Janovjec i drugi protiv Rusije

Država na koju se presuda odnosi
Rusija
Institucija
Evropski sud za ljudska prava
Broj predstavke
55508/07, 29520/09
Stepen važnosti
Referentni slučaj
Jezik
Srpski
Datum
21.10.2013
Članovi
2
2-1
3
34
35
35-3-a
38
41
Kršenje
38
Nekršenje
3
Ključne reči po HUDOC/UN
(Čl. 2) Pravo na život
(Čl. 2-1) Efikasna istraga
(Čl. 3) Zabrana torture
(Čl. 3 / CAT-16) Ponižavajuće postupanje
(Čl. 3 / CAT-16) Nečovečno postupanje
(Čl. 34) Pojedinačne predstavke
(Čl. 34) Ometanje vršenja prava predstavke
(Čl. 35) Uslovi prihvatljivosti
(Čl. 35-3-a) Ratione personae
(Čl. 35-3-a) Ratione temporis
(Čl. 38-1-a) Ispitivanje predmeta
(Čl. 38-1-a) Obaveza obezbeđivanja svih neophodnih uslova
(Čl. 41) Pravično zadovoljenje - opšte
Tematske ključne reči
VS deskriptori
Zbirke
Sudska praksa
Presuda ESLJP
Veliko veće
Sažetak
Postupak u ovom predmetu je pokrenut dvema predstavkama protiv Ruske Federacije, koju je Sudu podnelo petnaest državljana Poljske (podnosioci predstavke), sredinom novembra 2007.g. i krajem maja 2009.g. Podnosioci žive u Poljskoj i SAD. U postupak se umešala država Poljska. Predstavka je prvobitno dodeljena Veću. Odlučeno je da se predstavkama da prvenstvo, na osnovu člana 41 Poslovnika Suda. Odlukom od početka jula 2011.g. Sud je spojio predstavke. Nakon odluke Veća, podnosioci su tražili da se predmet prosledi Velikom veću.

Kada je Nemačka izvršila invaziju na Poljsku otpočeo je Drugi svetski rat. SSSR je sebi pripojio deo istočne teritorije Poljske i proglasio da deo poljskih državljana koji su tamo živeli od tada postaju sovjetski državljani. Deo vojnika, graničara, policajaca je pritvoren, a neki su poslati u logor. Predloženo je da deo poljskih ratnih zarobljenika bude streljan, jer predstavljaju opasnost za novi sovjetski režim. Streljanja su izvršena u aprilu i maju 1940.g. Okolnosti pod kojima su pogubljeni i dalje su nepoznate. Nakon što je okrivena masovna grobnica, komisija je zaključila da su sovjetske vlasti odgovorne za masakr. Sovjetske vlasti su krivicu svalile na Nemce.

Podnosioci predstavke su ili bili u logoru ili su direktni (pobočni) srodnici lica koja su bila zatočena u logoru. Godine 1990., ruski predsednik Gorbačov je poljskom predsedniku predao relevantnu dokumentaciju. Pokrenuta je ktivična istraga o poreklu masovnih grobnica. Rusija je odbila zahtev Suda da dostavi odluku od 21.9.2004.g., tvrdivši da je reč o dokumentu koji je označen kao tajni.

NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 2 KONVENCIJE
- Procesni aspekt – da se sprovede odgovarajuća i delotvorna istraga;
- Pravo na život svake osobeje zaštićeno zakonom.
Veće je smatralo da Sud nema vremensku nadležnost da odlučuje o ovom pitanju. Sud ima vremensku nadležnost da postupa od momenta kada je država ugovornica ratifikovala Konvenciju. Sud smatra da procesna odgovornost države, koja proističe iz člana 2 Konvencije, predstavlja odvojeno pitanje. Samo procesne radnje i/ili propusti koji su se dogodili nakon stupanja Konvencije na snagu u državi ugovornici spadaju u vremensku nadležnost Suda. Potrebno je da postoji „suštinska veza“ između događaja koji je sve pokrenuo i stupanja Konvencije na snagu, u odnosu na tuženu državu ((pre svega vremenska povezanost). Test „vrednosti Konvencije“ – potreba da se obezbedi stvarna i delotvorna zaštita za garancije i temeljne vrednosti Konvencije (vanredna kategorija povreda).Uzimajući sve u obzir, Sud smatra da nema nadležnost da ispita pritužbe prema članu 2 Konvencije (13:4).

NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 3 KONVENCIJE
- Niko ne sme biti podvrgnut mučenju ili nečovečnom ili ponižavajućem postupanju ili kažnjavanju.
Podnosioci su se žalili da je produženo poricanje istorijske činjenice i prikrivanje informacija o sudbini njihovih rođaka, zajedno sa prezrivim i protivrečnim odgovorima ruskih organa vlasti na njihove zahteve da im se pruže informacije, predstavljalo nečovečno ili ponižavajuće ponašanje. Sud smatra da patnje podnosilaca nisu dostigle razmere i karakter koji se razlikuju od emotivne patnje za koju se može reći da je neizbežna za rođake žrtava ozbiljnih povreda ljudskih prava. Nije došlo do povrede člana 3 Konvencije (12:5).

POŠTOVANJE ČLANA 38 KONVENCIJE OD STRANE TUŽENE DRŽAVE
- Odbijanjetužene države da dostavi Sudu kopiju odluke od 21.09.2004.g., kojom je obustavljena istraga o masakru u Katinu.
Tužena država je propustila da ispuni svoje obaveze po osnovu ovog člana (jednoglasno).

PRIMENA ČLANA 41 KONVENCIJE
- Pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj stranci.
Zahtev podnosilaca za pravično zadovoljenje je odbijen (12:5).
Odluka Suda nije u celosti jednoglasna.

Preuzmite presudu u pdf formatu

 EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA  

VELIKO VEĆE

PREDMET JANOVJEC I DRUGI PROTIV RUSIJE

(predstavke br. 55508/07 i 29520/09)

PRESUDA

STRAZBUR

21. oktobar 2013.

Ova presuda je pravosnažna ali može biti predmet redakcijskih izmena.

U predmetu Janovjec i drugi protiv Rusije, Evropski sud za ljudska prava, zasedajući u Velikom veću u sastavu:

Jozep Kasadeval (Josep Casadevall), predsednik,
Gvido Rajmondi (Guido Raimondi),
Ineta Ziemele,
Izabel Bero-Lefevr (Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre),
Korneliu Birsan (Corneliu Bîrsan),
Per Lorencen (Peer Lorenzen),
Alvina Gjulumjan (Gyulumyan),
Hanlar Hađijev (Khanlar Hajiyev),
Dragoljub Popović,
Luis Lopez Gvera (López Guerra),
Kristina Pardalos,
Vinsent (Vincent) A. de Gaetano,
Džulija Lafrank (Julia Laffranque),
Helen Keler (Keller),
Helena Jederblom (Jäderblom),
Kšištof Vojtiček (Krzysztof Wojtyczek),
Dmitri (Dmitry) Dedov, sudije,
i Erik Friberg (Fribergh), sekretar,

Nakon većanja zatvorenog za javnost 13. februara i 5. septembra 2013. godine, Izriče sledeću presudu, usvojenu 5. septembra 2013. godine:

POSTUPAK

  1. Predmet je formiran na osnovu dve predstavke (br. 55508/07 i 29520/09) koje je Sudu protiv Ruske Federacije podnelo petnaest državljana Poljske (u daljem tekstu: podnosioci predstavki) 19. novembra 2007, odnosno 24. maja 2009. godine, shodno članu 34 Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: Konvencija)
  2. Imena podnosilaca predstavki navedena su u stavovima 25 i 37 u donjem tekstu. Oni žive u Poljskoj i Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama. Podnosioce Janovjeca i Tribovskog (Trybowski) pred Sudom je zastupao J. Ševčik (Szewczyk), poljski advokat koji radi u Varšavi. Ostale podnosioce su zastupali profesor I. Kaminjski (Kamiński) iz Instituta za pravne nauke (Institute of Legal Studies), i R. Novošelski (Nowosielski) i B. Sohanjski (Sochański), poljski advokati koji rade u Gdanjsku, odnosno Šćećinu, kao i R. Karpinskij (Karpinskiy) i A. Stavickaja (Stavitskaya), ruski advokati koji rade u Moskvi.
  3. Državu Rusiju (u daljem tekstu: Država) je zastupao G. Matjuškin (Matyushkin), predstavnik Ruske Federacije u Evropskom sudu za ljudska prava.
  4. Državu Poljsku, koja se umešala u postupak u skladu sa članom 36, st. 1 Konvencije, najpre je zastupao njen zastupnik pred Sudom, J. Volosevič (Wołąsiewicz) iz Ministarstva spoljnih poslova, a zatim koagent, A. Mežikovska (Mężykowska).
  5. Predstavke su dodeljene Petom odeljenju Suda (pravilo 52, st. 1 Poslovnika Suda). Predsednik Odeljenja odlučio je 7. oktobra 2008. i 24. novembra 2009. godine da predstavke dostavi Rusiji i Poljskoj. Takođe je odlučeno da se predstavkama da prvenstvo u smislu člana 41 Poslovnika Suda.
  6. Odlukom od 5. jula 2011. godine Sud je spojio predstavke. Takođe je odlučeno da se prigovor Države koji se odnosio na vremensku nadležnost Suda u pogledu pritužbe koja se ticala procesnog aspekta člana 2 Konvencije razmatra zajedno s meritumom, i predstavke su proglašene delimično prihvatljivim.
  7. Šesnaestog aprila 2012. godine veće Petog odeljenja sastavljeno od sudija: Dina Špilmana (Dean Spielmann), predsednika, Karela Jungvirta (Jungwiert), Boštjana M. Zupančiča, Anatolija (Anatoly) Kovlera, Marka Filigera (Villiger), Gane Judkivske (Ganna Yudkivska) i Angelike Nusberger (Nußberger) donelo je presudu. Veće je s četiri glasa prema tri zaključilo da nije u mogućnosti da razmatra osnovanost pritužbe u pogledu člana 2 Konvencije, s pet glasova prema dva zaključilo da je došlo do povrede člana 3 Konvencije u odnosu na deset podnosilaca predstavki, i jednoglasno da nije došlo do povrede te odredbe u odnosu na ostale podnosioce. Takođe je zaključilo s četiri glasa prema tri da tužena Država nije poštovala obaveze koje ima prema članu 38 Konvencije.
  8. Petog jula 2012. godine podnosioci predstavki tražili su da predmet bude prosleđen Velikom veću na osnovu člana 43 Konvencije i pravila 73 Poslovnika Suda. Panel Velikog veća usvojio je ovaj zahtev 24. septembra 2012. godine.
  9. Sastav Velikog veća određen je u skladu s odredbama člana 26, st. 4 i 5 i pravila 24.
  10. I podnosioci predstavki i Država su Velikom veću dostavili pismene podneske.
  11. Nakon toga, predsednik Velikog veća dozvolio je sledećim organizacijama da podnesu pisane komentare kao treće strane, u skladu sa članom 36, st. 2 Konvencije: Open Society Justice Initiative, Amnesty International i Public International Law and Policy Group. Grupi od tri nevladine organizacije – Memorial, European Human Rights Advocacy Centre i Transitional Justice Network – takođe je dozvoljeno da kao treće strane podnesu zajednički pisani podnesak.
  12. Javno zasedanje je održano u zgradi Suda u Strazburu 13. februara 2013. godine (u skladu sa pravilom 59, st. 3 Poslovnika Suda).

Pred Sudom su se pojavili:

(a) u ime Države G. MATJUŠKIN, zastupnik Države pred Sudom,
N. MIHAJLOV (MIKHAYLOV),
P. SMIRNOV, savetnici;

(b) u ime podnosilaca predstavki
J. ŠEVČIK,
I. KAMINJSKI,
B. SOHANJSKI, zastupnici;

(c) u ime Poljske
M. ŠPUNAR (SZPUNAR), zamenik ministra spoljnih poslova,
A. MEŽIKOVSKA, koagent,
V. ŠABAS (W. SCHABAS), savetnik.

Sudu su se obratili Ševčik, Kaminjski i Sohanjski u ime podnosilaca predstavki, Matjuškin u ime tužene Države i Mežikovska u ime Poljske.

ČINJENICE

I.  OKOLNOSTI SLUČAJA

  1. Činjenice ovog slučaja, kako su ih predstavile strane u postupku ili u meri u kojoj među stranama nisu sporne, mogu se ukratko izložiti kao u nastavku.

A.  Pozadina slučaja

  1. Dvadeset trećeg avgusta 1939. godine ministri spoljnih poslova Sovjetskog Saveza i nacističke Nemačke potpisali su ugovor o nenapadanju (poznat kao „Pakt Ribentrop-Molotov“) koji je sadržao i dodatni tajni protokol kojim su se strane saglasile o „pitanju granica njihovih zona uticaja u Istočnoj Evropi“. Konkretno, zaključile su sledeće:

„2.  U slučaju teritorijalnih ili političkih promena u oblastima koje pripadaju poljskoj državi, zone uticaja Nemačke i SSSR biće okvirno razgraničene linijama reka Narev, Visla i San.“

  1. Prvog septembra 1939. godine Nemačka je izvršila invaziju na Poljsku, čime je započela Drugi svetski rat. Sedamnaestog septembra 1939. godine sovjetska Crvena armija umarširala je na teritoriju Poljske, navodno da bi zaštitila Ukrajince i Beloruse koji su živeli u istočnom delu Poljske, jer se poljska država urušila pod nemačkim napadom i više nije mogla da garantuje bezbednost sopstvenih državljana. Poljska vojska nije pružila vojni otpor. SSSR je sebi pripojio teritoriju koja je došla pod njegovu kontrolu i u novembru 1939. godine proglasio da su 13.5 miliona poljskih državljana koji su tamo živeli od tog trenutka sovjetski državljani.
  2. Uoči napredovanja Crvene armije pritvoreno je oko 250.000 poljskih vojnika, graničara, policajaca, čuvara zatvora, državnih službenika i drugih funkcionera. Nakon što su razoružani, neki od njih su oslobođeni; drugi su poslati u posebne logore koje je ustanovio NKVD (Narodni komesarijat za unutrašnje poslove, prethodnik KGB) u Kozelsk, Ostaškov i Starobelsk. Devetog oktobra 1939. godine odlučeno je da poljski oficirski kadar bude smešten u logorima u Kozelsku i Starobelsku, a preostali službenici, uključujući policajce i čuvare zatvora, u Ostaškov.
  3. Početkom marta 1940. godine L. Beria, koji je bio na čelu NKVD, predložio je J. Staljinu (Stalin), generalnom sekretaru Komunističke partije SSSR, da dozvoli streljanje poljskih ratnih zarobljenika na osnovu toga što su svi oni „neprijatelji sovjetskih vlasti ispunjeni mržnjom prema sovjetskom režimu“ koji „pokušavaju da nastave svoje a[nti]-r[evolucionarno] delovanje“ i „sprovode anti-sovjetsku propagandu“. U predlogu je precizirano da je u logoru za ratne zarobljenike smešteno 14.736 bivših vojnika i policajaca, od kojih je više od 97 posto poljskih državljana, a da je u zatvorima u zapadnim oblastima Ukrajine i Belorusije zatočeno još 10.685 Poljaka.
  4. Petog marta 1940. Politbiro Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije SSSR razmatrao je predlog i doneo sledeću odluku:

„I. Nalaže se da NKVD SSSR postupi na sledeći način:

(1)  predmeti 14.700 osoba koje su i dalje u logorima za ratne zarobljenike (bivši oficiri Poljske vojske, državni službenici, zemljoposednici, policajci, obaveštajci, pripadnici vojne policije, doseljenici i zatvorski čuvari),

(2)  i predmeti lica koja su uhapšena i zadržana u zatvoru u zapadnim oblastima Ukrajine i Belorusije, kojih ima 11.000 (članovi različitih kontrarevolucionarnih špijunskih organizacija i organizacija za sabotažu, bivši zemljoposednici, vlasnici fabrika, bivši oficiri Poljske vojske, državni službenici i begunci), moraju se razmotriti u posebnom postupku, uz izricanje smrtne kazne – [izvršenje kazne] streljanjem.

II. Predmete treba razmatrati bez pozivanja pritvorenih lica ili pružanja informacija o optužbi, i bez obaveštavanja pritvorenih lica o završetku istrage ili podizanju optužnice, na sledeći način:

(a)  lica koja su ostala u logorima za ratne zarobljenike: na osnovu obaveštenja dobijenih od Direkcije za poslove ratnih zarobljenika, NKVD SSSR,

(b)  uhapšena lica: na osnovu obaveštenja koja će dati NKVD ukrajinske SSR i NKVD beloruske SSR.“

Odluku su potpisali J. Staljin, K. Vorošilov (Voroshilov), A. Mikojan (Mikoyan), V. Molotov, M. Kalinjin (Kalinin) i L. Kaganovič (Kaganovich).

  1. Streljanja su izvršena u aprilu i maju 1940. godine. Zatvorenici iz kampa Kozelsk ubijeni su na lokaciji blizu Smolenska koja je poznata kao Katinska šuma; oni iz kampa Starobelsk streljani su u zatvoru NKVD u Harkovu i njihova tela su sahranjena u blizini sela Pjatihatki; policajci iz Ostaškova ubijeni su u zatvoru NKVD u Kalinjingradu (sada Tver) i sahranjeni u naselju Mednoje. Okolnosti pod kojim su pogubljeni zatvorenici iz zatvora u zapadnoj Ukrajini i Belorusiji i dalje su nepoznate.
  2. U 1942. i 1943. godini prvo su poljski radnici na železnici, a potom i nemačka vojska, otkrili masovne grobnice u blizini Katinske šume. Osnovana je međunarodna komisija sastavljena od dvanaest forenzičkih eksperata i njihovih saradnika iz Belgije, Bugarske, Hrvatske, Danske, Finske, Francuske, Mađarske, Italije, Holandije, Rumunije, Slovačke i Švedske, koja je radila na ekshumaciji od aprila do juna 1943. Iskopani su posmrtni ostaci 4.243 poljskih oficira, od kojih je njih 2.730 identifikovano. Komisija je zaključila da su sovjetske vlasti odgovorne za masakr.
  3. Sovjetske vlasti odgovorile su tako što su krivicu svalile na Nemce koji su – prema navodima Moskve – u leto 1941. godine navodno preuzeli kontrolu nad poljskim zatvorenicima i ubili ih. Nakon što je Crvena armija oslobodila Smolensku oblast septembra 1943. godine, NKVD je osnovao Specijalnu državnu komisiju kojom je predsedavao N. Burdenko, koja je navodno sakupljala dokaze o nemačkoj odgovornosti za ubistva poljskih oficira. U saopštenju od 22. januara 1944. godine Komisija je objavila da su poljske zatvorenike ubili Nemci u jesen 1941. godine.
  4. Tokom suđenja nemačkim ratnim zločincima pred Međunarodnim vojnim tribunalom ubistva u Katinu pomenuta su u optužnici kao primer ratnog zločina (Optužnica: tačka tri – ratni zločini, Odeljak C (2)). Zamenik glavnog tužioca za SSSR Pokrovski (Pokrovsky) je 13. februara 1946. godine stavio na teret optuženih ubistvo 11.000 poljskih ratnih zarobljenika u jesen 1941. godine, oslanjajući se na izveštaj Specijalne državne komisije (Suđenje najvećim ratnim zločincima pred Međunarodnim vojnim tribunalom, tom VII, str. 425-7). I pored toga što su sovjetski tužioci ulagali prigovore na izvođenje dokaza usmenim svedočenjem, Tribunal je 1. i 2. jula 1946. godine saslušao dokaze koje su iznela tri svedoka optužbe i tri svedoka odbrane (tom XVII, str. 270-371). Na kraju suđenja ubistva u Katinu nisu pomenuta ni u tekstu presude Međunarodnog vojnog tribunala ni u izdvojenom mišljenju sovjetskog sudije.
  5. Trećeg marta 1959. godine A. Šeljepin (Shelepin), predsedavajući Komiteta državne bezbednosti (KGB), predložio je N. Hruščovu (Khrushchev), generalnom sekretaru Komunističke partije SSSR, da se unište dokumenta o ubistvima poljskih ratnih zarobljenika:

„Od 1940. godine dosijee i druge materijale koji se odnose na zatvorenike i zarobljene oficire, policajce, žandarme, [vojne] doseljenike, zemljoposednike i druge zatvorenike iz bivše buržoaske Poljske koji su streljani te iste godine čuvao je Komitet državne bezbednosti Saveta ministara SSSR. Na osnovu odluka koje je donela specijalna trojka (troika) sovjetskog NKVD, streljano je ukupno 21.857 lica, od toga

4.421 u Katinskoj šumi (Smolenska oblast), 3.820 u logoru Starobelsk blizu Harkova, 6.311 u logoru Ostaškov (Kalinjingradska oblast) i 7.305 u drugim logorima i zatvorima u zapadnoj Ukrajini i Belorusiji.

Celokupna operacija likvidacije gore pomenutih pojedinaca sprovedena ja na osnovu odluke Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije SSSR od 5. marta 1940. godine... Od vremena od kada je sprovedena gore pomenuta operacija, tj. od 1940. godine, nikome nisu data nikakva obaveštenja koja se odnose na taj predmet, i svih 21.857 dosijea pohranjeno je na tajnoj lokaciji.

Nijedan od ovih dosijea nema nikakvu operativnu ili istorijsku vrednost za sovjetske organe. Isto tako, pod velikom je sumnjom da li bi mogli imati bilo kakvu stvarnu vrednost za naše poljske prijatelje. Naprotiv, nepredviđeni incident mogao bi dovesti do toga da operacija bude otkrivena, sa svim neželjenim posledicama koje bi to imalo za našu zemlju, pogotovo stoga što je zvaničnu verziju, kada je reč o licima koja su streljana u Katinskoj Šumi, potvrdila istraga obavljena na inicijativu sovjetskih vlasti 1944...

Na osnovu gore iznetog, izgleda da je poželjno uništiti celokupnu arhivu koja se odnosi na lica streljana 1940. u gore navedenoj operaciji... [I]zveštaji sa sastanaka trojke NKVD SSSR u kojima se ta lica osuđuju na streljanje, kao i dokumenta o izvršenju ove odluke, mogu se sačuvati.“

  1. Preostala dokumenta stavljena su u poseban dosije, poznat kao „paket br. 1“, kome je pravo pristupa imao samo generalni sekretar Komunističke partije SSSR. Njegova sadržina je 28. aprila 2010. godine zvanično objavljena na internet stranici Službe državnog arhiva Rusije. Dosije je sadržao sledeća istorijska dokumenta: predlog Berije od 5. marta 1940. godine, odluku Politbiroa od istog datuma, stranice uklonjene iz zapisnika sa sastanka Politbiroa i belešku Šeljepina od 3. marta 1959. godine.

B.  Podnosioci predstavki i njihov odnos sa žrtvama

1.  Podnosioci predstavke u predmetu br. 55508/07

  1. Prvi podnosilac predstavke, Ježi-Roman (Jerzy-Roman) Janovjec, rođen je 1929. godine. On je sin Andžeja (Andrzej) Janovjeca, rođenog 1890. godine, koji je bio poručnik u Poljskoj vojsci pre Drugog svetskog rata.
  2. Drugi podnosilac predstavke, Antoni-Stanislav (Stanisław) Tribovski, rođen je 1940. godine. On je unuk Antonija Navratila (Nawratil), rođenog 1883. godine, koji je bio potpukovnik u Poljskoj vojsci.
  3. I Andžej Janovjec i Antoni Navratil postali su ratni zarobljenici tokom sovjetske invazije na Poljsku u septembru 1939. godine i poslati su u logor Starobelsk u SSSR. Janovjec je upisan u spisak zarobljenika kao br. 3914, a Navratil kao br. 2407. Oni su kasnije premešteni u zatvor u Harkovu i ubijeni aprila 1940. godine.

2.  Podnosioci predstavke u predmetu br. 29520/09

  1. Prva i druga podnositeljka predstavke, Vitomila Volk-Jezjerska (Witomiła Wołk-Jezierska) i Ojcumila Volk (Ojcumiła Wołk), rođene su 1940, odnosno 1917. godine. One su ćerka i supruga Vincentija Volka (Wincenty Wołk), rođenog 1909. godine, koji je bio poručnik u jedinici teške artiljerije Poljske vojske pre Drugog svetskog rata. On je postao ratni zarobljenik Crvene armije u noći 19. septembra 1939. godine i držan je u specijalnom logoru Kozelsk (naveden pod rednim brojem 3 na otpremnoj listi NKVD 052/3 04.1940). Ubijen je 30. aprila 1940. godine i sahranjen u Katinu. Njegovo telo je identifikovano tokom ekshumacije 1943. godine (br. 2564).
  2. Treća podnositeljka predstavke, Vanda Rodovič (Wanda Rodowicz), rođena je 1938. godine. Ona je unuka Stanislava Rodoviča (Stanisław Rodowicz), rođenog 1883. godine, koji je bio rezervni oficir u Poljskoj vojsci. Njega je Crvena armija zarobila na mađarskoj granici oko 20. septembra 1939. godine i držala ga kao ratnog zarobljenika u specijalnom logoru u Kozelsku (naveden pod rednim brojem 94 na spisku 017/2). Ubijen je i sahranjen u Katinu. Njegovo telo je identifikovano tokom ekshumacije 1943. godine (br. 970).
  3. Četvrta podnositeljka predstavke, Halina Mihalska (Halina Michalska), rođena je 1929. i umrla 2012. godine. Ona je bila ćerka Stanislava Uzjembloa (Stanisław Uziembło), rođenog 1889. godine. Uzjemblo je bio oficir Poljske vojske, i Sovjeti su ga uhvatili kao ratnog zarobljenika blizu Bjalistoka u Poljskoj i zatvorili ga u specijalni logor NKVD u Starobelsku (redni broj 3400). Pretpostavlja se da je ubijen u Harkovu i sahranjen u selu Pjatihatki blizu Harkova (danas Ukrajina).
  4. Peti podnosilac predstavke, Artur Tomaševski (Artur Tomaszewski), rođen je 1933. godine. On je sin Šimona Tomaševskog (Szymon Tomaszewski), rođenog 1900. godine. Oca petog podnosioca predstavke, koji je bio komandir policijske stanice na poljsko-sovjetskoj granici u Kobilji, uhapsile su na tom mestu sovjetske trupe i odvele u specijalni logor NKVD u Ostaškovu (redni broj 5 na spisku 045/3). Ubijen je u Tveru i sahranjen u naselju Mednoje.
  5. Šesti podnosilac predstavke, Ježi Leh Vijelebnovski (Jerzy Lech Wielebnowski), rođen je 1930. godine. Njegov otac, Aleksander Vijelebnovski, rođen 1897. godine, bio je policajac koji je radio u Luku u istočnoj Poljskoj. Oktobra 1939. godine uhapsile su ga sovjetske trupe i smestile u logor u Ostaškovu (redni broj 10 na spisku 033/2). Ubijen je u Tveru i sahranjen u naselju Mednoje.
  6. Sedmi podnosilac predstavke, Gustav Erhard (Gustaw Erchard), rođen je 1935. godine. Njegov otac, Stefan Erhard, rođen 1900. godine, bio je direktor osnovne škole u Rudki, Poljska. Uhapsili su ga Sovjeti i zatvorili u logor u Starobelsku (redni broj 3869). Pretpostavlja se da je ubijen u Harkovu i sahranjen u selu Pjatihatki.
  7. Osmi i deveti podnosilac predstavke, Ježi Karol Malevič (Jerzy Karol Malewicz) i Kšištof Jan Malevič (Krzysztof Jan Malewicz), rođeni 1928, odnosno 1931. godine, deca su Stanislava Augusta Maleviča (Stanisław August Malewicz). Deveti podnosilac predstavke umro je 2011. godine. Njihov otac je rođen 1889. godine i radio je kao lekar u Poljskoj vojsci. Uhvaćen je kao ratni zarobljenik kod Rovne, u Poljskoj, i zatvoren u logoru u Starobelsku (redni broj 2219). Pretpostavlja se da je ubijen u Harkovu i sahranjen u selu Pjatihatki.
  8. Deseta i jedanaesta podnositeljka predstavke, Kristina Kšiškovjak (Krystyna Krzyszkowiak) i Irena Erhard (Erchard), rođene 1940, odnosno 1936. godine, su ćerke Mihala Adamčika (Michał Adamczyk). Rođen 1903. godine, on je bio komandir policijske stanice u Sarnaki. Uhapsili su ga Sovjeti, zatvorili u logor u Ostaškovu (redni broj 5 na spisku 037/2), a ubijen je u Tveru i sahranjen u naselju Mednoje.
  9. Dvanaesti podnosilac aplikacije, Kristina Mješčankovska (Krystyna Mieszczankowska), rođena 1930. godine, ćerka je Stanislava Mjeleckog (Stanisław Mielecki). Njen otac, poljski oficir, rođen je 1895. godine, i bio je zatvoren u logoru u Kozelsku nakon što su ga uhapsile sovjetske trupe. Ubijen je i sahranjen u Katinu; njegovo telo je identifikovano tokom ekshumacije 1943. godine.
  10. Trinaesti podnosilac predstavke, Kšištof Romanovski (Krzysztof Romanowski), rođen 1953. godine, je nećak Rišarda Žoledžjovskog (Ryszard Żołędziowski). Žoledžjovski, rođen 1887. godine, je bio zatvoren u logoru u Starobelsku (redni broj 1151) i pretpostavlja se da je ubijen u Harkovu i sahranjen u selu Pjatihatki. Spisak zatvorenika iz Starobelska na kome se nalazilo i njegovo ime pronađeno je u džepu kaputa jednog poljskog oficira čiji su posmrtni ostaci, s ranama od metka na glavi, iskopani tokom zajedničke poljsko-ruske ekshumacije u blizini Harkova 1991. godine.

C.  Istrage u krivičnom predmetu br. 159

  1. Trinaestog aprila 1990. godine, tokom posete poljskog predsednika V. Jaruzelskog Moskvi, predsednik SSSR, M. Gorbačov (Gorbachev), predao mu je dokumenta koja se odnose na masakr u Katinu. Zvanična novinska agencija SSSR objavila je saopštenje u kome je potvrđeno, na osnovu novootkrivenih arhivskih materijala, da „Beria, Merkulov i njihovi potčinjeni snose neposrednu odgovornost za zločin počinjen u Katinskoj šumi“.
  2. Dvadeset i drugog marta 1990. godine regionalno tužilaštvo u Harkovu pokrenulo je krivičnu istragu o poreklu masovnih grobnica pronađenih u gradskom okrugu Lesopark. Šestog juna 1990. godine tužilaštvo u Kalinjingradu (Tver) je pokrenulo krivični postupak o „nestanku“ (исчезновение) poljskih ratnih zarobljenika koji su bili zatvoreni u logoru NKVD u Ostaškovu, do kojeg je došlo u maju 1940. godine. Dvadeset i sedmog septembra 1990. godine Glavno vojno tužilaštvo SSSR preuzelo je istragu iz Harkova pod brojem 159 i dodelilo je grupi vojnih tužilaca.
  3. Tokom leta i jeseni 1991. godine poljski i ruski specijalisti izvršili su ekshumacije tela iz masovnih grobnica u Harkovu, naselju Mednoje i Katinu. Oni su isto tako pregledali arhivska dokumenta koja se odnose na masakr u Katinu, saslušali najmanje četrdeset svedoka i odredili forenzička ispitivanja.
  4. Četrnaestog oktobra 1992. godine ruski predsednik B. Jeljcin (Yeltsin) otkrio je da su poljske oficire osudili na smrt Staljin i Politbiro Komunističke partije SSSR. Direktor Državnog arhiva Rusije predao je poljskim vlastima niz dokumenata, uključujući odluku od 5. marta 1940. godine. Tokom zvanične posete Poljskoj 25. avgusta 1993. godine, predsednik Jeljcin odao je poštu žrtvama pred Katinskim krstom u Varšavi.
  5. Krajem maja 1995. godine tužioci iz Belorusije, Poljske, Rusije i Ukrajine održali su radni sastanak u Varšavi tokom kojeg su razmotrili napredak istrage u predmetu 159. Učesnici sastanka su se složili da ruski tužioci zatraže pravnu pomoć svojih beloruskih i ukrajinskih kolega kako bi se ustanovile okolnosti pogubljenja 7.305 poljskih građana 1940. godine.
  6. Trinaestog maja 1997. beloruske vlasti obavestile su svoje ruske kolege da nisu bili u stanju da otkriju bilo kakva dokumenta koje se odnose na pogubljenje poljskih ratnih zarobljenika 1940. godine. Ukrajinske vlasti su 2002. godine dostavile dokumenta koja se odnose na transfer poljskih zarobljenika iz logora u Starobelsku u zatvor NKVD u oblasti Harkova.
  7. U 2001, 2002. i 2004. godini predsednik poljskog Instituta za narodno sećanje (INS) je često, ali neuspešno, kontaktirao Glavno vojno tužilaštvo Rusije želeći da dobije pristup spisima istrage.
  8. Dvadeset i prvog septembra 2004. godine Glavno vojno tužilaštvo odlučilo je da obustavi krivični postupak br. 159, očigledno na osnovu toga što su lica koja su navodno odgovorna za zločin već umrla. Dvadeset i drugog decembra 2004. godine Međuresorska komisija za zaštitu državnih tajni označila je trideset i šest tomova dosijea predmeta – od ukupno 183 toma – oznakom „strogo poverljivo“, a daljih osam tomova oznakom „samo za internu upotrebu“. Odluka da se obustavi istraga dobila je oznaku „strogo poverljivo“ i njeno postojanje je otkriveno tek 11. marta 2005. na konferenciji za štampu Glavnog vojnog tužioca.
  9. Ruska Država je odbila zahtev Suda da dostavi kopiju odluke od 21. septembra 2004. godine, pozivajući se na to da je reč o dokumentu koji je označen kao tajni. Iz navoda Države proizilazi da je istraga obustavljena na osnovu člana 24, st. 4 (1) Zakonika o krivičnom postupku, usled smrti osumnjičenog.
  10. Od 9. do 21. oktobra 2005. godine tri tužioca iz INS koji su sprovodili istragu o katinskom masakru i glavni stručnjak Centralne komisije za gonjenje zločina protiv poljske nacije posetili su Moskvu na poziv Glavnog vojnog tužilaštva. Oni su proučili šezdeset i sedam tomova iz predmeta 159 koji nisu označeni kao tajni, ali im nije dozvoljeno da naprave kopije.
  11. Osmog maja 2010. godine ruski predsednik D. Medvedev dao je predsedniku poljskog Parlamenta šezdeset i sedam tomova dosijea o katinskoj istrazi. Ukupno, prema informacijama dobijenim od Poljske, ruske vlasti su im predale overene kopije 148 tomova, koji sadrže oko 45.000 strana.

D.  Postupak u vezi s predstavkom br. 55508/07

  1. U 2003. godini Ševčik – poljski advokat koga su angažovali podnosilac predstavke Janovjec i majka podnosioca predstavke Tribovskog – obratio se Glavnom tužiocu Ruske Federacije sa zahtevom da mu se dostave dokumenti koji se odnose na Andžeja Janovjeca, Antonija Navratila i na treće lice.
  2. Dvadeset i trećeg juna 2003. godine Glavno tužilaštvo je odgovorilo advokatu, obaveštavajući ga da Glavno vojno tužilaštvo istražuje krivični predmet koji se odnosi na pogubljenje poljskih oficira 1940. godine. U istrazi je 1991. godine otkriveno nekih dve stotine tela u Harkovskoj, Tverskoj i Smolenskoj oblasti i neka od njih su identifikovana, uključujući Navratila i Janovjeca. Njihova imena su takođe nađena na spisku zatvorenika iz logora u Starobelsku. Sva druga dokumenta koja se na njih odnose prethodno su uništena.
  3. Četvrtog decembra 2004. godine Ševčik je formalno podneo zahtev Glavnom vojnom tužilaštvu da prizna prava Janovjeca i Tribovskog kao rođaka ubijenih poljskih oficira i da im da kopije dokumenata u vezi s postupkom, kao i ličnih dokumenata koja se odnose na Antonija Navratila i Andžeja Janovjeca.
  4. Desetog februara 2005. godine Glavno vojno tužilaštvo odgovorilo je da su Antoni Navratil i Andžej Janovjec na spisku zarobljenika iz logora u Starobelsku koje je NKVD ubio 1940. godine i sahranio blizu Harkova. Nikakvi drugi materijali koji se tiču ovih pojedinaca nisu dostupni. Kopije dokumenata u vezi s postupkom mogu se dati samo zvanično priznatim žrtvama ili njihovim zastupnicima.
  5. Kasnije su podnosioci predstavke Janovjec i Tribovski angažovali ruskog advokata, Bušujeva (Bushuev), koji je od Glavnog vojnog tužilaštva tražio dozvolu da prouči spise predmeta. Sedmog novembra 2006. godine Glavno vojno tužilaštvo obavestilo ga je da mu neće biti dozvoljen uvid u dosije zato što njegovi klijenti nisu u predmetu formalno priznati kao žrtve.
  6. Advokat se obratio sudu zbog odbijanja Glavnog vojnog tužilaštva od 10. februara 2005. i 7. novembra 2006. godine. Naveo je, naročito, da status žrtve krivičnog dela treba da bude utvrđen pozivanjem na činjenice, kao što je okolnost da li je pojedinac o kome je reč pretrpeo štetu od tog dela ili nije. Iz te perspektive posmatrano, odluka istražnih organa da nekoga priznaju kao žrtvu treba da bude shvaćena kao formalno prihvatanje takve činjenice. Advokat je tražio da podnosioci predstavke Janovjec i Tribovski budu priznati kao žrtve i da im se dozvoli uvid u spise predmeta.
  7. Osamnaestog aprila 2007. godine Vojni sud moskovske komande odbio je pritužbu. Primetio je da se, iako su Antoni Navratil i Andžej Janovjec bili na spisku zatvorenika u logoru Starobelsk, njihovi posmrtni ostaci nisu nalazili među onima koje je istraga identifikovala. Shodno tome, prema mišljenju Vojnog suda, nije bilo pravnog osnova za pretpostavku da su umrli usled krivičnog dela o kome je reč. Što se tiče materijala u spisima predmeta, Vojni sud je primetio da je odluka o obustavljanju krivičnog postupka od 21. septembra 2004. godine proglašena za državnu tajnu i da, iz tog razloga, strani državljani ne mogu da imaju uvida u nju.
  8. Dvadeset i četvrtog maja 2007. godine Vrhovni sud Ruske Federacije potvrdio je ovakvu odluku po žalbi, ponavljajući od reči do reči obrazloženje koje je dao Vojni sud.

E.  Postupak u vezi s predstavkom br. 29520/09

  1. Dvadesetog avgusta 2008. godine tim advokata koji zastupa podnosioce predstavke pokrenuo je sudski postupak protiv odluke tužioca od 21. septembra 2004. godine. Oni su naveli da su rođaci podnosilaca predstavke bili među zarobljenim poljskim oficirima čije pogubljenje je naredio Politbiro Komunističke partije SSSR 5. marta 1940. godine. Međutim, podnosiocima predstavke nije priznat status žrtve u predmetu br. 159 i nisu mogli dostavljati podneske i zahteve, imati uvida u spise predmeta ili dobijati kopije odluka. Advokati su isto tako tvrdili da istraga nije bila delotvorna jer nije bilo pokušaja da se uzmu biološki uzorci od podnosilaca predstavke kako bi se identifikovali ekshumirani posmrtni ostaci.
  2. Četrnaestog oktobra 2008. godine Vojni sud moskovske komande odbio je žalbu. Ustanovio je da su 1943. godine Međunarodna komisija i Tehnička komisija poljskog Crvenog krsta iskopali posmrtne ostatke i ponovo ih sahranili, bez identifikovanja ili prebrojavanja tela. Prilikom kasnijeg iskopavanja obavljenog 1991. godine identifikovana su samo dvadeset i dva lica, a rođaci podnosilaca predstavke nisu bili među njima. Vojni sud je konstatovao da imena rođaka podnosilaca predstavke jesu bila na spiskovima NKVD za logore Ostaškov, Starobelsk i Kozelsk; međutim, „‘katinska’ istraga ... nije utvrdila kakva je bila sudbina pomenutih pojedinaca“. Pošto njihova tela nisu identifikovana, nije bilo dokaza da su rođaci podnosilaca predstavke izgubili svoje živote usled krivičnog dela zloupotreba položaja (član 193-17 sovjetskog Krivičnog zakonika iz 1926) na koju se poziva odluka od 21. septembra 2004. godine. Shodno tome, nije bilo osnova da se podnosiocima predstavke prizna status žrtve prema članu 42 Zakonika o krivičnom postupku. Štaviše, materijal sa oznakom tajnosti nije mogao biti učinjen dostupnim „predstavnicima stranih država“.
  3. Advokati su podneli tužbu u kojoj su tvrdili da je nedostatak informacija o sudbini rođaka podnosilaca predstavke rezultat nedelotvorne istrage. Dvadeset dva lica identifikovana su samo na osnovu vojnih identifikacionih kartica nađenih na mestu sahranjivanja, a istražitelji nisu preduzeli nikakve mere niti odredili bilo kakva forenzička ispitivanja u cilju identifikacije ekshumiranih posmrtnih ostataka. Štaviše, bila je javno poznata činjenica da su tokom iskopavanja 1943. godine pronađeni posmrtni ostaci 4.243 lica, među kojima je identifikovano 2.730 pojedinaca. Među identifikovanima su tri lica čiji su rođaci bili tužioci u postupku. Davanje statusa žrtve tužiocima dozvolilo bi identifikaciju posmrtnih ostataka pomoću genetičkih metoda. Najzad, advokati su naglasili da spisi katinskog krivičnog predmeta ne sadrže bilo kakve informacije koje pružaju osnova za zaključak da je bilo koji od poljskih oficira koji je bio odveden iz NKVD logora preživeo ili umro prirodnom smrću.
  4. Dvadeset i devetog januara 2009. godine Vrhovni sud Ruske Federacije potvrdio je presudu od 14. oktobra 2008. u potpunosti. Ponovio je od reči do reči opširne stavove iz nalaza moskovskog Vojnog suda, ali je takođe dodao da odluka od 21. septembra 2004. godine ne može biti ukinuta jer je rok zastarelosti istekao i jer je postupak u pogledu određenih osumnjičenih obustavljen zbog „rehabilitacije“.

F.  Postupak za skidanje oznake tajnosti s odluke od 21. septembra 2004. godine

  1. Dvadeset i šestog marta 2008. godine ruska nevladina organizacija koja se bavi ljudskim pravima, Memorial, podnela je zahtev Glavnom vojnom tužilaštvu da se skine oznaka tajnosti s odluke od 21. septembra 2004. godine. U svom odgovoru od 22. aprila 2008. godine Tužilaštvo je obavestilo Memorial da nije nadležno za uklanjanje oznake tajnosti, što je 22. decembra 2004. potvrdila Međuresorska komisija za zaštitu državnih tajni (u daljem tekstu: Komisija).
  2. Dvanaestog marta 2009. godine Memorial se obratio Komisiji radi skidanja oznake tajnosti s odluke od 21. septembra 2004. godine, tvrdeći da je oznaka tajnosti na materijalu o katinskoj istrazi moralno i pravno neprihvatljiva i da takođe predstavlja povredu člana 6 Zakona o državnim tajnama, koji isključuje stavljanje oznake tajnosti na bilo koju informaciju o kršenju ljudskih prava. Pismom od 27. avgusta 2009. godine Komisija je odgovorila organizaciji Memorial da je njihov zahtev razmotren i odbijen, ali nije dala druge detalje.
  3. Memorial je osporio odluku Komisije o odbijanju pred moskovskim Gradskim sudom. Na ročištu 13. jula 2010. godine sud je pročitao pismo Komisije od 25. juna 2010. upućeno predsedavajućem sudiji. U pismu se navodi da Komisija 22. decembra 2004. godine nije donela nikakvu odluku o stavljanju oznake tajnosti na odluku Glavnog vojnog tužilaštva od 21. septembra 2004. godine.
  4. Posle ročišta zatvorenog za javnost, moskovski Gradski sud je 2. novembra 2010. godine odbio zahtev organizacije Memorial za skidanje oznake tajnosti, zaključujući konkretno sledeće:

„Sud je ustanovio da je 21. septembra 2004. Glavno vojno tužilaštvo donelo odluku o okončanju krivične istrage koju je 22. marta 1990. godine pokrenulo regionalno tužilaštvo ukrajinske SSR u Harkovu u vezi s otkrićem posmrtnih ostataka poljskih državljana u pošumljenoj zoni Harkova...

Istraga je kvalifikovala radnje niza poznatih visoko rangiranih zvaničnika SSSR kao zloupotrebu položaja, uz naročito otežavajuće okolnosti prema članu 193-17 (b) Krivičnog zakonika RSFSR. Krivični predmet u odnosu na ove zvaničnike je okončan na osnovu člana 24, st. 1(4) ruskog Zakonika o krivičnom postupku (na osnovu smrti okrivljenog lica). Predmet je u odnosu na druge okončan na osnovu člana 24, st. 1(2) (nije bilo krivičnog dela).

Glavno vojno tužilaštvo poslalo je nacrt odluke o okončanju krivičnog postupka Federalnoj službi bezbednosti radi dobijanja stručnog mišljenja o tome da li sadrži bilo kakve poverljive ili tajne informacije u smislu člana 9 Zakona o državnim tajnama, jer je Federalna služba bezbednosti imala pravo da postupi s informacijom prenetom u odluci Glavnog vojnog tužilaštva na način koji je smatrala odgovarajućim.

Komisija sastavljena od eksperata iz Federalne službe bezbednosti ustanovila je da je nacrt odluke Glavnog vojnog tužioca obuhvatao i informacije s kojih nije skinuta oznaka tajnosti. Osim toga, komisija je istakla da nacrt odluke sadrži informacije kojima je ograničen pristup...

Dvadeset i prvog septembra 2004. godine službenik Glavnog vojnog tužilaštva doneo je odluku o obustavljanju krivične istrage br. 159. U svetlu gore pomenutih zaključaka Federalne službe bezbednosti i na osnovu člana 5, st. 4 (2, 3) i člana 8 Zakona o državnim tajnama i tačke 80 predsedničkog ukaza br. 1203 od 30. novembra 1995. godine, dokument je označen kao strogo poverljiv ... Shodno tome, nema pravnog osnova da se odobri zahtev organizacije Memorial da odluka Glavnog vojnog tužioca kojom je odluka od 21. septembra 2004. godine označena kao tajna bude proglašena nezakonitom i neopravdanom...

U pogledu tvrdnje tužioca da informacije koje se odnose na kršenje zakona od strane državnih vlasti ili zvaničnika ne mogu biti proglašene niti državnom tajnom niti mogu dobiti drugu oznaku tajnosti u skladu s članom 7 Zakona o državnim tajnama, ovaj argument je bez osnova jer odluka Glavnog vojnog tužioca od 21. septembra 2004. sadrži obaveštajne i kontraobaveštajne informacije i informacije u vezi s operativnim i istražnim aktivnostima koje, u skladu s članom 4 Zakona o državnim tajnama, predstavljaju državnu tajnu...“

  1. Dvadeset i šestog januara 2011. Vrhovni sud Ruske Federacije odbacio je žalbu koju je organizacija Memorial podnela protiv presude Gradskog suda.

G.  Postupak za „rehabilitaciju“ rođaka podnosilaca predstavki

  1. Većina podnosilaca predstavki se više puta obraćala različitim ruskim organima vlasti, prvo i pre svega Glavnom vojnom tužilaštvu, tražeći informacije o katinskoj krivičnoj istrazi i „rehabilitaciju“ svojih rođaka u skladu s odredbama Zakona o rehabilitaciji iz 1991. godine (vidi stav 86 u daljem tekstu).
  2. Pismom od 21. aprila 1998. godine koje je poslato kao odgovor na zahtev za rehabilitaciju koji je poslala Ojcumila Volk, Glavno vojno tužilaštvo potvrdilo je da je njen muž, Vincenti Volk, bio u logoru u Kozelsku kao ratni zarobljenik i da je zatim pogubljen, zajedno s drugim zarobljenicima, u proleće 1940. godine. U pismu se navodi da će njen zahtev za rehabilitaciju biti razmatran tek po završetku krivične istrage.
  3. Nakon obustavljanja istrage u predmetu br. 159 Vitomila VolkJezjerska tražila je od Glavnog vojnog tužilaštva 25. oktobra 2005. godine primerak odluke o obustavljanju istrage. Pismom od 23. novembra 2005. godine tužilaštvo je odbilo da joj dostavi tu odluku, pozivajući se na to da je ona označena kao strogo poverljiva. Osmog decembra 2005. godine poljska ambasada u Moskvi tražila je od tužilaštva objašnjenje o rehabilitaciji Volka. U pismu od 18. januara 2006. godine tužilaštvo je iznelo stav da nema pravnog osnova za rehabilitaciju Volka ili drugih poljskih državljana jer istraga nije utvrdila koja odredba Krivičnog zakonika iz 1926. godine je bila osnov za represiju kojoj su bili izloženi. U pismu od 12. februara 2007. godine sličnim rečima odbijen je još jedan zahtev istog tipa koji je podnela Volk.
  4. Trinaestog marta 2008. godine Glavno vojno tužilaštvo odbacilo je zahtev za rehabilitaciju koju je podneo zastupnik u ime svih podnosilaca predstavki. Tužilac je naveo da nije moguće odrediti pravni osnov za represiju koju su pretrpeli poljski državljani 1940. godine. I pored postojanja nekih dokumenata u kojima je navedeno da su rođaci podnosilaca predstavki iz logora NKVD u Ostaškovu, Kozelsku i Starobelsku bili prebačeni u Kalinjingrad, Smolensk i Harkov, udruženi napori beloruskih, poljskih, ruskih i ukrajinskih istražitelja nisu doveli do pronalaženja bilo kakvih spisa krivičnih predmeta ili drugih dokumenata koji se odnose na njihovo gonjenje 1940. godine. U odsustvu takvih dokumenata nije bilo moguće utvrditi da li bi Zakon o rehabilitaciji bio primenjiv. Štaviše, tužilac je izjavio da posmrtni ostaci rođaka podnosilaca predstavki nisu bili otkriveni među posmrtnim ostacima koji su pronađeni tokom vršenja ekshumacija.
  5. Advokat je pred sudom osporio odluku tužioca o odbacivanju zahteva.
  6. Dvadeset i četvrtog oktobra 2008. godine Kamovničeski Okružni sud u Moskvi odbio je žalbu. Iako je sud potvrdio da su se imena rođaka podnosilaca predstavki nalazila na spisku zarobljenika NKVD, on je istakao da je samo dvadeset tela identifikovano na osnovu ekshumacija izvršenih u kontekstu predmeta br. 159 i da rođaci podnosilaca predstavki nisu bili među onima koji su identifikovani. Sud je dalje našao da nije bilo osnova za pretpostavku da je deset poljskih ratnih zarobljenika (rođaka podnosilaca predstavki) u stvari ubijeno, i da ruski advokati nemaju pravni interes kad je u pitanju rehabilitacija poljskih državljana.
  7. Dvadeset i petog novembra 2008. godine moskovski Gradski sud odbacio je, na uopšten način, žalbu protiv presude Okružnog suda.

H.  Izjava ruske Dume o katinskoj tragediji

  1. Dvadeset i šestog novembra 2010. godine Državna duma, donji dom ruskog Parlamenta, usvojila je izjavu pod naslovom „O katinskoj tragediji i njenim žrtvama“ u kojoj se, konkretno, navodi sledeće:

„Pre sedamdeset godina streljane su hiljade poljskih državljana koji su kao ratni zarobljenici bili smešteni u logorima NKVD SSSR i zatvorima u zapadnim delovima ukrajinske SSR i beloruske SSR.

Zvanična sovjetska propaganda pripisala je odgovornost za ovo zverstvo, koje je nazvano zbirnim imenom Katinska tragedija, nacističkim zločincima... Početkom 1990-ih naša zemlja uložila je velike napore u cilju ustanovljavanja istine o Katinskoj tragediji. Priznato je da je masovno istrebljivanje poljskih državljana na teritoriji SSSR tokom Drugog svetskog rata bio samovoljan čin totalitarne države...

Objavljeni materijali koji su godinama bili čuvani u tajnim arhivama ne samo da pokazuju razmere ove užasne tragedije, već isto tako potvrđuju činjenicu da je Katinski zločin izvršen na osnovu neposrednih naredbi Staljina i drugih sovjetskih lidera...

Kopije mnogih dokumenata koji su čuvani u zatvorenim arhivama Politbiroa Komunističke partije Sovjetskog Saveza već su predate poljskoj strani. Članovi Državne dume veruju da ovaj rad mora biti nastavljen. Neophodno je nastaviti s izučavanjem arhiva, proveravanjem spiskova žrtava, vraćanjem ugleda onih koji su nestali u Katinu i na drugim mestima, i otkrivanjem okolnosti ove tragedije ...“

II.  RELEVANTNO MEĐUNARODNO PRAVO I PRAKSA

A.  IV Haška konvencija

  1. Konvencija (IV) o poštovanju zakona i običaja rata na kopnu, konkretno njen Aneks: Pravila o pravu i običajima rata na kopnu (Hag, 18. oktobar 1907) predviđaju sledeće:

„Čl. 4.  Ratni zarobljenici su u vlasti neprijateljske vlade, ali ne i pojedinaca i vojnih jedinica koje su ih zarobile.

S njima se mora postupati čovečno.

...

Čl. 23.  Osim zabrana ustanovljenih posebnim konvencijama, naročito je zabranjeno –

...

(b)  verolomno ubijati ili ranjavati lica koja pripadaju neprijateljskom narodu ili vojsci;

(c) ubijati ili ranjavati neprijatelja koji se, pošto je položio oružje ili ostao bez sredstava za odbranu, bezuslovno predao...

...

Čl. 50.  Nikakva kolektivna kazna, novčana ili druga kazna, ne može se izreći protiv stanovništva zbog dela pojedinaca za koje ono ne može biti smatrano solidarno odgovornim.“

B.  Ženevska konvencija

  1. Konvencija o postupanju s ratnim zarobljenicima (Ženeva, 27. juli 1929) predviđa sledeće:

„Čl. 2.  Ratni zarobljenici su u vlasti neprijateljske vlade, ali ne pojedinaca ili formacija koje su ih zarobile.

S njima će se u svakom trenutku postupati čovečno i biće zaštićeni, naročito od akata nasilja, od uvreda i radoznalosti javnosti.

Protiv njih su zabranjene mere odmazde.

...

Čl. 61.  Nijedan ratni zarobljenik neće biti osuđen, a da mu nije pružena prilika da se brani.

Nijedan ratni zarobljenik neće biti primoravan da prizna da je kriv za krivično delo za koje je optužen.

...

Čl. 63.  Ratnom zarobljeniku će biti izrečena kazna samo od strane istih sudova i u skladu s istim postupkom kao kada je reč o licima koja pripadaju vojnim snagama Strane koja ga je zarobila.“

C.  Povelja Međunarodnog vojnog tribunala

  1. Član 6 Povelje (Statuta) Međunarodnog vojnog tribunala (Nirnberški tribunal) koji je osnovan u skladu sa sporazumom koji su 8. avgusta 1945. potpisale vlade SAD, Francuske, Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva i SSSR sadrži sledeće definicije zločina:

„Sledeća dela, ili bilo koje od njih, predstavljaju zločine koji spadaju u nadležnost Tribunala, i za njih će se odgovorati pojedinačno:

(a)  zločini protiv mira: naime, planiranje, priprema, otpočinjanje ili vođenje agresivnog rata, ili rata suprotno međunarodnim ugovorima, sporazumima ili garancijama, ili učešće u zajedničkom planu ili zaveri za izvršenje bilo čega od gore pomenutog;

(b)  ratni zločini: naime, povrede zakona ili običaja rata. Takve povrede uključiće, ali neće biti na njih ograničene, ubistva, zlostavljanje ili deportaciju radi robovskog rada ili u bilo koju drugu svrhu civilnog stanovništva iz okupiranih teritorija ili na njima, ubistva ili zlostavljanje ratnih zarobljenika ili lica na moru, ubijanje talaca, pljačke javne ili privatne imovine, obesno razaranje velikih ili malih gradova ili sela, ili uništavanja koja nisu opravdana vojnim potrebama;

(c)  zločini protiv čovečnosti: naime, ubistva, istrebljivanje, porobljavanje, deportacija i druga nečovečna dela protiv civilnog stanovništva, pre ili tokom rata; ili proganjanja na političkoj, rasnoj ili verskoj osnovi prilikom izvršenja bilo kog zločina ili u vezi s bilo kojim zločinom u nadležnosti Tribunala, bez obzira na to da li to jeste ili nije u suprotnosti s domaćim pravom zemlje u kojoj se počinjeno.“

  1. Definicija je naknadno kodifikovana kao Načelo VI u Načelima međunarodnog prava priznatim u Povelji Nirnberškog tribunala i u presudi Tribunala, kako ga je formulisala Komisija za međunarodno pravo 1950. godine prema Rezoluciji 177 (II) Generalne skupštine Ujedinjenih nacija i potvrdila Generalna skupština.

D.  Konvencija o nezastarevanju ratnih zločina i zločina protiv čovečnosti

  1. Konvencija o nezastarevanju ratnih zločina i zločina protiv čovečnosti (26. novembar 1968), čija je strana ugovornica Ruska Federacija, konkretno predviđa sledeće:

Član I

„Ne postoji vremensko zastarevanje u pogledu sledećih zločina bez obzira na datum kada su počinjeni:

(a)  ratni zločini prema definiciji u Povelji Međunarodnog vojnog suda, Nirnberg, od 8. avgusta 1945, potvrđenoj u rezolucijama 3 (I) od 13. februara 1946. godine i 95 (I) od 11. decembra 1946. godine, koje je usvojila Generalna skupština Ujedinjenih nacija...

(b)    zločini protiv čovečanstva bilo da su počinjeni u doba rata ili u doba mira prema definiciji u Povelji Međunarodnog vojnog suda, Nirnberg, od 8. avgusta 1945. godine i kao što je potvrđeno rezolucijama 3 (I) od 13. februara 1946. godine i 95 (I) od 11. decembra

1946. godine, koje je usvojila Generalna skupština Ujedinjenih nacija...“

Član IV

„ Države ugovornice ove konvencije obavezuju se da usvoje, u skladu sa svojim ustavnim postupkom, sve zakonodavne i druge mere koje su potrebne da se obezbedi da se zakonske i druge odredbe o zastarevanju ne odnose na gonjenje i kažnjavanje zločina pomenutih u članovima I i II ove konvencije i da se takve odredbe o zastarevanju, ako postoje, ukinu.“

E.  Bečka konvencija o ugovornom pravu

  1. Bečka konvencija o ugovornom pravu (23. maj 1969), čija je strana ugovornica Ruska Federacija, predviđa sledeće:

Član 26.

„Pacta sunt servanda“

„Svaki ugovor na snazi vezuje članice i one treba da ga dobronamerno izvršavaju.“

Član 27.

Unutrašnje pravo i poštovanje ugovora

„Jedna članica ne može se pozvati na odredbe svog unutrašnjeg prava da bi opravdala neizvršavanje ugovora...“

Član 28.

Nepovratna snaga ugovora

„Osim ako drukčija namera ne proizilazi iz ugovora ili nije na drugi način utvrđena, odredbe ugovora ne vezuju jednu članicu u pogledu akta ili činjenice koji su prethodili datumu stupanja na snagu ovog ugovora u odnosu na tu članicu ili situaciju koja je prestala da postoji tog datuma.“

F.   Međunarodni pakt o građanskim i političkim pravima

  1. Član 7 Pakta, čija je strana ugovornica Ruska Federacija, glasi:

„ Niko ne može biti podvrgnut mučenju ili svirepim, nehumanim ili unižavajućim kaznama ili postupcima. Posebno je zabranjeno da se neko lice podvrgne medicinskom ili naučnom eksperimentu bez njegovog slobodnog pristanka.“

  1. Opšti komentar br. 31 [80] Komiteta za ljudska prava, Priroda opštih pravnih obaveza nametnutih državama članicama Pakta, usvojen 29. marta 2004. godine (2187. zasedanje), glasi:

„4.  Obaveze koje prostiču iz Pakta i iz člana 2 su obavezujuće za sve zemlje članice u potpunosti. Izvršna, zakonodavna i pravosudna vlast, kao i ostale javne i državne ustanove, bez obzira na nivo (nacionalna, regionalna ili lokalna) mogu svojim radnjama da prouzrokuju odgovornost države. Izvršna vlast koja u najvećem broju slučajeva predstavlja državu u međunarodnoj sferi, kao i pred Komitetom, nema pravo da se pozove na nedostatak nadležnosti nekog drugog organa ukoliko je kršenje proisteklo iz njegove radnje i da na taj način traži oslobađanje od odgovornosti. Ovo shvatanje proizlazi direktno iz principa usvojenog u članu 27 Bečke konvencije o ugovornom pravu, prema kome ‘jedna članica ne može se pozvati na odredbe svog unutrašnjeg prava da bi opravdala neizvršenje ugovora’...“.

  1. Na zasedanju održanom 3. aprila 2003. godine, Komitet za ljudska prava, ustanovljen na osnovu člana 28 Pakta izrazio je sledeće stavove nakon razmatranja predstavke br. 886/1999, koja je u ime Natalije Šedko (Natalia Schedko) i Antona Bondarenka podneta protiv Belorusije:

„10.2  Komitet primećuje da nije osporavana tvrdnja podnositeljke predstavke da njena porodica nije obaveštena ni o datumu, ni o času, ni o mestu pogubljenja njenog sina, niti o tačnom mestu gde je on naknadno sahranjen. S obzirom da država ugovornica nije osporavala ove tvrdnje, niti je dostavila bilo kakve relevantne podatke o tome kako se izvršavaju smrtne kazne, tvrdnjama podnositeljke mora se dati odgovarajući značaj. Komitet ima razumevanja za trajnu brigu i patnju koje trpi podnositeljka, kao majka osuđenog zatvorenika, usled trajne nesigurnosti u pogledu okolnosti koje su dovele do njegovog pogubljenja, kao i u pogledu mesta gde se nalazi njegov grob. Potpuna tajnovitost u vezi s datumom pogubljenja i mestom sahrane i odbijanje da se telo preda radi sahrane čine da se porodice osećaju zastrašeno i kažnjeno time što su namerno ostavljene u stanju nesigurnosti i mentalne patnje. Komitet smatra da početni propust vlasti da obaveste podnositeljku o zakazanom datumu pogubljenja njenog sina i njihovo naknadno uporno propuštanje da je obaveste o mestu gde je grob njenog sina predstavljaju nečovečno postupanje prema podnositeljki predstavke, u suprotnosti sa članom 7 Pakta.“

  1. Na zasedanju 28. marta 2006. godine Komitet za ljudska prava izneo je sledeću konstataciju nakon što je razmatrao predstavku br. 1159/2003, koja je podneta u ime Mariam, Filipa (Philippe), Auguste i Tomasa (Thomas) Sankara protiv Burkine Faso:

„6.2  Komitet konstatuje razloge koje je iznela država ugovornica u prilog tvrdnji da je predstavka neprihvatljiva ratione temporis. Uzimajući u obzir i razloge koje su izneli podnosioci predstavke, Komitet je zaključio da treba razlikovati pritužbu koja se tiče Tomasa Sankare i pritužbu koja se tiče gđe Sankara i njene dece. Komitet je zaključio da je do smrti Tomasa Sankare, koja je možda bila u vezi s povredom više članova Pakta, došlo 15. oktobra 1987. godine, dakle pre nego što su Pakt i Fakultativni protokol stupili na snagu u odnosu na Burkinu Faso. Ovaj deo predstavke je, stoga, neprihvaljiv ratione temporis. Umrlica Tomasa Sankare od 17. januara 1988. godine, u kojoj se navodi da je umro prirodnom smrću – u suprotnosti s činjenicama, koje su poznate javnosti i koje je potvrdila država ugovornica ... – i propuštanje vlasti da isprave umrlicu u periodu posle tog vremena mora se posmatrati u svetlu njihovog trajnog dejstva na gđu Sankara i njenu decu.

...

12.2 Kad je u pitanju navodna povreda člana 7, Komitet ima razumevanja za patnju i psihološki pritisak kojima su bili izloženi i koje i dalje trpe gđa Sankara i njeni sinovi, porodica čoveka ubijenog pod spornim okolnostima, zbog toga što još uvek ne znaju okolnosti smrti Tomasa Sankare, niti tačno mesto gde su njegovi posmrtni ostaci sahranjeni. Porodica Tomasa Sankare ima pravo da zna okolnosti njegove smrti, i Komitet ukazuje da nadležni organi moraju hitno i nepristrasno razmotriti svaku pritužbu koja se odnosi na radnje koje su zabranjene članom 7 Pakta. Pored toga, Komitet primećuje, kao što je to učinio i prilikom razmatranja prihvatljivosti, propust da se ispravi umrlica Tomasa Sankare od 17. januara 1988. godine, koja navodi prirodnu smrt nasuport javno poznatim činjenicama, koje je država ugovornica potvrdila. Komitet smatra da odbijanje da se sprovede istraga o smrti Tomasa Sankare, odsustvo formalnog priznanja mesta na kome je sahranjen i propuštanje da se umrlica ispravi predstavljaju nečovečno postupanje prema gđi Sankara i njenim sinovima, u suprotnosti sa članom 7 Pakta...“

III.  RELEVANTNO DOMAĆE PRAVO

A.  Zakonik o krivičnom postupku Ruske Federacije (Zakon br. 174FZ od 18. decembra 2001)

  1. Član 24, st. 1 navodi sledeće razloge za obustavljanje krivičnog postupka:

„(1) nije bilo krivičnog dela;

(2)  počinjena dela ne predstavljaju krivično delo;

...

(4)  osumnjičeni ili optuženi je umro, osim u slučajevima kada krivični postupak treba da se nastavi radi rehabilitacije preminulog lica...“

  1. Član 42 definiše „žrtvu“ kao pojedinca koji je pretrpeo fizičku povredu ili materijalnu ili nematerijalnu štetu usled krivičnog dela. Odluku da se pojedincu prizna status „žrtve“ može doneti smo islednik, istražni organ, tužilac ili sud.

B.  Zakon o rehabilitaciji (Zakon br. 1761-I od 18. oktobra 1991)

  1. Prema preambuli, svrha Zakona o rehabilitaciji je „rehabilitacija“ svih žrtava političke represije protiv kojih su se vodili postupci na teritoriji Ruske Federacije posle 7. novembra 1917. godine, pri čemu se pod terminom „rehabilitacija“ podrazumeva „povraćaj njihovih građanskih prava, uklanjanje svih drugih negativnih posledica samovoljnih radnji i plaćanje naknade na ime novčane štete“.
  2. Član 1 definiše „političku represiju“ kao različite mere ograničavanja, uključujući lišavanje života ili slobode, koje je država nametnula iz političkih razloga, kao i svako drugo ograničenje prava ili sloboda onih pojedinaca koji su označeni kao društveno opasni po državu ili politički režim zbog svog klasnog ili društvenog porekla, etničke pripadnosti ili vere.
  3. Član 2 proširio je primenu Zakona o rehabilitaciji na sve ruske državljane, bivše državljane SSSR, strane državljane i lica bez državljanstva koji su pretrpeli političku represiju na teritoriji Ruske Federaciji posle 7. novembra 1917. godine.
  4. Član 3 određuje kategorije lica u odnosu na koja je „rehabilitacija“ moguća. Tačka (b) odnosi se na pojedince koji su bili izloženi krivičnopravnoj represiji na osnovu odluka Sveruske specijalne komisije (VeCheKa, ВЧК), Glavne političke direkcije (GPU, ГПУ), Narodnog komesarijata za unutrašnje poslove (NKVD, НКВД), Ministarstva državne bezbednosti (MGB, МГБ), tužilaca i njihovih stručnih tela, „specijalnih komisija“, trojki (troika) i drugih organa s pravosudnim funkcijama.

C.  Određivanje državne tajne i skidanje oznake državna tajna u Rusiji

  1. Prema preambuli, Zakon o državnim tajnama (Zakon br. 5485-I od 21. jula 1993) reguliše postupak za određivanje državnih tajni, stavljanje i skidanje oznake državna tajna s informacija i zaštiti informacija od interesa za nacionalnu bezbednost Ruske Federacije.
  2. Član 5 sadrži spisak kategorija informacija koje predstavljaju državnu tajnu. U njega su uključene, naročito, sledeće:

„(4)  obaveštajne informacije, kontraobaveštajne informacije i informacije u oblasti operativnih i istražnih aktivnosti, kao i one u oblasti protiv-terorističke delatnosti:

- u pogledu resursa, sredstava, izvora, metoda, planova i rezultata obaveštajnih, kontraobaveštajnih i operativnih i istražnih aktivnosti i njihovog finansiranja...

- u pogledu lica koja su sarađivala ili sarađuju na poverljivoj osnovi s organima vlasti koji su nadležni za obaveštajne, kontraobaveštajne i operativne i istražne aktivnosti.“

  1. Član 7 sadrži spisak informacija koje ne mogu biti proglašene za državnu tajnu ili za poverljive. On se odnosi, konkretno, na sledeće informacije:

„- koje se tiču povreda ljudskih prava i sloboda pojedinaca i građana...

-  koje se tiču povreda zakona od strane državnih organa i službenika.“

  1. Član 13 reguliše postupak za skidanje oznake tajnosti sa informacije. On takođe predviđa sledeće:

„Vreme u kome će državne tajne ostati pod oznakom tajnosti ne sme biti duže od trideset godina. U izuzetnim slučajevima, Međuresorska komisija o zaštiti državnih tajni može produžiti ovaj period.“

  1. Drugog avgusta 1997. godine Država je usvojila Uredbu o pripremi informacija koje imaju oznaku državna tajna za predaju stranim državama i međunarodnim organizacijama (br. 973). Predviđeno je da odluku o predaji takvih informacija može doneti Vlada Rusije na osnovu izveštaja koji priprema Međuresorska komisija o zaštiti državnih tajni (st. 3). Strana kojoj se dostavljaju informacije mora preduzeti mere da zaštiti poverljive informacije tako što će zaključiti međunarodni ugovor koji, između ostalog, uređuje postupak za prenos informacija, klauzulu o poverljivosti i postupak za rešavanje sporova (st. 4).

D.  Krivični zakonik Ruske Federacije (Zakon br. 63-FZ 13. od 13. juna 1996)

  1. Poglavlje 34 sadrži spisak zločina protiv mira i bezbednosti čovečanstva. Član 356 naročito zabranjuje „surovo postupanje prema ratnim zarobljenicima ili civilima“, što je krivično delo za koje se može izreći kazna do dvadeset godina zatvora.
  2. Član 78, st. 5 predviđa da krivična dela definisana u članovima 353 (rat), 356 (zabranjena sredstva ratovanja), 357 (genocid) i 358 (ekocid) ne zastarevaju.

PRAVO

I. DA LI ROĐACI PREMINULIH PODNOSILACA PREDSTAVKE IMAJU PRAVO DA BUDU STRANA U POSTUPKU

  1. Posle smrti podnosioca predstavke Kšištofa Jana Maleviča 7. jula 2011. godine, njegov sin, Pjotr Malevič, obavestio je Sud o svojoj želji da umesto njega nastavi s postupkom koji je on pokrenuo.
  2. Veće je ponovilo da je ranije Sud, u predmetima u kojima je podnosilac predstavke umro tokom postupka, uzimao u obzir izjave naslednika podnosilaca predstavke ili bliskih članova porodice koji su izrazili želju da nastave postupak pred Sudom (vidi Karner protiv Austrije [Karner v. Austria], predstavka br. 40016/98, st. 25, ECHR 2003-IX, i Dalban protiv Rumunije [Dalban v. Romania] [VV], predstavka br. 28114/95, st. 39, ECHR 1999-VI). Veće je, stoga, prihvatilo da Pjotr Malevič preuzme postupak po predstavci koju je podneo njegov pokojni otac.
  3. Podnositeljka predstavke Halina Mihalska umrla je 28. novembra 2012. godine. Pismom od 30. januara 2013. godine njen sin, Kazimjež Račinjski, izrazio je nameru da nastavi postupak umesto nje.
  4. Veliko veće se uverilo da su i Pjotr Malevič i Kazimjež Račinjski najbliži rođaci preminulih podnosilaca predstavke. Ono dalje primećuje da prihvatanje Veća da Pjotr Malevič bude strana u postupku pred Sudom nije osporavala nijedna od strana. Veliko Veće stoga ne vidi nijedan razlog da dođe do drugačijeg zaključka, bilo u pogledu Pjotra Maleviča ili, po analogiji, u pogledu Kazimježa Račinjskog.
  5. Shodno tome, Sud prihvata da Pjotr Malevič i Kazimjež Račinjski preuzmu postupak koji su pokrenuli pokojni Kšištof Jan Malevič odnosno pokojna Halina Mihalska.

II. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 2 KONVENCIJE

  1. Podnosioci predstavke su se žalili da ruske vlasti nisu poštovale svoje obaveze koje imaju prema procesnom aspektu člana 2 Konvencije, koji od njih zahteva da sprovedu odgovarajuću i delotvornu istragu o smrti njihovih rođaka. Član 2 predviđa sledeće:

 „1.  Pravo na život svake osobe zaštićeno je zakonom. Niko ne može biti namerno lišen života, sem prilikom izvršenja presude suda kojom je osuđen za zločin za koji je ova kazna predviđena zakonom.

 2. Lišenje života se ne smatra protivnim ovom članu ako proistekne iz upotrebe sile koja je apsolutno nužna:

a)  radi odbrane nekog lica od nezakonitog nasilja;

b)  da bi se izvršilo zakonito hapšenje ili sprečilo bekstvo lica zakonito lišenog slobode;

c)  prilikom zakonitih mera koje se preduzimaju u cilju suzbijanja nereda ili pobune.“

A.  Presuda Veća

  1. Podsećajući da je u svojoj odluci o prihvatljivosti od 5. jula 2011. godine Sud spojio razmatranje prigovora Države koji se ticao njegove vremenske nadležnosti u odnosu na procesni aspekt člana 2 s razmatranjem merituma, Veće je razmatralo na početku da li ovaj prigovor treba usvojiti ili odbiti. U tom cilju, ono je razmotrilo primenjivu praksu Suda i načela koja uređuju vremenska ograničenja u pogledu procesnih obaveza država kako su formulisana u presudi u predmetu Šilih protiv Slovenije ([VV], predstavka br. 71463/01, st. 160-163, od 9. aprila 2009) i primenjena u nizu predmeta protiv Rumunije, Ukrajine i Hrvatske.
  2. Kad je u pitanju prvi test – postojanje „suštinske veze“ koju zahteva prva rečenica stava 163 u presudi Šilih, Veće je smatralo da će standard „suštinske veze“ biti ispunjen samo ako protok vremena između događaja koji je razlog za postupak i datuma ratifikacije ostane razumno kratak. Osim toga, ukazalo je da značajan deo istražnih koraka koji su neophodni radi obezbeđivanja poštovanja procesnih obaveza iz člana 2 mora biti sproveden nakon datuma ratifikacije. Prema oceni Veća, nijedan od ovih uslova nije ispunjen u ovom predmetu, u kome je protok vremena između smrti (1940) i datuma ratifikacije (5. maj 1998) bio previše dug u apsolutnom smislu da bi ispunio standard „suštinske veze“. Isto tako, Veće nije moglo da nađe ništa u spisima ili podnescima strana u postupku što bi ukazalo na to da su posle ratifikacije preduzeti bilo kakvi procesni koraci koji bi po svom značaju bili poredivi s onima koji su sprovedeni pre datuma ratifikacije.
  3. Veće je zatim razmatralo da li su okolnosti slučaja takve da opravdavaju zaključak da je veza između događaja koji je razlog postupka i datuma ratifikacije zasnovana na „potrebi da se obezbedi delotvorna zaštita garancija i vrednosti na kojima se zasniva Konvencija“ (stav 139), kao što je istaknuto u poslednjoj rečenici stava 163 u presudi Šilih. Pošto je to bio prvi predmet u kome je Sud pozvan da da tumačenje ove odredbe, Veće je – inspirisano Breknel presudom (Breknel protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Brecknell v. the United Kingdom], predstavka br. 32457/04, od 27. novembra 2007) – to učinilo na sledeći način:

„Daleko od toga da je slučajno, upućivanje na temeljne vrednosti Konvencije ukazuje na to da bi događaj o kome je reč, da bi takva veza bila uspostavljena, morao biti većih razmera nego obično krivično delo i predstavljati negaciju samih temelja Konvencije, kao na primer, ratni zločini ili zločini protiv čovečnosti. Iako takvi zločini ne podležu zastarevanju na osnovu Konvencije o nezastarevanju ratnih zločina i zločina protiv čovečnosti..., to ne znači da države imaju neprestanu obavezu da ih istražuju. Ipak, procesne obaveze mogu biti obnovljene ako informacije koje navodno bacaju novo svetlo na okolnosti takvih zločina postanu javno poznate nakon kritičnog datuma. Ne može svaka tvrdnja ili navod da pokrene novu obavezu sprovođenja istrage prema članu 2 Konvencije. S obzirom na suštinsku važnost ove odredbe, državni organi moraju imati sluha za svaku informaciju ili materijal koji imaju potencijal bilo da podriju zaključke prethodne istrage ili da dozvole da ranija istraga koja nije dovela do jasnih rezultata bude nastavljena... Ukoliko bi se otkrio novi materijal u periodu posle ratifikacije, i ukoliko on ima dovoljnu težinu i dovoljno je ubedljiv da zahteva novu fazu postupka, Sud će imati vremensku nadležnost da se uveri da je tužena Država izvršila svoje procesne obaveze prema članu 2 na način koji je saglasan s načelima utvrđenim kroz njegovu praksu.“ (stav 139, reference izostavljene)

  1. Primenjujući ove kriterijume na predmet o kome je reč, Veće je zaključilo da je (1) masovno ubistvo poljskih zarobljenika od strane sovjetske tajne policije imalo osobine ratnog zločina, ali da (2) u periodu posle 5. maja 1998, nijedan dokaz koji bi po karakteru ili suštini mogao obnoviti procesnu obavezu da se sprovede istraga ili pokrenuti nova ili šira pitanja nije predstavljen niti otkriven. Shodno tome zaključilo je da nema nikakvih elemenata koji bi mogli predstavljati most od daleke prošlosti do nedavnog perioda posle ratifikacije i da nije pokazano da postoje posebne okolnosti koje bi opravdale vezu između smrti i ratifikacije.
  2. U svetlu takvih razmatranja, Veće je zaključilo da Sud nema nadležnost ratione temporis da razmatra meritum pritužbe na osnovu člana 2 Konvencije.

B.  Podnesci strana u postupku

1.  Država (Rusija)

  1. Država je tvrdila da treba pravno razlikovati dve situacije: jednu, kada je do povrede Konvencije došlo tokom perioda koji ne spada u vremensku nadležnost Suda, i drugu, kada povreda Konvencije „pravno uopšte nije postojala“ jer u datom trenutku Konvencija nije postojala. Prema mišljenju Države, ova razlika je bitna, pošto bi samo „pravno postojeća“ povreda člana 2 u njegovom materijalnom smislu – do koje je ipak moglo doći van vremenske nadležnosti Suda – mogla da pokrene procesne obaveze države prema članu 2 posmatranom u vezi sa članom 1 Konvencije. U predmetima koje je Sud ranije razmatrao, događaji koji su pokrenuli obavezu da se sprovede istraga odigrali su se nakon usvajanja Konvencije. U ovom predmetu navodna povreda materijalnog aspekta člana 2 ne samo da je van vremenske nadležnosti Suda, već i de jure nije postojala pošto su „događaji u Katinu“ prethodili deset godina usvajanju Konvencije 4. novembra 1950. godine, a pedeset i osam godina ratifikovanju Konvencije od strane Rusije 5. maja 1998. godine. Prema mišljenju Države, to sprečava Sud da ispituje da li je Rusija poštovala svoje procesne obaveze. Uz to, Država je tvrdila da Sud nije imao nadležnost ratione materiae da kvalifikuje masakr u Katinu kao „ratni zločin“ sa stanovišta međunarodnog humanitarnog prava.
  2. Država je navela da se ne može reći da je nastala bilo kakva obaveza da se istražuju „događaji u Katinu“, bilo kao pitanje domaćeg prava ili međunarodnog humanitarnog prava ili na osnovu Konvencije. Na domaćem nivou sprovedena je istraga o krivičnom delu koje je kažnjivo prema članu 193-17 (b) Krivičnog zakonika RSFSR iz 1926. godine (zloupotreba vlasti koja je izazvala ozbiljne posledice, koja je učinjena pod otežavajućim okolnostima) za koje je bio propisan rok zastarelosti od deset godina. Ruski Zakonik o krivičnom postupku iz tog vremena nalagao je da postupak bude obustavljen nakon isteka roka zastarelosti. Povrh toga, oficiri NKVD SSSR umrli su pre nego što su pokrenute krivične istrage. Kao pitanje domaćeg krivičnog postupka, njihova smrt je bila odvojeni pravni osnov koji je sprečavao da protiv njih budu pokrenuti ili vođeni krivični postupci. U međunarodnom pravu smrt osumnjičenih ili optuženih lica je takođe bila univerzalno prihvaćena kao osnov za odbijanje da se pokrene krivični postupak ili za njegovo obustavljanje (ovde se Država pozvala na predmet Tužilac protiv Normana, Fofane i Kondeve [Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana and Kondewa], Specijalni sud za Sijera Leone, odluka pretresnog veća od 21. maja 2007, SCSL-04-14-T-776, i Tužilac protiv Slobodana Miloševića [Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević], Međunarodni krivični tribunal za bivšu Jugoslaviju, IT-02-54, Odluka o obustavljanju postupka od 14. marta 2006). Sa stanovišta države, bilo je jasno da je istraga u krivičnom predmetu br. 159 sprovedena „suprotno zahtevima krivičnog postupka, iz političkih razloga, kao gest dobre volje prema poljskim vlastima“.
  3. Država je smatrala da, sa stanovišta međunarodnog humanitarnog prava, bar do 1945. godine nije postojala univerzalno obavezujuća odredba međunarodnog prava o definiciji ratnih zločina ili zločina protiv čovečnosti ili o pripisivanju odgovornosti i gonjenju takvih zločina. S obzirom na to da je Međunarodni vojni tribunal bio ad hoc tribunal, odredbe njegove Povelje, uključujući definicije zločina koje su sadržane u njoj, bile su ograničene na postupak koji se pred njim vodi protiv najvećih ratnih zločinaca koji su pripadali evropskim silama osovine. Država je zaključila da međunarodno pravo, onako kakvo je bilo 1940. godine, nije davalo dovoljno osnova da se „događaji u Katinu“ kvalifikuju kao ratni zločin, zločin protiv čovečnosti ili genocid, osim ukoliko su mogli da se pripišu najvećim ratnim zločincima evropske osovine i da spadaju pod nadležnost Nirnberškog tribunala. Ipak, na zahtev poljskih vlasti, ruski istražitelji su ispitali „verziju genocida“ i zaključili da nikakav zločin takve vrste nije bio počinjen jer su osumnjičeni imali čisto kriminalne motive, a ne nameru da unište, u celini ili delimično, neku nacionalnu, etničku, rasnu ili versku grupu (u skladu s definicijom iz članova 2 i 3 Konvencije o sprečavanju i kažnjavanju zločina genocida od 9. decembra 1948).
  4. Što se tiče procesne obaveze da se sprovede istraga kako je predviđeno Konvencijom, Država je ponovila prvo da je istraga u krivičnom predmetu br. 159 sprovedena iz političkih razloga, kao gest dobre volje, i da stoga ne može biti ocenjena sa stanovišta procesnih zahteva iz člana 2. Drugo, prema mišljenju Države, samo događaji koji su se odigrali nakon usvajanja Konvencije mogu da pokrenu bilo kakvu procesnu obavezu. Treće, nije se razumno moglo očekivati da ruske vlasti sprovedu delotvornu istragu nekih pedeset i osam godina posle događaja kada su svedoci već umrli, a ključni dokumenti su uništeni. Alternativno, Država je tvrdila da „Konvencija ne nameće [nije nametnula] nikakve konkretne obaveze... da se pruži zadovoljenje za povrede ili štetu koji su nastali pre... ratifikacije“ (ovde su se pozvali na Kopecki protiv Slovačke [Kopecký v. Slovakia] [VV], predstavka br. 44912/98, st. 38, ECHR 2004-IX). Drugim rečima, kada je Sud bio sprečen ratione temporis da istražuje okolnosti neke smrti, on nije mogao da ustanovi da li ona pokreće ili ne pokreće procesnu obavezu prema članu 2 (ovde su se pozvali na Holodovi protiv Rusije [Kholodovy v. Russia] (odluka), predstavka br. 30651/05, od 14. septembra 2006, i Moldovan i drugi protiv Rumunije [Moldovan and Others v. Romania] (odluka), predstavke br. 41138/98 i 64320/01, od 13. marta 2001).
  5. Što se tiče odvojenosti procesne obaveze, Država je istakla da ne bi svaka smrt proizvela procesnu obavezu i da je Sud trebalo da istraži na početku da li su okolnosti smrti takve da ovde stvore takvu obavezu. Međutim, kada se smrt dogodi pre datuma ratifikacije, Sud ne bi imao vremensku nadležnost da izvede takvu analizu. Štaviše, načelo odvojenosti moralo je biti podvrgnuto određenim ograničenjima kako bi se izbeglo nepredvidivo širenje nadležnosti Suda i dejstva Konvencije. Prvo, protok vremena trebalo je da bude razumno kratak, što u ovom predmetu nije bio slučaj. Drugo, značajan deo istražnih koraka morao je biti sproveden nakon datuma ratifikacije. Ovaj kriterijum isto tako nije bio ispunjen u ovom predmetu. Najzad, kada je reč o potrebi da se obezbedi stvarna i delotvorna zaštita temeljnih vrednosti Konvencije, Država se složila da je događaj o kome je reč trebalo da bude većih razmera od običnog krivičnog dela. Međutim, što se tiče „događaja u Katinu“, Sud nije imao nadležnost, bilo ratione temporis ili ratione materiae, da ih ocenjuje sa stanovišta međunarodnog humanitarnog prava.
  6. Država je naglasila da su svi najvažniji procesni koraci u katinskoj istrazi izvedeni u periodu između 1990. i 1995. i da se nikakav relevantni „novi materijal“ nije pojavio posle 5. maja 1998. godine. Nasuprot navodima Poljske, odluka o poverljivosti određenih materijala nije se mogla posmatrati kao „novi materijal“ koji je podoban da ponovo pokrene procesnu obavezu prema članu 2. Takođe, ni navodno otkriće ukrajinskog spiska 2002. godine, koji se završio samo zahtevom da ukrajinske vlasti pruže objašnjenje.

2.  Podnosioci predstavki

  1. Podnosioci predstavki su priznali da je masakr u Katinu koji je izvršen 1940. bio čin koji je van vremenskog dometa Konvencije, i da Sud nema nikakve nadležnosti ratione temporis da se bavi materijalnim aspektima člana 2. Ipak, prema njihovom mišljenju, Sud treba da ima vremensku nadležnost da ispita da li je Rusija poštovala svoju procesnu obavezu prema članu 2, što je bila odvojena i autonomna dužnost koja je bila podobna da obaveže Državu čak i kada je smrt o kojoj je reč nastupila pre datuma ratifikacije.
  2. Podnosioci predstavki su smatrali da suštinska veza neophodna da se uspostavi vremenska nadležnost Suda treba da bude zasnovana pre svega na „potrebi da se obezbedi da [su] garancije i temeljne vrednosti Konvencije zaštićene na stvaran i delotvoran način“ (podnosioci predstavke su se pozvali na Šilih, citirano gore u tekstu, st. 163 in fine). Sud se ranije pozivao na izraz „temeljne vrednosti Konvencije“ nalazeći da su određeni primeri govora mržnje, kao što je govor koji negira Holokaust ili opravdava ratne zločine, nespojivi s vrednostima Konvencije (ovde su se pozvali na Garodi protiv Francuske [Garaudy protiv Francuske] (odluka), predstavka br. 65831/01, ECHR 2003-IX (izvodi); Vič protiv Nemačke [Witzsch protiv Nemačke] (odluka), predstavka br. 7485/03, od 13. decembra 2005; i Orban i drugi protiv Francuske [Orban and Others v. France], predstavka br. 20985/05, st. 35, od 15. januara 2009). S obzirom na to da se smatralo da je govor kojim se negira realnost zločina prema međunarodnom pravu u suprotnosti s temeljnim vrednostima Konvencije, isto rezonovanje bi trebalo da se primenjuje a fortiori na same radnje koje su podrivale samo značenje pravde i mira, što su fundamentalne vrednosti Konvencije kako su formulisane u preambuli. Prema stavu podnosilaca predstavki, pominjanje temeljnih vrednosti u stavu 163 presude u predmetu Šilih ukazivalo je da postoje neki primeri dela koji krše same temelje sistema Konvencije, čija bi priroda, razmere i ozbiljnost trebalo da Sudu daju nadležnost ratione temporis da ispita obavezu Države da sprovede delotvornu istragu.
  3. Podnosioci predstavki su ostali pri tome da je masakr u Katinu bio zločin prema međunarodnom pravu. Poljski vojnici koje je zarobila Crvena armija imali su pravo na punu zaštitu koja se garantuje ratnim zarobljenicima, uključujući zaštitu od akata nasilja i surovosti koju pružaju odredbe Haške konvencije IV iz 1907. i Ženevske konvencije iz 1929. godine. Ubistvo poljskih ratnih zarobljenika 1940. godine bilo je nezakonit čin koji je predstavljao povredu članova 4, 23 (c) i 50 Haške konvencije IV i članova 2, 46, 61 i 63 Ženevske konvencije. Iako SSSR nije bio strana ugovornica nijedne od ove dve konvencije, bio je dužan da poštuje univerzalno obavezujuća načela međunarodnog običajnog prava, koja su samo kodifikovana u tim konvencijama. Da je SSSR smatrao da je takva obaveza pravno obavezujuća bilo je jasno pokazano kroz činjenicu da je, na Nirnberškom suđenju, sovjetski tužilac pokušao da optuži nacističke vođe za ubistvo poljskih ratnih zarobljenika. Istrebljivanje poljskih ratnih zarobljenika predstavljalo je ratni zločin u smislu člana 6 (b) Nirnberške povelje, a streljanje civila je predstavljalo zločin protiv čovečnosti kako je definisan u članu 6 (c) Nirnberške povelje. Kvalifikovanje masakra u Katinu kao ratnog zločina, kao što je to učinio Nirnberški tribunal, moralo se posmatrati na objektivan način i nije zavisilo od toga ko je zaista počinio zločin. Štaviše, pogubljenje ratnih zarobljenika predstavljalo je ratni zločin i međunarodna zajednica ga je tretirala kao ratni zločin, što je činjenica koja je nedvosmisleno predstavljena u praksi sudova u posleratnim suđenjima ratnim zločincima. Budući da predstavlja zločin prema međunarodnom pravu, na masakr u Katinu u vreme kad je izvršen nije bio primenjiv institut zastarelosti, a nije ni u današnje vreme, i prateća obaveza da bude istražen opstala je do danas.
  4. Podnosioci predstavki su dalje naveli dva činioca koji su potvrdili tezu da je Sud nadležan da presuđuje o ruskom poštovanju procesne obaveze iz člana 2. Prvo, Savet Evrope i Konvencija su nastali kao demokratske političke i pravne alternative masovnim povredama ljudskog dostojanstva koje su počinila dva totalitarna režima, nacizam i staljinizam. Masakr u Katinu izvršio je totalitarni režim čiji su ciljevi i vrednosti radikalno protivrečili onima iz Konvencije. Ako Konvenciju treba štititi stvarno i na delotvoran način, postojeće države ugovornice moraju sprovesti delotvorne istrage o totalitarnim zločinima. Drugo, delotvorna istraga o masakru u Katinu je preduslov za „rehabilitaciju“ ubijenih osoba kao žrtava političke represije i za povećanje javne svesti o totalitarnim zločinima.
  5. Podnosioci predstavki su, dalje, smatrali da bi čak i prema „testu novog materijala“ koji je ustanovljen i primenjen u presudi Veća, Sud mogao da ima nadležnost da ispita da li Rusija poštuje procesne obaveze prema članu 2, pretpostavljajući da se zahtevani novi element ne ograničava samo na to da su važni novi dokazi postali poznati u periodu posle ratifikacije, već da isto tako uključuju nove i dovoljno važne procesne činjenice. Ovaj test bi isto tako trebalo da obuhvati predmete u kojima su domaće vlasti propustile da prikupe nove dokaze ili kada su usvojile zaključke koji u potpunosti protivreče prethodnim nalazima ili istorijskim činjenicama. Iako odluka o zatvaranju istrage po sebi nije novi materijal za istragu, mogla bi predstavljati novi procesni događaj koja je od značaja u kontekstu člana 2 Konvencije, naročito zato što je označavala iznenadnu promenu u istrazi. Štaviše, pošto je značajan deo spisa istrage postao poverljiv, a isti status je dobila i konačna odluka u istrazi, postojali su snažni razlozi da se pretpostavi da je do nagle i radikalne promene u istrazi došlo usled novih relevantnih otkrića.
  6. Prelazeći na meritum pritužbe prema članu 2, podnosioci predstavki su izjavili da ruska istraga nije ispunila osnovne zahteve te odredbe. Ruske vlasti nisu pružile objašnjenje za razliku između broja ubijenih osoba (21.857) i mnogo manjeg broja onih koji se pominju kao „nestali“ (1,803). Nisu sprovele sveobuhvatne ekshumacije na svim lokacijama gde su obavljena sahranjivanja. Odbijen je zahtev podnosilaca predstavki da dobiju status oštećene strane u postupku i istraga nije bila transparentna u tom pogledu. Najzad, istraga nije usmeravana ka identifikovanju počinilaca i njihovom dovođenju pred lice pravde. Podnosioci predstavki citirali su imena dva visoko rangirana sovjetska funkcionera koji su bili dovođeni u vezi s masakrom implicated u Katinu i koji su tokom 1990-ih još uvek bili živi.

3.  Poljska

  1. Poljska je tvrdila da bi tumačenje „klauzule o posebnim okolnostima“ u poslednjoj rečenici stava 163 presude u predmetu Šilih trebalo da uzme u obzir posebnu prirodu počinjenih dela, koja su prema međunarodnom pravu predstavljala ratne zločine. Uz to, Sud treba da uzme u obzir sledeće činioce: (1) istraga o masakru u Katinu nije bila moguća iz političkih razloga pre 1990. godine; (2) istraga je vođena šest godina nakon što je Rusija ratifikovala Konvenciju; (3) postojao je značajan broj pojedinaca koji su imali legitiman interes da se ustanove okolnosti masakra; i (4) još uvek je postojao niz mogućnosti da se nastavi istraga.
  2. Poljska je, dalje, navela da su ruski tužilački organi između 1998. i 2004. godine, u okviru istrage o Katinu, preduzeli niz procesnih radnji koje su za rezultat imale nove dokaze za koje se može tvrditi da su bili podobni da „ožive“ procesnu obavezu prema članu 2. Oni su obuhvatali: (1) razmenu korespondencije u 2002. godini između ruskih i ukrajinskih tužilaca o katinskom zločinu; (2) slanje više od 3.000 zahteva ruskim centrima za lične podatke radi dobijanja informacija o sudbini poljskih državljana čija imena su se nalazila na „ukrajinskom katinskom spisku“; (3) poljsko-ruske bilateralne konsultacije; (4) podnošenje više od devedeset zahteva od strane rođaka katinskih žrtava; (5) nalaganje dva veštačenja o pravnoj kvalifikaciji masakra u Katinu; i (6) odluku o stavljanju oznake tajnosti na spise predmeta.
  3. Prelazeći na meritum pritužbe po osnovu člana 2, Poljska je tvrdila da katinska istraga nije bila delotvorna. S jedne strane, ruski tužioci su potvrdili da su rođaci podnosilaca predstavke pogubljeni 1940. godine, ali su ih, s druge strane, ruski vojni sudovi proglasili nestalim osobama. Ruske vlasti nisu uzele dokaze od podnosilaca predstavki, niti uložile bilo kakve napore da sprovedu forenzička ispitivanja ili da pronađu dokumenta. Netačno su ocenile dokaze koje im je poljska strana dostavila i pogrešno su kvalifikovale masakr u Katinu kao zloupotrebu položaja. Podnosiocima predstavki nije dato pravo da učestvuju u istrazi i nije im dat procesni status oštećenih strana. Najzad, stavljanjem oznake tajnosti na značajan deo spisa predmeta, ruske vlasti su propustile da postignu pravičnu ravnotežu između javnog interesa da se otkriju zločini totalitarne prošlosti i privatnog interesa podnosilaca predstavki da se ustanove okolnosti smrti njihovih rođaka.

4.  Treće strane

(a)  Open Society Justice Initiative

  1. Organizacija Open Society Justice Initiative navela je da Države imaju obavezu, prema Konvenciji i običajnom međunarodnom pravu, da istraže ratne zločine i zločine protiv čovečnosti sve dotle dok je to praktično izvodljivo. Ova obaveza je bila implicitna u zabrani primene instituta zastarelosti na takve zločine i nije bila ograničena nikakvom vremenskom kvalifikacijom. Istina je da je sprovođenje delotvornih istraga postajalo sve veći izazov kako je vreme prolazilo; međutim, postojeća praksa domaćih i međunarodnih sudova da prihvate nadležnost nad prošlim kršenjima ukazuje da je uspešno gonjenje moguće čak i mnogo decenija nakon događaja. Treća strana pozvala se na presude Suda u predmetima Breknel i Varnava i na praksu Inter-američkog suda za ljudska prava u predmetima Heliodoro Portugal protiv Paname [Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama] (presuda od 12. avgusta 2008) i Gomeš Lund protiv Brazila [Gomes Lund v. Brazil] (presuda od 24. novembra 2010). Treća strana tvrdila je da je delotvorna istraga o zločinima u Drugom svetskom ratu i dalje moguća posle 1998. godine. Oni su naveli primere istraga o zločinima iz nacističkog doba izvršenim u Nemačkoj, Mađarskoj, Italiji i Poljskoj, od kojih su neke za rezultat imale uspešna gonjenja uprkos starosti optuženika. Pored toga, 2012. godine jedan britanski sud je dozvolio da se nastavi parnični postupak za naknadu štete protiv britanske Vlade u vezi s navodnim aktima mučenja tokom ustanka u Keniji koji se dogodio između 1952. i 1961. godine.
  2. Treća strana je isto tako navela da pravo na istinu, kad se gleda pojedinačno, pretpostavlja pristup rezultatima istrage, kao i arhiviranim i otvorenim istražnim spisima. Ovakav uvid je neophodan kako bi se sprečile povrede, suzbijala nekažnjivost i održala vera javnosti u vladavinu prava (ovde su se pozvali na Keli i drugi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, predstavka br. 30054/96, st. 118, od 4. maja 2001). Kada je reč o pravu na istinu, stavljanje oznake tajnosti na informacije koje se tiču povreda ljudskih prava bilo je dozvoljeno samo u izuzetnim okolnostima, nakon što se pokaže da postoji ubedljiv državni interes, koji se može osporiti pred sudom i za ograničeni vremenski period, pod uslovom da nisu bili dostupni manje restriktivni načini. Treća strana dostavila je zaključke jedne studije o zakonima koji regulišu pravo na informacije u devedeset i tri države, iz koje se videlo da četrdeset i četiri među njima izričito zahtevaju da informacije budu objavljene kada je javni interes za objavljivanje pretežniji od bilo kakvog interesa za očuvanje tajnosti. Objektivna rekonstrukcija istine o povredama prava u prošlosti bila je ključna kako bi se narodima omogućilo da uče iz svoje istorije i da preduzmu mere kako bi se sprečili budući zločini (UNCHR, Ažurirani skup načela za zaštitu i promovisanje ljudskih prava kroz akcije kojima se suzbija nekažnjivost [Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity], Rezolucija 2005/81, 8. februar 2005, Načela 2 i 3).

(b)  Amnesty International

  1. Organizacija Amnesty International je navela da se obaveza da se istraže ratni zločini i zločini protiv čovečnosti proteže na takve zločine koji su izvršeni pre izrade nacrta i stupanja na snagu Konvencije. Ubijanje i zlostavljanje ratnih zarobljenika i civila bilo je zabranjeno prema običajnom međunarodnom pravu 1939. godine, i države su imale obavezu da istraže i gone ratne zločine mnogo pre 1939. godine, bez zastarelosti (ovde su se pozvali na Kononov protiv Letonije [Kononov v. Latvia] [VV], predstavka br. 36376/04, st. 186 i 232, ECHR 2010, i na presude Inter-američkog suda za ljudska prava u Velaskez-Rodrigez protiv Hondurasa [VelásquezRodríguez v. Honduras], od 29. jula 1988, st. 174, i Gomeš Lund protiv Brazila [Gomes Lund v. Brazil], od 24. novembra 2010, st. 108). Treća strana je naglasila da je Inter-američki sud u više navrata ustanovio povredu obaveze da se istraže, gone i kazne radnje koje su se dogodile pre ratifikacije Američke konvencije o ljudskim pravima od strane tužene Države (ovde su citirali presudu Gomeš Lund kao i Almonasid Areljano protiv Čilea [Almonacid Arellano v. Chile], od 26. septembra 2006, st. 151). Istakli su da protok vremena nije izmenio obavezu države da sprovede istragu i da pruži odgovarajuće, delotvorne lekove žrtvama. Pravo žrtava na delotvoran pristup pravdi uključivalo je pravo na saslušanje i pravo na potpuno obeštećenje, što je obuhvatalo sledeće elemente: restituciju, kompenzaciju, rehabilitaciju, zadovoljenje i garancije da se povreda neće ponoviti (navedeni su zaključci Interameričkog suda u Gomeš Lund, st. 261262, 277 i 297). Najzad, treća strana je navela, opet pozivanjem na presudu Gomeš Lund (st. 241-242), da je propust da se sprovede delotvorna istraga na negativan način uticao na pravo članova porodice da se s njima postupa čovečno.

(c)  Memorial (Moskva), EHRAC (London) i Transitional Justice Network (Eseks)

  1. Ove tri organizacije su navele da Generalna skupština UN, interamerički sistem ljudskih prava i međunarodno ugovorno pravo sadrže obavezu da se istraže i gone ratni zločini s ciljem da se žrtvama, njihovim porodicama, široj društvenoj zajednici i međunarodnoj zajednici pruži precizan i transparentan odgovor o povredama prava. Pravo porodica da znaju sudbinu svojih nestalih ili umrlih rođaka je bilo samostalna komponenta obaveze da se sprovede istraga koja je kodifikovana norma običajnog međunarodnog prava (ovde su se naročito pozvali na pravilo 117, Običajno međunarodno humanitarno pravo [Customary International Humanitarian Law], tom I, Studija Međunarodnog komiteta Crvenog krsta o običajnom međunarodnom pravu [International Committee of the Red Cross Study of Customary International Law], 2005, i na praksu Interameričkog suda za ljudska prava). Oni su takođe dali prikaz različitih postupanja država koja se odnose na osnivanje komisija za istinu ili sličnih istražnih tela kao odgovor na izvršenje međunarodnih zločina, uključujući detaljne informacije o mandatima i funkcijama ovih komisija.

C.  Ocena Suda

  1. Država je iznela prethodni prigovor u odnosu na nadležnost Suda ratione temporis da se bavi meritumom pritužbe koju su podneli podnosioci predstavki na osnovu procesnog aspekta člana 2 Konvencije. Shodno tome, Sud treba najpre da ispita da li bi ovaj prigovor trebalo prihvatiti.

1.  Opšta načela

  1. Sud ponovo podseća da odredbe Konvencije ne obavezuju stranu ugovornicu u odnosu na bilo koju radnju ili činjenicu koji su se dogodili ili na bilo koju situaciju koja je prestala da postoji pre datuma stupanja na snagu Konvencije za stranu ugovornicu („kritični datum“). To je načelo koje je ustanovljeno u praksi Suda na osnovu opšteg pravila međunarodnog prava sadržanog u članu 28 Bečke konvencije o ugovornom pravu od 23. maja 1969. godine (vidi Varnava i drugi protiv Turske [Varnava and Others v. Turkey] [VV], predstavke br. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 i 16073/90, st. 130, ECHR 2009; Šilih protiv Slovenije [Šilih v. Slovenia] [VV], predstavka br. 71463/01, st. 140, od 9. aprila 2009; i Blečić protiv Hrvatske [Blečić v. Croatia] [VV], predstavka br. 59532/00, st. 70, ECHR 2006-III).
  2. Kada su se neka radnja, propust ili odluka koji su navodno predstavljali povredu Konvencije dogodili pre nego što je Konvencija stupila na snagu, ali je postupak za dobijanje zadovoljenja za tu radnju pokrenut ili se nastavio nakon njenog stupanja na snagu, ovi postupci ne mogu se posmatrati kao deo činjenica/okolnosti koje predstavljaju navodnu povredu i ne mogu uvesti predmet u vremensku nadležnost Suda (vidi Varnava i drugi, st. 130, i Blečić, st. 77-79, citirano gore u tekstu).
  3. Mada je tačno da od kritičnog datuma nadalje sve radnje i propusti države moraju biti u skladu s Konvencijom, Konvencija ne nameće nikakve posebne obaveze državama ugovornicama da pruže zadovoljenje za povrede ili štetu koje su nastale pre tog datuma (vidi Kopecki protiv Slovačke [Kopecký v. Slovakia] [VV], predstavka br. 44912/98, st. 38, ECHR 2004-IX). Tako je, da bi se ustanovila vremenska nadležnost Suda, nužno da se utvrdi, u svakom konkretnom slučaju, tačno vreme navodne povrede. Pri tome, Sud mora uzeti u obzir i činjenice na koje se podnosilac predstavke žali i opseg prava po Konvenciji koje je navodno povređeno (vidi Varnava i drugi, st. 131, i Blečić, st. 72 i 81-82, oba citirana gore u tekstu).
  4. Sud se bavio nizom slučajeva u kojima činjenice koje se odnose na materijalni aspekt člana 2 ili 3 nisu bile u vremenskoj nadležnosti Suda, dok su činjenice koje su se odnosile na procesni aspekt, odnosno kasnije postupke, bar delimično spadale u nadležnost Suda (za sumarni prikaz prakse Suda vidi Šilih, st. 148-152, citirano u gornjem tekstu).
  5. Sud je zaključio da se procesna obaveza da se sprovede delotvorna istraga prema članu 2 razvila u odvojenu i autonomnu obavezu. Iako je podstaknuta činjenicama koje se tiču materijalnog aspekta člana 2, može se smatrati da predstavlja odvojenu obavezu koja proističe iz člana 2, koja može da obaveže državu čak i kada se smrt dogodila pre kritičnog datuma (vidi Varnava i drugi, st. 138, i Šilih, st. 159, oba citirana u gornjem tekstu).
  6. Ipak, imajući u vidu načelo pravne sigurnosti, vremenska nadležnost Suda u pogledu poštovanja obaveze prema članu 2 kada je reč o smrtnim slučajevima koji su se dogodili pre kritičnog datuma nije bez ograničenja (vidi Šilih, st. 161, citirano u gornjem tekstu). U presudi u predmetu Šilih Sud je definisao granice svoje vremenske nadležnosti na sledeći način:

„162.  Prvo, jasno je da kada je smrt nastupila pre kritičnog datuma, samo procesne radnje i/ili propusti koji su se dogodili posle tog datuma spadaju u vremensku nadležnost Suda.

163.  Drugo, mora postojati suštinska veza između smrti i stupanja Konvencije na snagu u odnosu na tuženu Državu da bi postojala procesna obaveza koju nameće član 2.

Tako je značajan deo procesnih koraka koje zahteva ova odredba – koji uključuju ne samo delotvornu istragu o smrti osobe o kojoj je reč, već i pokretanje odgovarajućeg postupka radi određivanja uzroka smrti i radi utvrđivanja odgovornosti počinilaca – bio ili je trebalo da bude sproveden posle kritičnog datuma.

Međutim, Sud ne isključuje da bi u određenim okolnostima veza mogla biti zasnovana i na potrebi da se obezbedi da garancije i temeljne vrednosti Konvencije budu zaštićeni na stvarni i delotvoran način.“

  1. U presudi u predmetu Varnava, Sud je razjasnio važnu razliku koju treba napraviti između obaveze da se istraži neka sumnjiva smrt i obaveze da se istraži sumnjivi nestanak:

„148. ... Nestanak je poseban fenomen, karakterističan po stalnoj neizvesnosti i odsustvu odgovornosti, pri čemu je prisutan nedostatak informacija ili čak i namerno prikrivanje ili zamagljivanje onoga što se dogodilo... Ova sitaucija često veoma dugo traje, produžavajući agoniju žrtvinih rođaka. Stoga se ne može reći da je nestanak, jednostavno „trenutni“ čin ili događaj; dodatni element koji ga čini posebnim je to da nema naknadnih informacija o tome gde se nalazi i kakva je sudbina nestale osobe, pa to postaje trajna situacija. Zato će procesna obaveza, potencijalno, opstati sve dok se ne sazna sudbina nestale osobe; trajno propuštanje da se sprovede neophodna istraga smatraće se trajnom povredom. ... To je tako čak i kada se, na kraju, smrt može pretpostaviti.“

  1. Sud je dalje naglasio da je zahtev da se smrt dogodila i da su istražni koraci preduzimani kratko vreme pre datuma stupanja Konvencije na snagu u odnosu na tuženu Državu – kao što je rečeno u presudi u predmetu Šilih – primenjen samo u kontekstu ubistava ili sumnjivih smrti, gde je suštinski činjenični element, gubitak života žrtve, bio poznat sa sigurnošću, čak i kada tačan uzrok ili krajnja odgovornost to nisu bili. U takvim slučajevima procesna obaveza nije trajnog karaktera (vidi Varnava i drugi, citirano u gornjem tekstu, st. 149).

2.  Skorašnja praksa Suda

  1. Posle presude u predmetu Šilih, načela koja su određivala vremensku nadležnost Suda u odnosu na „odvojenu“ obavezu da se istraži smrt pojedinca, koja proističe iz člana 2 Konvencije, primenjena su u velikom broju predmeta.
  2. Pojedinačno najveću grupu takvih predmeta predstavljale su pritužbe protiv Rumunije u vezi s navodno nedelotvornom istragom smrti demonstranata tokom rumunske revolucije decembra 1989. godine, povodom kojih je Sud našao da ima nadležnost usled činjenice da su u vreme kada je Konvencija stupila na snagu u odnosu na Rumuniju postupci još uvek bili u radu u tužilaštvu (vidi Udruženje „21. decembar 1989. i drugi protiv Rumunije [Association „21 December 1989“ and Others v. Romania], predstavke br. 33810/07 i 18817/08, od 24. maja 2011; Pastor i Ciklete protiv Rumunije [Pastor and Ţiclete v. Romania], predstavke br. 30911/06 i 40967/06, od 19. aprila 2011; Lapušan i drugi protiv Rumunije [Lăpuşan and Others v. Romania], predstavke br. 29007/06, 30552/06, 31323/06, 31920/06, 34485/06, 38960/06, 38996/06, 39027/06 i 39067/06, od 8. marta 2011; Šandru i drugi protiv Rumunije [Şandru and Others v. Romania], predstavka br. 22465/03, od 8. decembra 2009; i Agake i drugi protiv Rumunije [Agache and Others v. Romania], predstavka br. 2712/02, od 20. oktobra 2009). Slično je zaključeno u dva kasnija predmeta koji se tiču nasilnih incidenata koji su se dogodili u junu 1990. godine (vidi Mokanu i drugi protiv Rumunije [Mocanu and Others v. Romania], predstavke br. 10865/09, 45886/07 i 32431/08, od 13. novembra 2012) i u septembru 1991. godine (vidi Krainičeanu i Frumušanu protiv Rumunije [Crăiniceanu and Frumuşanu v. Romania], predstavka br. 12442/04, od 24. aprila 2012).
  3. S izuzetkom predmeta Tuna protiv Turske koji je za povod imao smrt u policijskom pritvoru do koje je došlo približno sedam godina pre nego što je Turska priznala pravo na pojedinačnu predstavku (vidi Tuna protiv Turske [Tuna v. Turkey], predstavka br. 22339/03, st. 57-63, od 19. januara 2010), u drugim skorašnjim predmetima za smrt o kojoj je reč nije se tvrdilo da je bila posledica bilo kakvih radnji državnih organa i prethodila je datumu stupanja na snagu od jedne do četiri godine, a značajan deo postupka se odvijao posle tog datuma (vidi Kudra protiv Hrvatske [Kudra v. Croatia], predstavka br. 13904/07, st. 110-112, od 18. decembra 2012: četiri godine, slučajna smrt usled nemara privatne kompanije; Igor Ševčenko protiv Ukrajine [Igor Shevchenko v. Ukraine], predstavka br. 22737/04, st. 45-48, od 12. januara 2012: tri godine, saobraćajna nesreća; Bajić protiv Hrvatske [Bajić v. Croatia], predstavka br. 41108/10, st. 62, od 13. novembra 2012: četiri godine, lekarski nemar; Dimovi protiv Bugarske [Dimovi v. Bulgaria], predstavka br. 52744/07, st. 36-45, od 6. novembra 2012: tri godine, smrt usled požara; Velčea i Mazare protiv Rumunije [Velcea and Mazăre v. Romania], predstavka br. 64301/01, st. 85-88, od 1. decembra 2009: jedna godina, porodična svađa; Trufin protiv Rumunije [Trufin v. Romania], predstavka br. 3990/04, st. 32-34, od 20. oktobra 2009: dve godine, ubistvo; i Ljubov Efimenko protiv Ukrajine [Lyubov Efimenko v. Ukraine], predstavka br. 75726/01, st. 65, od 25. novembra 2010: četiri godine, razbojništvo i ubistvo). U dva predmeta činjenica da su rođaci podnosilaca predstavke izgubili živote dok su bili u vlasti pobunjenika ili paravojnih formacija sedam odnosno šest godina pre kritičnog datuma nije sprečila Sud da razmatra meritum pritužbe prema procesnom aspektu člana 2 (vidi Pačaci i drugi protiv Turske [Paçacı and Others v. Turkey], predstavka br. 3064/07, st. 64-66, od 8. novembra 2011, i Jularić protiv Hrvatske [Jularić v. Croatia], predstavka br. 20106/06, st. 38 i 45-46, od 20. januara 2011). Isto tako, ni trinaestogodišnji period koji je prošao od smrti sina podnositeljke predstavke u tuči do stupanja Konvencije na snagu u odnosu na Srbiju nije tumačen tako da preteže u odnosu na značaj procesnih radnji koje su preduzete posle kritičnog datuma (vidi Mladenović protiv Srbije [Mladenović v. Serbia], predstavka br. 1099/08, st. 38-40, od 22. maja 2012).
  4. Sud je isto tako razmatrao jedan broj predmeta u kojima je podnosilac predstavke navodno bio podvrgnut postupanju kakvo je zabranjeno članom 3 Konvencije u nekom trenutku pre kritičnog datuma. Sud je zaključio da ima nadležnost da ispita da li je postupanje tužene države – u periodu posle stupanja na snagu – u skladu s procesnim aspektom člana 3 koji zahteva od nje da sprovede delotvornu istrago o policijskoj brutalnosti (vidi Jacenko protiv Ukrajine [Yatsenko v. Ukraine], predstavka br. 75345/01, st. 40, od 16. februara 2012, i Stanimirović protiv Srbije [Stanimirović v. Serbia], predstavka br. 26088/06, st. 28-29, od 18. oktobra 2011), silovanju (vidi P.M. protiv Bugarske [P.M. v. Bulgaria], predstavka br. 49669/07, st. 58, od 24. januara 2012) i zlostavljanju od strane privatnog pojedinca (vidi Otašević protiv Srbije [Otašević v. Serbia], predstavka br. 32198/07, od 5. februara 2013).

3.  Razjašnjenje kriterijuma iz predmeta Šilih

  1. Bez obzira na to što stalno raste broj presuda u kojima je Sud odredio svoju nadležnost ratione temporis pozivanjem na kriterijume usvojene u predmetu Šilih, njihova primena u praksi je ponekad dovodila do nesigurnosti, zbog čega je poželjno da se pruži dalje razjašnjenje.
  2. Kriterijumi sadržani u stavovima 162 i 163 presude u predmetu Šilih (citirano u stavu Error! Reference source not found. gore) mogu se sažeti na sledeći način. Prvo, kada je smrt nastupila pre kritičnog datuma, vremenska nadležnost Suda će se proširiti samo na procesne radnje ili propuste u periodu posle tog datuma. Drugo, procesna obaveza stupiće na snagu samo ako je postojala „suštinska veza“ između smrti kao događaja zbog kog je postupak pokrenut i stupanja Konvencije na snagu. Treće, veza koja nije „suštinska“ ipak može biti dovoljna da se ustanovi nadležnost Suda, ako je to potrebno kako bi se obezbedilo da garancije i temeljne vrednosti Konvencije budu zaista zaštićene na stvaran i delotvoran način Sud će ispitati posebno svaki od ovih elemenata.

(a)  Procesne radnje i propusti u periodu posle stupanja na snagu

  1. Sud podvlači na početku da procesna obaveza da se vodi istraga prema članu 2 nije postupak pružanja zadovoljenja u odnosu na navodnu povredu prava do koje je možda došlo pre kritičnog datuma. Navodna povreda procesne obaveze sastoji se u tome da nema delotvorne istrage; procesna obaveza ima sopstveni različit domen primene i deluje nezavisno do materijalnog aspekta člana 2 (vidi Varnava i drugi, st. 136, i Šilih, st. 159, oba citirana gore) Shodno tome, vremenska nadležnost Suda proširuje se na one procesne radnje i propuste koji su se dogodili ili je trebalo da se dogode u periodu posle stupanja Konvencije na snagu u odnosu na tuženu Državu.
  2. Sud dalje smatra da pozivanje na „procesne radnje“ mora da se shvati u smislu koji je svojstven procesnoj obavezi iz člana 2 ili, zavisno od slučaja, člana 3 Konvencije, naime da su to radnje koje su preduzete u okviru krivičnog, parničnog, upravnog ili disciplinskog postupka i da mogu dovesti do identifikacije i kažnjavanja odgovornih, ili do dosuđivanja naknade oštećenoj strani (vidi Labita protiv Italije [Labita v. Italy] [GC], predstavka br. 26772/95, st. 131, ECHR 2000-IV, i MekKan i drugi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom], od 27. septembra 1995, st. 161, Series A no. 324). Ova definicija ima dejstvo da isključuje druge vrste istraga koje se mogu sprovoditi u druge svrhe, kao što je ustanovljavanje istorijske istine.
  3. Pominjanje „propusta“ odnosi se na situacije kada nije sprovedena nikakva istraga ili su preduzeti samo beznačajni procesni koraci, ali gde se navodi da je delotvorna istraga trebalo da bude sprovedena. Takva obaveza organa vlasti da preduzmu istražne radnje može nastati kada postanu poznati tvrdnja, dokaz ili informacija koji su verodostojni i uverljivi i koji su relevantni za identifikovanje i na kraju gonjenje ili kažnjavanje odgovornih (vidi Gutierez Dorado i Dorado Ortiz protiv Španije [Gutiérrez Dorado and Dorado Ortiz v. Spain] (odluka), predstavka br. 30141/09, st. 39-41, od 27. marta 2012; Čakir i drugi protiv Kipra [Çakir and Others v. Cyprus] (odluka), predstavka br. 7864/06, od 29. aprila 2010; i Breknel protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Brecknell v. the United Kingdom], predstavka br. 32457/04, st. 66-72, od 27. novembra 2007). Ukoliko se pojavi novi materijal posle stupanja na snagu, i ukoliko bude imao dovoljnu težinu i uverljivost da bi zahtevao novu fazu postupka, Sud će morati da se uveri da je tužena Država ispunila svoju procesnu obavezu prema članu 2 na način koji je saglasan s načelima izraženim kroz praksu Suda. Međutim, ukoliko je događaj koji je sve pokrenuo van nadležnosti Suda ratione temporis, otkrivanje novog materijala posle kritičnog datuma može iznova pokrenuti obavezu da se vodi istraga samo ako su ispunjeni ili test „suštinske veze“ ili test „vrednosti Konvencije“, koji su prikazani u nastavku.

(b)  Test postojanja „suštinske veze“

  1. Prva rečenica stava 163 presude u predmetu Šilih određuje da postojanje „suštinske veze“ između događaja koji je sve pokrenuo i stupanja na snagu Konvencije u odnosu na tuženu Državu predstavlja uslov sine qua non da bi postojala procesna obaveza prema članu 2 Konvencije.
  2. Sud smatra da je vremenski faktor prvi i najbitniji pokazatelj „suštinske“ prirode veze. On navodi, kao što je to učinio ranije u presudi Veća, da protok vremena između događaja koji je sve pokrenuo i kritičnog datuma mora ostati razumno kratak da bi ispunjavao standard za „suštinsku vezu“. Iako nema očiglednih pravnih kriterijuma prema kojima bi moglo da se definiše apsolutno ograničenje za trajanje tog perioda, on ne bi trebalo da bude duži od deset godina (vidi, po analogiji, Varnava i drugi, citirano gore u tekstu, st. 166, i Er i drugi protiv Turske [Er and Others v. Turkey], predstavka br. 23016/04, st. 59-60, ECHR 2012 (izvodi)). Čak i ukoliko bi, u izuzetnim okolnostima, moglo biti opravdano da se produži vremensko ograničenje dalje u prošlost, to bi trebalo da bude urađeno pod uslovom da su ispunjeni zahtevi koje postavlja test „vrednosti Konvencije“.
  3. Trajanje vremenskog perioda između događaja koji je sve pokrenuo i kritičnog datuma, međutim, nije odlučujuće samo po sebi da bi se odredilo da li je veza „suštinska“. Kao što ukazuje druga rečenica stava 163 iz presude u predmetu Šilih, veza će biti uspostavljena ukoliko je veliki deo istrage o smrti obavljen ili je trebalo da bude obavljen u periodu nakon stupanja Konvencije na snagu. To obuhvata vođenje postupka radi određivanja uzroka smrti i radi utvrđivanja odgovornosti, kao i preduzimanje značajnog dela procesnih koraka koji su bili odlučujući za tok istrage. To je posledica načela da se nadležnost Suda proteže samo na procesne radnje i propuste koji su se dogodili posle stupanja na snagu. Ukoliko su, međutim, veliki deo postupka ili najznačajniji procesni koraci izvedeni pre stupanja na snagu, to može nepovratno da podrije sposobnost Suda da da ukupnu ocenu delotvornosti istrage sa stanovišta procesnih zahteva člana 2 Konvencije.
  4. Imajući u vidu navedeno, Sud smatra da za ustanovljavanje da li postoji „suštinska veza“, oba kriterijuma moraju biti zadovoljena: period vremena između smrti kao događaja koji je sve pokrenuo i stupanja Konvencije na snagu mora biti razumno kratak, a veliki deo istrage mora da bude sproveden, ili je trebalo da bude sproveden, nakon stupanja na snagu.

(c)  Test „vrednosti Konvencije“

  1. Sud dalje prihvata da mogu postojati vanredne situacije koje ne zadovoljavaju standard „suštinske veze“ kako je gore opisan, ali gde bi potreba da se obezbedi stvarna i delotvorna zaštita za garancije i temeljne vrednosti Konvencije predstavljala dovoljan osnov da se prihvati da veza postoji. Poslednja rečenica stava 163 presude u predmetu Šilih ne isključuje takvu mogućnost, koja bi delovala kao izuzetak u odnosu na opšte pravilo testa „suštinske veze“. U svim gore opisanim predmetima Sud je prihvatio postojanje „suštinske veze“ jer je protok vremena između smrti i kritičnog datuma bio razumno kratak i značajan deo postupka je sproveden posle kritičnog datuma. U odnosu na to, ovaj predmet je prvi za koji se može tvrditi da spada u ovu drugu, vanrednu kategoriju. Shodno tome, Sud mora da razjasni kriterijume za primenu testa „vrednosti Konvencije“.
  2. Kao i Veće, Veliko Veće smatra da upućivanje na temeljne vrednosti Konvencije znači da se može ustanoviti da postoji zahtevana veza ukoliko je događaj koji je sve pokrenuo bio većih razmera nego obično krivično delo i predstavljao je negiranje samih temelja Konvencije. To bi bio slučaj s ozbiljnim zločinima prema međunarodnom pravu, kao što su ratni zločini, genocid ili zločini protiv čovečnosti, u skladu s definicijama ovih dela u relevantnim međunarodnim instrumentima.
  3. Gnusna priroda i težina takvih zločina podstakli su strane ugovornice Konvencije o nezastarevanju ratnih zločina i zločina protiv čovečnosti da se saglase da oni moraju biti izuzeti od zastarevanja u domaćem pravnom poretku. Ipak, Sud smatra da klauzula o „vrednostima Konvencije“ ne može da se primenjuje na događaje koji su se zbili pre usvajanja Konvencije 4. novembra 1950. godine jer je tek tada Konvencija započela svoje postojanje kao međunarodni ugovor o ljudskim pravima. Dakle, ugovorna strana se ne može smatrati odgovornom prema Konvenciji ako ne istražuje čak i najozbiljnije zločine prema međunarodnom pravu ukoliko su prethodili Konvenciji. Iako Sud prihvata s uvažavanjem da su čak i danas neke države uspešno sudile odgovornima za zločine počinjene tokom Drugog svetskog rata, on naglašava suštinsku razliku između toga da li postoji prilika da se goni pojedinac zbog ozbiljnih zločina po međunarodnom prava kada to okolnosti dozvoljavaju, i toga da li je obaveza da se tako postupi propisana Konvencijom.

4.  Primena gore navedenih načela na ovaj predmet

  1. Vraćajući se nespornim činjenicama vezanim za ovaj predmet, Sud podseća da su rođaci podnosilaca predstavke služili u Poljskoj vojsci i da su zarobljeni uoči sovjetske invazije na teritoriju istočne Poljske septembra 1939. godine. Tokom narednih meseci bili su zatvoreni u logorima NKVD u zapadnom delu SSSR u Kozelsku, Ostaškovu i Starobelsku.
  2. Petog marta 1940. godine, postupajući po predlogu šefa NKVD, članovi Politbiroa Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije SSSR saglasili su se sa pogubljenjima poljskih ratnih zarobljenika koja nisu bila zasnovana na sudskoj odluci, koja je trebalo da sprovedu oficiri NKVD. Zarobljenici su ubijeni i sahranjeni u masovnim grobnicima različitih datuma u aprilu i maju 1940. godine. Spiskovi zarobljenika za pogubljenje bili su izrađeni na osnovu „otpremnih lista“ NKVD, na kojima su među ostalim imenima navedena imena članova porodica podnosilaca predstavki.
  3. Tri člana porodica podnosilaca predstavki su identifikovana tokom ekshumacije 1943. godine; posmrtni ostaci drugih nisu pronađeni ni identifikovani. Sud ponavlja da je u mnogo navrata donosio zaključak da se nestala osoba može smatrati mrtvom. Uopšteno posmatrano, Sud je donosio ovakav zaključak kada su tužene države tvrdile da je osoba u pitanju i dalje u životu ili da nije pokazano da je umrla dok je bila u vlasti državnih organa. Ova pretpostavka smrti nije automatska i usvaja se tek posle ispitivanja okolnosti predmeta, među kojima je protok vremena od trenutka kada je lice viđeno živo ili se javilo relevantan element. (vidi Aslahanova i drugi protiv Rusije [Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia], predstavke br. 2944/06, 8300/07, 50184/07, 332/08 i 42509/10, st. 100, od 18. decembra 2012; Varnava i drugi, citirano gore u tekstu, st. 143; i Vagapova i Zubirajev protiv Rusije [Vagapova and Zubirayev v. Russia], predstavka br. 21080/05, st. 85-86, od 26. februara 2009). Sud je primenio pretpostavku smrti u odsustvu bilo kakvih pouzdanih vesti o nestalim osobama tokom vremenskih perioda koji variraju od četiri i po godine (vidi Imakajeva protiv Rusije [Imakayeva v. Russia], predstavka br. 7615/02, st. 155, ECHR 2006-XIII (izvodi)) do preko deset godina (vidi Aslahanova i drugi, citirano gore u tekstu, st. 103-115).
  4. Nesporno je – i „otpremne liste“ NKVD su dokumenti koji predstavljaju dokaz za to – da su krajem 1939. i početkom 1940. godine članovi porodica podnosilaca predstavki bili zarobljeni na sovjetskoj teritoriji i pod punom i isključivom kontrolom sovjetskih vlasti. Odluka Politbiroa od 5. marta 1940. godine propisivala je da su svi poljski ratni zarobljenici koji se nalaze u logorima NKVD, bez izuzetka, mogli biti pogubljeni bez odluke suda, što je u narednim mesecima sprovela sovjetska tajna policija. Masovne grobnice zarobljenika koji su nosili poljske uniforme otkrivene su u Katinskoj šumi već 1943. godine, nakon što su Nemci preuzeli teritoriju. U belešci koju je 1959. godine napisao šef KGB, naslednik NKVD, priznaje se da su zvaničnici NKVD streljali ukupno više od dvadeset i jedne hiljade poljskih zarobljenika. Porodice su prestale da dobijaju poštu od zarobljenika 1940. godine i od tada, što znači tokom više od sedamdeset godina, više nikad nisu dobili vesti od njih,.
  5. Imajući u vidu ove činjenične elemente, Sud zaključuje da se mora smatrati da su sovjetkse vlasti pogubile 1940. godine članove porodica podnosilaca predstavki koji su bili zarobljeni 1939. godine.
  6. Ruska Federacija ratifikovala je Konvenciju 5. maja 1998. godine, odnosno pedeset i osam godina nakon pogubljenja rođaka podnosilaca predstavki. Veliko veće prihvata zaključak Veća da je vremenski period između smrti i kritičnog datuma ne samo višestruko duži od onih koji su pokrenuli primenu procesne obaveze po članu 2 u svim prethodnim predmetima, već isto tako previše dug u apsolutnom smislu da bi mogla da se ustanovi suštinska veza između smrti rođaka podnosilaca predstavki i stupanja na snagu Konvencije u odnosu na Rusiju.
  7. Istraga o poreklu masovnih grobnica započela je 1990. godine i formalno je okončana septembra 2004. Iako je Država tvrdila da je prvobitna odluka da se pokrene postupak bila nezakonita, ovi postupci su, bar u teoriji, bili takvi da su mogli da dovedu do identifikacije i kažnjavanja odgovornih. Shodno tome, oni spadaju u domen „procesnih radnji i propuštanja“ u smislu člana 2 Konvencije.
  8. Početkom 1990-ih sovjetske i ruske vlasti preduzele su značajan broj procesnih koraka. Leševi su iskopani iz masovnih grobnica u Harkovu, naselju Mednoje i Katinu 1991. godine i istražni organi su naložili izradu forenzičkih studija i organizovali razgovore s potencijalnim svedocima ubistava. Ruski, poljski, ukrajinski i beloruski organi imali su zvanične posete i koordinacione sastanke. Međutim, svi ovi koraci dogodili su se pre kritičnog datuma. Što se tiče perioda posle stupanja na snagu, nemoguće je na osnovu informacija dostupnih u spisima predmeta i podnescima strana, da se identifikuju bilo kakve stvarne istražne radnje posle 5. maja 1998. godine. Sud ne može da prihvati da bi se moglo smatrati da ponovna ocena dokaza, napuštanje prethodno donetih zaključaka ili donošenje odluke o poverljivosti istražnog materijala predstavljaju „značajan deo procesnih radnji“ koji se zahteva za ustanovljavanje „suštinske veze“ za potrebe člana 2 Konvencije. Niti su bilo koji relevantni dokaz ili suštinska informacija obelodanjeni u periodu posle kritičnog datuma. Pošto je tako, Sud zaključuje da nijedan od kriterijuma za ustanovljavanje postojanja „suštinske veze“ nije ispunjen.
  9. Najzad, ostaje da se utvrdi da li su postojale vanredne okolnosti u ovom predmetu koje bi mogle opravdati odstupanje od zahteva za „suštinskom vezom“ tako što bi se primenio standard koji se odnosi na vrednosti Konvencije. Kao što je Sud ustanovio, događaji koji su mogli da pokrenu obavezu sprovođenja istrage prema članu 2 zbili su se početkom 1940. godine, odnosno više od deset godina pre nego što je Konvencija nastala. Usled toga Sud prihvata zaključak Veća da nije bilo elemenata koji mogu da budu most od daleke prošlosti do nedavnog perioda posle stupanja na snagu.
  10. 161. Imajući u vidu ova razmatranja, Sud prihvata prigovor Države ratione temporis i smatra da nema nadležnost da ispita pritužbu prema članu 2 Konvencije.

III.  NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 3 KONVENCIJE

  1. Podnosioci predstavke su se žalili da je produženo poricanje istorijske činjenice i prikrivanje informacija o sudbini njihovih rođaka, zajedno s prezrivim i protivrečnim odgovorima ruskih organa vlasti na njihove zahteve da im se pruže informacije, predstavljalo nečovečno ili ponižavajuće postupanje, što je povreda člana 3 Konvencije koji predviđa:

„Niko ne sme biti podvrgnut mučenju, ili nečovečnom ili ponižavajućem postupanju ili kažnjavanju.“

A.  Presuda Veća

  1. Veće je napravilo razliku između dve grupe podnosilaca predstavki na osnovu bliskosti porodičnih veza koje ih povezuju sa žrtvama masakra u Katinu. Prihvatilo je da postoji „snažna porodična veza“ u slučaju udovice i devetoro dece koja su rođena pre 1940. godine, i da oni mogu da tvrde da su žrtve navodne povrede člana 3. S druge strane, mentalne patnje ostalih pet podnosilaca predstavki, koji su rođeni 1940. godine ili kasnije ili su bili dalji rođaci katinskih žrtava, nisu bile takve da spadaju u domen člana 3 Konvencije.
  2. Veće je zatim ispitalo situaciju prve grupe podnosilaca predstavke tokom različitih vremenskih perioda. Tokom Drugog svetskog rata „ostali su u stanju neizvesnosti što se tiče sudbine“ njihovih voljenih; posle rata oni su „i dalje mogli da gaje nadu da su bar neki od poljskih zarobljenika mogli da prežive, bilo u udaljenijim sovjetskim logorima, bilo tako što su pobegli i krili se“. Tokom trajanja socijalističke Poljske koja je bila pod kontrolom SSSR, podnosiocima predstavki „nije bilo dozvoljeno, iz političkih razloga, da saznaju istinu o tome šta se desilo i bili su prinuđeni da prihvate iskrivljavanje istorijske činjenice od strane sovjetskih i poljskih vlasti.“ Čak i posle javnog priznanja masakra u Katinu od strane sovjetskih i ruskih vlasti, podnosioci predstavki su svakako „osećali bespomoćnost jer u istrazi očigledno nije bilo napretka“.
  3. U periodu posle stupanja na snagu, podnosiocima predstavki nije bio dozvoljen pristup materijalima iz istrage ili su bili isključeni iz postupka zbog toga što su strani državljani. Veću je naročito bilo upečatljivo „očigledno oklevanje ruskih vlasti da priznaju realnost masakra u Katinu.“ Mada su priznali da su rođaci podnosilaca predstavki bili držani kao zarobljenici u logorima NKVD, ruski vojni sudovi su dosledno izbegavali svako pominjanje njihovog naknadnog pogubljenja, upućujući u tom smislu na nedostatak dokaza iz katinske istrage. Veće je ovaj pristup okarakterisalo kao „bezosećajno nepoštovanje brige podnosilaca predstavki i namerno zamagljivanje okolnosti masakra u Katinu“. Što se tiče postupka za rehabilitaciju, Veće je smatralo da „poricanje realnosti masovnog zločina koje je ojačano sugestijom da su poljski zarobljenici možda bili suočeni s krivičnim optužbama za koje je trebalo da odgovaraju i da su propisno osuđeni na smrtnu kaznu pokazuje [jedan] stav prema podnosiocima predstavke koji nije samo sramotan, već pokazuje i nedostatak čovečnosti.“
  4. Veće je prihvatilo da je vreme koje je proteklo od kako su podnosioci predstavki razdvojeni od svojih rođaka bilo značajno duže u ovom predmetu nego što je bilo u drugim predmetima, i da podnosioci predstavki više nisu u agoniji zbog toga što ne znaju da li su članovi njihove porodice mrtvi ili živi. Ipak, pozivajući se na praksu Komiteta Ujedinjenih nacija za ljudska prava u vezi sa analognim članom 7 PGPP, Veće je zaključilo da obaveze organa vlasti prema članu 3 ne bi mogle da budu svedene na puko priznavanje činjenice smrti, već se zahteva da oni pruže odgovor u vezi s okolnostima smrti i mestom gde se nalazi grob. U ovom predmetu ruske vlasti nisu dale podnosiocima predstavke nikakve zvanične informacije o okolnostima u kojima su umrli njihovi rođaci niti su učinili bilo kakav ozbiljan napor da utvrde mesta na kojima su sahranjeni. Već je ustanovilo povredu člana 3.

B.  Podnesci strana u postupku

1.  Država (Rusija)

  1. Država je najpre istakla da se mora pokazati postojanje dva elementa kako bi se postavilo pitanje da li je povređen član 3 u odnosu na rođake ubijenih ili nestalih lica: (1) potrebno je da su podosioci neko vreme trpeli zbog neizvesnosti o sudbini njihovih rođaka, i (2) potrebno je da su njihove patnje u to vreme uvećane postupcima vlasti (ovde su se pozvali na Lulujev i drugi protiv Rusije [Luluyev and Others v. Russia], predstavka br. 69480/01, st. 114-115, ECHR 2006-XIII (izvodi)).
  2. Što se tiče prvog elementa, stanja neizvesnosti, Država je primetila da, iako se sudbina rođaka podnosilaca predstavki nije mogla ustanoviti sa sigurnošću koja se zahteva za potrebe krivičnog postupka ili postupka „rehabilitacije“, nije bilo razumno očekivati da su oni 5. maja 1998. još uvek bili živi, s obzirom na datume njihovog rođenja i odsustvo bilo kakvih vesti od njih od Drugog svetskog rata. U odsustvu prvog elementa, Država je smatrala da se nikakva izdvojena pitanja ne mogu postaviti na osnovu člana 3 u odnosu na ona koja su već ispitana na osnovu člana 2 (ovde su se pozvali na Esmuhambetov i drugi protiv Rusije [Esmukhambetov and Others v. Russia], predstavka br. 23445/03, st. 189, od 29. marta 2011; Velhijev i drugi protiv Rusije [Velkhiyev and Others v. Russia], predstavka br. 34085/06, st. 137, od 5. jula 2011; Sambijev i Pokajeva protiv Rusije [Sambiyev and Pokayeva v. Russia], predstavka br. 38693/04, st. 74-75, od 22. januara 2009; i Tandžijeva protiv Rusije [Tangiyeva v. Russia], predstavka br. 57935/00, st. 104, od 29. novembra 2007).
  3. Država je dalje primetila odsustvo „posebnih činilaca“ koji su patnjama podnosilaca predstavki mogli da daju „dimenziju i karakter različit od emotivnih patnji za koje se može smatrati da ih neizbežno trpe rođaci žrtava ozbiljnih kršenja ljudskih prava“ (ovde su citirali Gongadze protiv Ukrajine [Gongadze v. Ukraine], predstavka br. 34056/02, st. 184, ECHR 2005-XI, i Orhan protiv Turske [Orhan v. Turkey], predstavka br. 25656/94, st. 357-358, od 18. juna 2002). Što se tiče prvog „posebnog činioca“, „bliskosti porodičnih veza“, petoro podnosilaca predstavke rođeno je posle hapšenja njihovih rođaka i Veće nije ustanovilo povredu člana 3 u pogledu ovih podnosilaca. Drugi „posebni činilac“, „mera u kojoj je član porodice bio svedok događaja o kojima je reč“, nije bio prisutan, jer niko od njih nije video događaje koji su doveli do smrti njihovih rođaka. Treći kriterijum, „uključenost članova porodice u nastojanja da se dobiju informacije o nestalom licu“, nije ispunjen jer podnosioci predstavke nisu učestvovali u katinskoj istrazi i nisu podnosili predloge niti davali iskaze. Iako su ruski i poljski mediji davali veliki prostor ovom postupku više od četrnaest godina, tek kada je istraga obustavljena dva podnosioca su tražila da dobiju formalni status u postupku (ovde se Država pozvala, suprotstavljajući se, na Musihanova i drugi protiv Rusije [Musikhanova and Others v. Russia], predstavka br. 27243/03, st. 81-82, od 4. decembra 2008).
  4. Što se tiče odgovora ruskih vlasti na raspitivanja podnosilaca predstavki, što je bio četvrti „posebni činilac“, Država je ostala pri stavu, prvo, da je navodni uticaj njenog postupanja ili nepostupanja sigurno bitno umanjen usled perioda od pedeset i osam godina koji je delio „događaje u Katinu“ od datuma kada je Rusija ratifikovala Konvenciju, i isto tako zbog činjenice da podnosioci predstavki više nisu u stanju neizvesnosti u pogledu sudbine njihovih rođaka. Država je tvrdila da je postupanje domaćih organa vlasti bilo opravdano, ukazujući prvo da je „rehabilitacija“ poljskih zarobljenika bila nemoguća u odsustvu bilo kakvih informacija o optužbama protiv njih. Drugo, vlasti nisu imale nikakvu pravnu obavezu da uđu u trag podnosiocima predstavki podnosioce predstavki niti da im priznaju status žrtve, jer nije bilo dovoljno dokaza da se ustanovi uzročna veza između „događaja u Katinu“ i smrti rođaka podnosilaca predstavke koja bi zadovoljila standard dokazivanja koji se zahteva u krivičnom postupku. Treće, pisma tužilaca upućena podnosiocima predstavki sadržala su „netačne zaključke“, a „nedoslednosti“ su na kraju rasvetlili ruski sudovi koji su sproveli pravilnu analizu dokumenata, uz učešće zastupnika podnosilaca predstavki.
  5. Država se nije složila sa zaključkom Veća da su ruski sudovi poricali realnost masakra u Katinu; prema njenom mišljenju, sudovi su „jednostavno ukazali da nema dovoljno dokaza da bi se ustanovile okolnosti smrti rođaka podnosilaca predstavku“ u skladu sa standardom dokazivanja u krivičnom postupku. Država je isto tako osporavala da su domaće vlasti imale obavezu da pruže odgovor o sudbini nestalih lica i da traže lokacije na kojima su sahranjeni, jer rođaci podnosilaca predstavki nisu „nestala lica“ i pošto takve obaveze ne proističu iz domaćeg prava, međunarodnog humanitarnog prava ili iz Konvencije. Najzad, Država je tvrdila da nema nikakvu nameru da iskrivljuje istorijske činjenice, ili da podnosioce predstavki podvrgne bilo kakvom obliku ponižavajućeg postupanja.

2.  Podnosioci predstavki

  1. Podnosioci predstavki su se saglasili sa stavom iznetim u presudi Veća da je obaveza prema članu 3 različita od obaveze koja proističe iz člana 2 utoliko što ova potonja odredba zahteva da Država preduzme konkretne pravne korake, dok je prva bila više opšteg humanitarnog karaktera. Oni su smatrali da bi Sud trebalo da bude u mogućnosti da uzme u obzir činjenice koje su postojale pre stupanja snagu Konvencije u meri u kojoj bi one mogle biti od značaja za činjenice koje su se dogodile posle toga datuma (pozvali su se na Broniovski protiv Poljske [Broniowski v. Poland] (odluka) [VV], predstavka br. 31443/96, st. 74, ECHR 2002-X, i Hokanen protiv Finske [Hokkanen v. Finland], od 23. septembra 1994, st. 53, Serija A br. 299-A). Osim toga, Sud bi trebalo da ima nadležnost da oceni koliko se državni organi pridržavaju obaveza iz člana 3 čak i kada samo oduzimanje života izmiče njegovoj nadležnosti ratione temporis (ovde su povukli paralelu s odlukom koju je Komitet UN za ljudska prava doneo 28. marta 2006. u predmetu Mariam Sankara i drugi protiv Burkine Faso [Mariam Sankara and Others v. Burkina Faso]).
  2. Podnosioci predstavki nisu se saglasili s odlukom Veća da ih podeli u dve različite grupe na osnovu bliskosti njihovih porodičnih veza. Oni su naveli da su situacija u posleratnoj socijalističkoj Poljskoj i događaji koji su usledili posle sovjetskog priznanja katinskog masakra uticali na sve podnosioce predstavki u istoj meri. Oni su tvrdili, za razliku od pristupa Veća, da su oni koji se ne sećaju svojih očeva ili im je bila uskraćena prilika da imaju bilo kakav lični kontakt sa njima osetljiviji na tragičnu sudbinu svojih roditelja. Pored toga, podnosioci predstavki u drugoj grupi – u pogledu koje nije nađena nikakva povreda člana 3– bili su aktivno uključeni u niz pravnih koraka kao i drugih aktivnosti koje se tiču sećanja na njihove ubijene rođake: Volk-Jezjerska napisala je niz knjiga o masakru u Katinu, Kšiškovjak je osnovala izdavačku kuću koja štampa materijale koji se odnose na Katin, Rodovič je napravila nekoliko umetničkih dela posvećenih masakru u Katinu, a Romanovski, najmlađi među podnosiocima predstavke, „nasledio“ je od svoje pokojne majke zadatak da čuva sećanje na svog ujaka koji je ubijen. Pozivajući se na sudsku praksu Inter-američkog suda za ljudska prava, podnosioci predstavki izjavili su da su svi oni žrtve povreda formulisanih u članu 3, bilo kao odrasli direktni rođaci osoba koje su ubijene, ili kao posredni rođaci koji su pokazali svoje snažno i stalno lično angažovanje putem aktivnosti u vezi sa sudbinom članova njihove porodice koji su bili ubijeni.
  3. Što se tiče načina na koji su ruske vlasti postupale kad su se oni raspitivali, podnosioci predstavki su istakli da se u prethodnim predmetima pred Sudom ponekad dešavalo da „nestala lica“ postanu „mrtva lica“ kada njihova tela budu pronađena. U slučaju Katina sled je bio obrnut: oni koji su bili „mrtvi“ postali su „nestali“ u očima ruskih vlasti. Ovo obrtanje je predstavljalo oštro poricanje istorijskih činjenica i nanosilo je ozbiljan bol, patnju i stres podnosiocima predstavke. To je bilo isto kao da je grupa rođaka žrtava Holokausta obaveštena da se mora smatrati da je sudbina žrtava nepoznata jer je mogla biti praćena samo do koncentracionih logora kao puta bez povratka, jer su nacističke vlasti uništile dokumenta. Štaviše, u meri u kojoj su vojni tužioci tvrdili da nisu mogli da ustanove „koja odredba Kaznenog zakonika je predstavljala pravni osnov za pozivanje [poljskih] zarobljenika na odgovornost“, to je u suštini bila optužba da su žrtve možda bile kriminalci koji su propisno osuđeni na smrtnu kaznu. Uz to, u procesima za rehabilitaciju pred moskovskim sudom tužilac je tvrdio da su postojali „legitimni razlozi“ za represiju, jer su neki poljski oficiri bili „špijuni, teroristi i saboteri“ i pošto je predratna Poljska vojska bila „obučena da se bori protiv Sovjetskog Saveza“. Podnosioci predstavki su naglasili da njihova moralna patnja ne može biti kvalifikovana kao patnja koja nužno prati sama ubistva, već je rezultat postupanja ruskih vlasti kojem su bili izloženi.

3.  Poljska

  1. Poljska je ostala pri stavu da su ruske vlasti podvrgle podnosioce predstavki nečovečnom i ponižavajućem postupanju. Naglasili su da su lica koja su zarobljena, držana u zatvoru i na kraju ubijena od strane sovjetskih vlasti bila u bliskom srodstvu s podnosiocima predstavki. Tokom mnogo godina, iz političkih razloga, sovjetske vlasti su branile pristup bilo kojoj zvaničnoj informaciji o sudbini lica koja su zarobljena krajem 1939. godine. Nakon što je pokrenuta istraga 1990. godine, podnosioci predstavki su bezuspešno pokušavali da dobiju pristup materijalima iz istrage radi dobijanja pravne rehabilitacije za svoje rođake. Pošto podnosioci predstavki nisu dobili pristup, a dobijali su protivrečne informacije, u njima se razvilo osećanje stalne neizvesnosti i stresa i učinilo ih je potpuno zavisnim od postupanja ruskih vlasti koje je bile usmereno na to da ih ponizi. To predstavlja postupanje koje je protivno članu 3 Konvencije.

4.  Podnesci trećih strana

  1. Organizacija Public International Law & Policy Group dostavila je pregled prakse Suda koja se odnosi na prirodu i snagu porodičnih odnosa koji su neophodni da bi se podnosilac predstavke kao član porodice smatrao žrtvom povrede člana 3. Prema njihovom mišljenju, praksa Suda ukazuje da je Sud sve više pažnje poklanja postupanju podnosilaca predstavke koji su članovi porodice i uloge koju Država igra nakon što je iskazan zahtev za dobijanje informacija. Treća strana je isto tako izjavila da je pristup priznavanju statusa žrtve koji je zasnovan na uključenosti člana porodice u nastojanja da se dobiju informacije o nestalom pojedincu i načinu na koji su vlasti postupale s takvim nastojanjima, bio u skladu sa standardima koje primenjuju druge međunarodne sudske institucije, uključujući Interamerički sud za ljudska prava (ovde su citirali predmete Garido i Baigorija protiv Argentine [Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina], presuda od 27. avgusta 1998, i Blejk protiv Gvatemale [Blake v. Guatemala], presuda od 24. januara 1998) i Posebna veća u sudovima Kambodže.

C.  Ocena Suda

1.  Opšta načela

  1. Sud je u svojoj praksi uvek bio osetljiv na dubok psihološki uticaj koji ozbiljna povreda ljudskih prava ima na članove porodice žrtve koji su podnosioci predstavke pred Sudom. Međutim, da bi se ustanovila zasebna povreda člana 3 Konvencije u odnosu na rođake žrtve, treba da postoje posebni činioci koji bi njihovoj patnji dali dimenziju i karakter koji se razlikuju od emocinalne patnje koja neizbežno potiče iz same gore pomenute povrede. Relevantni činioci uključuju bliskost porodične veze, posebne okolnosti odnosa, meru u kojoj je član porodice bio svedok događajima o kojima je reč i uključenost podnosilaca predstavke u nastojanja da dobiju informaciju o sudbini svojih rođaka.
  2. S tim u vezi, Sud ponavlja da član porodice „nestalog lica“ može tvrditi da je žrtva postupanja suprotnog članu 3 u slučajevima kada je nestanku sledio dug period neizvesnosti do momenta kada je telo nestale osobe otkriveno. Suština pitanja prema članu 3 u ovoj vrsti predmeta leži ne toliko u ozbiljnom kršenju ljudskih prava nestale osobe, koliko u prezrivim reakcijama i odnosu vlasti prema toj situaciji kada im je na nju skrenuta pažnja. Nalaženje povrede po tom osnovu nije ograničeno na predmete u kojima tuženu Državu treba smatrati odgovornom za nestanak. Isto tako može biti rezultat propusta vlasti da odgovore na zahtev za dobijanjem informacija koji su podneli rođaci ili rezultat prepreka koje se postavljaju pred njih, ostavljajući ih da nose teret napora da se otkriju bilo koje činjenice, kada se takav stav može smatrati kao pokazivanje flagrantnog, stalnog i bezosećajnog nepoštovanja obaveze da se pruže obaveštenja o sudbini nestalog lica (vidi, naročito, Ačiš protiv Turske [Açış v. Turkey], predstavka br. 7050/05, st. 36 i 51-54, od 1. februara 2011; Varnava i drugi, citirano gore, st. 200; Osmanoglu protiv Turske [Osmanoğlu v. Turkey], predstavka br. 48804/99, st. 96, od 24. januara 2008; Lulujev i drugi protiv Rusije [Luluyev and Others v. Russia], predstavka br. 69480/01, st. 114, ECHR 2006-XIII (izvodi); Bazorkina protiv Rusije [Bazorkina v. Russia], predstavka br. 69481/01, st. 139, od 27. jula 2006; Gongadze protiv Ukrajine [Gongadze v. Ukraine], predstavka br. 34056/02, st. 184, ECHR 2005-XI; Taniš i drugi protiv Turske [Taniş and Others v. Turkey], predstavka br. 65899/01, st. 219, ECHR 2005–VIII; Orhan protiv Turske [Orhan v. Turkey], predstavka br. 25656/94, st. 358, od 18. juna 2002; i Čakci protiv Turske [Çakıcı v. Turkey] [VV], predstavka br. 23657/94, st. 98, ECHR 1999-IV).
  3. Sud je usvojio restriktivan pristup u situacijama kada je lice pritvoreno, ali je posle nađeno mrtvo nakon relativno kratkog perioda neizvesnosti u pogledu njegove sudbine (vidi Tanli protiv Turske [Tanlı v. Turkey], predstavka br. 26129/95, st. 159, ECHR 2001-III, i Bitijeva i drugi protiv Rusije [Bitiyeva and Others v. Russia], predstavka br. 36156/04, st. 106, od 23. aprila 2009). U nizu čečenskih predmeta u kojima podnosioci predstavke nisu bili svedoci ubijanja njihovih rođaka, već su saznali za njihovu smrt tek pošto su otkrivena tela, Sud je smatrao da nije neophodan nikakav zaseban zaključak o povredi člana 3 s obzirom na to da je već ustanovio povredu materijalnog i procesnog aspekta člana 2 Konvencije (vidi Velhijev i drugi protiv Rusije [Velkhiyev and Others v. Russia, predstavka br. 34085/06, st. 137, od 5. jula 2011; Sambijev i Pokajeva protiv Rusije [Sambiyev and Pokayeva v. Russia], predstavka br. 38693/04, st. 74-75, od 22. januara 2009; i Tandžijeva protiv Rusije [Tangiyeva v. Russia], predstavka br. 57935/00, st. 104, od 29. novembra 2007).
  4. Pored toga, u predmetima koji se odnose na lica koja su ubili državni organi kršeći član 2, Sud je smatrao da se primena člana 3 obično ne proteže na rođake zbog trenutne prirode incidenta koji je izazvao smrt o kojoj je reč (vidi Damajev protiv Rusije [Damayev v. Russia], predstavka br. 36150/04, st. 97, od 29. maja 2012; Jasin Ateš protiv Turske [Yasin Ateş v. Turkey], predstavka br. 30949/96, st. 135, od 31. maja 2005; Udajeva i Jusupova protiv Rusije [Udayeva and Yusupova v. Russia], predstavka br. 36542/05, st. 82, od 21. decembra 2010; Kašujeva protiv Rusije [Khashuyeva v. Russia], predstavka br. 25553/07, st. 154, od 19. jula 2011; i Inderbijeva protiv Rusije [Inderbiyeva v. Russia], predstavka br. 56765/08, st. 110, od 27. marta 2012).
  5. Ipak, Sud je smatrao da je opravdano naći zasebnu povredu člana 3 u situacijama potvrđene smrti kad su podnosioci predstavke bili neposredni svedoci patnji članova njihove porodice (vidi Salahov i Isljamova protiv Ukrajine [Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine], predstavka br. 28005/08, st. 204, od 14. marta 2013, kada je podnositeljka predstavke bila svedok spore smrti svog sina koji je bio u pritvoru, a da nije mogla da mu pomogne; Esmuhambetov i drugi protiv Rusije [Esmukhambetov and Others v. Russia], predstavka br. 23445/03, st. 190, od 29. marta 2011, gde je ustanovljena povreda člana 3 u odnosu na podnosioca predstavke koji je bio svedok ubijanja cele svoje porodice, ali nije ustanovljena povreda u odnosu na druge podnosioce predstavke koji su tek kasnije saznali za ubijanja; Hadžialijev i drugi protiv Rusije [Khadzhialiyev and Others v. Russia], predstavka br. 3013/04, st. 121, od 6. novembra 2008, kada podnosioci predstavke nisu mogli da sahrane raskomadana i obezglavljena tela svoje dece na pravi način; Musajev i drugi protiv Rusije [Musayev and Others v. Russia], predstavke br. 57941/00, 58699/00 i 60403/00, st. 169, od 26. jula 2007, gde je podnosilac predstavke bio svedok pogubljenja nekoliko svojih rođaka i suseda koje nije bilo zasnovano na sudskoj odluci; i Akum i drugi protiv Turske [Akkum and Others v. Turkey], predstavka br. 21894/93, st. 258-259, ECHR 2005-II (izvodi), kada je podnosiocu predstavke pokazano unakaženo telo njegovog sina).

2.  Primena navedenih načela na ovaj predmet

  1. Sud primećuje da je situacija koja je u samoj suštini pritužbe na osnovu članu 3 na početku izgledala kao slučaj „nestanka“. Članove porodica podnosilaca predstavki zarobile su sovjetske okupacione snage i oni su bili držani u sovjetskim logorima. Postoje dokazi da je razmena pisama između poljskih zarobljenika i njihovih porodica nastavljena do proleća 1940. godine, tako da su porodice morale da budu svesne toga da su njihovi rođaci živi. Nakon što su njihova pisma prestala da stižu u Poljsku, njihovi rođaci su dugi niz godina bili u stanju neizvesnosti u pogledu sudbine koja ih je zadesila.
  2. U 1943. godini, posle otkrića masovnih grobnica u blizini Katinske šume, izvršena je delimična ekshumacija i identifikacija posmrtnih ostataka. Međutim, samo trojica od rođaka podnosilaca predstavki – Volk, Rodovič i Mjelecki – su tada identifikovani. Sovjetske vlasti su poricale da su pogubile poljske ratne zarobljenike i, bez pristupa dosijeima Politbiroa ili NKVD, nije bilo moguće uvrditi sudbinu onih zarobljenika čija tela nisu identifikovana. Tokom Hladnog rata nije bilo daljih pokušaja da se identifikuju žrtve masakra u Katinu, jer je sovjetska verzija o ubijanjima koja su organizovali nacisti nametnuta kao zvanična u Narodnoj Republici Poljskoj tokom celokupnog tranja socijalističkog režima, odnosno do 1989. godine.
  3. U 1990. godini SSSR je zvanično priznao odgovornost sovjetskog rukovodstva za ubijanje poljskih ratnih zarobljenika. Narednih godina objavljena su sačuvana dokumenta koja se odnose na masakre i istražni organi su izvršili dalje delimične ekshumacije na nekoliko lokacija gde su tela pokopana. Održana je jedna runda konsultacija između poljskih, ruskih, ukrajinskih i beloruskih tužilaca.
  4. Do 5. maja 1998. godine, vremena kada je Ruska Federacija ratifikovala Konvenciju, prošlo je više od pedeset osam godina od pogubljenja poljskih ratnih zarobljenika. Imajući u vidu da je prošlo mnogo vremena, materijal koji je objavljen u međuvremenu i napore koje su različite strane uložile da bi rasvetlile okolnosti masakra u Katinu, Sud je zaključio da se, što se tiče perioda posle kritičnog datuma, ne može reći da su podnosioci predstavke bili u neizvesnosti u pogledu sudbine njihovih rođaka koje je zarobila sovjetska armija 1939. godine. Neizbežno sledi da se ono što je u početku mogao biti slučaj „nestanka“ mora smatrati slučajem „potvrđene smrti“. Podnosioci predstavke nisu osporavali takvu ocenu ovog slučaja (vidi, naročito, stav 116 gore i takođe stav 119 presude Veća). Na ovaj zaključak ne utiču stavovi ruskih sudova u različitim domaćim postupcima koji su se, čini se, uzdržavali da izričito priznaju činjenicu da su rođaci podnosilaca predstavki bili ubijeni u sovjetskim logorima.
  5. Sud ne dovodi u pitanje duboku tugu i patnju koje su doživeli podnosioci predstavki zbog pogubljenja članova njihovih porodica koja nisu bila izvršena na osnovu odluke suda. Međutim, on ponavlja da u interesu pravne sigurnosti, predvidivosti i jednakosti pred zakonom ne treba da odstupa od sopstvene prakse bez ubedljivih razloga (vidi Sabri Gineš protiv Turske [Sabri Güneş v. Turkey] [VV], predstavka br. 27396/06, st. 50, od 29. juna 2012). U praksi Suda, kao što je gore opisano, prihvaćeno je da patnja članova porodice „nestalog lica“, koji moraju da prođu kroz dug period u kome se smenjuju nada i očaj, može da opravda nalaženje zasebne povrede člana 3 zbog posebno bezosećajnog odnosa domaćih vlasti prema njihovim zahtevima za dobijanje informacija. Što se tiče ovog slučaja, nadležnost Suda se odnosi samo na period koji počinje 5. maja 1998. godine, što je datum kada je Konvencija stupila na snagu u odnosu na Rusiju. Sud je gore zaključio da se od tog datuma ne može reći da i dalje postoji tinjajuća neizvesnost u pogledu sudbine poljskih ratnih zarobljenika. Mada nisu pronađena sva tela, njihovu smrt su javno priznale sovjetske i ruske vlasti i to je postalo utvrđena istorijska činjenica. Razmera zločina koji su 1940. godine počinile sovjetske vlasti je snažan emotivni faktor, ipak, sa čisto pravnog stanovišta, Sud to ne može prihvatiti kao uverljiv razlog za odstupanje od svoje prakse u pogledu statusa članova porodice „nestalih lica“ kao žrtava povrede člana 3 i davanja tog statusa podnosiocima predstavki za koje je smrt njihovih rođaka bila izvesna.
  6. Sud, dalje, nije našao nikakve druge posebne okolnosti kakve bi ga podstakle da nađe zasebnu povredu člana 3 u slučajevima „potvrđene smrti“ (vidi sudsku praksu citiranu u stavu 181 gore).
  7. U takvim okolnostima Sud smatra da se ne može reći da su patnje podnosilaca predstavke dostigle razmere i karakter koji se razlikuju od emotivne patnje za koju se može reći da je neizbežna za rođake žrtava ozbiljnih povreda ljudskih prava.
  8. Shodno tome, Sud smatra da nije došlo do povrede člana 3 Konvencije.

IV.  POŠTOVANJE ČLANA 38 KONVENCIJE OD STRANE TUŽENE DRŽAVE

  1. Sud je više puta tražio da tužena Država dostavi kopiju odluke od 21. septembra 2004. kojom je obustavljena istraga o masakru u Katinu (vidi stav Error! Reference source not found. gore u tekstu). Suočen s odbijanjem tužene Države da podnse traženi dokument, Sud je tražio od strana da iznesu svoje stavove o tome da li je tužena Država postupala u skladu sa svojom obavezom da obezbedi sve neophodne uslove za istragu Suda, koja proističe iz člana 38 Konvencije. Ova odredba glasi:

„Sud razmatra predstavku zajedno s predstavnicima stranaka i, ako je to potrebno, pokreće istragu za čije će mu efikasno sprovođenje zainteresovane visoke strane ugovornice obezbediti sve neophodne uslove.“

A.  Presuda Veća

  1. Veće je potvrdilo da „samo Sud [može] da odluči ... koju vrstu dokaza strane treba da dostave radi odgovarajućeg razmatranja predmeta“ i da su „strane [bile] u obavezi da postupaju u skladu s njegovim zahtevima i uputstvima koji se odnose na dokaze“. Ono je, dalje, navelo da tužena Država nije dala uverljivo objašnjenje o prirodi bezbednosnih razloga zbog kojih je doneta odluka o tajnosti traženog dokumenta. Veće je primetilo da se traženi dokument „odnosi na istorijski događaj, da je većina protagonista mrtva, i da nije mogao da utiče na bilo koje tekuće policijske operacije i aktivnosti koje se odnose na nadzor “. U opštijem smislu, Veće je primetilo da su javna i transparentna istraga zločina prethodnog totalitarnog režima teško mogle da ugroze nacionalne bezbednosne interese savremene demokratske Ruske Federacije, naročito s obzirom na to da je odgovornost sovjetskih vlasti za taj zlačin priznata na najvišem političkom nivou.

B.  Podnesci strana u postupku

1.   Država (Rusija)

  1. Država je na početku navela da je stavljanje oznake „strogo poverljivo“ na trideset i šest tomova dosijea u predmetu i odluku od 21. septembra 2004. godine bilo zasnovano na zakonu jer su sadržali informacije iz oblasti obaveštajnog i kontraobaveštajnog rada i operativne i istražne aktivnosti i zato što su takvo označavanje „proverile i potvrdile“ Federalna služba bezbednosti i Međuresorska komisija za zaštitu državnih tajni, a takođe su proverene i potvrđene i kasnijim odlukama moskovskog Gradskog suda i Vrhovnog suda na osnovu predstavke koju je podnela organizacija Memorial. Država je tvrdila da ruski zakoni ne sadrže apsolutnu zabranu dostavljanja osetljivih informacija međunarodnim organizacijama i da odluka od 21. septembra 2004. nije dostavljena Sudu isključivo zato što „nadležna domaća tela [nisu] došla do zaključka“ da bi bilo moguće tako postupiti.
  2. Država je ostala pri stavu da se član 38 Konvencije ne može tumačiti tako da zahteva od država ugovornica da dostavljaju informacije koje bi mogle da ugroze njihovu bezbednost. Ona je pozvala Sud da analizira zakone drugih država članica „koje su vrlo verovatno takođe predvidele slična pravila“. Država se pozvala na odredbe Evropske konvencije o uzajamnoj pomoći u krivičnim stvarima i Sporazuma između Ruske Federacije i Republike Poljske o pravnoj pomoći i pravnim odnosima u građanskim i krivičnim predmetima, koje su dozvoljavale državi ugovornici da odbije da izvrši zahtev ukoliko je verovatno da bi to imalo negativne posledice na suverenitet, bezbednost, javni red ili druge bitne interese zemlje (ovde su takođe naveli Liu protiv Rusije (br. 2) [Liu v. Russia (no. 2)], predstavka br. 29157/09, st. 85, od 26. jula 2011, i Čahal protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Chahal v. the United Kingdom], od 15. novembra 1996, st. 138, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V). Država je naglasila da pravilo 33 Poslovnika Suda ne predviđa nikakvu sankciju za neovlašćeno obljavljivanje poverljivih informacija koje su poverene Sudu.
  3. Država je tvrdila da je dala informaciju o sadržini odluke od 21. septembra 2004. godine, što bi trebalo smatrati dovoljnim za ispunjavanje obaveze na osnovu člana 38. Ona je, tako, ukazala koji organ vlasti je stavio oznaku tajnosti, koji su bezbednosni razlozi razmotreni, koji su razlozi za obustavu postupka i kako su pravno kvalifikovana navodna krivična dela. U odluci o kojoj je reč nisu pominjani podnosioci predstavki, niti je sadržavala bilo kakve informacije o sudbini njihovih rođaka ili lokaciji na kojoj su sahranjeni.
  4. Najzad, Država se pozabavila onim što je opisala kao „neobičnu logiku“ presude Veća. Prema njenom mišljenju, član 38 trebalo je da bude razmotren na kraju presude, kao što je to učinjeno u ranijim predmetima. Naglasila je da je obaveza prema članu 38 „čisto procesne prirode“ i da njena navodna povreda „nije mogla da prouzrokuje nikakve patnje podnosilaca predstavki“ ili „nadmaši težinu navodnih povreda člana 2 i člana 3“. Država se nije složila sa stavom da se obaveza prema članu 38 mora ispuniti u svim okolnostima; prema njenom mišljenju, ona je po prirodi izvedena i zavisi od postojanja prihvatljivih pritužbi na osnovu drugih članova Konvencije. U ovom predmetu nije bilo svrhe da se istraži da li je Država postupala u skladu s članom 38, jer Sud treba da zaključi da nema nadležnost da razmatra meritum pritužbe na osnovu člana 2 Konvencije.

2.  Podnosioci predstavki

  1. Podnosioci predstavki naveli su da je načelo običajnog međunarodnog prava koje već dugo postoji da se nijedno unutrašnje pravilo, čak i ustavnog ranga, ne može koristiti kao izgovor za nepoštovanje međunarodnog prava (oni su se pozvali na praksu Stalnog suda međunarodne pravde i Međunarodnog suda pravde (MSP)). Ovo načelo kodifikovano je u članu 27 Bečke konvencije o ugovornom pravu kao proširenje opštijeg načela pacta sunt servanda, na koje su se u svojoj praksi često pozivali međunarodni sudovi i kvazi-sudska tela, uključujući Komitet za ljudska prava, Međunarodni krivični tribunal za bivšu Jugoslaviju (MKTJ), Inter-američki sud za ljudska prava, Afričku komisiju za ljudska prava i prava naroda, kao i arbitražni tribunali. Kada su nailazili na oklevanje države ugovornice da dostavi traženi materijal zbog brige za očuvanje poverljivosti, međunarodni tribunali su održavali sednice zatvorene za javnost (podnosioci predstavke pozvali su se na Godinez Kruz protiv Hondurasa [Godínez Cruz v. Honduras], IASLJP, presuda od 20. januara 1989, i Balo protiv UNESCO [Ballo v. UNESCO], Administrativni tribunal MOR, presuda br. 191, 15. maj 1972). U predmetu Krfski kanal [Corfu Channel] MSP nije izvukao nikakve negativne zaključke po Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo kada je ono odbilo da dostavi dokaze za koje je smatralo da se tiču pomorske tajne (presuda od 9. aprila 1949). Međutim, MKTJ je odbacio pozivanje hrvatske države na presudu u predmetu Krfski kanal, kojom je pravdala to što odbija da pruži dokumenta i dokaze vojnog karaktera u predmetu Tužilac protiv Tihomira Blaškića [Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić], smatrajući, naročito, da blanko pravo države da ne dostavi, iz razloga bezbednosti, dokumenta koja su neophodna za postupak može da ugrozi samu funkciju Tribunala (presuda od 29. oktobra 1997). Dodao je da se osnovanoj zabrinutosti države za bezbednost može izaći u susret procesnim ustupcima, uključujući zasedanja in camera i specijalne procedure za dostavljanje i čuvanje osetljivih dokumenata. U kasnijem predmetu Tužilac protiv Darija Kordića i Marija Čerkeza [Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez], MKTJ je isto tako smatrao da ima puno diskreciono pravo da oceni značaj traženog materijala i da države tu odluku ne mogu osporavati (odluka od 9. septembra 1999). Podnosioci predstavki naveli su da je ratio decidendi ovih predmeta bio primenjiv, mutatis mutandis, na ovaj predmet.
  2. Podnosioci predstavki su potvrdili da ruska Država nije potkrepila svoje tvrdnje vezane za bezbednosne razloge i da nije objasnila zašto dokument koji se odnosi na zverstva koja je počinio prethodni totalitarni režim treba da bude pod oznakom tajnosti. Odluka da bude pod oznakom tajnosti bila je u suprotnosti i sa ruskim Zakonom o državnim tajnama čiji član 7 ne dozvoljava stavljanje oznake tajnosti na informacije koje se odnose na povredu ljudskih prava. Masakr u Katinu predstavljao je masovno kršenje prava na život koje je izvršeno po naredbi najviših organa vlasti SSSR.
  3. Podnosioci predstavke ukazali su da se slažu s presudom Veća u meri u kojoj je njom utvrđena povreda člana 38 Konvencije. Oni su naveli da Sud ima apsolutnu diskreciju da odluči koji su dokazi potrebni za razmatranje predmeta i da odbijanje saradnje sa Sudom može dovesti do kršenja člana 38 čak i kada nije ustanovljena povreda nekog suštinskog prava iz Konvencije.

3.  Poljska

  1. Poljska je prihvatila zaključke Veća kojim je utvrđena povreda člana 38 Konvencije. Navela je na početku da je ruska Država iznela protivrečne informacije, čak i tokom postupka pred Sudom, o tome ko je doneo odluku da se na materijal stavi oznaka tajnosti i kog datuma je ona doneta. Mada je u podnesku od 19. marta 2010. godine ruska Država rekla da je odluku donela Međuresorska komisija za zaštitu državnih tajni, njen pismeni podnesak od 30. novembra 2012. godine ukazivao je da je odluku donelo Glavno vojno tužilaštvo u konsultaciji s Federalnom službom bezbednosti.
  2. Poljska veruje da odluka da se materijali iz istrage označe kao tajni predstavlja povredu materijalnog prava Rusije. Sadržaj odluke o obustavljanju krivičnog postupka jasno je naznačen u ruskom Zakoniku o krivičnom postupku i takva odluka nije mogla da sadrži bilo kakve informacije koje su označene kao državna tajna. Čak i da jeste uključivala podatke o pojedincima u odnosu na koje se vodi postupak, to nije moglo predstavljati osnov da se cela odluka označi kao strogo poverljiva. Svaka informacija o visoko pozicioniranim zvaničnicima SSSR odnosila se na period do 1970. godine i, shodno tome, do trenutka kada je odluka doneta već je proteklo 30 godina, što je maksimalni period u kome oznaka tajnosti može da se zadrži u skladu sa članom 13 Zakona o državnoj tajni. Osim toga, u meri u kojoj je ruska Država priznala da su radnje zvaničnika SSSR definisane u zakonu kao zloupotreba položaja, ova informacija je izričito isključena iz mogućnosti da se označi kao tajna na osnovu člana 7 Zakona o državnim tajnama. Poljska je isto tako naglasila da ruska Država nije dala obrazloženu odluku o određivanju tajnosti.
  3. Najzad, Poljska je istakla da se katinska istraga nije odnosila na tekuće funkcije ili operacije specijalnih službi policije. Čak i ako je prethodni režim stavio oznaku tajnosti na deo materijala, nije postojao trajni i stvarni javni interes da se zadrži ta oznaka.

C.  Ocena Suda

1.  Opšta načela

  1. Sud potvrđuje da je od najveće važnosti za delotvorno funkcionisanje sistema individualnih predstavki ustanovljenog na osnovu člana 34 Konvencije da države obezbede sve neophodne uslove kako bi omogućile odgovarajuće i delotvorno razmatranje predstavki. Ova obaveza zahteva da države ugovornice obezbede sve neophodne uslove Sudu, bez obzira da li sprovodi istragu za utvrđivanje činjenica ili vrši svoje opšte dužnosti u vezi s razmatranjem predstavki. Propust neke države da dostavi informacije koje poseduje bez zadovoljavajućeg objašnjenja ne samo da može omogućiti posredno zaključivanje o tome da li su navodi podnosilaca predstavke osnovani, već može takođe da baci negativno svetlo na način na koji tužena Država ispunjava svoje obaveze prema članau 38 Konvencije (vidi Tahsin Akar protiv Turske [Tahsin Acar v. Turkey] [VV], predstavka br. 26307/95, st. 253-254, ECHR 2004-III; Timurtaš protiv Turske [Timurtaş v. Turkey], predstavka br. 23531/94, st. 66 i 70, ECHR 2000-VI; i Tanrkulu protiv Turske [Tanrıkulu v. Turkey] [VV], predstavka br. 23763/94, st. 70, ECHR 1999-IV).
  2. Obaveza da se pruže dokazi koje traži Sud obavezuje tuženu Državu od trenutka kada je takav zahtev formulisan, bez obzira da li je to prilikom prvog dostavljanja predstavke državi ili u nekoj kasnijoj frazi postupka (vidi Enukidze i Girgvliani protiv Gruzije [Enukidze and Girgvliani v. Georgia], predstavka br. 25091/07, st. 295, od 26. aprila 2011, i [Bekirski protiv Bugarske], predstavka br. 71420/01, st. 111-113, presuda od 2. septembra 2010). Zahtev da traženi materijal bude podnet u svojoj ukupnosti, ako je Sud tako naložio, i da se za sve nedostajuće elemente mora dati valjano obrazloženje je od fundamentalnog značaja (vidi Damir Sibgatulin protiv Rusije [Damir Sibgatullin v. Russia], predstavka br. 1413/05, st. 65-68, od 24. aprila 2012; Enukidze i Girgvliani, citirano gore u tekstu, st. 299-300; i Davidov i drugi protiv Ukrajine [Davydov and Others v. Ukraine], predstavke br. 17674/02 i 39081/02, st. 167 et seq., od 1. jula 2010). Osim toga, svaki materijal koji se traži mora biti dostavljen bez odlaganja i, u svakom slučaju, u okviru vremenskog roka koji je odredio Sud, jer bi značajno i neobrazloženo odlaganje moglo navesti Sud da zaključi da su objašnjenja tužene Države neubedljiva (vidi Damir Sibgatulin, st. 68; Tahsin Akar, st. 254; i Enukidze and Girgvliani, st. 297 i 301, sve citirano gore u tekstu).
  3. Sud je ranije dolazio do zaključka da se država nije pridržavala zahteva iz člana 38 u predmetima u kojima država nije dala nikakvo obrazloženje zašto je odbila da dostavi tražena dokumenta (vidi, na primer, Bekirski, citirano gore, st. 115; Tigran Ajrapetjan protiv Rusije [Tigran Ayrapetyan v. Russia], predstavka br. 75472/01, st. 64, od 16. septembra 2010; i Maslova i Nalbandov protiv Rusije [Maslova and Nalbandov v. Russia], predstavka br. 839/02, st. 128-129, od 24. januara 2008) ili je podnela nepotpunu ili izmenjenu kopiju odbijajući da Sudu podnese radi provere originalni dokument (vidi Trubnikov protiv Rusije [Trubnikov v. Russia], predstavka br. 49790/99, st. 50-57, od 5. jula 2005).
  4. U predmetima u kojima je država isticala poverljivost ili bezbednosne razloge kao razlog zbog koga nije dostavila traženi materijal, Sud je morao da se uveri da postoje razumne i čvrste osnove da se s dokumentom o kome je reč postupa kao sa tajnim ili poverljivim. Tako se u mnogim slučajevima koji su se uglavnom odnosili na nestanke u Čečenskoj Republici ruska Država pozivala na odredbu Zakonika o krivičnom postupku koja je, prema njenoj tvrdnji, sprečavala objavljivanje dokumenata iz spisa istrage koja je u toku. Međutim, Sud je istakao da odredba o kojoj je reč ne sadrži apsolutnu zabranu već pre određuje postupak i ograničenja za takvo objavljivanje. Sud je takođe primetio da je u mnogim sličnim slučajevima ruska Država dostavila tražena dokumenta bez pominjanja ove odredbe, ili se saglasila da dostavi dokumenta iz spisa istrage čak iako se u početku pozvala na ovu odredbu (vidi, među ostalim predmetima, Sasita Israilova i drugi protiv Rusije [Sasita Israilova and Others v. Russia], predstavka br. 35079/04, st. 145, od 28. oktobra 2010, i Musihanova i drugi protiv Rusije [Musikhanova and Others v. Russia], predstavka br. 27243/03, st. 107, od 4. decembra 2008).
  5. Što se tiče označavanja dokumenata kao tajnih, Sud nije bio zadovoljan, u jednom predmetu, objašnjenjem koje je dala tužena Država prema kome pravila koja se odnose na postupak pregleda prepiske zatvorenika predstavljaju državnu tajnu (vidi Davidov i drugi, citirano gore u tekstu, st. 170) ili, u drugom slučaju, da domaće pravo nije ustanovilo postupak za prosleđivanje međunarodnoj organizaciji informacija koje su označene kao državna tajna (vidi Nolan i K. protiv Rusije [Nolan and K. v. Russia], predstavka br. 2512/04, st. 56, od 12. februara 2009). Sud je istakao da, ukoliko postoje legitimni razlozi vezani za nacionalne bezbednosne interese, Država je trebalo da zacrni osetljive pasuse ili da da rezime relevantnih činjeničnih osnova (loc. cit.). Najzad, kada razmatra prirodu informacija koje su označene kao tajne, Sud je uzeo u obzir da li je dokument poznat bilo kome van obaveštajne službe i najviših državnih zvaničnika. Navodna visoko osetljiva priroda informacija stavljena je pod sumnju kada je postalo jasno da laici, kao što je advokat tužioca u građanskom postupku, mogu izvršiti uvid u dokument o kome je reč (loc. cit.).

2.  Primena navedenih načela na ovaj predmet

  1. Prilikom dostavljanja tuženoj Državi dve predstavke na osnovu kojih je formiran ovaj predmet, Sud je postavio niz pitanja stranama i tražio je od Države da dostavi kopiju odluke od 21. septembra 2004. godine koja se odnosi na obustavljanje postupka u krivičnom predmetu br. 159. Država je odbila da je dostavi, navodeći da je na domaćem nivou označena kao strogo poverljiva. Petog jula 2011. godine Sud je doneo odluku o delimičnoj prihvatljivosti, pozvao je strane da podnesu sav dodatni materijal na koji žele da ukažu pažnju Sudu, i ujedno postavio pitanje da li Država ispunjava svoje obaveze prema članu 38 Konvencije. Država nije dostavila kopiju tražene odluke. U postupku pred Velikim Većem, 30. novembra 2012. i 17. januara 2013. godine, Država je dostavila jedan broj dodatnih dokumenata među kojima, međutim, nije bila kopija odluke od 21. septembra 2004. godine koja je bila tražena.
  2. Sud ponavlja da član 38 Konvencije nalaže državama ugovornicama da Sudu obezbede sve neophodne uslove bez obzira da li sprovodi istragu za utvrđivanje činjenica ili obavlja svoje opšte dužnosti u pogledu razmatranja predstavki. Pošto je gospodar sopstvenog postupka i sopstvenih pravila, Sud ima potpunu slobodu u ocenjivanju ne samo prihvatljivosti i relevantnosti, već i dokazne vrednosti svakog pojedinog dokaza koji se pred njim nalazi. Samo Sud može da odluči da li i u kom stepenu bi učešće određenog svedoka bilo relevantno za njegovu ocenu o činjenicama, i koju vrstu dokaza strane moraju da podnesu radi odgovarajućeg razmatranja predmeta. Strane su obavezne da se pridržavaju zahteva i uputstava u pogledu dokaza, da pruže pravovremene informacije o svim preprekama na koje nailaze kada ih izvršavaju i pruže sva razumna ili uverljiva objašnjenja kada ih ne izvršavaju (vidi Davidov i drugi, citirano gore, st. 174; Nevmeržicki protiv Ukrajine [Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine], predstavka br. 54825/00, st. 77, ECHR 2005-II (izvodi); i Irska protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [Ireland v. the United Kingdom], od 18. januara 1978, st. 210, Serija A br. 25). Stoga je dovoljno da Sud smatra da su dokazi sadržani u traženoj odluci neophodni za utvrđivanje činjenica u ovom predmetu (vidi Dedovskij i drugi protiv Rusije [Dedovskiy and Others v. Russia], predstavka br. 7178/03, st. 107, ECHR 2008 (izvodi), i takođe Ahmadova i Sadulajeva protiv Rusije [Akhmadova and Sadulayeva v. Russia], predstavka br. 40464/02, st. 137, od 10. maja 2007).
  3. Što se tiče navodno izvedene prirode obaveze da se obezbede svi neophodni uslovi za njegovu istragu, koja proističe iz člana 38 Konvencije, Sud ponavlja da je ova obaveza posledica preuzimanja obaveze da se ne ometa delotvorno korišćenje prava na individualnu predstavku na osnovu člana 34 Konvencije. Zaista, delotvorno vršenje ovog prava može biti sprečeno usled propusta strane ugovornice da pomogne Sudu u sprovođenju istrage o svim okolnostima koje se tiču predmeta, uključujući naročito tako što neće dostaviti dokaze koje Sud smatra bitnim za obavljanje svog zadatka. Obe odredbe zajedno deluju u cilju garantovanja delotvornog sprovođenja sudskog postupka i odnose se na pitanja postupka pre nego na meritum pritužbi na osnovu suštinskih odredaba Konvencije ili Protokola uz nju. Iako struktura presuda Suda uobičajeno odslikava numeraciju članova Konvencije, isto je tako postalo običaj da Sud na početku ispita da li država ispunjava svoju procesnu obavezu na osnovu člana 38 Konvencije, naročito ako se iz propuštanja države da dostavi tražene dokaze mogu posredno izvući negativni zaključci (vidi, među ostalim predmetima, Šahgirijeva i drugi protiv Rusije [Shakhgiriyeva and Others v. Russia], predstavka br. 27251/03, st. 134-140, od 8. januara 2009; Ucajeva i drugi protiv Rusije [Utsayeva and Others v. Russia], predstavka br. 29133/03, st. 149-153, od 29. maja 2008; Zubajrajev protiv Rusije [Zubayrayev v. Russia], predstavka br. 67797/01, st. 74-77, od 10. januara 2008; i Tandžijeva, citirano gore u tekstu, st. 73-77). Sud takođe podvlači s tim u vezi da može ustanoviti propust tužene države da odgovori svojim procesnim obavezama čak i u odsustvu bilo kakve prihvatljive pritužbe koja se odnosi na povredu suštinskog prava iz Konvencije (vidi Poleščuk protiv Rusije [Poleshchuk protiv Rusije], predstavka br. 60776/00, od 7. oktobra 2004). Pored toga, ne zahteva se da je navodno mešanje države stvarno i ograničilo, ili imalo bilo kakav značajan uticaj na uživanje prava na individualnu predstavku (vidi MekŠejn protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [McShane v. the United Kingdom], predstavka br. 43290/98, st. 151, od 28. maja 2002). Sud potvrđuje da se procesne obaveze strane ugovornice na osnovu članova 34 i 38 Konvencije moraju izvršiti nezavisno od krajnjeg ishoda postupka i to na takav način da se izbegne bilo kakvo stvarno ili potencijalno odvraćajuće dejstvo na podnosioce predstavke ili njihove zastupnike.
  4. Prelazeći na opravdanje koje je Država navela za to što nije dostavila kopiju tražene odluke, Sud primećuje da se ono bazira na činjenici da je odluka zakonito označena kao tajna na domaćem nivou i da su postojeći zakoni i pravila sprečili Državu da prosledi međunarodnoj organizaciji materijal koji ima oznaku tajnosti u odsustvu garancija koje se tiču njegove poverljivosti.
  5. Sud ponavlja da je već ustanovio u jednom drugom predmetu protiv Rusije da prosto upućivanje na strukturni nedostatak domaćeg prava koji čini nemogućim dostavljanje osetljivih dokumenata međunarodnim telima predstavlja nedovoljno objašnjenje za opravdavanje činjenice da su uskraćene informacije koje je Sud zahtevao (vidi Nolan i K., citirano gore, st. 56). Tako je prethodno odbacio slične prigovore Države koji su se odnosili na navodni nedostatak obezbeđenja u postupku pred Sudom koje bi garantovalo poverljivost dokumenata ili nametanje sankcije stranim državljanima za povredu poverljivosti (vidi Šahgirijeva i drugi, citirano gore, st. 136-140). Sud ponavlja s tim u vezi da Konvencija predstavlja međunarodni ugovor koji je, u skladu s načelom pacta sunt servanda koje je kodifikovano u članu 26 Bečke konvencije o ugovornom pravu, obavezujući za strane ugovornice i one moraju da ga izvršavaju u dobroj veri. U skladu s članom 27 Bečke konvencije, nije dozvoljeno pozivanje na odredbe domaćeg prava kako bi se opravdao propust strane ugovornice da poštuje svoje ugovorne obaveze. U kontekstu obaveze koja proističe iz teksta člana 38 Konvencije, ovaj zahtev znači da Vlada tužene Države ne sme da se oslanja na domaće pravne prepreke, kao što je nepostojanje posebne odluke drugog državnog organa, da opravda to što nije obezbedila sve uslove koji su neophodni da bi Sud razmotrio predmet. Sud je uvek zastupao stav da su vlade prema Konvenciji odgovorne za postupke svih državnih organa jer se u svim predmetima pred Sudom radi o međunarodnoj odgovornosti države (vidi Lukanov protiv Bugarske [Lukanov v. Bulgaria], od 20. marta 1997, st. 40, Reports 1997-II).
  6. Iako je u postupku pred Velikim većem Država dostavila kopije presuda koje su doneli domaći sudovi u postupcima za skidanje oznake tajnosti, ovo nije učinilo očiglednijom pravu prirodu bezbednosnih razloga zbog kojih je doneta odluka da se na jedan deo materijala u spisima krivičnog predmeta, uključujući odluku od 21. septembra 2004. godine koju je tražio Sud, stavi oznaka tajnosti. Postalo je jasno da odluku o tajnosti nije donelo Glavno vojno tužilaštvo na sopstvenu inicijativu već pre na osnovu mišljenja nekih zvaničnika iz Federalne službe bezbednosti, koja je imala „pravo da s informacijom koja je reprodukovana u odluci Glavnog vojnog tužioca postupa kako smatra za shodno“. Rečeno je isto tako da odluka od 21. septembra 2004. godine sadrži informacije „iz oblasti obaveštajnog i kontraobaveštajnog rada i operativnih i istražnih aktivnosti“, bez daljeg objašnjavanja (vidi stav 64 gore u tekstu).
  7. Sud ponavlja da nije na njemu da osporava sud nacionalnih vlasti o tome da li u bilo kom konkretnom slučaju postoje razlozi koji se tiču nacionalne bezbednosti. Međutim, čak i kada je reč o nacionalnoj bezbednosti, koncepti zakonitosti i vladavine prava u demokratskom društvu zahtevaju da mere koje utiču na osnovna ljudska prava moraju biti podložne postupku u kom mogu biti osporene pred nekim nezavisnim telom koje ima nadležnost da razmotri razloge za odluku i relevantne dokaze. Ako nema mogućnosti da se delotvorno ospori tvrdnja izvršne vlasti da je reč o nacionalnoj bezbednosti, državni organi bi bili u stanju da se samovoljno mešaju u prava koja štiti Konvencija (vidi Liu, citirano gore u tekstu, st. 8587, i Al-Našif protiv Bugarske [Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria], predstavka br. 50963/99, st. 123 i 124, od 20. juna 2002).
  8. U ovom predmetu presuda moskovskog Gradskog suda od 2. novembra 2010. godine, koju je potvrdio Vrhovni sud, ne sadrži nikakvu suštinsku analizu razloga da se ne skine oznaka tajnosti s materijala iz predmeta. Nije čak ni očigledno da li je Gradski sud dobio primerak stručnog izveštaja koji je sačinila Federalna služba bezbednosti. Nacionalni sudovi nisu ispitali na suštinski način tvrdnju izvršne vlasti da informacije sadržane u toj odluci treba da budu tajne posle više od sedamdeset godina od događaja. Oni su ograničili domet svog ispitivanja na utvrđivanje da li je odluka o tajnosti bila doneta u okviru upravnih nadležnosti relevantnih organa, bez nezavisnog preispitivanja da li ima razumnog osnova za zaključak da bi skidanje oznake tajnosti predstavljalo pretnju po nacionalnu bezbednost. Ruski sudovi nisu se suštinski bavili argumentom koji je iznela organizacija Memorial, po kome je odluka okončala istragu o masovnom ubistvu nenaoružanih zarobljenika, odnosno jednoj od najozbiljnijih povreda ljudskih prava koja je izvršena po naredbi visoko pozicioniranih sovjetskih zvaničnika, i da stoga nije podobna za dobijanje oznake tajnosti na osnovu člana 7 Zakona o državnim tajnama. Najzad, nisu sproveli odmeravanje između navodne potrebe da se zaštite informacije koje poseduje Federalna služba bezbednosti, s jedne strane, i javnog interesa da se obavi transparentna istraga o zločinima prethodnog totalitarnog režima i privatnog interesa rođaka žrtava da se otkriju okolnosti njihove smrti, s druge strane. S obzirom na ograničeni domet sudskog razmatranja odluke o tajnosti na nacionalnom nivou, Sud ne može da prihvati da je dostavljanje kopije odluke od 21. septembra 2004. godine, kao što je Sud tražio, moglo da utiče na nacionalnu bezbednost Rusije.
  9. Sud naglašava, najzad, da se legitimnoj brizi za nacionalnu bezbednost može izaći u susret u postupcima koji se pred njim vode putem odgovarajućih procesnih ustupaka, uključujući ograničeni pristup dokumentima o kojima je reč u skladu s pravilom 33 Poslovnika Suda i, in extremis, održavanjem zasedanja bez prisustva javnosti. Iako je ruska Država bila u potpunosti svesna ovih mogućnosti, ona nije tražila primenu takvih mera, iako je obaveza strane koja zahteva poverljivost da takav zahtev istakne i da ga obrazloži.
  10. Shodno tome, Sud smatra da je u ovom predmetu tužena Država propustila da ispuni svoje obaveze na osnovu člana 38 Konvencije jer je odbila da dostavi kopiju dokumenta koji je Sud tražio.

V.  PRIMENA ČLANA 41 KONVENCIJE

  1. Član 41 Konvencije propisuje:

„Kada Sud utvrdi prekršaj Konvencije ili protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo Visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo delimičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj stranci.“

A.  Šteta

  1. Podnosioci predstavke Ježi Karol Malevič, Janovjec i Tribovski podneli su zahtev za naknadu štete zbog toga što su izgubili očeve odnosno dedu. Svi podnosioci predstavke su takođe pondeli zahtev za naknadu nematerijalne štete u vezi s navodnom povredom članova 2 i 3 Konvencije, ostavljajući Sudu da, po svojoj diskrecionoj oceni, utvrdi iznos pravičnog zadovoljenja.
  2. Država je osporila njihove zahteve.
  3. Sud nije ustanovio povredu članova 2 i 3 Konvencije kako su tvrdili podnosioci predstavke. Propust Države da poštuje član 38 Konvencije je procesno pitanje koje ne zahteva da se podnosiocima predstavki pruži pravično zadovoljenje. Shodno tome, Sud odbija zahteve podnosilaca predstavki u odnosu na materijalnu i nematerijalnu štetu.

B.  Troškovi i izdaci

  1. Podnosioci predstavke su tražili sledeće iznose:

(i) 25.024,82 evra (EUR) na ime honorara za Ševčika (izuzimajući pravnu pomoć koja je dobijena od Suda);

(ii) 7.000 EUR na ime honorara za Karpinskog i Stavickaju u ruskom postupku;

(iii) 7.581 EUR i 1.199,25 poljskih zlota za troškove prevoza i prevoda koji su nastali u potupku pred Većem;

(iv) 4.129 EUR za troškove prevoza i smeštaja koje su imali advokati i podnosioci predstavki radi pripreme i učešća u zasedanju na kome je izrečena presuda Veća i na zasedanju Velikog veća;

(v) 124 EUR za troškove prevoda i poštanskih troškova u postupku pred Velikim većem.

  1. Osim toga, podnosilac predstavke Ježi Karol Malevič tražio je 2.219,36 US dolara za troškove puta i smeštaja za njega i njegovu ćerku koji su nastali u vezi s njihovim prisustvom na zasedanju Veća.
  2. Država je komentarisala da honorari Ševčika deluju preterano veliki, da nije na ubedljiv način pokazana neophodnost putnih troškova, i da su dva ruska advokata učestvovala samo u domaćem postupku „rehabilitacije“, što je van okvira ovog predmeta. Štaviše, zahtev ruskog advokata nije bio zasnovan ni na kakvoj tarifi i nije bio u vezi s količinom posla koji je stvarno izvršen. Trošak koji se tiče prisustva podnosilaca predstavki na zasedanju na kome je izrečena presuda i na zasedanju Velikog veća nisu bili nužni jer je podnosioce predstavke zastupao tim sastavljen od tri advokata. Najzad, prema sopstvenom priznanju, Kaminjski i Sohanjski su obavili svoj pravni posao pro bono što ih, po mišljenju Države, sprečava da traže bilo koji iznos za pripremu predmeta.
  3. Sud ponavlja da nije ustanovio povrede koje su podnosioci predstavke naveli. Sud ipak prihvata da je propust ruske Države da ispunjava obaveze iz člana 38 Konvencije stvorio dodatnu količinu posla za zastupnike podnosilaca predstavki, od kojih je zahtevano da se bave ovim pitanjem u pisanim i usmenim podnescima. Međutim, on smatra da su iznosi koji su isplaćeni kao pravna pomoć bili dovoljni u odnosu na obim posla u ovim okolnostima. Shodno tome, Sud odbija zahteve za naknadu troškova.

 

IZ OVIH RAZLOGA, SUD

  1. Zaključuje, jednoglasno, da Pjotr Malevič i Kazimjež Račinjski imaju pravo da učestvuju u postupku umesto pokojnih Kšištofa Jana Maleviča, odnosno pokojne Haline Mihalske;
  2. Zaključuje, s trinaest glasova prema četiri, da Sud nije nadležan da ispita pritužbu na osnovu člana 2 Konvencije;
  3. Zaključuje, s dvanaest glasova prema pet, da nije prekršen član 3 Konvencije;
  4. Zaključuje, jednoglasno, da tužena Država nije poštovala svoje obaveze iz člana 38 Konvencije;
  5. Odbija, s dvanaest glasova prema pet, zahtev podnosilaca predstavke za pravično zadovoljenje.

 

Sačinjeno na engleskom i francuskom i izrečeno na javnom zasedanju u zgradi Suda u Strazburu, 21. oktobra 2013.

Erik Friberg

Jozep Kasadeval

sekretar

predsednik

U skladu sa članom 45, st. 2 Konvencije i pravilom 74, st. 2 Poslovnika Suda, ovoj presudi priložena su sledeća posebna separate mišljenja:

(a) saglasno mišljenje sudije Gjulumjan;

(b) saglasno mišljenje sudije Dedova;

(c) delimično saglasno i delimično izdvojeno mišljenje sudije Vojtičeka;

(d)  zajedničko delimično izdvojeno mišljenje sudija Ziemele, de Gaetano, Lafrank i Keler.

J.K.*. E.F.*.

Izdvojena mišljenja nisu prevedena, ali su navedena na engleskom i francuskom jeziku u zvaničnoj verziji ili verzijama presude. Zvanična verzija presude može se naći u bazi podataka HUDOC koja sadrži predmete iz sudske prakse Evropskog suda.

 

 

___________________________________
Prevod presude preuzet sa https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/

 

Ovaj prevod je nastao uz podršku Fiducijarnog fonda za ljudska prava Saveta Evrope (www.coe.int/humanrightstrustfund). 

 

 

 

GRAND CHAMBER

CASE OF JANOWIEC AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA

(Applications nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

21 October 2013

In the case of Janowiec and Others v. RussiaThe European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:

Josep Casadevall, President,
Guido Raimondi,
Ineta Ziemele,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
Corneliu Bîrsan,
Peer Lorenzen,
Alvina Gyulumyan,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Dragoljub Popović,
Luis López Guerra,
Kristina Pardalos,
Vincent A. De Gaetano,
Julia Laffranque,
Helen Keller,
Helena Jäderblom,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Dmitry Dedov, judges,

and Erik FriberghRegistrar,

Having deliberated in private on 13 February and 5 September 2013Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in two applications (nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by fifteen Polish nationals (“the applicants”), on 19 November 2007 and 24 May 2009 respectively.

2.  The applicants names are listed in paragraphs 25 to 37 below. They live in Poland and in the United States of America. The applicants Mr Janowiec and Mr Trybowski were represented before the Court by Mr J. Szewczyk, a Polish lawyer practising in Warsaw. The other applicants were represented by Professor I. Kamiński from the Institute of Legal Studies, and by Mr R. Nowosielski and Mr B. Sochański, Polish lawyers practising in Gdańsk and Szczecin respectively, as well as by Mr R. Karpinskiy and Ms A. Stavitskaya, Russian lawyers practising in Moscow.

3.  The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.

4.  The Polish Government, who intervened in the case in accordance with Article 36 § 1 of the Convention, were initially represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and subsequently by their co-Agent, Ms A. Mężykowska.

5.  The applications were allocated to the Fifth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 7 October 2008 and 24 November 2009 the President of the Section decided to give notice of the applications to the Russian and Polish Governments. It was also decided to grant priority to the applications under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

6.  By decision of 5 July 2011, the Court joined the applications. It further decided to join to the merits the Governments objection as to the Courts jurisdiction ratione temporis in respect of the complaint under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention, and declared the applications partially admissible.

7.  On 16 April 2012 a Chamber of the Fifth Section composed of Dean SpielmannPresident, Karel Jungwiert, Boštjan M. Zupančič, Anatoly Kovler, Mark Villiger, Ganna Yudkivska and Angelika Nuβberger, judges, delivered its judgment. It found, by four votes to three, that it was unable to take cognisance of the merits of the complaint under Article 2 of the Convention; by five votes to two, that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of ten applicants; and, unanimously, that there had been no violation of that provision in respect of the other applicants. It also found, by four votes to three, that the respondent Government had failed to comply with their obligations under Article 38 of the Convention.

8.  On 5 July 2012 the applicants requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber under Article 43 of the Convention and Rule 73. On 24 September 2012 a panel of the Grand Chamber granted the request.

9.  The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24.

10.  The applicants and the Government each filed a memorial before the Grand Chamber.

11.  Subsequently, the President of the Grand Chamber granted leave to the following organisations to submit written comments as third parties under Article 36 § 2 of the Convention: Open Society Justice Initiative, Amnesty International and the Public International Law and Policy Group. A group of three non-governmental organisations – Memorial, the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre and the Transitional Justice Network – were also granted leave to make a joint written submission as third parties.

12.  A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 13 February 2013 (Rule 59 § 3).

There appeared before the Court:

(a)  for the respondent Government
MrG. Matyushkin,Agent,
MrN. Mikhaylov,
MrP. Smirnov,Advisers;

(b)  for the applicants
MrJ. Szewczyk,
MrI. Kamiński,
MrB. Sochański,Counsel;

(c)  for the Polish Government
MrM. Szpunar,Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
MsA. Mężykowska,Co-Agent,
MrW. Schabas,Adviser.

The Court heard addresses by Mr Szewczyk, Mr Kamiński and Mr Sochański for the applicants, Mr Matyushkin for the respondent Government and Ms Mężykowska for the Polish Government.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

13.  The facts of the case, as submitted or undisputed by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

A.  Background

14.  On 23 August 1939 the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed a non-aggression treaty (known as the MolotovRibbentrop Pact) which included an additional secret protocol whereby the parties agreed on “the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe”. In particular, they concluded as follows:

“2.  In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish State, the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.”

15.  On 1 September 1939 Germany invaded Poland, starting the Second World War. On 17 September 1939 the Soviet Red Army marched into Polish territory, allegedly acting to protect the Ukrainians and Belorussians living in the eastern part of Poland because the Polish State had collapsed under the German attack and could no longer guarantee the security of its own citizens. The Polish army did not offer military resistance. The USSR annexed the territory newly under its control and in November 1939 declared that the 13.5 million Polish citizens who lived there were henceforth Soviet citizens.

16.  In the wake of the Red Armys advance around 250,000 Polish soldiers, border guards, police officers, prison guards, State officials and other functionaries were detained. After they had been disarmed, some of them were set free; the others were sent to special prison camps established by the Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs ((NKVD), a predecessor of the State Security Committee (KGB)) in Kozelsk, Ostashkov and Starobelsk. On 9 October 1939 it was decided that the Polish officer corps should be billeted at the camps in Kozelsk and Starobelsk and the remaining functionaries, including the police officers and prison guards, in Ostashkov.

17.  In early March 1940 Lavrentiy Beria, Head of the NKVD, submitted to Joseph Stalin, Secretary General of the USSR Communist Party, a proposal to approve the shooting of Polish prisoners of war on the ground that they were all “enemies of the Soviet authorities filled with hatred for the Soviet system of government” who were “attempting to continue their c[ounter]r[evolutionary] work” and “conducting anti-Soviet agitation”. The proposal specified that the prisoner-of-war camps accommodated 14,736 former military and police officers, of whom more than 97 per cent were Polish by nationality, and that a further 10,685 Poles were being held in the prisons of the western districts of Ukraine and Belorussia.

18.  On 5 March 1940 the Politburo of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party considered the proposal and decided as follows:

“I.  Instructs the NKVD USSR as follows:

(1)  the cases of the 14,700 persons remaining in the prisoner-of-war camps (former Polish army officers, government officials, landowners, policemen, intelligence agents, military policemen, settlers and prison guards),

(2)  and the cases of the persons arrested and remaining in prisons in the western districts of Ukraine and Belorussia, numbering 11,000 (members of various counter-revolutionary espionage and sabotage organisations, former landowners, factory owners, former Polish army officers, government officials and fugitives), are to be considered in a special procedure, with the sentence of capital punishment  [execution by] shooting – being imposed.

II.  The cases are to be considered without the detainees being summoned or the charges being disclosed, and without any statements concerning the conclusion of the investigation or the bills of indictment being issued to them, in the following manner:

(a)  the persons remaining in the prisoner-of-war camps: on the basis of information provided by the Directorate of Prisoner-of-War Affairs, NKVD USSR,

(b)  the persons arrested: on the basis of information provided by the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR and the NKVD of the Belorussian SSR.”

The decision was signed by Joseph Stalin, Kliment Voroshilov, Anastas Mikoyan, Vyacheslav Molotov, Mikhail Kalinin and Lazar Kaganovich.

19.  The killings took place in April and May 1940. Prisoners from the Kozelsk camp were killed at a site near Smolensk known as the Katyn Forest; those from the Starobelsk camp were shot in the Kharkov NKVD prison and their bodies were buried near the village of Pyatikhatki; the police officers from Ostashkov were killed in the Kalinin (now Tver) NKVD prison and buried in Mednoye. The circumstances of the execution of the prisoners from the prisons in western Ukraine and Belorussia remain unknown to this day.

20.  In 1942 and 1943, first Polish railroad workers and then the German army discovered mass burials near the Katyn Forest. An international commission consisting of twelve forensic experts and their support staff from Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden was set up. It conducted the exhumation works from April to June 1943. The remains of 4,243 Polish officers were excavated, of whom 2,730 were identified. The commission concluded that the Soviet authorities had been responsible for the massacre.

21.  The Soviet authorities responded by putting the blame on the Germans who had allegedly – according to Moscow – taken control of the Polish prisoners and murdered them in the summer of 1941. Following the liberation of the Smolensk district by the Red Army in September 1943, the NKVD set up the Extraordinary State Commission chaired by Nicolay Burdenko, which purported to collect evidence of German responsibility for the killing of the Polish officers. In its communiqué of 22 January 1944 the Commission announced that the Polish prisoners had been executed by the Germans in the autumn of 1941.

22.  In the course of the trial of German war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, the Katyn killings were mentioned in the indictment as an instance of a war crime (Indictment: Count Three – War Crimes, Section C (2)). On 13 February 1946 the Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the USSR, Colonel Y.V. Pokrovsky, charged the defendants with the execution of 11,000 Polish prisoners of war in the autumn of 1941, relying on the Extraordinary State Commissionreport (Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, vol. VII, pp. 425-27). Despite the objections by Soviet prosecutors to the taking of oral evidence, the Tribunal heard evidence on 1 and 2 July 1946 from three witnesses for the prosecution and three witnesses for the defence (Vol. XVII, pp. 270371). At the conclusion of the trial, no mention of the Katyn killings was made either in the text of the judgment of the International Military Tribunal or in the dissenting opinion of the Soviet judge.

23.  On 3 March 1959 Aleksandr Shelepin, Chairman of the KGB, proposed to Nikita Khrushchev, Secretary General of the USSR Communist Party, that the documents on the execution of Polish prisoners of war be destroyed:

“Since 1940, records and other materials regarding prisoners and interned officers, policemen, gendarmes, [military] settlers, landowners and other persons from the former bourgeois Poland who were shot that same year, have been kept by the Committee of State Security of the Council of Ministers, USSR. On the basis of decisions taken by the Soviet NKVDs special troika, a total of 21,857 persons were shot, 4,421 of them in Katyn Forest (Smolenskiy district), 3,820 in the Starobelsk camp near Kharkov, 6,311 in the Ostashkov camp (Kalininskiy district) and 7,305 in other camps and prisons in western Ukraine and Belorussia.

The entire operation to liquidate the above-mentioned individuals was carried out on the basis of decision by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR dated 5 March 1940... Since the time the above-mentioned operation was carried out, that is, since 1940, no information has been released to anybody relating to the case, and all of the 21,857 files have been stored in a sealed location.

None of these files are of any operational or historical value to Soviet organs. It is also highly doubtful whether they could be of any real value to our Polish friends. On the contrary, an unforeseen incident could lead to the operation being revealed, with all the undesirable consequences that would entail for our country, especially since, as regards the persons shot in the Katyn Forest, the official version was confirmed by an investigation carried out on the initiative of the Soviet authorities in 1944...

On the basis of the above, it seems opportune to destroy all the records concerning the persons shot in 1940 in the above-mentioned operation ... [T]he reports of the meetings of the NKVD USSR troika sentencing those persons to be shot, and also the documents on execution of that decision, could be preserved.”

24.  The remaining documents were put in a special file, known as “package no. 1”, to which only the Secretary General of the USSR Communist Party had the right of access. On 28 April 2010 its contents were officially made public on the website of the Russian State Archives Service. The file contained the following historical documents: Beriaproposal of 5 March 1940, the Politburos decision of the same date, the pages removed from the minutes of the Politburos meeting and Shelepins note of 3 March 1959.

B.  The applicants and their relationship to the victims

1.  The applicants in case no. 55508/07

25.  The first applicant, Mr Jerzy-Roman Janowiec, was born in 1929. He is the son of Mr Andrzej Janowiec, born in 1890, who was a lieutenant in the Polish army before the Second World War.

26.  The second applicant, Mr Antoni-Stanisław Trybowski, was born in 1940. He is the grandson of Mr Antoni Nawratil, born in 1883, a lieutenantcolonel in the Polish army.

27.  Both Mr Andrzej Janowiec and Mr Antoni Nawratil were taken prisoner of war during the Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939 and sent to the Starobelsk camp in the USSR. Among the prisoners in the camp, Mr Janowiec was listed as prisoner no. 3914 and Mr Nawratil as prisoner no. 2407. They were subsequently transferred to a prison in Kharkov and executed in April 1940.

2.  The applicants in case no. 29520/09

28.  The first and second applicants, Ms Witomiła Wołk-Jezierska and Ms Ojcumiła Wołk, were born respectively in 1940 and 1917. They are the daughter and wife of Mr Wincenty Wołk, born in 1909, who was a lieutenant in a heavy artillery unit of the Polish army before the Second World War. He was taken prisoner of war by the Red Army on the night of 19 September 1939 and held in Kozelsk special camp (listed in position 3 on NKVD dispatching list 052/3 of April 1940). He was killed on 30 April 1940 and buried in Katyn. His body was identified during the 1943 exhumation (no. 2564).

29.  The third applicant, Ms Wanda Rodowicz, was born in 1938. She is the granddaughter of Mr Stanisław Rodowicz, born in 1883, who was a reserve officer in the Polish army. He was taken prisoner of war by the Red Army at the Hungarian border on around 20 September 1939 and held in Kozelsk special camp (listed in position 94 on list 017/2). He was killed and buried in Katyn. His body was identified during the 1943 exhumation (no. 970).

30.  The fourth applicant, Ms Halina Michalska, was born in 1929 and died in 2012. She was the daughter of Mr Stanisław Uziembło, born in 1889. An officer of the Polish army, Mr Uziembło was taken prisoner of war by the Soviets near Białystok, Poland, and detained in the special NKVD camp at Starobelsk (position 3400). He was presumed killed in Kharkov and buried at Pyatikhatki near Kharkov (now in Ukraine).

31.  The fifth applicant, Mr Artur Tomaszewski, was born in 1933. He is the son of Mr Szymon Tomaszewski, born in 1900. The fifth applicants father, commander of the police station at the Polish-Soviet border in Kobylia, was arrested there by Soviet troops and taken to the special NKVD camp at Ostashkov (position 5 on list 045/3). He was killed in Tver and buried in Mednoye.

32.  The sixth applicant, Mr Jerzy Lech Wielebnowski, was born in 1930. His father, Mr Aleksander Wielebnowski, born in 1897, was a police officer working in Luck in eastern Poland. In October 1939 he was arrested by Soviet troops and placed in the Ostashkov camp (position 10 on list 033/2). He was killed in Tver and buried in Mednoye.

33.  The seventh applicant, Mr Gustaw Erchard, was born in 1935. His father, Mr Stefan Erchard, born in 1900, was the headmaster of a primary school in Rudka, Poland. He was arrested by the Soviets and detained at the Starobelsk camp (position 3869). He was presumed killed in Kharkov and buried in Pyatikhatki.

34.  The eighth and ninth applicants, Mr Jerzy Karol Malewicz and Mr Krzysztof Jan Malewicz, born in 1928 and 1931 respectively, are the sons of Mr Stanisław August Malewicz. The ninth applicant died in 2011. Their father was born in 1889 and served as a doctor in the Polish army. He was taken prisoner of war at Równe, Poland, and held at the Starobelsk camp (position 2219). He was presumed killed in Kharkov and buried in Pyatikhatki.

35.  The tenth and eleventh applicants, Ms Krystyna Krzyszkowiak and Ms Irena Erchard, born in 1940 and 1936 respectively, are the daughters of Mr Michał Adamczyk. Born in 1903, he was the commander of Sarnaki police station. He was arrested by the Soviets, detained at the Ostashkov camp (position 5 on list 037/2), killed in Tver and buried in Mednoye.

36.  The twelfth applicant, Ms Krystyna Mieszczankowska, born in 1930, is the daughter of Mr Stanisław Mielecki. Her father, a Polish officer, was born in 1895 and was held at the Kozelsk camp after his arrest by Soviet troops. He was killed and buried in Katyn; his body was identified during the 1943 exhumation.

37.  The thirteenth applicant, Mr Krzysztof Romanowski, born in 1953, is the nephew of Mr Ryszard Żołędziowski. Mr Żołędziowski, born in 1887, was held at the Starobelsk camp (position 1151) and was presumed killed in Kharkov and buried in Pyatikhatki. A list of Starobelsk prisoners which included his name was retrieved from the coat pocket of a Polish officer whose remains, with gunshot wounds to the head, were excavated during a joint Polish-Russian exhumation near Kharkov in 1991.

C.  Investigations in criminal case no. 159

38.  On 13 April 1990, during a visit by Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski to Moscow, the President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, handed over to him the documents concerning the Katyn massacre. The official news agency of the USSR published a communiqué which affirmed, on the basis of newly disclosed archive materials, that “Beria, Merkulov and their subordinates bore direct responsibility for the crime committed in the Katyn Forest”.

39.  On 22 March 1990 the Kharkov regional prosecutors office opened a criminal investigation into the origin of mass graves found in the cityLesopark district. On 6 June 1990 the Kalinin (Tver) prosecutors office instituted a criminal case into “the disappearance” (исчезновениеin May 1940 of the Polish prisoners of war who had been held in the NKVD camp in Ostashkov. On 27 September 1990 the Chief Military Prosecutors Office of the USSR took over the Kharkov investigation under the number 159 and assigned it to a group of military prosecutors.

40.  In the summer and autumn of 1991, Polish and Russian specialists carried out exhumations of corpses at the mass burial sites in Kharkov, Mednoye and Katyn. They also reviewed the archive documents relating to the Katyn massacre, interviewed at least forty witnesses and commissioned forensic examinations.

41.  On 14 October 1992 the Russian President Boris Yeltsin revealed that the Polish officers had been sentenced to death by Stalin and the Politburo of the USSR Communist Party. The director of the Russian State Archives transferred to the Polish authorities a number of documents, including the decision of 5 March 1940. During an official visit to Poland on 25 August 1993, President Yeltsin paid tribute to the victims in front of the Katyn Cross in Warsaw.

42.  In late May 1995 prosecutors from Belarus, Poland, Russia and Ukraine held a working meeting in Warsaw during which they reviewed the progress of the investigation in case no. 159. The participants agreed that the Russian prosecutors would ask their Belarusian and Ukrainian counterparts for legal assistance to determine the circumstances of the execution of 7,305 Polish citizens in 1940.

43.  On 13 May 1997 the Belarusian authorities informed their Russian counterparts that they had not been able to uncover any documents relating to the execution of Polish prisoners of war in 1940. In 2002 the Ukrainian authorities produced documents concerning the transfer of Polish prisoners from the Starobelsk camp to the NKVD prison in the Kharkov region.

44.  In 2001, 2002 and 2004 the President of the Polish Institute for National Remembrance (“the INR) repeatedly but unsuccessfully contacted the Russian Chief Military Prosecutors Office with a view to obtaining access to the investigation files.

45.  On 21 September 2004 the Chief Military Prosecutors Office decided to discontinue criminal case no. 159, apparently on the ground that the persons allegedly responsible for the crime had already died. On 22 December 2004 the Inter-Agency Commission for the Protection of State Secrets classified thirty-six volumes of the case file – out of a total of 183 volumes – as “top secret” and a further eight volumes as “for internal use only”. The decision to discontinue the investigation was given “top secret” classification and its existence was only revealed on 11 March 2005 at a press conference given by the Chief Military Prosecutor.

46.  Further to a request from the Court for a copy of the decision of 21 September 2004, the Russian Government refused to produce it, citing its secret classification. It transpired from the Governments submissions that the investigation had been discontinued on the basis of Article 24 § 4 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on account of the suspects death.

47.  From 9 to 21 October 2005 three prosecutors from the INR conducting the investigation into the Katyn massacre and the chief specialist of the Central Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation visited Moscow at the invitation of the Chief Military Prosecutors Office. They examined the sixty-seven volumes of case no. 159 which were not classified, but were not allowed to make any copies.

48.  On 8 May 2010 the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev provided the Speaker of the Polish Parliament with sixty-seven volumes of the Katyn investigation files. In total, according to the information submitted by the Polish Government, the Russian authorities handed over to them certified copies of 148 volumescontaining approximately 45,000 pages.

D.  Proceedings in application no. 55508/07

49.  In 2003, Mr Szewczyk – a Polish lawyer retained by the first applicant (Mr Janowiec) and by the mother of the second applicant (Mr Trybowski) – applied to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation with a request to be provided with documents concerning Mr Andrzej Janowiec, Mr Antoni Nawratil and a third person.

50.  On 23 June 2003 the Prosecutor Generals Office replied to the lawyer, informing him that the Chief Military Prosecutors Office was investigating a criminal case concerning the execution of Polish officers in 1940. In 1991 the investigation had recovered some 200 bodies in the Kharkov, Tver and Smolensk regions and identified some of them, including Mr Nawratil and Mr Janowiec. Their names had also been found on the list of prisoners in the Starobelsk camp. Any further documents concerning them had been destroyed previously.

51.  On 4 December 2004 Mr Szewczyk formally requested the Chief Military Prosecutors Office to recognise the rights of Mr Janowiec and Mr Trybowski as relatives of the executed Polish officers and to provide them with copies of the procedural documents and also of personal documents relating to Mr Antoni Nawratil and Mr Andrzej Janowiec.

52.  On 10 February 2005 the Chief Military Prosecutors Office replied that Mr Antoni Nawratil and Mr Andrzej Janowiec were listed among the prisoners from the Starobelsk camp who had been executed in 1940 by the NKVD and buried near Kharkov. No further materials concerning those individuals were available. Copies of the procedural documents could only be given to officially recognised victims or their representatives.

53.  Subsequently the applicants Mr Janowiec and Mr Trybowski retained the services of a Russian lawyer, Mr Bushuev, who asked the Chief Military Prosecutors Office for permission to study the case file. On 7 November 2006 the Chief Military Prosecutors Office informed him that he would not be allowed to access the file because his clients had not been formally recognised as victims in the case.

54.  The lawyer lodged a judicial appeal against the Chief Military Prosecutors Offices refusals of 10 February 2005 and 7 November 2006. He submitted, in particular, that the status as victim of a criminal offence should be determined by reference to the factual circumstances, such as whether or not the individual concerned had sustained damage as a result of the offence. From that perspective, the investigators decision to recognise someone as a victim should be viewed as a formal acknowledgement of such factual circumstances. The lawyer sought to have the applicants Mr Janowiec and Mr Trybowski recognised as victims and to be granted access to the case file.

55.  On 18 April 2007 the Military Court of the Moscow Command rejected the complaint. It noted that, although Mr Antoni Nawratil and Mr Andrzej Janowiec had been listed among the prisoners in the Starobelsk camp, their remains had not been among those identified by the investigation. Accordingly, in the Military Courts view, there were no legal grounds to assume that they had died as a result of the offence in question. As to the materials in the case file, the Military Court observed that the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings dated 21 September 2004 had been declared a State secret and, for that reason, foreign nationals could not have access to it.

56.  On 24 May 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld that judgment on appeal, reproducing verbatim the reasoning of the Military Court.

E.  Proceedings in application no. 29520/09

57.  On 20 August 2008 a team of lawyers acting for the applicants lodged a judicial appeal against the prosecutors decision of 21 September 2004. They submitted that the applicants relatives had been among the imprisoned Polish officers whose execution had been ordered by the Politburo of the USSR Communist Party on 5 March 1940. However, the applicants had not been granted victim status in case no. 159 and could not file motions or petitions, have access to the file materials or receive copies of the decisions. The lawyers also claimed that the investigation had not been effective because no attempt had been made to take biological samples from the applicants in order to identify the exhumed human remains.

58.  On 14 October 2008 the Military Court of the Moscow Command dismissed the appeal. It found that in 1943 the International Commission and the Technical Commission of the Polish Red Cross had excavated the remains and then reburied them, without identifying the bodies or counting them. A subsequent excavation in 1991 had only identified twenty-two persons and the applicants relatives had not been among those identified. The Military Court acknowledged that the names of the applicants relatives had been included in the NKVD lists for the Ostashkov, Starobelsk and Kozelsk camps; however, “the Katyn investigation ... did not establish the fate of the said individuals”. As their bodies had not been identified, there was no proof that the applicants relatives had lost their lives as a result of the crime of abuse of power (Article 193-17 of the 1926 Soviet Criminal Code) referred to in the decision of 21 September 2004. Accordingly, there was no basis for granting victim status to the applicants under Article 42 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, classified materials could not be made accessible to “representatives of foreign States”.

59.  The lawyers submitted a statement of appeal in which they alleged that the lack of information about the fate of the applicants relatives had been the result of an ineffective investigation. The twenty-two persons had been identified only on the basis of the military identification tags found at the burial places and the investigators had not undertaken any measures or commissioned any forensic examinations to identify the exhumed remains. Furthermore, it was a publicly known fact that the 1943 excavation had uncovered the remains of 4,243 people, of whom 2,730 individuals had been identified. Among those identified were three persons whose relatives had been complainants in the proceedings. The granting of victim status to the complainants would have allowed the identification of the remains with the use of genetic methods. Finally, the lawyers stressed that the Katyn criminal case file did not contain any information supporting the conclusion that any of the Polish officers taken from the NKVD camps had survived or died of natural causes.

60.  On 29 January 2009 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of 14 October 2008 in its entirety. It repeated verbatim extensive passages of the findings of the Moscow Military Court, but also added that the decision of 21 September 2004 could not be quashed because the prescription period had expired and because the proceedings in respect of certain suspects had been discontinued on “rehabilitation grounds”.

F.  Proceedings for declassification of the decision of 21 September 2004

61.  On 26 March 2008 Memorial, a Russian nongovernmental human rights organisation, lodged an application with the Chief Military ProsecutorOffice seeking to have the decision of 21 September 2004 declassified. In its answer dated 22 April 2008, the prosecutors office informed Memorial that it was not competent to set aside the classified status, which had been approved on 22 December 2004 by the Inter-Agency Commission for the Protection of State Secrets (“the Commission”).

62.  On 12 March 2009 Memorial applied to the Commission for declassification of the decision of 21 September 2004, claiming that the classification of the materials of the Katyn investigation was morally and legally unacceptable and that it had also been in breach of section 7 of the State Secrets Act, which precluded classification of any information about violations of human rights. By letter of 27 August 2009, the Commission replied to Memorial that their application had been examined and rejected, but did not provide further details.

63.  Memorial challenged the Commissions refusal before the Moscow City Court. At hearing on 13 July 2010 the court read out the Commissions letter of 25 June 2010 addressed to the presiding judge. The letter stated that the Commission had not made any decision on 22 December 2004 to classify the decision of the Chief Military ProsecutorOffice of 21 September 2004.

64.  Following an in camera hearing, the Moscow City Court rejected Memorials application for declassification on 2 November 2010, finding in particular as follows:

The court has established that on 21 September 2004 the Chief Military ProsecutorOffice issued a decision terminating the criminal investigation which had been instituted on 22 March 1990 by the Kharkov regional prosecutors office of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] in connection with the discovery of the remains of Polish nationals in the wooded zone of Kharkov ...

The investigation characterised the actions of a number of named high-ranking officials of the USSR as an abuse of power with particularly aggravating circumstances under Article 193-17 (b) of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Criminal Code. The criminal case in respect of those officials was terminated on the basis of Article 24 § 1 (4) of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (on account of the guilty persons deaths). The case in respect of the others was terminated on the basis of Article 24 § 1 (2) (there was no criminal offence).

The Chief Military ProsecutorOffice sent the draft decision on termination of the criminal proceedings to the Federal Security Service for an expert opinion as to whether or not it contained any confidential or secret information within the meaning of section 9 of the State Secrets Act, since the Federal Security Service had the right to dispose as it saw fit of the information reproduced in the Chief Military Prosecutors decision.

A commission of experts from the Federal Security Service found that the Chief Military Prosecutors draft decision included information which had not been declassified. In addition, the commission pointed out that the draft decision contained information to which access was restricted ...

On 21 September 2004 an official from the Chief Military ProsecutorOffice issued the decision discontinuing criminal investigation no. 159. In the light of the above-mentioned findings by the Federal Security Service and on the basis of section 5 § 4 (2, 3) and section 8 of the State Secrets Act and point 80 of Presidential Decree no. 1203 of 30 November 1995, the document was given top secret classification ... Accordingly, there are no legal grounds for granting Memorials request that the Chief Military Prosecutorresolution classifying the decision of 21 September 2004 be declared unlawful and unjustified ...

In so far as the complainant argued that information concerning violations of the law by State authorities or officials may not be declared a State secret or classified in accordance with section 7 of the State Secrets Act, this argument is without merit because the Chief Military Prosecutors decision of 21 September 2004 contained information in the field of intelligence, counterintelligence and operational and search activities which, pursuant to section 4 of the State Secrets Act, constituted a State secret ...

65.  On 26 January 2011 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation rejected the appeal lodged by Memorial against the City Courts judgment.

G.  Proceedings for the rehabilitation of the applicants relatives

66.  Most of the applicants applied repeatedly to different Russian authorities, first and foremost the Chief Military ProsecutorOffice, for information on the Katyn criminal investigation and for the rehabilitation” of their relatives in accordance with the provisions of the 1991 Rehabilitation Act (see paragraph 86 below).

67.  By letter of 21 April 1998 sent in response to a rehabilitation request by Ms Ojcumiła Wołk, the Chief Military Prosecutors Office confirmed that her husband, Mr Wincenty Wołk, had been held as a prisoner of war in the Kozelsk camp and had then been executed, along with other prisoners, in the spring of 1940. The letter stated that her application for rehabilitation would be considered only after the conclusion of the criminal investigation.

68.  Following the discontinuation of the investigation in case no. 159, Ms Witomiła Wołk-Jezierska asked the Chief Military Prosecutors Office on 25 October 2005 for a copy of the decision discontinuing the investigation. By letter of 23 November 2005, the prosecutors office refused to provide it, citing the decisiontop secret classification. On 8 December 2005 the Polish Embassy in Moscow asked the prosecutors office for an explanation concerning the rehabilitation of Mr Wołk. In a letter of 18 January 2006 the prosecutors office expressed the view that there was no legal basis for the rehabilitation of Mr Wołk or the other Polish citizens because the investigation had not determined which provision of the 1926 Criminal Code had been the basis for the repression to which they had been subjected. A similarly worded letter of 12 February 2007 refused a further request to the same effect by Ms Wołk.

69.  On 13 March 2008 the Chief Military Prosecutors Office rejected a request for rehabilitation submitted by counsel on behalf of all the applicants. The prosecutor stated that it was not possible to determine the legal basis for the repression to which Polish citizens had been subjected in 1940. Despite the existence of some documents stating that the applicants relatives had been transferred from the NKVD camps at Ostakhkov, Kozelsk and Starobelsk to Kalinin, Smolensk and Kharkov, the joint efforts by Belarusian, Polish, Russian and Ukrainian investigators had not uncovered any criminal files or other documents relating to their prosecution in 1940. In the absence of such files it was not possible to decide whether the Rehabilitation Act would be applicable. Furthermore, the prosecutor stated that the remains of the applicants relatives had not been discovered among the human remains found during the exhumation works.

70.  Counsel lodged a judicial appeal against the prosecutors refusal.

71.  On 24 October 2008 the Khamovnicheskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the appeal. While the court confirmed that the names of the applicants relatives had featured on the NKVD lists of prisoners, it pointed out that only twenty bodies had been identified as a result of the exhumations conducted in the context of case no. 159 and that the applicants relatives had not been among those identified. The court further found that there was no reason to assume that the ten Polish prisoners of war (the applicants relatives) had actually been killed, and that Russian lawyers had no legal interest in the rehabilitation of Polish citizens.

72.  On 25 November 2008 the Moscow City Court rejected, in summary fashion, an appeal against the District Courts judgment.

H.  Statement by the Russian Duma on the Katyn tragedy

73.  On 26 November 2010 the State Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian Parliament, adopted a statement entitled “On the Katyn tragedy and its victims” which read, in particular, as follows:

“Seventy years ago, thousands of Polish citizens held in the prisoner-of-war camps of the NKVD of the USSR and in prisons in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR and Belorussian SSR were shot dead.

The official Soviet propaganda attributed responsibility for this atrocity, which has been given the collective name of the Katyn tragedy, to Nazi criminals ... In the early 1990s our country made great strides towards the establishment of the truth about the Katyn tragedy. It was recognised that the mass extermination of Polish citizens on USSR territory during the Second World War had been an arbitrary act by the totalitarian State ...

The published materials that have been kept for many years in secret archives not only demonstrate the scale of this terrible tragedy but also attest to the fact that the Katyn crime was carried out on the direct orders of Stalin and other Soviet leaders ...

Copies of many documents which had been kept in the closed archives of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have already been handed over to the Polish side. The members of the State Duma believe that this work must be carried on. It is necessary to continue studying the archives, verifying the lists of victims, restoring the good names of those who perished in Katyn and other places, and uncovering the circumstances of the tragedy ...”

II.  RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE

A.  The Hague Convention IV

74.  The Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907 (“the 1907 Hague Convention (IV)”), and in particular its annex, Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, provides as follows:

“Art. 4.  Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or corps who capture them.

They must be humanely treated.

...

Art. 23.  In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden

...

(b)  To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army;

(c)  To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;

...

Art. 50.  No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible.”

B.  Geneva Convention

75.  The Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 27 July 1929 (“the Geneva Convention of 1929”) provided as follows:

“Art. 2.  Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or formation which captured them.

They shall at all times be humanely treated and protected, particularly against acts of violence, from insults and from public curiosity.

Measures of reprisal against them are forbidden.

...

Art. 61.  No prisoner of war shall be sentenced without being given the opportunity to defend himself.

No prisoner shall be compelled to admit that he is guilty of the offence of which he is accused.

...

Art. 63.  A sentence shall only be pronounced on a prisoner of war by the same tribunals and in accordance with the same procedure as in the case of persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining Power.”

C.  Charter of the International Military Tribunal

76.  Article 6 of the Charter (Statute) of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Tribunal) set up in pursuance of the agreement signed on 8 August 1945 by the governments of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and the USSR, contained the following definition of crimes:

...

The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:

(a)  crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;

(b)  war crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;

(c)  crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

...

77.  The definition was subsequently codified as Principle VI in the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, formulated by the International Law Commission in 1950 under United Nations General Assembly Resolution 177 (II) and affirmed by the General Assembly.

D.  Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity

78.  The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (26 November 1968), to which the Russian Federation is a party, provides in particular as follows:

Article I

“No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of the date of their commission:

(a)  War crimes as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the General Assembly of the United Nations ...

(b)  Crimes against humanity whether committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the General Assembly of the United Nations ...”

Article IV

“The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to adopt, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, any legislative or other measures necessary to ensure that statutory or other limitations shall not apply to the prosecution and punishment of the crimes referred to in articles I and II of this Convention and that, where they exist, such limitations shall be abolished.”

E.  Vienna Convention on the law of treaties

79.  The Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (23 May 1969), to which the Russian Federation is a party, provides as follows:

Article 26
Pacta sunt servanda

“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”

Article 27
Internal law and observance of treaties

“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. ...”

Article 28
Non-retroactivity of treaties

“Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.”

F.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

80.  Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the Covenant”), to which the Russian Federation is a party, reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”

81.  The United Nations Human Rights Committees General Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, adopted on 29 March 2004 (2,187th meeting), reads as follows:

“4.  The obligations of the Covenant in general and article 2 in particular are binding on every State Party as a whole. All branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial), and other public or governmental authorities, at whatever level – national, regional or local – are in a position to engage the responsibility of the State Party. The executive branch that usually represents the State Party internationally, including before the Committee, may not point to the fact that an action incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant was carried out by another branch of government as a means of seeking to relieve the State Party from responsibility for the action and consequent incompatibility. This understanding flows directly from the principle contained in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which a State Party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. ...”

82.  At its meeting on 3 April 2003 the Human Rights Committee established under Article 28 of the Covenant expressed the following views after consideration of Communication No. 886/1999, submitted on behalf of Ms Natalia Schedko and Mr Anton Bondarenko against Belarus:

“10.2  The Committee notes that the authors claim that her family was informed of neither the date, nor the hour, nor the place of her sons execution, nor of the exact place of her sons subsequent burial, has remained unchallenged. In the absence of any challenge to this claim by the State party, and any other pertinent information from the State party on the practice of execution of capital sentences, due weight must be given to the authors allegation. The Committee understands the continued anguish and mental stress caused to the author, as the mother of a condemned prisoner, by the persisting uncertainty of the circumstances that led to his execution, as well as the location of his gravesite. The complete secrecy surrounding the date of execution, and the place of burial and the refusal to hand over the body for burial have the effect of intimidating or punishing families by intentionally leaving them in a state of uncertainty and mental distress. The Committee considers that the authorities initial failure to notify the author of the scheduled date for the execution of her son, and their subsequent persistent failure to notify her of the location of her sons grave amounts to inhuman treatment of the author, in violation of article 7 of the Covenant.”

83.  At its meeting on 28 March 2006 the Human Rights Committee expressed the following views after consideration of Communication No. 1159/2003, submitted on behalf of Mariam, Philippe, Auguste and Thomas Sankara against Burkina Faso:

“6.2  The Committee noted the State partys arguments concerning the inadmissibility of the communication ratione temporis. Having also noted the authors arguments, the Committee considered that a distinction should be drawn between the complaint relating to Mr. Thomas Sankara and the complaint concerning Ms. Sankara and her children. The Committee considered that the death of Thomas Sankara, which may have involved violations of several articles of the Covenant, occurred on 15 October 1987, hence before the Covenant and the Optional Protocol entered into force for Burkina Faso. This part of the communication was therefore inadmissible ratione temporis. Thomas Sankaras death certificate of 17 January 1988, stating that he died of natural causes  contrary to the facts, which are public knowledge and confirmed by the State party ...  and the authorities failure to correct the certificate during the period since that time must be considered in the light of their continuing effect on Ms. Sankara and her children.

...

12.2  Concerning the alleged violation of article 7, the Committee understands the anguish and psychological pressure which Ms. Sankara and her sons, the family of a man killed in disputed circumstances, have suffered and continue to suffer because they still do not know the circumstances surrounding the death of Thomas Sankara, or the precise location where his remains were officially buried. Thomas Sankaras family have the right to know the circumstances of his death, and the Committee points out that any complaint relating to acts prohibited under article 7 of the Covenant must be investigated rapidly and impartially by the competent authorities. In addition, the Committee notes, as it did during its deliberations on admissibility, the failure to correct Thomas Sankaras death certificate of 17 January 1988, which records a natural death contrary to the publicly known facts, which have been confirmed by the State party. The Committee considers that the refusal to conduct an investigation into the death of Thomas Sankara, the lack of official recognition of his place of burial and the failure to correct the death certificate constitute inhuman treatment of Ms. Sankara and her sons, in breach of article 7 of the Covenant.

III.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

A.  Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation (Law no. 174-FZ of 18 December 2001)

84.  Article 24 § 1 sets out the following grounds for discontinuation of criminal proceedings:

“(1)  there was no criminal offence;

(2)  the acts did not constitute a criminal offence;

...

(4)  the suspect or the defendant died, except in cases in which the criminal proceedings need to be continued for the rehabilitation of the deceased.

85.  Article 42 defines a “victim” as an individual who has sustained physical, pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage as the result of a crime. The decision to recognise the individual as a “victim” must be made by the examiner, investigator, prosecutor or court.

B.  Rehabilitation Act (Law no. 1761-I of 18 October 1991)

86.  According to the preamble, the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act is the rehabilitation of all victims of political repression who were prosecuted on the territory of the Russian Federation after 7 November 1917, the term “rehabilitation” being understood as the restoration of their civil rights, the removal of any other adverse consequences of the arbitrary actions and the payment of compensation in respect of pecuniary damage.

87.  Section 1 defines “political repression” as various measures of restraint, including deprivation of life or liberty, imposed by the State for political motives, as well as any other restriction on the rights or freedoms of those individuals who were recognised as being socially dangerous to the State or political regime on account of their class or social origin, ethnicity or religion.

88.  Section 2 extended the application of the Rehabilitation Act to all Russian nationals, former USSR nationals, foreign nationals and stateless persons who were subjected to political repression in the territory of the Russian Federation after 7 November 1917.

89.  Section 3 establishes the categories of persons who are eligible for rehabilitation. Point (b) concerns individuals who were subjected to criminal repression on the basis of decisions by the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Vecheka, ВЧК), the Chief Political Directorate (GPU, ГПУ), the Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD, НКВД), the Ministry of State Security (MGB, МГБ), prosecutors and their collegiate bodies, “special commissions”, the troika and other authorities with judicial functions.

C.  Classification and declassification of State secrets in Russia

90.  According to its preamble, the State Secrets Act (Law no. 5485-I of 21 July 1993) governs the procedure for the identification of State secrets, the classification and declassification of information and the protection of information in the interests of the national security of the Russian Federation.

91.  Section 5 contains list of categories of information that constitute a State secret. It includes, in particular, the following:

“(4)  information in the field of intelligence, counterintelligence and operational and search activities, as well as in the field of counter-terrorism:

  concerning resources, means, sources, methods, plans and outcomes of intelligence, counterintelligence and operational and search activities and the financing thereof ...

  concerning persons who cooperated or are cooperating on a confidential basis with the authorities in charge of intelligence, counterintelligence and operational and search activities.”

92.  Section 7 contains a list of information which may not be declared a State secret or classified. It covers, in particular, the following information:

  concerning violations of human rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens ...

  concerning breaches of the law committed by State authorities or officials.”

93.  Section 13 governs the procedure for declassifying the information. It also provides as follows:

“The period, during which the State secrets shall remain classified, may not exceed thirty years. In exceptional cases, the Inter-Agency Commission on the Protection of State Secrets may extend this period.”

94.  On 2 August 1997 the government adopted Regulation no. 973 on preparing State secret information for transfer to foreign States and international organisations. It provides that a decision on transferring such information may be made by the Russian government on the basis of a report prepared by the Inter-Agency Commission on the Protection of State Secrets (§ 3). The recipient party must undertake to protect the classified information by entering into an international treaty establishing, among other matters, the procedure for transferring information, confidentiality clause and dispute resolution procedure (§ 4).

D.  Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Law no. 63-FZ of 13 June 1996)

95.  Chapter 34 contains a list of crimes against the peace and security of humankind. Article 356 prohibits in particular “cruel treatment of prisoners of war or civilians”, an offence punishable by up to twenty years imprisonment.

96.  Article 78 § 5 stipulates that the offences defined in Articles 353 (War), 356 (Prohibited means of warfare), 357 (Genocide) and 358 (Ecocide) are imprescriptible.

THE LAW

I.  WHETHER THE RELATIVES OF THE DECEASED APPLICANTS HAVE STANDING BEFORE THE COURT

97.  Following the death of the applicant Mr Krzysztof Jan Malewicz on 7 July 2011, his son, Mr Piotr Malewicz, informed the Court of his wish to pursue in his stead the grievances he had raised.

98.  The Chamber reiterated that in cases where an applicant had died in the course of the proceedings, the Court had previously taken into account the statements of the applicants heirs or close family members expressing the wish to pursue the proceedings before it (see Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, § 25, ECHR 2003-IX, and Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, § 39, ECHR 1999-VI). The Chamber therefore accepted that Mr Piotr Malewicz could pursue the application in so far as it had been lodged by his late father.

99.  The applicant Ms Halina Michalska died on 28 November 2012. By letter of 30 January 2013, her son, Mr Kazimierz Raczyński, expressed his intention to pursue the proceedings in her stead.

100.  The Grand Chamber is satisfied that both Mr Piotr Malewicz and Mr Kazimierz Raczyński are the next of kin of the deceased applicants. It further notes that the Chambers acceptance of Mr Piotr Malewiczs standing before the Court has not been disputed by any of the parties. The Grand Chamber therefore sees no reason to reach a different conclusion, either in respect of Mr Piotr Malewicz or, by analogy, in respect of Mr Kazimierz Raczyński.

101.  Accordingly, the Court accepts that Mr Piotr Malewicz and Mr Kazimierz Raczyński may pursue the application in so far as it was lodged by the late Mr Krzysztof Jan Malewicz and the late Ms Halina Michalska respectively.

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION

102.  The applicants complained that the Russian authorities had not discharged their obligations under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention, which required them to conduct an adequate and effective investigation into the deaths of their relatives. Article 2 provides as follows:

“1.  Everyones right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

2.  Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a)  in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b)  in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c)  in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”

A.  The Chamber judgment

103.  Recalling that in its admissibility decision of 5 July 2011 the Court had joined the Governments objection as to its temporal competence in respect of the procedural limb of Article 2 to the merits of the case, the Chamber examined at the outset whether that objection was to be upheld or rejected. To that end, it reviewed the applicable case-law of the Court and the principles governing the temporal limits of States procedural obligations as they had been formulated in the Šilih v. Slovenia judgment ([GC], no. 71463/01, §§ 160-63, 9 April 2009) and applied in a series of cases against Romania, Ukraine and Croatia.

104.  On the first test – the existence of a “genuine connection” required under the first sentence of paragraph 163 of the above-cited Šilih judgmentthe Chamber held that the “genuine connection” standard would be satisfied only if the lapse of time between the triggering event and the ratification date remained reasonably short. In addition, it pointed out that a significant proportion of the investigative steps required for ensuring compliance with the procedural obligation under Article 2 must have been carried out after the ratification date. In the Chamberassessment, neither condition had been met in the instant case, in which the time lapse between the deaths (1940) and the ratification date (5 May 1998) was excessively long, too long in absolute terms to satisfy the “genuine connection” standard. Likewise, the Chamber was unable to find any indication in the file or in the parties submissions that any procedural steps had been taken in the post-ratification period that would have been comparable in their significance to those carried out before the ratification date.

105.  The Chamber then went on to examine whether the circumstances of the case were such as to justify the finding that the connection between the triggering event and the ratification date was based on the need to ensure the effective protection of the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention (see paragraph 139 of the Chamber judgment), as indicated in the last sentence of paragraph 163 of the above-cited Šilih judgment. As this was the first case in which the Court had been called upon to give an interpretation of that clause, the Chamber – drawing inspiration from the Brecknell judgment (see Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, no. 32457/04, 27 November 2007) – construed it in the following manner.

139.  ... Far from being fortuitous, the reference of the underlying values of the Convention indicates that, for such connection to be established, the event in question must be of a larger dimension than an ordinary criminal offence and constitute a negation of the very foundations of the Convention, such as, for instance, war crimes or crimes against humanity. Although such crimes are not subject to a statutory limitation by virtue of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity ..., it does not mean that the States have an unceasing duty to investigate them. Nevertheless, the procedural obligation may be revived if information purportedly casting new light on the circumstances of such crimes comes into the public domain after the critical date. It cannot be the case that any assertion or allegation can trigger a fresh investigative obligation under Article 2 of the Convention. Given the fundamental importance of this provision, the State authorities must be sensitive to any information or material which has the potential either to undermine the conclusions of an earlier investigation or to allow an earlier inconclusive investigation to be pursued further ... Should new material come to light in the post-ratification period and should it be sufficiently weighty and compelling to warrant a new round of proceedings, the Court will have temporal jurisdiction to satisfy itself that the respondent State has discharged its procedural obligation under Article 2 in a manner compatible with the principles enunciated in its case-law.” (references omitted)

106.  Applying those requirements to the case at hand, the Chamber found that the mass murder of Polish prisoners by the Soviet secret police had the features of a war crime, but that, in the period after 5 May 1998, no piece of evidence of a character or substance which could revive a procedural obligation of investigation or raise new or wider issues had been produced or uncovered. It concluded accordingly that there were no elements capable of providing a bridge from the distant past into the recent post-ratification period and that the special circumstances justifying a connection between the deaths and ratification had not been shown to exist.

107.  In the light of those considerations, the Chamber found that the Court had no competence ratione temporis to take cognisance of the merits of the complaint under Article 2 of the Convention.

B.  The parties submissions

1.  The Russian Government

108.  The Government submitted that a legal distinction should be drawn between two situations: one in which a violation of the Convention occurred during a period falling outside the Courts temporal jurisdiction, and a second in which a violation of the Convention “did not legally exist at all” because at the material time the Convention had not existed. In their view, this distinction was crucial, as only a “legally existing” violation of Article 2 in its substantive aspect – which might nevertheless have taken place outside the Courts temporal jurisdiction – could trigger the States procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1. In the cases previously examined by the Court, the events that triggered the duty to investigate had occurred after the adoption of the Convention. In the instant case the alleged violation of Article 2 under its substantive limb not only fell outside the Courts temporal jurisdiction but also had not existed de jure, since the Katyn events” had preceded the adoption of the Convention on 4 November 1950 by ten years and its ratification by Russia on 5 May 1998 by fifty-eight years. In the Governments view, this precluded the Court from examining Russias compliance with its procedural obligations. Furthermore, the Government asserted that the Court had no competence ratione materiae to characterise the Katyn massacre as a “war crime” from the standpoint of international humanitarian law.

109.  The Government submitted that no obligation to investigate the “Katyn events” could be said to have arisen, whether as a matter of domestic law or international humanitarian law or under the Convention. At the domestic level, an investigation had been conducted into a criminal offence punishable under Article 193-17 (b) of the 1926 Criminal Code of the RSFSR (abuse of power causing grave consequences, committed under aggravating circumstances) which had a limitation period of ten years. The contemporary Russian Code of Criminal Procedure required that the proceedings be discontinued upon the expiry of the limitation period. In addition, the officers of the NKVD of the USSR had died before the criminal investigation had been opened. As a matter of domestic criminal procedure, their death was a separate legal ground precluding criminal proceedings from being instituted against them or pursued. In international law, the death of suspects or defendants was also a universally recognised ground for refusing to institute or for discontinuing criminal proceedings (here the Government referred to Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana and KondewaThe Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber decision of 21 May 2007, Case no. SCSL-04-14-T-776, and Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Case no. IT-02-54-T, Order Terminating the Proceedings, 14 March 2006). For the Government, it was clear that the investigation of criminal case no. 159 had been carried on “in breach of the criminal procedure requirements, for political reasons, as a goodwill gesture to the Polish authorities”.

110.  From the standpoint of international humanitarian law the Government considered that, at least until 1945, there had existed no universally binding provision of international law on the definition of war crimes or crimes against humanity or on the attribution of responsibility and the prosecution of such crimes. Since the International Military Tribunal was an ad hoc tribunal, the provisions of its Charter, including the definitions of crimes contained therein, were limited to the proceedings before it against the major war criminals belonging to the European Axis powers. The Government concluded that international law, as it existed in 1940, did not provide a sufficient basis for characterising the Katyn events” as a war crime, a crime against humanity or genocide unless they were attributable to the major war criminals of the European Axis and fell within the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Nevertheless, at the request of the Polish authorities, the Russian investigators had examined the “version of genocide” and determined that no such crime had been committed because the suspects had had purely criminal motives rather than an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group (according to the definition in Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948).

111.  As to the procedural obligation to investigate under the Convention, the Government reiterated firstly that the investigation in criminal case no. 159 had been conducted for political reasons, as a goodwill gesture, and could not therefore be assessed from the standpoint of the procedural requirements of Article 2. Secondly, in the opinion of the Government, only those events that took place after the adoption of the Convention could trigger any procedural obligationThirdly, the Russian authorities could not reasonably be expected to carry out an effective investigation some fiftyeight years after the events when the witnesses had already died and the crucial documents had been destroyed. In the alternative, the Government pleaded that “the Convention impose[d] no specific obligation ... to provide redress for wrongs or damage caused prior to ... ratification” (here they referred to Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 38, ECHR 2004IX). In other words, when the Court was prevented ratione temporis from examining the circumstances of death, it could not establish whether or not it gave rise to a procedural obligation under Article 2 (here they referred to Kholodovy v. Russia (dec.), no. 30651/05, 14 September 2006, and Moldovan and Others and Rostaş and Others v. Romania (dec.), nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01, 13 March 2001).

112.  As to the detachability of the procedural obligation, the Russian Government pointed out that not every death would trigger the procedural obligation and that the Court had to examine at the outset whether the circumstances of the death were such as to bring the obligation into play. However, where the death had occurred before the ratification date, the Court would have no temporal jurisdiction to perform such an analysis. Furthermore, the detachability principle had to be subject to certain limitations if an unforeseeable extension of the Courts jurisdiction and the Conventions outreach were to be avoided. Firstly, the lapse of time had to be reasonably short, which it was not in the present case. Secondly, a significant portion of the investigative steps had to have been carried out after the ratification date. This criterion was likewise not fulfilled in the instant case. Finally, where the need to ensure the real and effective protection of the underlying values of the Convention was concerned, the Government agreed that the event in question had to be of a larger dimension than an ordinary criminal offence. However, as far as the “Katyn events” were concerned, the Court had no jurisdiction, either ratione temporis or ratione materiae, to assess them from the standpoint of international humanitarian law.

113.  The Government emphasised that all the most significant procedural steps in the Katyn investigation had been carried out in the period between 1990 and 1995 and that no relevant “new material” had emerged after 5 May 1998. Contrary to the Polish Governments allegation, the decision on the classification of certain materials could not be seen as “new material” capable of (re-)triggering the procedural obligation under Article 2. Neither could the alleged discovery of the Ukrainian list in 2002, which amounted only to a request for clarification by the Ukrainian authorities.

2.  The applicants

114.  The applicants acknowledged that the Katyn massacre committed in 1940 was an act falling outside the temporal reach of the Convention, and that the Court had no competence ratione temporis to deal with the substantive aspect of Article 2. Nevertheless, in their view, the Court should have temporal jurisdiction to examine whether Russia had observed its procedural obligation under Article 2, which was a separate and autonomous duty capable of binding the State even when the deaths in question had occurred before the ratification date.

115.  The applicants considered that the genuine connection necessary to establish the Courts temporal competence should be based first of all on the “need to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention [were] protected in a real and effective manner” (the applicants referred to Šilih, cited above, § 163 in fine). The expression “the underlying values of the Convention” had previously been invoked by the Court in finding that particular instances of hate speech, such as speech denying the Holocaust or justifying war crimes, were incompatible with the values of the Convention (here they referred to Garaudy v. France (dec.), no. 65831/01, ECHR 2003-IX; Witzsch v. Germany (dec.), no. 7485/03, 13 December 2005; and Orban and Others v. France, no. 20985/05, § 35, 15 January 2009). Since speech denying the reality of crimes under international law was deemed to contravene the underlying values of the Convention, the same rationale should apply a fortiori to the acts themselves, which undermined the very meaning of justice and peace, the fundamental values of the Convention as expressed in its Preamble. In the applicants submission, the mention of the underlying values in paragraph 163 of the Šilih judgment indicated that there existed some instances of acts violating the very foundation of the Convention system whose nature, magnitude and gravity should give the Court jurisdiction ratione temporis to examine the States obligation to conduct an effective investigation.

116.  The applicants maintained that the Katyn massacre was a crime under international law. The Polish soldiers captured by the Red Army had been entitled to the full protection guaranteed to prisoners of war, including the protection against acts of violence and cruelty afforded by the provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) and the Geneva Convention of 1929. The murder of Polish prisoners of war in 1940 had been an unlawful act which violated Articles 4, 23 (c) and 50 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) and Articles 2, 46, 61 and 63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929. Even though the USSR had not been a party to either Convention, it had a duty to respect the universally binding principles of international customary law, which had merely been codified in those Conventions. That such an obligation was recognised as legally binding by the USSR was clearly evidenced by the fact that, at the Nuremberg trial, the Soviet prosecutor had attempted to charge the Nazi leaders with the murder of Polish prisoners of war. The extermination of Polish prisoners of war was a war crime within the meaning of Article 6 (b) of the Nuremberg Charter and the shooting of civilians amounted to a crime against humanity as defined in Article 6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter. The Nuremberg Tribunals classification of the Katyn massacre as a war crime had to be viewed in objective terms and was not dependent upon who had actually committed the atrocity. Moreover, the execution of prisoners of war constituted and was treated as a war crime by the international community, a fact convincingly demonstrated by the abundant case-law from the postwar trials of war criminals. As a crime under international law, the Katyn massacre had been imprescriptible at the time of its commission, as it was today, and the concomitant duty to investigate it survived to this day.

117.  The applicants further referred to two factors which corroborated the argument regarding the Courts competence to adjudicate on Russias compliance with the procedural obligation under Article 2. Firstly, the Council of Europe and the Convention had come into being as democratic political and legal alternatives to the violations of human dignity committed on a massive scale by two totalitarian regimes, namely Nazism and Stalinism. The Katyn massacre had been carried out by a totalitarian regime whose aims and values radically contradicted those of the Convention. If the Convention was to be protected in a real and effective manner, the current Contracting Parties had to conduct effective investigations into totalitarian crimes. Secondly, an effective investigation into the Katyn massacre was a prerequisite for the “rehabilitation” of the murdered persons as victims of political repression and to increase public awareness of totalitarian crimes.

118.  The applicants further considered that, even under the new material test” which had been developed and applied in the Chamber judgment, the Court could be competent to examine Russias compliance with the procedural obligation under Article 2, assuming that the required new element was not limited to important new evidence becoming known in the post-ratification period but also included new and sufficiently important procedural facts. This test should also encompass cases where the domestic authorities had failed to collect new evidence or where they had adopted conclusions that starkly contradicted previous findings or historical facts. Although decision to close the investigation was not as such new material for the investigation, it could constitute a new procedural development of relevance in the context of Article 2 of the Convention, especially since it marked a sudden change in the investigation. Moreover, when a significant portion of the investigation file became classified and the same status was given to the final decision in the investigation, there existed good reasons to presume that the sudden and radical change in the investigation must have resulted from relevant new findings.

119.  Turning to the merits of the Article 2 complaint, the applicants submitted that the Russian investigation had not met the basic requirements of that provision. The Russian authorities had not accounted for the difference between the number of persons killed (21,857) and the much lower number of those referred to as “perished” (1,803). They had not conducted full-scale excavations at all the burial sites. The applicants had been refused the status of injured parties in the proceedings and the investigation had lacked transparency on that account. Lastly, the investigation had not been geared towards identifying the perpetrators and bringing them to justice. The applicants cited the names of two high-ranking Soviet functionaries who had been implicated in the Katyn massacre and who were still alive in the 1990s.

3.  The Polish Government

120.  The Polish Government submitted that the interpretation of the “special-circumstances clause” in the last sentence of paragraph 163 of the Šilih judgment should take into account the special nature of the acts committed, which were war crimes under international law. In addition, the Court should have regard to the following factors: (a) the investigation into the Katyn massacre had been impossible for political reasons before 1990; (b) the investigation had been pursued for six years after Russias ratification of the Convention; (c) there was a substantial number of individuals with a legitimate interest in finding out the circumstances of the massacre; and (d) there were still ample opportunities to carry on the investigation.

121.  The Polish Government further submitted that between 1998 and 2004 the Russian prosecuting authorities, in the framework of the Katyn investigation, had carried out a number of procedural acts which had produced new pieces of evidence that could arguably “revive” the procedural obligation under Article 2. Those included: (a) exchanges of correspondence in 2002 between Russian and Ukrainian prosecutors on the subject of the Katyn crime; (bthe sending of more than 3,000 requests for information to the Russian personal data centres concerning the fate of Polish citizens whose names featured on the “Ukrainian Katyn list”; (c) Polish-Russian bilateral consultations; (dthe lodging of more than ninety requests from the relatives of the Katyn victims; (ethe commissioning of two expert opinions on the legal characterisation of the Katyn massacre; and (f) the decision on the classification of the case-file materials.

122.  Turning to the merits of the Article 2 complaint, the Polish Government contended that the Katyn investigation had been ineffective. On the one hand the Russian prosecutors had confirmed the execution of the applicants relatives in 1940, but on the other hand the Russian military courts had declared them to be missing persons. The Russian authorities had not taken evidence from the applicants or made any efforts to carry out forensic examinations or to uncover documents. They had made an incorrect assessment of the evidence that the Polish side had handed over to them and had wrongly characterised the Katyn massacre as an abuse of power. The applicants had been denied the right to participate in the investigation and had not been granted the procedural status of injured parties. Finally, by classifying a significant part of the case file, the Russian authorities had failed to strike a fair balance between the public interest in uncovering the crimes of the totalitarian past and the private interest of the applicants in establishing the circumstances of their relatives death.

4.  Third parties

(a)  Open Society Justice Initiative

123.  Open Society Justice Initiative submitted that States had an obligation, under the Convention and customary international law, to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity for as long as it was practically feasible. This obligation was implicit in the prohibition on applying statutory limitations to such crimes and it was not subject to any temporal qualification. Admittedly, the conduct of effective investigations became more challenging with the passing of time; however, the existing practice of national and international courts to assert jurisdiction over past violations indicated that successful prosecutions were possible even many decades after the underlying facts. The third party referred to the Courts judgments in Brecknell, cited above, and Varnava and Others v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 16064/9016065/9016066/9016068/9016069/9016070/9016071/9016072/90 and 16073/90, ECHR 2009) and to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) in the cases of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama ((preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs), judgment of 12 August 2008, Series C No. 186), and Gomes Lund et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguaira”) v. Brazil ((preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs), judgment of 24 November 2010, Series C No. 219). The third party asserted that an effective investigation into Second World War crimes was still possible after 1998. They cited examples of investigations into Nazi-era crimes undertaken in Germany, Hungary, Italy and Poland, some of which had resulted in successful prosecutions despite the age of the defendants. Furthermore, in 2012 a British court had allowed a civil action for damages to proceed against the British government in connection with alleged acts of torture during the Kenyan uprising which took place between 1952 and 1961.

124.  The third party also submitted that the right to truth, seen in its individual dimension, presupposed access to the results of investigations, as well as to archived and open investigative files. Such disclosure was essential to prevent violations, fight immunity and maintain public faith in the rule of law (here they referred to Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 30054/96, § 118, 4 May 2001). Where the right to truth was concerned, classification of information relating to human rights violations was permissible only in exceptional circumstances upon demonstration of a compelling State interest, pursuant to an independent judicial review and for a limited time-period, provided that less restrictive alternatives were not available. The third party produced the findings of a study into right-to-information laws in ninety-three States, from which it appeared that fortyfour of them explicitly required information to be released where the public interest in disclosure outweighed any interest in secrecy. The objective reconstruction of the truth about past abuses was essential to enable nations to learn from their history and take measures to prevent future atrocities (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Updated Set of Principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005, Principles 2 and 3).

(b)  Amnesty International

125.  Amnesty International submitted that the obligation to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity extended to such crimes committed prior to the drafting and entry into force of the Convention. The murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war and civilians had been prohibited under customary international law in 1939, and States had had an obligation to investigate and prosecute war crimes well before 1939, with no statutory limitation (here they referred to Kononov v. Latvia [GC], no. 36376/04, §§ 186 and 232, ECHR 2010, and to the judgments of the IACtHR in Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (merits), judgment of 29 July 1988, § 174, Series C No. 4, and Gomes Lund et al., cited above, § 108). The third party emphasised that the IACtHR had repeatedly found violations of the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish acts that took place before the ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights by the respondent State (here they cited the Gomes Lund et al. judgment (cited above), and also Almonacid Arellano v. Chile ((preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs), judgment of 26 September 2006, § 151, Series C No. 154). They pointed out that the passage of time did not alter the States obligation to conduct an investigation or to provide suitable, effective remedies to victims. The right of victims to effective access to justice included the right to be heard and the right to full reparation, which comprised the following elements: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition (reference was made to the IACtHRs findings in Gomes Lund et al., §§ 261-62, 277 and 297). Finally, the third party submitted, again by reference to the Gomes Lund et al. judgment (§§ 241-42), that the failure to conduct an effective investigation adversely impacted the right of family members to be treated humanely.

(c)  Memorial (Moscow), the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (London) and Transitional Justice Network (Essex)

126.  The three organisations submitted that the United Nations General Assembly, the Inter-American Human Rights System and international treaty law contained an obligation to investigate and prosecute war crimes, with the objective of providing an accurate and transparent account of violations to victims, their families, the wider society and the international community. The right of families to know the fate of their missing or dead relatives was a free-standing component of the duty to investigate which was a codified norm of customary international law (here they referred in particular to Rule 117 in Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2005, and to the case-law of the IACtHR). They further provided a description of various State practices involving the establishment of truth commissions or similar investigative bodies in response to the commission of international crimes, including detailed information on the mandates and functions of those commissions.

C.  The Courts assessment

127.  The Government raised a preliminary objection relating to the Courts competence ratione temporis to deal with the merits of the applicants complaint under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court has to examine at the outset whether this objection should be upheld.

1.  General principles

128.  The Court reiterates that the provisions of the Convention do not bind a Contracting Party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the Convention with respect to that Party (“the critical date”). This is an established principle in the Courts case-law based on the general rule of international law embodied in Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 (see Varnava and Others, cited above, § 130; Šilih, cited above, § 140; and Blečić v. Croatia [GC], no. 59532/00, § 70, ECHR 2006III).

129.  Where an act, omission or decision alleged to have violated the Convention occurred prior to its entry into force but the proceedings to obtain redress for that act were instituted or continued after its entry into force, these proceedings cannot be regarded as part of the facts which constitute the alleged violation and do not bring the case within the Courts temporal jurisdiction (see Varnava and Others, § 130, and Blečić, §§ 77-79, both cited above).

130.  While it is true that from the critical date onwards all of the States acts and omissions must conform to the Convention, the Convention imposes no specific obligation on the Contracting States to provide redress for wrongs or damage caused prior to that date (see Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 38, ECHR 2004IX). Thus, in order to establish the Courts temporal jurisdiction it is essential to identify, in each specific case, the exact time of the alleged interference. In doing so, the Court must take into account both the facts of which the applicant complains and the scope of the Convention right alleged to have been violated (see Varnava and Others, § 131, and Blečić, §§ 72 and 81-82both cited above).

131.  The Court has dealt with a number of cases where the facts concerning the substantive aspect of Article 2 or 3 fell outside the Courttemporal competence, while the facts concerning the related procedural aspect, that is the subsequent proceedings, fell at least partly within the Courts competence (for a summary of the case-law, see Šilihcited above, §§ 148-52).

132.  The Court concluded that the procedural obligation to carry out an effective investigation under Article 2 had evolved into a separate and autonomous duty. Although it is triggered by the facts concerning the substantive aspect of Article 2, it can be considered to be a detachable obligation arising out of Article 2 capable of binding the State even when the death took place before the critical date (see Varnava and Others, § 138, and Šilih, § 159, both cited above).

133.  However, having regard to the principle of legal certainty, the Courts temporal jurisdiction as regards compliance with the procedural obligation of Article 2 in respect of deaths that occurred before the critical date is not open-ended (see Šilih, § 161, cited above). In Šilih, the Court defined the limits of its temporal jurisdiction in the following manner:

“162.  Firstly, it is clear that, where the death occurred before the critical date, only procedural acts and/or omissions occurring after that date can fall within the Courts temporal jurisdiction.

163.  Secondly, there must exist a genuine connection between the death and the entry into force of the Convention in respect of the respondent State for the procedural obligations imposed by Article 2 to come into effect.

Thus a significant proportion of the procedural steps required by this provision – which include not only an effective investigation into the death of the person concerned but also the institution of appropriate proceedings for the purpose of determining the cause of the death and holding those responsible to account – will have been or ought to have been carried out after the critical date.

However, the Court would not exclude that in certain circumstances the connection could also be based on the need to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are protected in a real and effective manner.”

134.  In the above-cited Varnava judgment, the Court clarified the important distinction to be drawn between the obligation to investigate a suspicious death and the obligation to investigate a suspicious disappearance:

“148.  ... A disappearance is a distinct phenomenon, characterised by an ongoing situation of uncertainty and unaccountability in which there is a lack of information or even a deliberate concealment and obfuscation of what has occurred ... This situation is very often drawn out over time, prolonging the torment of the victims relatives. It cannot therefore be said that a disappearance is, simply, an instantaneous act or event; the additional distinctive element of subsequent failure to account for the whereabouts and fate of the missing person gives rise to a continuing situation. Thus, the procedural obligation will, potentially, persist as long as the fate of the person is unaccounted for; the ongoing failure to provide the requisite investigation will be regarded as a continuing violation ... This is so, even where death may, eventually, be presumed.”

135.  The Court further emphasised that the requirement of proximity of the death and investigative steps to the date of entry into force of the Convention in respect of the respondent State – as stated in Šilih (cited above) – applied only in the context of killings or suspicious deaths, where the anchoring factual element, the loss of life of the victim, was known for a certainty, even if the exact cause or ultimate responsibility was not. In such cases, the procedural obligation was not of a continuing nature (see Varnava and Otherscited above, § 149).

2.  Recent case-law

136.  Following the above-cited Šilih judgment, the principles governing the Courts temporal jurisdiction with regard to the “detachable” obligation to investigate the death of an individual, flowing from Article 2 of the Convention, were applied in a large number of cases.

137.  The single largest group of such cases constituted the complaints lodged against Romania in connection with the allegedly ineffective investigation into the deaths of protesters during the Romanian revolution in December 1989, in which the Court found that it had jurisdiction on account of the fact that on the date of entry into force of the Convention in respect of Romania the proceedings were still pending before the prosecutors office (see Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania, nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, 24 May 2011; Pastor and Ţiclete v. Romania, nos. 30911/06 and 40967/06, 19 April 2011; Lăpuşan and Others v. Romania, nos. 29007/0630552/0631323/0631920/0634485/0638960/0638996/0639027/06 and 39067/06, 8 March 2011; Şandru and Others v. Romania, no. 22465/03, 8 December 2009; and Agache and Others v. Romania, no. 2712/02, 20 October 2009). Similar findings were made in two subsequent cases which concerned violent incidents that took place in June 1990 (see Mocanu and Others v. Romania, nos. 10865/0945886/07 and 32431/08, 13 November 2012) and in September 1991 (see Crăiniceanu and Frumuşanu v. Romania, no. 12442/04, 24 April 2012).

138.  With the exception of the case of Tuna v. Turkey (no. 22339/03§§ 57-63, 19 January 2010), which originated in a death in police custody occurring approximately seven years before the recognition by Turkey of the right of individual petitionin other recent cases the death in question was not alleged to have been the consequence of any actions by State agents and preceded the date of entry into force by one to four years, with a significant portion of the proceedings having been conducted after that date (see Kudra v. Croatia, no. 13904/07, §§ 110-12, 18 December 2012 – four years, accidental death because of negligence by a private companyIgor Shevchenko v. Ukraine, no. 22737/04, §§ 45-48, 12 January 2012  three years, traffic accident; Bajić v. Croatia, no. 41108/10, § 62, 13 November 2012  four years, medical negligenceDimovi v. Bulgaria, no. 52744/07, §§ 36-45, 6 November 2012  three years, death by fireVelcea and Mazăre v. Romania, no. 64301/01, §§ 85-88, 1 December 2009  one year, family disputeTrufin v. Romania, no. 3990/04, §§ 32-34, 20 October 2009  two years, murder; and Lyubov Efimenko v. Ukraine, no. 75726/01, § 65, 25 November 2010  four years, robbery and murder). In two cases the fact that the applicants relatives had lost their lives at the hands of insurgents or paramilitary formations seven and six years respectively before the critical date did not prevent the Court from taking cognisance of the merits of the complaint under the procedural limb of Article 2 (see Paçacı and Others v. Turkey, no. 3064/07, §§ 64-66, 8 November 2011, and Jularić v. Croatia, no. 20106/06, §§ 38 and 45-46, 20 January 2011). Nor was the thirteen-year period separating the death of the applicants son in a brawl and the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Serbia seen as outweighing the importance of the procedural acts that were accomplished after the critical date (see Mladenović v. Serbia, no. 1099/08, §§ 38-40, 22 May 2012).

139.  The Court also examined a number of cases in which the applicant had allegedly been subjected to treatment of the kind prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention at some point in time before the critical date. The Court found that it had jurisdiction to examine the respondent States compliance – in the post entry into force period – with the procedural limb of Article 3 which required it to conduct an effective investigation into police brutality (see Yatsenko v. Ukraine, no. 75345/01, § 40, 16 February 2012, and Stanimirović v. Serbia, no. 26088/06, §§ 28-29, 18 October 2011), rape (see P.M. v. Bulgaria, no. 49669/07, § 58, 24 January 2012) and illtreatment inflicted by a private individual (see Otašević v. Serbia, no. 32198/07, 5 February 2013).

3.  Clarification of the Šilih criteria

140.  Notwithstanding a constantly growing number of judgments in which the Court has determined its competence ratione temporis by reference to the criteria adopted in Šilih (cited above)their application in practice has sometimes given rise to uncertainty, which is why further clarification is desirable.

141.  The criteria laid down in paragraphs 162 and 163 of the Šilih judgment (cited above) can be summarised in the following manner. Firstly, where the death occurred before the critical date, the Courts temporal jurisdiction will extend only to the procedural acts or omissions in the period subsequent to that date. Secondly, the procedural obligation will come into effect only if there was a genuine connection between the death as the triggering event and the entry into force of the Convention. Thirdly, a connection which is not “genuine” may nonetheless be sufficient to establish the Courts jurisdiction if it is needed to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are protected in a real and effective way. The Court will examine each of these elements in turn.

(a)  Procedural acts and omissions in the post entry into force period

142.  The Court reiterates at the outset that the procedural obligation to investigate under Article 2 is not a procedure of redress in respect of an alleged violation of the right to life that may have occurred before the critical date. The alleged violation of the procedural obligation consists in the lack of an effective investigation; the procedural obligation has its own distinct scope of application and operates independently from the substantive limb of Article 2 (see Varnava and Others, § 136, and Šilih, § 159, both cited above). Accordingly, the Courts temporal jurisdiction extends to those procedural acts and omissions which took place or ought to have taken place in the period after the entry into force of the Convention in respect of the respondent Government.

143.  The Court further considers that the reference to “procedural acts” must be understood in the sense inherent in the procedural obligation under Article 2 or, as the case may be, Article 3 of the Convention, namely acts undertaken in the framework of criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings which are capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible or to an award of compensation to the injured party (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 131, ECHR 2000IV, and McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, § 161, Series A no. 324). This definition operates to the exclusion of other types of inquiries that may be carried out for other purposes, such as establishing a historical truth.

144.  The mention of “omissions” refers to situation where no investigation or only insignificant procedural steps have been carried out but where it is alleged that an effective investigation ought to have taken place. Such an obligation on the part of the authorities to take investigative measures may be triggered when a plausible, credible allegation, piece of evidence or item of information comes to light which is relevant to the identification and eventual prosecution or punishment of those responsible (see Gutiérrez Dorado and Dorado Ortiz v. Spain (dec.), no. 30141/09, §§ 39-41, 27 March 2012; Çakir v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 7864/06, 29 April 2010; and Brecknell cited above, §§ 6672). Should new material emerge in the post entry into force period and should it be sufficiently weighty and compelling to warrant a new round of proceedings, the Court will have to satisfy itself that the respondent State has discharged its procedural obligation under Article 2 in a manner compatible with the principles enunciated in its caselaw. However, if the triggering event lies outside the Courts jurisdiction ratione temporisthe discovery of new material after the critical date may give rise to a fresh obligation to investigate only if either the “genuine connection” test or the “Convention values” test, discussed below, has been met.

(b)  The genuine connection” test

145.  The first sentence of paragraph 163 of the above-cited Šilih judgment posits that the existence of a “genuine connection” between the triggering event and the entry into force of the Convention in respect of the respondent State is a condition sine qua non for the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to come into effect.

146.  The Court considers that the time factor is the first and most crucial indicator of the “genuine” nature of the connection. It notes, as it previously did in the Chamber judgment, that the lapse of time between the triggering event and the critical date must remain reasonably short if it is to comply with the “genuine connection” standard. Although there are no apparent legal criteria by which the absolute limit on the duration of that period may be defined, it should not exceed ten years (see, by analogy, Varnava and Others, cited above, § 166, and Er and Others v. Turkey, no. 23016/04, §§ 59-60, 31 July 2012). Even if, in exceptional circumstances, it may be justified to extend the time-limit further into the past, it should be done on condition that the requirements of the “Convention values” test have been met.

147.  The duration of the time period between the triggering event and the critical date is however not decisive, in itself, for determining whether the connection was a genuine one. As the second sentence of paragraph 163 of the Šilih judgment indicates, the connection will be established if much of the investigation into the death took place or ought to have taken place in the period following the entry into force of the Convention. This includes the conduct of proceedings for determining the cause of the death and holding those responsible to account, as well as the undertaking of a significant proportion of the procedural steps that were decisive for the course of the investigation. This is a corollary of the principle that the Courts jurisdiction extends only to the procedural acts and omissions occurring after the entry into forceIf, however, a major part of the proceedings or the most important procedural steps took place before the entry into forcethis may irretrievably undermine the Courtability to make a global assessment of the effectiveness of the investigation from the standpoint of the procedural requirements of Article 2 of the Convention.

148.  Having regard to the above, the Court finds that, for a “genuine connection” to be established, both criteria must be satisfied: the period of time between the death as the triggering event and the entry into force of the Convention must have been reasonably short, and a major part of the investigation must have been carried outor ought to have been carried out, after the entry into force.

(c)  The “Convention values” test

149.  The Court further accepts that there may be extraordinary situations which do not satisfy the “genuine connection” standard as outlined above, but where the need to ensure the real and effective protection of the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention would constitute a sufficient basis for recognising the existence of a connection. The last sentence of paragraph 163 of the Šilih judgment does not exclude such an eventuality, which would operate as an exception to the general rule of the “genuine connection” test. In all the cases outlined above the Court accepted the existence of a “genuine connection” as the lapse of time between the death and the critical date was reasonably short and a considerable part of the proceedings had taken place after the critical date. Against this background, the present case is the first one which may arguably fall into this other, exceptional, category. Accordingly, the Court must clarify the criteria for the application of the “Convention values” test.

150.  Like the Chamber, the Grand Chamber considers the reference to the underlying values of the Convention to mean that the required connection may be found to exist if the triggering event was of a larger dimension than an ordinary criminal offence and amounted to the negation of the very foundations of the Convention. This would be the case with serious crimes under international law, such as war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity, in accordance with the definitions given to them in the relevant international instruments.

151.  The heinous nature and gravity of such crimes prompted the Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity to agree that they must be imprescriptible and not subject to any statutory limitation in the domestic legal orderThe Court nonetheless considers that the “Convention values” clause cannot be applied to events which occurred prior to the adoption of the Convention, on 4 November 1950, for it was only then that the Convention began its existence as an international human rights treaty. Hence, a Contracting Party cannot be held responsible under the Convention for not investigating even the most serious crimes under international law if they predate the Convention. Although the Court is sensitive to the argument that even today some countries have successfully tried those responsible for war crimes committed during the Second World War, it emphasises the fundamental difference between having the possibility of prosecuting an individual for a serious crime under international law where circumstances allow it, and being obliged to do so by the Convention.

4.  Application of the above principles to the present case

152.  Turning to the undisputed facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicants relatives were servicemen in the Polish army who had been taken prisoner in the wake of the Soviet invasion of the territory of eastern Poland in September 1939. During the following months they were detained in the NKVD camps in the western part of the USSR, in Kozelsk, Ostashkov and Starobelsk.

153.  On 5 March 1940, acting on the proposal of the Head of the NKVD, the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR approved the extrajudicial execution of Polish prisoners of war, which was to be carried out by NKVD officers. The prisoners were killed and buried in mass graves on various dates in April and May 1940. The lists of prisoners to be executed were drawn up on the basis of the NKVD “dispatch lists”, on which the names of the applicants family members were mentioned among others.

154.  Three of the applicants family members were identified during the exhumation in 1943; the remains of the others have not been recovered or identified. The Court reiterates that it has on many occasions made findings of fact to the effect that a missing person can be presumed dead. Generally, this finding of fact has been reached in response to claims made by the respondent Government that the person is still alive or has not been shown to have died at the hands of State agents. This presumption of death is not automatic and is only reached on examination of the circumstances of the case, in which the lapse of time since the person was seen alive or heard from is a relevant element (see Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia, nos. 2944/068300/0750184/07332/08 and 42509/10, § 100, 18 December 2012; Varnava and Others, cited above, § 143; and Vagapova and Zubirayev v. Russia, no. 21080/05§§ 85-86, 26 February 2009). The Court has applied a presumption of death in the absence of any reliable news about the disappeared persons for periods ranging from four and a half years (see Imakayeva v. Russia, no. 7615/02, § 155, 9 November 2006) to over ten years (see Aslakhanova and Others, cited above, §§ 103-15).

155.  It is undisputed – and the NKVDs “dispatch lists” furnish documentary evidence to that effect – that in late 1939 and early 1940 the applicants family members were in custody in Soviet territory and under the full and exclusive control of the Soviet authorities. The Politburos decision of 5 March 1940 stipulated that all Polish prisoners of war being held in the NKVD camps, without exception, were liable to extrajudicial execution, which was carried out by the Soviet secret police in the following monthsMass burials of prisoners wearing Polish uniforms were uncovered in the Katyn Forest as early as 1943, following the German takeover of the territory. A note written in 1959 by the Head of the KGB, a successor to the NKVD, acknowledged that a total of more than twenty-one thousand Polish prisoners had been shot by NKVD officials. The families stopped receiving correspondence from the prisoners in 1940 and have not received any news from them ever since, that is, for more than seventy years.

156.  Having regard to these factual elements, the Court concludes that the applicants family members who were taken prisoner in 1939 must be presumed to have been executed by the Soviet authorities in 1940.

157.  The Russian Federation ratified the Convention on 5 May 1998, that is, fifty-eight years after the execution of the applicants relatives. The Grand Chamber endorses the Chambers finding that the period of time between the death and the critical date is not only many times longer than those which triggered the coming into effect of the procedural obligation under Article 2 in all previous cases, but also too long in absolute terms for genuine connection to be established between the death of the applicants relatives and the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Russia.

158.  The investigation into the origin of the mass burials started in 1990 and was formally terminated in September 2004. Even though the Russian Government argued that the initial decision to institute the proceedings had been unlawful, those proceedings were, at least in theory, capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. Accordingly, they fell within the scope of “procedural acts and omissions” for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention.

159.  In the early 1990s a significant number of procedural steps were undertaken by the Soviet and subsequently the Russian authorities. Corpses were excavated at the mass burial sites in Kharkov, Mednoye and Katyn in 1991 and the investigators commissioned forensic studies and arranged interviews with potential witnesses to the killings. Official visits and coordination meetings were held between the Russian, Polish, Ukrainian and Belarusian authorities. However, all these steps took place before the critical date. As regards the post entry into force period, it is impossible, on the basis of the information available in the case file and in the parties submissions, to identify any real investigative steps after 5 May 1998. The Court is unable to accept that a re-evaluation of the evidence, a departure from previous findings or a decision regarding the classification of the investigation materials could be said to have amounted to the “significant proportion of the procedural steps” which is required for establishing a “genuine connection” for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention. Nor has any relevant piece of evidence or substantive item of information come to light in the period since the critical date. That being so, the Court concludes that neither criterion for establishing the existence of a “genuine connection” has been fulfilled.

160.  Finally, it remains to be determined whether there were exceptional circumstances in the instant case which could justify derogating from the “genuine connection” requirement by applying the Convention values standard. As the Court has established, the events that might have triggered the obligation to investigate under Article 2 took place in early 1940, that is, more than ten years before the Convention came into existence. The Court therefore upholds the Chambers finding that there were no elements capable of providing a bridge from the distant past into the recent post entry into force period.

161.  Having regard to the above considerations, the Court upholds the Governments objection ratione temporis and finds that it has no competence to examine the complaint under Article 2 of the Convention.

III.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

162.  The applicants complained that the prolonged denial of historical fact and the withholding of information about the fate of their relatives, together with the dismissive and contradictory replies by the Russian authorities to their requests for information, amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which provides as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

A.  The Chamber judgment

163.  The Chamber distinguished between two groups of applicants on the basis of the proximity of the family ties that linked them to the victims of the Katyn massacre. It accepted that there existed “a strong family bond” in the case of the widow and the nine children who had been born before 1940, and that that group could claim to be victims of the alleged violation of Article 3. On the other hand, the mental anguish of the other five applicants, who had been born in 1940 or later or were more distant relatives of the Katyn victims, was not such as to fall within the ambit of Article 3 of the Convention.

164.  The Chamber went on to examine the situation of the first group of applicants over different periods of time. During the Second World War they had “remained in a state of uncertainty as to the fate” of their loved ones; after the war they “could still nurture hope that at least some of the Polish prisoners could have survived, either in more remote Soviet camps or by escaping and going into hiding”. Throughout the lifetime of USSRcontrolled socialist Poland, the applicants “were not allowed, for political reasons, to learn the truth about what had happened and forced to accept the distortion of historical fact by the Soviet and Polish communist authorities”. Even after the public acknowledgement of the Katyn massacre by the Soviet and Russian authorities, the applicants must have “suffered frustration on account of an apparent lack of progress in the investigation”.

165.  In the post entry into force period the applicants were denied access to the materials of the investigation or excluded from the proceedings on account of their foreign nationality. The Chamber was particularly struck “by the apparent reluctance of the Russian authorities to recognise the reality of the Katyn massacre”. While acknowledging that the applicants relatives had been detained as prisoners in the NKVD camps, the Russian military courts consistently avoided any mention of their subsequent execution, citing a lack of evidence to that effect from the Katyn investigation. The Chamber qualified that approach as “a callous disregard for the applicants concerns and deliberate obfuscation of the circumstances of the Katyn massacre”. As regards the rehabilitation proceedings, the Chamber considered that “a denial of the reality of the mass murder reinforced by the implied proposition that Polish prisoners may have had a criminal charge to answer and had been duly sentenced to capital punishment demonstrated [an] attitude vis-à-vis the applicants that was not just opprobrious but also lacking in humanity”.

166.  The Chamber acknowledged that the amount of time that had passed since the applicants had been parted from their relatives was significantly longer in the present case than it was in others, and that the applicants no longer suffered the agony of not knowing whether their family members were dead or alive. Nonetheless, referring to the jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee on the analogous Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Chamber found that the authorities obligation under Article 3 could not be reduced to a mere acknowledgment of the fact of death but also required that they account for the circumstances of the death and the location of the grave. In the instant case the Russian authorities had not provided the applicants with any official information about the circumstances surrounding the death of their relatives or made any earnest attempts to locate their burial sites. The Chamber found a violation of Article 3.

B.  The parties submissions

1.  The Russian Government

167.  The Government submitted at the outset that, for an issue under Article 3 to arise in respect of the relatives of the persons killed or missing, two elements must be shown to exist: (i) the applicants must have endured a period of uncertainty as to the fate of their relatives; and (ii) the actions by the authorities must have aggravated their suffering during that period (here they referred to Luluyev and Others v. Russia, no. 69480/01, §§ 114-15, ECHR 2006XIII).

168.  On the first element, the state of uncertainty, the Government observed that, although the fate of the applicants relatives could not be established with the certainty required for the purposes of criminal or “rehabilitation” proceedingsit was not reasonable to expect that they would still have been alive by 5 May 1998, taking into account their dates of birth and the absence of any news from them since World War II. In the absence of the first element, the Russian Government considered that no separate issues could arise under Article 3 beyond those already examined under Article 2 (here they referred to Esmukhambetov and Others v. Russia, no. 23445/03, § 189, 29 March 2011; Velkhiyev and Others v. Russia, no. 34085/06, § 137, 5 July 2011; Sambiyev and Pokayeva v. Russia, no. 38693/04, §§ 74-75, 22 January 2009; and Tangiyeva v. Russia, no. 57935/00, § 104, 29 November 2007).

169.  The Government further noted the absence of special factors” which could have given the applicants sufferings a dimension and character distinct from the emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to relatives of a victim of serious violations of human rights” (here they quoted Gongadze v. Ukraine, no. 34056/02, § 184, ECHR 2005XI, and Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, §§ 357-58, 18 June 2002)As to the first “special factor”, “the proximity of the family ties”, five of the applicants had been born after the arrest of their relatives and the Chamber did not find a violation of Article 3 in respect of those applicants. The second “special factor”, “the extent to which the family member witnessed the events in question”, was absent, since none of them had seen the events which had led to the death of their relatives. The third criterion, “the involvement of the family members in the attempts to obtain information about the disappeared person”, was not fulfilled, as the applicants did not take part in the Katyn investigation and did not lodge motions or give testimony. Although the proceedings had been widely covered in the Russian and Polish media for more than fourteen years, it was not until after the discontinuation of the investigation that two applicants had asked to be granted formal procedural status (here the Government referred, by contrast, to Musikhanova and Others v. Russia, no. 27243/03, §§ 81-82, 4 December 2008).

170.  As to the Russian authorities response to the applicants enquirieswhich was the fourth “special factor”, the Government maintained, firstly, that the alleged impact of their actions or inaction must have been significantly diminished on account of the period of fifty-eight years that separated the “Katyn events” from the date of Russias ratification of the Convention and also on account of the fact that the applicants were no longer in a state of uncertainty as to the fate of their relatives. The Government argued that the actions of the domestic authorities had been justified, pointing out firstly that the “rehabilitation” of the Polish prisoners had been impossible in the absence of any information about the charges that had been levelled against them. Secondly, the authorities had been under no legal obligation to locate the applicants or to grant them victim status, since there had been insufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between the Katyn events” and the death of the applicants relatives to the standard of proof required in criminal proceedingsThirdly, the prosecutors letters addressed to the applicants had contained “incorrect conclusions” and the “inconsistencies” had eventually been elucidated by the Russian courts, which had carried out a proper assessment of the documents, with the participation of the applicants representatives.

171.  The Government disagreed with the Chambers finding that the Russian courts had denied the reality of the Katyn massacre; in their view, the courts had “merely pointed out the lack of sufficient evidence for establishing the circumstances of the death of the applicants relatives” to the criminal standard of proof. The Government also disputed that the domestic authorities had been under an obligation to account for the fate of the missing persons and to search for their burial sites, since the relatives of the applicants were not “missing persons” and since no such obligation flowed from domestic law, international humanitarian law or the Convention. Finally, they claimed that they had had no intention of distorting historical facts or subjecting the applicants to any form of degrading treatment.

2.  The applicants

172.  The applicants agreed with the position expressed in the Chamber judgment whereby the obligation under Article 3 was distinct from the obligation flowing from Article 2 in that the latter provision required the State to take specific legal action, whereas the former was of a more general humanitarian nature. They maintained that the Court should be able to have regard to the facts prior to entry into force of the Convention inasmuch as they could be relevant for the facts occurring after that date (they referred to Broniowski v. Poland (dec.) [GC], no. 31443/96, § 74, ECHR 2002X, and Hokkanen v. Finland, 23 September 1994, § 53, Series A no. 299A). In addition, the Court should be competent to assess the State authorities compliance with Article 3 obligations even when the original taking of life escaped its scrutiny ratione temporis (here they dreparallel with the United Nations Human Rights Committees decision of 28 March 2006 in the case of Mariam Sankara et al. v. Burkina Faso, Communication No. 1159/2003).

173.  The applicants disagreed with the Chambers decision dividing them into two distinct groups based on the proximity of their family ties. They submitted that the situation in post-war socialist Poland and the events following the Soviet acknowledgement of the Katyn massacre had affected all the applicants in equal measure. They argued, in contrast to the Chambers approach, that those who did not remember their fathers or had been denied an opportunity to have any personal contact with them were more sensitive to the tragic fate of their parents. Furthermore, the applicants in the second group – in respect of which no violation of Article 3 was found – had been actively involved in a range of legal steps as well as other activities relating to the commemoration of their relatives who had been killed: Ms WołkJezierska had written a number of books on the Katyn massacre, Ms Krzyszkowiak had set up a publishing house printing Katyn-related materials, Ms Rodowicz had created several artistic works dedicated to the Katyn massacre and Mr Romanowski, the youngest among the applicantshad “inherited” from his late mother the task of honouring the memory of his uncle who had been killed. Referring to the case-law of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, the applicants submitted that all of them were victims of the grievances formulated under Article 3, either as adult direct relatives of the persons who had been killed, or as indirect relatives who had demonstrated their strong and continuous personal involvement through numerous actions relating to the fate of their family members who had been killed.

174.  As to the treatment of their enquiries by the Russian authorities, the applicants pointed out that in previous cases before the Court it had sometimes happened that “disappeared persons” became “dead persons” when their bodies had been found. In the Katyn case, the sequence was reversed: those who were “dead” had become “disappeared” in the eyes of the Russian authorities. That reversal represented a sheer denial of historical facts and inflicted severe pain, anguish and stress on the applicants. It was tantamount to informing a group of relatives of Holocaust victims that the victims must be considered unaccounted for as their fate could only be traced to the dead-end track of a concentration camp because the documents had been destroyed by the Nazi authorities. Moreover, in so far as the military prosecutors had claimed that they were unable to establish “which provision of the Penal Code formed the legal basis for calling the [Polish] prisoner[s] to account”, this was essentially an allegation that the victims might have been criminals who had been duly sentenced to capital punishment. Furthermore, in the rehabilitation proceedings before the Moscow Court, the prosecutor had argued that there existed “due reasons” for the repression, as some Polish officers had been “spies, terrorists and saboteurs” and as the Polish pre-war army “had been trained to fight against the Soviet Union”. The applicants emphasised that their moral suffering could not be classified as inherently accompanying the killings themselves but resulted from the treatment they had experienceat the hands of the Russian authorities.

3.  The Polish Government

175.  The Polish Government maintained that the Russian authorities had subjected the applicants to inhuman and degrading treatment. They pointed out that the persons who had been taken prisoner, held in custody and eventually murdered by the Soviet authorities were the applicants next of kin. Over a period of many years, for political reasons, the Soviet authorities had denied access to any official information about the fate of persons taken prisoner in late 1939. After an investigation had been instituted in 1990, the applicants had unsuccessfully attempted to gain access to the investigation materials for the purpose of obtaining the legal rehabilitation of their relatives. The lack of access and the contradictory information the applicants had received, had instilled in them a feeling of constant uncertainty and stress and made them totally dependent on the actions of the Russian authorities aimed at humiliating them. This amounted to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

4.  The third-partys submissions

176.  The Public International Law and Policy Group provided an overview of the Courts case-law concerning the nature and strength of family relationships required for an applicant family member to be considered a victim of violations of Article 3. In their view, that case-law indicated that the Court was increasingly concerned with the actions of applicant family members and the role played by the State after requests for information had been made. The third party further submitted that the approach to recognition of victim status based on the involvement of the family member in the attempts to obtain information about the disappeared individual, and the way in which the authorities dealt with those attempts, was in line with the standards applied by other international judicial institutions, including the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (here they cited Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina (reparations and costs), judgment of 27 August 1998, Series C No. 39, and Blake v. Guatemala (merits), judgment of 24 January 1998, Series C No. 36) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.

C.  The Courts assessment

1.  The general principles

177.  The Court has always been sensitive in its case-law to the profound psychological impact of a serious human rights violation on the victims family members who are applicants before the Court. However, in order for a separate violation of Article 3 of the Convention to be found in respect of the victims relatives, there should be special factors in place giving their suffering a dimension and character distinct from the emotional distress inevitably stemming from the aforementioned violation itself. The relevant factors include the proximity of the family tie, the particular circumstances of the relationship, the extent to which the family member witnessed the events in question and the involvement of the applicants in the attempts to obtain information about the fate of their relatives.

178.  In this connection, the Court reiterates that a family member of a “disappeared person” can claim to be the victim of treatment contrary to Article 3 in cases where the disappearance was followed by a long period of uncertainty until the body of the missing person was discovered. The essence of the issue under Article 3 in this type of case lies not so much in serious violation of the missing persons human rights but rather in the authorities dismissive reactions and attitudes in respect of that situation when it was brought to their attention. The finding of a violation on this ground is not limited to cases where the respondent State is to be held responsible for the disappearance. It can also result from the failure of the authorities to respond to the quest for information by the relatives or from the obstacles placed in their way, leaving them to bear the brunt of the efforts to uncover any facts, where this attitude may be regarded as disclosing a flagrant, continuous and callous disregard of an obligation to account for the fate of the missing person (see, in particular, Açış v. Turkey, no. 7050/05, §§ 36 and 5154, 1 February 2011; Varnava and Others, cited above, § 200; Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, no. 48804/99, § 96, 24 January 2008; Luluyev and Others, cited above, § 114; Bazorkina v. Russia, no. 69481/01, § 139, 27 July 2006; Gongadze, cited above, § 184; Taniş and Others v. Turkey, no. 65899/01, § 219, ECHR 2005–VIII; Orhan, cited above, §358; and Çakıcı v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657/94, § 98, ECHR 1999IV).

179.  The Court adopted a restrictive approach in situations where the person was taken into custody but later found dead following a relatively short period of uncertainty as to his fate (see Tanlı v. Turkey, no. 26129/95, § 159, ECHR 2001-III, and Bitiyeva and Others v. Russia, no. 36156/04, § 106, 23 April 2009). In a series of Chechen cases in which the applicants had not witnessed the killing of their relatives but had found out about their deaths only on discovery of their bodies, the Court considered that no separate finding of a violation of Article 3 was necessary, given that it had already found a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its substantive and procedural aspects (see Velkhiyev and Others§ 137; Sambiyev and Pokayeva, §§ 7475; and Tangiyeva, § 104, all cited above).

180.  Furthermore, in cases concerning persons who were killed by the authorities in violation of Article 2, the Court has held that the application of Article 3 is usually not extended to the relatives on account of the instantaneous nature of the incident causing the death in question (see Damayev v. Russia, no. 36150/04, § 97, 29 May 2012; Yasin Ateş v. Turkey, no. 30949/96, § 135, 31 May 2005; Udayeva and Yusupova v. Russia, no. 36542/05, § 82, 21 December 2010; Khashuyeva v. Russia, no. 25553/07, § 154, 19 July 2011; and Inderbiyeva v. Russia, no. 56765/08, § 110, 27 March 2012).

181.  Nevertheless, the Court has considered a separate finding of a violation of Article 3 to be justified in situations of confirmed death where the applicants were direct witnesses to the suffering of their family members (see Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no. 28005/08, § 204, 14 March 2013, where the applicant witnessed the slow death of her son who was in detention, without being able to help him; Esmukhambetov and Otherscited above, § 190, where a violation of Article 3 was found in respect of an applicant who had witnessed the killing of his entire family, but no violation was found in respect of other applicants who had only later found out about the killingsKhadzhialiyev and Others v. Russia, no. 3013/04, § 121, 6 November 2008, where the applicants were unable to bury the dismembered and decapitated bodies of their children in a proper manner; Musayev and Others v. Russia, nos. 57941/0058699/00 and 60403/00, § 169, 26 July 2007, where the applicant was a witness to the extrajudicial execution of several of his relatives and neighbours; and Akkum and Others v. Turkey, no. 21894/93, §§ 258-59, ECHR 2005II, where the applicant was presented with the mutilated body of his son).

2.  Application of the above principles to the present case

182.  The Court observes that the situation which is at the heart of the complaint under Article 3 initially presented the features of a “disappearance” case. The family members of the applicants had been taken prisoner by the Soviet occupation forces and had been detained in Soviet camps. There is evidence that exchanges of correspondence between the Polish prisoners and their families continued until the spring of 1940, so the families must have been aware that their relatives were alive. After the letters from them stopped coming to Poland, their relatives remained for many years in a state of uncertainty as to the fate that had befallen them.

183.  In 1943, following the discovery of mass graves near the Katyn Forest, partial exhumation and identification of the remains was carried out. However, only three of the applicants relatives – Mr Wołk, Mr Rodowicz and Mr Mielecki – were identified at that time. The Soviet authorities denied that they had executed the Polish prisoners of war and, without access to the Politburo or NKVD files, it was not possible to ascertain the fate of those prisoners whose bodies had not been identified. No further attempts at identifying the victims of the Katyn massacre were made during the Cold War, since the Soviet version of Nazi-orchestrated killings was imposed as the official one in the Peoples Republic of Poland for the entire duration of the existence of the Socialist regime, that is, until 1989.

184.  In 1990 the USSR officially acknowledged the responsibility of the Soviet leadership for the killing of Polish prisoners of war. In the following years, the surviving documents relating to the massacre were made public and the investigators carried out further partial exhumations at several burial sites. round of consultations was held between Polish, Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian prosecutors.

185.  By the time the Convention was ratified by the Russian Federation on 5 May 1998, more than fifty-eight years had passed since the execution of the Polish prisoners of war. Having regard to the long lapse of time, to the material that came to light in the intervening period and to the efforts that were deployed by various parties to elucidate the circumstances of the Katyn massacre, the Court finds that, as regards the period after the critical date, the applicants cannot be said to have been in a state of uncertainty as to the fate of their relatives who had been taken prisoner by the Soviet army in 1939. It necessarily follows that what could initially have been a “disappearance” case must be considered to be a “confirmed death” case. The applicants acquiesced in that assessment of the present case (see, in particular, paragraph 116 above and also paragraph 119 of the Chamber judgment). This finding is undisturbed by the pronouncements of the Russian courts in various domestic proceedings which appeared to withhold explicit acknowledgment of the fact that the applicants relatives had been killed in the Soviet camps.

186.  The Court does not question the profound grief and distress that the applicants have experienced as a consequence of the extrajudicial execution of their family members. However, it reiterates that it is in the interest of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart from its own precedents without compelling reason (see Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [GC], no. 27396/06, § 50, 29 June 2012). The Courts case-law, as outlined above, has accepted that the suffering of family members of a “disappeared person” who have to go through a long period of alternating hope and despair may justify finding a separate violation of Article 3 on account of the particularly callous attitude of the domestic authorities to their quest for information. As regards the instant case, the Courts jurisdiction extends only to the period starting on 5 May 1998, the date of entry into force of the Convention in respect of Russia. The Court has found above that as from that date, no lingering uncertainty as to the fate of the Polish prisoners of war could be said to have remained. Even though not all of the bodies have been recovered, their death was publicly acknowledged by the Soviet and Russian authorities and has become an established historical fact. The magnitude of the crime committed in 1940 by the Soviet authorities is a powerful emotional factor, yet, from a purely legal point of view, the Court cannot accept it as a compelling reason for departing from its case-law on the status of the family members of “disappeared persons” as victims of a violation of Article 3 and conferring that status on the applicants, for whom the death of their relatives was a certainty.

187.  The Court further finds no other special circumstances of the kind which have prompted it to find a separate violation of Article 3 in “confirmed death” cases (see the case-law cited in paragraph 181 above).

188.  In such circumstances, the Court considers that it cannot be held that the applicants suffering reached a dimension and character distinct from the emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to relatives of victims of a serious human rights violation.

189.  Accordingly, the Court finds no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

IV. OBSERVANCE OF ARTICLE 38 OF THE CONVENTION BY THE RESPONDENT GOVERNMENT

190.  The Court repeatedly requested the respondent Government to produce a copy of the decision of 21 September 2004 by which the investigation into the Katyn massacre had been discontinued (see paragraph 45 above). Confronted with the respondent Governments refusal to submit the requested material, the Court asked the parties to comment on the matter of the respondent Governments observance of their obligation to furnish all necessary facilities for the Courts investigation, flowing from Article 38 of the Convention. That provision reads as follows:

“The Court shall examine the case together with the representatives of the parties and, if need be, undertake an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the High Contracting Parties concerned shall furnish all necessary facilities.”

A.  The Chamber judgment

191.  The Chamber reiterated that “only the Court [could] decide ... what kind of evidence the parties should produce for due examination of the case” and that “the parties [were] obliged to comply with its evidential requests and instructions”. It further noted the absence of a plausible explanation on the part of the respondent Government as to the nature of the security concerns that informed the decision to classify the requested document. It observed that the requested document “related to a historical event, with most of the protagonists being already dead, and it could not have touched upon any current police surveillance operations or activities”. On a more general note, the Chamber observed that a public and transparent investigation into the crimes of the previous totalitarian regime could hardly have compromised the national security interests of the contemporary democratic Russian Federation, especially taking into account that the responsibility of the Soviet authorities for that crime has been acknowledged at the highest political level.

B.  The parties submissions

1.  The Russian Government

192.  The Government submitted at the outset that the classification of thirty-six volumes of the case file and of the decision of 21 September 2004 as “top secret” documents had been lawful because they contained information in the sphere of intelligence, counterintelligence and operational and search activity and because that classification had been “checked and confirmed” by the Federal Security Service and the Inter-Agency Commission for the Protection of State Secrets, as well as by the subsequent decisions of the Moscow City Court and the Supreme Court on an application by Memorial. They claimed that Russian law did not contain an absolute prohibition on communicating sensitive information to international organisations and that the decision of 21 September 2004 had not been disclosed to the Court solely because “the competent domestic bodies [had] not come to [the] conclusion” that it would be possible to do so.

193.  The Government maintained that Article 38 of the Convention could not be interpreted in such a way as to require Contracting States to disclose information that was likely to impair their security. They invited the Court to analyse the laws of other member States “which very likely might have foreseen similar rules”. The Government referred to the provisions of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Poland on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil and Criminal Cases, which allowed the Contracting State to refuse to execute the request if it was likely to prejudice the sovereignty, security, public order or other essential interests of the country (here they also referred to Liu v. Russia (no. 2), no. 29157/09, § 85, 26 July 2011, and Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 138, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996V). The Government emphasised that Rule 33 of the Rules of Court did not provide for any sanction for unauthorised disclosure of confidential information which had been entrusted to the Court.

194.  The Government claimed that they had provided information on the content of the decision of 21 September 2004 which should be deemed sufficient to discharge their obligation under Article 38. Thus, they had indicated which authority had classified it, what the security considerations had been, what the grounds for discontinuing the proceedings had been and what legal characterisation had been attributed to the alleged offences. The decision in question did not mention the applicants or contain any information about the fate of their relatives or the location of their burial sites.

195.  Finally, the Government took issue with what they described as the “unusual logic of the Chamber judgment. In their view, Article 38 should have been examined at the end of the judgment, as had been done in previous cases. They emphasised that the obligation under Article 38 was “of a purely procedural nature”, and that an alleged breach thereof “could not cause any suffering to the applicants” or “outweigh the gravity of the alleged violations of Article 2 and Article 3”. The Government disagreed that the obligation under Article 38 had to be enforced in all circumstances; in their opinion, it was derivative by its nature and conditional on the existence of admissible complaints under other Convention provisions. In the instant case, there was no point in examining the Governmentcompliance with Article 38, since the Court should find that it lacked jurisdiction to take cognisance of the merits of the complaint under Article 2 of the Convention.

2.  The applicants

196.  The applicants submitted that a long-standing principle of customary international law established that no internal rule, even of constitutional rank, could be invoked as an excuse for non-observance of international law (they referred to the case-law of the Permanent Court of International Justice and of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)). This principle was codified in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as an extension of the more general pacta sunt servanda principle, and had been frequently invoked in the jurisprudence of international courts and quasi-judicial bodies including the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, and arbitration tribunals. When confronted with a State Partys reluctance to submit the requested materials on account of confidentiality concerns, international tribunals held hearings in a closed session (the applicants referred to the IACtHRs judgment in Godínez Cruz v. Honduras (merits), judgment of 20 January 1989, Series C No. 5, and the judgment of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation in Ballo v. UNESCO, judgment no. 191, 15 May 1972). In the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ had not drawn any negative inferences when the United Kingdom refused to submit evidence which it considered to be related to naval secrecy (see Corfu Channel case, judgment of 9 April 1949: ICJ Reports 1949). However, the ICTY had rejected the Croatian governments reliance on the Corfu judgment as justification for their refusal to produce certain documents and evidence of a military character in the Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić case, holding, in particular, that a blanket right of States to withhold, for security reasons, documents necessary for proceedings might jeopardise the very function of the Tribunal (Case No. IT-95-14-AR108bis, judgment of 29 October 1997). It had added that the validity of State security concerns could be accommodated by procedural arrangements, including in camera hearings and special procedures for communicating and recording sensitive documents. In the later case of Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez (Case No. IT-95-14/2, decision of 9 September 1999), the ICTY had also held that the question of the relevance of the requested material for the proceedings fell within its full discretion and could not be challenged by States. The applicants submitted that the ratio decidendi of those cases was applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the instant case.

197.  The applicants reiterated that the Russian Government had not substantiated their allegations of security concerns and had not explained why a document concerning an atrocity committed by the previous totalitarian regime needed to be classified. The decision to classify it also contradicted the Russian State Secrets Act, section 7 of which precluded the classification of information on human rights violations. The Katyn massacre was a violation of the right to life on a massive scale perpetrated on the orders of the highest authorities of the USSR.

198.  The applicants indicated their agreement with the Chamber judgment in so far as it had established a breach of Article 38 of the Convention. They submitted that the Court had absolute discretion to determine what evidence it needed for the examination of the case and that refusal to cooperate with the Court might lead to a violation of Article 38 even where no violation of the substantive Convention right had been established.

3.  The Polish Government

199.  The Polish Government endorsed the conclusions of the Chamber with regard to the finding of a breach of Article 38 of the ConventionThey noted at the outset that the Russian Government had presented contradictory information, even during the proceedings before the Court, as to who had issued the decision to classify the materials and on what date it had been issued. Whereas in their submissions of 19 March 2010 the Russian Government stated that the decision had been made by the Inter-Agency Commission on the Protection of State Secrets, their written submissions of 30 November 2012 indicated that the Chief Military Prosecutors Office had taken the decision in consultation with the Federal Security Service.

200.  The Polish Government believed that the decision to classify the materials of the investigation had been in breach of substantive Russian law. The content of a decision on the discontinuation of criminal proceedings was clearly outlined in the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure and could not include any information classified as a State secret. Even if it did include data on the individuals with respect to whom the proceedings had been conducted, this could not constitute a basis for classifying the entire decision as top secret. Any information on high-ranking USSR officials concerned the period up to 1970 and, accordingly, by the time the decision was issued, the maximum thirty-year classification period established in section 13 of the State Secrets Act had already elapsed. In addition, in so far as the Russian Government admitted that the actions of the USSR officials had been characterised in law as an abuse of power, this information was explicitly excluded from classification by virtue of section 7 of the State Secrets Act. The Polish Government also emphasised that the Russian Government had not produced a reasoned decision on the classification.

201.  Finally, the Polish Government pointed out that the Katyn investigation was not related to the current functions or operations of the special services of the police. Even if part of the materials had been classified by the former regime, there existed no continuing and actual public interest in maintaining that classification.

C.  The Courts assessment

1.  General principles

202.  The Court reiterates that it is of the utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of individual petition instituted under Article 34 of the Convention that States should furnish all necessary facilities to make possible a proper and effective examination of applications. This obligation requires the Contracting States to furnish all necessary facilities to the Court, whether it is conducting a fact-finding investigation or performing its general duties as regards the examination of applications. A failure on a governments part to submit such information which is in their hands without a satisfactory explanation may not only give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicants allegations, but may also reflect negatively on the level of compliance by a respondent State with its obligations under Article 38 of the Convention (see Tahsin Acar v. Turkey [GC], no. 26307/95, §§ 253-54, ECHR 2004III; Timurtaş v. Turkey, no. 23531/94, §§ 66 and 70, ECHR 2000VI; and Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763/94, § 70, ECHR 1999IV).

203.  The obligation to furnish the evidence requested by the Court is binding on the respondent Government from the moment such request has been formulated, whether it be on initial communication of an application to the Government or at a subsequent stage in the proceedings (see Enukidze and Girgvliani v. Georgia, no. 25091/07, § 295, 26 April 2011, and Bekirski v. Bulgaria, no. 71420/01, §§ 111-13, 2 September 2010). It is a fundamental requirement that the requested material be submitted in its entirety, if the Court has so directed, and that any missing elements be properly accounted for (see Damir Sibgatullin v. Russia, no. 1413/05, §§ 65-68, 24 April 2012; Enukidze and Girgvliani, cited above, §§ 299300; and Davydov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 17674/02 and 39081/02, §§ 167 et seq., 1 July 2010). In addition, any material requested must be produced promptly and, in any event, within the time-limit fixed by the Court, for a substantial and unexplained delay may lead the Court to find the respondent States explanations unconvincing (see Damir Sibgatullin, § 68; Tahsin Acar, § 254; and Enukidze and Girgvliani, §§ 297 and 301, all cited above).

204.  The Court has previously found that the respondent Government failed to comply with the requirements of Article 38 in cases where they did not provide any explanation for the refusal to submit documents that had been requested (see, for instance, Bekirski, cited above, § 115; Tigran Ayrapetyan v. Russia, no. 75472/01, § 64, 16 September 2010; and Maslova and Nalbandov v. Russia, no. 839/02, §§ 128-29, 24 January 2008) or submitted an incomplete or distorted copy while refusing to produce the original document for the Courts inspection (see Trubnikov v. Russia, no. 49790/99, §§ 50-57, 5 July 2005).

205.  In cases where the Government advanced confidentiality or security considerations as the reason for their failure to produce the material requested, the Court had to satisfy itself that there existed reasonable and solid grounds for treating the documents in question as secret or confidential. Thus, in many cases chiefly concerning disappearances in the Chechen Republic, the Russian Government relied on provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure which, in their submission, precluded the disclosure of documents from the file of an ongoing investigation. The Court, however, pointed out that the provision in question did not contain an absolute prohibition but rather set out the procedure for, and limits to, such disclosure. It also noted that in many similar cases the Russian Government had submitted the documents requested without mentioning that provision, or had agreed to produce documents from the investigation files even though they had initially invoked that provision (see, among other casesSasita Israilova and Others v. Russia, no. 35079/04, § 145, 28 October 2010, and Musikhanova and Others v. Russia, no. 27243/03, § 107, 4 December 2008).

206.  As regards the classification of documents as secret, the Court was not satisfied, in one case, with the respondent Governments explanation according to which regulations relating to the procedure for review of prisoners correspondence constituted a State secret (see Davydov and Others, cited above, § 170) or, in another case, that the domestic law did not lay down a procedure for communicating information classified as a State secret to an international organisation (see Nolan and K. v. Russia, no. 2512/04, § 56, 12 February 2009). The Court pointed out that, if there existed legitimate national security concerns, the Government should have edited out the sensitive passages or supplied a summary of the relevant factual grounds (loc. cit.). Finally, when reviewing the nature of the classified information, the Court took into account whether the document was known to anyone outside the secret intelligence services and the highest State officials. The supposedly highly sensitive nature of information was cast into doubt once it became clear that lay persons, such as counsel for the claimant in a civil case, could take cognisance of the document in question (loc. cit.).

2.  Application of the above principles to the present case

207.  In giving notice of the two applications at the origin of the instant case to the respondent Government, the Court put a number of questions to the parties and requested the Government to produce a copy of the decision of 21 September 2004 relating to the discontinuation of the proceedings in criminal case no. 159. The Government refused to provide it, citing its top secret classification at domestic level. On 5 July 2011 the Court adopted a partial admissibility decisioninvited the parties to submit any additional material which they wished to bring to its attention, and also put a question regarding the Governments compliance with their obligations under Article 38 of the Convention. The Government did not submit a copy of the requested decision. In the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, on 30 November 2012 and 17 January 2013, the Government submitted a number of additional documents which, however, did not include the copy of the decision of 21 September 2004 that had been requested.

208.  The Court reiterates that Article 38 of the Convention requires the Contracting States to furnish all necessary facilities to the Court, whether it is conducting a fact-finding investigation or performing its general duties as regards the examination of applications. Being master of its own procedure and of its own rules, the Court has complete freedom in assessing not only the admissibility and the relevance but also the probative value of each item of evidence before it. Only the Court may decide whether and to what extent the participation of a particular witness would be relevant for its assessment of the facts and what kind of evidence the parties are required to produce for due examination of the case. The parties are obliged to comply with its evidential requests and instructions, provide timely information on any obstacles in complying with them and provide any reasonable or convincing explanations for failure to comply (see Davydov and Others, cited above, § 174; Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, no. 54825/00, § 77, 5 April 2005; and Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 210, Series A no. 25). It is therefore sufficient that the Court regards the evidence contained in the requested decision as necessary for the establishment of the facts in the present case (see Dedovskiy and Others v. Russia, no. 7178/03, § 107, 15 May 2008, and also Akhmadova and Sadulayeva v. Russia, no. 40464/02, § 137, 10 May 2007).

209.  As regards the allegedly derivative nature of the obligation to furnish all necessary facilities for its investigation, flowing from Article 38 of the Convention, the Court reiterates that this obligation is a corollary of the undertaking not to hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual application under Article 34 of the Convention. Indeed, the effective exercise of this right may be thwarted by a Contracting Partys failure to assist the Court in conducting an examination of all circumstances relating to the case, including in particular by not producing evidence which the Court considers crucial for its task. Both provisions work together to guarantee the efficient conduct of the judicial proceedings and they relate to matters of procedure rather than to the merits of the applicants grievances under the substantive provisions of the Convention or its Protocols. Although the structure of the Courts judgments traditionally reflects the numbering of the Articles of the Convention, it has also been customary for the Court to examine the Governments compliance with their procedural obligation under Article 38 of the Convention at the outset, especially if negative inferences are to be drawn from the Governments failure to submit the requested evidence (see, among other cases, Shakhgiriyeva and Others v. Russia, no. 27251/03, §§ 134-40, 8 January 2009; Utsayeva and Others v. Russia, no. 29133/03, §§ 149-53, 29 May 2008; Zubayrayev v. Russia, no. 67797/01, §§ 74-77, 10 January 2008; and Tangiyevacited above, §§ 73-77). The Court also reiterates in this connection that it may establish a failure by the respondent Government to comply with their procedural obligations even in the absence of any admissible complaint about a violation of a substantive Convention right (see Poleshchuk v. Russia, no. 60776/00, 7 October 2004). Furthermore, it is not required that the Governments alleged interference should have actually restricted, or had any appreciable impact on, the exercise of the right of individual petition (see McShane v. the United Kingdom, no. 43290/98, § 151, 28 May 2002). The Court reaffirms that the Contracting Partys procedural obligations under Articles 34 and 38 of the Convention must be enforced irrespective of the eventual outcome of the proceedings and in such a manner as to avoid any actual or potential chilling effect on the applicants or their representatives.

210.  Turning to the justification advanced by the Government for their failure to produce a copy of the requested decision, the Court observes that it focused on the fact that the decision had been lawfully classified at domestic level and that the existing laws and regulations prevented the Government from communicating classified material to international organisations in the absence of guarantees as to its confidentiality.

211.  The Court reiterates that it has already found in another case against Russia that a mere reference to the structural deficiency of the domestic law which rendered impossible communication of sensitive documents to international bodies is an insufficient explanation to justify the withholding of information requested by the Court (see Nolan and K., cited above, § 56). It has also previously rejected similar objections from the Russian Government relating to the alleged lack of safeguards in the Courts procedure guaranteeing the confidentiality of documents or imposing sanctions on foreign nationals for a breach of confidentiality (see Shakhgiriyeva and Otherscited above, §§ 136-40). The Court reiterates in this connection that the Convention is an international treaty which, in accordance with the principle of pacta sunt servanda codified in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is binding on the Contracting Parties and must be performed by them in good faith. Pursuant to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention, the provisions of internal law may not be invoked as justification for a failure by the Contracting State to abide by its treaty obligations. In the context of the obligation flowing from the text of Article 38 of the Convention, this requirement means that the respondent Government may not rely on domestic legal impediments, such as the absence of a special decision by a different agency of the State, to justify a failure to furnish all the facilities necessary for the Courts examination of the case. It has been the Courts constant position that Governments are answerable under the Convention for the acts of any State agency since what is in issue in all cases before the Court is the international responsibility of the State (see Lukanov v. Bulgaria, 20 March 1997, § 40, Reports 1997II).

212.  Even though in the Grand Chamber proceedings the Government submitted copies of the judgments issued by the domestic courts in the declassification proceedings, these did not make any more apparent the exact nature of the security concerns that informed the decision to classify a portion of the materials in the criminal case file, including the decision of 21 September 2004 requested by the Court. It has become clear that the classification decision was not made by the Chief Military Prosecutors Office of its own initiative but rather on the basis of the opinion of some officials from the Federal Security Service, which had “the right to dispose as it saw fit of the information reproduced in the Chief Military Prosecutors decision”. It was also stated that the decision of 21 September 2004 contained information “in the field of intelligence, counterintelligence and operational and search activities”, without further elaboration (see paragraph 64 above).

213.  The Court reiterates that the judgment by the national authorities in any particular case in which national security considerations are involved is one which it is not well equipped to challenge. However, even where national security is at stake, the concepts of lawfulness and the rule of law in a democratic society require that measures affecting fundamental human rights must be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body competent to review the reasons for the decision and the relevant evidence. If there was no possibility of challenging effectively the executives assertion that national security was at stake, the State authorities would be able to encroach arbitrarily on rights protected by the Convention (see Liucited above, §§ 85-87, and AlNashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963/99, §§ 123-24, 20 June 2002).

214.  In the instant case the Moscow City Courts judgment of 2 November 2010, as endorsed by the Supreme Court, contains no substantive analysis of the reasons for maintaining the classified status of the case materials. It is not even apparent whether the City Court was presented with a copy of the expert report issued by the Federal Security Service. The national courts did not subject to any meaningful scrutiny the executives assertion that information contained in that decision should be kept secret more than seventy years after the events. They confined the scope of their inquiry to ascertaining that the classification decision had been issued within the administrative competence of the relevant authorities, without carrying out an independent review of whether the conclusion that its declassification constituted a danger to national security had a reasonable basis in fact. The Russian courts did not address in substance Memorials argument that the decision brought to an end the investigation into a mass murder of unarmed prisoners, that is, one of the most serious violations of human rights committed on orders from the highest-ranking Soviet officials, and that it was not therefore amenable to classification by virtue of section 7 of the State Secrets Act. Finally, they did not perform a balancing exercise between the alleged need to protect the information owned by the Federal Security Service, on the one hand, and the public interest in a transparent investigation into the crimes of the previous totalitarian regime and the private interest of the victims relatives in uncovering the circumstances of their death, on the other hand. Given the restricted scope of the domestic judicial review of the classification decision, the Court is unable to accept that the submission of a copy of the decision of 21 September 2004, as it had requested, could have affected Russianational security.

215.  The Court emphasises, lastly, that legitimate national security concerns may be accommodated in its proceedings by means of appropriate procedural arrangements, including restricted access to the document in question under Rule 33 of the Rules of Court and, in extremis, the holding of a hearing behind closed doors. Although the Russian Government were fully aware of those possibilities, they did not request the application of such measures, even though it is the responsibility of the party requesting confidentiality to make and substantiate such a request.

216.  Accordingly, the Court considers that in the present case the respondent State failed to comply with their obligations under Article 38 of the Convention on account of their refusal to submit a copy of the document requested by the Court.

V.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

217.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

218.  The applicants Mr Jerzy Karol Malewicz, Mr Janowiec and Mr Trybowski claimed compensation for the loss of their fathers and grandfather respectively. All the applicants also claimed compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage in connection with the alleged violations of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, leaving the determination of the amount of just satisfaction to the discretion of the Court.

219.  The Government disputed their claims.

220.  The Court has not found a violation of Article 2 or Article 3 of the Convention as alleged by the applicants. The Russian Governments failure to comply with Article 38 of the Convention was a procedural matter which does not call for an award of just satisfaction to the applicants. Accordingly, the Court rejects the applicants claims in respect of pecuniary and nonpecuniary damage.

B.  Costs and expenses

221.  The applicants claimed the following amounts:

(i)  25,024.82 euros (EUR) in legal fees for Mr Szewczyk (exclusive of the legal aid received from the Court);

(ii)  EUR 7,000 in legal fees for Mr Karpinskiy and Ms Stavitskaya in the Russian proceedings;

(iii)  EUR 7,581 and 1,199.25 Polish złotys for transport and translation costs incurred in the Chamber proceedings;

(iv)  EUR 4,129 in transport and accommodation costs relating to the lawyers and the applicants preparation for, and participation in, the hearing at which the Chamber judgment was delivered and at the Grand Chamber hearing;

(v)  EUR 124 for translation and postal expenses in the Grand Chamber proceedings.

222.  In addition, the applicant Mr Jerzy Karol Malewicz claimed 2,219.36 United States dollars for his daughters and his own travel and accommodation expenses incurred in connection with their attendance at the Chamber hearing.

223.  The Government commented that Mr Szewczyks fees appeared excessive, that the necessity of travel expenses had not been convincingly shown, and that the two Russian lawyers had taken part only in the domestic rehabilitation proceedings, which fell outside the scope of the instant case. Moreover, the claim by Russian counsel was not based on any payment rate and was not linked to the amount of work actually performed. The expenses relating to the applicants presence at the delivery hearing and the Grand Chamber hearing were not necessarily incurred as the applicants had been represented by a team of three lawyers. Finally, by their own admission, Mr Kamiński and Mr Sochański had carried out the legal work on pro bono basis which, in the Governments view, prevented them from claiming any amounts for the preparation of the case.

224.  The Court reiterates that it did not find the violations the applicants alleged. It accepts nonetheless that the Russian Governments failure to comply with Article 38 of the Convention generated an additional amount of work for the applicants representatives, who were required to address that issue in their written and oral submissions. However, it considers that the amounts which were paid to the representatives by way of legal aid were sufficient as to quantum in these circumstances. Accordingly, the Court rejects the claims for costs and expenses.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1.  Holdsunanimously, that Mr Piotr Malewicz and Mr Kazimierz Raczyński have standing to pursue the application in place of the late Mr Krzysztof Jan Malewicz and the late Ms Halina Michalska respectively;

 

2.  Holds, by thirteen votes to four, that the Court has no competence to examine the complaint under Article 2 of the Convention;

 

3.  Holds, by twelve votes to five, that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention;

 

4.  Holds, unanimously, that the respondent State failed to comply with their obligations under Article 38 of the Convention;

 

5.  Dismisses, by twelve votes to five, the applicants claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English and French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 21 October 2013.

Erik FriberghJosep Casadevall
RegistrarPresident

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:

(a)  concurring opinion of Judge Gyulumyan;

(b)  concurring opinion of Judge Dedov;

(c)  partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion of Judge Wojtyczek;

(d)  joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Ziemele, De Gaetano, Laffranque and Keller.

J.C.
E.F

 

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE GYULUMYAN

Although I do share the opinion of the majority on all points in this case, I nevertheless have certain reservations of a more general character about the Courts approach concerning the “humanitarian clause” and “genuine connection” requirements. In substantiating its position the Court referred to the time factor, having regard to the period of time between the death of the applicants relatives and the entry into force of the Convention. I do not find this reasoning persuasive. The States obligation to carry out a thorough investigation is engaged when gross human rights violations (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) are at stake. The mere fact that the crimes in question took place before the Convention came into existence is not decisive. If the investigation is carried out before the ratification of the Convention by the respondent State, it is the complaints as to the quality of the investigation which might fall outside of the Courts competence ratione temporis.

I do believe that human rights violations of this kind can be prevented and redressed in the future only by the respondent States willingness and readiness to confront its past and not to bury its history under layers. In this respect I attach particular importance to the fact that an investigation was carried out and that a significant number of actions were undertaken by the Soviet and subsequently the Russian authorities to acknowledge responsibility for the Katyn massacre and to pay tribute to the victims (see paragraphs 38, 41 and 73).

If the above-mentioned actions had not been undertaken and no investigation had been carried out, that is to say, if there had been an absolute denial of the crime, I would have chosen instead to join in the dissenting opinion of Judges Ziemele, De Gaetano, Laffranque and Keller.

 


CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE DEDOV

Responsibility for acts should be determined in accordance with the law in force. For this purpose the law (the Convention in this case) should not be applied retrospectively. This principle is supported by the judgment, and it applies to all member States. That is why the special status of crimes against humanity cannot override this procedural principle as it relates to different matters. Recognising that the Court lacks jurisdiction ratione temporis does not amount to recognising as lawful a situation entailing a breach of a jus cogens rule such as the prohibition of war crimes.

In support of the judgments findings I would stress that the protection afforded by jus cogens rules is based on the responsibility of individuals rather than that of the State (starting with the Nuremberg trials, organised to prosecute prominent members of the political, military and economic leadership of Nazi Germany). Even in international conflicts it is important to adhere to this approach and not to blame the State automatically. In particular, the Russian Federation did not exist in 1940 and the Soviet Union was a totalitarian State in which a large number of families suffered under Stalins regime and millions of people were subjected to killings without a fair trial. The Politburos order authorised the execution of Polish prisoners of war and of thousands of Soviet citizens at the same time. Indeed, the right approach would be to punish those members of the Politburo but not the State itself, because all the people of that country who were victims cannot at the same time bear responsibility for this crime against humanity.

Furthermore, this crime against humanity was not supported by citizens in silence, nor did they authorise their representatives in Parliament for any purpose, as happens nowadays when it comes to launching a military invasion of another country. In such a case, the State has to be held fully responsible for every life lost due to that invasion. All this suggests that the Convention system and jus cogens rules in the global context should effectively serve the modern world rather than history.

 

PARTLY CONCURRING AND PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE WOJTYCZEK

(Translation)

1.  I do not share the view that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention by the respondent State; nor can I subscribe to the majoritys argument concerning the issue of the applicability of Article 2 of the Convention.

2.  Firstly, it is necessary to emphasise at this point a number of important circumstances for the assessment of this case. Not only did the applicants lose their relatives and were then confronted with official propaganda attributing the crime to the Germans, but also, over many years in the Soviet Union and Poland, any private attempt to conduct research into the truth of the Katyn massacre was punished, as was the dissemination of information gathered on that subject. It is not therefore exact to say that the alleged events occurred more than seventy years ago: on the contrary, various forms of violation of the applicants fundamental rights characterised the entire period of the communist regime in both countries. It should be added here that, for the victims of a crime or for their relatives, time does not always flow in the same manner in different States. From the perspective of human rights protection, decades in a totalitarian State cannot be compared with the same lapse of time in a democratic State governed by the rule of law. Consequently, the argument concerning the lapse of time, occasionally relied on to justify the termination of legal obligations with regard to human rights (see, for example, paragraph 157 of the judgment), must always be examined in the specific historical context of each country. Moreover, the applicants have described in detail the various acts and omissions of the Russian authorities subsequent to the date of entry into force of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in respect of the Russian Federation. In particular, they report the disparaging remarks made against them by certain representatives of the Russian authorities. The Chamber judgment (see Janowiec and Others v. Russia, nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, 16 April 2012) established a number of important facts reflecting those authorities dismissive and disdainful attitude. I note that the Grand Chamber did not consider it necessary to express a position on this matter in its judgment.

3.  The Convention is an international treaty, and not a constitution. It is undeniable that, while the international treaties on protection of human rights have certain specific and important features which have an indisputable impact on their application and interpretation, they nonetheless remain subject to the rules of interpretation of treaties, developed under customary international law and codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“the Vienna Convention”). Indeed, the Court has explicitly confirmed in a number of cases the applicability of those rules of interpretation, referring to the provisions of the Vienna Convention (see, for example, the judgments in Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18; Johnston and Others v. Ireland18 December 1986, Series A no. 112; and Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03, ECHR 2008; and the decision in Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 52207/00, ECHR 2001-XII). Although this latter treaty does not as such apply to the Convention, it remains a point of reference in so far as it codifies the rules of customary treaty law.

Under the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Consequently, the Convention must be read in the light of its object and purpose, which is the effective protection of a certain number of fundamental human rights set out therein.

The Convention is undeniably a living instrument, since its application must give constant material effect, through the case-law and in hitherto unconsidered situations, to the general rules. In this respect, it does not differ significantly from the majority of other international treaties. The interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument is subject to the limits set by the rules governing the interpretation of international treaties.

The legitimacy of an international court depends, inter alia, on the persuasive force of its decisions. The case examined here raises fundamental questions of interpretation and application of the Convention and of other rules of conventional or customary international law. The Courts decision establishing the interpretation of the Convention in the present case requires the greatest methodological vigilance. An interpretive decision in international law presupposes (a) precise identification and formulation of the applicable rules of interpretation; (b) an account of the provisions to be interpreted and their context (within the meaning of the law of treaties); (c) wording of the conclusion which sets out with sufficient precision the legal rule derived from the international text as interpreted in this manner; and (d) the reasoning for the decision in question, regard being had to the rules of interpretation applied in the case. I regret that the majority has refused to follow such a methodology. In addition, the approach taken seems, in my opinion, to contravene the rules of international law concerning the interpretation and scope of treaties.

4.  The paramount question which arises in the present case is the temporal scope of the Convention. In responding, it is first necessary to make a clear distinction between two concepts: the temporal scope of the Convention (in other words, the temporal import of the Convention) and the Courts jurisdiction ratione temporis. While the temporal scope of a treaty is a matter of substantive law, the extent of the jurisdiction ratione temporis of an international body is governed by the rules of jurisdiction. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the temporal scope of the Convention varies according to the High Contracting Parties. In practice, under the rules of the law of treaties, the Convention comes into force with regard to a High Contracting Party on the date of its ratification and creates obligations as of that date.

The jurisdiction ratione temporis of an international court does not necessarily coincide with the temporal scope of the treaty which it is called upon to apply. Yet the wording of the reasoning in this judgment does not seem to take account of this scholarly distinction, which may have an important practical significance.

If the alleged violation of the Convention does not fall within the temporal scope of the Convention, the question of the Courts jurisdiction to find such a violation is devoid of purpose. In contrast, the fact that the alleged violation of the Convention falls within the temporal scope of the Convention does not automatically mean that the Court has jurisdiction to examine it. A legal rule defining the scope of the Courts jurisdiction may in fact restrict such jurisdiction in respect of certain violations of the international obligations deriving from the Convention. To illustrate this point, one might refer here to the situation of the States which had made a declaration recognising the competence of the European Commission of Human Rights to examine individual applications, under the legal regime applicable prior to 1 November 1998, that is, prior to the entry into force of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, restructuring the control machinery established thereby. Such a declaration could recognise the competence of the Commission for matters arising after or based on facts occurring subsequent to the given declaration. Violations of the Convention committed between the date of its entry into force with regard to the State making the declaration and the date of that declaration fall within the temporal scope of application of the Convention but fall outside the scope of the Courts jurisdiction ratione temporis (see Article 6 of Protocol No. 11).

In examining any application alleging violations of human rights, before responding to the question of the Courts temporal jurisdiction, it is first necessary to verify whether the alleged facts fall within the temporal scope of the Convention. To do so, it is necessary to set out unequivocally the Convention rule applicable to the High Contracting Party and to define precisely its temporal scope.

5.  One of the fundamental principles of international law is that of the non-retroactivity of treaties. This principle of customary international law has been codified in Article 28 of the Vienna Convention, worded as follows:

Article 28: Non-retroactivity of Treaties

Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.”

Where the temporal scope of an international treaty is determined, it is necessary firstly to verify whether the parties intended to accord it retroactive scope. Nothing in the text of the Convention or its additional Protocols suggests that the High Contracting Parties had the intention of giving retroactive effect to the Convention. Nor, in my opinion, does such an intention on the part of the High Contracting Parties appear to derive from other elements of value in interpreting this treaty. On the contrary, it seems that the aims of the Convention were solely prospective: regard being had to Europes painful past, the issue was that of preventing future violations of human rights.

The concepts of the retroactivity and non-retroactivity of legal rules raise particularly difficult questions, which have been examined both by legal theory and by international law scholarship. I am perfectly aware that it is not easy to define unequivocally the content of the principle of non-retroactivity of treaties. In particular, the characterisation of the events as representing a single situation or a number of different situations may frequently be open to discussion. In addition, the finding of a situations continued (present) or discontinued (past) nature is often a matter of more or less subjective assessment. In those circumstances, the principle of the non-retroactivity of the Convention must be interpreted and applied with a certain flexibility, taking account of the specific nature and object of this international treaty. At the same time, in spite of the difficulties referred to, the principle of non-retroactivity in treaty law has a sufficiently precise normative content, making it possible, on the one hand, to rule in the instant case, and, on the other, to assess the relevance of the applicability criteria in respect of Article 2 of the Convention proposed by the majority.

It is clear that the Convention provisions do not bind a Party in relation to any act or facts which took place before the date of its entry into force with respect to that Party or any situation which ceased to exist on that date. The Convention, read in the light of the rules of interpretation of international treaties, allows for no exception to this rule. On the other hand, it may be applied to continuing situations which existed at the date of entry into force of the Convention in respect of the State concerned.

It should be added that while Article 32 § 2 of the Convention authorises the Court to rule on the scope of its own jurisdiction, it does not permit it to extend that jurisdiction beyond its scope as defined by the other Convention provisions. In ruling on the basis of Article 32 § 2, the Court is bound by all the other legal rules which define its jurisdiction.

6.  The Court has explicitly acknowledged the principle of the non-retroactive nature of the Convention and applied it consistently for many years (see, for example, the decision in Kadiķis v. Latvia, no. 47634/99, 29 June 2000, and the judgment in Blečić v. Croatia [GC], no. 59532/00, ECHR 2006-III, and the case-law cited in that judgment). As emphasised in the reasoning of the Blečić judgment, “the Court, on account of its subsidiary role in safeguarding human rights, must be careful not to reach a result tantamount to compelling the domestic authorities to apply the Convention retroactively” (§ 90 in fine).

The judgment in Šilih v. Slovenia ([GC], no. 71463/01, 9 April 2009) marked a significant departure from the case-law. The Court held in that judgment:

“161.  ... the Courts temporal jurisdiction as regards compliance with the procedural obligation of Article 2 in respect of deaths that occur before the critical date is not open-ended.

...

163.  ... there must exist a genuine connection between the death and the entry into force of the Convention in respect of the respondent State for the procedural obligations imposed by Article 2 to come into effect.

Thus a significant proportion of the procedural steps required by this provision – which include not only an effective investigation into the death of the person concerned but also the institution of appropriate proceedings for the purpose of determining the cause of the death and holding those responsible to account ... – will have been or ought to have been carried out after the critical date.

However, the Court would not exclude that in certain circumstances the connection could also be based on the need to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are protected in a real and effective manner.”

Analysis of this judgment indicates that the State is under an obligation to investigate a death which occurred prior to the date of entry into force of the Convention in its regard (a) where a significant proportion of the procedural steps were carried out after the “critical date”; (b) where a significant proportion of the procedural steps ought to have been carried out after the “critical date”; or (c) where it is necessary to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are protected in a real and effective manner. The State in question may therefore, of its own motion, launch application of the Convention rule requiring that an effective investigation be conducted if it takes investigative measures into events which occurred prior to its ratification of the Convention. The new approach proposed in the above-cited Šilih judgment was then confirmed in numerous subsequent judgments.

I share the opinion of those who submit that this approach amounts to imposing retroactive obligations on the High Contracting Parties that they could not have foreseen at the date of ratification of the Convention. I also subscribe here to the highly critical views expressed by Judges Bratza and Türmen in their dissenting opinion joined to the above-cited Šilih judgment. The majoritys reasoning in that case is not, in my opinion, substantiated by arguments which would confirm the intention of the High Contracting Parties to give retroactive effect to the Convention. It should also be noted in passing that the practical consequences of the criteria identified in the Šilih judgment vary from one State to another, depending on the date of ratification of the Convention, and are of particular import for those States which have recently ratified the Convention. In those circumstances, it would be desirable for the Court to agree to return to its initial interpretation of the principle of the non-retroactivity of the Convention.

7.  As Judge Lorenzen quite rightly pointed out in his concurring opinion joined to the above-cited Šilih judgment, the criteria established in that judgement are not very clear. The term “genuine connection” between a death and the ratification of the Convention does not appear adequate and may be a source of confusion, in that its linguistic meaning does not reflect the content ascribed to it by the Court. At first sight, one might think that there is a connection between the ratification of a treaty and violations of human rights if that ratification represents a reaction in relation to the human rights violations committed in the past. Furthermore, while the Šilih judgment states that Article 2 of the Convention is applicable to a situation in which “the procedural steps required ... ought to have been carried out after the critical date”, it raises questions as to the nature of the (domestic? international?) legal rule from which this obligation to investigate should arise.

It is important to note that application of the criteria established in the Šilih case leads to the conclusion that the alleged violation of the Convention in the instant case falls within the temporal scope of this treaty. Firstly, it should be noted that Russias ratification of the Convention was precisely a reaction against the massive violations of human rights committed under the communist regime, for example the massacre of Polish prisoners of war, since it was intended to prevent such violations in the future. The existence of a “genuine connection”, in the ordinary meaning of these words, is hardly open to dispute. Secondly, under Russian domestic law and the rules of international law applicable in Russia, the Russian authorities were obliged to prosecute the perpetrators of the massacre of Polish prisoners of war. In those circumstances, given that the investigation carried out prior to Russias ratification of the Convention was incomplete, a significant proportion of the procedural steps ought to have been carried out after the “critical date” (one of the criteria in the Šilih judgment). In addition, a significant proportion of the investigative measures were indeed carried out after the Conventions entry into force in respect of Russia (an alternative criterion from the Šilih judgment). Thirdly, given the gravity of the human rights violations committed, the “genuine connection” here is based, irrespective of the above considerations, on the need to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are protected in a real and effective manner.

8.  In the instant case, the majority has proposed amending the criteria established in the Šilih judgment by limiting the retroactive effect given to the Convention in that judgment. Firstly, they assert that the “genuine connection” between an event and the ratification of the Convention exists if the lapse of time between the two is relatively short. Secondly, they set the maximum period for this lapse of time at ten years. Thirdly, while they accept that the requirements of protection of the Convention values may require acceptance of a longer time-limit, they set the time-limit for retroactive application of the Convention at 4 November 1950. Such an interpretation of the Convention represents a fresh departure from the case-law and does not find sufficient justification in the rules of international law, applicable in this case, on the interpretation of treaties.

9.  There is no doubt that at the time when the massacre of the Polish prisoners was committed, sufficiently precise rules of international humanitarian law existed, which prohibited such acts and were binding on the Soviet Union. This massacre amounts to a war crime within the meaning of international law. Moreover, the rules of international law applicable to Russia imposed on it a duty to prosecute the perpetrators of that crime. In this respect, I share the opinion expressed by Judges Ziemele, De Gaetano, Laffranque and Keller in their dissenting opinion, which analyses these questions in detail.

I fully agree that the Convention must be interpreted in the light and in the context of international law as a whole and of international humanitarian law in particular. Such an interpretation does not, however, permit extension of the scope of the Convention as that has been defined by the Convention itself. The Convention does not impose an obligation to investigate or to punish violations of human rights, however serious they might be, which fall outside its temporal or territorial scope. An obligation to punish war crimes, such as those in issue here, may, in contrast, arise under other rules of international law. In any event, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on human rights violations which fall within the rules of international humanitarian law but do not fall within the scope of the Convention or the Protocols thereto.

It must be concluded from the arguments set out above that the massacre of the Polish prisoners of war in 1940 falls outside the Conventions temporal scope and that Article 2 of the Convention did not impose an obligation to carry out a criminal investigation into those events.

10.  Under the principle of the non-retroactive nature of treaties, the Court has jurisdiction in this case only to examine the acts and omissions of the Russian authorities from the date on which the Convention came into force in respect of Russia.

In accordance with Article 3 of the Convention, any action by the authorities of a High Contracting Party must comply with the prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. This obligation protects, inter alia, the relatives of victims of various crimes, irrespective of whether or not the Convention imposes an obligation on the authorities to prosecute the perpetrators of the crimes. The relatives of deceased persons are particularly vulnerable to the actions and omissions of the authorities, which, in this context, are obliged to act with all the tact and sensitivity called for in the circumstances.

The applicants considered that the actions and omissions of the Russian authorities after 1998 amounted to a violation of Article 3. The essence of their complaints lies in the latters dismissive and disdainful attitude. The alleged facts go far beyond the usual consequences of the disappearance or unexplained death of a relative. The alleged violations, by their nature and gravity, are distinct from the complaint under Article 2 and should therefore be examined in detail, separately from the issue of that Articles admissibility, as indeed the Chamber did in its judgment of 16 April 2012.

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has developed an interesting case-law on the basis of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, cited in the present Grand Chamber judgment. This case-law allows for full compliance with the principle of the non-retroactivity of treaties, and the Chamber drew on it in examining the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. On this point, I am in general agreement with the finding of the Chamber judgment.

It should be added here that, for many years, the applicants experienced a threefold trauma: the suffering caused by the loss of their relatives, the official organised lie and the punishment of any attempt to establish the truth. On the date of Russias ratification of the Convention, the situation was that those applicants who knew that their relatives had been victims of a war crime were still seeking to obtain more specific information about their fate and the location of their graves. As the Chamber pointed out, the applicants were refused access to documents from the investigation file or the proceedings on the ground of their foreign nationality. The military courts consistently avoided any mention of the victims execution. In addition, as Judges Spielmann, Villiger and Nußberger pointed out in their dissenting opinion joined to the Chamber judgment, serious allegations of a criminal nature were made against the applicants relatives. Those three judges were correct in stating that it is hard to disagree with the applicants argument that such a finding by the Russian courts “appeared to suggest that there might have been good reasons for their relatives execution, as if they had been common criminals deserving of capital punishment”.

In those circumstances, regard being had to the authorities conduct, taken together with the various facts of the case, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In my opinion, the applicants situation represents a flagrant example of suffering which has “a dimension and character distinct from the emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to the closest relatives of victims of a war crime”.

This conclusion applies to all of the applicants in the instant case. On this last point, I do not share the opinion of the Chamber, which considered it necessary to distinguish between two categories of applicant. In my opinion, all the applicants have demonstrated that they had very close family ties to the victims of the massacre and that they were involved in the attempts to establish the truth regarding that event. In particular, the fact that certain of the applicants had never had personal contact with their fathers does not strike me as a relevant argument. On the contrary, this absence of any contact with one of ones parents usually gives rise to particularly deep suffering.

11.  It should be noted that the instant case was referred to the Grand Chamber at the request of the applicants. While the Convention does not set out a prohibition of reformatio in peius, the situation is paradoxical, in that a remedy provided for by Article 43 of the Convention and used by the applicants with a view to ensuring protection of human rights has ultimately led to a Grand Chamber judgment which is much less favourable to them than the Chamber judgment.

 


JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES ZIEMELE, DE GAETANO, LAFFRANQUE AND KELLER

1.  We agree with the majoritys finding that Article 38 of the Convention has been violated. To our great regret, we are unable to follow the majoritys opinion concerning the findings under Articles 2 and 3. This case is about an undeniable obligation to investigate and prosecute gross human rights and humanitarian law violations which under international law are not subject to statutory limitations. The mass killings of the Polish prisoners of war by the Soviet authorities are war crimes. It is evident that in this case the Court was called upon to identify the relationship between the Convention and one of the most important obligations in international law. We are therefore convinced that the Court should have either distinguished this case from previous cases on jurisdiction ratione temporis or applied the Šilih principles differently (see Šilih v. Slovenia [GC], no. 71463/01, 9 April 2009). In particular, this case would have been a perfect opportunity for applying the “humanitarian clause”. What follows are the arguments in support of these two positions.

2.  We concentrate our reasoning on the question of jurisdiction ratione temporis for the application of Article 2. Since, as we will argue below, it is our opinion that the Court should have assumed jurisdiction and found a violation of Article 2, there is no need to distinguish between different groups of victims (as the Chamber did concerning victim status under Article 3 of the Convention in regard to the suffering of the various family members – see paragraphs 153 and 154 of the Chamber judgment (see Janowiec and Others v. Russia, nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, 16 April 2012)). In Article 2 cases, the Court recognises not only surviving parents, spouses, children and siblings as victims, but also uncles and aunts, grandchildren and in-laws (see, for example, Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00§ 201, 24 February 2005, and Estamirov and Others v. Russia, no. 60272/00§ 131, 12 October 2006).

3.  The legal basis for all matters of jurisdiction is Article 32 of the Convention. We recall the wording of Article 32 § 2: “In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide.”

I.  Difference between Šilih and Janowiec

4.  The case at hand is hardly comparable to the situation in Šilih (cited above). Šilih concerned a death resulting from medical malpractice, whereas Janowiec deals with the massacre of more than twenty-one thousand Polish prisoners of war.

5.  We accept that the principles governing the jurisdiction of the Court must be the same for all cases. However, the reasons for declaring a Šilih type of situation to be outside of the Courts jurisdiction might change in a Janowiec type of case. In the former, the argument that an effective investigation might be difficult after a certain period of time is understandable and correct. In the latter, however, the investigation is not essentially dependent on the evidence available but rather on the goodwill of the State concerned. In the former, the evidence is a technical matter which becomes more difficult to collect with the passage of time. In the latter, the ultimate proof is available in the Russian archives notwithstanding that seventy years have passed since the event.

II.  Applying the Šilih principles to Janowiec

6.  Even if one based ones reasoning on the principles established in the Šilih judgment, the case at hand offers ample opportunity to acknowledge the Courts jurisdiction ratione temporis in the specific circumstances of the case.

7.  We could agree with the majoritys opinion that the Šilih principles need some clarification (see paragraphs 140-41 of the judgment). In a situation in which the death in question occurred before the critical date, the Courts jurisdiction is limited to the period after that date for the procedural obligations stemming from Article 2 of the Convention (first principle). In order to establish the Courts jurisdiction ratione temporis, the Court requires a “genuine connection” between the death and the entry into force of the Convention in respect of the State concerned (second principle). If there is no genuine connection, the Court can exceptionally assume jurisdiction based on the need to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are applied and upheld in a real and effective manner (third principle, the so-called humanitarian clause). We disagree, however, with some aspects of the clarification and the concrete application of those principles to the case at hand, where the majoritys finding overlooked vital factual and legal elements.

(a)  The first Šilih principle: procedural acts and omissions after the crucial date

8.  Regarding the first principle, the majority defines “procedural acts” in a narrow way, that is, in the sense of “acts undertaken in the framework of criminal, civil or disciplinary proceedings which are capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible or to an award of compensation”, and excludes “other types of inquiries that may be carried out for other purposes, such as establishing a historical truth” (see paragraphs 143 et seq. of the judgment).

9.  This distinction is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the two types of proceedings might very often go hand in hand, and it would be difficult in practice to separate one from the other. Sometimes, one procedural step is a precondition for another. Secondly, in international law there is a clear trend towards recognising a right to the truth in cases of gross human rights violations (see United Nations Human Rights Committee, Mariam Sankara et al. v. Burkina FasoCommunication No. 1159/2003, § 12.2, and Schedko v. Belarus, Communication No. 886/1999, § 10.2; see also the 8th recital of the Preamble and Article 24(2) of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, New York, 20 December 2006, in force since 23 December 2010, 40 States Parties). The Court has also recognised such a right via its jurisprudence (see the Chamber judgment in this case, § 163; see also El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630/09§ 191, ECHR 2012; Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/9016065/9016066/9016068/9016069/9016070/9016071/9016072/90 and 16073/90, §§ 200-02, ECHR 2009; and Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania, nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08§ 144, 24 May 2011).

10.  Under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the Court requires a thorough and effective investigation whenever an individual is killed or is presumed to have been killed by State agents (as regards Article 2, see AlSkeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07§§ 163 and 166-67, ECHR 2011, and Bazorkina v. Russia, no. 69481/01§§ 117-19, 27 July 2006; see also Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00, 24 February 2005; Isayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 57947/0057948/00 and 57949/00, 24 February 2005; and Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, 24 February 2005), or whenever an arguable claim of a violation of Article 3 is raised (see El-Masricited above, § 182). For example, in ElMasri (cited above, § 182) the Grand Chamber found:

[W]here an individual raises an arguable claim that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with ... Article 1 of the Convention ..., requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation ... capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible.

As regards Article 2, the Court has stated:

[T]he investigation must be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to a determination of whether the force used was or was not justified in the circumstances and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but of means. The authorities must take the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident ...” (see Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 166)

In disappearance cases the Court emphasises:

[T]he procedural obligation will, potentially, persist as long as the fate of the person is unaccounted for; the ongoing failure to provide the requisite investigation will be regarded as a continuing violation. This is even so where death may, eventually, be presumed and even if this death had occurred prior to the ratification of the Convention by the respondent State.” (see Tashukhadzhiyev v. Russia, no. 33251/04§ 76, 25 October 2011)

11.  In determining whether the procedural obligation to investigate the killings of Polish prisoners of war falls within the ratione temporis jurisdiction of the Court, the majority refers to the relevant principles as recently clarified in three main judgments: Varnava and Others (cited above), Šilih (cited above), and Blečić v. Croatia ([GC], no. 59532/00ECHR 2006-III – see paragraphs 128-31 of the judgment). It should be pointed out that in Varnava and Others the Court dealt with a particular situation of continuing human rights violations in respect of which Turkey had not elucidated the facts. The Court, while referring to its previous case-law, took into consideration the specificities of the case concerned. In fact, it refuted the Governments reliance on Blečić and its argument that complaints concerning such investigations, or lack of them, fell foul of the principle that procedures aimed at redressing violations do not affect the lack of temporal jurisdiction for facts occurring beforehand” (Varnava and Others, cited above, § 136). The Court held as follows (ibid., § 136):

“This argument fails since the procedural obligation to investigate under Article 2 is not a procedure of redress within the meaning of Article 35 § 1. The lack of an effective investigation itself is the heart of the alleged violation. It has its own distinct scope of application which can operate independently from the substantive limb of Article 2, which is concerned with State responsibility for any unlawful death or life-threatening disappearance, as shown by the numerous cases decided by the Court where a procedural violation has been found in the absence of any finding that State agents were responsible for the use of lethal force (see, amongst many examples, Finucane v. the United Kingdom, no. 29178/95, ECHR 2003VIII).

The Court was very clear in stating that the character of the right claimed has a bearing on its jurisdiction. The Court said that “the continuing nature” of the violations involved “has implications for the ratione temporis jurisdiction of the Court” (ibid., § 139). It is our submission that the Court, while having a standard procedure for assessing its ratione temporis jurisdiction, which is clearly summed up in the Blečić judgment (concerning loss of property as an instantaneous act), must also respond to the nature of the right invoked.

12.  Finally, it is recalled that the discovery of new material after the critical date may give rise to a fresh obligation to investigate. We fully subscribe to these principles, which are well established in the Courts case-law.

13.  Unfortunately these very same principles have been wrongly applied to the facts of the case in hand (see paragraphs 142-44 of the majority judgment).

Procedural shortcomings

14.  Turning to the facts of the case, the Court holds tersely that it is “impossible, on the basis of the information available in the case file and in the parties submissions, to identify any real investigative steps after 5 May 1998” (see paragraph 159 of the judgment). With this, it is our opinion that the majority not only overlooks the fact that proceedings continued until the decision of 2004 (see paragraph 45), which was confirmed in 2009 (see paragraph 60), but also fails to give sufficient importance to the significant shortcomings in the investigation into the deaths, to the apparent contradictions between the various proceedings and to the partially arbitrary attitude of the Russian authorities.

15.  In 2004, the domestic proceedings resulted in the classification of thirty-six volumes of the relevant files as “top secret”; an additional eight volumes were classified as “for internal use only” (see paragraph 45). Judges Spielmann, Villiger and Nußberger rightly found it to be “inconsistent, and hence shocking” that “what was initially a transparent investigation ended in total secrecy” (see the Chamber judgment, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Spielmann, Villiger and Nußberger, paragraph 8). Furthermore, the Russian Government refused to provide the Court with a copy of the decision of the Chief Military Prosecutors Office of 21 September 2004, in which it decided to discontinue criminal investigation no. 159 into the origin of the mass graves in Kharkov. The decisions secret classification was given as justification for this refusal (see paragraphs 45 et seq. of the judgment). Attempts to achieve the declassification of the decision were unsuccessful (see paragraphs 61 et seq.).

16.  The lack of transparency regarding the application for declassification of the decision represents just one of the shortcomings of the domestic proceedings. Further shortcomings regarding the complaint under Article 2 include the failure of the Russian authorities to account for the difference between the number of individuals actually killed and those they considered to have “perished”, as well as the lack of transparency regarding the refusal to grant the applicants the status of injured parties. In addition, the declaration by the Russian military courts that the relatives of the applicants were “missing persons” is illogical considering that Russian prosecutors had previously confirmed the execution of those individuals (see paragraph 122). Furthermore, the domestic authorities failed to undertake an investigation “geared towards identifying the perpetrators and bringing them to justice”, despite the fact that at least two of the functionaries implicated were alive in the 1990s (see paragraph 119). Lastly, the Russian authorities argued that the domestic proceedings could not be conducted to the standards of the law of criminal procedure because they had been conducted “for political reasons, as a goodwill gesture to the Polish authorities” (see paragraphs 109 and 111). Such an “exemption” of the proceedings from the procedural requirements of Article 2 is arbitrary and untenable. Further evidence of the generally uncooperative attitude of the Russian authorities can be found in the arbitrary denial of rehabilitation of the relatives of the applicants (see paragraphs 86 et seq.). These shortcomings render the domestic procedure insufficient as regards the requirements of Article 2 of the Convention.

Isolated violation of Article 38

17.  In this context, it is important to note that, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time in the Courts history that an isolated violation of Article 38 has been found. So far, all of the cases in which the Court found that a State had failed to comply with the obligations under Article 38 also concerned another Convention right (mostly Article 2 or 3) which the Court found to have been violated. On the one hand, the present judgment emphasises the autonomous character of the obligation to cooperate. On the other, it raises certain suspicions about the finding concerning Articles 2 and 3. In other instances, where a States failure to submit information to the Court resulted in a finding of a breach of Article 38, the Court associated that failure with “the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicants allegations” regarding the other Articles relied upon (see Timurtaş v. Turkey, no. 23531/94§§ 66 and 70, ECHR 2000-VI, and Bitiyeva and X v. Russia, nos. 57953/00 and 37392/03§ 122, 21 June 2007).

Discovery of new material

18.  Finally, the majority states that the discovery of new material after the critical date may give rise to a fresh obligation to investigate, but – where the triggering event lies outside of the Courts temporal jurisdiction – only if either the “genuine connection” test or the “Convention values” test is met (see paragraph 144). This connection between the triggering of a fresh obligation to investigate and the Šilih principles is not as straightforward as the judgment makes it seem. For example, in Stanimirović v. Serbia (no. 26088/06, §§ 28 et seq., 18 October 2011) the emergence of significant new evidence seems alternative, and not cumulative, to these principles. The same is true for Mrdenović v. Croatia ((dec.), no. 62726/10, 5 June 2012).

19.  In this context, it is necessary to mention the events between 1998 and 2004 (see paragraph 121), and in particular the discovery of “the Ukrainian list” in 2002 (see paragraph 113). Furthermore, 2010 was a decisive year in the proceedings, and this for two reasons: firstly, the disclosure of essential historical documents on the website of the Russian State Archives Service on 28 April 2010 manifested a change in the Russian authorities attitude which gave some hope to the applicants (see paragraph 24); secondly, we consider the fact that the Russian Duma adopted a statement on the Katyn tragedy on 26 November 2010, that is, more than twelve years after the crucial date, as significant. It is unusual for a national parliament to acknowledge responsibility for gross human rights violations. The change in the attitude of Russia is a vital step in the process of coming to terms with the past. The Duma recognised not only “that the mass extermination of Polish citizens on USSR territory during the Second World War had been an arbitrary act by the totalitarian State” and “that the Katyn crime was carried out on the direct orders of Stalin and other Soviet leaders”, but emphasised that work for the establishment of the facts “must be carried on”. We consider the Dumas statement as a clear political signal of a new approach by the Russian government, an approach desiring that all the circumstances of the tragedy be uncovered.

(b)  The second Šilih principle: the “genuine connection” test

20.  As to the “genuine connection” between the triggering event and the entry into force of the Convention in respect of the respondent State, the majoritys finding emphasises the time element and, by referring to classic cases of disappearance, repeats that the period concerned should not exceed ten years (see paragraph 146). In exceptional circumstances, the majoritys finding allows an extension of the time-limit further into the past, but only “on condition that the requirements of the Convention values test have been met” (ibid.).

21.  We do not agree with this interpretation of the “genuine connection” test. The exceptional circumstances allowing the extension of the time-limit must be interpreted separately from the third Šilih principle. Otherwise, the two conditions would merge together and would not have independent meaning. Furthermore, such an interpretation is clearly incompatible with international law in the case of war crimes, and the Court, in its interpretation of the Convention, must respect international law. For example, in the travaux préparatoires to the Convention, in 1950, the Committee of Experts instructed to draw up a draft Convention providing a collective guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedoms made it clear that, in accordance with international law on State responsibility, “[the] jurisprudence of a European Court will never ... introduce any new element or one contrary to existing international law”[1]. The history of the Convention thus shows that it was not designed to function in isolation, but was instead intended to harmonise with international law. This principle is well established in the Courts jurisprudence:

“In the Courts view, the principles underlying the Convention cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum. Mindful of the Conventions special character as a human rights treaty, it must also take into account any relevant rules of international law when deciding on disputes concerning its jurisdiction pursuant to Article 49 of the Convention (art. 49).” (see Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 18 December 1996, § 43 Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI)

In Nada v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 10593/08, § 169, ECHR 2012), the Court elaborated this further by saying:

“Moreover, the Court reiterates that the Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum but must be interpreted in harmony with the general principles of international law. Account should be taken, as indicated in Article 31 § 3 (c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, of any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties, and in particular the rules concerning the international protection of human rights ...

22.  There is no doubt that the Katyn massacre must be qualified as a war crime (see paragraph 140 of the Chamber judgment, and paragraph 6 of the joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Spielmann, Villiger and Nußberger in the Chamber judgment)[2]. The Court has recently pointed out:

[B]y May 1944 war crimes were defined as acts contrary to the laws and customs of war and that international law had defined the basic principles underlying, and an extensive range of acts constituting, those crimes. States were at least permitted (if not required) to take steps to punish individuals for such crimes, including on the basis of command responsibility. Consequently, during and after the Second World War, international and national tribunals prosecuted soldiers for war crimes committed during the Second World War.” (see Kononov v. Latvia [GC], no. 36376/04§ 213, ECHR 2010)

This statement by the Court reflects the relevant state of international law already in the 1940s. Since then, the obligation to investigate and prosecute serious violations of international humanitarian law has gained in prominence and detail. The majority view correctly refers to the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (see paragraph 151). Article IV of that Convention spells out the obligation concerned as well as the principle that statutory limitations do not apply in relation to the obligation to prosecute those responsible.

23.  Also regarding statutory limitations for proceedings concerning war crimes, it is relevant to recall Article 7 § 2 of the Convention. A long-established understanding of the Court based on the travaux préparatoires to the Convention has been:

[T]he purpose of the second paragraph of Article 7 was to specify that Article 7 did not affect laws which, in the wholly exceptional circumstances at the end of the Second World War, were passed in order to punish, inter alia, war crimes so that Article 7 does not in any way aim to pass legal or moral judgment on those laws (see X. v. Belgium, no. 268/57, Commission decision of 20 July 1957, Yearbook 1, p. 241). The Court further notes that the definition of war crimes included in Article 6(b) of the [Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter)] was found to be declaratory of international laws and customs of war as understood in 1939 ...” (see Kononov, cited above, § 186)

In other words, the Convention does not prevent laws aimed at punishing war crimes. As noted in the previous paragraph, it also accepts that such an obligation exists under international law. In its decision in Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia ((dec.), nos. 23052/04 and 24018/04, ECHR 2006-I) the Court noted that no statutory limitation applies to crimes against humanity, irrespective of the date on which they were committed.

24.  We would point out that, while the applicants have an undeniable interest in the elucidation of the fate of their family members, it is equally clear that the obligation to investigate and prosecute those responsible for grave human rights and serious humanitarian law violations serves fundamental public interests by allowing a nation to learn from its history and by combating impunity. It has been recognised in a series of international instruments that “there can be no just and lasting reconciliation unless the need for justice is effectively satisfied” and “that national and international measures must be taken for that purpose with a view to securing jointly, in the interests of the victims of violations, observance of the right to know and, by implication, the right to the truth, the right to justice and the right to reparation, without which there can be no effective remedy against the pernicious effects of impunity” (see the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Updated Set of Principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1). The right to the truth is “a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations” and protects the collective memory of the affected people, which is a part of its heritage (ibid.).

25.  The argument of the Russian Government (see paragraph 110 of the judgment) that there existed no binding international humanitarian law on the definition of responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity is untenable. At the time, customary international law, as codified by the Hague Convention IV of 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1929, which required in no uncertain terms the humane treatment of prisoners of war, applied to all States concerned.

26.  While Russia existed under a different political regime in 1907, it was this very State that had initiated the conferences which resulted in the adoption of the Hague laws: Nicholas II, the Tsar of Russia, had convened the International Peace Conference at the Hague in 1899, which – in a second meeting in 1907 – led to the adoption of the Hague Convention IV[3]. The Russian Empire was one of the original signatories of the Hague Convention and ratified it on 27 November 1909. There is also considerable evidence which speaks in favour of the thesis that the Russian Federation continues the legal personality of the former USSR, having inherited obligations entered into under the Soviet regime[4]. In Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99§ 378, ECHR 2004-VII) the Court also noted at the outset that the Russian Federation is the successor State to the USSR under international law. There is no question under international law that, despite the changes of government, Russia has always existed as the same State.

27.  However, even according to the rules of State succession, the argument must be made that the USSR was bound by the international obligations of Tsarist Russia. Under public international law, a solid body of literature and practice speaks for an exemption of State obligations under human rights treaties from the tabula rasa of treaty obligations on a new State: these obligations do not end with the ratifying State, but are transferred to its successor State(s)[5]. For example, the Human Rights Committee considers:

[O]nce the people are accorded the protection of the rights under the Covenant, such protection devolves with territory and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in Government of the State party, including ... State succession ...[6]

Moreover, it must be noted that, in 1954, the USSR ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949[7]. At the Nuremberg trial, the Soviet prosecutor attempted to charge leading Nazis with the Katyn massacre, thereby showing that Russia considered the prohibition of war crimes such as those concerned here to be a binding principle of international law (see paragraph 140 of the Chamber judgment). According to both the rules of State continuity and those of State succession, and plainly in view of the applicable rules of customary law, the Governments submission that they are not bound by the international humanitarian law on war crimes thus violates the principle of venire contra factum proprium. In light of the above, we must conclusively find that the massacre of the Polish prisoners of war in 1940 constituted a violation of the prohibition of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Under customary international humanitarian law, States have an obligation “to investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or armed forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects”[8]. There is no time-limit on this obligation, for war crimes and crimes against humanity are imprescriptible[9].

28.  Finally, paragraph 148 of the judgment must be read with some caution. We agree that in principle both of the criteria mentioned therein must be fulfilled, that is, only a short time should have passed between the death and the entry into force of the Convention for the State concerned, and the major part of the investigation must have been carried out or ought to have been carried out after the entry into force. However, in a situation such as that in the case at hand, where the national authorities denied any connection to or responsibility for the Katyn crimes for over forty years, the mere counting of years leads to an absurd result. In particular, the period of deadlock, in which any procedural steps were completely blocked and the victims did not have the slightest hope of making any progress in finding out who was responsible for the death of their relatives, should not be held against the applicants.

29.  The above is sufficient for us to conclude that the Court should have accepted its jurisdiction ratione temporis on the basis of the first two Šilih principles in this case. However, even if one were to deny the existence of the “genuine connection”, we are of the view that this case was perfectly suited for the application of the so-called “humanitarian clause”.

(c)  The third Šilih principle: the “humanitarian clause”

30.  According to the third Šilih principle, a connection might not be qualified as “genuine”, but may nonetheless be sufficient to establish the Courts jurisdiction if “it is needed to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are protected in a real and effective way” (see paragraph 141 of the judgment).

31.  We agree with the circumscription of the “underlying values of the Convention” as applied by the Chamber judgment (see paragraph 119 of that judgment) and repeated by the majority (see paragraph 150 of the present judgment). The “humanitarian clause” allows the Court to acknowledge its jurisdiction in cases of gross human rights violations of a larger dimension than those resulting from ordinary criminal offences, that is, those events falling under the definitions of war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity contained in the relevant international instruments.

32.  However, the Court does not apply the humanitarian clause, arguing that it “cannot be applied to events which occurred prior to the adoption of the Convention, on 4 November 1950” (see paragraph 151). This stand is most problematic for several reasons.

33.  Firstly, if the crucial sentence in paragraph 151 of the judgment means what it says, the majority should have stopped the examination at that very point. In other words, the examination of the events after the ratification of the Convention by the respondent State in paragraphs 158 and 159 is superfluous, if not contradictory. Secondly, this interpretation of the “humanitarian clause” closes the Courts door to victims of any gross human rights violation that occurred prior to the existence of the Convention, although it is clearly accepted today that the States concerned carry a continuing procedural obligation to establish the facts, to find the perpetrators and to punish them. Thirdly, the majoritys position contradicts a principle well established in the Courtcase-law, namely that the Convention shall not be interpreted in splendid isolation, but is to be interpreted taking into account the relevant international law (see Nada, cited above, § 169; AlAdsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no35763/97§ 55, ECHR 2001-XI; and Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08§§ 76 and 105, ECHR 2011). In paragraph 151, the Court creates an artificial distinction between the relevant international law and the Convention, finding that the “Convention values” clause is inapplicable to events occurring before the adoption of the Convention in 1950. This distinction was not made in the previous case-law, which had not given the Court the opportunity to consider a case potentially falling under the “Convention values” clause (see paragraph 149). Lastly, it must be noted that the killings committed in 1940 were, also at the time of their commission, in violation of the authorities obligations under customary international law.

34.  We thus agree that “the gravity and magnitude of the war crimes committed in 1940 in Katyn, Kharkov and Tver, coupled with the attitude of the Russian authorities after the entry into force of the Convention, warrant application of the special-circumstances clause in the last sentence of paragraph 163 [of the Šilih judgment]” (see Chamber judgment, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Spielmann, Villiger and Nußbergerparagraph 4). According to Article 32 § 2 of the Convention (see paragraph 3 above), the Court has the competence to define its own jurisdiction. With this judgment, the Court has missed an opportunity to fulfil this very task and thereby uphold the “Convention values” clause in the Šilih principles. In doing so, it has deprived that clause of its humanitarian effect in the case at hand and potentially weakened its effect in the event of its future application. This approach is untenable if the Convention system is to fulfil the role for which it was intended: to provide a Court that would act as a “conscience” for Europe[10].

35.  In accordance with its purpose as Europes conscience, the Convention is intended to guarantee “not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective” (see Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760/06§ 231, ECHR 2012). The interpretation of the humanitarian clause by the majority contradicts this very aim. We regret the majoritys interpretation of the humanitarian clause in the most non-humanitarian way.

III.  Conclusion

36.  We express our profound disagreement and dissatisfaction with the findings of the majority in this case, a case of most hideous human rights violations, which turn the applicants long history of justice delayed into a permanent case of justice denied.


[1].  Commentary to Article 39 (43) (new) in the Collected Edition of the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the European Convention on Human Rights, 8 vols., The Hague 19751985, vol. IV, at 44.

[2].  See also W.A. Schabas, Victor’s Justice: Selecting Situations at the International Criminal Court”, 43 John Marshall Law Review 535, at 536.

[3].  Preamble to the Final Act of the International Peace Conference, The Hague, 29 July 1899, and Final Act of the Second Peace Conference, The Hague, 18 October 1907.

[4].  See H. Hamant, Démembrement de l’URSS et problèmes de succession d’États, Bruylant, 2007, p. 128. Support for this argument can be found in the recognition by the USSR, in 1955, of the obligations under the Hague Convention as incurred by Tsarist Russia (Soviet note to the Netherlands, cited in G.B. Baldwin, “A New Look at the Law of War: Limited War and Field Manual 27-10”, Military Law Review 1 (1959), pp. 1-38).

[5].  M.T. Kamminga, “State Succession in Respect of Human Rights Treaties”, 7 European Journal of International Law 4 (1996) 469-484, pp. 472 et seq.: F. Pocar, “Some Remarks On the Continuity of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Treaties,” in E. Cannizzaro, The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention, Oxford University Press: Oxford 2011, pp. 292 et seq.

[6].  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 26 (61) on the Continuity of Obligations, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1, 8 December 1997, paragraph 4.

[7].  Table of Ratifications of the Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949, available at: <http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=365>, accessed 26 August 2013.

[8].  J.-M.Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2005, Rule 158, p. 607; First Geneva Convention (Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 195 States Parties, in force since 21 October 1950), Art. 49; Second Geneva Convention (Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 195 States Parties, in force since 21 October 1950), Art. 50; Third Geneva Convention (Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 195 States Parties, in force since 21 October 1950), Art. 129; Fourth Geneva Convention (Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 195 States Parties, in force since 21 October 1950), Art. 146; UN General Assembly Resolutions 2583 (XXIV) of 15 December 1969 and 2712 (XXV) of 15 December 1970; United Nations Principles of international co-operation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 3074 (XXVIII) of 3 December 1973.

[9].  Compare the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity of 26 November 1968, United Nations Treaty Series vol. 754, p. 73, in force since 11 November 1970, 54 States Parties.

[10].  Statement of Lynn Ungoed-Thomas (United Kingdom) at the first session of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, in Collected Edition of the “Travaux Préparatoires of the European Convention on Human Rightsvol. II, p. 174.

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Presuda je povezana sa rešenjem Rev 627/2020 od 07.02.2020. Vrhovnog kasacionog suda, kojim se odbacuje kao nedozvolјena revizija predlagača izjavlјena protiv rešenja Višeg suda u Leskovcu Ržg 216/19 od 22.11.2019. godine.

Rešenjem Višeg suda u Leskovcu Ržg 216/19 od 22.11.2019. godine, odbijena je žalba punomoćnika predlagača izjavlјena protiv rešenja Osnovnog suda u Leskovcu R4 I 109/19 od 09.09.2019. godine, kojim je odbijen prigovor predlagača za ubrzanje postupka, zbog povrede prava na suđenje u razumnom roku u predmetu tog suda I 7838/10, kao neosnovan.
Protiv navedenog rešenja, predlagač je blagovremeno izjavila reviziju zbog bitne povrede odredaba parničnog postupka, pogrešnog i nepotpuno utvrđenog činjeničnog stanja i pogrešne primene materijalnog prava, s tim što je predložila da se revizija smatra izuzetno dozvolјenom, u skladu sa odredbom član 404. ZPP.

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Član 41 | DIC | Stojanović protiv Hrvatske
Presuda je povezana sa rešenjem Rev 3050/2019 od 18.09.2019. godine godine, Vrhovnog kasacionog suda, kojim se odbacuje revizija tužene izjavlјena protiv presude Višeg suda u Vranju Gž 1751/18 od 13.11.2018. godine i odbija kao neosnovan zahtev tužioca za naknadu troškova odgovora na reviziju.

Presudom Osnovnog suda u Vranju Prr1 22/17 od 09.02.2018. godine, obavezana je tužena da tužiocu plati na ime naknade imovinske štete izazvane povredom prava na suđenje u razumnom roku u predmetu Opštinskog suda u Vranju
I br. 1012/09 (ranije I. br. 850/05) iznose sa zateznom kamatom od dospeća pa do isplate bliže navedene u izreci pod 1. Tužana je obavezana da tužiocu na ime troškova parničnog postupka plati iznos od 24.000,00 dinara.
Viši sud u Vranju je presudom Gž 1751/18 od 13.11.2018. godine odbio kao neosnovanu žalbu tužene i potvrdio presudu Osnovnog suda u Vranju Prr1 22/17 od 09.02.2018. godine. Odbijen je zahtev tužene za naknadu troškova drugostepenog postupka.

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