosiocem predstavke se u osnovi sastojala od prekora za mišljenja koja je ovaj drugi ranije izneo.
Država navodi da je kneževo pismo od 27. februara 1995. bilo samo najava moguće odluke koju knez može doneti u budućnosti; stoga je to bilo privatno pismo i ne može se izjednačiti s nekom sankcijom.
S tim u vezi Sud ponavlja da na osnovu Konvencije država može biti odgovorna za sve radnje njenih organa, predstavnika i službenika. Kao i u međunarodnom pravu uopšte, njihov nivo nije bitan zato što se radnje koje lica preduzmu u zvaničnom svojstvu u svakom slučaju pripisuju državi. Naročito, obaveze strane ugovornice na osnovu Konvencije može prekršiti bilo koje lice koje sprovodi neku zvaničnu radnju za koju je ovlašćeno (vidi Ireland v. the United Kingdom, predstavka br. 5310/71, izveštaj Komisije od 25. januara 1976, Yearbook 19, str. 758).
Sud konstatuje da je Kneževina Lihtenštajn nasledna ustavna monarhija zasnovana na demokratiji i Parlamentu; snaga države tesno je povezana s knezom i narodom, od njih proističe i oni je primenjuju u skladu s odredbama Ustava (čl 2 Ustava). Poglavlje II Ustava navodi različite suverene moći kneza, između ostalog, postavljanje državnih zvaničnika (čl. 11 Ustava).
Sud dalje konstatuje da je podnosilac predstavke postavljen za predsednika Upravnog suda Lihtenštajna u decembru 1993. Lihtenštajnski knez je 27. februara 1995. u pismu upućenom podnosiocu predstavke istog obavestio o svojoj nameri da ga ponovo ne postavi na javnu funkciju ako ga predloži Parlament ili neko drugo telo. Povod za kneževo pismo, što ni jedna strana ne osporava, bio je izveštaj u Lihtenštajner folksblatu u vezi s predavanjem o prirodi i funkcijama Ustavnog suda Lihtenštajna koje je podnosilac predstavke održao 16. februara 1995, a koje je uključivalo i izjavu da bi na osnovu Ustava nadležnost tog suda mogla da se proširi na sporove koji se tiču kneževih ovlašćenja u pitanjima tumačenja Ustava. Prema pismu, tako izneta mišljenja podnosioca predstavke krše odredbe Ustava i stav podnosioca predstavke prema Ustavu čini ga nepodobnim za javnu funkciju. Knez je svoju nameru da podnosioca predstavke ne imenuje potvrdio u pismima koja su usledila 4. aprila i 2. juna 1995. i konačno je, u pismu od 17. aprila 1997, odbio da na predlog Parlamenta ponovo postavi podnosioca predstavke za predsednika Upravnog suda. Stoga Sud ne može da prihvati argument da su kneževa pisma predstavljala privatnu prepisku i da nisu predstavljala akt države.
Ispitujući da li je došlo do ometanja prava podnosioca predstavke na slobodu izražavanja, Sud je zaključio da kneževo pismo od 27. februara 1995. treba da bude u centru njegove pažnje jer se u njemu po prvi put iznose kneževe namere vis-à-vis podnosioca predstavke. Međutim, ova mera se mora gledati u kontekstu kneževe dalje komunikacije koja je potvrdila te namere.
Razmatrajući sadržaj ovog pisma, Sud je zaključio da se jedan državni organ umešao u pravo izražavanja podnosioca predstavke. Do mere na koju se podnosilac predstavke žali došlo je u sredini njegovog mandata na mestu predsednika Upravnog suda; ona nije bila povezana s bilo kojim konkretnim postupkom angažovanja koji uključuje procenu ličnih kvalifikacija. Na osnovu terminologije pisma od 27. februara 1995. deluje da je knez doneo odluku u vezi sa svojim budućim ponašanjem prema podnosiocu predstavke, što se odnosi na jedno od njegovih suverenih moći, odnosno njegovu moć da postavlja državne funkcionere. Dalje, pomenuto pismo bilo je izričito adresirano na podnosioca predstavke kao predsednika Upravnog suda, iako je poslato na njegovo mesto stanovanja. Stoga je spornu meru preduzeo organ koji je nadležan za delovanje na način na koji je delovao i čije radnje čine Lihtenštajn kao državu odgovornom na osnovu Konvencije. U pravo podnosioca predstavke da uživa slobodu izražavanja mešalo se čim je knez, kritikujući sadržaj govora podnosioca predstavke, najavio nameru da sankcioniše podnosioca predstavke zbog toga što je ovaj slobodno izrazio svoje mišljenje. Kneževa najava da podnosioca predstavke ne namerava da ponovo postavi na javnu funkciju predstavlja prekor podnosiocu predstavke za prethodnu primenu slobode izražavanja, a pored toga je imala negativan efekat (chilling effect) na primenu slobode izražavanja podnosioca predstavke, pošto je bilo verovatno da će ga odvratiti od davanja takvih izjava u budućnosti.
Sledi da je došlo do mešanja u primenu prava na slobodu izražavanja podnosioca predstavke, kako je zajemčeno članom 10 stav 1.
B. Opravdanosti mešanja
1. "Propisano zakonom" i legitimni cilj
Podnosilac predstavke naveo je da mešanje na koje se žali nema pravnu osnovu u lihtenštajnskom zakonu. On naročito nije mogao da predvidi da će, reagujući na njegov govor, knez nametnuti tako ozbiljnu i dalekosežnu sankciju. Dalje, kneževa mera nije imala nikakav legitimni cilj.
Prema mišljenju Države, mešanje, ako je do njega uopšte došlo, opravdano je zbog toga što je podnosilac predstavke prekršio pravne norme ponašanja i svoju službenu zakletvu na osnovu lihtenštajnskog zakona, što uključuje i zakletvu na lojalnost knezu i poštovanje Ustava i zakona. Pored toga, cilj ovog mešanja bio je i da se održi javni red i unapredi građanska stabilnost, kao i da se očuva sudska nezavisnost i nepristrasnost.
Komisija je zaključila da je pri ispitivanju opravdanosti mešanja u pravo podnosioca predstavke na slobodu mišljenja, centralno pitanje da li je ovo mešanje „neophodno u demokratskom društvu“. S obzirom na zaključke koje je donela u vezi s ovim trećim uslovom, ona nije zaključila da je neophodno da se ispita poštovanje prva dva uslova.
Pretpostavljajući da je mešanje propisano zakonom i da ima legitiman cilj, kako Država tvrdi, Sud smatra da ono nije bilo „neophodno u demokratskom društvu“ iz sledećih razloga.
2. „Neophodno u demokratskom društvu“
Podnosilac predstavke naveo je da mera na koju se žali predstavlja mešanje u njegovo pravo na slobodu izražavanja koje se ne može opravdati na osnovu člana 10 stav 2, pošto to nije „neophodno u demokratskom društvu“.
Komisija je bila istog mišljenja, a Država je to osporila.
Država je navela da član 10 stav 2 državama daje širok prostor za određivanje toga koje političko ponašanje nije u skladu s „ugledom funkcije u pravosuđu“. Na raspravi je objasnila da iznad određenog nivoa javne funkcije neslaganje s onima koji imaju slobodu da postavljaju, ponovo postavljaju ili otpuštaju visoke funkcionere, uključujući i sudije (na visokom nivou), nosi određeni rizik, rizik koji je poznat svim zainteresovanim stranama i koji do sada nije smatran za kršenje ljudskih prava. Po njenom mišljenju, u prirodi je funkcija u pravosuđu da nosioci takvih funkcija budu vrlo uzdržani kada daju javne izjave koje mirišu na politiku.
Država smatra da predavanje podnosioca predstavke o funkcijama Ustavnog suda Lihtenštajna sadrži kontroverznu političku izjavu i suptilnu, ali znatnu provokaciju jednog od suverena Lihtenštajna. Podnosilac predstavke je bio svestan da je njegova izjava, koja se odnosi na nadležnost Ustavnog suda pri odlučivanju u slučaju sukoba između kneza i Parlamenta, u suprotnosti s kneževim gledištem, što podržava tekst Ustava, da je on ima potpuni imunitet od obavezne nadležnosti bilo kog suda. Prema predstavci, podnosilac je pozvan da održi predavanje u svojstvu sudije i tu priliku je iskoristio da iznese u javnost svoja politička i pravna verovanja. Stoga je doveo u pitanje poverenje javnosti u nezavisnost i nepristrasnost sudstva.
(i) Sloboda izražavanja predstavlja jedan od nužnih osnova demokratskog društva i jedan od osnovnih uslova za njegov napredak i samo-ispunjenje svakog pojedinca. Prema članu 10 stav 2 ona se primenjuje ne samo na „informacije“ ili „ideje“ koje se povoljno dočekaju ili smatraju neuvredljivim ili neutralnim, već i na one koje vređaju, šokiraju i uznemiravaju; takvi su zahtevi tog pluralizma, tolerancije i otvorenosti bez kojih nema „demokratskog društva“. Sloboda izražavanja, kako je zajemčena članom 10, podleže nizu izuzetaka koji, međutim, moraju biti usko tumačeni i neophodnost svih ograničenja mora se uverljivo dokazati.
(ii) Pridev „neophodan“, u okviru značenja člana 10 stava 2 ukazuje na postojanje „hitne društvene potrebe“. Države ugovornice imaju određen prostor za procenu da li takva potreba postoji, ali to ide ruku pod ruku s evropskim nadzorom i obuhvata i pravo i odluke koje ga primenjuju, čak i one koje donesu nezavisni sudovi. Sud stoga ima moć da donese konačnu presudu o tome da li neko „ograničenje“ može ići zajedno sa slobodom izražavanja kako je ona zaštićena članom 10.
(iii) Zadatak Suda, u sprovođenju svoje nadzorne funkcije, nije da zauzme mesto nadležnih nacionalnih tela, već da na osnovu člana 10 razmotri odluke koje su ona donela shodno njihovoj moći procene. Ovo ne znači da je nadzor ograničen na to da se uveri da li je tužena država svoja diskreciona prava koristila na razuman način, pažljivo ili u dobroj veri; ono što Sud mora da uradi je da razmotri mešanje koje neko prijavljuje u svetlu celokupnog slučaja i da odluči da li je ono bilo „srazmerno legitimnom cilju koji se želi postići“ i da li su razlozi koje su nacionalni organi naveli da bi ga opravdali „odgovarajući i dovoljni“. Pri tom, Sud mora da se uveri da su nacionalni organi primenili standarde koji su u skladu s načelima otelotvorenim u članu 10 i, pored toga, da su zasnovali svoje odluke na prihvatljivoj proceni relevantnih činjenica.
„Ova načela se primenjuju i na državne službenike. Iako je za neku državu legitimno da državnim službenicima, zbog njihovog statusa, nametne dužnost diskrecije, državni službenici su pojedinci i, kao takvi, kvalifikovani su za zaštitu člana 10 Konvencije. Stoga je na Sudu, s obzirom na okolnosti svakog slučaja, da odluči da li je postignuta pravedna ravnoteža između osnovnih prava pojedinca na slobodu izražavanja i legitimnog interesa demokratske država da obezbedi da njena državna služba propisno unapređuje ciljeve navedene u članu 10 stav 2. Tokom ovog preispitivanja, Sud će voditi računa o tome da kad god se postavi pitanje prava na slobodu izražavanja državnih službenika ‘dužnosti i odgovornosti’ pomenute u članu 10 stav 2 dobijaju posebnu važnost, što opravdava to što se nacionalnim organima ostavlja određen prostor za procenu da li je sporno mešanje srazmerno gore navedenom cilju“. (str. 26, st. 53, i presuda Ahmed and Others v. the United Kingdom od 2. septembra 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998–VI, str. 2378, st. 56).
Procenjujući da li mera koju je knez preduzeo kao reakciju na izjavu koju je podnosilac predstavke dao tokom svog predavanja 16. februara 1995. odgovara „hitnoj društvenoj potrebi“ i da li je „srazmerna legitimnom cilju“, Sud će razmatrati spornu izjavu u svetlu predmeta u celini. On će naročitu pažnju pridati funkciji koju ima podnosilac predstavke, njegovoj izjavi, kontekstu u kojoj je data i reakciji na nju.
Decembru 1993. podnosilac predstavke je postavljen za predsednika Upravnog suda i bio je na ovoj funkciji kada je 16. februara 1995. održao dotično predavanje. Pošto je u to vreme podnosilac predstavke bio sudija visokog ranga, Sud mora da ima na umu da, kad je u pitanju pravo na slobodu izražavanja lica na takvoj poziciji, „dužnosti i odgovornosti“ iz člana 10 stav 2 dobijaju posebnu važnost pošto se od zvaničnika koji rade u pravosuđu može očekivati da budu uzdržani u sprovođenju svoje slobode izražavanja u svim slučajevima kada se može dovesti u pitanje autoritet i nezavisnost sudstva. Ipak, Sud zaključuje da mešanje u slobodu izražavanja jednog sudije koji je na poziciji na kakvoj je podnosilac predstavke zahteva pomno ispitivanje od strane Suda.
Što se tiče predavanja podnosioca predstavke od 16. februara 1995, Sud konstatuje da je ovo predavanje održano u okviru niza akademskih predavanja u jednom lihtenštajnskom istraživačkom institutu o pitanjima ustavne nadležnosti i osnovnih prava (vidi gore stav 8). Predavanje podnosioca predstavke uključivalo je i izjavu o nadležnostima Ustavnog suda na osnovu člana 112 Ustava Lihtenštajna. Gledište je podnosioca predstavke da termin „Vlada“ koji se koristi u ovoj odredbi uključuje kneza, a to mišljenje je navodno u sukobu s načelom kneževog imuniteta od nadležnosti lihtenštajnskog pravosuđa (vidi stavove 24 i 29).
Prema mišljenju podnosioca predstavke ova izjava je predstavljala akademski komentar na tumačenje člana 112 Ustava. Država, s druge strane, smatra da iako ta izjava deluje kao pravno neutralna, ona je, u suštini, vrlo politička i uključuje i napad na postojeći ustavni poredak i nije u skladu s javnom funkcijom koju je u to vreme imao podnosilac predstavke.
Sud prihvata da je predavanje podnosioca predstavke, pošto se bavilo pitanjima ustavnog prava i, konkretnije, pitanjem da li jedan od suverena države podleže nadležnosti Ustavnog suda, neizbežno imalo političke implikacije. On smatra da pitanja ustavnog prava, samom svojom prirodom, imaju političke implikacije. On, međutim, ne može da zaključi da bi samo ovaj element trebalo da spreči podnosioca predstavke da daje izjave o ovom pitanju. Sud dalje konstatuje da je u kontekstu donošenja zakona o izmenama i dopunama Zakona o Ustavnom sudu 1991. godine, lihtenštajnska Vlada u svojim komentarima tog zakona imala slično gledište, kome se suprotstavio knez, ali s kojim se složio lihtenštajnski Parlament, iako samo manjinom (vidi gore stav 30). Mišljenje koje je izrazio podnosilac predstavke ne može se smatrati neodrživim predlogom pošto ga deli znatan broj lica u Lihtenštajnu. Pored toga, nema dokaza za zaključak da je predavanje podnosioca predstavke sadržavalo ikakve napomene u vezi s tekućim predmetima, žestoku kritiku ljudi ili javnih institucija ili uvrede visokih zvaničnika ili kneza.
Okrećući se kneževoj reakciji, Sud primećuje da je on najavio svoju nameru da nikad više ne postavi podnosioca predstavke na javnu funkciju, ako podnosioca predstavke predloži Parlament ili neko drugo telo. Knez smatra da je gore pomenuta izjava podnosioca predstavke jasno prekršila lihtenštajnski Ustav. U tom kontekstu, on se takođe pozvao na političku raspravu s lihtenštajnskom Vladom iz oktobra 1992. i u zaključku opomenuo podnosioca predstavke, koji je u to vreme bio član Vlade, a od 1993. predsednik Upravnog suda Lihtenštajna, zbog toga što ne smatra da ga obavezuje Ustav. Prema kneževom mišljenju, stav podnosioca predstavke prema Ustavu čini ga nepodobnim za javnu funkciju (vidi gore stav 11).
Kneževa reakcija je zasnovana na opštim zaključcima izvedenim iz prethodnog ponašanja podnosioca predstavke kao člana Vlade, a naročito tokom političkog sukoba iz 1992, i njegove kratke izjave, kako je o njoj izvestila štampa, o konkretnom, iako kontroverznom, ustavnom pitanju nadležnosti suda. Nije bilo pomenuto ništa što bi ukazalo da je gledište podnosioca predstavke na dotičnom predavanju imalo veze s njegovim radom u svojstvu predsednika Upravnog suda ili bilo kojim postojećim ili budućim postupkom. Takođe, Država nije navela ni jednu priliku kada je podnosilac predstavke, tokom vršenja svojih pravosudnih dužnosti ili na neki drugi način, delovao na način na koji bi se moglo prigovoriti.
Što se tiče činjenica ovog predmeta, Sud konstatuje da, iako bitni, razlozi na koje se Država oslanja da bi opravdala mešanje u pravo na slobodu mišljenja podnosioca predstavke nisu dovoljni da pokažu da je mešanje koje se prijavljuje bilo „neophodno u demokratskom društvu“. Dozvolivši određen prostor za procenu, deluje da knežev postupak nije u skladu s ciljem koji se želi postići. Shodno tome, Sud stoji na stanovištu da je došlo do kršenja člana 10 Konvencije.
II. NAVODNO KRŠENJE ČLANA 13 KONVENCIJE
„Svako kome su povređena prava i slobode predviđeni u ovoj Konvenciji ima pravo na delotvoran pravni lek pred nacionalnim vlastima, bez obzira jesu li povredu izvršila lica koja su postupala u službenom svojstvu.“
Država je osporila gore navedeno, naglasivši da postoji lek koji podnosilac predstavke nije iskoristio. Na raspravi Država je navela da u sudskoj praksi Ustavnog suda postoje jake indikacije da će on razmatrati ne samo sud ili upravni organ već i Parlament kao jedno od tela protiv koji se može podneti zahtev za presuđivanje Ustavnom sudu na osnovu člana 23 Zakona o Ustavnom sudu. Podnosilac predstavke je stoga na raspolaganju imao efikasni lek u okviru značenja člana 13 Konvencije pošto je mogao i trebalo da ospori neinsistiranje Parlamenta na njegovom imenovanju za predsednika Upravnog suda.
U podnesku podnosioca predstavke, zahtev Ustavnom sudu za presuđivanje na osnovu člana 23 Zakona o Ustavnom sudu zahteva da odluka na koju se lice žali dođe od nekog suda ili upravnog organa. Knez, međutim, nije ni jedno od ta dva.
Komisija se saglasila s podnosiocem predstavke. Zaključila je da Država nije uspela da pokaže da u lihtenštajnskom pravu postoji lek koji je efikasan u praksi protiv kršenja člana 10 Konvencije koje navodi podnosilac predstavke. Naročito, što se tiče žalbe kod Ustavnog suda, Država nije navela ni jedan primer koji bi pokazivao njegovu primenu u nekom predmetu koji je sličan ovome.
Sud stalno tumači član 13 na takav način da se u njemu zahteva da u domaćem pravu postoji lek samo u vezi s problemima koji se mogu smatrati „dokazivim“ što se tiče Konvencije (vidi presudu Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom od 27. aprila 1988, Series A No. 131, str. 23, st. 52, i presudu Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom od 21. februara 1990, Series A No. 172, str. 14, st. 31). Član 13 garantuje dostupnost na nacionalnom nivou leka koji će sprovesti suštinu prava i sloboda iz Konvencije u kojoj god formi da su obezbeđeni u domaćem pravnom poretku. Efekat ovog člana je stoga da zahteva obezbeđenje domaćeg leka koji omogućuje da se „nadležno nacionalno telo“ bavi i suštinom odgovarajuće žalbe prema Konvenciji i da obezbedi odgovarajući lek, iako strane ugovornice imaju izvesno diskreciono pravo u vezi s načinom na koji poštuju svoju obavezu na osnovu ove odredbe. Ovaj lek mora da bude „efikasan“ u praksi kao i u zakonu (vidi presudu Mentes and Others v. Turkey od 28. novembra 1997, Reports 1997–VIII, str. 2715, st. 89).
U svetlu zaključka iz stava 70 gore, zahtev da žalba bude „dokaziva“ zadovoljen je u smislu podneska koji je u pitanju (vidi presudu Vereinigung demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi v. Austria od 19. decembra 1994, Series A No. 302, str. 20, st. 53).
Što se tiče argumenta Države da je podnosilac predstavke trebalo da se žali Ustavnom sudu protiv Parlamenta zbog toga što ovaj drugi nije insistirao na svom pravu da ga imenuje za novi mandat kao predsednika Upravnog suda, dovoljno je napomenuti da se žalba podnosioca predstavke na osnovu člana 10 odnosi na postupke kneza, a ne Parlamenta. Država, međutim, nije pokazala da postoji presedan u sudskoj praksi Ustavnog suda od njegovog osnivanja 1925, gde je taj sud ikad bio prihvaćen za presuđivanje kod neke žalbe protiv kneza. Ona stoga nije pokazala da bi takav lek bio efikasan.
III. NAVODNO KRŠENJE ČLANA 6 KONVENCIJE I ČLANA 14 U VEZI SA ČLANOM 10
„Svako, tokom odlučivanja o njegovim građanskim pravima i obavezama ili o krivičnoj optužbi protiv njega, ima pravo na pravičnu i javnu raspravu u razumnom roku pred nezavisnim i nepristrasnim sudom, obrazovanim na osnovu zakona...“
„Uživanje prava i sloboda predviđenih u ovoj Konvenciji obezbeđuje se bez diskriminacije po bilo kom osnovu, kao što su pol, rasa, boja kože, jezik, veroispovest, političko ili drugo mišljenje, nacionalno ili socijalno poreklo, veza s nekom nacionalnom manjinom, imovno stanje, rođenje ili drugi status.“
Što se tiče žalbe na osnovu člana 6, Komisija je zaključila da je odgovarajuće da ovu žalbu ispita u vezi s opštijim obavezama država na osnovu člana 13 da bi obezbedila efikasan lek u vezi s kršenjima Konvencije. Zaključila je da nije neophodno odrediti da li je došlo do kršenja člana 6. Što se tiče žalbe na osnovu člana 14 Komisija je, imajući u vidu svoj zaključak u vezi sa članom 10, zaključila da nema nikakvog posebnog problema na osnovu člana 14 u vezi sa članom 10.
Pred Sudom podnosilac predstavke nije ponovio ove žalbe i Sud ne nalazi da je potrebno da se samoinicijativno bavi ovim pitanjem.
IV. PRIMENA ČLANA 41 KONVENCIJE
„Kada Sud utvrdi prekršaj Konvencije ili protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo Visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo delimičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj stranci.“
A. Šteta
Pod stavkom materijalna šteta, podnosilac predstavke je zatražio 25.000 švajcarskih franaka (CHF) odštete za finansijski gubitak koji je pretrpeo usled mere na koju se žali. On je naveo da njemu, za razliku od njegovih prethodnika, nije ponuđeno nikakvo mesto u lihtenštajnskim industrijskim i poslovnim krugovima za koje se dobija nadoknda.
Država je prigovorila na ovaj zahtev.
Sud nalazi da ne postoji dovoljna uzročno-posledična veza između tražene odštete i ustanovljenog kršenja Konvencije. Stoga on ne može da odobri zahtev za naknadu štete koji je predat pod ovom stavkom.
Pod stavkom nematerijalna šteta, podnosilac predstavke je tražio CHF 30.000. Naveo je da su kneževe izjave bile vrlo uvredljive i da su loše uticale na njegov ugled.
Država se usprotivila i ovom zahtevu.
Sud smatra da može da se uzme da je podnosilac predstavke pretrpeo bol zbog činjenica slučaja. Na pravičnoj osnovi Sud mu dosuđuje CHF 10.000 na ime nematerijalne štete.
B. Sudski i ostali troškovi
Što se tiče sudskih i ostalih troškova koji se odnose na njegovo zastupanje pred institucijama iz Konvencije, podnosilac predstavke je tražio ukupno CHF 91.014,05, odnosno CHF 44.927,20 za g. Kleja i CHF 46.086,85 za g. Zegera.
Država nije osporila ovaj zahtev.
Sud je zadovoljan što su satnice za postupak u Strazburu za koje je ispostavljen račun razumne. Uzimajući u obzir činjenicu da je rasprava održana i pred Komisijom i pred Sudom, takođe zaključuje da traženi broj sati nije preteran. Zahtev za naplatu sudskih i ostalih troškova će stoga biti dosuđen u celosti.
C. Zatezna kamata
IZ OVIH RAZLOGA, SUD
Odlučuje sa šesnaest glasova prema jedan da je došlo do kršenja člana 10 Konvencije;
Odlučuje sa šesnaest glasova prema jedan da je došlo do kršenja člana 13 Konvencije;
Odlučuje jednoglasno da nije neophodno da razmotri da li je došlo do kršenja člana 6 Konvencije i člana 14 u vezi sa članom 10;
Odlučuje jednoglasno
(a) da tužena Država treba da u roku od tri meseca podnosiocu predstavke plati sledeće iznose:
(i) CHF 10.000 (deset hiljada švajcarskih franaka) na ime nematerijalne štete;
(ii) CHF 91.014,05 (devedeset jednu hiljadu i četrnaest švajcarskih franaka i pet santima) na ime sudskih i ostalih troškova;
(b) da će kamata na glavnicu po godišnjoj stopi od 5% biti plativa od isticanja gore pomenutog tromesečnog roka do namirenja;
Sačinjeno na engleskom i francuskom jeziku i izrečeno na javnoj raspravi u zgradi Suda u Strazburu 28. oktobra 1999.
Elizabet Palm Mod de Boer-Bukikio
Predsednik Zamenik sekretara
Shodno članu 45 stav 2 Konvencije i pravilu 74, stav 2 Poslovnika Suda, ovoj presudi su pripojena sledeća izdvojena mišljenja:
(a) zajedničko saglasno mišljenje g. Kafliša, g. Zupančiča i g. Hedigana;
(b) izdvojeno mišljenje g. Kabral Bareta.
E. P.
M. B.
ZAJEDNIČKO SAGLASNO MIŠLJENJE SUDIJA KAFLIŠA, ZUPANČIČA I HEDIGANA
Saglasni smo s presudom Suda, ali bismo želeli da izrazimo rezervu prema obrazloženju Suda kod zaključka o kršenju člana 10.
Zaključeno je da je problem na koji se žali podnosilac predstavke, koji je naveo da on predstavlja mešanje u pravo zajemčeno članom 10, završen do prvog pisma koje je napisao njegovo veličanstvo knez Hans-Adam II od Lihtenštajna. Mi ne delimo to mišljenje. To pismo nosi datum 27. februar 1995. U to vreme moglo je da se smatra da je to samo izražavanje namere, koja je zaista mogla da se promeni u sledećim mesecima i koja se kristalisala kao „mešanje“ u kneževim daljim potvrđujućim komunikacijama. Samo u svetlu ovog poslednjeg može se prihvatiti da je za podnosioca predstavke zaista postojala pretnja nekom sankcijom. Dalje, ako se uzme samo za sebe, pismo od 27. februara 1995. moglo je da se smatra za izražavanje privatnog ličnog mišljenja. Dalja potvrđujuća pisma bez ikakve sumnje opravdavaju zaključak da je ova mera, u stvari, predstavljala državni čin.
Stoga donosimo zaključak da se mera koja je prekršila pravo zajemčeno članom 10 sastojala od celokupne kneževe komunikacije.
IZDVOJENO MIŠLJENJE SUDIJE KABRAL BARETA
(Prevod)
Žao mi je što ne mogu da delim mišljenje većine u Sudu; po mom mišljenju nije došlo do kršenja prava podnosioca predstavke na izražavanje.
Postoje dva odlučujuća dokaza u predmetu: kneževo pismo od 27. februara 1995, u kome knez po prvi put izražava svoju nameru da podnosioca predstavke ne postavi ponovo za predsednika Upravnog suda, i pismo predsedniku Parlamenta od 17. aprila 1997, u kome knez odbija da izvrši to postavljanje.
Da ih ispitamo.
1. Pismo od 27. februara 1995. bilo je privatno pismo, poslato na privatnu adresu podnosioca predstavke, u kome knez navodi svoju nameru da više ne postavlja podnosioca predstavke na javnu funkciju.
Mislim da će biti od pomoći da se reprodukuje sledeći pasus:
„U mojim očima Vas Vaše ponašanje, dr Vile, čini nepodobnim za javnu funkciju. Ne nameravam da se upustim u dugu javnu ili privatnu raspravu s Vama, ali bih voleo da Vas blagovremeno obavestim da Vas neću ponovo imenovati na javnu funkciju ukoliko Vas predloži Parlament ili neko drugo telo ...“
Na početku navodim da knez nije želeo da se upušta u javnu raspravu i da je samo blagovremeno hteo da naznači svoju nameru da, ako se pojavi prilika, preduzme određene mere.
Teško mogu da vidim na koji način ovo pismo predstavlja „prekor“ (vidi stav 50 presude).
Pismo je, iznad svega, izrazilo svo kneževo neslaganje s idejama podnosioca predstavke u vezi s tumačenjem lihtenštajnskog Ustava. To neslaganje dovelo je do gubitka političkog poverenja koje je knez trebalo da ima prema podnosiocu predstvke i stoga i do najave da knez namerava da izvede neophodne političke zaključke.
Drugim rečima, ništa osim onoga što je podnosilac predstavke mogao da očekuje, s obzirom na neslaganje iz 1992. između kneza i Vlade (čiji je podnosilac predstavke tada bio član).
Sama po sebi namera ne predstavlja pravni čin, niti čak ni početni korak ka izvršenju takvog čina.
Nema sumnje da se ovde nalazimo u oblasti čiste psihologije, još uvek daleko čak i od pripremne radnje koja bi pretpostavljala da su fizički činovi već izvršeni.
Stoga bih mogao da razumem da treba smatrati da je kneževo pismo napisano jednostavno da bi „blagovremeno“ najavilo njegovu nameru da sprovede neku radnju, da bi podnosiocu predstavke dao vremena da za svoju budućnost napravi neophodne pripreme.
Tačno je da je ovo privatno pismo u kome se najavljuje namera postalo javno i da su ga potvrdila druga kneževa pisma, koja su bila otvorena.
Sve je to, međutim, bilo isključivo usled ponašanja podosioca predstavke i kako je g. Konforti pravilno rekao u svom izdvojenom mišljenju koje se nalazi u prilogu izveštaja Komisije, podnosilac predstavke ne može da „izbegne primenu principa nemo contra factum suum proprium venire potest“.
Prihvatanje suprotnog, po mom mišljenju, ne bi bilo u skladu s jezikom i duhom člana 10 Konvencije. Nije moguće suditi o namerama i ne upasti u svet „virtuelnog“ kršenja, a meni deluje da se upravo to desilo u ovom slučaju.
2. Odbijanje da se podnosilac predstavke ponovo postavi za predsednika Upravnog suda bilo je, bez ikakve sumnje, pravni čin i u okolnostima slučaja mogu da prihvatim da je to usledilo zbog mišljenja koja je podnosilac predstavke izrazio i to predstavlja problem na osnovu člana 10.
Međutim, ja smatram da nije potrebno određivati da li je to odbijanje imalo legitiman cilj i da li je bilo neophodno u demokratskom društvu, pošto niko neće osporiti da se ovde nalazimo u zoni pristupa javnoj funkciji, temi koja je namerno izostavljena iz Konvencije. To je u stavu 41 presude potvrdila većina u Sudu.
Stoga zaključujem da nije došlo do kršenja Konvencije.
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In the case of Wille v. Liechtenstein,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article 27 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”), as amended by Protocol No. 11[1], and the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court2, as a Grand Chamber composed of the following judges:
MrsE. Palm, President,
MrC.L. Rozakis,
MrL. Ferrari Bravo,
MrG. Ress,
MrL. Caflisch,
MrI. Cabral Barreto,
MrJ.-P. Costa,
MrW. Fuhrmann,
MrK. Jungwiert,
MrB. Zupancic,
MrsN. Vajic,
MrJ. Hedigan,
MrsW. Thomassen,
MrsM. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
MrT. Pantîru,
MrE. Levits,
MrK. Traja,
and also of Mrs M. de Boer-Buquicchio, Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 2 June and 13 October 1999,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court, as established under former Article 19 of the Convention3, by the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) and by the Liechtenstein Government (“the Government”) on 24 and 27 October 1998 respectively, within the three-month period laid down by former Articles 32 § 1 and 47 of the Convention. It originated in an application (no. 28396/95) against the Principality of Liechtenstein lodged with the Commission under former Article 25 by a Liechtenstein citizen, Mr Herbert Wille, on 25 August 1995.
The Commission’s request referred to former Articles 44 and 48 and to the declaration whereby Liechtenstein recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (former Article 46); the Government’s application referred to former Article 48. The object of the request and of the application was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Articles 10 and 13 of the Convention.
2. After the entry into force of Protocol No. 11 on 1 November 1998 and in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 § 5 thereof, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court. The Grand Chamber included ex officio Mr L. Caflisch, the judge elected in respect of Liechtenstein (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 24 § 4 of the Rules of Court), Mrs E. Palm and Mr C.L. Rozakis, the Vice-Presidents of the Court, and Mr J.‑P. Costa and Mr G. Ress, Vice-Presidents of Sections (Article 27 § 3 of the Convention and Rule 24 §§ 3 and 5 (a)). The other members appointed to complete the Grand Chamber were Mr L. Ferrari Bravo, Mr I. Cabral Barreto, Mr W. Fuhrmann, Mr K. Jungwiert, Mr B. Zupancic, Mrs N. Vajic, Mr J. Hedigan, Mrs W. Thomassen, Mrs M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska, Mr T. Pantîru, Mr E. Levits and Mr K. Traja (Rule 24 § 3 and Rule 100 § 4).
3. The applicant designated the lawyers who would represent him (Rule 36). The lawyers were given leave by the President of the Grand Chamber, Mrs Palm, to use the German language (Rule 34 § 3).
4. As President of the Grand Chamber, Mrs Palm, acting through the Deputy Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Government, the applicant’s lawyers and the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of the written procedure. Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the Registrar received the applicant’s memorial on 25 February 1999 and the Government’s memorial on 30 March 1999.
5. In accordance with the decision of the President of the Grand Chamber, a hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 2 June 1999.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
MrH. Golsong, Attorney,Co-Agent,
MrN. Marxer,
MrT. Stein,
MrM. Walker,Counsel;
(b) for the applicant
MrW.E. Seeger, Rechtsanwalt,
MrA. Kley, Rechtsanwalt,Counsel.
Mr Wille was also present.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Seeger, Mr Kley, Mr Golsong and Mr Stein.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
6. In 1992 a controversy arose between His Serene Highness Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein (“the Prince”) and the Liechtenstein government on political competences in connection with the plebiscite on the question of Liechtenstein’s accession to the European Economic Area. At the relevant time, the applicant was a member of the Liechtenstein government. Following an argument between the Prince and members of the government at a meeting on 28 October 1992, the matter was settled on the basis of a common declaration by the Prince, the Diet (Landtag) and the government.
7. Following elections and the constitution of the new Diet in May 1993, discussions on various constitutional issues took place between the Prince and the government, when the applicant no longer held a government office. The applicant had not stood for re-election in May 1993, and he was appointed President of the Liechtenstein Administrative Court (Verwaltungsbeschwerdeinstanz) in December 1993 for a fixed term of office (see paragraph 26 below).
8. On 16 February 1995, in the context of a series of lectures on questions of constitutional jurisdiction and fundamental rights, the applicant gave a public lecture at the Liechtenstein-Institut, a research institute, on the “Nature and Functions of the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court” (“Wesen und Aufgaben des Staatsgerichtshofes”). In the course of the lecture, the applicant expressed the view that the Constitutional Court was competent to decide on the “interpretation of the Constitution in case of disagreement between the Prince (government) and the Diet” (“Entscheidung über die Auslegung der Verfassung bei einem Auslegungsstreit zwischen Fürst (Regierung) und Landtag”).
9. On 17 February 1995 the newspaper Liechtensteiner Volksblatt published an article on the lecture given by the applicant, mentioning, inter alia, his views on the competences of the Constitutional Court
10. On 27 February 1995 the Prince addressed a letter to the applicant concerning the above lecture, as summarised in the article published in the Liechtensteiner Volksblatt.
11. The letter, written on heraldic letter paper, read as follows:
“Vaduz Castle, 27 February 1995
Dr Herbert Wille
President of the Liechtenstein Administrative Court
[applicant’s private address]
Sir,
I was astonished to read the report in the 17 February issue of the Liechtensteiner Volksblatt on your lecture on the theme of the ‘Nature and Functions of the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court’. I assume that the statements you made on the Court’s areas of responsibility have been correctly reproduced in this report, in particular the comment that the Constitutional Court can, as a court that interprets the law, be appealed to in the event of a disagreement between the Prince and the people.
You will doubtless remember the discussion between the government and me in the period before 28 October 1992, at which you were present as deputy head of government. I drew the government’s attention during this exchange of views at Vaduz Castle to the fact that it was not abiding by the Constitution and read out the relevant Articles thereof. You replied that you did not agree (or words to that effect) with these parts of the Constitution in any case and that you therefore did not consider yourself bound by it. Since the other members of the government did not contradict you, I was forced to assume that the entire government was of the opinion that the two bodies that hold supreme power, the people and the Prince, must observe the Constitution and the ordinary laws but not the members of the government, who have sworn an oath of allegiance to the Constitution.
I considered your statement at that time and the government’s attitude to be incredibly arrogant and therefore informed the government in no uncertain terms that it had lost my confidence. Following the compromise that was fortunately reached a little later between the government and the Diet, on the one hand, and myself, on the other, I declared that I once again had confidence in the government, doing so in the hope that individual members had realised that they had taken up an inexcusable position in relation to our Constitution and now recognised that they were bound by it. Just as I would have appointed Mr Brunhart head of government, had his party won the election, I appointed you President of the Administrative Court on the Diet’s recommendation.
Unfortunately, I had to realise following the publication of the report in the Liechtensteiner Volksblatt that you still do not consider yourself bound by the Constitution and hold views that are clearly in violation of both the spirit and the letter thereof. Anyone reading the relevant Articles of the Constitution will be able to establish that the Constitutional Court has no competence to decide as a court of interpretation in the event of a disagreement between the Prince and the people (the Diet). In my eyes your attitude, Dr Wille, makes you unsuitable for public office. I do not intend to get involved in a long public or private debate with you, but I should like to inform you in good time that I shall not appoint you again to a public office should you be proposed by the Diet or any other body. I only hope that in your judgments as President of the Administrative Court you will abide by the Constitution and the ordinary laws for the rest of your term of office.
Yours sincerely,
Hans-Adam II
Prince of Liechtenstein”
“Schloss Vaduz, 27. Februar 1995
Herrn Dr. Herbert Wille
Präsident der Fürstlich Liecht.
Verwaltungsbeschwerdeinstanz
...
Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident
Mit Erstaunen habe ich im Liechtensteiner Volksblatt vom 17. Februar den Bericht über Ihren Vortrag am Liechtenstein Institut zum Thema ‘Wesen und Aufgaben des Staatsgerichtshofes’ gelesen. Ich nehme an, dass Ihre Aussagen über die Zuständigkeitsbereiche des Staatsgerichtshofes in diesem Bericht korrekt wiedergegeben wurden, insbesondere jene, in der Sie feststellen, dass der Staatsgerichtshof als Interpretations-gerichtshof bei unterschiedlichen Auffassungen zwischen Fürst und Volk angerufen werden könne.
Sie werden sich bestimmt noch an die Auseinandersetzung zwischen der Regierung und mir vor dem 28. Oktober 1992 erinnern, bei der Sie als stellvertretender Regierungschef anwesend waren. Ich habe damals bei der Aussprache auf Schloss Vaduz die Regierung darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass sie sich nicht an die Verfassung hält, und die entsprechenden Artikel aus der Verfassung der Regierung vorgelesen. Sie haben dazumal sinngemäss geantwortet, dass Sie mit diesen Teilen der Verfassung sowieso nicht einverstanden seien, und sich deshalb auch nicht an die Verfassung gebunden fühlten. Nachdem die anderen Regierungsmitglieder Ihrer Aussage nicht widersprochen haben, musste ich davon ausgehen, dass die gesamte Regierung der Auffassung ist, dass sich zwar die beiden Souveräne, Volk und Fürst, an Verfassung und Gesetze zu halten haben, nicht aber die Regierungsmitglieder, welche einen Eid auf die Verfassung abgelegt haben.
Ich habe Ihre damalige Aussage sowie die Haltung der Regierung als unglaubliche Arroganz empfunden, und deshalb habe ich der Regierung in sehr klaren Worten mitgeteilt, dass sie mein Vertrauen verloren hat. Beim Kompromiss, der glücklicherweise etwas später zwischen Regierung und Landtag auf der einen Seite und mir auf der anderen Seite erzielt wurde, habe ich der Regierung wieder mein Vertrauen ausgesprochen. Ich habe dies auch in der Hoffnung getan, dass die einzelnen Regierungsmitglieder ihre unentschuldbare Haltung gegenüber unserer Verfassung eingesehen haben und die Verfassung für sie wieder als bindend anerkennen. Ebenso wie ich Herrn Brunhart bei einem Sieg seiner Partei wiederum zum Regierungschef ernannt hätte, so habe ich Sie über Vorschlag des Landtages zum Präsidenten der Verwaltungs-beschwerdeinstanz ernannt.
Leider muss ich aufgrund des Berichtes im Liechtensteiner Volksblatt nun feststellen, dass Sie sich nach wie vor nicht an die Verfassung gebunden fühlen und Auffassungen vertreten, die eindeutig gegen Sinn und Wortlaut der Verfassung verstossen. Jeder wird beim Lesen der einschlägigen Verfassungsartikel feststellen können, dass der Staatsgerichtshof eben nicht Interpretationsgerichtshof bei unterschiedlichen Auffassungen zwischen Fürst und Volk (Landtag) ist. In meinen Augen sind Sie, Herr Dr. Wille, aufgrund Ihrer Haltung gegenüber der Verfassung ungeeignet für ein öffentliches Amt. Ich habe nicht die Absicht, mich mit Ihnen öffentlich oder privat in eine lange Auseinandersetzung einzulassen, aber ich möchte Ihnen rechtzeitig mitteilen, dass ich Sie nicht mehr für ein öffentliches Amt ernennen werde, sollten Sie mir vom Landtag oder sonst irgendeinem Gremium vorgeschlagen werden. Es verbleibt mir die Hoffnung, dass Sie sich während des Restes Ihrer Amtszeit als Präsident der Verwaltungsbeschwerdeinstanz in Ihren Urteilen an Verfassung und Gesetze halten.
Mit vorzüglicher Hochachtung
Hans-Adam II.
Fürst von Liechtenstein”
12. By letter of 9 March 1995 the applicant informed the President of the Diet about the letter of 27 February 1995. He denied having ever made a statement to the effect that he did not consider himself bound by the Constitution or parts thereof. He further explained his research on the competences of the Constitutional Court in constitutional matters. According to him, the expression of an opinion not shared by the Prince could not be regarded as a failure to comply with the Constitution. However, taking into account the conclusions drawn by the Prince in the said letter, his office as President of the Administrative Court was called into question. The President of the Diet subsequently informed the applicant that the Diet had discussed the matter in camera and had come to the unanimous conclusion that the applicant’s office was not called into question on account of his legal opinions as stated in the context of his lecture.
13. On 20 March 1995 the applicant replied to the letter sent by the Prince on 27 February 1995, and enclosed a copy of his letter to the President of the Diet. He explained in particular that it was his conviction as a lawyer that his statements on the occasion of the lecture of 16 February 1995, namely that the Constitutional Court was competent to decide on the interpretation of the Constitution in case of a dispute between the Prince and the people (Diet), were correct and did not infringe the Constitution. The applicant concluded that the declaration made by the Prince that he did not intend to appoint the applicant to a public office, amounted to an interference with his rights to freedom of opinion and to freedom of thought, as guaranteed under the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. It further called into question the constitutional right to equal access to public office and constituted an attempt to interfere with judicial independence.
14. In his letter in reply dated 4 April 1995, the Prince noted that Mr Wille had distributed the letter of 27 February 1995 to a large group of persons. The Prince stated that it had been his intention to avoid a public discussion in informing Mr Wille, in a personal letter, about his decision as early as possible. He considered that a long debate between them on the question of Mr Wille’s qualification for the office of judge was inappropriate, as Mr Wille had remained in office and the Prince’s criticism had not been directed at the decisions of the Administrative Court, but at Mr Wille’s general attitude towards the Constitution.
15. The Prince added that it was left to his discretion whether or not to appoint a candidate for public office and that he was not obliged to give any reasons for such a decision. However, as he had known Mr Wille for many years, he had considered it appropriate to state the reasons for his decision regarding him. Moreover, the decision no longer to appoint him to the office of President of one of the highest courts, on account of his attitude in the past as well as the opinions expressed by him, did not amount to an interference with Mr Wille’s rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of thought. All citizens were free to propose and to plead for amendments to constitutional or other legal provisions. However, Mr Wille, during his term of office as a member of the government and in his lecture, had not availed himself of such constitutional and democratic means, but had simply ignored those parts of the Constitution with which he disagreed.
16. The Prince further explained that the relevant provision, namely Article 112 of the Constitution, concerned the competence of the Constitutional Court to decide on the interpretation of the Constitution in case of a dispute between the government and the Diet. Confusing the terms “Government” and “Diet” with “Prince” or “people”, as Mr Wille had done, would undermine the rule of law. As head of State, he was obliged to safeguard the constitutional order and the democratic rights of the people. He would be failing in his duties if he were to appoint to one of the highest judicial offices a person whom, owing to his attitude and the statements he had made, he could not regard as being committed to upholding the Constitution.
17. On 2 June 1995 the Prince sent to the applicant, President of the Administrative Court, an open letter which was published in Liechtenstein newspapers. The Prince noted that Mr Wille had made public at least part of the Prince’s letter of 27 February 1995. As this had given rise to various comments, the Prince considered it necessary to explain his point of view in an open letter.
18. In his opinion, in a democratic State based on the rule of law (demokratischer Rechtsstaat), a distinction had to be drawn between freedom of expression and the means used by an individual for imposing his views in such a society. In that connection, the individual should respect the rules defined in the Constitution and other statutory provisions. The Prince further stated that it was the right of Mr Wille, in his position as a judge, to express the opinion that the monarchy was no longer opportune; that Article 7 of the Constitution should be amended; that the Prince should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Liechtenstein judiciary; and that the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court should be given supplementary competences. However, Mr Wille was not entitled to place himself above the existing Constitution or incite the Constitutional Court to lay claim to competences which were not vested in it by virtue of the Constitution. The Prince considered that Mr Wille, having regard to his education and professional experience, knew that the terms “people” (“Volk”), “Diet” (“Landtag”), “Government” (“Regierung”) and “Prince” (“Fürst”) and their respective rights and obligations were clearly defined in the Constitution. The applicant’s contention that these terms were interchangeable would jeopardise the Constitution and the constitutional State as a whole.
19. The Prince also made reference to the political events in the autumn of 1992 and, lastly, he stated that, on the basis of the article in a Liechtenstein newspaper of 17 February 1995, he was forced to conclude that Mr Wille continued to have the intention of placing himself above the Liechtenstein Constitution. He explained that he had therefore intended to inform Mr Wille, in a personal letter and as early as possible, about his decision not to appoint him to public office in future.
20. In spring 1997 the applicant’s term of office as President of the Administrative Court expired. On 14 April 1997 the Liechtenstein Diet decided to propose the applicant again as President of the Administrative Court.
21. In a letter of 17 April 1997 to the President of the Diet the Prince refused to accept the proposed appointment. He explained that, considering his experiences with Mr Wille, he had become convinced that Mr Wille did not feel bound by the Liechtenstein Constitution. In these circumstances, he would be failing in his duties as head of State if he were to appoint Mr Wille as President of the Administrative Court. The Prince further stated that Mr Wille, on account of his other professional qualifications, had made important contributions as a judge of the Administrative Court and that he (the Prince) could therefore understand the proposal made to a certain extent. If the Diet did not share his doubts regarding Mr Wille, it could elect him as associate judge of the Administrative Court.
22. The applicant is currently employed as a researcher by the Liechtenstein-Institut.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
23. The Principality of Liechtenstein is a constitutional, hereditary monarchy on a democratic and parliamentary basis; the power of the State is inherent in and emanates from the Prince and the people and shall be exercised by both of them in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution (Article 2 of the Constitution of 24 October 1921).
24. Chapter II of the Constitution is entitled “The Prince”. In its Article 7, it stipulates that the Prince is the head of the State and exercises his sovereign authority in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution and of the other laws; and that his person is sacred and inviolable. Further competences are laid down in Articles 8 to 13. According to Article 11, the Prince appoints the State officials, in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution (see Article 79 concerning the head of the government, the government councillors and their substitutes; Article 97 concerning the president of the Administrative Court and his deputy; Article 99, in conjunction with the Court Organisation Act, concerning the first-instance judges; Article 102 § 3 concerning the members of the High Court (Obergericht) and the Supreme Court of Justice (Oberster Gerichtshof)). By letter of 28 April 1997, the Prince informed the Liechtenstein government that he instructed it to proceed, within its competence, with the appointment in 1997 of State officials who, pursuant to Article 11 of the Constitution, were to be appointed by the Prince.
25. Chapter IV of the Constitution contains the general rights and obligations of citizens of the Principality. Article 31 stipulates the equality of all citizens before the law, and also provides that the public offices are equally open to them, subject to observance of the legal regulations.
26. According to Article 97 of the Constitution, all decisions or orders by the government are subject to appeal before the Administrative Court. The Administrative Court consists of a president trained in the law and of his deputy, who are appointed by the Prince on the proposal of the Diet, and of four appeal judges and their substitutes, who are elected by the Diet. The president and his deputy must be Liechtenstein nationals. Their term of office coincides with that of the Diet, and ends at such time as they are replaced.
27. According to Article 104 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is, inter alia, competent to protect rights accorded by the Constitution. Section 23 of the Constitutional Court Act (Staatsgerichtshofgesetz) provides that decisions of a court or of an administrative authority may be challenged before the Constitutional Court, by alleging that there has been an infringement of constitutional rights or of rights guaranteed under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
28. Pursuant to Article 105 of the Constitution, in conjunction with section 4 of the Constitutional Court Act, the judges of the Constitutional Court are elected by the Diet; the election of the president and the deputy president are subject to confirmation by the Prince.
29. Article 112 of the Constitution reads as follows:
“If doubts arise as to the interpretation of specific provisions of the Constitution and cannot be dispelled on the basis of an agreement between the Government and the Diet, the Constitutional Court is called upon to decide on the matter.”
“Wenn über die Auslegung einzelner Bestimmungen der Verfassung Zweifel entstehen und nicht durch Übereinkunft zwischen der Regierung und dem Landtage beseitigt werden können, so hat hierüber der Staatsgerichtshof zu entscheiden.”
30. In 1991 the Liechtenstein government introduced a bill in Parliament with the object of amending the Constitutional Court Act of 1925. In its comments on the provision regarding the Constitutional Court’s competence to decide on the interpretation of specific provisions of the Constitution, the government explained, inter alia, its views on the wording and purpose of Article 112 of the Constitution and in particular on the term “Government” which should be understood as referring to the Prince. At the preparatory stage, the Prince, in a letter addressed to the applicant, who at the time held the office of deputy head of the Liechtenstein government, had stated his disagreement with the proposed interpretation. The applicant explained the bill in Parliament when it received its first reading in April 1992. In the course of the discussions, the President of the Parliament questioned the interpretation of Article 112 of the Constitution, as contained in the government’s comments. The bill was passed by the Diet on 11 November 1992; however, the Prince failed to sign it so that it did not enter into force.
31. Under section 20 of the Liechtenstein Court Organisation Act (Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz, LGBl 1922 Nr. 16), judges are required to swear an oath, including the duties of loyalty to the Prince and of obedience to the laws and the Constitution.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
32. Mr Herbert Wille applied to the Commission on 25 August 1995. He alleged that following a public lecture he had given on issues of constitutional law the monarch of Liechtenstein, His Serene Highness Prince Hans-Adam II, as announced in a letter, decided not to appoint the applicant to public office in the future. This measure constituted a violation of his rights under Articles 6, 10, 13 and 14 of the Convention.
33. The Commission declared the application (no. 28396/95) admissible on 27 May 1997. In its report of 17 September 1998 (former Article 31 of the Convention), it expressed the opinion that there had been a violation of Article 10 (fifteen votes to four); that it was not necessary to determine whether there had been a violation of Article 6 (seventeen votes to two); that there had been a violation of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 10 (sixteen votes to three); and that no separate issue arose under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 10 (seventeen votes to two). The full text of the Commission’s opinion and of the three dissenting opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment[2].
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
34. In his memorial, the applicant requested the Court to find the respondent State in breach of its obligations under Articles 10 and 13 of the Convention and to award him just satisfaction under Article 41.
The Government, for their part, invited the Court to dismiss the applicant’s complaints under Articles 10 and 13 of the Convention.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
35. The applicant complained that, on account of the views expressed by him in the course of a public lecture on constitutional law at the Liechtenstein-Institut on 16 February 1995, the monarch of Liechtenstein, His Serene Highness Prince Hans-Adam II, in a letter addressed to him, announced his intention not to appoint the applicant to a public office again. He considered that this constituted a breach of his right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention, which reads:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
A. As to the applicability of Article 10 and the existence of an interference
36. The applicant submitted that the Prince’s decision not to appoint him to a public office in the future should he be proposed by the Diet or any other body as expressed in the Prince’s letter of 27 February 1995 constituted an immediate reaction to his academic speech delivered a few days before and could not be considered anything else but a sanction for the expression of his legal opinion. Although the Convention did not guarantee a right of access to the civil service, civil servants nevertheless enjoyed the protection of Article 10.
37. The Government submitted that the applicant’s speech and the Prince’s reaction thereto expressed in his letter of 27 February 1995 should be considered against the background of an ongoing political debate in Liechtenstein regarding the Prince’s authority and should not be seen in isolation. In 1992 there was a controversy between the Prince and the government over the date of a referendum for accession to the European Economic Area. The applicant was then a member of the Liechtenstein government, deputy head of the government and in charge of the justice portfolio. In the course of that controversy the applicant had expressed the view that, under Article 112 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court had the power to decide on the interpretation of the Constitution in case of a disagreement between the Prince and the Diet. At the same time the Diet was considering a draft amendment to the Constitutional Court Act. In the explanatory report thereon the applicant had expressed the same opinion. In both cases the Prince had directly contradicted the applicant. Nevertheless, in December 1993, he had appointed the applicant President of the Administrative Court. Thus the Prince’s letter essentially expressed the Prince’s disappointment and surprise that the applicant, despite a previous compromise on the controversy regarding the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, had given a public speech on this issue although he must have known that the Prince could not have been in agreement with the opinion expressed.
38. The Prince’s letter to the applicant of 27 February 1995 was a personal letter not intended for the general public and sent to the applicant’s private address. It did not constitute an act of State but was rather the notice of an intent to make a decision at a later time. The letter did not have a direct impact on the applicant’s legal status. He was not dismissed from office nor was his professional activity as President of the Administrative Court obstructed in any other way. But even if the Prince’s letter could be construed as an act of State, the Convention would not be applicable to the case. As the sanction was the refusal to appoint the applicant to a specific public office, it did not affect the applicant in any of his rights, as there was no right, either under Liechtenstein law or under the Convention, to be appointed to such office. Article 10 did not apply when the central issue was a question of access to public office.
39. The Commission essentially agreed with the applicant. It found that the Prince’s decision, as expressed in his letter of 27 February 1995, not to appoint the applicant in the future to public office was an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression as secured in Article 10 of the Convention.
40. The Court will first deal with the Government’s argument that the case essentially concerns access to the civil service, a right not guaranteed by the Convention.
41. In this connection the Court points out that the right of recruitment to the civil service was deliberately omitted from the Convention. Consequently, the refusal to appoint a person as a civil servant cannot as such provide the basis for a complaint under the Convention. This does not mean, however, that a person who has been appointed as a civil servant cannot complain of being dismissed if that dismissal violates one of his or her rights under the Convention. Civil servants do not fall outside the scope of the Convention. In Articles 1 and 14, the Convention stipulates that “everyone within [the] jurisdiction” of the Contracting States must enjoy the rights and freedoms in Section I “without discrimination on any ground”. Moreover, Article 11 § 2 in fine, which allows States to impose special restrictions on the exercise of the freedoms of assembly and association by “members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State”, confirms that as a general rule the guarantees in the Convention extend to civil servants (see the Glasenapp and Kosiek v. Germany judgments of 28 August 1986, Series A nos. 104, p. 26, § 49, and 105, p. 20, § 35, and the Vogt v. Germany judgment of 26 September 1995, Series A no. 323, pp. 22-23, § 43).
42. Accordingly, the status of civil servant obtained by the applicant when he was appointed President of the Liechtenstein Administrative Court did not deprive him of the protection of Article 10.
43. In order to determine whether this provision was infringed it must first be ascertained whether the disputed measure amounted to an interference with the exercise of freedom of expression – in the form of a “formality, condition, restriction or penalty” – or whether it lay within the sphere of the right of access to the civil service, a right not secured in the Convention. In order to answer this question, the scope of the measure must be determined by putting it in the context of the facts of the case and of the relevant legislation (see the Glasenapp and Kosiek judgments cited above, p. 26, § 50, and p. 20, § 36).
44. In the Glasenapp and Kosiek cases, the Court analysed the action of the authorities as a refusal to grant the applicants access to the civil service on the ground that they did not possess one of the necessary qualifications. In the Vogt case, the Court found that Mrs Vogt, for her part, had been a permanent civil servant since February 1979. She was suspended in August 1986 and dismissed in 1987. It concluded that there was indeed an interference with the exercise of the right protected by Article 10 of the Convention (see the Vogt judgment cited above, p. 23, § 44). In the instant case, the Court considers likewise that recruitment to the civil service does not lie at the heart of the issue submitted to it. Even though the Prince raised the matter of a possible reappointment of the applicant as President of the Administrative Court in the future, his communications to the applicant essentially consisted in a reprimand for the opinions the latter had expressed previously.
45. The Government argue that the Prince’s letter of 27 February 1995 was merely an advance announcement of a possible decision to be taken by the Prince in the future; thus it was a private letter and could not be equated to a sanction.
46. The Court reiterates in this connection that the responsibility of a State under the Convention may arise for acts of all its organs, agents and servants. As is the case in international law generally, their rank is immaterial since the acts by persons accomplished in an official capacity are imputed to the State in any case. In particular, the obligations of a Contracting Party under the Convention can be violated by any person exercising an official function vested in him (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, application no. 5310/71, Commission’s report of 25 January 1976, Yearbook 19, p. 758).
47. The Court notes that the Principality of Liechtenstein is a constitutional hereditary monarchy on a democratic and parliamentary basis; the power of the State is inherent in and emanates from the Prince and the people and shall be exercised by both of them in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution (Article 2 of the Constitution). Chapter II of the Constitution specifies various sovereign powers of the Prince, inter alia, the appointment of State officials (Article 11 of the Constitution).
48. The Court further notes that the applicant had been appointed President of the Liechtenstein Administrative Court in December 1993. On 27 February 1995 the Prince of Liechtenstein, in a letter to the applicant, informed him of his intention not to appoint him to public office again, should he be proposed by the Diet or any other body. The Prince’s letter was prompted, and this is not in dispute between the parties, by a report in the Liechtensteiner Volksblatt concerning the lecture given by the applicant on 16 February 1995 on the nature and functions of the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court, including a statement that the competence of that court under the Constitution could, in matters of interpretation of the Constitution, extend to disputes involving the powers of the Prince. According to the latter, the views thus expressed by the applicant infringed the Constitution, and the applicant’s attitude towards the Constitution made him unsuitable for public office. The Prince confirmed his intention not to appoint the applicant in subsequent letters of 4 April and 2 June 1995 and eventually, by letter of 17 April 1997, refused to reappoint the applicant as President of the Administrative Court after he had been proposed for this post by the Diet. Hence the Court cannot accept the argument that the letters of the Prince were private correspondence and did not constitute an act of State.
49. In examining whether there has been an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression the Court finds that the Prince’s letter of 27 February 1995 should be at the centre of its attention as it expressed for the first time the Prince’s intentions vis-à-vis the applicant. However, this measure has to be seen in the context of the Prince’s subsequent communications which confirmed these intentions.
50. Considering the contents of this letter the Court finds that there has been an interference by a State authority with the applicant’s freedom of expression. The measure complained of occurred in the middle of the applicant’s term of office as President of the Administrative Court; it was unconnected with any concrete recruitment procedure involving an appraisal of personal qualifications. From the terms of the letter of 27 February 1995 it appears that the Prince had come to a resolution regarding his future conduct towards the applicant, which related to the exercise of one of his sovereign powers, that is his power to appoint State officials. Moreover, the said letter was expressly addressed to the applicant as President of the Administrative Court, though sent to his place of residence. Thus, the measure complained of was taken by an organ which was competent to act in the manner it did and whose acts engaged the responsibility of Liechtenstein as a State under the Convention. The right of the applicant to exercise his freedom of expression was interfered with once the Prince, criticising the contents of the applicant’s speech, announced the intention to sanction the applicant because he had freely expressed his opinion. The announcement by the Prince of his intention not to reappoint the applicant to a public post constituted a reprimand for the previous exercise by the applicant of his right to freedom of expression and, moreover, had a chilling effect on the exercise by the applicant of his freedom of expression, as it was likely to discourage him from making statements of that kind in the future.
51. It follows that there was an interference with the exercise of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, as secured in Article 10 § 1.
B. As to whether the interference was justified
52. Such an interference gives rise to a breach of Article 10 unless it can be shown that it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more legitimate aim or aims as defined in paragraph 2 and was “necessary in a democratic society” to attain them.
1. “Prescribed by law” and legitimate aim
53. The applicant submitted that the interference complained of did not have any legal basis in Liechtenstein law. In particular, it had been unforeseeable for him that as a reaction to his speech the Prince would impose such a serious and far-reaching sanction. Furthermore the Prince’s measure did not pursue any legitimate aim.
54. In the Government’s view the interference, if there had been any, was justified on account of the applicant’s violation of judicial norms of conduct and of his oath of office under Liechtenstein law, which included swearing loyalty to the Prince and obedience to the Constitution and the laws. Furthermore, the aim of the interference was to maintain public order and promote civil stability, and to preserve judicial independence and impartiality.
55. The Commission found that in examining the justification of the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, the central issue was whether this interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. In view of the conclusions it reached with regard to this third condition, it did not find it necessary to examine compliance with the first two conditions.
56. Assuming that the interference was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim, as the Government claimed, the Court considers that it was not “necessary in a democratic society”, for the following reasons.
2. “Necessary in a democratic society”
57. The applicant submitted that the measure complained of constituted an interference with his right to freedom of expression which could not be justified under paragraph 2 of Article 10 as it was not “necessary in a democratic society”.
58. The Commission shared this opinion while it was contested by the Government.
59. The Government submitted that Article 10 § 2 granted States a wide margin of appreciation in determining what political conduct was incompatible with the “decorum of judicial office”. At the hearing they explained that beyond a certain level in the public service, dissenting from those who were free to appoint, reappoint or dismiss high-ranking officials, including (high-ranking) judges, carries a certain risk, a risk known to all concerned and so far not regarded as a violation of human rights. In their view, it was inherent in the nature of judicial office that a particularly high degree of self-restraint be observed by the holder of such office in making public pronouncements which had a political flavour.
60. The Government considered that the applicant’s lecture on the functions of the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court contained a controversial political statement and a subtle but significant provocation of one of the sovereigns of Liechtenstein. The applicant had been aware that his statement regarding the competence of the Constitutional Court to decide in the event of a conflict between the Prince and Parliament contradicted the Prince’s view, supported by the text of the Constitution, that he was completely immune from the compulsory jurisdiction of any court. In their submission, the applicant was invited as a judge to give a lecture, and he used the opportunity to make his own political and legal beliefs public. He thereby put at risk the public trust in judicial independence and impartiality.
61. The Court recalls that in its above-mentioned Vogt judgment (pp. 25-26, § 52) it summarised as follows the basic principles concerning Article 10 as laid down in its case-law:
(i) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb; such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”. Freedom of expression, as enshrined in Article 10, is subject to a number of exceptions which, however, must be narrowly interpreted, and the necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly established.
(ii) The adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, implies the existence of a “pressing social need”. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the law and the decisions applying it, even those given by independent courts. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10.
(iii) The Court’s task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place of the competent national authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully or in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient”. In so doing, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.
62. In the same judgment the Court declared:
“These principles apply also to civil servants. Although it is legitimate for a State to impose on civil servants, on account of their status, a duty of discretion, civil servants are individuals and, as such, qualify for the protection of Article 10 of the Convention. It therefore falls to the Court, having regard to the circumstances of each case, to determine whether a fair balance has been struck between the fundamental right of the individual to freedom of expression and the legitimate interest of a democratic State in ensuring that its civil service properly furthers the purposes enumerated in Article 10 § 2. In carrying out this review, the Court will bear in mind that whenever civil servants’ right to freedom of expression is in issue the ‘duties and responsibilities’ referred to in Article 10 § 2 assume a special significance, which justifies leaving to the national authorities a certain margin of appreciation in determining whether the impugned interference is proportionate to the above aim.” (p. 26, § 53, and the Ahmed and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VI, p. 2378, § 56)
63. In assessing whether the measure taken by the Prince as a reaction to the statement made by the applicant in the course of his lecture on 16 February 1995 corresponded to a “pressing social need” and was “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”, the Court will consider the impugned statement in the light of the case as a whole. It will attach particular importance to the office held by the applicant, the applicant’s statement, the context in which it was made and the reaction thereto.
64. In December 1993 the applicant was appointed President of the Administrative Court and he held this office when, on 16 February 1995, he gave the lecture at issue. Since the applicant was a high-ranking judge at that time, the Court must bear in mind that, whenever the right to freedom of expression of persons in such a position is at issue, the “duties and responsibilities” referred to in Article 10 § 2 assume a special significance since it can be expected of public officials serving in the judiciary that they should show restraint in exercising their freedom of expression in all cases where the authority and impartiality of the judiciary are likely to be called in question. Nevertheless the Court finds that an interference with the freedom of expression of a judge in a position such as the applicant’s calls for close scrutiny on the part of the Court.
65. As regards the applicant’s lecture on 16 February 1995, the Court observes that this lecture formed part of a series of academic lectures at a Liechtenstein research institute on questions of constitutional jurisdiction and fundamental rights (see paragraph 8 above). The applicant’s discourse included a statement on the competences of the Constitutional Court under Article 112 of the Liechtenstein Constitution. It was the applicant’s view that the term “Government” used in this provision included the Prince, an opinion allegedly in conflict with the principle of the Prince’s immunity from the jurisdiction of the Liechtenstein judiciary (see paragraphs 24 and 29).
66. In the applicant’s view this statement was an academic comment on the interpretation of Article 112 of the Constitution. The Government, on the other hand, maintained that although it was being made in the guise of a legally aseptic statement, it constituted, in essence, a highly political statement involving an attack on the existing constitutional order and not reconcilable with the public office held by the applicant at the time.
67. The Court accepts that the applicant’s lecture, since it dealt with matters of constitutional law and more specifically with the issue of whether one of the sovereigns of the State was subject to the jurisdiction of a constitutional court, inevitably had political implications. It considers that questions of constitutional law, by their very nature, have political implications. It cannot find, however, that this element alone should have prevented the applicant from making any statement on this matter. The Court further observes that in the context of introducing a bill amending the Constitutional Court Act in 1991, the Liechtenstein government had, in its accompanying comments, held a similar view, which had been opposed by the Prince but had found agreement in the Liechtenstein Diet, albeit only by a majority (see paragraph 30 above). The opinion expressed by the applicant cannot be regarded as an untenable proposition since it was shared by a considerable number of persons in Liechtenstein. Moreover, there is no evidence to conclude that the applicant’s lecture contained any remarks on pending cases, severe criticism of persons or public institutions or insults of high officials or the Prince.
68. Turning to the Prince’s reaction, the Court observes that he announced his intention not to appoint the applicant to public office again, should the applicant be proposed by the Diet or any other body. The Prince considered that the above-mentioned statement by the applicant clearly infringed the Liechtenstein Constitution. In this context, he also made reference to a political controversy with the Liechtenstein government in October 1992 and, in conclusion, he reproached the applicant, who had been a member of the government at that time and President of the Liechtenstein Administrative Court since 1993, with regarding himself as not being bound by the Constitution. In the Prince’s view, the applicant’s attitude towards the Constitution made him unsuitable for public office (see paragraph 11 above).
69. The Prince’s reaction was based on general inferences drawn from the applicant’s previous conduct in his position as a member of the government, in particular on the occasion of the political controversy in 1992, and his brief statement, as reported in the press, on a particular, though controversial, constitutional issue of judicial competence. No reference was made to any incident suggesting that the applicant’s view, as expressed at the lecture in question, had a bearing on his performance as President of the Administrative Court or on any other pending or imminent proceedings. Also the Government did not refer to any instance where the applicant, in the pursuit of his judicial duties or otherwise, had acted in an objectionable way.
70. On the facts of the present case, the Court finds that, while relevant, the reasons relied on by the Government in order to justify the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression are not sufficient to show that the interference complained of was “necessary in a democratic society”. Even allowing for a certain margin of appreciation, the Prince’s action appears disproportionate to the aim pursued. Accordingly the Court holds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
71. The applicant complained that he did not have an effective judicial or other remedy enabling him to challenge the action taken by the Prince with regard to the opinion expressed on the occasion of his lecture. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
72. The Government disputed the above contention, emphasising that a remedy existed of which the applicant had failed to avail himself.
At the hearing the Government submitted that there were strong indications in the case-law of the Constitutional Court that it would not only consider a court or an administrative authority but also the Diet as one of the bodies against which a request for adjudication could be lodged with the Constitutional Court under Section 23 of the Constitutional Court Act. The applicant therefore had at his disposal an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention as he could and should have challenged the Diet’s failure to insist on his nomination as President of the Administrative Court.
73. In the applicant’s submission, a request for adjudication to the Constitutional Court under Section 23 of the Constitutional Court Act required that the decision complained of should emanate from a court or an administrative authority. The Prince, however, was neither of these.
74. The Commission agreed with the applicant. It found that the Government had not succeeded in showing that, against the violation of Article 10 of the Convention alleged by the applicant, a remedy effective in practice as well as in law existed under Liechtenstein law. In particular, as regards a complaint with the Constitutional Court the Government had not put forward any example showing its application in a case similar to the present one.
75. Article 13 has been consistently interpreted by the Court as requiring a remedy in domestic law only in respect of grievances which can be regarded as “arguable” in terms of the Convention (see the Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, § 52, and the Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172, p. 14, § 31). Article 13 guarantees the availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of this Article is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the “competent national authority” both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their obligation under this provision. The remedy must be “effective” in practice as well as in law (see the Mentes and Others v. Turkey judgment of 28 November 1997, Reports 1997-VIII, p. 2715, § 89).
76. In the light of the conclusion in paragraph 70 above, the requirement that the complaint be “arguable” is satisfied in respect of the submission in question (see the Vereinigung demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi v. Austria judgment of 19 December 1994, Series A no. 302, p. 20, § 53).
77. As regards the Government’s argument that the applicant should have seised the Constitutional Court against the Diet for not having insisted on its right to nominate him for a new term of office as President of the Administrative Court, it suffices to note that the applicant’s complaint under Article 10 concerned acts by the Prince and not by the Diet. The Government, however, have failed to show that there exists any precedent in the Constitutional Court’s case-law, since its establishment in 1925, that that court has ever accepted for adjudication a complaint brought against the Prince. They have therefore failed to show that such a remedy would have been effective.
78. It follows that the applicant has also been the victim of a violation of Article 13.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION AND OF ARTICLE 14 TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 10
79. Before the Commission the applicant further alleged that he had been denied access to a tribunal to defend his reputation and seek protection of his personal rights, including his occupation and professional career, against the statements of the Prince. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law …”
80. Before the Commission the applicant also complained that, because of his opinion regarding a particular legal issue, he was prejudiced in his access to public office. He relied on Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 10. Article 14 of the Convention states:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
81. As regards the complaint under Article 6, the Commission found it appropriate to examine this complaint in relation to the more general obligation on States under Article 13 to provide an effective remedy in respect of violations of the Convention. It concluded that it was not necessary to determine whether there had been a violation of Article 6. As regards the complaint under Article 14, the Commission, having regard to its conclusion concerning Article 10, found that no separate issue arose under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 10.
82. Before the Court the applicant did not reiterate these complaints and the Court does not find it necessary to deal with the matter of its own motion.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
83. The applicant sought just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention, which provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
84. Under the head of pecuniary damage, the applicant claimed 25,000 Swiss francs (CHF) compensation for economic loss suffered by him as a consequence of the measure complained of. He submitted that, unlike his predecessors, he had not been offered any remunerated position in Liechtenstein industrial and business circles.
85. The Government objected to this claim.
86. The Court finds that there is no sufficient causal link established between the damage claimed and the violation of the Convention found. Thus, it cannot allow the compensation claim submitted under this head.
87. Under the head of non-pecuniary damage, the applicant claimed CHF 30,000. He submitted that the Prince’s statements had been highly offensive and had adversely affected his reputation.
88. The Government also opposed this claim.
89. The Court considers that the applicant may be taken to have suffered distress on account of the facts of the case. On an equitable basis, the Court awards him CHF 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
90. In respect of costs and expenses relating to his representation before the Convention institutions, the applicant claimed a total of CHF 91,014.05, namely CHF 44,927.20 for Mr Kley and CHF 46,086.85 for Mr Seeger.
91. The Government did not contest this claim.
92. The Court is satisfied that the hourly rates charged in the Strasbourg proceedings were reasonable. Taking into account that a hearing was held both before the Commission and the Court, it also finds the number of hours claimed not excessive. The claim for costs and expenses is thus to be allowed in its entirety.
C. Default interest
93. According to the information available to the Court, the statutory rate of interest applicable in Liechtenstein at the date of adoption of the present judgment is 5% per annum.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Holds by sixteen votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention;
2. Holds by sixteen votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;
3. Holds unanimously that it is not necessary to consider whether there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 10;
4. Holds unanimously
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:
(i) 10,000 (ten thousand) Swiss francs for non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) 91,014.05 (ninety-one thousand and fourteen) Swiss francs and five centimes for costs and expenses;
(b) that simple interest at an annual rate of 5% shall be payable from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement;
5. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicant’s claims for just satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 28 October 1999.
Elisabeth Palm
President
Maud de Boer-Buquicchio
Deputy Registrar
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) joint concurring opinion of Mr Caflisch, Mr Zupancic and Mr Hedigan;
(b) dissenting opinion of Mr Cabral Barreto.
E.P.
M.B.
JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES CAFLISCH, ZUPANCIC AND HEDIGAN
We concur with the Court in its judgment but should like to enter a reservation as to the Court’s reasoning in finding a violation of Article 10.
The matter complained of by the applicant, who alleged that it amounted to an interference with a right guaranteed by Article 10, is held to have been completed by the first letter written by HSH Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein. We do not share that view. The letter in question was dated 27 February 1995. At that juncture it could be regarded as the mere expression of an intention, which might very well have changed in the months that followed and which only crystallised into an “interference” with the Prince’s subsequent confirming communications. Only in the light of the latter can it be accepted that the threat of a sanction indeed hung over the applicant. Furthermore, taken alone, the letter of 27 February 1995 could have been regarded as the expression of a private personal opinion. It is the subsequent confirming letters which justify concluding, without any possible doubt, that this measure was, in fact, an act of State.
We thus reach the conclusion that the measure which infringed the right guaranteed by Article 10 consisted in the Prince’s communications taken as a whole.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE CABRAL BARRETO
(Translation)
I regret that I cannot share the opinion of the majority of the Court; in my opinion, there has not been a violation of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression.
There are two decisive pieces of evidence in the case: the Prince’s letter of 27 February 1995, in which the Prince expressed for the first time his intention of not reappointing the applicant as President of the Administrative Court, and the letter of 17 April 1997 to the President of the Diet, in which the Prince refused to make that appointment.
Let us examine these.
1. The letter of 27 February 1995 was a personal letter, sent to the applicant’s private address, in which the Prince indicated his intention of not appointing the applicant to any public office again.
It will, I think, be helpful to reproduce the following passage:
“In my eyes your attitude, Dr Wille, makes you unsuitable for public office. I do not intend to get involved in a long public or private debate with you, but I should like to inform you in good time that I shall not appoint you again to a public office should you be proposed by the Diet or any other body …”
I note at the outset that the Prince did not wish to get involved in a public discussion and that he merely wanted to indicate in good time his intention of taking a certain course of action if the opportunity arose.
I have difficulty in seeing how this letter constituted a “reprimand” (see paragraph 50 of the judgment).
The letter expressed above all the Prince’s disagreement with the applicant’s ideas about the interpretation of the Liechtenstein Constitution. That disagreement entailed the loss of the political confidence which the Prince was supposed to have in the applicant and consequently the announcement that the Prince intended to draw the necessary political conclusions.
Nothing more, in other words, than what the applicant could expect, regard being had to the controversy in 1992 between the Prince and the government (of which the applicant was then a member).
An intention does not, in itself, amount to a legal act or even an initial step towards performing such an act.
There is no doubt that we are here in the purely psychological field, still far from even a preparatory act, which would presuppose that physical acts had already been performed.
I would therefore be able to understand that the Prince’s letter should be judged as having been quite simply designed to announce “in good time” his intention of carrying out an act, in order to give the applicant time to make the necessary preparations for his future.
It is true that this private letter announcing an intention became public and that it was confirmed by the other letters from the Prince, which were open letters.
All that, however, was due solely to the applicant’s conduct and, as Mr Conforti rightly said in his dissenting opinion annexed to the Commission’s report, the applicant cannot “avoid the application of the principle nemo contra factum suum proprium venire potest”.
Accepting the contrary would, to my mind, contravene the letter and the spirit of Article 10 of the Convention. It is not possible to judge intentions without falling into the realm of a “virtual” violation, and that seems to me to be what has happened in the instant case.
2. The refusal to reappoint the applicant as President of the Administrative Court was, without any doubt, a legal act, and in the circumstances of the case I can accept that it was prompted by the opinions that the applicant had expressed, and that poses a problem under Article 10.
However, I consider that it is unnecessary to determine whether that refusal pursued a legitimate aim and whether it was necessary in a democratic society, since no one will dispute that we are here in the field of access to public office, a subject which was deliberately omitted from the Convention. That is acknowledged by the majority of the Court in paragraph 41 of the judgment.
I therefore conclude that there has been no violation of the Convention.
[1]Notes by the Registry
1-2. Protocol No. 11 and the Rules of Court came into force on 1 November 1998.
3. Since the entry into force of Protocol No. 11, which amended Article 19, the Court has functioned on a permanent basis.
[2]1. Note by the Registry. For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the final printed version of the judgment (in the official reports of selected judgments and decisions of the Court), but a copy of the Commission’s report is obtainable from the Registry.
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