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EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
VELIKO VIJEĆE
PREDMET NEJDET ŞAHİN I PERİHAN ŞAHİN protv TURSKE
(Predstavka broj 13279/05)
PRESUDA
STRASBOURG
20. oktobra 2011. godine
Ova presuda je konačna, ali može biti predmet redakcijskih izmjena.
U predmetu Nejdet Şahin i Perihan Şahin protiv Turske, Evropski sud za ljudska prava, zasjedajući u Velikom vijeću u sastavu:
Nicolas Bratza, predsjednik,
Josep Casadevall,
Nina Vajić,
Dean Spielmann,
Christos Rozakis,
Corneliu Bîrsan,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabet Fura,
Ljiljana Mijović,
Egbert Myjer,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
George Nicolaou,
Luis López Guerra,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Ann Power-Forde,
Işıl Karakaş,
Guido Raimondi, sudije,
i Michael O’Boyle, zamjenik sekretara,
nakon vijećanja zatvorenog za javnost, koje je održano 9. marta i 21. septembra 2011. godine, donosi sljedeću presudu, koja je usvojena posljednjeg navedenog dana:
POSTUPAK
Postupak u ovom predmetu je pokrenut predstavkom (broj 13279/05) koju je Sudu podnijelo dvoje turskih državljana, gosp. Nejdet Şahin i gđa Perihan Şahin (podnosioci predstavke) protiv Republike Turske u skladu sa članom 34. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (Konvencija) 9. aprila 2005. godine.
Podnosioce predstavke, kojima je dodijeljena pravna pomoć, je zastupao gosp. K. Karabulut, odvjetnik iz Ankare. Tursku vladu (Vlada) je zastupao gosp. M. Özmen, njen kozastupnik.
Podnosioci predstavke su naveli da su postupci pred domaćim sudovima bili nepravični zbog proturječnih odluka koje su donijeli ti sudovi (član 6. stav 1. Konvencije).
Predstavka je dodijeljena Drugom odjeljenju Suda (pravilo 52. stav 1. Pravila Suda). Dana 27. maja 2010. godine, Vijeće tog odjeljenja, u sastavu: Françoise Tulkens, Ireneu Cabral Barreto, Vladimiro Zagrebelsky, Danute Jočienė, Dragoljub Popović, András Sajó, Işıl Karakaş, sudije i Sally Dollé, sekretarka Odjeljenja, je proglasilo predstavku prihvatljivom, te je zaključilo, sa šest glasova prema jednom glasu, da član 6. stav 1. Konvencije nije prekršen.
Dana 25. augusta 2010. godine, podnosioci predstavke su zahtijevali da se predmet proslijedi Velikom vijeću na osnovu člana 43. Konvencije i pravila 73. Dana 4. oktobra 2010. godine, Odbor Velikog vijeća je prihvatio taj zahtjev.
Sastav Velikog vijeća je određen u skladu sa odredbama člana 26. st. 4. i 5. Konvencije i pravilom 24. Budući da Jean-Paul Costa nije mogao učestvovati u drugom vijećanju, Nicolas Bratza ga je zamijenio kao predsjednik Velikog vijeća, a Egbert Myjer, prvi zamjenik, je postao punopravi član (pravilo 11). Corneliu Bîrsan, drugi zamjenik, je zamijenio Kristinu Pardalos koja je bila spriječana da učestvuje u vijećanju.
Podnosioci predstavke su dostavili zapažanja o meritumu u pisanoj formi. Vlada nije dostavila zapažanja.
Javna rasprava je održana u Palati ljudskih prava u Strasbourgu 9. marta 2011. godine (pravilo 59. stav 3).
Pred Sudom su se pojavili
– u ime Vlade
Gosp. M. ÖZMEN,
Gosp. K. ESENER,
Gosp. O. ÇIDEM,
Gosp. M. K. ERDEM,
Gosp. N. YAMALI,
Gosp. I. ERTÜZÜN,
Gđa F. SÖZEN,
Gđa İ. KOCAYIĞIT, kozastupnik,
Gđa A. ÖZDEMIR,
– u ime podnosilaca predstavke: savjetnici.
Gosp. K. KARABULUT, branitelj,
Gđa M. TUNCEL, asistentica.
Sud je saslušao izjave gosp. Karabuluta i gosp. Özmena.
ČINJENICE
I. OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA
Podnosioci predstavke su rođeni 1949. godine i 1950. godine, te žive u Ankari.
Njihov sin, vojni pilot, je preminuo u avionskoj nesreći koja se desila u blizini sela Malatya (Akçadağ / Güzyurdu) 16. maja 2001. godine dok je prevozio trupe iz Diyarbakıra u Ankaru. Trideset tri druga vojna lica su poginula u istoj nesreći, od kojih su petorica članovi posade.
Dana 10. maja 2002. godine, podnosioci predstavke su, putem svog odvjetnika, podnijeli zahtjev za penziju Generalnoj direkciji turskog penzionog fonda u skladu sa članom 21. Zakona broj 3713 koji se odnosi na borbu protiv terorizma (Zakon broj 3713).
U dopisu od 23. maja 2002. godine, Generalna direkcija turskog penzionog fonda je istakla da je podnosiocima predstavke dodijeljena, inter alia, mjesečna ratna vojna invalidska penzija na osnovu člana 64. Zakona broj 5434, te paušalni iznos koji je jednak sumi trideset plata najvišeg državnog službenika. Ona je dalje istakla da smrt njihovog sina nije bila uzrokovana terorističkim aktom u smislu Zakona broj 3713, nego činjenicom da se njegov avion srušio iz nepoznatog razloga. To je bio razlog zbog kojeg nije bilo moguće povećati mjesečnu invalidsku penziju do iznosa mjesečne plate koja se isplaćuje ekvivalentnim aktivnim vojnim licima.
Dana 15. jula 2002. godine, podnosioci predstavke su, putem svog odvjetnika, uložili žalbu protiv te odluke Upravnom sudu u Ankari. Oni su prije svega istakli da je njihov sin poginuo dok je transportirao trupe angažovane u borbi protiv terorizma iz sjevernog Iraka tako da se treba smatrati da se njegova smrt desila u kontekstu borbe protiv terorizma.
Dana 1. aprila 2003. godine, 4. vijeće Upravnog suda u Ankari je odbacilo njihovu žalbu budući da je smatralo da ne potpada pod opseg njegove nadležnosti, nego nadležnosti Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda. Pozivajući se na presudu Suda za rješavanja sukoba nadležnosti od 14. maja 2001. godine (E.2000/77, K.2001/22), 4. vijeće Upravog suda u Ankari je istaklo:
“(...) da bi se odredilo da li se upravni akt “odnosi na vojnu službu” i odlučilo koji sud ima jurisdikciju, mora se ispitati predmet akta. Ako je akt donesen u vezi sa vojnim zahtjevima, procedurom i praksom, mora se smatrati da se odnosi na vojnu službu (...). Okolnost da li je ili nije akt prvobitno usvojila vlast koja nije vojna nije relevantna - Vrhovni vojni upravni sud je sud koji je odgovoran za ispitivanje postupka koji je [pokrenuo] neki pripadnik vojnih snaga. Ovaj predmet se odnosi na zahtjev za mjesečnu penziju koji su podnijeli podnosioci zahtjeva na osnovu Zakona broj 3713 (...). Da bi se odredilo da li zahtjev potpada pod opseg tog zakona, potrebno je uzeti u obzir (...) cilj vojne službe, specifičnost lokacije vojne misije te vojnu sposobnost kako bi se dokazalo da je sporni akt u funkciji vojnih potreba, procedure i prakse.
U tom slučaju, (...) ispitivanje i rješavanje spora je obuhvaćeno opsegom nadležnosti Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda.
Uostalom, odluka Suda za sporove nadležnosti broj E: 2000/77, K: 2001/22, koja je objavljena u Službenim novinama (...) od 18. juna 2001. godine, sadrži obrazloženje u tom smislu.”
Dana 3. juna 2003. godine, podnosioci predstavke su dostavili predmet Vrhovnom vojnom upravnom sudu. U svom zahtjevu, oni su se pozvali na odluku koju je usvojilo 10. vijeće Upravnog suda u Ankari, (E.2002/1059, K.2003/27) od 22. januara 2003. godine, smatrajući da se radi o sličnom predmetu (vidi, stav 26. dole).
Dana 10. juna 2004. godine, Vrhovni vojni upravni sud je odbacio njihov zahtjev. On je, prije svega, istakao da je podnosiocima predstavke dodijeljena mjesečna ratna vojna invalidska penzija te paušalni iznos koji je jednak sumi trideset plata najvišeg državnog službenika, koja je izračunata na osnovu dodatnog člana 78. Zakona broj 5434 i revalorizirana prema Zakonu broj 4567. Sud je potom istakao da je nadležna vlast odbacila njihov zahtjev za povećanje mjesečne penzije do iznosa mjesečne plate koja se isplaćuje ekvivalentnim aktivnim vojnim licima. On je naznačio da je korištenje prava priznatih na osnovu člana 21. Zakona broj 3713 ograničeno na predmete koji se odnose na državne službenike koji su bili direktno ranjeni, ostali invalidi ili su ubijeni usljed terorističkih djela. On je smatrao da sama činjenica da je žrtva obavljala poslove koji se odnose na borbu protiv terorizma nije dovoljna. Budući da preminuli nije bio žrtva terorističkog akta, osporeni upravni akt nije nezakonit.
Jedan od sudija je izrazio mišljenje o neslaganju u kojem je kritizirao takvo restriktivno tumačenje Zakona broj 3713. Ističući da nije sporno da je sin podnosilaca predstavke poginuo u avionskoj nesreći koja se desila dok je kopilotirao avionom prevozeći trupe koje su se vraćale nakon antiterorističke operacije, on je smatrao da je suština spora pitanje da li smrt potpada pod opseg člana 21. Zakona broj 3713. Prema njegovom mišljenju, imajući u vidu misiju preminule osobe, ta odredba je svakako primjenjiva na okolnosti predmeta.
Dana 6. jula 2004. godine, podnosioci predstavke su podnijeli žalbu protiv presude Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda. U svom podnesku, odvjetnik podnosilaca predstavke je objasnio da je, u svom podnesku od 11. juna 2004. godine i na raspravi pred Vrhovnim vojnim upravnim sudom isti dan, predočio četiri odluke koje su usvojili redovni upravni sudovi, tj. 6, 10, i 11. vijeće Upravnog suda u Ankari, u vezi sa zahtjevima, koji su slični zahtjevu podnosilaca predstavke, koje su podnijele porodice vojnih lica koja su poginula u istoj nesreći kao i njihov sin; sudovi su u tim odlukam presudili u korist podnosilaca zahtjeva. On se žalio da se Vrhovni vojni upravni sud nije pozvao na te predmete, te je istakao da je usvojeno rješenje suprotno ustavnim principima jednakosti pred zakonom i dosljedne primjene zakona.
Presudom od 30. septembra 2004. godine, Vrhovni vojni upravni sud je odbio žalbu podnosilaca predstavke kao neosnovanu, te je zaključio da je osporena presuda u suglasnosti sa zakonom i predviđenom procedurom. Presuda je dostavljena odvjetniku podnosilaca predstavke. Na poštanskom pečatu na koverti u kojoj je dostavljena presuda je bio naznačen datum 11.oktobra 2004. godine.
II RELEVANTNO DOMAĆE PRAVO I PRAKSA
A. Kratka prezentacija sudskog sistema Turske
Turski sudski sistem je podijeljen u tri kategorije: redovni sudovi, koji uključuju građanske i krivične sudove; upravni sudovi i vojni sudovi. Te tri kategorije su podijeljene u tri potkategorije prema predmetu spora. Na vrhu svake od te tri grane se nalazi vrhovni sud: Kasacioni sud za sudove općeg prava, Vrhovni upravni sud za upravne sudove i Vojni kasacioni sud i Vrhovni vojni upravni sud za vojna pitanja.
Prema odredbama člana 157. Ustava, Vrhovni vojni upravni sud je prvostepena i konačna pravosudna instanca koja ispituje sporove koji proizilaze iz upravnih odluka i akata, koji se odnose na vojna lica ili vojnu službu, čak kada njih donose vlasti koje nisu vojne. Međutim, kada se spor odnosi na obaveznu vojnu službu, zainteresirano lice ne mora biti vojno lice.
Specijalni sud, nazvan Sud za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti ima nadležnost da rješava sporove između sudova općeg prava, upravnih i vojnih sudova u pogledu njihove nadležnosti i odluka (član 158. Ustava).
B. Relevantno domaće pravo
Član 21. Zakona broj 3713[1]od 12. aprila 1991. godine (Zakon o borbi protiv terorizma) glasi:
“Odredbe Zakona broj 2330 koje se odnose na novčanu naknadu i prava na mjesečnu penziju se primjenjuju na javne uposlenike koji su ranjeni ili su ostali invalidi, ili su poginuli ili ubijeni usljed terorističkog akta prilikom obavljanja svojih dužnosti, unutar ili izvan teritorije zemlje, ili, ako nisu više aktivna lica, zbog svojih [nekadašnjih] dužnosti (...).”
Relevantne odredbe Zakona broj 2247 od 12. juna 1979. godine (koji je stupio na snagu 22. juna 1979. godine), koji se odnosi na osnivanje i djelovanje Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti, glasi:
Član 10.
“Spor sukoba nadležnosti se pokreće kada glavni državni pravobranitelj zahtijeva od
Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti da ispita pitanje nadležnosti nakon odbacivanja prigovora o nenadležnosti u sporu pred redovnim, upravnim ili vojnim sudom (...).”
Član 17.
“Pozitivan sukob nadležnosti postoji kada su predmeti sa istim strankama, predmetom i razlogom za pokretanje postupka upućeni dva različitih tipa suda – redovnom, upravnom ili vojnom – a i jedan i drugi sud usvoji odluku u kojoj smatra da je on taj koji je nadležan da riješi predmet.”
Član 24.
“Spor u vezi sa kolizijom presuda postoji kada je ostvarivanje nekog prava nemoguće zbog nepodudarnosti između konačnih odluka koje su usvojila najmanje dva suda navedena u članu 1, pod uvjetom da se te odluke odnose na isti predmet i isti razlog za pokretanje postupka – a ne na pitanje nadležnosti – i da je najmanje jedna od stranaka [u predmetu] ista (...).”
Član 28.
“Sud za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti odmah saopćava zaključke do kojih je došao u svojim odlukama relevantnim državnim pravobraniteljima, sudu koji mu se obratio s ciljem rješavanja sukoba nadležnosti, sudu ili sudovima koji čekaju njegovu odluku i osobama ili organima koji su zahtijevali rješavanje sukoba. Odnosni sudovi i odnosne vlasti, organi i osobe se moraju povinovati odlukama Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti te ih primijeniti bez odlaganja.”
Član 29.
“Odluke odjeljenja i suda u plenumu su konačne. Principijelne odluke i odluke odjeljenja koje predsjednik smatra relevantnim se objavljuju u Službenom glasniku.”
Član 30.
“Proturječnost između odluka odjeljenjā Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti se rješava principijelnim odlukama koje donosi sud u plenumu (...). Principijelne odluke koje se odnose na pitanje nadležnosti su obavezujuće za Sud za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti i sve pravosudne organe; principijelne odluke u meritumu koje se donose u predmetima u vezi sa proturječnim presudama su obavezujuće samo za Sud za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti.”
C. Relevantno domaće pravo i praksa
1. Presude redovnih upravnih sudova i Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda
Upravni sud u Ankari je razmotrio žalbe u četrnaest predmeta, od kojih su se četiri odnosila na bliske srodnike članova avionske posade, u kojima je presudio u korist porodica žrtava. Dana 19. juna 2002. godine (odluka E.2002/87, K.2002/870), 22. januara 2003 (odluka E.2002/1059, K.2003/27), 31. marta 2003 (odluka E.2003/148, K.2003/522) i 26. juna 2003 (odluke E.2002/100, K.2003/1073 i E.2002/101, K.2003/1053), 19. oktobra 2004 (odluke E.2004/3051, K.2004/1535 i E.2004/3055, K.2004/1536), 6. i 14. oktobra 2005 (odluke E.2005/1973, K.2005/1424 i E.2005/1743, K.2005/1011), 8. i 29. marta 2006 (odluke E.2006/653, K.2006/594 i E.2006/678, K.2006/551), 27. septembra 2007 (E.2007/764, K.2007/1849) i 29. i 30. januara 2008 (E.2008/82, K.2008/184 i E.2007/1491, K.2008/135), različita vijeća Upravnog suda u Ankari (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10. i 11. vijeće) su donijela presude u kojima su priznala da okolnosti avionske nesreće potpadaju pod opseg Zakona broj 3713.
Naime, 22. januara 2003. godine (odluka E.2002/1059, K.2003/27), po žalbi u kojoj se zahtijevalo poništenje odluke penzionog fonda kojom je odbijen zahtjev za dodjeljivanje dodatne penzije predviđene Zakonom broj 3713, koji su podnijeli roditelji preminulog pilota, 10. vijeće Upravnog suda u Ankari je donijelo presudu koja sadrži sljedeće stavove:
“(...) Nakon ispitivanja spisa [proizilazi] da je (...) sin podnosilaca zahtjeva bio pilot aviona (...), čiji je posao bio da preveze specijalne trupe u misiji protiv separatističke terorističke organizacije PKK, zajedno sa njihovim oružjem i opremom, u operacionu zonu i da vrati trupe koje napuštaju tu zonu do njihovih jedinica (...). On je poginuo 16. maja 2001. godine, kada se njegov avion srušio za vrijeme te misije. Nakon nesreće, podnosiocima zahtjeva je dodijeljena mjesečna ratna vojna invalidska penzija na osnovu člana 64. Zakona broj 5434 (...). Smatrajući da smrt njihovog sina potpada pod opseg Zakona broj 3713, oni su podnijeli zahtjev za mjesečnu penziju na osnovu tog zakona (...). Oni su pokrenuli ovaj postupak nakon što su vlasti odbacile njihov zahtjev (...).
Iz ispitivanja (...) navedenih pravnih odredbi i spisa proizilazi da je sin podnosilaca zahtjeva poginuo 16. maja 2001. godine kada se srušio avion u kojem je on vraćao trupe iz antiterorističke misije. Predmetna misija ja jasno činila dio borbe protiv terorizma (...) te, prema tome, osporeni upravni akt mora biti poništen (...).”
Svaki put kad mu je uložena žalba protiv navedenih presuda Upravnog suda u Ankari, Vrhovni upravni sud je potvrdio stajalište prvostepenog suda (odluke E.2002/4268, K.2005/333; E.2003/1775, K.2005/5476; E.2003/3110, K.2006/843; E.2003/3860, K.2004/4655; E.2003/3856, K.2004/4656; E.2005/2298, K.2007/8147; E.2005/1399, K.2007/6047; E.2006/1352, K.2009/7096; E.2006/1802, K.2009/7096; E.2007/2275, K.2009/8317; E.2006/9775, K.2009/7138; E.2008/715, K.2010/3868; E.2008/7839, K.2010/3870).
Dana 28. marta 2003. godine, pozivajući se na odluku Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti od 14. maja 2001. godine (E.2000/77, K.2001/22 – vidi, stav 31. dole), 5. vijeće Upravnog suda u Ankari je smatralo da nije nadležno da razmotri žalbu koju je uložila porodica jednog narednika koji je poginuo u istoj avionskoj nesreći u kojoj je zahtijevala poništenje odluke penzionog fonda kojom je odbačen njen zahtjev za mjesečnu penziju na osnovu Zakona broj 3713 (odluka E.2002/754, K.2003/346). Predmet je proslijeđen Vrhovnom vojnom upravnom sudu koji je, presudom od 13. maja 2004. godine, odbio žalbu jer je smatrao da preminuli nije bio žrtva terorizma (odluka E.2003/14, K.2004/754). Nakon toga, dana 30. septembra 2004. godine, on je odbio žalbu protiv te presude (odluka E.2004/1199, K.2004/1480).
2. Presude Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti
Dana 22. februara 1999. godine, po zahtjevu za rješavanje proturječnosti između rješenja koja su usvojili redovni upravni sudovi i Vrhovni vojni upravni sud, koji su došli do različitih zaključaka o sličnim činjeničnim i pravnim pitanjima, Sud za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti je usvojio odluku (E.1998/75, K.1999/4) sa sljedećim obrazloženjem:
“Prvi stav člana 24. Zakona broj 2247 o osnivanju i djelovanju Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti, onako kako je izmijenjen Zakonom broj 2592, propisuje: “Spor u vezi sa kolizijom presuda postoji kada je ostvarivanje nekog prava nemoguće zbog nepodudarnosti između konačnih odluka koje su usvojila najmanje dva suda navedena u članu 1, pod uvjetom da se te odluke odnose na isti predmet i isti razlog za pokretanje postupka – a ne na pitanje nadležnosti – i da je najmanje jedna od stranaka [u predmetu] ista (...).
Na osnovu te odredbe, da bi postojao spor u vezi sa kolizijom presuda, svi sljedeći uvjeti moraju biti ispunjeni kumulativno: (a) odluke koje uzrokuju spor moraju usvojiti najmanje dva [različita] suda među redovnim, vojnim ili upravnim sudovima; (b) predmet, razlog za pokretanje postupka i najmanje jedna od stranka moraju biti isti; (c) obje odluke moraju biti konačne; (d) u odlukama se moralo odlučiti o meritumu predmeta; i (e) ostvarivanje prava mora biti onemogućeno zbog nepodudaranja odluka.
Ispitivanje odluka za koje se navodi da su u proturječne pokazuje da se radi o presudama koje su donijeli redovni upravni sudovi i vojni upravni sud, u kojima su, objektivno, predmet i razlog za pokretanje spora, koji su zasnovani na različitim materijalnim činjenicama, identični, i da je najmanje jedna od stranaka (tužena upravna vlast) ista; predmetne presude su postale konačne nakon iscrpljivanja žalbenog postupka, a u obje presude je odlučeno o meritumu predmeta. Imajući u vidu navedeno, utvrđeno je da su prva četiri uvjeta, koja se iziskuju na osnovu člana 24. da bi postojao spor zbog kolizije presuda, ispunjena.
U vezi sa pitanjem da li je u ovom predmetu kriterij u vezi sa onemogućavanjem ostvarivanja prava ispunjen (...), član 24. omogućava Sudu za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti, u situacijama u kojima je nemoguće da neka osoba osigura realiziranje prava zbog proturječnih presuda koje su donijela dva različita suda, da riješi to pitanje
(...).
(...) presuda upravnog suda kojom se poništava ranija odluka nema dejstva na presudu Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda kojom se odbija zahtjev; tužena upravna vlast, koja je morala poništiti mjeru u svjetlu presude upravnog suda u korist H. i F.G., nema obavezu da izvrši tu presudu u pogledu N.T., kao trećeg lica u postupku. Budući da je tužba koju je podnio N.T. odbijena, ne može se smatrati da N.T. ima pravo koje je priznato sudskom odlukom.
(...) podnositeljica zahtjeva ne može tvrditi da ima pravo priznato sudskom odlukom tako da njen zahtjev mora biti odbijen u skladu sa članom 24. Zakona broj 2247 jer uvjet koji se odnosi na “nemogućnost izvršenja presude”, koji se iziskuje kako bi postojala nepodudarnost presuda, nije ispunjen.”
Dana 14. maja 2001. godine, Sud za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti je usvojio odluku (E.2000/77, K.2001/22), čiji relevantni dijelovi glase:
“(...) Rezime: Zahtjev za poništenje odluke penzionog fonda (...) kojom se odbacuje zahtjev za invalidsku penziju (...), koji je podnijela osoba koja je medicinskim nalazom proglašena nesposobnom za vojnu službu, a koja je smatrala da je njen zdravstveni problem uzrokovan vojnom službom, je pitanje za čije rješavanje je nadležan Vrhovni vojni upravni sud.
(...)
Meritum: Prema članu 157. Ustava, Vrhovni vojni upravni sud, iako osnovan od strane vlasti koje nisu vojne, je prvostepena i konačna pravosudna instanca nadležna za sudsku kontrolu sporova koji proizilaze iz upravnih akata ili postupaka koji se odnose na vojnu službu i na vojno osoblje. Međutim, u pogledu sporova koji proizilaze iz vojnih obaveza je ustanovljeno da nije potrebno utvrđivati da li je određena osoba bila član vojnog osoblja. (...) Da bi Vrhovni vojni upravni sud mogao ispitati predmet, osporeni upravni akt se mora odnositi na “pripadnika oružanih snaga” i biti “u vezi sa vojnom službom.” (...)
Da bi se odredilo da li je upravni akt u “vezi sa vojnom službom” i odlučilo koji sud ima jurisdikciju, predmet akta mora biti ispitan. Ako je akt usvojen u skladu sa vojnom tradicijom, principima i praksom, mora se smatrati da je on u vezi sa vojnom službom (...). Preciznije rečeno, upravni akti koji se odnose na vojnu službu su akti koji se odnose na sposobnosti (...) vojnog osoblja, njihov stav i ponašanje, njihovu vojnu karijeru, njihova prava i obaveze kao pripadnika vojske, cilj vojne službe i specifičnost lokacija gdje obavljaju svoju funkciju. Čak i ako je akt usvojila vlast koja nije vojna, to ne prouzrokuje nikakve posljedice – Vrhovni vojni upravni sud je sud koji je odgovoran za ispitivanje tužbe koju je [podnio] pripadnik oružanih snaga koji je lišen neke povlastice.
(...) kada se upravni akt odnosi na pripadnika vojske i u vezi je sa vojnom službom, na Vrhovnom vojnom upravnom sudu je da ispita i riješi spor.”
“Činjenice: Sin podnosilaca zahtjeva (...) je poginuo u nesreći u Malatya-AkçadağGüzyurdu 16. maja 2001. godine, kada se srušio avion za prevoz trupa koji je letio iz Diyarbakıra prema Ankari nakon misije u regiji koja je bila u vanrednom stanju (...).
U postupku kojeg su pokrenuli podnosioci zahtjeva nakon što je penzioni fund odbio da im dodijeli penziju uprkos njihovoj tvrdnji da se smrt desila u toku zadataka koji potpadaju pod opseg Zakona broj 2330 i Zakona broj 3713, 3. vijeće Upravnog suda u Ankari je odbilo zahtjev odlukom od 27. juna 2002. godine (E. 2001/1616, K. 2002/1095), smatrajući da ono što se desilo nije bilo rezultat terorističkog akta. Po njihovoj žalbi, 11. odjeljenje Vrhovnog upravnog suda, presudom od 30. januara 2003. godine (E: 2002/3971, K: 2003/495), je poništilo odluku nižestepenog suda, smatrajući da je sud trebao priznati da podnosioci zahtjeva imaju prava na osnovu Zakona broj 2330 i Zakona broj 3713 jer je smrt njihovg sina rezultat terorističkog akta. Predmet je vraćen nižestepenom sudu, koji je ustrajao u svojoj odluci, nakon čega su upravna odjeljenja Vrhovnog upravnog suda, zasjedajući u plenarnom sazivu, potvrdila odluku 11. odjeljenja Vrhovnog upravnog suda, presudom od 1.4.2004.godine (E: 2003/774, K: 2004/409) i ponovo poništila odluku nižestepenog suda (...).
Premda su se tužitelji obratili (...) tuženoj upravnoj vlasti tražeći novčanu naknadu, nakon što je Vrhovni upravni sud, u plenarnom sazivu, potvrdio da je smrt njihovog sina obuhvaćena Zakonom broj 2330 i Zakonom broj 3713, oni nisu primili nikakav odgovor.
(...) dana 25. jula 2005. godine, zainteresirane stranke su se obratile redovnim upravnim sudovima zahtijevajući poništenje implicitne odluke o odbacivanju (...). Tužena upravna vlast je uložila prigovor nenadležnosti, navodeći da Vrhovni vojni upravni sud ima jurisdikciju (...). Odlukom od 2. marta 2006. godine, Upravni sud u Ankari je odbio prigovor te se proglasio nadležnim. (...) Tužena upravna vlast je podnijela zahtjev za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti (...).
Glavni državni pravobranitelj pri Vrhovnom vojnom upravnom sudu (...) smatra da spor (...) potpada pod opseg nadležnosti Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda i da odluka 4. vijeća Upravnog suda u Ankari koja se odnosi na nadležnost treba biti poništena (...). Glavni državni pravobranitelj pri Vrhovnom upravnom sudu (...) tvrdi da spor (...) potpada pod opseg nadležnosti redovnih upravnih sudova (...).
(...) [u pogledu], kada je ispitivala pitanje da li se smrt sina podnosilaca zahtjeva, kao vojnika, desila jer bio žrtva terorističkih akata u smislu Zakona broj 3713 ili u toku dužnosti predviđene Zakonom broj 2330, ili kao rezultat takvih dužnosti, ili kao ovom predmetu (...) pri kontroli mjere [odbacivanja], komisija za novčanu naknadu je uzela u obzir vojne sposobnopsti vojnika (...), njegovo ponašanje (...), njegovu vojnu karijeru, njegova prava i dužnosti kao vojnika, cilj vojne službe, specifičnosti lokacija vojnih misija, i vojne propise i tradicije; i [u pogledu] ovog predmeta, da uvjet, da upravni akt bude u vezi sa vojnom službom, bude ispunjen, Vrhovni vojni upravni sud ima nadležnost da razmatra predmet koji čini predmet spora (...).”
III KOMPARATIVNO PRAVO
Neke evropske zemlje imaju samo jedan vrhovni sud. Takav je slučaj naročito sa zemljama gdje postoji common law, kao što su Kipar, Irska i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, ali i Albanija, Azerbejdžan, Hrvatska, Danska, Estonija, Gruzija, Mađarska, Island, Latvija, Moldavija, Norveška, Rumunija, San Marino, Srbija, Slovačka, Švicarska. Ostale zemlje, kao što su Njemačka, Austrija, Belgija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Bugarska, Finska, Francuska, Italija, Litvanija, Luksemburg, “Bivša Jugoslovenska Republika Makedonija”, Monako, Nizozemska, Poljska, Porugal, Češka Republika, Švedska i Ukrajina, imaju dva ili više vrhovnih sudova.
Zakon u velikom broju tih zemalja ne predviđa nikakvo sredstvo za rješavanje mogućih proturječnosti sudske prakse vrhovnih sudova, nego samo sredstva za rješavanje mogućih sukoba nadležnosti. Organ zadužen za rješavanje takvih sukoba može biti sud ili odjeljenje suda kojem je posebno dodijeljena ta ovlast (Fracuska, Luksemburg, Litvanija, Češka Republika). U Italiji, zakon dodjeljuje tu ovlast Kasacionom sudu, u Austriji i Andori Ustavnom sudu, a u Monaku Vrhovnom sudu. U Poljskoj ne postoji sudski organ koji je odgovoran za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti. Konačno, samo mali broj zemalja ima sudove koji su zaduženi za rješavanje proturječne sudske prakse vrhovnih sudova (Njemačka, Ukrajina i Grčka). Zakonodavstvo u Bugarskoj predviđa a posteriori sredstva za rješavanje proturječnosti.
PRAVO
I NAVODNO KRŠENJE ČLANA 6. STAV 1. KONVENCIJE
Podnocioci predstavke su naveli da je postupak pred domaćim sudovima bio nepravičan i da je mogućnost da ista činjenica može dovesti do različite pravne ocjene od jednog suda do drugog u suprotnosti sa principima jednakosti pred zakonom i dosljedne primjene zakona. Oni su istakli da su porodice žrtava koje su poginule u istoj avionskoj nesreći kao i njihov sin podnijele zahtjeve koji su slični njihovom zahtjevu i da su dobile spor pred redovnim upravnim sudovima.
Podnosioci zahtjeva su se pozvali na član 6. stav 1. Konvencije, čiji relevantni dijelovi glase:
“Prilikom utvrđivanja građanskih prava i obaveza (...), svako ima pravo na pravično (...) raspravu (...).”
Sud ističe da su podnosioci predstavke istakli sporedno pitanje u svom formularu za predstavku, žaleći se da turske vlasti nisu pokrenule nikakav postupak protiv proizvođača aviona koji se srušio. Budući da taj žalbeni navod nije ponovo predočen pred Velikim vijećem, Veliko vijeće potvrđuje generalno stajalište koje je usvojilo Vijeće (presuda Vijeća, stav 62) te smatra da nema potrebe da to pitanje ispituje odvojeno.
A. Presuda Vijeća
B. Argumenti stranaka
1. Podnosioci predstavke
Prema podnosiocima predstavke, nema sumnje da su slični predmeti upućeni Upravnom sudu u Ankari, Vrhovnom upravnom sudu i Vrhovnom vojnom upravnom sudu. Imajući to u vidu, odluka Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda da se ne usvoji njihov zahtjev na osnovu Zakona broj 3713 je dovela do proturječne odluke jer je suprotna tumačenju Upravnog suda u Ankari i Vrhovnog upravnog suda.
Podnosioci predstavke su dalje istakli da je Vrhovni vojni upravni sud ignorirao presude koje su donijeli redovni upravni sudovi u sličnim predmetima – iako mu je skrenuta pažnja na njih – i da je to dovelo do kršenja principa jednakosti iz člana 10. Ustava Turske. Osim toga, podnosioci predstavke su istakli da različito tumačenje dva vrhovna suda u istoj zemlji ne bi trebalo imati dejstvo lišavanja građana njihovih prava. U tom smislu, oni su ponovo istakli argument da je različito tumačenje redovnih upravnih sudova i vojnog upravnog suda nepovratno dovelo do kršenja principa dosljedne primjene zakona.
Oni su dalje istakli da je to proturječno tumačenje također ugrozilo princip pravne sigurnosti, te opće pravne principe. U tom pogledu, podnosioci predstavke su osporili zaključke Vijeća koje je, izražavajući svoje žaljenje zbog različitih tumačenja istih pravnih odredbi, zaključilo da ta okolnost nije dovoljna da bi princip pravne sigurnosti bio ugrožen.
Konačno, podnosioci predstavke su osporili odluku 4. vijeća Upravnog suda u Ankari, prema kojoj ono nije imalo nadležnost da razmatra njihov predmet, dok su se ostala vijeća tog suda proglasila nadležnim. U vezi sa tim, oni su osporili stajalište Vijeća koje nije izvuklo nikakav zaključak iz te činjenice u pogledu člana 6. Konvencije.
2. Vlada
Vlada je istakla da, imajući u vidu princip neovisnosti sudova, odluke jednog suda nemaju obavezujuće dejstvo za druge sudove koji pripadaju istom ili različitom području nadležnosti. Samo su odluke vrhovnih sudova obavezujuće za hijerarhijski nižestepene sudove istog područja naležnosti. Prema tome, različite odluke redovnih upravnih sudova nemaju obavezujuće dejstvo na druge upravne sudove, a ni, transferzalno, na Vrhovni vojni upravni sud.
Vlada je dalje potvrdila da se ne može reći da je odluka 4. vijeća Upravnog suda u Ankari, prema kojoj ono nije imalo nadležnost da razmatra predmet podnosilaca predstavke, bila proizvoljna. Odluka je bila usvojena u skladu sa kriterijima naznačenim u presudi Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti od 14. maja 2001. godine, na koju se ono pozvalo i koje je uzelo u obzir vezu sa vojnom službom da bi ustanovilo nadležnost Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda. Isto tako, Vlada je istakla da se ne može reći ni da je odluka Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda bila proizvoljna budući da je bila u skladu sa odredbama člana 21. Zakona broj 3713: uzrok avionske nesreće nije bio teroristički napad.
Vlada je istakla da se, u svjetlu pravnih odredbi koje se odnose na Zakon o Sudu za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti, činjenice ovog predmeta ne odnose na sukob nadležnosti, ni na proturječne odluke. Ona je naznačila da ne postoji dvosmislenost ili nesigurnost u vezi sa pitanjem koji sud je bio nadležan da presudi predmet podnosilaca predstavke i da je domaće pravo sasvim jasno u vezi sa tim pitanjem. Član 157. Ustava (vidi, stav 21. gore) propisuje da je Vrhovni vojni upravni sud pravosudni organ koji ispituje sporove koji se odnose na vojna lica ili vojnu službu, a ta odredba Ustava je prenesena u član 20. Zakona o Vrhovnom vojnom upravnom sudu. U presudama od 14. maja 2001. godine i 11. decembra 2006. godine (vidi, st. 31. i 32. gore), Sud za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti je također potvrdio to stajalište. Prema tome, pravo podnosilaca predstavke na pristup sudu nije bilo ograničeno bilo kakvom dvosmislenošću ili nesigurnošću.
Vlada je dalje istakla da ne postoji pitanje proturječnih tumačenja zakona u ovom predmetu. Pozivajući se na član 24. Zakona o Sudu za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti (vidi, stav 24. gore) i na presudu Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti od 22. februara 1999. godine (vidi, stav 30. gore), ona je istakla da do rješavanja proturječnih odluka sudova različitih jurisdikcija dolazi samo u izuzetnim situacijama, kada ostvarivanje nekog prava utvrđenog sudskom odlukom postane nemoguće. Prekoračenje granica te izuzetne okolnosti bi dovelo do nezakonitog miješanja u neovisnost sudova različitih jurisdikcija, u okviru kojih svaki ima sopstveni kontrolni mehnizam za rješavanje proturječnosti presuda. U vezi s tim, Vlada se pozvala na predmet Karakaya protiv Turske ((odluka), broj 30100/06, od 25. januara 2011).
Vlada je prihvatila da postoje različita tumačenja sudova koji pripadaju različitim područjima nadležnosti, ali je istakla da je nadležni sud taj koji je donio odluku protiv podnosilaca predstavke. Konfiguracija turskih sudova različitih područja nadležnosti je stvar sudske organizacije. Način na koji visoke strane ugovornice organiziraju svoje sudske sisteme i jurisdikciju svojih sudova potpada pod slobodno polje procjene država. Ako jedan sud koji ima jurisdikciju za presuđivanje predmeta usvoji odluku koja se razlikuje od one koju je donio sud koji nema jurisdikciju, bilo bi nepravično, prema tvrdnji Vlade, da zaključi da bi odluka ovog posljednjeg trebala prevagnuti.
Konačno, Vlada smatra da je ovaj predmet jedinstven i da se razlikuje od ostalih predmeta koji se odnose na pitanja proturječnosti sudske prakse koje je Sud ispitivao u prošlosti i da, prema tome, ne postoji primjenjivi precedent. Ona je dodala da nepovoljna sudska odluka ne znači da postoji pravna nesigurnosti u pogledu primjene zakona.
C. Ocjena Suda
1. Opći principi
Sud na početku ponavlja da on nema zadatak da zamjenjuje domaće sudove. Prvenstveno je na domaćim vlastima, naročito sudovima, da rješavaju probleme tumačenja domaćeg zakonodavstva (vidi, Brualla Gómez de la Torre protiv Španije, od 19. decembra 1997, stav 31, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII; Waite i Kennedy protiv Njemačke [VV], broj 26083/94, stav 54, ECHR 1999-I; i Saez Maeso protiv Španije, broj 77837/01, stav 22, od 9. novembra 2004). Njegova uloga je da provjeri da li su dejstva takvog tumačenja kompatibilna sa Konvencijom (vidi, Kuchoglu protiv Bugarske, broj 48191/99, stav 50, od 10. maja 2007, i Işyar protiv Bugarske, broj 391/03, stav 48, od 20. novembra 2008).
Imajući u vidu navedeno, osim u slučaju očigledne proizvoljnosti, uloga Suda nije da preispituje tumačenje domaćeg zakonodavstva od strane domaćih sudova (vidi, na primjer, Ādamsons protiv Latvije, broj 3669/03, stav 118, od 24. juna 2008). Isto tako, u vezi sa tim pitanjem, Sud, u principu, nema funkciju da upoređuje različite odluke domaćih sudova, čak ni one koje su donesene u očigledno sličnim postupcima; on mora poštivati neovisnosti tih sudova (vidi, Engel i ostali protiv Nizozemske, od 8. juna 1976, stav 103, Serija A broj 22; Gregório de Andrade protiv Portugala, broj 41537/02, stav 36, od 14. novembra 2006; i Ādamsons, citirana gore, stav 118).
Sud je već priznao da je mogućnost proturječnih sudskih odluka karakteristika svojstvena bilo kojem sudskom sistemu koji je zasnovan na mreži prvostepenih i žalbenih sudova koji imaju vlast na području svoje teritorijalne jurisdikcije. Takve nepodudarnosti se mogu pojavljivati u okviru samog suda. To se, po sebi, ne može smatrati suprotnim Konvenciji (vidi, Santos Pinto v. Portugal, no. 39005/04, stav 41, od 20. maja 2008. godine).
Od Suda je u više navrata traženo da ispita predmete koji se odnose na proturječne odluke (vidi, inter alia, Zielinski i Pradal i Gonzalez i ostali protiv Francuske [VV], br. 24846/94 i 34165/96 do 34173/96, ECHR 1999-VII; Paduraru protiv Rumunije, broj 63252/00, ECHR 2005-XII (izvodi); Beian protiv Rumunije (broj 1), broj 30658/05, ECHR 2007-XIII (izvod); i Iordan Iordanov i ostali protiv Bugarske, broj 23530/02, od 2. jula 2009) te je Sud tako imao mogućnost da se izjasni o pitanju pod kojim uvjetima proturječne odluke domaćih vrhovnih sudova krše zahtjev u vezi sa pravičnim suđenjem iz člana 6. stav 1. Konvencije (vidi, Perez Arias protiv Španije, broj 32978/03, stav 25, od 28. juna 2007; Beian (broj 1), citirana gore, st. 34-40; Ştefan i Ştef protiv Rumunije, br. 24428/03 i 26977/03, st. 33-36, od 27. januara 2009; Iordan Iordanov i ostali,citirana gore, st. 48-49; i Schwarzkopf i Taussik protiv Češke Republike (odluka), broj 42162/02, od 2. decembra 2008).
Sud je pri tome objasnio kriterije kojima se rukovodio pri svojoj ocjeni, a koji se sastoje od utvrđivanja pitanja da li postoje “duboke i dugoročne razlike” u sudskoj praksi vrhovnog suda, da li domaće zakonodavstvo predviđa mehanizme za prevazilaženje tih nedosljednosti, da li se ti mehanizmi primjenjuju i koja su, ako je potrebno, dejstva njihove primjene (vidi, Iordan Iordanov i ostali, citirana gore, st. 49-50).
Od Suda se također tražilo da donese presudu o proturječnim odlukama koje mogu biti donesene u okviru istog apelacionog suda (vidi, Tudor Tudor protiv Rumunije, broj 21911/03, od 24. marta 2009) ili različitih okružnih sudova koji donose odluku na posljednjoj instanci (vidi, Ştefănică i ostali protiv Rumunije, broj 38155/02, od 2. novembra 2010. godine). Pored “duboke i dugoročne” prirode nedosljednosti o kojoj je riječ, smatra se da i pravna nesigurnost koja je rezultat nedosljednosti u praksi sudova i nedostatak mehanizama za rješavanje proturječnih odluka krše pravo na pravično suđenje (vidi, Tudor Tudor, citirana gore, st. 30-32, i Ştefănică i ostali, citirana gore, st. 37-38).
U tom pogledu, Sud je istakao više puta značaj uspostavljanja mehanizama kojima bi se osigurala dosljednost sudske prakse i uniformnost jurisprudencije sudova (vidi, Schwarzkopf i Taussik, citirana gore). Sud je isto tako izjavio da je odgovornost država da organiziraju svoje pravne sisteme na takav način da se izbjegne usvajanje proturječnih presuda (vidi, Vrioni i ostali protiv Albanije, broj 2141/03, stav 58, od 24. marta 2009; Mullai i ostali protiv Albanije, broj 9074/07, stav 86, od 23. marta 2010; i Brezovec protiv Hrvatske, broj 13488/07, stav 66, od 29. marta 2011).
Njegova ocjena okolnosti koje su mu dostavljene radi ispitivanja je uvjek bila zasnovana na principu pravne sigurnosti, koji je implicitan u svim članovima Konvencije i predstavlja jedan od fundamentalnih aspekata vladavine zakona (vidi, inter alia, Beian (broj 1), citirana gore, stav 39; Iordan Iordanov i ostali, citirana gore, stav 47; i Ştefănică i ostali,citirana gore, stav 31). Naravno, nesigurnost – bilo da je pravna, administrativna ili da proizilazi iz praksi koje primjenjuju vlasti – je faktor koji mora biti uzet u razmatranje kada se ispituje postupanje države (vidi, Păduraru, citirana gore, stav 92; Beian (broj 1), citirana gore, stav 33; i Ştefănică i ostali,citirana gore, stav 32).
U tom pogledu, Sud također ponavlja da se pravo na pravično suđenje mora tumačiti u svjetlu Preambule Konvencije u kojoj se izjavljuje da je vladavina zakona dio zajedničkog nasljeđa država ugovornica. Jedan od fundamnetalnih aspekata vladavine zakona je sada princip pravne sigurnosti (vidi, Brumărescu protiv Rumunije [VV], broj 28342/95, stav 61, ECHR 1999-VII), koji garantira, inter alia, izvjesnu stabilnost pravnih situacija i doprinosi povjerenju javnosti u sudove (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Ştefănică i ostali, citirana gore, stav 38). S druge strane, dugotrajnost postojanja proturječnih sudskih odluka može stvoriti stanje pravne nesigurnosti koje je po prirodi takvo da smanjuje povjerenje javnosti u pravosudni sistem, dok je takvo povjerenje jasno jedna od osnovnih komponenti države zasnovane na vladavini zakona (vidi, Paduraru, citirana gore, stav 98; Vinčić i ostali protiv Srbije, br. 44698/06 i ostali, stav 56, od 1. decembra 2009. godine; i Ştefănică i ostali, citirana gore, stav 38).
Međutim, Sud ističe da uvjeti pravne sigurnosti i zaštita legitimnog povjerenja javnosti ne dodjeljuju stečeno pravo na dosljednost sudske prakse (vidi, Unédic protiv Francuske, broj 20153/04, stav 74, od 18. decembra 2008). Razvoj sudske prakse nije po sebi suprotan ispravnom administriranju pravde budući da bi neodržavanje dinamičnog i evolutivnog stajališta stvorilo rizik od sprečavanja reforme ili poboljšanja (vidi, Atanasovski protiv “Bivše Jugoslovenske Republike Makedonije”, broj 36815/03, stav 38, od 14. januara 2010).
2. Primjena tih principa na ovaj predmet
(a) Preliminarne naznake
Sud na početku zapaža da se ovaj predmet razlikuje od onih koje je imao imao priliku da ispituje u prošlosti po tome što pitanje koje se ovdje postavlja nisu proturječne odluke u sudskoj praksi sudova konačne instance u okviru iste grane sudskog sistema, nego navedena nepodudarnost između presuda dva hijerarhijski nepovezana, različita i neovisna tipa suda.
Imajući to u vidu, Sud smatra da, budući da su formulirani u kontekstu koji se suštinski razlikuje od ovog predmeta, kriteriji i principi razrađeni u navedenoj sudskoj praksi ne mogu kao takvi biti preneseni na ovaj predmet, koji, iako se odnosi na tip žalbe koji je Sud već imao priliku da presuđuje, ipak pokreće novo pravno pitanje. Međutim, Sud se njima može rukovoditi pri svojoj ocjeni okolnosti ovog predmeta. Prema tome, Sud će prvo razmotriti da li postoje proturječne sudske odluke u ovom predmetu; ako postoje, on će onda ispitati da li su, u svjetlu posebnih okolnosti, te proturječne odluke dovele do kršenja člana 6. stav 1. Konvencije.
(b) Da li su postojale proturječne odluke?
Sud ponavlja da se razlika u postupanju u dva spora ne može smatrati proturječnošću sudske prakse kada je to opravdano razlikom u predmetnim faktičnim situacijama (vidi, Erol Uçar protiv Turske (odluka), broj 12960/05, od 29. septembra 2009). Iz dokaza predočenih Sudu u ovom premetu proizilazi da se razlika na koju se žale podnosioci predstavke ne zasniva na faktičnim situacijama koje su ispitali različiti domaći sudovi, koje su identične, nego na primjeni materijalnog prava i res judicata koja iz toga rezultira.
U tom pogledu, Sud ističe da su stranke dostavile nekoliko odluka domaćih sudova koje se odnose na porodice vojnih lica koja su poginula u istoj avionskoj nesreći kao i sin podnosilaca predstavke. Nakon čitanja tih odluka, Sud prvo ističe da predmetna vojna lica potpadaju pod dvije kategorije: ona čija je misija bila da se bore protiv terorizma i posada aviona (vidi, st. 17. i 25-26 gore).
Sud dalje ističe da se različiti predmeti pred redovnim upravnim sudovima, na koje se podnosioci predstavke pozivaju u svojim navodima, odnose na žalbe porodica žrtava predmetne nesreće protiv odluke turskog penzionog fonda koji je odbacio, inter alia, njihove zahtjeve za penziju na osnovu Zakona broj 3713.
Konačno, Sud zapaža da iz spisa proizilazi da su redovni upravni sudovi ispitali u meritumu četrnaest predmeta koje su dostavile porodice žrtava, koji su uspostavili uzročno-posljedičnu vezu između avionske nesreće i borbe protiv terorizma – uvjet sine qua non za ostvarivanje prava predviđenih članom 21. Zakona broj 3713 – bez pravljenja ikakve razlike u pogledu tipa dužnosti koje su obavljala preminula vojna lica (vidi, st. 25-26 gore).
Redovni upravni sudovi su se tako izjasnili u korist podnosilaca zahtjeva; njihovo tumačenje uvjeta primjene Zakona broj 3713 se razlikovalo od tumačenja Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda koji, u predmetu podnosilaca predstavke, nije našao uzrošno-posljedičnu vezu te je odbio njihov zahtjev za poništenje odluke penzionog fonda (vidi, stav 16. gore).
Ta razlika u tumačnju je rezultirala različitim pravnim postupanjem dva tipa sudova u sporovima koji su u osnovi slični. Prema tome, redovni upravni sudovi (Upravni sud u Ankari i Vrhovni upravni sud) i Vrhovni vojni upravni sud su došli do dijametralno suprotnih zaključaka. Pored toga, Vlada je prihvatila postojanje tih različitih tumačenja (vidi, stav 47. gore). Ovdje je potrebno naznačiti da se razlike po kojima se njihov predmet razlikuje od predmeta koje su ispitivali redovni upravni sudovi ne spominju u odluci koja se odnosi na predmet podnosilaca predstavke koju je donio Vrhovni vojni upravni sud (vidi, stav 16. gore).
Iz toga jasno proizilazi da se Sud suočava sa veoma rijetkim predmetom u kojem domaći sudovi različito tumače okolnosti i posljedice istog događaja – avionske nesreće. Imajući u vidu navedeno, potrebno je podsjetiti da sam zaključak o nedosljednosti sudske prakse nije dovoljan da bi se konstatovalo kršenje člana 6. Konvencije. Sud mora odmjeriti uticaj proturječne sudske prakse u pogledu principa pravičnog suđenja, a naročito, principa pravne sigurnosti.
(c) Da li su proturječne odluke dovele do kršenja člana 6. stav 1. Evropske Konvencije?
Sud prije svega zapaža da je pitanje proturječnih odluka u okolnostima ovog predmeta povezano sa samom organizacionom strukturom turskog sudskog sistema u kojem redovni upravni sudovi, sa općom jurisprudencijom, koegzistiraju paralelno sa vojnim upravnim sudom, sa specijalnom jurisprudencijom (vidi st. 20-21 i stav 45. gore). Međutim, to je samo jedan primjer među drugim primjerima raznolikosti pravnih sistema koji postoje u Evropi, te Sud nema zadatak da ih standardizira (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Taxquet protiv Belgije [VV], broj 926/05, stav 83, od 16. novembra 2010).
Osim toga, u predmetima koji se odnose na pojedinačne predstavke, Sud nema zadatak da preispituje relevantno zakonodavstvo ili osporenu praksu in abstracto. Umjesto toga, on se mora ograničiti, što je moguće više, a da ne gubi iz vida generalni kontekst, na ispitivanje pitanja koja se pokreću pred njim (vidi, inter alia, N.C. protiv Italije [VV], broj 24952/94, stav 56, ECHR 2002–X, i Taxquet, citirana gore, stav 83).
Prema tome, zadatak Suda u ovom predmetu nije da preispituje in abstracto kompatibilnost turskog sudskog sistema, koji ima različite tipove upravnog suda, sa Konvencijom, nego da odredi, in concreto, dejstvo rezultirajuće proturječne sudske prakse na pravo na pravično suđenje obuhvaćeno članom 6. stav 1. Konvencije (vidi, na primjer i mutatis mutandis, Padovani protiv Italije, od 26. februara 1993. godine, stav 24, Serija A broj 257-B).
Sud prije svega zapaža da su osporene proturječne sudske odluke koje se odnose na tumačenje člana 21. Zakona broj 3813 rezultat istovremenog djelovanja redovnih upravnih sudova i Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda u predmetima koji u osnovi pokreću isto pitanje (vidi, st. 6266. gore). To ukazuje na sukob nadležnosti između dva tipa suda koji imaju zadatak da donesu presudu na paralelan način o istom pravnom pitanju.
Prema tome, Sud se slaže da zaključkom Vijeća da je izvor proturječnih odluka na koje se podnosioci predstavke žale u činjenici da ti sudovi nisu poštivali granice svoje nadležnosti (vidi, presuda Vijeća, stav 57).
Imajući to u vidu, u svjetlu argumenata Vlade da nema nikakve sumnje da Vrhovni vojni upravni sud ima nadležnost u ovom predmetu (vidi, stav 45. gore), Sud ističe da je Sud za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti – uspostavljen, inter alia, da rješava sukob nadležnosti između redovnih, upravnih i vojnih sudova (vidi, st. 22. i 24. gore) – imao priliku da odlučuje o pitanju područja jurisdikcije redovnih upravnih sudova i Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda.
Pri tome, on je odlučio da Vrhovni vojni upravni sud ima nadležnost da odlučuje o predmetima koji se odnose na vojne penzije ili dodatke (vidi, st. 31-32 gore). Naravno, kada je 4. vijeće Upravnog suda u Ankari izjavilo da je tužba koju su podnijeli podnosioci predstavke izvan njegove jurisdikcije i da je Vrhovni vojni upravni sud (vidi, stav 14. gore) nadležan da to rješava, on se pozvao na presudu Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti od 14. maja 2001. godine (vidi, stav 31. gore).
Vijeće je smatralo u tom pogledu da je djelovanje Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti pomoglo pri rješavanju nepodudarnosti između stava redovnih upravnih sudova i vojnog upravnog suda u pogledu njihovih područja nadležnosti, okončavajući u principu djelovanje redovnih upravnih sudova u području koja potpada pod jurisdikciju vojnog upravnog suda (vidi, presuda Vijeća, st. 57-58).
Međutim, Veliko vijeće ne dijeli te zaključke. Imajući u vidu dokaze koje su predočile stranke, ono zapaža da su, uprkos djelovanju Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti i njegovoj odluci da Vrhovni vojni upravni sud ima nadležnost da odlučuje o tipu predmeta kao što je ovaj, redovni upravni sudovi nastavili da primaju predmete koji su slični predmetu podnosilaca predstavke i da odlučuju u meritumu (vidi, st. 25-27 gore). 77. Prema objašnjenjima koje je Vlada predočila na raspravi pred Velikim vijećem, dok su “principijelne odluke” Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti, koje se odnose na jurisdikciju, obavezujuće, njegove ostale presude imaju jednostavno vrijednost i autoritet precedenata kojima se rukovode domaći sudovi pri vijećanju. Odluka je “principijelna” kada takva nazanka u njoj postoji.
U ovom predmetu, Sud ističe da presude Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti, na koje se poziva Vlada (vidi, st. 44-45 gore) u prilog nadležnosti Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda, nisu principijelne odluke i da se one nisu nametnule, svojom moći ubjeđivanja, redovnim upravnim sudovima, koji su nastavili da ispituju - i da prihvataju – zahtjeve koji su slični zahtjevu podnosilaca predstavke (vidi, st. 25-27 gore).
Imajući u vidu navedeno i bez obzira na važnost koju su redovni upravni sudovi željeli pridavati presudama Suda za rješavanje sukoba naležnosti, Sud ističe da uloga Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti u svakom slučaju nije da rješava proturječnost sudske prakse. Premda on nema ovlast da rješava proturječnost presuda različitih sudova, on to može raditi samo u izuzetnoj situaciji u kojoj su presude toliko proturječne da bi njihovo izvšenje rezultiralo uskraćivanjem pravde za određenu stranku (vidi, st. 24. i 30. gore), što nije slučaj u ovom predmetu. Njegovo djelovanje, prema tome, ne utiče na žalbeni navod koji su podnosioci predstavke predočili Sudu.
Sud ističe da je već naznačio da onda kada se identificira nedosljednost sudske prakse, ona se u principu mora riješiti uspostavljanjem tumačenja koje se mora slijediti i harmoniziranjem sudske prakse putem mehanizama sa prerogativima koji omogućavaju da se to uradi (vidi, inter alia, Beian (broj 1), citirana gore, st. 37. i 39). Međutim, potrebno je naznačiti da su ti principi određeni u predmetima u kojima su se proturječnosti tumačenja, koje je Sud morao ispitati, pojavila u istoj grani sudskog sistema, u vezi sa pravnim odredbama u pogledu kojih Vrhovni sud može vršiti svoje ovlasti unificiranja (vidi, stav 59. gore – vidi, također, inter alia, Beian (broj 1),citirana gore, stav 37, i Schwarzkopf i Taussik, citirana gore).
Dok takvi razlozi prevladavaju tamo gdje se proturječne odluke pojavljuju u okviru hijerarhijske sudske strukture, oni se ne mogu prenijeti na ovaj predmet. Sud smatra da u domaćem pravnom kontekstu koji je okarakteriziran, kao što je to u ovom predmetu, postojanjem nekoliko vrhovnih sudova koji ne podliježu nijednoj zajedničkoj sudskoj hijerarhiji, on ne može zahtijevati implementaciju mehanizma vertikalne kontrole pristupa kojeg su ti sudovi izabrali. Postaviti takav zahtjev bi prevazilazilo zahtjeve pravičnog suđenja iz člana 6. stav 1. Konvencije.
Štaviše, Sud ističe da nedostatak zajedničke regulatorne vlasti koju bi dijelili vrhovni sudovi – u ovom predmetu Vrhovni upravni sud i Vrhovni vojni upravni sud – koja bi mogla odrediti tumačenje koje bi ti sudovi trebali slijediti, nije specifičnost turskog sudskog sistema. Brojne evropske države čiji sudski sistemi imaju dva ili više vrhovnih sudova nemaju takvu ovlast (vidi, stav 34. gore). Međutim, ne može se smatrati da to po sebi predstavlja kršenje Konvencije.
Sud dalje smatra da je u sudskom sistemu kao što je turski, sa nekoliko različitih grana sudova, i u kojem nekoliko vrhovnih sudova egzisitraju na paralelan način, a od kojih se zahtijeva da tumače zakon u isto vrijeme i paralelno, postizanje dosljednosti jurisprudencije može potrajati, pa se periodi proturječne sudske prakse mogu tolerirati, a da se pravna sigurnost ne dovodi u pitanje.
Budući da sudska praksa nije nepromjenjiva, nego je, naprotiv, u suštini evolutivna, Sud ističe da se ne može smatrati da princip dobrog administriranja pravde nameće striktan zahtjev dosljednosti sudske prakse (vidi, Unédic, citirana gore, stav 73, i Atanasovski, citirana gore, stav 38). Međutim, dužnost Suda je da osigura da taj princip bude ispoštovan kada on smatra da pravičnost postupka ili vladavina zakona iziskuje od njega da intervenira kako bi okončao nesigurnost koju su stvorile proturječne presude koje su donijeli različiti sudovi o jednom i istom pitanju. Cilj pravne sigurnosti kojem on teži ipak se mora slijediti uz dužno poštovanje autonomije donošenja odluka i neovisnosti domaćih sudova u skladu sa principom supsidijarnosti koji je osnov sistema Konvencije.
U tom pogledu, Sud ponavlja da je tumačenje svojstveno vršenju sudske funkcije. Međutim, koliko god neka pravna odredba može biti jasno koncipirana, neizostavno postoji element sudskog tumačenja (vidi, inter alia, Başkaya i Okçuoğlu protiv Turske [VV], br. 23536/94 i 24408/94, stav 39, ECHR 1999-IV). Određivanje norme koju je potrebno primijeniti i uvjeta primjene je dio individualiziranog pristupa pravu.
To znači da dva suda, svaki sa sopstvenim područjem nadležnosti, ispitujući različite predmete mogu doći do različitih, ali racionalnih i obrazloženih zaključaka u pogledu istog pravnog pitanja koje je pokrenuto sličnim činjeničnim okolnostima. Mora se prihvatiti da su različitosti stajališta koje se pojavljuju između sudova jednostavno neizbježan ishod procesa tumačenja pravnih odredbi i njihovog adaptiranja na materijalne situacije na koje one moraju odgovoriti.
Te razlike se mogu tolerirati kada ih domaći pravni sistem može prilagoditi. U ovom predmetu, Sud smatra da su vrhovni sudovi - Vrhovni upravni sud i Vrhovni vojni upravni sud – imali mogućnost rješavanja samih proturječnosti, bilo da su odlučili zauzeti isti stav, bilo da su poštovali granice sopstvenog područja nadležnosti i uzdržali se od interveniranja u istom pravnom području.
Kao što nije zadatak Suda da djeluje kao sud treće ili četvrte instance i da preispituje izbor domaćih sudova u vezi sa tumačenjem pravnih odredbi i nedosljednostima koje iz toga mogu proizaći, on ističe da njegova uloga nije ni da intervenira kada jednostavno postoje proturječne sudske odluke.
Prema Sudu, kada ne postoje dokazi o proizvoljnosti, ispitivanje postojanja i uticaja takvih proturječnih odluka ne znači da Sud ispituje mogućnost koju su domaći sudovi izabrali (vidi, Vinčić i ostali,citirana gore, stav 56; Işık protiv Turske (odluka), broj 35224/05, od 16. juna 2009; i Ivanov i Dimitrov protiv“Bivše Jugoslovenske Republike Makedonije”, broj 46881/06, stav 32, od 21. oktobra 2010). Kao što je navedeno gore (vidi, stav 50), njegova uloga u pogledu člana 6. stav 1. Konvencije je ograničena na predmete u kojima je osporena odluka očigledno proizvoljna.
Prema tome, čak i ako je tumačenje Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda člana 21. Zakona broj 3713 nepovoljno po podnosioce predstavke, to tumačenje, koliko god se njima učinilo nepravednim u usporedbi sa rješenjem koje su usvojili redovni upravni sudovi, ne predstavlja po sebi kršenje člana 6. Konvencije.
Također je potrebno istaći - u svjetlu zaključka Suda za rješavanje sukoba nadležnosti (vidi, st. 31-32 gore) da je Vrhovni vojni upravni sud organ koji je nadležan da ispituje tip spora o kojem je ovdje riječ – da, u okolnostima ovog predmeta, odluka 4. vijeća Upravnog suda u Ankari, prema kojoj on nema nadležnost u predmetu podnosilaca predstavke, nije uopšte proizvoljna.
Podnosioci predstavke ne mogu tvrditi ni da im je bila uskraćena pravda kao rezultat ispitivanja njihovog spora od strane Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda ili zaključka do kojeg je on došao. Odluka koju je usvojio Vrhovni vojni upravni sud u predmetu podnosilaca predstavke potpada pod opseg njegove nadležnosti, te ne postoji ništa u tome što bi po sebi opravdalo intervenciju Suda.
Potrebno je istaći da su presude, koje se odnose na podnosioce predstavke, činjenično i pravno propisno obrazložene (vidi, st. 16. i 19. gore) i da se ne može reći da je tumačenje činjenica, od strane Vrhovnog vojnog upravnog suda, koje su dostavljene radi ispitivanja, bilo proizvoljno, nerazumno ili da je uticalo na pravičnost postupka, nego je jednostavno stvar primjene domaćeg prava.
Imajući u vidu navedeno, Sud ponovo ističe da on mora izbjegavati bilo koje neopravdano miješanje u vršenje pravosudnih funkcija država ili u organizaciju njihovih sudskih sistema. Odgovornost za dosljednost njihovih odluka počiva prije svega na domaćim sudovima, a djelovanje Suda bi trebalo ostati izuzetak.
U ovom predmetu, Sud smatra da okolnosti ne iziskuju takvo djelovanje i da njegova uloga nije da traži rješenje za osporenu proturječnost sudske prakse vis-à-vis člana 6. stav 1. Konvencije. U svakom slučaju, individualna žalba Sudu se ne može koristiti kao sredstvo za razmatranje ili eliminiranje proturječnosti sudske prakse, koja se može pojaviti u domaćem pravu, ili mehanizam za preispitiavnje čiji je cilj haromoniziranje nedosljednosti u odlukama različitih domaćih sudova.
Prema tome, Sud zaključuje da član 6. stav 1. Konvencije nije prekršen.
IZ TIH RAZLOGA, SUD
odlučuje, sa deset glasova prema sedam glasova, da član 6. stav 1. Konvencije nije prekršen.
Sastavljena na engleskom i francuskom jeziku, te saopćena na javnoj raspravi u Palati ljudskih prava u Strasbourgu 20. oktobra 2011.
Michael O’Boyle Nicolas Bratza
Zamjenik sekretara Predjednik
U skladu sa članom 45. stav 2. Konvencije i pravilom 74. stav 2. Pravila Suda, izdvojeno mišljenje sudija Bratzae, Casadevalla, Vajić, Spielmanna, Rozakisa, Kovlera i Mijović se nalazi u prilogu ove presude.
N.B. M.O.B.
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[1] . Onako kako je izmijenjen Zakonom broj 5532 od 18. jula 2006. godine, u kojem je termin “državni službenici”, u prvom stavu, zamijenjen terminom “javni uposlenici”.
[2] . Postupak je još uvijek u toku.
___________________________________
Prevod presude preuzet sa https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
Ovaj prevod je realiziran zahvaljujući pomoći Fonda povjerenja Vijeća Evrope (www.coe.int/humanrightstrustfund).
GRAND CHAMBER
CASE OF NEJDET ŞAHİN AND PERİHAN ŞAHİN v. TURKEY
(Application no. 13279/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20 October 2011
This judgment is final but may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Josep Casadevall,
Nina Vajić,
Dean Spielmann,
Christos Rozakis,
Corneliu Bîrsan,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabet Fura,
Ljiljana Mijović,
Egbert Myjer,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
George Nicolaou,
Luis López Guerra,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Ann Power-Forde,
Işıl Karakaş,
Guido Raimondi, judges,
and Michael O’Boyle, Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 9 March and 21 September 2011,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last‑mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 13279/05) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Turkish nationals, Mr Nejdet Şahin and Mrs Perihan Şahin (“the applicants”), on 9 April 2005.
2. The applicants, who had been granted legal aid, were represented by Mr K. Karabulut, a lawyer practising in Ankara. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr M. Özmen, their co-Agent.
3. The applicants alleged that the proceedings before the domestic courts had been unfair because of the conflicting decisions delivered by the different courts (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention).
4. The application was allocated to the Second Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 27 May 2010 it was declared admissible by a Chamber of that Section, composed of the following judges: Françoise Tulkens, Ireneu Cabral Barreto, Vladimiro Zagrebelsky, Danute Jočienė, Dragoljub Popović, András Sajó, Işıl Karakaş, and also of Sally Dollé, Section Registrar, which found, by six votes to one, that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
5. On 25 August 2010, the applicants requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber by virtue of Article 43 of the Convention and Rule 73. On 4 October 2010 the panel of the Grand Chamber accepted that request.
6. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. As Jean-Paul Costa was unable to attend the second deliberations, Nicolas Bratza replaced him as President of the Grand Chamber, and Egbert Myjer, first substitute, became a full member (Rule 11). Corneliu Bîrsan, second substitute, replaced Kristina Pardalos, who was unable to attend.
7. The applicants, but not the Government, filed written observations on the merits.
8. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 9 March 2011 (Rule 59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
– for the Government
MrM. Özmen,Co-Agent,
Mr K. Esener,
Mr O. Çidem,
Mr M. K. Erdem,
Mr N. Yamali,
Mr I. Ertüzün,
MrsF. Sözen,
Mrsİ. Kocayiğit,
MrsA. Özdemir, Advisers.
– for the applicants
MrK. Karabulut, Counsel,
MrsM. Tuncel, Assistant.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Karabulut and Mr Özmen.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
9. The applicants were born in 1949 and 1950 respectively and live in Ankara.
10. Their son, an army pilot, died on 16 May 2001, when his plane crashed near the village of Malatya (Akçadağ / Güzyurdu) while transporting troops from Diyarbakır to Ankara. Thirty-three other servicemen died in the same accident, five of them also members of the plane’s crew.
11. On 10 May 2002 the applicants applied, through their lawyer, to the Turkish Pension Fund Authority to award them the pension payable under section 21 of Law no. 3713, the Anti-Terrorism Act (hereinafter “Law no. 3713”).
12. In a letter dated 23 May 2002 the Pension Fund Authority noted that the applicants had been awarded, inter alia, a monthly war disability pension under section 64 of Law no. 5434, as well as a lump sum equal to thirty times the highest salary of a public servant. It further noted that their son’s death had not been caused by an act of terrorism within the meaning of Law no. 3713 but by the fact that, for an unknown reason, his plane had crashed. It was therefore not possible to increase their monthly invalidity pension to the level of the monthly salary paid to an equivalent serving member of the military.
13. On 15 July 2002 the applicants appealed, through their lawyer, to the Ankara Administrative Court against that decision. They submitted, in particular, that their son had died while transporting troops engaged in the fight against terrorism from northern Iraq, so his death should be considered to have occurred in the context of the fight against the terrorism.
14. On 1 April 2003 the 4th Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court rejected their appeal as being outside its jurisdiction, considering that it was rather a matter for the Supreme Military Administrative Court. Referring to a judgment of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court of 14 May 2001 (E.2000/77, K.2001/22), it held:
“... to determine whether the administrative act is “linked to military service” and decide which court has jurisdiction, the object of the act must be examined. If the act was done in keeping with military requirements, procedure and practice, it must be considered to be linked to military service ... Whether or not a non-military authority was at the origin of the act is of no consequence – the Supreme Military Administrative Court is the Court responsible for examining a case [brought by] a member of the armed forces. In the present case the issue is an application for a monthly pension made by the claimants under Law no. 3713 ... To determine whether the claim falls within the scope of that Law, regard must be had to ... the purpose of the military service and the specificity of the locations where it is effected, as well as military aptitude, to show that the impugned act was done in keeping with military needs, procedure and practice.
Where this is the case ... it is for the Supreme Military Administrative Court to examine and resolve the dispute.
This was, moreover, the line of reasoning of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court’s decision no. E: 2000/77, K: 2001/22, published in the Official Gazette ... of 18.06.2001.”
15. On 3 June 2003 the applicants brought their case before the Supreme Military Administrative Court. In their statement of claim they included a decision adopted by the 10th Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court on 22 January 2003 (E.2002/1059, K.2003/27) in what they considered a similar case (see paragraph 26 below).
16. On 10 June 2004 the Supreme Military Administrative Court rejected their claim. First of all, it observed that the applicants had been awarded a monthly war disability pension as well as a lump sum equal to thirty times the highest salary of a public servant, calculated in accordance with additional section 78 to Law no. 5434 and readjusted in accordance with Law no. 4567. It then noted that their request to have their monthly pension increased to the level of that paid to an equivalent serving member of the military had been rejected by the competent authorities. It pointed out that entitlement under section 21 of Law no. 3713 was restricted to cases where an agent of the State had been directly wounded, disabled or killed as a result of acts of terrorism. It considered that the mere fact that the victim had been employed in work connected with the fight against terrorism did not suffice. As the deceased had not been killed by an act of terrorism, the impugned administrative act was not unlawful.
17. One of the judges expressed a dissenting opinion in which he criticised such a restrictive interpretation of Law no. 3713. Pointing out that it was not disputed that the applicants’ son had died in a plane crash while co-piloting a plane carrying troops returning from an anti-terrorism operation, he considered that the crux of the matter was whether the death fell within the scope of section 21 of Law no. 3713. In his opinion, in view of the purpose of the deceased’s mission that provision was certainly applicable to the circumstances of the case.
18. On 6 July 2004 the applicants lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Supreme Military Administrative Court. In his pleadings their lawyer explained that in his submissions of 10 June 2004 and at the hearing before the Supreme Military Administrative Court the same day he had produced four decisions adopted by the ordinary administrative courts, namely the 6th, 10th and 11th Chambers of the Ankara Administrative Court, concerning applications similar to the applicants’, lodged by four families of servicemen who had died in the same accident as their son; in those decisions the Courts had found in favour of the claimants. He complained that the Supreme Military Administrative Court had made no reference to those cases, and argued that the solution adopted was contrary to the constitutional principles of equality before the law and consistency of the law.
19. In a judgment of 30 September 2004 the Supreme Military Administrative Court rejected the applicants’ appeal as being ill-founded and found the impugned judgment to be in conformity with the law and the requisite procedure. That judgment was served on the applicants’ lawyer. The postmark on the envelope was dated 11 October 2004.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Brief presentation of Turkey’s court system
20. Turkey’s judicial system breaks down into three categories: the ordinary courts, which include civil and criminal courts; the administrative courts and the military courts. These categories in turn break down into subdivisions according to the subject at issue. These three branches of courts are each headed by their own Supreme Court: the Court of Cassation for the ordinary law courts, the Supreme Administrative Court for the administrative courts and the Military Court of Cassation and the Supreme Military Administrative Court for military matters.
21. Under the provisions of Article 157 of the Constitution, the Supreme Military Administrative Court is the body which judicially examines at first and last instance disputes arising from administrative decisions and acts concerning either military personnel or military service, even where they emanate from non-military authorities. Where the dispute concerns compulsory military service, the interested party does not have to be a member of the military.
22. A special court called the Jurisdiction Disputes Court has the power to settle conflicts that may arise between the ordinary, administrative and military courts concerning their jurisdiction and decisions (Article 158 of the Constitution).
B. Relevant domestic law
23. Section 21 of Law no. 3713[1] of 12 April 1991 (the Anti-Terrorism Act) reads as follows:
“The provisions of Law no. 2330 on pecuniary compensation and monthly pension rights apply to public employees who are wounded or disabled, or die or are killed as a result of terrorist acts, in the performance of their duties, inside and outside the country, or, if they were no longer in active service, because of their [former] duties. ...”
24. The relevant provisions of Law no. 2247 of 12 June 1979 (which entered into force on 22 June 1979) on the creation and operation of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court, read as follows:
Section 10
“A conflict of jurisdiction is raised when the Principal State Counsel concerned asks the Jurisdiction Disputes Court to examine a question of jurisdiction following the rejection of an objection of lack of jurisdiction in a dispute before the ordinary, administrative or military courts ...”
Section 17
“There is a positive conflict of jurisdiction when cases in which the parties, subject and cause of action are the same are lodged with two different types of court – ordinary, administrative or military – and each court adopts a decision whereby it considers that it has jurisdiction to hear the case.”
Section 24
“There is conflict of judgments when the enforcement of a right is rendered impossible by a divergence between the final decisions adopted by at least two of the courts referred to in section 1, provided that those decisions concern the same subject and the same cause of action – but not matters of jurisdiction – and that at least one of the parties [to the case] is the same...”
Section 28
“The Jurisdiction Disputes Court immediately gives notice of all the conclusions reached in its decisions to the various Principal State Counsel concerned, the court which applied to it to settle the conflict of jurisdiction, the court or courts awaiting its decision and the persons or bodies that requested settlement of the conflict. The courts concerned, as well as all the authorities, bodies and persons concerned, must abide by the decisions of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court and apply them without delay.”
Section 29
“The decisions of the sections and the full court are final. Decisions of principle and decisions of the sections deemed pertinent by the President shall be published in the Official Gazette.”
Section 30
“Conflicts between decisions of the sections of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court shall be settled by decisions of principle of the full court ... decisions of principle in matters of jurisdiction are binding on the Jurisdiction Disputes Court and all judicial bodies; decisions of principle on the substance delivered in cases of conflicting judgments are binding only on the Jurisdiction Disputes Court.”
C. Relevant domestic case-law and practice
1. Judgments of the ordinary administrative courts and the Supreme Military Administrative Court
25. Apart from the action brought by the applicants, seventeen actions under Law no. 3713 were brought before the domestic administrative courts by the families of victims of the plane crash of 16 May 2001 following the rejection of their claims by the Turkish Pension Fund.
In fourteen cases, four of which concerned close relatives of the plane’s crew members, the appeals were heard by the Ankara Administrative Court, which ruled in favour of the victims’ families. On 19 June 2002 (decision E.2002/87, K.2002/870), 22 January 2003 (decision E.2002/1059, K.2003/27), 31 March 2003 (decision E.2003/148, K.2003/522) and 26 June 2003 (decisions E.2002/100, K.2003/1073 and E.2002/101, K.2003/1053), 19 October 2004 (decisions E.2004/3051, K.2004/1535 and E.2004/3055, K.2004/1536), 6 and 14 October 2005 (decisions E.2005/1973, K.2005/1424 and E.2005/1743, K.2005/1011), 8 and 29 March 2006 (decisions E.2006/653, K.2006/594 and E.2006/678, K.2006/551), 27 September 2007 (E.2007/764, K.2007/1849) and 29 and 30 January 2008 (E.2008/82, K.2008/184 and E.2007/1491, K.2008/135), different chambers of the Ankara Administrative Court (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 10th and 11th Chambers) adopted judgments in which they acknowledged that the circumstances of the plane crash fell within the scope of Law no. 3713.
26. In particular, on 22 January 2003 (decision E.2002/1059, K.2003/27), in response to an appeal to set aside the decision of the pension fund to refuse an application filed by the parents of the deceased pilot to receive the supplementary pension provided for in Law no. 3713, the 10th Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court pronounced a judgment which included the following passages:
“... After examination of the file, [it appears] that ... the claimants’ son was the pilot of the aircraft ... whose job it was to transport special troops on a mission against the separatist terrorist organisation PKK, together with their weapons and equipment, to the operation zone and also to take troops leaving that zone back to their units. ... He died on 16 May 2001, when his plane crashed during that mission. After the accident the claimants were awarded a monthly war disability pension under section 64 of Law no. 5434 ... Considering that their son’s death fell within the scope of Law no. 3713, they applied for a monthly pension under that Law ... They brought the present action following the authorities’ refusal of that application ...
Examination ... of the above-mentioned legal provisions and the case file reveals that the claimants’ son was killed on 16 May 2001 when the aircraft in which he was transporting troops back from an anti-terrorist mission crashed. The mission in question was clearly part of the fight against terrorism ... accordingly, the impugned administrative act must be set aside ...”
27. Each time an appeal was lodged with it against the above-mentioned judgments of the Ankara Administrative Court, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the approach of the first-instance court (decisions E.2002/4268, K.2005/333; E.2003/1775, K.2005/5476; E.2003/3110, K.2006/843; E.2003/3860, K.2004/4655; E.2003/3856, K.2004/4656; E.2005/2298, K.2007/8147; E.2005/1399, K.2007/6047; E.2006/1352, K.2009/7096; E.2006/1802, K.2009/7096; E.2007/2275, K.2009/8317; E.2006/9775, K.2009/7138; E.2008/715, K.2010/3868; E.2008/7839, K.2010/3870).
28. On 28 March 2003, referring to the Jurisdiction Disputes Court’s decision of 14 May 2001 (E.2000/77, K.2001/22 – see paragraph 31 below), the 5th Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal, lodged by the family of a sergeant who died in the same plane crash, to set aside the pension fund’s decision rejecting their claim for a monthly pension under Law no. 3713 (decision E.2002/754, K.2003/346). The case was brought before the Supreme Military Administrative Court, which, in a judgment of 13 May 2004, dismissed the appeal, finding that the deceased had not been a victim of terrorism (decision E.2003/14, K.2004/754). On 30 September 2004 it dismissed a subsequent appeal against that judgment (decision E.2004/1199, K.2004/1480).
29. On 2 October 2009 the deceased’s widow filed another application with the pension fund for the monthly pension provided for under Law no. 3713, in her own name and on behalf of her son. The application was rejected and an appeal was lodged with the 5th Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court, which that court rejected on 11 March 2010, finding that it lacked jurisdiction (E.2009/1631, K.2001/343)[2]. In its reasoning it referred to a judgment of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court of 11 December 2006 (E.2006/246, K.2006/236 – see paragraph 32 below).
2. Judgments of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court
30. On 22 February 1999, in response to a request to settle a conflict between the solutions adopted respectively by the ordinary administrative courts and the Supreme Military Administrative Court, which had reached different conclusions in a matter concerning similar points of fact and law, the Jurisdiction Disputes Court adopted a decision (E.1998/75, K.1999/4) which included the following reasoning:
“The first paragraph of section 24 of Law no. 2247 on the creation and operation of a Jurisdiction Disputes Court, as amended by Law no. 2592, stipulates: “There is conflict of judgments when the enforcement of a right is rendered impossible by a divergence between the final decisions adopted by at least two of the courts referred to in section 1, provided that those decisions concern the same subject and the same cause of action – but not matters of jurisdiction – and that at least one of the parties [to the case] is the same.
By virtue of this provision, in order for there to be conflict of judgments all the following conditions must be met cumulatively: (a) the decisions at the origin of the conflict must have been adopted by at least two [different] courts from among the ordinary, military or administrative courts; (b) the subject matter, the cause of action and at least one of the parties must be the same; (c) the two decisions must be final; (d) the decisions must rule on the merits of the case; and (e) the enforcement of the right must have been made impossible by the divergence between the decisions.
Examination of the decisions alleged to be in conflict reveals that they are judgments pronounced by the ordinary administrative courts and the military administrative court, in which, objectively, the subject matter and the cause of action, while based on different material facts, are identical, and at least one of the parties (the respondent administrative authority) is the same; the judgments in question have become final after the exhaustion of the appeals process, and they both rule on the merits. That being so, it is established that the first four conditions required under section 24 in order for there to be conflict of judgments have been met.
As to whether the result in the instant case has been to render impossible the enforcement of a right ..., in situations where it is impossible for a person to secure the enforcement of a right because of conflicting judgments delivered by two different courts, section 24 leaves it to the Jurisdiction Disputes Court to settle the matter ...
... the administrative court’s judgment setting aside the earlier decision does not affect the judgment of the Supreme Military Administrative Court dismissing the application; the respondent administrative authority, which had to annul the measure in the light of the administrative court judgment in favour of H. and F.G., is under no obligation to execute that judgment in respect of N.T., who was not party to those proceedings. As the action brought by N.T. was dismissed, N.T. cannot be considered to have a right recognised by a judicial decision.
... the claimant cannot claim to have a right recognised by a judicial decision, so her application must be dismissed pursuant to section 24 of Law no. 2247, as the condition that it is “impossible to enforce the judgment”, required for there to be a conflict of judgments, has not been established.
31. On 14 May 2001 the Jurisdiction Disputes Court adopted a decision (no. E.2000/77, K.2001/22), the relevant passages of which read as follows:
“... Summary: The application to set aside the pension fund’s decision rejecting a claim for a disability pension ... filed by a person declared by a medical report to be unfit for military service, who considered that his health problem had been caused by his military service, is a matter for the Supreme Military Administrative Court to resolve.
...
The merits: ... Under Article 157 of the Constitution, the Supreme Military Administrative Court, although instituted by non-military authorities, is the court of first and final jurisdiction for the judicial review of disputes arising from administrative acts or conduct linked to military service and concerning military personnel. However, it has been established that for disputes arising out of military obligations, it is not necessary to determine whether the person concerned was a member of the armed forces. ... In order for the Supreme Military Administrative Court to be able to examine a case, the impugned administrative act must concern a “member of the armed forces” and be “linked to military service ...”
To determine whether the administrative act is “linked to military service” and decide which court has jurisdiction, the subject matter of the act must be examined. If the act was adopted in keeping with military traditions, principles and practice, it must be considered to be linked to military service ... More specifically, administrative acts linked to military service are those related to the capabilities ... of military personnel, their attitude and conduct, their military career, their rights and obligations as members of the military, the purpose of the military service and the specificity of the locations in which they serve. Whether or not a non-military authority was at the origin of the act is of no consequence – the Supreme Military Administrative Court is the court responsible for examining a case [brought by] a member of the armed forces who has been deprived of an advantage.
... where the administrative act concerns a member of the military and is linked to military service, it is for the Supreme Military Administrative Court to examine and settle the dispute.”
32. On 11 December 2006 the Jurisdiction Disputes Court adopted a decision (E.2006/246, K.2006/236) in which it determined which court had jurisdiction to hear disputes concerning pecuniary compensation under Law no. 3713. The relevant passages read as follows:
“The facts: The claimants’ son ... died on 16 May 2001 in the accident at Malatya‑Akçadağ-Güzyurdu, when the troop transport plane flying him from Diyarbakır to Ankara after a mission in the state of emergency region crashed ...
In the proceedings lodged by the claimants following the pension fund’s refusal to award them a pension [although] they alleged that the death had occurred in the course of duties that fell within the scope of Laws nos. 2330 and 3713, the 3rd Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court dismissed the application in a decision of 27/06/2002 (E. 2001/1616, K. 2002/1095), considering that what had happened had not been the result of terrorist acts. On appeal, the 11th Division of the Supreme Administrative Court, in a judgment of 30/01/2003 (E: 2002/3971, K: 2003/495), set aside the lower court’s decision, considering that the court should have acknowledged the claimant’s entitlement to the rights governed by Laws nos. 2330 and 3713, his son’s death having been attributable to terrorist acts. The case was referred back to the lower court, which persisted in its decision, following which the Administrative Divisions of the Supreme Administrative Court, sitting in plenary, upheld the decision of the 11th Division of the Supreme Administrative Court in a judgment of 01/04/2004 (E: 2003/774, K: 2004/409) and again set aside the lower court’s decision ...
Although the claimants applied to ... the respondent administrative authority for pecuniary compensation after the Supreme Administrative Court, sitting in plenary, confirmed that their son’s death fell within the scope of Laws nos. 2330 and 3713, they received no reply.
... on 25 July 2005 the interested parties appealed to the ordinary administrative courts to set aside the administrative authority’s implicit rejection ... The respondent administrative authority filed an objection for lack of jurisdiction, alleging that the Supreme Military Administrative Court had jurisdiction ... In a decision of 2 March 2006 the Ankara Administrative Court dismissed that objection and declared that it did have jurisdiction. ... The respondent administrative authority filed an application to have the matter of jurisdiction settled ...
Principal State Counsel at the Supreme Military Administrative Court ... considers that the dispute ... lies within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Military Administrative Court, and that the decision of the 4th Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court concerning jurisdiction should be set aside ... Principal State Counsel at the Supreme Administrative Court ... argues that the dispute ... is a matter for the ordinary administrative courts ...
... [in so far as], when it examined whether the death of the claimants’ son, a serviceman, occurred because he was a victim of terrorist acts within the meaning of Law no. 3713, or in the course of duties covered by Law no. 2330 or as a result of such duties, or, as in this case ... when it reviewed the [rejection] measure, the pecuniary compensation board took into account the serviceman’s military aptitudes ..., his conduct ..., his military career, his rights and duties as a serviceman, the purpose of the military service, the specificities of the locations of the military missions, and military regulations and traditions; and [in so far as,] in the present case, the condition that the administrative act must be linked to military service is fulfilled, the Supreme Military Administrative Court has jurisdiction in the matter at the origin of the dispute ...”
III. COMPARATIVE LAW
33. In some European countries there is only one Supreme Court. This approach is found in “common law” countries like Cyprus, Ireland and the United Kingdom, but also in Albania, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Moldova, Norway, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia and Switzerland. Other countries, like Germany, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Monaco, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Sweden and Ukraine, have two or more supreme courts.
34. In many of these countries the law does not provide for any means of settling possible conflicts of case-law between the supreme courts, but only for means of resolving possible conflicts of jurisdiction. The authority responsible for settling such conflicts may be a court or a division of a court specially vested with this power (France, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Lithuania, the Czech Republic). In Italy the law confers this power on the Court of Cassation; in Austria and Andorra, on the Constitutional Court, and in Monaco, on the Supreme Court. In Poland there is no judicial authority responsible for settling conflicts of jurisdiction. Lastly, only a small number of countries have courts tasked with resolving conflicts of case-law between supreme courts (Germany, Ukraine and Greece). In Bulgaria the legislation provides for an a posteriori means of resolving conflicts.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
35. The applicants alleged that the proceedings before the domestic courts had been unfair and that the possibility that the same fact could give rise to differing legal assessments from one court to another was in breach of the principles of equality before the law and consistency of the law. They submitted that the families of victims who died in the same plane crash as their son had submitted claims similar to theirs and had won their cases before the ordinary administrative courts.
36. The applicants relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...”
37. The Court notes that in their application form, as a subsidiary issue, the applicants also complained that the Turkish authorities had failed to take any action against the manufacturer of the plane that crashed. As this complaint has not been reiterated before the Grand Chamber, the Grand Chamber endorses the general approach adopted by the Chamber (Chamber judgment, § 62) and considers that there is no need for it to examine this point separately.
A. Chamber judgment
38. The Chamber considered that it was not its function to compare different decisions of national courts, even if given in apparently similar proceedings; it must respect the independence of those courts. Having regard to the stance taken by the Jurisdiction Disputes Court, which confirmed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Military Administrative Court, it further considered that the applicants could not claim to have been denied justice as a result of the examination of their dispute by that court or the conclusion it reached. It accordingly found that in the circumstances of the case there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (Chamber judgment, §§ 54-61).
B. The parties’ submissions
1. The applicants
39. For the applicants, there was no doubt that the Ankara Administrative Court, the Supreme Administrative Court and the Supreme Military Administrative Court had had similar cases referred to them. That being so, the decision of the Supreme Military Administrative Court not to allow their claim under Law no. 3713 had amounted to a conflicting decision as it ran counter to the interpretation made by the Ankara Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court.
40. The applicants further submitted that the Supreme Military Administrative Court had ignored the judgments delivered by the ordinary administrative courts in similar cases – even though they had been brought to its attention – and that this had been in breach of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution. In addition, the applicants argued that a difference of interpretation between two supreme courts in the same country should not have the effect of depriving certain citizens of their rights. In that connection they reiterated their argument that the difference of interpretation between the ordinary administrative courts and the military administrative court had irrevocably infringed the principle of the consistency of the law.
41. They further argued that this conflicting interpretation also undermined the principle of legal certainty, as well as the general principles of law. In that regard the applicants challenged the conclusions of the Chamber, which, while finding it regrettable that different interpretations had been made of the same legal provisions, found that that alone did not suffice to undermine the principle of legal certainty.
42. Lastly, the applicants challenged the decision of the 4th Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court that it had no jurisdiction in their case when other chambers of that court had considered that they did have jurisdiction. In this connection they complained that the Chamber had drawn no conclusion from this fact with regard to Article 6 of the Convention.
2. The Government
43. The Government submitted that in view of the principle of the independence of the courts, the decisions of one court had no binding effect on other courts, belonging to the same or different jurisdictions. Only the decisions of the supreme courts were binding on the lower courts within the hierarchical order of the same jurisdiction. Thus, the various decisions of the ordinary administrative courts had no binding effect either on other ordinary administrative courts or, transversally, on the Supreme Military Administrative Court.
44. The Government further affirmed that the 4th Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court’s decision that it did not have jurisdiction to examine the applicants’ case could not be said to have been arbitrary. The decision had been adopted in conformity with the criteria laid down in the judgment of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court of 14 May 2001, to which reference had been made and which had taken into account the link with military service to establish that jurisdiction lay with the Supreme Military Administrative Court. The Government likewise affirmed that the decision of the Supreme Military Administrative Court could not be said to have been arbitrary either, as it was in conformity with the provisions of section 21 of Law no. 3713: the cause of the plane crash had not been a terrorist attack.
45. The Government submitted that in the light of the legal provisions relating to the Law on the Jurisdiction Disputes Court, the facts of the present case did not concern a conflict of jurisdiction, or conflicting decisions. They maintained that there was no ambiguity or uncertainty as to which court had been competent to judge the applicants’ case and that the domestic law was quite clear on the matter. Article 157 of the Constitution (see paragraph 21 above) stated that the Supreme Military Administrative Court was the body which judicially examined disputes concerning military personnel or military service, and that provision of the Constitution was reproduced in section 20 of the Law on the Supreme Military Administrative Court. In judgments of 14 May 2001 and 11 December 2006 (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above) the Jurisdiction Disputes Court had also confirmed that approach. The applicants’ right to a court had therefore not been restricted by any ambiguity or uncertainty.
46. The Government further maintained that there had been no issue of conflicting interpretations of the law in this case. Referring to section 24 of the Law on the Jurisdiction Disputes Court (see paragraph 24 above) and to the Jurisdiction Disputes Court’s judgment of 22 February 1999 (see paragraph 30 above), they submitted that settlement of conflicting decisions of courts in different jurisdictions occurred only in exceptional situations, where it became impossible to enforce a right established by a court decision. To go beyond the limits of that exceptional circumstance would amount to unlawful interference with the independence of the courts in the different jurisdictions, each of which had its own review machinery to settle conflicts of judgments. The Government referred in this connection to the case of Karakaya v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 30100/06, 25 January 2011).
47. The Government accepted that there were varying interpretations between courts in different jurisdictions, but maintained that it was the right court that had found against the applicants. The configuration of the Turkish courts into different jurisdictions was a matter of judicial organisation. The way in which the High Contracting Parties organised their judicial systems and the jurisdiction of their courts fell within the States’ margin of appreciation. If one court which had jurisdiction in a matter adopted a decision that differed from that of a court which did not have jurisdiction, it would be unfair, the Government argued, to affirm that the latter decision should prevail.
48. Lastly, the Government considered that the present case was unique and differed from other cases concerning conflicting case-law which the Court had had to examine in the past, and that there was therefore no applicable precedent. They added that an unfavourable court decision did not mean that there was a lack of legal certainty in the application of the law.
C. The Court’s assessment
1. General principles
49. The Court reiterates at the outset that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts. It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation (see Brualla Gómez de la Torre v. Spain, 19 December 1997, § 31, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII; Waite and Kennedy v. Germany [GC], no. 26083/94, § 54, ECHR 1999‑I; and Saez Maeso v. Spain, no. 77837/01, § 22, 9 November 2004). Its role is to verify whether the effects of such interpretation are compatible with the Convention (see Kuchoglu v. Bulgaria, no. 48191/99, § 50, 10 May 2007, and Işyar v. Bulgaria, no. 391/03, § 48, 20 November 2008).
50. That being so, save in the event of evident arbitrariness, it is not the Court’s role to question the interpretation of the domestic law by the national courts (see, for example, Ādamsons v. Latvia, no. 3669/03, § 118, 24 June 2008). Similarly, on this subject, it is not in principle its function to compare different decisions of national courts, even if given in apparently similar proceedings; it must respect the independence of those courts (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, § 103, Series A no. 22; Gregório de Andrade v. Portugal, no. 41537/02, § 36, 14 November 2006; and Ādamsons, cited above, § 118).
51. The Court has already acknowledged that the possibility of conflicting court decisions is an inherent trait of any judicial system which is based on a network of trial and appeal courts with authority over the area of their territorial jurisdiction. Such divergences may also arise within the same court. That, in itself, cannot be considered contrary to the Convention (see Santos Pinto v. Portugal, no. 39005/04, § 41, 20 May 2008).
52. The Court has been called upon a number of times to examine cases concerning conflicting court decisions (see, among other authorities, Zielinski and Pradal and Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], nos. 24846/94 and 34165/96 to 34173/96, ECHR 1999‑VII; Paduraru v. Romania, no. 63252/00, ECHR 2005‑XII (extracts); Beian v. Romania (no. 1), no. 30658/05, ECHR 2007‑XIII (extracts); and Iordan Iordanov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 23530/02, 2 July 2009), and has thus had an opportunity to pronounce judgment on the conditions in which conflicting decisions of domestic supreme courts were in breach of the fair trial requirement enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Perez Arias v. Spain, no. 32978/03, § 25, 28 June 2007; Beian (no. 1), cited above, §§ 34‑40; Ştefan and Ştef v. Romania, nos. 24428/03 and 26977/03, §§ 33‑36, 27 January 2009; Iordan Iordanov and Others, cited above, §§ 48‑49; and Schwarzkopf and Taussik v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 42162/02, 2 December 2008).
53. In so doing it has explained the criteria that guided its assessment, which consist in establishing whether “profound and long-standing differences” exist in the case-law of a supreme court, whether the domestic law provides for machinery for overcoming these inconsistencies, whether that machinery has been applied and, if appropriate, to what effect (see Iordan Iordanov and Others, cited above, §§ 49-50).
54. The Court has also been called upon to pronounce judgment on conflicting decisions that may be made within a single court of appeal (see Tudor Tudor v. Romania, no. 21911/03, 24 March 2009) or by different district courts ruling at last instance (see Ştefănică and Others v. Romania, no. 38155/02, 2 November 2010). In addition to the “profound and long‑standing” nature of the divergences in issue, the legal uncertainty resulting from the inconsistency in the practice of the courts concerned and the lack of machinery for resolving the conflicting decisions were also considered to be in breach of the right to a fair trial (see Tudor Tudor, cited above, §§ 30-32, and Ştefănică and Others, cited above, §§ 37-38).
55. In this regard the Court has reiterated on many occasions the importance of setting mechanisms in place to ensure consistency in court practice and uniformity of the courts’ case-law (see Schwarzkopf and Taussik, cited above). It has likewise declared that it is the States’ responsibility to organise their legal systems in such a way as to avoid the adoption of discordant judgments (see Vrioni and Others v. Albania, no. 2141/03, § 58, 24 March 2009; Mullai and Others v. Albania, no. 9074/07, § 86, 23 March 2010; and Brezovec v. Croatia, no. 13488/07, § 66, 29 March 2011).
56. Its assessment of the circumstances brought before it for examination has also always been based on the principle of legal certainty which is implicit in all the Articles of the Convention and constitutes one of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law (see, amongst other authorities, Beian (no. 1), cited above, § 39; Iordan Iordanov and Others, cited above, § 47; and Ştefănică and Others, cited above, § 31). Indeed, uncertainty – be it legal, administrative or arising from practices applied by the authorities – is a factor that must be taken into consideration when examining the conduct of the State (see Păduraru, cited above, § 92; Beian (no. 1), cited above, § 33; and Ştefănică and Others, cited above, § 32).
57. In this regard the Court also reiterates that the right to a fair trial must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which declares the rule of law to be part of the common heritage of the Contracting States. Now, one of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty (see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999‑VII), which, inter alia, guarantees a certain stability in legal situations and contributes to public confidence in the courts (see, mutatis mutandis, Ştefănică and Others, cited above, § 38). The persistence of conflicting court decisions, on the other hand, can create a state of legal uncertainty likely to reduce public confidence in the judicial system, whereas such confidence is clearly one of the essential components of a State based on the rule of law (see Paduraru, cited above, § 98; Vinčić and Others v. Serbia, nos. 44698/06 and others, § 56, 1 December 2009; and Ştefănică and Others, cited above, § 38).
58. The Court points out, however, that the requirements of legal certainty and the protection of the legitimate confidence of the public do not confer an acquired right to consistency of case-law (see Unédic v. France, no. 20153/04, § 74, 18 December 2008). Case-law development is not, in itself, contrary to the proper administration of justice since a failure to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk hindering reform or improvement (see Atanasovski v. “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, no. 36815/03, § 38, 14 January 2010).
2. Application of these principles to the present case
(a) Preliminary remarks
59. The Court observes at the outset that the present case differs from those it has had the opportunity to examine in the past in that what is at issue here is not conflicting decisions in the case-law of courts of final jurisdiction within the same branch of the judicial system, but rather alleged disparities between the judgments of two hierarchically unrelated, different and independent types of court.
60. That being so, it considers that having been formulated in a substantially different context from the instant case, the criteria and principles developed in the above-mentioned case-law cannot be transposed as such to the present case, which, although it concerns a type of complaint on which the Court has already had the opportunity to rule, nevertheless raises a new legal question. They may, however, guide it in its assessment of the circumstances of this case. The Court shall therefore first consider whether there have been conflicting court decisions in the present case; if so, it will then examine whether, in the light of the particular circumstances of the present case, those conflicting decisions amounted to a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
(b) Whether there were conflicting decisions
61. The Court reiterates that giving two disputes different treatment cannot be considered to give rise to conflicting case-law when this is justified by a difference in the factual situations at issue (see Erol Uçar v. Turkey (dec.), no. 12960/05, 29 September 2009). In the present case it appears from the evidence before the Court that the difference the applicants complained of resides not in the factual situations examined by the different domestic courts, which were identical, but in the application of the substantive law and the resulting res judicata.
62. In this regard, the Court points out that the parties submitted several decisions by the national courts concerning the families of servicemen who died in the same plane crash as the applicants’ son. On reading those decisions, it notes first of all that the servicemen concerned fall into two categories: those whose mission was to fight terrorism, and the crew of the aircraft (see paragraphs 17 and 25-26 above).
63. It further notes that the different cases brought before the ordinary administrative courts on which the applicants rely in their allegation concerned appeals by the families of victims of the accident in question against the decision of the Turkish Pension Fund rejecting, inter alia, their applications for a pension under Law no. 3713.
64. Lastly, the Court observes from the materials in the case file that fourteen of the cases brought by the victims’ families were examined on the merits by the ordinary administrative courts, which established a causal link between the plane crash and the fight against terrorism – a sine qua non condition for entitlement to the rights provided for in section 21 of Law no. 3713 – without making any distinction in respect of the type of duties performed by the deceased servicemen (see paragraphs 25-26 above).
65. The ordinary administrative courts thus found in favour of the claimants; their interpretation of the conditions of application of Law no. 3713 differed from that of the Supreme Military Administrative Court, which, in the applicants’ case, found no such causal link and dismissed their application to set aside the decision of the Pension Fund (see paragraph 16 above).
66. This difference of interpretation resulted in the different legal treatment by the two types of court of what were essentially similar cases. Diametrically opposite conclusions were thus reached by the ordinary administrative courts (Ankara Administrative Court and Supreme Administrative Court) and the Supreme Military Administrative Court. The Government have, moreover, accepted the existence of these different interpretations (see paragraph 47 above). It is worth noting here that in the decision pronounced by the Supreme Military Administrative Court in the applicants’ case no mention was made of any differences capable of distinguishing their case from those examined by the ordinary administrative courts (see paragraph 16 above).
67. Clearly, then, the Court is faced with a very rare case where the circumstances and consequences of the same event – a plane crash – were interpreted differently by the domestic courts. Having said that, it should be remembered that the mere finding of a conflict of case-law is not sufficient in itself to constitute a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. The Court has to measure the impact of the conflicting case-law in terms of the principle of a fair trial and, in particular, against the yardstick of the principle of legal certainty.
(c) Whether the conflicting decisions resulted in a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
68. First of all, the Court observes that the issue of conflicting decisions in the circumstances of the present case is linked to the very organisational structure of the Turkish court system, where ordinary administrative courts, with general jurisdiction, coexist alongside a military administrative court, with special jurisdiction (see paragraphs 20-21 and 45 above). This, however, is just one example among others of the variety of legal systems existing in Europe, and it is not the Court’s task to standardise them (see, mutatis mutandis, Taxquet v. Belgium [GC], no. 926/05, § 83, 16 November 2010).
69. Furthermore, in cases arising from individual petitions the Court’s task is not to review the relevant legislation or an impugned practice in the abstract. Instead, it must confine itself, as far as possible, without losing sight of the general context, to examining the issues raised by the case before it (see, among other authorities, N.C. v. Italy [GC], no. 24952/94, § 56, ECHR 2002–X, and Taxquet, cited above, § 83).
70. Here, therefore, the Court’s task is not to review, in abstracto, the compatibility with the Convention of Turkey’s court system, with its two different types of administrative court, but to determine, in concreto, the effect of the resulting conflict of case-law on the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, for example and mutatis mutandis, Padovani v. Italy, 26 February 1993, § 24, Series A no. 257‑B).
71. The Court observes, first of all, that the impugned conflicting judicial decisions concerning the interpretation of section 21 of Law no. 3713 were the result of simultaneous intervention by the ordinary administrative courts and the Supreme Military Administrative Court in cases raising essentially the same issue (see paragraphs 62-66 above). This reveals a conflict of jurisdiction between these two types of court which were called upon to give judgment, in parallel, on the same legal issue.
72. The Court therefore agrees with the Chamber’s finding that the origin of the conflicting decisions the applicants complained of lies in the fact that these different courts failed to respect the boundaries of their respective jurisdictions (see Chamber judgment, § 57).
73. Having said that, in view of the Government’s arguments that there was no doubt whatsoever that the Supreme Military Administrative Court had jurisdiction in the case at issue here (see paragraph 45 above), the Court notes that the Jurisdiction Disputes Court – established, inter alia, to settle conflicts of jurisdiction between the ordinary, administrative and military courts (see paragraphs 22 and 24 above) – has had occasion to rule on the question of the areas of jurisdiction of the ordinary administrative courts and the Supreme Military Administrative Court.
74. In so doing, it ruled that the Supreme Military Administrative Court had jurisdiction in cases concerning military pensions or allowances (see paragraphs 31‑32 above). Indeed, when the 4th Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court declared that the action brought by the applicants was outside its jurisdiction, and was rather a matter for the Supreme Military Administrative Court (see paragraph 14 above), it referred to the Jurisdiction Disputes Court’s judgment of 14 May 2001 (see paragraph 31 above).
75. The Chamber found in this connection that the intervention of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court had helped to settle the divergence between the positions of the ordinary administrative courts and the military administrative court as regards their respective spheres of competence, bringing to an end, in principle, the intervention of the ordinary administrative courts in an area that fell under the jurisdiction of the military administrative court (see Chamber judgment, §§ 57-58).
76. The Grand Chamber, however, does not share these conclusions. Having regard to the evidence adduced by the parties, it observes that in spite of the intervention of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court and its ruling that the Supreme Military Administrative Court had jurisdiction in the type of case in question, the ordinary administrative courts continued to accept cases similar to that of the applicants and to rule on the merits (see paragraphs 25‑27 above).
77. According to the Government’s explanations at the hearing before the Grand Chamber, while “decisions of principle” of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court concerning jurisdiction are binding, its other judgments merely have the value and authority of precedents meant to guide the domestic courts in their deliberations. A decision is “of principle” when it actually states as much.
78. In the present case the Court notes that the judgments of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court to which the Government referred (see paragraphs 44‑45 above) in support of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Military Administrative Court were not decisions of principle, and that they have failed to impose themselves, by their sheer power of persuasion, on all the ordinary administrative courts, which have continued to examine – and to allow – claims similar to the applicants’ (see paragraphs 25-27 above).
79. Having said that, and no matter what weight the ordinary administrative courts elected to give to the judgments of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court in question, the Court emphasises that in any event the role of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court is not to resolve conflicts of case-law. Although it does have the power to settle conflicts of judgments between different courts, it can do so only in the exceptional situation where the judgments are so irreconcilable that their execution would result in a denial of justice for the party concerned (see paragraphs 24 and 30 above), a situation which does not arise in the instant case. Its intervention thus has no bearing on the complaint the applicants have brought before the Court.
80. The Court points out that it has already indicated that, once identified, conflicts of case-law should, in principle, be settled by establishing the interpretation to be followed and harmonising the case-law, through mechanisms vested with such powers (see among many other authorities, Beian (no. 1), cited above, §§ 37 and 39). It should be noted, however, that these principles were laid down in cases where the divergent interpretations the Court had to examine had come about within the same branch of the judicial system, in connection with legal provisions in respect of which a Supreme Court could exercise its unifying powers (see paragraph 59 above – see also, amongst other authorities, Beian (no. 1), cited above, § 37, and Schwarzkopf and Taussik, cited above).
81. While such considerations obtain where the conflicting decisions arise within a hierarchical judicial structure, they cannot be transposed to the present case. The Court considers that in a domestic legal context characterised, as in the present case, by the existence of several Supreme Courts not subject to any common judicial hierarchy, it cannot demand the implementation of a vertical review mechanism of the approach those courts have chosen to take. To make such a demand would go beyond the requirements of a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
82. What is more, the Court points out that the lack of a common regulatory authority shared by the Supreme Courts – in this case the Supreme Administrative Court and the Supreme Military Administrative Court – capable of establishing the interpretation these courts should follow, is not a specificity of the Turkish judicial system. Numerous European States whose judicial systems feature two or more Supreme Courts have no such authority (see paragraph 34 above). In itself, however, this cannot be considered to be in breach of the Convention.
83. The Court further considers that in a judicial system like that of Turkey, with several different branches of courts, and where several Supreme Courts exist side by side and are required to give interpretations of the law at the same time and in parallel, achieving consistency of the law may take time, and periods of conflicting case-law may therefore be tolerated without undermining legal certainty.
84. As case-law is not unchanging, but on the contrary, evolutive in essence, the Court considers that the principle of good administration of justice cannot be taken to impose a strict requirement of case-law consistency (see Unédic, cited above, § 73, and Atanasovski, cited above, § 38). However, it is the Court’s duty to ensure that this principle is upheld when it considers that the fairness of the proceedings or the rule of law require it to intervene to put a stop to the uncertainty created by conflicting judgments pronounced by different courts on one and the same question. The legal certainty it then aims to achieve must nevertheless be pursued with due respect for the decision-making autonomy and independence of the domestic courts, in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity at the basis of the Convention system.
85. In this connection, the Court reiterates that interpretation is inherent in the work of the judiciary. However clearly drafted a legal provision may be, there is an inevitable element of judicial interpretation (see, amongst other authorities, Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 23536/94 and 24408/94, § 39, ECHR 1999‑IV). Determining what law to apply and in what conditions is part of this individualised approach to the law.
86. This means that two courts, each with its own area of jurisdiction, examining different cases may very well arrive at divergent but nevertheless rational and reasoned conclusions regarding the same legal issue raised by similar factual circumstances. It must be accepted that the divergences of approach that may thus arise between courts are merely the inevitable outcome of this process of interpreting legal provisions and adapting them to the material situations they are intended to cover.
87. These divergences may be tolerated when the domestic legal system is capable of accommodating them. In the instant case, the Court considers that the supreme courts in question – the Supreme Administrative Court and the Supreme Military Administrative Court – have the possibility of settling the divergences themselves, either by deciding to take the same approach, or by respecting the boundaries of their respective areas of jurisdiction and refraining from both intervening in the same area of the law.
88. Just as it is not for the Court to act as a court of third or fourth instance and review the choices of the domestic courts concerning the interpretation of legal provisions and the inconsistencies that may result, nor is it its role, it would like to emphasise, to intervene simply because there have been conflicting court decisions.
89. For the Court, where there is no evidence of arbitrariness, examining the existence and the impact of such conflicting decisions does not mean examining the wisdom of the approach the domestic courts have chosen to take (see Vinčić and Others, cited above, § 56; Işık v. Turkey (dec.), no. 35224/05, 16 June 2009; and Ivanov and Dimitrov v. “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, no. 46881/06, § 32, 21 October 2010). As stated above (see paragraph 50), its role in respect of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is limited to cases where the impugned decision is manifestly arbitrary.
90. Therefore, even though the interpretation made by the Supreme Military Administrative Court of section 21 of Law no. 3713 was unfavourable to the applicants, that interpretation, however unjust it might appear to them compared with the solution adopted by the ordinary administrative courts, does not, in itself, constitute a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
91. It should also be noted – in the light of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court’s finding (see paragraphs 31-32 above) that the Supreme Military Administrative Court was the body with jurisdiction to examine the type of dispute at issue here – that in the circumstances of the present case the decision of the 4th Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court that it did not have jurisdiction in the applicants’ case was not at all arbitrary.
92. Nor can the applicants claim to have been denied justice as a result of the examination of their dispute by the Supreme Military Administrative Court, or the conclusion it reached. The decision adopted by the Supreme Military Administrative Court in the applicants’ case fell within the bounds of its jurisdiction and there is nothing in it that, in itself, would warrant the intervention of the Court.
93. It should be noted that the judgments concerning the applicants were duly reasoned, in terms of the facts and the law (see paragraphs 16 and 19 above), and that the interpretation made by the Supreme Military Administrative Court of the facts submitted to it for examination cannot be said to have been arbitrary, unreasonable or capable of affecting the fairness of the proceedings, but was simply a case of application of the domestic law.
94. In view of the above, the Court reiterates that it must avoid any unjustified interference in the exercise by the States of their judicial functions or in the organisation of their judicial systems. Responsibility for the consistency of their decisions lies primarily with the domestic courts and any intervention by the Court should remain exceptional.
95. In the present case the Court considers that the circumstances require no such intervention and that it is not its role to seek a solution to the impugned conflict of case-law vis-à-vis Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In any event, individual petition to the Court cannot be used as a means of dealing with or eliminating conflicts of case-law that may arise in domestic law or as a review mechanism for rectifying inconsistencies in the decisions of the different domestic courts.
96. Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Holds, by ten votes to seven, that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 20 October 2011.
Michael O’BoyleNicolas Bratza
Deputy RegistrarPresident
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judges Bratza, Casadevall, Vajić, Spielmann, Rozakis, Kovler and Mijović is annexed to this judgment.
N.B.
M.O.B.
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES BRATZA, CASADEVALL, VAJIĆ, SPIELMANN, ROZAKIS, KOVLER AND MIJOVIĆ
(Translation)
1. Unlike the majority, we believe that there was a violation of Article 6 of the Convention in this case.
2. To put things in perspective, we would make clear from the outset that at the heart of this case is not the fact that the Supreme Military Administrative Court’s interpretation of Article 21 of Law no. 3713 was unfavourable to the applicants. Nor is the case concerned with whether or not the decision of the 4th Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court that it did not have jurisdiction in the applicants’ case was arbitrary, or whether the judgments concerning the applicants were duly reasoned in terms of the facts and the law (paragraphs 90-93 of the judgment). Nor, contrary to the suggestion in the judgment, does the case concern merely “ the exercise by the States of their judicial functions or ... the organisation of their judicial systems” (paragraph 94); rather, it concerns, in our view, a “flagrant malfunctioning” of the Turkish judicial system, which resulted in a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
3. In reality, the lack of an effective mechanism for harmonising the case-law not only caused but, worse, perpetuated conflicts of case-law between the ordinary and the military administrative courts which led, in the instant case, to results that gave an impression of “arbitrariness”. In addition to that, conflicts of case-law continue to exist within the administrative court system.
4. We emphasise that, as is pointed out in paragraph 57 of the judgment, the right to a fair trial must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which declares the rule of law to be part of the common heritage of the Contracting States. One of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty (see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999 VII), which, inter alia, guarantees a certain stability in legal situations and contributes to public confidence in the courts (see, mutatis mutandis, Ştefănică and Others, no. 38155/02, § 38, 2 November 2010). The persistence of conflicting court decisions can, on the contrary, create a state of legal uncertainty likely to reduce public confidence in the judicial system, a confidence which is clearly one of the essential components of a State based on the rule of law (see Păduraru v. Romania, no. 63252/00, § 98, ECHR 2005‑XII (extracts); Vinčić and Others v. Serbia, nos. 44698/06 and others, § 56, 1 December 2009; and Ştefănică and Others, cited above, § 38).
5. It is true that the principle of the independence of the courts relied on by the Government (paragraph 43 of the judgment) and the resulting autonomy enjoyed by the courts in their decision-making may explain why different interpretations can be made of the same texts at different levels of the court system. In our opinion, however, such interpretations must not have the effect of placing the public in a situation of legal uncertainty where the outcome of a case is dependent on a mechanism incapable of guaranteeing consistency in court decisions. The ability of the domestic legal system to maintain stability in legal situations and consistency in court decisions is decisive in preserving public confidence in the administration of justice.
6. In the instant case the applicants were first faced with flagrant inconsistency within the same branch of the court system. We note in this regard that the applicants challenged the decision of the 4th Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court that it did not have jurisdiction in their case when other chambers of that court had considered that they did have jurisdiction to examine similar cases (paragraph 42 of the judgment). Within the same administrative court structure the autonomy of the numerous judicial formations and the assignment of the cases to the different formations led to conflicting case-law in the form of two discordant interpretations concerning that court’s jurisdiction.
7. Indeed, on three occasions – one of which was in the applicant’s case – the 4th and 5th Chambers of the Ankara Administrative Court found that they did not have jurisdiction to examine cases concerning the rights regulated by Article 21 of Law no. 3713 (paragraph 14, 28 and 29 of the judgment), considering such cases to be a matter for the Supreme Military Administrative Court. This was not the approach adopted by other chambers of the same court, which in fourteen cases comparable to that of the applicants, had accepted to examine the applications submitted by the families of other servicemen who had died in the same accident on 16 May 2001, and found in their favour (paragraphs 25-27 of the judgment). This is a fundamental aspect of the case. There is no doubt that the case-law context in which the applicants’ appeal was heard was marked by the variable approach of the different chambers of the Ankara Administrative Court to the question of jurisdiction in cases concerning military pension rights.
8. It is our opinion that this inconsistency of approach over the jurisdiction of the courts to examine substantially identical legal issues arising out of an identical event (in this case a plane crash in which a number of people died) is fundamentally problematic with respect to Article 6 of the Convention.
9. It is important to recall that the question of jurisdiction was decisive for the outcome of the case: most of the decisions of the ordinary administrative courts acknowledged a causal link between the plane crash and the fight against terrorism, so it is highly likely that if their action had not been redirected towards the Supreme Military Administrative Court, the applicants, like the families of some of the other occupants of the plane, would have succeeded in their claims. The manner in which the Supreme Military Administrative Court interpreted the circumstances of the plane crash of 16 May 2001 led to a difference of treatment of the applicants compared with others who had submitted claims similar to theirs. While the applicants had informed the military court of the position adopted by the ordinary administrative courts in similar cases (paragraphs 15 and 18 of the judgment), the military court completely ignored that position, without giving reasons and without taking any account of the risk of a divergence – even a synchronic one. Nor did it explain what factual differences distinguished the case in issue from those relied on by the applicants to support their claim (paragraphs 16 and 66). As a result, the same factual situation and the same legal provisions were interpreted differently by two types of court.
10. It is true that the Jurisdiction Disputes Court – established, inter alia, to settle conflicts of jurisdiction between the ordinary, administrative and military courts (paragraphs 22 and 24 of the judgment) – has had occasion to rule on the question of the areas of jurisdiction of the ordinary administrative courts and the Supreme Military Administrative Court and lay down the criteria for establishing the jurisdiction of the latter court (paragraphs 31-32). In so doing, the Jurisdiction Disputes Court ruled that the Supreme Military Administrative Court had jurisdiction in cases concerning military pensions or allowances (paragraphs 31-32). Indeed, when the 4th Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court declared that the action brought by the applicants was outside its jurisdiction, and was rather a matter for the Supreme Military Administrative Court (paragraph 14 of the judgment), it referred to the Jurisdiction Disputes Court’s judgment of 14 May 2001 (paragraph 31).
11. However, the resolution by the Jurisdiction Disputes Court of the conflict between the two courts was theoretical and illusory.
12. In spite of the intervention of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court and its ruling that the Supreme Military Administrative Court had jurisdiction in the type of case in question, the ordinary administrative courts continued to accept cases similar to that of the applicants and to rule on the merits (paragraphs 25-27). In this context the Government’s explanations at the hearing before the Grand Chamber were particularly revealing as regards the inefficacy of the conflict settlement process; they were based on a subtle distinction between judgments “of principle” and other judgments. Judgments “of principle” of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court concerning jurisdiction are apparently binding, while its other judgments merely have the value and authority of precedents meant to guide the domestic courts in their deliberations. We were also told that a judgment was a judgment “of principle” when it actually stated as much, and that the judgments of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court attributing jurisdiction to the Supreme Military Administrative Court (paragraphs 44-45 of the judgment) did not fall into this prestigious category.
13. As a mechanism for settling conflicts the Jurisdiction Disputes Court thus proved insufficient to either prevent or finally settle the legal uncertainty resulting from the variable interpretation by the ordinary administrative courts of their own jurisdiction in cases concerning the pension rights provided for in Law no. 3713 (paragraphs 28-29 and 76-77). The judgments of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court to which the Government referred have clearly failed to impose themselves on all the ordinary administrative courts by their sheer power of persuasion alone (paragraphs 25-27). This means that in spite of the intervention of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court, the uncertainty as to the distribution of jurisdiction between the ordinary administrative courts and the military administrative court seems to persist. The lack of a decision on jurisdiction binding on all the courts concerned can only serve to prolong the resulting conflict in the case-law and the corresponding uncertainty.
14. On the specific subject of inconsistency with respect to the merits of the case, the conflicting judicial decisions concerning the interpretation of section 21 of Law no. 3713 were the result of simultaneous intervention by the ordinary administrative courts and the Supreme Military Administrative Court in what were essentially similar cases (paragraphs 62-66). The conflict of jurisdiction between these two types of court which were called upon to give judgment, in parallel, on the same legal issue thus gave rise to legal uncertainty which the Turkish judicial system was unable to accommodate.
15. Consequently, we consider that a violation of the right to a fair hearing was caused by a malfunctioning of the machinery set in place to settle conflicts of jurisdiction, coupled with inconsistency in court decisions concerning cases having their origin in the same factual situation. The disagreement between the different chambers of the Ankara Administrative Court as to whether they had jurisdiction was compounded in the present case by the different line of reasoning adopted by the Supreme Military Administrative Court compared with the ordinary administrative courts concerning the conditions of application of section 21 of Law no. 3713.
16. While domestic legal systems may comprise a variety of judicial structures, these structures should not give any appearance of arbitrariness in the public eye; when taking legal action litigants should be able to make decisions with a sufficient degree of foreseeability and based on clear, common and stable criteria.
17. If justice is not to degenerate into a lottery, the scope of litigants’ rights should not depend simply on which court hears their case. The fact that litigants can receive diametrically opposite answers to the same legal question depending on which type of court examines their case can only undermine the credibility of the courts and weaken public confidence in the judicial system.
18. For all these reasons we believe that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
[1]1. As amended by Law no. 5532 of 18 July 2006, which replaced the reference to “public servants” in the first paragraph with “public employees”.
[2]1. It appears that the proceedings are still pending.
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