Čović protiv Bosne i Hercegovine

Država na koju se presuda odnosi
Bosna i Hercegovina
Institucija
Evropski sud za ljudska prava
Broj predstavke
61287/12
Stepen važnosti
3
Jezik
Srpski
Datum
03.10.2017
Članovi
5
5-4
Kršenje
5
5-4
Nekršenje
nije relevantno
Ključne reči po HUDOC/UN
(Čl. 5) Pravo na slobodu i bezbednost
(Čl. 5-4) Ispitivanje od strane suda
Tematske ključne reči
lišenje slobode
trajanje pritvora
zakonitost pritvora / lišenja slobode
ratni zločini
VS deskriptori
1.5.1 Lišenje slobode
1.5.2.3 Trajanje
1.5.2.5 Obrazloženje odluke
1.5.2.6 Zakonom predviđeni postupak
Zbirke
Sudska praksa
Presuda ESLJP
Veće
Sažetak
Podnosilac predstavke je rođen 1953. godine i živi u Hadžićima. Žalio se sudu da postupak kontrole zakonitosti pritvora u njegovom slučaju nije bio u skladu sa zahtevima iz člana 5. stav 4. Konvencije. Osim toga naveo je da prema članu 5. Stavovi 1(c) i 3. Njegovo pritvaranje bilo proizvoljno, a dužina pritvora neopravdana.

Uhapšen je 22. Novembra 2011. Zbog sumnje da je počinio ratne zločine protiv civilnog stanovništva i protiv ratnih zarobljenika u periodu između 1992. i 1995. godine. Sud BiH je 23.novembra 2011. godine izvršio kontrolu njegovog pritvora i produžio ga zbog opasnosti da će ometati rad pravosuđa vršenjem pritiska na svedoke i druge optužene ili uništavanjem dokaza. Tu odluku potvrdilo je Apelaciono odeljenje državnog suda. Državni sud je kasnije produžio pritvor, nakon čega je podignuta optužnica protiv podnosioca i sedam drugih osumnjičenih osoba. Nakon toga, sud je vršio redovnu dvomesečnu kontrolu pritvora i produžavao ga. Nakon više žalbi Apelacionom odeljenju državnog suda, podnosilac predstavke podneo je ustavnu apelaciju, koju je Ustavni sud BiH odbacio. Podnosilac predstavke pušten je na slobodu 1. decembra 2012. godine, uz preventivne mere. Ove mere ukinute su 16. decembra 2015. godine. Prema poslednjim informacijama kojima je Sud raspolagao 22. jula 2016. godine, krivični postupak protiv podnosioca predstavke bio je još uvek u toku.

Evropski sud za ljudska prava jednoglasno je proglasio predstavku dopuštenom, utvrdivši da je došlo do povrede člana 5. stav 4. Konvencije. Utvrđeno je da nema potrebe ispitivati da li je došlo do povrede člana 5. stav 1. Konvencije, kao ni člana 5. stav 3. Konvencije. Utvrđeno je da tužena država treba da obezbedi ponovno ispitivanje predmeta pred Ustavnim sudom, u roku od tri meseca, i da podnosiocu predstavke u istom roku isplati utvrđeni novčani iznos na ime nematerijalne štete, kao i bilo koji porez koji može biti zaračunat na taj iznos i određeni iznos na ime troškova i izdataka. Nakon isteka roka od tri meseca, obračunavaće se obična kamata, do izmirenja. Preostali deo zahteva za pravično zadovoljenje je odbijen.

Preuzmite presudu u pdf formatu

 

 EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA

ĈETVRTI ODJEL

PREDMET ĈOVIĆ protiv BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE

(Aplikacija br. 61287/12)

PRESUDA

STRASBOURG

3.10.2017. godine 

Ova presuda će postati konačna u skladu s uvjetima iz člana 44. stav 2. Konvencije. U presudi su moguće redakcijske izmjene.

U predmetu Ĉović protiv Bosne i Hercegovine, Evropski sud za ljudska prava (Ĉetvrti odjel), zasjedajući u vijeću u sljedećem sastavu:

Ganna Yudkivska, predsjednica,
Vincent A. De Gaetano,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Faris Vehabović,
Iulia Motoc,
Carlo Ranzoni,
Marko Bošnjak, sudije,
i Andrea Tamietti, zamjenik registrara Odjela,

nakon vijećanja na sjednici zatvorenoj za javnost 12.09.2017. godine donio je sljedeću presudu koja je usvojena navedenog datuma:

POSTUPAK

  1. Postupak u ovom predmetu pokrenut je na osnovu aplikacije protiv Bosne i Hercegovine (br. 61287/12) koju je prema ĉlanu 34. Konvencije o zaštiti ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda („Konvencija“) Sudu podnio državljanin Bosne i Hercegovine, g. Fadil Ĉović („aplikant“), dana 17.09.2012.
  2. Aplikanta je zastupao g. K. Kolić, advokat iz Sarajeva. Vladu Bosne i Hercegovine („vlada“) zastupala je njena tadašnja zastupnica, gdja Mijić.
  3. Aplikant je posebno naveo da postupak kontrole zakonitosti pritvora u njegovom sluĉaju nije bio u skladu sa zahtjevima iz ĉlana 5. stav 4. Konvencije. Takodjer se žalio prema ĉlanu 5. stavovi 1.(c) i 3. da je njegovo pritvaranje bilo proizvoljno, a dužina pritvora neopravdana.
  4. Dana 11.01.2016. godine pritužbe prema ĉlanu 5. stav 4. i ĉlanu 5. stavovi 1.(c) i 3. Konvencije dostavljene su vladi, dok je preostali dio aplikacije proglašen nedopuštenim prema pravilu 54. stav 3. Pravila Suda.

ĈINJENICE

I OKOLNOSTI SLUĈAJA

  1. Aplikant je rodjen 1953. godine, a živi u Hadžićima.
  2. Dana 22.11.2011. godine aplikant je uhapšen i pritvoren zbog sumnje da je poĉinio ratne zloĉine protiv civilnog stanovništva i protiv ratnih zarobljenika za vrijeme rata koji se vodio u periodu1992. -95. godine.
  3. Dana 23.11.2011. godine Sud Bosne i Hercegovine („državni sud“) izvršio je kontrolu njegovog pritvora i produžio ga zbog opasnosti da će ometati rad pravosudja vršenjem pritiska na svjedoke i suoptužene ili uništavanjem dokaza. Dana 1.12.2011. godine tu odluku je potvrdilo Apelaciono odjeljenje državnog suda.
  4. Dana 21.12.2011. godine državni sud je produžio pritvor aplikanta po istom osnovu kao i ranije. Dana 5.01.2012. godine tu odluku je potvrdilo Apelaciono odjeljenje državnog suda.
  5. Dana 29.12.2011. godine tužitelj državnog tužiteljstva podnio je optužnicu protiv aplikanta i sedam drugih osumnjiĉenih osoba koju je državni sud potvrdio dana 10.01.2012.
  6. Nakon toga, držvni sud je vršio redovnu dvomjeseĉnu kontrolu pritvora aplikanta i produžavao ga. Pored ovih automatskih kontrola pritvora, aplikant se u više navrata žalio na pritvor Apelacionom odjeljenju državnog
  7. Dana 23.02.2012. godine aplikant je podnio ustavnu apelaciju pozivajući se na ĉlan II stav 3.(d) Ustava (vidi taĉku dalje u tekstu) i ĉlan 5. Konvencije. Naveo je posebno da je njegov pritvor bio proizvoljan i trajao predugo, te da se nije temeljio na relevantnim i dostatnim razlozima.
  8. Dana 13.07.2012. godine Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine („Ustavni sud“), u sastavu od osam sudija, odbio je apelaciju aplikanta budući da ni o jednom prijedlogu nije mogao postići većinu. Obrazloženje suda sadržavalo je sve stavove koji su izneseni na sjednici o pitanjima pokrenutim u tom predmetu. Temeljem ĉlana VI stav 4. Ustava (vidi taĉku 16. dalje u tekstu), ta odluka je bila konaĉna.
  9. Dana 1.11.2012. godine, državni sud je utvrdio da su prestali razlozi za nastavak pritvora aplikanta i on je pušten na slobodu. Istim rješenjem sud je aplikantu izrekao preventivne mjere koje su ukljuĉivale sljedeće: zabranu napuštanja mjesta prebivališta bez prethodne saglasnosti državnog suda osim u svrhu prisustva na tom sudu; obavezno javljanje policiji u Hadžićima jednom sedmiĉno; zabrana sastajanja s drugim optuženima u istom predmetu, kao i sastajanja i kontakata sa svjedocima. Takodjer, aplikantu je oduzet pasoš.
  10. Ove mjere zabrane su preispitivane i produžavane svaka dva mjeseca. Ukinute su dana 16.12.2015.
  11. Na dan posljednje informacije kojom je Sud raspolagao (dana 22.07.2016. godine) kriviĉni postupak protiv aplikanta je još uvijek bio u toku.

II RELEVANTNO DOMAĆE PRAVO

A.   Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine

  1. Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine (Aneks 4. Općeg okvirnog sporazuma za mir u Bosni i Hercegovini) stupio je na snagu dana 14.12.1995.  Relevantni dio Ustava glasi:

„Ĉlan II

Ljudska prava i osnovne slobode

...

2. Medjunarodni standardi

Prava i slobode predvidjeni u Evropskoj konvenciji o zaštiti ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda i u njenim protokolima direktno se primjenjuju u Bosni i Hercegovini. Ovi akti imaju prioritet nad svim ostalim zakonima..

3. Katalog prava

Sva lica na teritoriji Bosne i Hercegovine uživaju ljudska prava i slobode iz stava 2 ovog ĉlana, što ukljuĉuje:

...

(d) Pravo na liĉnu slobodu i sigurnost.

...

Ĉlan VI

Ustavni sud

1.Sastav

Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine sastoji se od devet ĉlanova.

(a) Ĉetiri ĉlana bira Predstavniĉki dom Federacije, a dva ĉlana Skupština Republike Srpske. Preostala tri ĉlana bira predsjednik Evropskog suda za ljudska prava nakon konsultacija sa Predsjedništvom.

...

2.Procedure

(a) Većina svih ĉlanova suda saĉinjava

(b) Sud će, većinom glasova svih ĉlanova, usvojiti svoja pravila o radu. Sud će voditi javne rasprave, a svoje odluke će javno obrazlagati i

3.Nadležnost

Ustavni sud podržava ovaj Ustav.

...

(b) Ustavni sud takodjer ima apelacionu nadležnost u pitanjima koja su sadržana u ovom Ustavu, kada ona postanu predmet spora zbog presude bilo kojeg suda u Bosni i

...

4. Odluke

Odluke Ustavnog suda su konaĉne i obavezujuće.“

B.     Zakon o kriviĉnom postupku iz 2003. godine

  1. Ĉlan 137. stav 1. Zakona o kriviĉnom postupku Bosne i Hercegovine iz 2003. godine (Službeni list Bosne i Hercegovine („SL BiH“), br. 3/03, 32/03, 36/03, 26/04, 63/04, 13/05, 48/05, 46/06, 76/06, 29/07, 32/07, 53/07, 76/07, 15/08, 58/08, 12/09, 16/09, 93/09 i 72/13) propisuje da nakon podizanja optužnice sudsko vijeće svaka dva mjeseca ispituje da li i dalje postoje zakonski razlozi za trajanje pritvora. Optuženi, branitelj ili državni tužitelj može uložiti žalbu protiv odluke o odredjivanju, produženju ili ukidanju pritvora (ĉlanovi 134, 135, 136 i 137. stav 1. zakona iz godine).

C.     Pravila Ustavnog suda

  1. Ĉlan 40. stav 2. Pravila Ustavnog suda koja su u predmetno vrijeme bila na snazi (SL BiH, br. 60/05, 76/05, 64/08 i 51/09) propisivao je da Sud na plenarnoj sjednici donosi odluke većinom glasova svih svojih ĉlanova. Ĉlan 40. stav 3. propisivao je da kada na plenarnoj sjednici u donošenju odluke uĉestvuje manje od devet sudija, smatra se da se apelacija odbija ukoliko najmanje pet sudija ne glasa identiĉno o prijedlogu o kojem se raspravlja. Takva odluka je sadržavala sve stavove iznesene na plenarnoj sjednici o pitanjima koja su pokrenuta u predmetu i bila je konaĉna. Sudija nije mogao biti suzdržan kod glasanja (ĉlan 41).
  2. Dana 1.04.2014. godine stupila su na snagu nova Pravila Ustavnog suda (SL BiH, br. 22/14 i 57/14). Ĉlan 42. stav 5. tih Pravila propisuje da u situaciji kada manje od devet sudija uĉestvuje u plenarnoj sjednici, ukoliko najmanje pet sudija ne glasa identiĉno o prijedlogu o kojem se raspravlja, odluĉivanje o predmetu će se odgoditi za najviše šest mjeseci; ako nakon tog perioda dodje do iste situacije, glas predsjednika će se raĉunati dvostruko. Ostale odredbe u pogledu sistema glasanja ostale su neizmijenjene.
  3. Nadalje, ĉlan 68. stav 2. novih Pravila propisuje da će se postupak ponoviti ukoliko je Evropski sud za ljudska prava donio presudu kojom je utvrdio povredu prava na pristup sudu pred Ustavnim sudom. U takvom sluĉaju, Ustavni sud će ponovno ispitati predmet najkasnije u roku od tri mjeseca od dana kada je presuda Evropskog suda postala konaĉna.

 

PRAVO

I NAVODNA POVREDA ĈLANA 5. stav 4. KONVENCIJE

  1. Aplikant se žalio da postupak ispitivanja zakonitosti njegovog pritvora pred Ustavnim sudom nije bio u skladu sa zahtjevima iz ĉlana 5. stav 4. Konvencije koji glasi:

„4. Svako ko je lišen slobode hapšenjem ili pritvaranjem ima pravo  pokrenuti sudski postupak kako bi sud u kratkom roku odluĉio o zakonitosti lišenja slobode, te ukoliko ono nije bilo zakonito, naredio puštanje na slobodu.“

A.     Dopuštenost

1. Prigovor vlade u pogledu gubitka statusa žrtve

  1. Vlada je istakla da aplikant više ne može tvrditi da je žrtva navodne povrede s obzirom na ĉinjenicu da je 1.11.2012. godine pušten iz pritvora.
  2. Aplikant se usprotivio toj tvrdnji.
  3. Sud ponavlja da odluka ili mjera koja je povoljna za aplikanta u naĉelu nije dovoljna da ga liši statusa „žrtve“ osim ukoliko su domaće vlasti priznale, bilo izriĉito ili u suštini, da je došlo do povrede Konvencije, a potom pružile obeštećenje za tu povredu (vidi, medju drugim izvorima, Nada protiv Švicarske [VV], br. 10593/08, taĉka 128, ESLJP 2012; vidi takodjer, u pogledu ĉlana 5. Konvencije, Moskovets protiv Rusije, br. 14370/03, taĉka 50, 04.2009).
  4. Vraćajući se na predmetni sluĉaj Sud zapaža da je aplikant još uvijek bio u pritvoru kada je podnio apelaciju Ustavnom sudu i kada je Ustavni sud odluĉivao o njegovom predmetu (vidi, mutatis mutandisReinprecht  protiv Austrije, br. 67175/01, taĉka 51, ESLJP 2005-XII). On je pušten na slobodu 1.11.2012. godine jer je državni sud utvrdio da su prestali razlozi za trajanje pritvora (vidi taĉku gore u tekstu). Sud stoga zapaža da u ovom sluĉaju nije došlo ni do priznanja o navodnoj povredi prava aplikanta da ospori zakonitost svoga pritvora, niti do bilo kakvog obeštećenja za to. Prema tome, prigovor vlade o gubitku statusa žrtve se mora odbiti.

2. Drugi osnovi nedopuštenosti

  1. Sud primjećuje da ova pritužba nije oĉigledno neosnovana u smislu ĉlana 35. stav 3. (a) Konvencije. Sud nadalje zapaža da ona nije nedopuštena niti po bilo kojem drugom osnovu. Stoga se mora proglasiti dopuštenom. 

B.     Meritum

1. Podnesci strana

  1. Aplikant je tvrdio da mu je, odbijanjem njegove apelacije zbog toga što Ustavni sud nije mogao postići većinu, uskraćen djelotvoran postupak kojim bi osporio zakonitost svoga pritvora, kako to zahtijeva ĉlan 5. stav 4. Konvencije.
  2. Vlada je istakla da su nadležni sudovi po službenoj dužnosti vršili redovnu kontrolu pritvora aplikanta svaka dva mjeseca. Aplikant je uvijek imao mogućnost da podnese žalbu Apelacionom odjeljenju državnog suda protiv svakog rješenja o produženju pritvora, a odluke povodom njegovih žalbi donošene su brzo. Žalba na rješenje o produženju pritvora pokazala se zaista djelotvornom, te je dovela do puštanja aplikanta na slobodu dana 1.11.2012.

2. Ocjena Suda

  1. Sud ponavlja da je svrha ĉlana 5. stav 4. da osobama koje su uhapšene i pritvorene osigura pravo na sudski nadzor nad zakonitošću mjere kojoj su na taj naĉin podvrgnute (vidi De Wilde, Ooms i Versyp protiv Belgije, 18.06.1971, taĉka 76, Serija A br. 12, i Ismoilov i drugi protiv Rusije, br. 2947/06, taĉka 145, 24.04.2008). Tokom trajanja pritvora, osobi mora biti na raspolaganju pravni lijek koji omogućuje brzo sudsko preispitivanje zakonitosti pritvora, te koji može dovesti do puštanja na slobodu te osobe kada je to primjereno. Postojanje pravnog lijeka, kako to zahtijeva ĉlan 5. stav 4, mora biti dovoljno izvjesno, ne samo u teoriji nego i u praksi, jer će mu u suprotnom nedostajati dostupnost i djelotvornost koja se zahtjeva u svrhu te odredbe (vidi Stoichkov protiv Bugarske, br. 9808/02, taĉka 66. in fine, 24.03.2005). Dostupnost pravnog lijeka podrazumijeva, inter alia, da okolnosti koje su vlasti svjesno stvorile, moraju biti takve da podnositeljima zahtjeva pružaju realnu mogućnost korištenja tog pravnog lijeka (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Čonka protiv Belgije, br. 51564/99, taĉke 46 i 55, ESLJP 2002-I).
  2. Sud primjećuje da je aplikant bio u mogućnosti podnijeti žalbu Apelacionom odjeljenju državnog suda protiv svakog rješenja toga suda kojim je produžen njegov pritvor. Domaći sudovi su takodjer vršili periodiĉnu i automatsku kontrolu njegovog pritvora i obrazlagali svoje odluke (vidi taĉku 10. gore u tekstu). Sud dalje primjećuje da Ustavni sud ima apelacionu nadležnost za pitanja sadržana u Ustavu koja nastanu u vezi sa presudom bilo kojeg drugog suda u Bosni i Hercegovini (vidi ĉlan VI stav 3.(b) Ustava, citiran u taĉki ove presude). Aplikant je podnio ustavnu apelaciju dana 23.02.2012. godine kojom je osporio zakonitost i dužinu trajanja svog pritvora prema ĉlanu II stav 3.(d) Ustava i ĉlanu 5. Konvencije (vidi taĉku 11. ove presude). Medjutim, njegova apelacija je odbaĉena prema ĉlanu 40. (3) Pravila Ustavnog suda koji je u predmetno vrijeme bio na snazi (vidi taĉku 18. ove presude) zbog toga što Ustavni sud nije mogao postići većinsku odluku o pitanjima o kojima je odluĉivao. Ta odluka je sadržavala sve stavove izražene na sjednici suda i bila je konaĉna (vidi taĉku 12. ove presude).
  3. Sud napominje da je isto pravno pitanje kao i ovo koje pokreće predmetni sluĉaj bilo razmatrano u drugaĉijem kontekstu u jednom ranijem predmetu protiv Bosne i Hercegovine (vidi Avdić i drugi protiv Bosne i Hercegovine, br. 28357/11, 31549/11 i 39295/11, 19.11.2013). U tom sluĉaju koji se odnosio na parniĉni i disciplinski postupak Sud je utvrdio da je aplikantima bio uskraćen pristup sudu u postupku pred Ustavnim sudom protivno ĉlanu 6. stav 1. Konvencije. Sud je naroĉito utvrdio sljedeće (ibid., taĉka 37):

„37. ... Iako su sporne odluke bile konaĉne, one nisu ukljuĉivale konaĉno „odluĉivanje“ o gradjanskim pravima i obavezama aplikanata. Iako je Ustavni sud formalno donio odluke povodom apelacija aplikanata, on je praktiĉno odbio odluĉiti o njihovoj dopuštenosti i/ili meritumu. Sporne odluke su sadržavale kako razloge za, tako i razloge protiv utvrdjenja o povredi prava, a jedini razlog zbog kojeg su apelacije aplikanata odbijene, bio je neuspjeh suda da postigne većinsku odluku o bilo kojem od pitanja, ĉime bi se odluĉilo o gradjanskim pravima i obavezama aplikanata. Drugim rijeĉima, nije bilo većine niti za odluku o prihvaćanju apelacija, niti za odluku o njihovom odbijanju. Ukoliko nema istinskog „odluĉivanja“ o gradjanskim pravima i obavezama, pravo pristupa sudu ostaje iluzorno (vidi Marini protiv Albanije br. 3738/02, taĉka 122, 18.12.2007]).“

  1. U vezi s tim Sud ponavlja da prema njegovoj praksi ĉlan 5. stav 4. kao i ĉlan 6. stav 1. sadržava pravo na pristup sudu koje može biti predmet iskljuĉivo opravdanih ograniĉanja koja ne ugrožavaju samu njegovu suštinu (vidi Shishkov protiv Bugarske, br. 38822/97, taĉke 82-90, ESLJP 2003-I, i Bochev protiv Bugarske, 73481/01, taĉka 70, 13.11.2008).
  2. Nadalje, ĉlan 5. stav 4. ne obavezuje države potpisnice na uspostavu drugog nivoa nadležnosti za ispitivanje zakonitosti pritvora i razmatranje zahtjeva za puštanje na slobodu. Ipak, država koja uspostavi takav sistem mora pritvorenim osobama u naĉelu pružiti iste garancije povodom žalbe kao i u prvom stepenu (vidi, medju ostalim izvorima, Kučera protiv Slovačke, br. 48666/99, taĉka 107, 17.07.2007, i predmete citirane u toj presudi). Sud smatra da se isto odnosi i na sistem u kojem je propisana mogućnost podnošenja ustavne tužbe protiv odluka kojima se odredjuje i produžava pritvor.
  3. U predmetnom sluĉaju, iako je Ustavni sud donio formalnu odluku o aplikantovoj apelaciji, on je u stvarnosti odbio odluĉiti o njenoj dopuštenosti i/ili meritumu. Sporna odluka je sadržavala kako razloge za, tako i razloge protiv utvrdjenja o povredi, a jedini razlog zbog kojeg je aplikantova apelacija odbijena, bio je neuspjeh suda da postigne većinsku odluku. Sud stoga nalazi da se dozvolilo da pitanje ustavnosti pritvora aplikanta ostane neriješeno. Sud smatra da je ta situacija aplikanta ostavila bez konaĉne odluke u njegovom predmetu, te je tako ograniĉena sama suština njegovog prava na pristup sudu
  4. Odbiviši aplikantovu apelaciju samo zbog toga što nije mogao postići većinu u odluĉivanju o bilo kojem od razmatranih prijedloga, Ustavni sud nije ispunio zahtjev da okonosti koje su vlasti svjesno stvorile moraju biti takve da ponositeljima zahtjeva pruže realnu mogućnost korištenja pravnog sredstva (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Peša protiv Hrvatske, br. 40523/08, taĉka 126, 8.04.2010, i Getoš-Magdić protiv Hrvatske, br. 56305/08, taĉka 106, 2.12.2010). Na taj naĉin on nije ispunio svoju obavezu sadržanu u ĉlanu 5. stav 4. Konvencije da preispita zakonitost pritvora aplikanta. Prema tome, došlo je do povrede te odredbe.

 

II NAVODNA POVREDA ĈLANA 5. STAVOVI 1. I 3. KONVENCIJE 

  1. Aplikant se dalje žalio da je njegov pritvor bio proizvoljan i pretjerano dugog trajanja. On se pozvao na ĉlan 5. stavovi 1. i 3. Konvencije ĉiji relevantni dio glasi:

„1. Svako ima pravo na slobodu i sigurnost liĉnosti. Niko ne smije biti lišen slobode izuzev u sljedećim sluĉajevima i u skladu sa postupkom propisanim zakonom:

...

(c) zakonitog hapšenja ili lišenja slobode osobe radi privodjenja nadležnom sudskom tijelu kada postoji opravdana sumnja da je osoba izvršila kriviĉno djelo, ili kada se to opravdano smatra neophodnim kako bi se sprijeĉilo da osoba izvrši kriviĉno djelo ili da, nakon izvršenja kriviĉnog djela, pobjegne;

...

3. Svako ko je uhapšen ili lišen slobode prema odredbama stava 1.(c) ovog ĉlana mora odmah biti izveden pred sudiju ili drugu službenu osobu ovlaštenu zakonom za vršenje sudske vlasti, te ima pravo na sudjenje u razumnom roku ili da bude pušten na slobodu do sudjenja. Puštanje na slobodu može se uvjetovati garancijama da će se osoba pojaviti na sudjenju.“

  1. Sud primjećuje da su ove pritužbe povezane s pritužbom koja je razmatrana gore u tekstu, te se stoga moraju takodjer proglasiti nedopuštenima.
  2. Medjutim, imajući u vidu svoj zakljuĉak u vezi sa ĉlanom 5. stav 4. Konvencije, Sud smatra da nije potrebno ispitivati da li je u ovom sluĉaju došlo i do povrede ĉlana 5. stavovi 1. i 3. Konvencije. U tom pogledu Sud napominje da je Ustavni  sud obavezan  ponoviti postupak prema  ĉlanu (2) svojih Pravila, nakon presude ovog Suda u kojoj je utvrdjena povreda prava na pristup sudu do koje je došlo u postupku pred Ustavnim sudom (vidi taĉku 20. ove presude). U vezi s tim, Sud ponavlja da u sluĉajevima pritvora u kojima je aplikant još uvijek pritvoren u vrijeme kada domaći sud ispituje njegove žalbe, pritužba koja se odnosi na pristup sudu treba biti ispitana prema ĉlanu 5. stav 4. Konvencije (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Reinprecht, citiran gore u tekstu, taĉke 48, 52. i 55.; vidi takodjer, a contrario i mutatis mutandis, Lazoroski protiv Bivše Jugoslavenske Republike Makedonije, br. 4922/04, taĉka 66, 8.10.2009, i Stephens protiv Malte (br. 1), br. 11956/07, taĉka 103, 21.04.2009). Stoga je Sud uvjeren da će se pritužbe u pogledu ĉlana 5. stavovi 1. i 3. Konvencije ispitati na domaćem nivou. S obzirom na postojeći domaći pravni okvir i supsidijarnu ulogu mehanizma Konvencije, Sud smatra da u okolnostima predmetnog sluĉaja nema potrebe za odvojeno ispitivanje ovih pritužbi.

 

III PRIMJENA ĈLANA 41. KONVENCIJE 

  1. Ĉlan 41. Konvencije propisuje:

„Ukoliko Sud utvrdi da je došlo do povrede Konvencije ili njenih Protokola, te ukoliko zakonodavstvo visoke ugovorne strane o kojoj je rijeĉ omogućuje samo djelomiĉno obeštećenje, Sud će, po potrebi, odrediti praviĉnu naknadu oštećenoj strani.“

A.     Šteta

  1. Aplikant potražuje 10.000 eura (EUR) na ime nematerijalne štete.
  2. Vlada smatra da je traženi iznos nepotkrijepljen dokazima i pretjerano visok.
  3. S obzirom na sve okolnosti predmetnog sluĉaja, Sud prihvaća da je aplikant pretrpio nematerijalnu štetu koja se ne može nadoknaditi samo utvrdjenjem o povredi. Na osnovu nepristrasne ocjene, Sud aplikantu dosudjuje 1.500 eura na ime nematerijalne štete, kao i svaki porez koji se može zaraĉunati na taj iznos.
  4. Nadalje, Sud ponavlja da presuda u kojoj on utvrdi povredu Konvencije ili njenih Protokola nameće pravnu obavezu tuženoj državi ne samo da osobama o kojima je rijeĉ isplati iznose dosudjene u smislu praviĉne naknade, već i da odabere, uz nadzor Komiteta Ministara, opće i/ili kada je to primjereno, individualne mjere koje je potrebno usvojiti u njenom domaćem pravnom poretku kako bi se otklonila povreda koju je Sud utvrdio i, koliko je to moguće, pružilo obeštećenje za njene posljedice. Odgovorna država ostaje, u naĉelu, slobodna da izabere naĉin na koji će izvršiti svoju pravnu obavezu iz ĉlana 46. Konvencije, pod uvjetom da je taj naĉin spojiv sa zakljuĉcima iz presude Suda (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Sejdovic protiv Italije [GC], br. 56581/00, taĉka 119, ESLJP 2006 III, i Simeonovi protiv Bugarske [GC], br. 21980/04, taĉka 149, ESLJP 2017. (izvaci)). Ovo diskreciono pravo u pogledu naĉina izvršenja presude odražava slobodu izbora koja je povezana s primarnom obavezom država ĉlanica prema Konvenciji da osiguraju zagarantirana prava i slobode (vidi Assanidze protiv Gruzije [GC], br. 71503/01, taĉka 202, ESLJP 2004-II).
  5. Medjutim, u odredjenim posebnim situacijama, kako bi pomogao odgovornoj državi da ispuni svoje obaveze iz ĉlana 46, Sud može ukazati na vrstu individualnih i/ili generalnih mjera koje bi se mogle poduzeti u cilju okonĉanja situacije koja je dovela do utvrdjenja o povredi. U drugim izuzetnim sluĉajevima, priroda utvrdjene povrede može biti takva da ne ostavlja izbor u pogledu mjera potrebnih za njeno otklanjanje pa Sud može odluĉiti da ukaže na samo jednu takvu mjeru (vidi Assanidze, citiran gore, taĉka 202, i Del Río Prada protiv Španije [GC], br. 42750/09, taĉka 138, ESLJP 2013). S obzirom na njegov zakljuĉak u predmetnom sluĉaju, Sud smatra da on spada u ovu drugu kategoriju. Prema tome, tužena država mora osigurati ponovno razmatranje aplikantovog predmeta pred Ustavnim sudom u skladu sa ĉlanom (2) Pravila Ustavnog suda (vidi taĉke 20. i 38. ove presude).

B.     Troškovi i izdaci

  1. Aplikant takodjer potražuje 1.054,55 eura za troškove i izdatke koje je imao u postupku pred Sudom. On je dostavio raĉun za usluge prevoda u iznosu od 61,35 eura.
  2. Vlada smatra da traženi iznos nije potkrijepljen, te da je previsok.
  3. Prema praksi Suda, aplikant ima pravo na nadoknadu troškova i izdataka samo mjeri u kojoj je pokazano da su oni stvarno nastali, da su bili neophodni i da je njihov iznos opravdan. To znaĉi da ih je aplikant platio ili da ih je dužan platiti u skladu s pravnom ili ugovornom obavezom, te da su oni bili neizbježni kako bi se sprijeĉile utvrdjene povrede ili da bi se dobilo obeštećenje. Sud zahtijeva podnošenje raĉuna i faktura sa stavkama troškova koje sadrže dovoljno detalja kako bi Sud mogao utvrditi u kojoj mjeri su navedeni uvjeti ispunjeni (vidi pravilo 60. Pravila Suda).
  4. U predmetnom sluĉaju Sud zapaža da aplikant nije podnio bilo kakve dokaze (raĉune ili fakture) o troškovima i izdacima koje je imao, osim fakture za usluge prevodjenja. Stoga Sud smatra opravdanim da mu dosudi iznos od 61,35 eura za ovu stavku, kao i svaki porez koji se aplikantu može zaraĉunati na taj iznos.

C.     Zatezna kamata

  1. Sud smatra primjerenim da se zatezna kamata zasniva na najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke uvećanoj za tri postotna boda.

 

IZ NAVEDENIH RAZLOGA, SUD JEDNOGLASNO

  1. Proglašava aplikaciju dopuštenom; 
  1. Utvrdjuje da je došlo do povrede ĉlana 5. stav 4. Konvencije; 
  1. Utvrdjuje da nema potrebe ispitivati da li je došlo do povrede ĉlana 5. stav 1. Konvencije; 
  1. Utvrdjuje da nema potrebe ispitivati da li je došlo do povrede ĉlana 5. stav 3. Konvencije; 
  1. Utvrdjuje
    • da je tužena država dužna osigurati ponovno ponovno ispitivanje aplikantovog predmeta pred Ustavnim sudom u skladu sa ĉlanom 68. (2) Pravila toga suda, u roku od tri mjeseca od dana kada presuda postane konaĉna prema ĉlanu 44. stav 2. Konvencije, te u istom roku isplatiti aplikantu sljedeće iznose koji će se pretvoriti u valutu tužene države, po teĉaju na dan izmirenja:
      • 1.500 eura (hiljadu i pet stotina eura) i svaki porez koji se može zaraĉunati, na ime nematerijalne štete;
      • 61,35 (šezdeset i jedan euro i trideset i pet centi) i svaki porez koji se aplikantu može zaraĉunati, na ime troškova i izdataka;
    • da će se od isteka navedenog roka od tri mjeseca do izmirenja plaćati obiĉna kamata na navedene iznose, po stopi jednakoj najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke u periodu neplaćanja, uvećanoj za tri postotna boda; 
  1. Odbija ostali dio aplikantovog zahtjeva za praviĉnu nadoknadu.

 

Saĉinjeno na engleskom jeziku i dostavljeno u pisanom obliku dana 3.10.2017. godine, u skladu s pravilom 77. stavovi 2. i 3 Pravila Suda.

Andrea Tamietti                                                                 Ganna Yudkivska

zamjenik registrara                                                                   predsjednica

 


___________________________________
Prevod presude preuzet sa https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/

 

FOURTH SECTION 

CASE OF ČOVIĆ v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

(Application no. 61287/12) 

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

3 October 2017

FINAL

03/01/2018 

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Čović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Ganna Yudkivska, President,
Vincent A. De Gaetano
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Faris Vehabović,
Iulia Motoc,
Carlo Ranzoni,
Marko Bošnjak, judges,
and Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 12 September 2017, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 61287/12) against Bosnia and Herzegovina lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr Fadil Čović (“the applicant”), on 17 September 2012.

2. The applicant was represented by Mr K. Kolić, a lawyer practising in Sarajevo. The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent at the time, Ms M. Mijić.

3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that the proceedings for review of the lawfulness of his detention had not complied with the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. He further complained under Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and 3 that his detention had been arbitrary and its length unjustified.

4. On 11 January 2016 the complaints under Article 5 § 4 and Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and 3 of the Convention were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Hadžići.

6. On 22 November 2011 the applicant was arrested and detained on suspicion of having committed war crimes against the civilian population and against prisoners of war during the 1992-95 war.

7. On 23 November 2011 the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the State Court”) reviewed and extended his detention based on the risk of his obstructing the course of justice by exerting pressure on witnesses and co-accused or by destroying evidence. On 1 December 2011 that decision was upheld by the Appeals Chamber of the State Court.

8. On 21 December 2011 the State Court further extended the applicant’s detention on the same grounds as before. On 5 January 2012 that decision was upheld by the Appeals Chamber of the State Court.

9. On 29 December 2011 the State Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant and seven other co-suspects, which was confirmed by the State Court on 10 January 2012.

10. Thereafter, the applicant’s detention was regularly examined and extended every two months by the State Court. In addition to those automatic reviews, the applicant repeatedly challenged his detention before the Appeals Chamber of the State Court.

11. On 23 February 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, relying on Article II § 3.(d) of the Constitution (see paragraph 16 below) and Article 5 of the Convention. He alleged, in particular, that his detention had been arbitrary and excessive, and that it had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons.

12. On 13 July 2012 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”), in a formation of eight judges, rejected the applicant’s appeal since it could not reach a majority on any of the proposals. The court’s reasoning included all the views expressed at the session on the issues raised in the case. Pursuant to Article VI § 4 of the Constitution (see paragraph 16 below) that decision was final.

13. On 1 November 2012 the State Court held that the grounds for the applicant’s continued detention had ceased to apply and released the applicant. By the same decision, the court imposed preventive measures on the applicant which included the following: a prohibition on leaving his place of residence without the prior approval of the State Court save for the purpose of appearing before that court; the duty to report once a week to the Hadžići police; a prohibition on associating with other co-accused and on associating or having contact with the witnesses. Furthermore, the applicant’s passport was seized.

14. The preventive measures were reviewed and extended every two months. On 16 December 2015 they were revoked.

15. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (22 July 2016), the criminal proceedings against the applicant were still ongoing.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

A. Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina

16. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina) entered into force on 14 December 1995.

The relevant part of the Constitution reads as follows:

“Article II

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

...

2. International Standards

The rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These shall have priority over all other law.

3. Enumeration of Rights

All persons within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall enjoy the human rights and fundamental freedoms referred to in paragraph 2 above; these include:

...

(d) The rights to liberty and security of person.

...

Article VI

Constitutional Court

1. Composition

The Constitutional Court shall have nine members.

(a) Four members shall be selected by the House of Representatives of the Federation, and two members by the Assembly of the Republika Srpska. The remaining three members shall be selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights after consultation with the Presidency.

...

2. Procedures

(a) A majority of all members of the Court shall constitute a quorum.

(b) The Court shall adopt its own rules of court by a majority of all members. It shall hold public proceedings and shall issue reasons for its decisions, which shall be published.

3. Jurisdiction

The Constitutional Court shall uphold this Constitution.

...

(b) The Constitutional Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction over issues under this Constitution arising out of a judgment of any other court in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

...

4. Decisions

Decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be final and binding.”

B. 2003 Code of Criminal Procedure

17. Article 137 § 1 of the 2003 Code of Criminal Procedure of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Zakon o krivičnom postupku Bosne i Hercegovine, Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“OG BH”), nos. 3/03, 32/03, 36/03, 26/04, 63/04, 13/05, 48/05, 46/06, 76/06, 29/07, 32/07, 53/07, 76/07, 15/08, 58/08, 12/09, 16/09, 93/09 and 72/13), provides that after an indictment has been lodged a judicial panel shall examine every two months whether the statutory conditions for detention continue to apply. A defendant, defence counsel or the State Prosecutor may lodge an appeal against a decision to order, extend or lift detention (Articles 134, 135, 136 and 137 § 1 of the 2003 Code).

C. Rules of the Constitutional Court

18. Rule 40(2) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court in force at the relevant time (OG BH, nos. 60/05, 76/05, 64/08 and 51/09) provided that a plenary court made decisions by a majority of all its members. Rule 40(3) provided that when fewer than nine judges participated in a plenary session it was considered that an appeal was rejected unless a minimum of five judges voted identically on a proposal under discussion. Such a decision contained all the views expressed at the plenary session on the issues raised in a case and was final. A judge could not abstain from voting (Rule 41).

19. On 1 April 2014 new Rules of the Constitutional Court entered into force (OG BH, nos. 22/14 and 57/14). Rule 42(5) thereof provides that when fewer than nine judges participate in a plenary session, unless a minimum of five judges vote identically on a proposal under discussion, the case shall be adjourned for a maximum period of six months; if after that period the same situation occurs, the President’s vote shall count for two votes. Other provisions concerning voting system remained unchanged.

20. Furthermore, Rule 68(2) of the new Rules provides for the reopening of the proceedings following a judgment in which the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of the right of access to a court before the Constitutional Court. In such a case, the Constitutional Court shall re-examine the case within three months of the date on which the European Court’s judgment became final, at the latest.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION

21. The applicant complained that the proceedings for review of the lawfulness of his detention before the Constitutional Court had not complied with the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

A. Admissibility

1. The Government’s objection of loss of victim status

22. The Government argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of the alleged violation in view of the fact that he had been released from detention on 1 November 2012.

23. The applicant disagreed.

24. The Court reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Nada v. Switzerland [GC], no.10593/08, § 128, ECHR 2012; see also, concerning Article 5 of the Convention, Moskovets v. Russia, no. 14370/03, § 50, 23 April 2009).

25. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was still in detention when he lodged his constitutional appeal and when the Constitutional Court ruled on his case (see, mutatis mutandisReinprecht v. Austria, no. 67175/01, § 51, ECHR 2005-XII). On 1 November 2012 he was released because the State Court held that the grounds for his continued detention had ceased to apply (see paragraph 13 above). Therefore, the Court notes that in this case there was neither any acknowledgement of the alleged breach of the applicant’s right to challenge the lawfulness of his detention nor any redress for it. The Government’s objection of loss of victim status must accordingly be dismissed.

2. Other grounds for inadmissibility

26. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submissions

27. The applicant maintained that the rejection of his constitutional appeal because the Constitutional Court could not reach a majority had denied him an effective procedure by which to challenge the lawfulness of his detention as required by Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

28. The Government argued that the applicant’s detention had been regularly reviewed by the competent courts on their own motion every two months. The applicant had always been able to lodge an appeal with the Appeals Chamber of the State Court against every decision extending his detention and his appeals had been speedily decided. An appeal against the decision to extend the detention had indeed proved effective and led to the applicant’s release on 1 November 2012.

2. The Court’s assessment

29. The Court reiterates that the purpose of Article 5 § 4 is to secure to persons who are arrested and detained the right to judicial supervision of the lawfulness of the measure to which they are thereby subjected (see De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 18 June 1971, § 76, Series A no. 12, and Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, no. 2947/06, § 145, 24 April 2008). A remedy must be made available during a person’s detention to allow that person to obtain speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of the detention, capable of leading, where appropriate, to his or her release. The existence of the remedy required by Article 5 § 4 must be sufficiently certain, not only in theory but also in practice, failing which it will lack the accessibility and effectiveness required for the purposes of that provision (see Stoichkov v. Bulgaria, no. 9808/02, § 66 in fine, 24 March 2005). The accessibility of a remedy implies, inter alia, that the circumstances voluntarily created by the authorities must be such as to afford applicants a realistic possibility of using the remedy (see, mutatis mutandisČonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, §§ 46 and 55, ECHR 2002-I).

30. The Court observes that the applicant was able to lodge an appeal with the Appeals Chamber of the State Court against each decision of that court extending his detention. The domestic courts also periodically and automatically reviewed his detention and gave reasons for their decisions (see paragraph 10 above). The Court further observes that the Constitutional Court has appellate jurisdiction over issues under the Constitution arising out of a judgment of any other court in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Article VI § 3 (b) of the Constitution, cited in paragraph 16 above). The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal on 23 February 2012 challenging the lawfulness and length of his detention under Article II § 3 (d) of the Constitution and Article 5 of the Convention (see paragraph 11 above). However, his appeal was rejected, under Rule 40(3) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court which was in force at the relevant time (see paragraph 18 above), as a result of the Constitutional Court’s failure to reach a majority on the issues before it. That decision contained all the views expressed at the court’s session and was final (see paragraph 12 above).

31. The Court notes that the same legal issue as the one raised in the present case was examined, in a different context, in an earlier case against Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Avdić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, nos. 28357/11, 31549/11 and 39295/11, 19 November 2013). In that case, which concerned civil and disciplinary proceedings, the Court held that the applicants had been denied access to a court in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court held in particular (ibid., § 37):

“37. ... Although the impugned decisions were final, they did not involve a final ‘determination’ of the applicants’ civil rights and obligations. While the Constitutional Court took formal decisions on the applicants’ appeals, it effectively declined to decide on their admissibility and/or merits. The impugned decisions contained reasons both for and against the finding of a violation and the only reason why the applicants’ appeals were rejected was the court’s failure to reach a majority on any of the issues which would determine the applicants’ civil rights and obligations. In other words, there was no majority for either accepting or rejecting their appeals. When there is no real ‘determination’ of civil rights and obligations, the right of access to court remains illusory (see [Marini v. Albania, no. 3738/02, § 122, 18 December 2007]). “

32. In this connection the Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, Article 5 § 4 enshrines, as does Article 6 § 1, the right of access to a court, which can only be subject to reasonable limitations that do not impair its very essence (see Shishkov v. Bulgaria, no. 38822/97, §§ 82-90, ECHR 2003-I, and Bochev v. Bulgaria, no. 73481/01, § 70, 13 November 2008).

33. Furthermore, Article 5 § 4 does not compel the Contracting States to set up a second level of jurisdiction for the examination of the lawfulness of detention and for hearing applications for release. Nevertheless, a State which institutes such a system must in principle accord detainees the same guarantees on appeal as at first instance (see, among other authorities, Kučera v. Slovakia, no. 48666/99, § 107, 17 July 2007, and the cases cited therein). The Court considers that the same applies in a system which provides for a constitutional complaint against decisions ordering and extending detention.

34. In the present case, although the Constitutional Court took a formal decision on the applicant’s appeal, it effectively declined to decide on its admissibility and/or merits. The impugned decision contained reasons both for and against the finding of a violation and the only reason why the applicant’s appeal was dismissed was the court’s failure to reach a majority. Therefore, the Court finds that the issue of the constitutionality of the applicant’s detention was allowed to remain unaddressed. The Court considers that that situation had left the applicant without any final determination of his case and, accordingly, restricted the very essence of his right of access to a court.

35. By dismissing the applicant’s appeal simply because it was unable to reach a majority on any of the proposals under consideration, the Constitutional Court failed to satisfy the requirement that the circumstances voluntarily created by the authorities must be such as to afford applicants a realistic possibility of using the remedy (see, mutatis mutandis,Peša v. Croatia, no. 40523/08, § 126, 8 April 2010, and Getoš-Magdić v. Croatia, no. 56305/08, § 106, 2 December 2010). Thus, it fell short of its obligation under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention to review the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention.

There has accordingly been a violation of that provision.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 §§ 1 AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION

36. The applicant further complained that his pre-trial detention had been arbitrary and excessively long. He relied on Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

...

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;

...

3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”

37. The Court notes that these complaints are linked to the one examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.

38. However, having regard to its finding relating to Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether, in this case, there has also been a violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention. In this respect, the Court notes that the Constitutional Court is obliged to reopen the proceedings, under Rule 68(2) of its Rules, following a judgment in which this Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court before the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 20 above). In this connection the Court reiterates that in detention cases where an applicant is still in custody at the time of the examination of his appeals by the domestic courts, a complaint concerning access to a court is to be examined under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandisReinprecht, cited above, §§ 48, 52 and 55; see also, a contrario and mutatis mutandisLazoroski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 4922/04, § 66, 8 October 2009, and Stephens v. Malta (no. 1), no. 11956/07, § 103, 21 April 2009). Therefore, the Court is satisfied that the complaints under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention will be examined at the domestic level. In view of the existing domestic legal framework and the subsidiary role of the Convention mechanism, the Court considers that in the circumstances of the present case there is no need to examine these complaints separately.

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

39. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

40. The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

41. The Government considered the amount claimed unsubstantiated and excessive.

42. Having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the applicant suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.

43. Furthermore, the Court reiterates that a judgment in which it finds a violation of the Convention or its Protocols imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress as far as possible the effects. The respondent State remains, in principle, free to choose the means by which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court’s judgment (see, mutatis mutandisSejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 119, ECHR 2006 III, and Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 21980/04, § 149, ECHR 2017 (extracts)). This discretion as to the manner of execution of a judgment reflects the freedom of choice attached to the primary obligation of the Contracting States under the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed (see Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, § 202, ECHR 2004‑II).

44. However, in certain particular situations, with a view to assisting the respondent State in fulfilling its obligations under Article 46, the Court may seek to indicate the type of individual and/or general measures that might be taken in order to put an end to the situation that gave rise to the finding of a violation. In other exceptional cases, the nature of the violation found may be such as to leave no real choice as to the measures required to remedy it and the Court may decide to indicate only one such measure (see Assanidze, cited above, § 202, and Del Río Prada v. Spain [GC], no. 42750/09, § 138, ECHR 2013). Having regard to its finding in the instant case, the Court considers that it belongs to this last-mentioned category. Therefore, the respondent State must secure the re-examination of the applicant’s case before the Constitutional Court in accordance with Rule 68(2) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 20 and 38 above).

B. Costs and expenses

45. The applicant also claimed EUR 1,054.55 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. He submitted an invoice for translation services for the sum of EUR 61.35.

46. The Government considered the amount claimed unsubstantiated and excessive.

47. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. That is to say, the applicant must have paid them, or be bound to pay them, pursuant to a legal or contractual obligation, and they must have been unavoidable in order to prevent the breaches found or to obtain redress. The Court requires itemised bills and invoices that are sufficiently detailed to enable it to determine to what extent the above requirements have been met (see Rule 60 of the Rules of Court).

48. In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant did not submit any evidence (bills or invoices) about the costs and expenses incurred, save for the invoice for translation services. Therefore, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 61.35 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount.

C. Default interest

49. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the application admissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;

3. Holds that there is no need to examine whether there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention;

4. Holds that there is no need to examine whether there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;

5. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to secure the re-examination of the applicant’s case before the Constitutional Court under Rule 68(2) of its Rules, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention and, within the same time-limit, to pay the applicant the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State, at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 61.35 (sixty-one euros and thirty-five cents), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 October 2017, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Andrea Tamietti                                 Ganna Yudkivska
Deputy Registrar                                President

Nema povezane prakse za ovu presudu.

Tematski povezani sadržaj u biblioteci Pravosudne akademije

Publikacije

Tematski povezani sadržaj na CrossReference

presude