Stakić protiv Crne Gore

 EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA 

ĈETVRTO ODJELJENJE

 PREDMET STAKIĆ PROTIV CRNE GORE

 (Predstavka br. 49320/07)

 PRESUDA

 STRAZBUR

 2. oktobar 2012. godine

Ova presuda postaće pravosnažna u okolnostima izloženim u članu 44 stav 2 Konvencije. Ona može biti predmet redaktorskih izmjena. 

U predmetu Stakić protiv Crne Gore, Evropski sud za ljudska prava (Ĉetvrto odjeljenje), zasijedajući u Vijeću u sastavu:

Lech Garlicki, predsjednik,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Päivi Hirvelä,
George Nicolaou,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva,
Nebojša Vuĉinić,
Vincent A. De Gaetano, sudije,
i Fatoş Aracı, zamjenik sekretara odjeljenja,

nakon vijećanja bez prisustva javnosti dana 11. septembra 2012. godine, donosi sljedeću presudu koja je usvojena toga dana:

POSUPAK

1. Predmet je pokrenut predstavkom (br. 49320/07) protiv Crne Gore koju je novembra 2007. godine Sudu po ĉlanu 34 Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: Konvencija) podnio državljanin Crne Gore, g. Momir Stakić (u daljem tekstu: podnosilac predstavke).
2. Podnosioca predstavke zastupao je Z. Đukanović, advokat sa praksom u Zemunu u Srbiji. Vladu Crne Gore (u daljem tekstu: Vlada) zastupao je njen zastupnik, g. Z. Pažin.
3. Podnosilac predstavke žalio se na dužinu parniĉnog postupka i nepostojanje djelotvornog pravnog lijeka za to.
4. Dana 6. januara 2010. godine o ovoj predstavci obaviještena je  Takodje je odluĉeno da se o prihvatljivosti i meritumu predstavke odluĉuje u isto vrijeme (ĉlan 29 stav 1).

ĈINJENICE

I OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA 

5. Podnosilac je rodjen 1953. godine u Zemunu (Srbija) gdje i živi. 

A.     Parnični postupak

6. Dana 21. februara 1977. godine Okružni sud u Podgorici utvrdio je da su lica X, Y i Z kriva za kriviĉno djelo učestvovanje u tuči dana 14. jula 1973. godine
7. Dana 18. decembra 1978. godine podnosilac predstavke pokrenuo je parniĉni postupak protiv X, Y i Z tražeći naknadu za povredu oka koju je pretrpio u tuĉi i kasniji gubitak vida na desnom oku, te za gubitak prihoda do koga je došlo zbog njegove umanjene sposobnosti za rad.
8. Dana 18. marta 1980. godine Opštinski sud u Podgorici presudio je dijelom u korist podnosioca predstavke na osnovu njegovih svjedoĉanstava, radne knjižice, dokumenata koji se odnose na njegovu povredu i lijeĉenje, te na osnovu izjava dva vještaka. Tu presudu dijelom je potvrdio Okružni sud u Podgorici 30. decembra 1980. godine. Dana 10. maja godine Vrhovni sud u Podgorici poništio je prethodne presude i naložio ponovno otvaranje postupka. U spisima predmeta nema informacija o tome koliko je rasprava održano i/ili odloženo prije nego što je Vrhovni sud donio svoju presudu
9. Izmedju 10. maja i 21. juna godine odloženo je pet roĉišta, a održano jedno. U periodu izmedju 23. septembra 1985. godine i 6. januara 1986. godine sporni postupak obustavljen je zbog odsustva podnosioca predstavke sa prethodnog roĉišta.
10. Dana 21. juna godine Osnovni sud u Podgorici presudio je dijelom u korist Podnosioca predstavke. Ova presuda bazirala se na prethodno iznesenim dokazima, kao i na drugim dokumentima koji su se odnosili na zdravlje i radni odnos podnosioca predstavke, te na još tri mišljenja vještaka. Dana 14. maja 1991. godine Viši sud u Podgorici poništio je prvostepenu presudu i naložio ponovno otvaranje postupka
11. U periodu izmedju maja 1991. godine i 16. oktobra 2008. godine još je sedam roĉišta odloženo, a jedno je održano.
12. Dana 16. oktobra 2008. godine Osnovni sud u Podgorici presudio je dijelom u korist podnosioca predstavke. Presuda se bazirala na: mišljenjima ĉetiri vještaka koja su data do novembra 1986. godine, dokumentima koji su dobijeni do maja godine, izjavama ĉetiri svjedoka koje su date u periodu izmedju marta 1997. godine i aprila 2002. godine i izjavama podnosioca predstavke, X i jos jednog vještaka koja je data izmedju 6. novembra 2005. godine i 19. novembra 2007. godine.
13. Dana 18. septembra 2009. godine, Viši sud u Podgorici poništio je ovu presudu i naložio ponovno otvaranje postupka
14. Dana 13. septembra 2010. godine Osnovni sud odluĉio je da predmet treba zapoĉeti iznova, s obzirom na to da je dodijeljen novom sudiji. Sud je tražio još jedno mišljenje finansijskog vještaka. Što se tiĉe ostalih dokaza stranke su se saglasile da može da se proĉita zapisnik sa prethodnih roĉišta.
15. Naredno roĉište zakazano je za 2. novembar 2010. godine. U spisima predmeta nema informacija o tome da li je došlo do tih roĉišta, niti da li je bilo daljih dešavanja u ovom predmetu. 

B. Ostale relevantne informacije 

16. Do 3. marta 2004. godine, kada je Konvencija stupila na snagu za tuženu državu, podnosilac predstavke nekoliko puta je izmijenio iznos naknade koju je tražio i odloženo je devet rasprava zbog toga što on nije bio prisutan ili zato što je on podnio zahtjev za to.
17. Nakon što je Konvencija stupila na snagu za Crnu Goru, podnosilac predstavke izmijenio je iznos koji je tražio u dva navrata.
18. Dana 19. januara 2006. godine podnosilac predstavke tražio je dodatno finansijsko vještaĉenje.
19. U spisima predmeta nema informacija o tome koliko je ukupno roĉišta održano i/ili odloženo.
20. Y je preminuo dana 19. maja 2007. godine, a Z dana 14. maja 1988. godine.

II RELEVANTNO DOMAĆE PRAVO 

A.     Ustav Crne Gore iz 2007. godine, objavljen u Službenom listu Crne Gore br. 1/07)

21. Ĉlan 32 predvidja, izmedju ostalog, da svako ima pravo na praviĉno i javno sudjenje u razumnom roku.
22. Ĉlan 149 Ustava predvidja da Ustavni sud odluĉuje o ustavnoj žalbi koja se predaje u vezi sa navodnom povredom ljudskog prava ili slobode koja se jemĉi Ustavom nakon što su iscrpljeni svi drugi djelotvorni pravni lijekovi.
23. Ovaj Ustav stupio je na snagu 22. oktobra 2007. godine. 

B.     Zakon o Ustavnom sudu Crne Gore; objavljen u Službenom listu Crne Gore br. 64/08) 

24. Ĉlan 48 predvidja da ustavna žalba može da se preda protiv pojedinaĉne odluke državnog organa, upravnog organa, organa lokalne saouprave ili pravnog lica koje vrši javna ovlašćenja, zbog povrede ljudskih prava i sloboda koje se jemĉe Ustavom, nakon što su iscrpljeni svi drugi djelotvorni domaći pravni lijek.
25. Ĉlanovima 49-59 predvidjaju se detaljnije aspekti koji se odnose na procesuiranje ustavnih žalbi. Konkretno, ĉlan 56 predvidja da kada Ustavni sud utvrdi povredu ljudskog prava ili slobode, on poništava spornu odluku u cijelosti ili dijelom i nalaže da se predmet ponovo ispita u istom organu koji je donio poništenu odluku.
26. Ovaj Zakon stupio je na snagu u novembru 2008. godine. 

C.     Zakon o zaštiti prava na suđenje u razumnom roku; objavljen u Službenom listu Crne Gore br. 11/07)

27. Ovaj zakon predvidja, u odredjenim okolnostima, mogućnost da se dug postupak ubrza putem kontrolnog zahtjeva, kao i mogućnost da se licu koje se žali dosudi naknada po tužbi za praviĉno zadovoljenje.
28. Ĉlan 44, konkretno, predvidja da se ovaj Zakon primjenjuje retroaktivno na sve postupke od marta 2004. godine, ali da će se u obzir uzeti i trajanje postupka prije tog datuma.
29. Ovaj Zakon stupio je na snagu 21. decembra 2007. godine, ali se u njemu nisu pominjale predstavke u kojima se radilo o dužini trajanja postupka, a koje su već bile predate Sudu. 

D.     Zakon o sudovima; objavljen u Službenom listu Republike Crne Gore -br. 05/02, 49/04, 22/08 i 39/11) 

30. Ĉlan 7 predvidja da svako ima pravo na nepristrasno sudjenje u razumnom roku. 

E.     Zakon o parničnom postupku, objavljen u Službenom listu Republike Crne Gore br. 22/04, 28/05 i 76/06) 

31. Ĉlan 11 stav 1, izmedju ostalog, predvidja obavezu domaćih sudova da obezbijede da se postupci vode bez odlaganja i u razumnom roku.

PRAVO

I NAVODNA POVREDA ĈLANA 6 STAV 1 KONVENCIJE 

32. Podnosilac predstavke žalio se po ĉlanu 6 Konvencije na dužinu gore pomenutog postupka.
33. Relevantni dio ovog ĉlana glasi:

“Svako, tokom odluĉivanja o njegovim gradjanskim pravima i obavezama ... ima pravo na... raspravu u razumnom roku pred... sudom...”.

A.     Prihvatljivost

1. Argumenti strana

34. Vlada je navela da podnosilac predstavke nije iscrpio sve djelotvorne domaće pravne lijekove koji su mu bili na raspolaganju. On naroĉito nije podnio kontrolni zahtjev i tužbu za praviĉno zadovoljenje koji su bili predvidjeni Zakonom o zaštiti prava na sudjenje u razumnom roku (v. stavove 27-29) ove presude. On takodje nije uložio ustavnu žalbu.
35. Podnosilac predstavke osporio je ove tvrdnje.

2. Relevantni principi

36. Sud podsjeća da, prema njegovoj utvrdjenoj sudskoj praksi, svrha pravila o domaćim pravnim lijekovima iz ĉlana 35 stav 1 Konvencije jeste da se stranama ugovornicama pruži prilika da sprijeĉe ili isprave navodne povrede, prije nego što se predaju Sudu.
37. Medjutim, jedini pravni lijekovi za koje Konvencija propisuje da moraju biti iscrpljeni su oni koji se odnose na navodne povrede i oni koji su u isto vrijeme dostupni i dovoljni (v. Selmouni protiv Francuske [GC], br. 25803/94, stav 75, ECHR 1999 V, McFarlane protiv Irske [GC], br. 31333/06, stav 107, ECHR 2010-...). Postojanje takvih lijekova mora biti dovoljno sigurno ne samo u teoriji već i u praksi, i ukoliko to nije sluĉaj oni nemaju propisanu dostupnost i djelotvornost. Zadatak je tužene države da utvrdi da su ovi razliĉiti uslovi ispunjeni (v. Vernillo protiv Francuske, 20. februar 1991. godine, stav 27, Serija A br. 198, i Dalia protiv Francuske, 19 februar 1998. godine, stav 38, Izvještaji 1998-I).
38. Kada se zadovolji ovaj teret dokazivanja, onda je zadatak podnosioca predstavke da utvrdi da pravni lijekovi koje je ponudila Vlada zapravo jesu bili upotrebljeni ili su iz nekog razloga bili neadekvatni ili nedjelotvorni u konkretnim okolnostima predmeta, ili da su postojale posebne okolnosti koje njega ili nju oslobadjaju od obaveze da ispuni uslov da te lijekove iscrpi (v. Dankevich protiv Ukrajine, br. 40679/98, stav 107, 7.april 2003. godine).

3. Ocjena Suda

39. Sud je već ranije izražavao stav da bi bilo nerazumno tražiti od podnosioca predstavke da pokuša da podnese kontrolni zahtjev na osnovu Zakona o zaštiti prava na sudjenje u razumnom roku u sluĉaju kada je domaći postupak bio u toku niz godina prije donošenja ovog zakona i u njemu nije donesena odluka, i kada se iz podnesaka Vlade ne može izvući nikakav zakljuĉak o djelotvornosti ovog pravnog lijeka (v. Boucke protiv Crne Gore, br. 26945/06, stavovi 72-74, 21. februar 2012. godine). Sud, medjutim, zadržava pravo da ponovo razmotri ovaj svoj stav ukoliko Vlada, navodeći konkretne predmete, pokaže djelotvornost ovog pravnog lijeka (v. Živaljević protiv Crne Gore, br. 17229/04, stav 66, 8. mart 2011).
40. S obzirom na ĉinjenicu da je sporni postupak bio otvoren više od dvadeset i osam godina prije nego što je na snagu stupio Zakon o zaštiti prava na sudjenje u razumnom roku, od ĉega je više od tri godine i devet mjeseci proteklo nakon što je Konvencija stupila na snagu u odnosu na tuženu državu, i da nisu podneseni podaci o novijoj sudskoj praksi koji bi se odnosili na efikasnost ovog konkretnog pravnog lijeka, Sud ne vidi razlog da odstupi od svog ranijeg nalaza i zakljuĉuje, stoga da se prigovor Vlade mora odbaciti.
41. Sud je takodje već izrazio stav da tužba za praviĉno zadovoljenje ne može da ubrza postupak dok je još u toku, i da ustavna žalba ne može da se smatra djelotvornim pravnim lijekom za dužinu postupka (v. Boucke protiv Crne Gore, citirano ranije u tekstu ove Presude, stavovi 75-79). Sud stoga ne vidi razloga da odstupi od svojih nalaza u ovom predmetu. Prigovor Vlade u tom smislu stoga se takodje mora odbaciti.
42. Sud konstatuje da ptitužba podnosioca predstavke nije oĉigledno neosnovana u smislu ĉlana 35 stav 3(a) Konvencije. Sud dalje konstatuje da ona nije neprihvatljiva ni po kojem drugom osnovu. Stoga se ona mora proglasiti prihvatljivom. 

B.     Meritum

1. Argumenti strana

43. Podnosilac predstavke potvrdio je svoju pritužbu. On je takodje naveo da je tražio da se neka od saslušanja odlože zbog njegovog zdravstvenog stanja.
44. Vlada je navela da je sporni postupak bio i ĉinjeniĉno i pravno složen i da je bilo potrebno saslušati niz svjedoka i vještaka. Konkretno, tokom perioda nad kojim Sud ima nadležnost ratione temporis, dato je pet mišljenja vještaka, i to svi na prijedlog podnosioca predstavke. Drugo, uglavnom je sam podnosilac predstavke bio odgovoran za dužinu postupka. Konkretno, on je mijenjao i precizirao svoj zahtjev u više navrata, od kojih su dva bila nakon što je Konvencija stupila na snagu u odnosu na Crnu Goru; nekoliko rasprava koje su bile zakazane u periodu izmedju 1983. i 2002. godine odložene su zbog njega, a sporni postupak bio je obustavljen u periodu izmedju 23. septembra 1985. godine i 6. januara 1986. godine zbog njegovog odsustva (v. stavove 9 i 16 - 17 ove presude). Treće, Y i Z u medjuvremenu su preminuli (v. stav 20 ove presude), zbog ĉega je bilo potrebno da se utvrde njihovi pravni sljedbenici, što je još uvećalo cjelokupnu dužinu postupka. I na kraju, sporni postupak nije bio  od suštinskog znaĉaja za podnosioca predstavke i, kao takav, nije iziskivao prioritet niti hitno djelovanje sudova. Sudovi su donijeli ukupno sedam odluka, od ĉega su dvije donesene u dva stepena nakon ratifikovanja Konvencije. Zbog toga se ne može reći da su sudovi bili neaktivni. Vlada je zakljuĉila da nije bilo povrede ĉlana 6 Konvencije.

2. Relevantni principi

45. Sud ponavlja da se o pitanju da li je dužina postupka razumna mora suditi u svjetlu okolnosti konkretnog predmeta i poštujući sljedeće kriterijume: složenost predmeta, ponašanje podnosilaca predstavke i relevantnih organa i znaĉaj predmeta spora za podnosioce predstavke (v. izmedju ostalog, Frydlender protiv Francuske [GC], br. 30979/96, stav 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
46. Da bi se utvrdilo da li je produženje postupka o kome je rijeĉ u razumnim granicama, mora se uzeti u obzir status predmeta na dan ratifikacije Konvencije (v. mutatis mutandis, Styranowski protiv Poljske, presuda od 30 oktobra 1998. godine, Izvještaji o presudama i odlukama 1998-VIII).

3. Ocjena Suda

47. Period koji treba uzeti u obzir poĉeo je marta 2004. godine, kada je Konvencija stupila na snagu u odnosu na Crnu Goru (v. Bijelić protiv Crne Gore i Srbije, br. 11890/05, stav 69, 28. april 2009. godine). Sporni postupak bio je, dakle, u okviru nadležnosti Suda ratione temporis u periodu od više od osam godina i šest mjeseci i još uvijek je bio otvoren u prvom stepenu, a prije tog datuma već je proteklo dvadeset i ĉetiri godine.
48. Sud konstatuje da se ovaj predmet odnosi na naknadu za povrede koje je podnosilac predstavke pretrpio u tuĉi. Sud napominje da su saslušana ĉetiri svjedoka i pet vještaka. Medjutim, suprotno podnesku Vlade, jasno je iz spisa predmeta da je većina tih dokaza dobijena prije nego što je Konvencija stupila na snagu u odnosu na tuženu državu (v. stav 12 ove presude). Iako se može prihvatiti da su neki zahtjevi za naknadu štete složeniji od drugih, Sud ne smatra da je ovaj zahtjev takve složenosti da bi se time mogla opravdati ovolika dužina postupka. Niti ĉinjenica da sporni postupak ne iziskuje prioritet ili hitno postupanje opravdava proceduralno odlaganje tolike dužine koja se može ĉak smatrati i de facto negiranjem pravde.
49. Konstatuje se da je podnosilac predstavke zaista izmijenio taĉan iznos naknade koju je tražio i to u dva navrata nakon što je Crna Gora ratifikovala Konvenciju. Sud, medjutim, ne smatra da je to moglo znaĉajno doprinijeti dužini postupka pošto zahtjev nije bio izmijenjen u svojoj suštini. Iako su neke od rasprava koje su bile zakazane prije 3. marta 2004. godine odložene na zahtjev podnosioca predstavke, ništa u spisima predmeta ne ukazuje na to da je do proceduralnih odlaganja nakon datuma ratifikacije došlo zbog njegovog ponašanja već prije da su ona nastala zbog propusta vlasti da budu marljive u svom postupanju.
50. Sud konstatuje da je prva odluka nakon što je tužena država ratifikovala Konvenciju donesena 16. oktobra 2008. godine, što je više od ĉetiri godine i sedam mjeseci nakon ratifikaciije. Nakon što je ova odluka poništena 18. septembra 2009. godine, predmet je otvoren pred prvostepenim sudom gotovo tri godine, a u medjuvremenu je održana je samo jedna rasprava (v. stavove 12 - 15 ove presude).
51. S obzirom na kriterijume predvidjene u sudskoj praksi Suda i relevantne ĉinjenice ovog predmeta, Sud je mišljenja da dužina postupka na koju se podnosilac predstavke žali ne ispunjava uslov razumnog roka. Shodno tome utvrdjuje se da je došlo do povrede ĉlana 6 stav 1 Konvencije.

II NAVODNA POVREDA 13 KONVENCIJE 

52. Podnosilac predstavke takodje se žalio po ĉlanu 13 da nije na raspolaganju imao djelotvoran pravni lijek da ubrza sporni postupak.
53. Ĉlan 13 predvidja sljedeće:

 “Svako kome su povrijedjena prava i slobode predvidjeni u ovoj Konvenciji ima pravo na djelotvoran pravni lijek pred nacionalnim vlastima, bez obzira jesu li povredu izvršila lica koja su postupala u službenom svojstvu."

A.     Prihvatljivost

54. Sud konstatuje da pritužba podnosioca predstavke povlaĉi pitanja ĉinjenica i prava po Konvenciji, ĉije utvrdjivanje iziskuje ispitivanje merituma. Sud takodje smatra da pritužba podnosioca predstavke nije oĉigledno neosnovana u okviru znaĉenja ĉlana 35 stav 3 (a) Konvencije i da ne može da bude odbaĉena ni po kom drugom osnovu. Stoga se predstavka mora proglasiti prihvatljivom. 

B.     Meritum 

55. Sud konstatuje da ĉlan 13 garantuje djelotvoran pravni lijek pred domaćim vlastima za navodnu povredu bilo kojih prava i sloboda garantovanih Konvencijom, ukljuĉujući pravo na sudjenje u razumnom roku po ĉlanu 6 stav 1 (v. izmedju ostalog, Kudła protiv Poljske [GC], br. 30210/96, stav 156, ECHR 2000-XI).
56. Sud podsjeća, dalje, da pravni lijek za dužinu postupka jeste "djelotvoran" ako može da se koristi ili da ubrza postupak pred sudovima koji rješavaju po predmetu, ili da obezbijede stranci u postupku adekvatno sredstvo za rješavanje odugovlaĉenja do koga je već došlo (v. Sürmeli protiv Njemačke [GC], br. 75529/01, stav 99, ECHR 2006-VII).
57. I na kraju, Sud naglašava da je najbolje rješenje u apsolutnom smislu i neosporno, kao i u mnogim oblastima, spreĉavanje. Kada je sudski sistem manjkav u odnosu na uslov razumnog roka iz ĉlana 6 stav 1 Konvencije, najdjelotvornije rješenje je pravni lijek koji je osmišljen da ubrza postupak da bi se sprijeĉilo da on postane pretjerano dug. Takav pravni lijek nudi neporecivu prednost u odnosu na pravni lijek koji nudi samo naknadu štete pošto on takodje spreĉava i da se utvrde kasnije povrede u odnosu na isti postupak i ne ispravlja povredu samo a posteriori, kako to ĉini pravni lijek naknade štete. Neke države su u potpunosti shvatile ovu situaciju i odabrale su da kombinuju dva tipa pravnih lijekova, jedan osmišljen da ubrza postupak i drugi da obezbijedi naknadu štete. (v. Scordino protiv Italije (br. 1) [GC], br. 36813/97, stavovi 183 i 186, ECHR 2006-V; i Sürmeli protiv Njemačke [GC], citirano ranije u tekstu ove presude, stav100).
58. Medjutim, kako je ranije navedeno, postojanje takvih pravnih lijekova mora biti dovoljno sigurno ne samo u teoriji već i u praksi, i ukoliko to nije sluĉaj onda im nedostaje uslov dostupnosti i djelotvornosti (v. stav 37 ove presude).
59. Kada je rijeĉ o ovom konkretnom predmetu, Sud konstatuje da je Vlada u svom prethodnom prigovoru navela da su postojali dostupni pravni lijekovi za pritužbu podnosioca predstavke na dužinu postupka po ĉlanu 6 stav 1, a taj prigovor je odbaĉen na osnovu opisanom u stavovima 39 - 41 ove presude.
60. Sud zakljuĉuje, iz istih razloga, da je došlo do povrede ĉlana 13 uzetog zajedno sa ĉlanom 6 stav 1 Konvencije zbog nepostojanja djelotvornog pravnog lijeka po domaćem pravu za pritužbe podnosioca predstavke koje se odnose na dužinu parniĉnog postupka (v. Stevanović protiv Srbije, br. 26642/05, stavovi 67-68, 9. oktobar 2007. godine; takodje, mutatis mutandis, Rodić i  drugi  protiv  Bosne  i  Hercegovine,  br. 22893/05, stavovi 84-85, 27. maj 2008. godine).
61. Sud želi još jednom da napomene da će možda ponovo razmotriti svoj stav u vezi sa navedenim ukoliko je Vlada u mogućnosti da u budućim predstavkama pokaže u odnosu na konkretne predmete, da su navedeni pravni lijekovi djelotvorni (v. stavove 39-40 ove presude).

III PRIMJENA ĈLANA 41 KONVENCIJE 

62. Ĉlan 41 Konvencije predvidja:

“Kada Sud utvrdi povredu Konvencije ili protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo Visoke strane ugovornice o kojoj je rijeĉ omogućava samo djelimiĉnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti praviĉno zadovoljenje oštećenoj stranci."

A.     Naknada štete

63. Podnosilac predstavke je u formularu za predstavku tražio 120.000 eura na ime nematerijalne štete. On u svojim pisanim napomenama nije naveo nikakav zahtjev u ovom smisliu.
64. Vlada je navela da je traženi iznos nepotkrijepljen, da je nesrazmjerno veliki, i da je suprotan sudskoj praksi Suda.
65. Iako nije iznesen konkretan zahtjev u napomenama podnosioca predstavke, Sud prihtava da je podnosilac predstavke u ovom predmetu zaista pretrpio odredjenu nematerijalnu štetu koja se ne može u dovoljnoj mjeri kompenzovati samo utvrdjivanjem da je do povrede došlo (v. mutatis mutandis, Garzičić protiv Crne Gore, 17931/07, stav 42, 21. septembar 2010. godine; te Staroszczyk protiv Poljske, br. 59519/00, stavovi 141-143, 22 mart 2007. godine; takodje, mutatis mutandis, Mijušković protiv Crne Gore, br. 49337/07, stavovi 94-96, 21. septembar 2010. godine). Nadalje, Vlada je komentarisala zahtjev podnosioca predstavke iznesen u formularu za predstavku. Praveći svoju procjenu po osnovu praviĉnosti, Sud dosudjuje podnosiocu predstavke 5.000 eura po ovoj stavci. 

B.     Troškovi i izdaci 

66. Podnosilac predstavke tvrdio je da je pretrpio znaĉajne troškove u postupcima pred domaćim sudovima, ali da nije saĉuvao relevantne priznanice jer nije znao da će mu biti potrebne. Nije istakao nikakav zahtjev u odnosu na troškove koje je pretrpio u postupku pred Sudom.
67. Vlada je osporila ovaj zahtjev.
68. Prema sudskoj praksi Suda, podnosilac predstavke ima pravo na nadoknadu troškova i izdataka samo u mjeri u kojoj se pokaže da su oni stvarno pretrpljeni i da su bili neophodni, te da su razumni po pitanju iznosa. U ovom predmetu, kada je razmotrio dokumente u svom posjedu i gore navedene kriterijume, Sud odbija zahtjev za nadoknadu troškova i izdataka jer nije dovoljno potkrijepljen. 

C.     Zatezna kamata 

69. Sud smatra da je prikladno da se zatezna kamata bazira na najmanjoj kreditnoj stopi Evropske Centralne Banke, uz dodatak od tri procentna poena. 

IZ TIH RAZLOGA, SUD JEDNOGLASNO

1. Proglašava predstavku prihvatljivom; 

2. Nalazi da je došlo do povrede ĉlana 6 stav 1 Konvencije; 

3. Nalazi da je došlo do povrede ĉlana 13 Konvencije; 

4. Nalazi
   • da tužena država treba da, na ime nematerijalne štete, plati podnosiocu predstavke, u roku od tri mjeseca od datuma na koji ova presuda postane pravosnažna prema ĉlanu 44 stav 2 Konvencije, 5.000 eura (pet hiljada eura), i sve poreze koji se na to obraĉunaju;
   • da se od isteka gore navedena tri mjeseca do izmirenja pomenutog iznosa, obraĉunava obiĉna kamata na gore navedeni iznos po stopi koja je jednaka najmanjoj kreditnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke tokom zateznog perioda plus tri procentna poena; 

5. Odbacuje ostatak    zahtjeva    podnosioca    predstavke   za    praviĉnom naknadom.

Saĉinjeno na engleskom jeziku i dostavljeno u pisanoj formi 2. oktobra 2012. godine po pravilu 77 stavovi 2 i 3 Poslovnika Suda.

Fatoş Aracı                                                                         Lech Garlicki

____________________________________________
Prevod presude preuzet sa https://sudovi.me/vrhs/sadrzaj/NQN9

FOURTH SECTION

 CASE OF STAKIĆ v. MONTENEGRO

 (Application no. 49320/07)

JUDGMENT

 STRASBOURG

 2 October 2012

 FINAL

02/01/2013

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision

In the case of Stakić v. Montenegro, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

          Lech Garlicki, President,
          David Thór Björgvinsson,
          Päivi Hirvelä,
          George Nicolaou,
          Zdravka Kalaydjieva,
          Nebojša Vučinić,
          Vincent A. De Gaetano, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 11 September 2012,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 49320/07) against Montenegro lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Montenegrin national, Mr Momir Stakić (“the applicant”), on 5 November 2007.

2.  The applicant was represented by Mr Z. Đukanović, a lawyer practising in Zemun, Serbia. The Montenegrin Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Pažin.

3.  The applicant complained about the length of civil proceedings as well as the lack of an effective domestic remedy in that regard.

4.  On 6 January 2010 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).

THE FACTS

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Zemun (Serbia).

Civil proceedings

6.  On 21 February 1977 the District Court (Okružni sud) in Podgorica found X, Y and Z guilty of participating in a fight (učestvovanje u tuči) on 14 July 1973.

7.  On 18 December 1978 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against X, Y and Z seeking compensation for an eye injury he had suffered in the fight and the subsequent loss of the sight in his right eye, and for loss of income caused by his reduced working capacity.

8.  On 18 March 1980 the Municipal Court (Opštinski sud) in Podgorica ruled partly in favour of the applicant on the basis of his school certificates, his employment record, documents concerning his injury and medical treatment as well as two expert witnesses’ statements. This judgment was partly upheld by the District Court (Okružni sud) in Podgorica on 30 December 1980. On 10 May 1983 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud) in Podgorica quashed the previous judgments and ordered a re-trial. There is no information in the case file as to how many hearings had been held and/or adjourned before the Supreme Court issued its ruling.

9.  Between 10 May 1983 and 21 June 1990 five hearings were adjourned and one hearing was held. Between 23 September 1985 and 6 January 1986 the impugned proceedings had been stayed due to the applicant’s absence from a prior hearing.

10.  On 21 June 1990 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica ruled partly in favour of the applicant.  The judgment was based on the evidence previously adduced as well as on further documents relating to the applicant’s health and employment, and another three expert witnesses’ opinions. On 14 May 1991 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica quashed the first-instance judgment and ordered another re-trial.

11.  Between 14 May 1991 and 16 October 2008 seven more hearings were adjourned and one hearing was held.

12.  On 16 October 2008 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica ruled partly in favour of the applicant. The judgment relied on: the opinions of four experts given by November 1986, documents obtained by May 1993, the statements of four witnesses provided between March 1997 and April 2002, and the statements of the applicant, X and another expert witness made between 6 November 2005 and 19 November 2007.

13.  On 18 September 2009, the High Court in Podgorica quashed this judgment and ordered another re-trial.

14.  On 13 September 2010 the Court of First Instance decided that the case should be examined afresh given that it had been assigned to a new judge. The court requested another opinion of a financial expert. As for the remaining evidence, the parties agreed that the minutes from previous hearings could be read.

15.  The next hearing was scheduled for 2 November 2010. There is no information in the case file as to whether this hearing took place or if there were any further developments in the case.

Other relevant information

16.  By 3 March 2004, which is when the Convention entered into force in respect of the respondent State, the applicant had amended the amount of compensation he had sought on seven occasions, and nine hearings had been adjourned due to his absence or upon his request.

17.  After the Convention had entered into force in respect of Montenegro the applicant amended the amount he sought on two further occasions.

18.  On 19 January 2006 the applicant requested an additional financial expertise.

19.  There is no information in the case file as to how many hearings in total were held and/or adjourned.

20.  Y and Z died on 19 May 2007 and 14 May 1988, respectively.

RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

Constitution of Montenegro 2007 (Ustav Crne Gore; published in the Official Gazette of Montenegro - OGM - no. 1/07)

21.  Article 32 provides, inter alia, that everybody has the right to a fair and public trial within a reasonable time.

22.  Article 149 of the Constitution provides that the Constitutional Court shall rule on a constitutional appeal lodged in respect of an alleged violation of a human right or freedom guaranteed by the Constitution, after all other effective legal remedies have been exhausted.

23.  This Constitution entered into force on 22 October 2007.

Montenegro Constitutional Court Act (Zakon o Ustavnom sudu Crne Gore; published in OGM no. 64/08)

24.  Section 48 provides that a constitutional appeal may be lodged against an individual decision of a state body, an administrative body, a local self-government body or a legal person exercising public authority, for violations of human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, after all other effective domestic remedies have been exhausted.

25.  Sections 49-59 provide additional details as regards the processing of constitutional appeals. In particular, section 56 provides that when the Constitutional Court finds a violation of a human right or freedom, it shall quash the impugned decision, entirely or partially, and order that the case be re-examined by the same body which rendered the quashed decision.

26.  This Act entered into force in November 2008.

Right to a Trial within a Reasonable Time Act (Zakon o zaštiti prava na suđenje u razumnom roku; published in OGM no. 11/07)

27.  This Act provides, under certain circumstances, the possibility to have lengthy proceedings expedited by means of a request for review (kontrolni zahtjev), as well as an opportunity for claimants to be awarded compensation by means of an action for fair redress (tužba za pravično zadovoljenje).

28.  Section 44, in particular, provides that this Act shall be applied retroactively to all proceedings from 3 March 2004, but that the duration of proceedings before that date shall also be taken into account.

29.  This Act entered into force on 21 December 2007, but contained no reference to applications involving procedural delay already lodged with the Court.

Courts Act (Zakon o sudovima; published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro - OG RM - nos. 05/02, 49/04, 22/08 and 39/11)

30.  Section 7 provides that everyone is entitled to an impartial trial within a reasonable time.

Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parničnom postupku, published in the OG RM nos. 22/04, 28/05 and 76/06)

31.  Section 11 paragraph 1 provides, inter alia, for the obligation of the domestic courts to ensure that the proceedings are conducted without delays, and within a reasonable time.

THE LAW

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

32.   The applicant complained, under Article 6 of the Convention, about the length of the above proceedings.

33.  The relevant part of this Article reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”.

Admissibility

Arguments of the parties

34.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted all effective domestic remedies available to him. In particular, he had failed to lodge a request for review and an action for fair redress, which were provided by the Right to a Trial within a Reasonable Time Act (see paragraphs 27-29 above). He had also failed to make use of a constitutional appeal.

35.  The second applicant contested these submissions.

Relevant principles

36.  The Court recalls that, according to its established case-law, the purpose of the domestic remedies rule in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the alleged violations before they are submitted to the Court.

37.  However, the only remedies which the Convention requires to be exhausted are those which relate to the breaches alleged and at the same time are available and sufficient (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 75, ECHR 1999 V, McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, § 107, ECHR 2010-...). The existence of such remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness; it falls to the respondent State to establish that these various conditions are satisfied (see Vernillo v. France, 20 February 1991, § 27, Series A no. 198, and Dalia v. France, 19 February 1998, § 38, Reports 1998-I).

38.  Once this burden of proof has been satisfied, it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government had in fact been used, or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case, or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from that requirement (see Dankevich v. Ukraine, no. 40679/98, § 107, 29 April 2003).

The Court’s assessment

39.  The Court has already held that it would be unreasonable to require an applicant to attempt to file a request for review on the basis of the Right to a Trial within a Reasonable Time Act in a case where the domestic proceedings had been pending for a number of years before the introduction of this legislation and had still not been decided, and where no conclusions could be drawn from the Government’s submissions about its effectiveness (see Boucke v. Montenegro, no. 26945/06, §§ 72-74, 21 February 2012). The Court, however, has reserved its right to reconsider its view if the Government demonstrate, with reference to specific cases, the efficacy of this remedy (see Živaljević v. Montenegro, no. 17229/04, § 66, 8 March 2011).

40.  In view of the fact that the proceedings at issue had been pending for more than twenty eight years before the Right to a Trial within a Reasonable Time Act entered into force, of which more than three years and nine months elapsed after the Convention entered into force in respect of the respondent State, and that no recent case-law with regard to the efficacy of this particular remedy has been submitted, the Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding and concludes, therefore, that the Government’s objection must be dismissed.

41.  The Court has also already held that an action for fair redress is not capable of expediting proceedings while they are still pending, and that a constitutional appeal cannot be considered an effective domestic remedy in respect of length of proceedings (see Boucke v. Montenegro, cited above, § 75-79). It sees no reason to depart from its finding in the present case. The Government’s objection in this regard must, therefore, also be dismissed.

42.  The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

Merits

Arguments of the parties

43.  The applicant reaffirmed his complaint. He also submitted that he had had to ask that some hearings be adjourned on account of his health.

44.  The Government maintained that the impugned proceedings were both factually and legally complex, requiring a number of witnesses and expert witnesses to be heard. In particular, five expert opinions had been given during the period of the Court’s competence ratione temporis, all of them upon the applicant’s proposal. Secondly, the applicant himself had been mainly responsible for the length of the proceedings. In particular, he had amended and further particularised his claim on a number of occasions, two of which after the Convention had entered into force in respect of Montenegro; several hearings scheduled between 1983 and 2002 had been adjourned because of him; and the impugned proceedings had been stayed between 23 September 1985 and 6 January 1986 due to his absence (see paragraphs 9, and 16-17 above). Thirdly, Y and Z had passed away in the meantime (see paragraph 20 above), which required that their legal successors be identified, which added to the overall length of the proceedings. Lastly, the impugned proceedings were of no vital importance to the applicant and, as such, did not require priority or any urgent action on the part of the courts. The courts issued seven decisions in total, two of which were rendered at two instances after the ratification of the Convention. It could not therefore be said that they were not active. The Government concluded that there was no violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

Relevant principles

45.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

46.  In order to determine the reasonableness of the delay at issue, regard must be had to the state of the case on the date of ratification (see, mutatis mutandis, Styranowski v. Poland, judgment of 30 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII).

The Court’s assessment

47.  The period to be taken into account began on 3 March 2004, which is when the Convention entered into force in respect of Montenegro (see Bijelić v. Montenegro and Serbia, no. 11890/05, 69, 28 April 2009). The impugned proceedings have thus been within the Court’s competence ratione temporis for a period of more than eight years and six months and they are still pending at first instance, another twenty-four years having already elapsed before that date.

48.  The Court observes that the present case concerns compensation for the injuries the applicant had suffered in a fight. The Court notes that four witnesses and five expert witnesses had been heard. However, contrary to the Government’s submissions, it is clear from the case file that most of this evidence had been obtained before the Convention entered into force in respect of the respondent State (see paragraph 12 above). While it can be accepted that some compensation claims may be more complex than others, the Court does not consider the present one to be of such complexity as to justify proceedings of this length. Nor does the fact that the impugned proceedings do not require priority or urgent action justify a procedural delay of such length, which length may even be considered a de facto denial of justice.

49.  It is noted that the applicant indeed amended the exact amount of compensation he sought on two occasions after the ratification of the Convention by Montenegro. The Court, however, does not consider that this could have significantly contributed to the length of the proceedings as the claim was not amended in its substance. While some of the hearings scheduled before 3 March 2004 had been postponed at the request of the applicant, there is nothing in the case file to suggest that the procedural delay after the date of ratification resulted from his conduct but rather was caused by the failure of the authorities to act diligently.

50.  The Court notes that the first decision after the respondent State’s ratification of the Convention was given on 16 October 2008, which is more than four years and seven months later. After this decision had been quashed on 18 September 2009, the case has been pending before the first-instance court for almost three years, with only one hearing having taken place in the meantime (see paragraphs 12-15 above).

51.  In view of the criteria laid down in its jurisprudence and the relevant facts of the present case, the Court is of the opinion that the length of the proceedings complained of has failed to satisfy the reasonable time requirement. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION

52.  The applicant also complained, under Article 13, that he had no effective domestic remedy at his disposal to expedite the impugned proceedings.

53.  Article 13 provides as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

Admissibility

54.  The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint raises issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. It also considers that the applicant’s complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and that it cannot be rejected on any other ground. The complaint must therefore be declared admissible.

Merits

55.  The Court notes that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, including the right to a hearing within a reasonable time under Articles 6 § 1 (see, inter alia, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 156, ECHR 2000‑XI).

56.  It recalls, further, that a remedy concerning length is “effective” if it can be used either to expedite the proceedings before the courts dealing with the case, or to provide the litigant with adequate redress for delays which have already occurred (see Sürmeli Germany [GC], no. 75529/01, § 99, ECHR 2006‑VII).

57.  Finally, the Court emphasises that the best solution in absolute terms is indisputably, as in many spheres, prevention. Where the judicial system is deficient with regard to the reasonable-time requirement in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, a remedy designed to expedite the proceedings in order to prevent them from becoming excessively lengthy is the most effective solution. Such a remedy offers an undeniable advantage over a remedy affording only compensation since it also prevents a finding of successive violations in respect of the same set of proceedings and does not merely repair the breach a posteriori, as does a compensatory remedy. Some States have fully understood the situation by choosing to combine two types of remedy, one designed to expedite the proceedings and the other to afford compensation (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 183 and 186, ECHR 2006‑V; and Sürmeli v. Germany [GC], cited above, §100).

58.  However, as noted above, the existence of such remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see paragraph 37 above).

59. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the Government averred in their preliminary objections that there were remedies available for the applicant’s complaint about the length of the proceedings under Article 6 § 1, which objections were rejected on the grounds described at paragraphs 39-41 above.

60.  The Court concludes, for the same reasons, that there has been a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of an effective remedy under domestic law for the applicant’s complaints concerning the length of civil proceedings (see Stevanović v. Serbia, no. 26642/05, §§ 67-68, 9 October 2007; see, also, mutatis mutandis, Rodić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 22893/05, §§ 84-85, 27 May 2008).

61.  The Court would again observe that it might reconsider its view in this regard if the Government are able to demonstrate in future such applications, with reference to specific cases, the efficacy of the said remedies (see paragraphs 39-40 above).

III.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

62.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

Damage

63.  The applicant claimed in the application form EUR 120,000 for non-pecuniary damage. He made no claim in this regard in his observations.

64.  The Government maintained that the claimed amount was unsubstantiated, inappropriately high and contrary to the case-law of the Court.

65. Even if not the subject of a specific claim in his observations, the Court accepts that the applicant in the present case has certainly suffered some non-pecuniary damage which cannot be sufficiently compensated by the sole finding of a violation (see, mutatis mutandis, Garzičić v. Montenegro, no. 17931/07, § 42, 21 September 2010; as well as Staroszczyk v. Poland, no. 59519/00, §§ 141-143, 22 March 2007; see, also, mutatis mutandis, Mijušković v. Montenegro, no. 49337/07, §§ 94-96, 21 September 2010). Furthermore, the Government have commented on the applicant’s claim as set out in the application form. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 5,000 under this head.

Costs and expenses

66.  The applicant claimed that he had incurred considerable costs before the domestic courts, but that he had not saved the relevant invoices as he had not known that he might need them. He made no claim with regard to the costs incurred before the Court.

67.  The Government contested this claim.

68.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses for lack of substantiation.

Default interest

69.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the application admissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;

4. Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 October 2012, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

     Fatoş Aracı                                                                         Lech Garlicki
Deputy Registrar                                                                       President