VIJEĆE EUROPE
EUROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
PRVI ODJEL
PREDMET HANŽEVAČKI PROTIV HRVATSKE
(Zahtjev br. 17182/07)
PRESUDA
STRASBOURG
16. travnja 2009.
Ova će presuda postati konačnom pod okolnostima utvrđenim u članku 44. stavku 2. Konvencije. Može biti podvrgnuta uredničkim izmjenama.
U predmetu Hanževački protiv Hrvatske, Europski sud za ljudska prava (Prvi odjel), zasjedajući u vijeću u sastavu:
g. Christos Rozakis, predsjednik,
gđa. Nina Vajić,
g. Anatoly Kovler,
gđa. Elisabeth Steiner,
g. Khanlar Hajiyev,
g. Dean Spielmann,
g. Sverre Erik Jebens, suci,
i g. Søren Nielsen, tajnik Odjela,
nakon vijećanja zatvorenog za javnost 26. ožujka 2009. godine, donosi sljedeću presudu koja je usvojena tog datuma:
POSTUPAK
Postupak u ovome predmetu pokrenut je na temelju zahtjeva (br. 17182/07) protiv Republike Hrvatske što ga je 28. ožujka 2007. godine hrvatski državljanin, g. Davor Hanževački ("podnositelj zahtjeva") podnio Sudu na temelju članka 34. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda ("Konvencija").
Podnositelja zahtjeva je zastupao g. Z. Novaković, odvjetnik iz Zagreba. Hrvatsku vladu ("Vlada") zastupala je njena zastupnica gđa Š. Stažnik.
Dana 27. lipnja 2008. godine predsjednik Prvoga odjela odlučio je Vladu obavijestiti o prigovorima koji se tiču prava podnositelja zahtjeva na pošteno suđenje i prava da se brani uz pomoć odvjetnika po svom izboru. Također je odlučeno o osnovanosti zahtjeva odlučiti istovremeno kad i o njegovoj dopuštenosti (članak 29., stavak 3.).
ČINJENICE
I. OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA
Podnositelj zahtjeva je rođen 1968. godine i živi u Daruvaru.
Dana 11. prosinca 2002. godine Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Daruvaru podiglo je optužnicu protiv podnositelja zahtjeva pred Općinskim sudom u Daruvaru, optuživši ga za povredu autorskih prava na način da je koristio razne dijelove kompjuterskog softvera bez suglasnosti imatelja mjerodavne dozvole. Podnositelja zahtjeva u postupku je zastupao odvjetnik kojega je on odabrao. Na ročištu održanom 10. ožujka 2003. godine podnositelj zahtjeva iznio je svoju obranu. Na ročištu održanom 28. travnja 2003. godine Općinski sud je saslušao svjedoke koje je predložila obrana i donio presudu kojom je podnositelja zahtjeva oslobodio svih optužbi. Međutim, Županijski sud u Daruvaru je 10. srpnja 2003. godine ukinuo ovu presudu po žalbi koju je uložilo državno odvjetništvo.
U ponovljenom postupku pred Općinskim sudom u Daruvaru pribavljeno je mišljenje vještaka. Na prvom ročištu održanom 6. listopada 2003. godine podnositelj zahtjeva je iznio svoju obranu u nazočnosti svoga odvjetnika. Slijedeće ročište, zakazano za 29. prosinca 2003. godine je odgođeno na prijedlog odvjetnika podnositelja zahtjeva koji je u podnesku dostavljenom 24. prosinca 2003. godine objasnio da je za taj dan već planirao putovanje. Ročište zakazano za 4. veljače 2004. godine odgođeno je zbog bolesti predsjednika vijeća.
Prema navodima podnositelja zahtjeva, njegov je odvjetnik prije ročišta zakazanog za 9. ožujka 2004. godine kontaktirao Općinski sud telefonom i zatražio odgodu zbog svoje iznenadne bolesti.
Podnositelj zahtjeva je na početku ročišta zatražio odgodu ročišta i obavijestio sud da ne želi iznijeti svoju obranu bez nazočnosti svoga odvjetnika. Predsjednik vijeća je međutim odlučio održati ročište. Zastupnik optužbe također nije bio prisutan. Podnositelj zahtjeva, koji je već iznio svoju obranu na prethodnim ročištima, iznio je dodatno svoju obranu. Prijedlog podnositelja zahtjeva da se saslušaju daljnji svjedoci odbijen je. Podnositelj zahtjeva je dao završnu riječ. Rasprava je zaključena i izrečena je presuda. Podnositelj zahtjeva je proglašen krivim za korištenje raznih dijelova kompjuterskog softvera bez suglasnosti imatelja mjerodavne licence. Izrečena mu je kazna zatvora u trajanju od tri mjeseca te je primijenjena uvjetna osuda sa rokom kušnje u trajanju od godine dana..
U žalbi podnesenoj 21. travnja 2004. godine podnositelj zahtjeva je inter alia prigovorio da je ročište od 9. ožujka 2004. godine održano u odsutnosti njegovoga odvjetnika, iako je postojao opravdani razlog za njegovu odsutnost. Ustvrdio je da je u jutro 9. ožujka 2004. godine njegov odvjetnik telefonom kontaktirao Općinski sud u Daruvaru. Na njegov poziv odgovorio je službenik i odvjetnik je zatražio da razgovara s predsjednikom vijeća. Sudac međutim nije odgovorio na poziv. Stoga je odvjetnik zamolio službenika, M.R. da obavijesti predsjednika vijeća o njegovoj nemogućnosti da nazoči ročištu zbog iznenadne bolest. Službenik je to učinio. U zapisniku s ročišta nije zabilježen zahtjev da ročište bude odgođeno zbog njegove iznenadne bolesti. Podnositelj zahtjeva je priložio liječničku potvrdu za svoga odvjetnika od 8. ožujka 2004. godine, u kojoj je naznačeno da je od toga datuma bio na bolovanju.
Dana 24. lipnja 2004. Županijski sud u Bjelovaru potvrdio je prvostupanjsku presudu. Utvrdio je da nazočnost odvjetnika podnositelja zahtjeva na ročištu održanom 9. ožujka 2004. godine nije bila nužna. Mjerodavni dio drugostupanjske presude glasi kako slijedi:
"(...) Žalbeni prigovori optuženika da je prvostupanjski sud počinio bitnu povredu odredaba Zakona o kaznenom postupku iz članka 367. stavak 3. ZKP, jer je glavnu raspravu održao bez prisutnosti branitelja, ovaj sud ne nalazi osnovanim. Polazeći od činjenica koje su navedene na zapisniku sa glavne rasprave od 09. ožujka 2004. godine dolazi se do zaključka da iako je optuženik zahtjevao odgodu glavne rasprave zbog opravdane spriječenosti dolaska njegova branitelja, da je prvostupanjski sud ocijenio da odsutnost branitelja očito ne bi bila štetna za njegovu obranu, jer je glavna raspravu održao unatoč toga i istoga dana donio prvostupanjsku presudu. Takav postupak prvostupanjskog suda trebalo je ocjenjivati u vidu povrede prava obrane optuženika i razmotriti je li to moglo utjecati na donesenu presudu. Polazeći od toga treba reći da nove činjenice, koje je optuženik isticao na navedenoj glavnoj raspravi i zbog kojih je tražio njezinu odgodu s obzirom da je njegov branitelj raspolagao novim dokazima koji se odnose na ponudu za kupnju softvera „Autocad“ i u kojoj je označena cijena, nisu činjenice koje bile odlučne za samo kazneno djelo. To iz razloga što je u pobijanoj presudi sud optuženika proglasio krivim zbog kaznenog djela iz čl. 230. st. 1. KZ i što se dakle radi o osnovnom obliku tog kaznenog djela za koje je neodlučno je li pribavljena znatna imovinska korist ili je pak prouzročena znatna šteta. Upravo stoga odsutnost branitelja na glavnoj raspravi nije mogla biti od utjecaja na donošenje pobijane presude i njezinu zakonitost."
Dana 28. rujna 2006. godine Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske odbio je naknadnu ustavnu tužbu podnositelja zahtjeva kao neosnovanu.
II. MJERODAVNO DOMAĆE PRAVO
Mjerodavni dio Zakona o kaznenom postupku („Narodne novine“, br. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002 i 62/2003) propisuje kako slijedi:
Članak 5.
„(1) Okrivljenik se ima pravo braniti sam ili uz stručnu pomoć branitelja kojega će sam izabrati iz reda odvjetnika....
...”
9. Govori stranaka
Članak 360.
Nakon završenoga dokaznog postupka predsjednik vijeća daje riječ strankama, oštećeniku i branitelju. Prvo govori tužitelj, zatim oštećenik, branitelj, pa optuženik...“
Članak 363.
(1) Branitelj ili sam optuženik izložit će u svojem govoru obranu i može se osvrnuti na navode tužitelja i oštećenika.
Na temelju članka 430. Zakona o kaznenom postupku, kad optuženik zatraži preinačenje pravomoćne presude nakon utvrđenja povrede, inter alia, prava na pošteno suđenje od strane Europskoga suda za ljudska prava, primjenjuju se pravila koja uređuju ponavljanje postupka.
Članak 230. stavak 1. Kaznenoga zakona („Narodne novine“, br. 110/1997, 28/1998, 50/2000, 129/2000, 51/2001, 11/2003 i 105/2004) propisuje kazneno djelo neovlaštene upotrebe autorskog djela, predviđajući novčanu kaznu ili kaznu zatvora od najmanje tri godine.
PRAVO
I. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANKA 6., STAVAK 1. I 3. KONVENCIJE
Podnositelj zahtjeva prigovara da je ročište od 9. ožujka 2004. godine održano u odsutnosti njegovoga branitelja. Poziva se na članak 6, stavke 1. i 3.(c) Konvencije, čiji mjerodavni dio glasi kako slijedi:
„1. Radi utvrđenja.......u slučaju podizanja optužnice za kazneno djelo protiv njega svatko ima pravo ...neovisni i nepristrani sud pravično.....
...
3. Svatko optužen za kazneno djelo ima najmanje sljedeća prava...
c) da se brani sam ili uz branitelja po vlastitom izboru, a ako nema dovoljno sredstava platiti branitelja, ima pravo na besplatnog branitelja, kad to nalažu interesi pravde;
...”
Vlada je osporila tu tvrdnju.
A. Dopuštenost
B. Osnovanost
Podnositelj zahtjeva tvrdi da je njegovo pravo na pošteno suđenje i osobito njegovo pravo da ga zastupa pravni zastupnik po njegovom izboru u kaznenom postupku koji se vodio protiv njega bilo povrijeđeno stoga što je raspravni sud koji je vodio postupak odbio njegov zahtjev za odgodom ročišta na kojem je zaključena glavna rasprava zbog nenadane bolesti njegovoga branitelja. Objasnio je da se njegov branitelj razbolio dan prije ročišta i da je propisno obavijestio raspravni sud o tome telefonom tog jutra kad je održano ročište. Tvrdi da je prema mjerodavnim odredbama Zakona o kaznenom postupku raspravni sud imao dužnost odgoditi ročište kad je branitelj obavijestio sud o svojoj nemogućnosti nazočiti ročištu iz opravdanog razloga. Podnositelj zahtjeva nadalje naglašava važnost ročišta na kojem je zaključena glavna rasprava u kaznenom postupku, budući je to jedina prilika da obrana usmeno iznese svoje mišljenje o rezultatima postupka pred raspravnim sudom, a i svoje zaključke i argumente glede dokaza u predmetu. Naglasio je i da se u tom predmetu radi o složenim pravnim pitanjima, osobito o tome mogu li se njegove radnje smatrati nezakonitima, te da je takve argumente mogao odgovarajuće iznijeti samo kvalificirani pravnik.
Vlada tvrdi da raspravni sud nije imao dužnost odgoditi ročište o kojemu je riječ budući su svi dokazi već bili izvedeni prije završnog ročišta i da nisu postojale nikakve posebne okolnosti koje bi zahtijevale nazočnost branitelja podnositelja zahtjeva na završnom ročištu. Naglašava da se branitelj podnositelja zahtjeva razbolio dan prije ročišta i da je mogao obavijestiti raspravni sud o tome taj isti dan telefaksom. Stoga, podnositelju zahtjeva nije bilo omogućeno pravno zastupanje upravo zbog propusta koji treba pripisati krivnji njegova branitelja.
Sud prvo primjećuje kako nije njegova zadaća dati odgovor na sporne tvrdnje stranaka o tome je li Općinski sud u Daruvaru, prema mjerodavnim odredbama hrvatskog Zakona o kaznenom postupku, bio obvezan odgoditi ročište na kojem je zaključena glavna rasprava u kaznenom postupku protiv podnositelja zahtjeva zbog opravdane nenazočnosti njegovoga branitelja. Zadatak suda je ocijeniti jesu li, sa stajališta Konvencije, bila poštivana prava podnositelja zahtjeva na obranu u mjeri koja zadovoljava jamstva poštenog suđenja iz članka 6. Konvencije. S tim u vezi Sud na početku ponavlja da zahtjeve iz stavka 3., članka 6. treba gledati kao osobite vidove prava na pošteno suđenje zajamčenog stavkom 1. (vidi, među mnogim drugim izvorima prava, predmet Balliu v. Albania, br. 74727/01, § 25., 16. lipnja 2005.). S time u vezi, Sud je pozvan ispitati je li kazneni postupak protiv podnositelja zahtjeva, u svojoj cijelosti, bio pošten (vidi, među mnogim drugim izvorima prava, predmet Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24. studenog 1993., Series A br. 275, § 38. i predmet S.N. v. Sweden, br. 34209/96, § 43., ECHR 2002-V i predmet Vanyan v. Russia, br. 53203/99, § 63.-68., 15. prosinca 2005.).
Sud ponavlja kako je pravo svakoga optuženoga za kazneno djelo da bude branjen od strane odvjetnika, jedno od temeljnih značajki poštenoga suđenja, iako to pravo nije apsolutno (vidi predmet Krombach v. France, br. 29731/96, § 89., ECHR 2001-II). Osobi optuženoj za kazneno djelo koja se ne želi sama braniti mora se omogućiti pravna pomoć po njegovom izboru (vidi predmete Campbell and Fell v.the United Kingdom, 28. lipnja 1984., SeriesA br.80., § 99.; Pakelli v. Germany, 25. travanj 1983., Series A br. 64, § 31. i Whitfield and Others v. the United Kingdom, br. 46387/99, 48906/99, 57410/00 i 57419/00, § 48., 12. travnja 2005.).
Sud primjećuje da je podnositelja zahtjeva u ovome predmetu u kaznenom postupku protiv njega stalno zastupao odvjetnik kojega je sam odabrao, osim na završnom ročištu pred raspravnim sudom. Prije toga ročišta podnositelj zahtjeva je iznio svoju obranu te su ispitani svi svjedoci koje je predložila obrana. Sud nadalje bilježi da je podnositelj zahtjeva na završnome ročištu pred raspravnim sudom zatražio odgodu zbog nenazočnosti svoga branitelja koji se iznenada razbolio. Taj je zahtjev, međutim, bio odbijen. Podnositelj zahtjeva je tada dao svoju daljnju obranu i iznio svoju završnu riječ.
Sud je svjestan zahtjeva učinkovitosti vođenja kaznenog postupka. Međutim, taj zahtjev ne može biti suprotan zaštiti prava na obranu u mjeri nespojivoj s jamstvima poštenoga suđenja iz članka 6. Konvencije. S tim u vezi Sud bilježi kako je istina da je branitelj podnositelja zahtjeva zatražio odgodu ročišta zakazanog za 29. prosinca 2003. godine zbog prethodno planiranoga puta. Međutim, imajuću u vidu da ročište pada tako blizu javnom prazniku kao i činjenicu da je branitelj unaprijed obavijestio raspravni sud o svojoj nemogućnosti da bude nazočan, Sud smatra kako te okolnosti ne ukazuju da su podnositelj zahtjeva ili njegov branitelj postupali u zloj namjeri ili da su pokušali nepotrebno odugovlačiti postupak.
Glede okolnosti oko zahtjeva za odgodu završnoga ročišta, Sud bilježi kako je u svojoj žalbi branitelj podnositelja zahtjeva podrobno objasnio da se iznenada razbolio dan prije ročišta i da je to jutro kad je održano ročište kontaktirao telefonom raspravni sud. Dao je ime službenika koji je primio poziv i koji je otišao obavijestiti raspravnoga suca o njegovoj nemogućnosti da bude nazočan. Također je priložio i liječničku potvrdu iz koje je vidljivo da je 8. ožujka 2004. godine bio na bolovanju. Žalbeni sud nije uopće komentirao te okolnosti nego je umjesto toga zaključio kako braniteljeva nazočnost nije bila potrebna u smislu dokaza koji su već bili izneseni pred raspravnim sudom te značajki kaznenoga djela za koje je podnositelj zahtjeva optužen.
Sud ne može podržati mišljenja žalbenoga suda iz slijedećih razloga. Sud bilježi da je jedan od najvažnijih vidova ročišta za zaključenje glavne rasprave u kaznenom postupku prilika da obrana, kao i tužitelj, iznesu svoje završne riječi, te je to jedina prilika da obje stranke usmeno izlože svoje poglede na cijeli predmet i sve dokaze izvedene tijekom postupka te da daju svoju ocjenu rezultata kaznenog postupka. Sud smatra kako izbor državnog odvjetnika da ne bude nazočan na zaključnom ročištu u predmetu protiv podnositelja zahtjeva ne može imati nikakav utjecaj na pravo okrivljenika da ga zastupa branitelj kojega je sam odabrao.
Po mišljenju Suda, nenazočnost branitelja podnositelja zahtjeva bila je opravdani razlog za odgodu ročišta 9. ožujka 2004. godine, s obzirom na značenje ročišta za zaključenje glavne rasprave u kaznenom postupku protiv podnositelja zahtjeva (vidi stavak 25. ove presude).
Ovaj nedostatak nije ispravljen od strane Županijskog suda ili Ustavnog suda, budući da ti sudovi nisu održali ročišta.
Imajući na umu svrhu Konvencije, a to je zaštita prava koja su praktična i djelotvorna, te važno mjesto koje pravo na pošteno vršenje pravde zauzima u demokratskom društvu, u smislu Konvencije, Sud smatra da bilo koje restriktivno tumačenje članka 6. ne bi odgovaralo cilju i svrsi te odredbe (vidi, mutatis mutandis, predmete Delcourt v. Belgium, 17. siječnja 1970., Series A br. 11, § 25., i Ryakib Biryukov v. Russia, br. 14810/02, § 37., ECHR 2008-...).
U takvim okolnostima Sud nalazi da se podnositelj zahtjeva nije mogao braniti uz pravnu pomoć po svom odabiru u mjeri kako to zahtijeva Konvencija. Stoga je došlo do povrede članka 6., stavka 1., zajedno s člankom 6., stavkom 3(c) Konvencije.
II. OSTALE NAVODNE POVREDE KONVENCIJE
Podnositelj zahtjeva također prigovara na temelju članka 6., stavka 1. Konvencije zbog ocjene dokaza i ishoda kaznenog postupka protiv njega i na temelju članka 7. Konvencije da djela koja je počinio ne predstavljaju kazneno djelo. Na kraju, poziva se na članak 17. Konvencije.
U svjetlu svega materijala koji posjeduje, a i utoliko koliko su stvari kojima se prigovara u okviru njegove nadležnosti, Sud smatra da se u ovome predmetu niti naizgled ne vidi povreda nekog od navedenih članaka Konvencije. Slijedi da su ovi prigovori nedopušteni na temelju članka 35., stavka 3. kao očigledno neosnovani i da ih treba odbiti na temelju članka 35., stavka 4. Konvencije.
III. PRIMJENA ČLANKA 41. KONVENCIJE
"Ako Sud utvrdi da je došlo do povrede Konvencije i dodatnih protokola, a unutarnje pravo zainteresirane visoke ugovorne stranke omogućava samo djelomičnu odštetu, Sud će, prema potrebi, dodijeliti pravednu naknadu povrijeđenoj stranci."
A. Šteta
Podnositelj zahtjeva potražuje 100.000 hrvatskih kuna (HRK) na ime nematerijalne štete.
Vlada smatra da je traženi iznos prekomjeran.
Sud smatra da utvrđenje povrede zajedno s mogućnošću traženja ponavljanja postupka, a koju podnositelj zahtjeva ima na temelju nacionalnoga prava (na temelju članka 430. hrvatskog Zakona o kaznenom postupku) predstavlja samo po sebi dostatnu pravičnu naknadu u okolnostima ovoga predmeta
B. Troškovi i izdaci
Podnositelj zahtjeva također potražuje 39.550 HRK na ime troškova i izdataka nastalih pred Sudom i pred domaćim sudovima.
Vlada je ostavila Sudu ocjenu nužnosti nastalih troškova.
Prema sudskoj praksi Suda, podnositelj zahtjeva ima pravo na naknadu svojih troškova i izdataka samo ukoliko je dokazao da su oni stvarno i nužno nastali i da su bili razumni s obzirom na količinu. U ovome predmetu, uzevši u obzir informacije koje posjeduje i naprijed navedene kriterije, Sud smatra razumnim podnositelju zahtjeva dosuditi iznos do 5.400 EUR na ime troškova i izdataka, uz sve poreze koji bi mogli biti zaračunati podnositelju zahtjeva na taj iznos
C. Zatezna kamata
Sud smatra primjerenim da se zatezna kamata temelji na najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Europske središnje banke uvećanoj za tri postotna boda.
IZ TIH RAZLOGA, SUD
(a) da utvrđenje povrede zajedno s mogućnošću da prema nacionalnom pravu traži ponavljanje postupka predstavlja dostatnu pravičnu naknadu;
(b) da tužena država treba podnositelju zahtjeva, u roku od tri mjeseca od dana kad presuda postane konačnom u skladu s člankom 44. stavkom 2. Konvencije, isplatiti iznos od 5.400 EUR (pet tisuća četiri stotine eura) uz sve poreze koji bi mogli biti zaračunati podnositelju zahtjeva na ime troškova i izdataka, koje treba pretvoriti u nacionalnu valutu tužene države po stopi primjenjivoj na dan namirenja;
(c) da se od proteka naprijed navedena tri mjeseca do namirenja na naprijed navedeni iznos plaća obična kamata prema stopi koja je jednaka najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Europske središnje banke tijekom razdoblja neplaćanja, uvećana za tri postotna boda;
Sastavljeno na engleskome jeziku i otpravljeno u pisanom obliku dana 16. travnja 2009. godine u skladu s pravilom 77. stavcima 2. i 3. Poslovnika Suda.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
tajnik predsjednik
U skladu sa člankom 45., stavkom 2. Konvencije i Pravilom 74., stavkom 2. Poslovnika Suda, ovoj je presudi dodano izdvojeno mišljenje suca Jebensa.
C.L.R. S.N.
IZDVOJENO MIŠLJENJE SUCA JEBENSA
Uz dužno poštovanje, ne slažem se s većinom da je u ovome predmetu došlo do povrede članka 6.. Iz razloga navedenih u daljnjem tekstu, mislim da je podnositelj zahtjeva imao pošteno suđenje pred Općinskim sudom.
Prvo primjećujem da je branitelj podnositelja zahtjeva bio nazočan na prethodnim ročištima, uključujući i ročište od 6. listopada 2003. godine, kad je podnositelj zahtjeva iznio svoju obranu. Isto je tako pomogao podnositelju zahtjeva pri ispitivanju svih svjedoka saslušanih na prethodnim ročištima. Nadalje, u pismenim je podnescima prije zaključnog ročišta imao dostatne prilike izraziti svoja mišljenja o činjenicama predmeta i o svim pripadajućim pravnim pitanjima. Na zaključnom ročištu nisu bili saslušani daljnji svjedoci. Međutim, sam podnositelj zahtjeva još je jednom saslušan na tom ročištu te je dao i završnu riječ.
Po mom mišljenju, za ocjenu prigovora mjerodavno je i to što je podnositelj zahtjeva bio zastupan tijekom cijeloga postupka pred žalbenim sudom i pred Ustavnim sudom. Branitelj podnositelja zahtjeva je tako i u žalbi protiv prvostupanjske presude i u ustavnoj tužbi imao daljnju mogućnost izložiti svoje mišljenje o predmetu.
Međutim, po mom je mišljenju još važnija činjenica da je žalbeni sud pažljivo ispitao je li nenazočnost branitelja mogla imati utjecaja na ishod predmeta. Na to je pitanje odgovorio negativno, i to je objasnio na konkretan i uvjerljiv način, vidi citat u stavku 10. Ne vidim nikakvog razloga dvojiti o valjanosti zaključka do kojega je došao žalbeni sud, imajući na umu i načelo supsidijarnosti, s obzirom na ocjenu činjeničnih pitanja.
I kao sažetak, stroga provjera postupka u cjelini navodi me na zaključak da podnositelj zahtjeva nije bio lišen poštenog suđenja (vidi, mutatis mutandis, predmet Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24. studeni 1993., § 44., Series A br. 275). U okolnostima ovoga predmeta nalazim da se je podnositelj zahtjeva mogao braniti uz pravnu pomoć u mjeri koju traži Konvencija. Stoga po mom mišljenju nije došlo do povrede članka 6., stavka 1. uzetog zajedno s člankom 6., stavkom 3. Konvencije.
___________________________________
Prevod presude preuzet sa https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF HANŽEVAČKI v. CROATIA
(Application no. 17182/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
16 April 2009
FINAL
16/07/2009
This judgment may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Hanževački v. Croatia, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Christos Rozakis, President,
Nina Vajić,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Dean Spielmann,
Sverre Erik Jebens, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 26 March 2009,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 17182/07) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a[n] Croatian national, Mr Davor Hanževački (“the applicant”), on 28 March 2007.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr Z. Novaković, a lawyer practising in Zagreb. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs Š. Stažnik.
3. On 27 June 2008 the President of the First Section decided to communicate the complaints concerning the applicant’s right to a fair hearing and to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing to the Government. It was also decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Daruvar.
5. On 11 December 2002 the Daruvar State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Daruvaru) filed a bill of indictment against the applicant in the Daruvar Municipal Court (Općinksi sud u Daruvaru) charging him with violation of copyrights in that he had used various items of computer software without the consent of the holders of the relevant licence. In the proceedings the applicant was represented by legal counsel of his own choosing. At a hearing held on 10 March 2003 the applicant gave his evidence. At a hearing held on 28 April 2003 the Municipal Court heard evidence from the witnesses nominated by the defence and gave a judgment acquitting the applicant of all charges. However, this judgment was quashed on 10 July 2003 by the Daruvar County Court, upon an appeal lodged by the prosecution.
6. In the resumed proceedings before the Daruvar Municipal Court an expert opinion was obtained. At the first hearing held on 6 October 2003 the applicant again gave his evidence, in the presence of his chosen counsel. The next hearing, scheduled for 29 December 2003, was adjourned on a request by the applicant’s counsel who explained, in a submission filed on 24 December 2003, that he had already planned a journey on that date. The hearing scheduled for 4 February 2004 was adjourned on account of the illness of the presiding judge.
7. According to the applicant, before a hearing scheduled for 9 March 2004 his counsel contacted the Municipal Court by telephone and asked for an adjournment on account of his sudden illness.
8. At the beginning of the hearing the applicant asked that the hearing be adjourned and informed the court that he did not wish to defend himself in the absence of his counsel. The presiding judge, however, decided to hold the hearing. A counsel for the prosecution was also absent. The applicant, who had already given evidence at the previous hearings, gave additional evidence. The applicant’s request that further witnesses be heard was dismissed. The applicant then gave his closing arguments. The hearing was concluded and a judgment was pronounced. The applicant was found guilty of using various items of computer software without the consent of the holder of the relevant licence. He was given a suspended sentence of three months’ imprisonment with a one-year probation period.
9. In an appeal lodged on 21 April 2004 the applicant complained, inter alia, that the hearing of 9 March 2004 had been held in the absence of his counsel although there had been a good reason for the latter’s absence. He asserted that on the morning of 9 March 2004 his counsel had contacted the Daruvar Municipal Court by telephone. His call had been answered by an usher and the counsel had asked to speak to the presiding judge. However, the judge had not answered the call. Therefore, the counsel had asked the usher, M.R., to inform the presiding judge about his inability to attend the hearing owing to his sudden illness. The usher had done so. The counsel’s request that the hearing be adjourned on account of his sudden illness had not been noted in the minutes of the hearing. The applicant enclosed a medical certificate for his counsel, of 8 March 2004, indicating that he had been given sick leave as of that date.
10. On 24 June 2004 the Bjelovar County Court (Županijski sud u Bjelovaru) upheld the first-instance judgment. It found that the presence of the applicant’s counsel at the hearing held on 9 March 2004 had not been necessary. The relevant part of the appellate judgment reads as follows:
“The ground for appeal raised by the defendant that the first-instance court had made a grave breach of the rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 367(3), when it held a hearing in the absence of the defendant’s counsel, this court finds unfounded. The facts established in the minutes of the hearing held on 9 March 2004 lead to the conclusion that, although the defendant requested the adjournment of the hearing on account of the justified absence of his counsel, the first-instance court assessed that the counsel’s absence was not detrimental to the defence and therefore held a hearing and on the same day adopted a first-instance judgment. The conduct of the first-instance court has to be viewed in the light of a [possible] violation of the defence rights and an assessment of its effect on the judgment adopted [by the first-instance court] has to be made. The new facts presented by the defendant at that hearing, on account of which he asked for an adjournment claiming that his counsel was in possession of fresh evidence in connection with the purchase and the price of the “Autocad” software, could not have been of decisive importance for the crime [at issue] as such. That is because the [first-instance] court found the defendant guilty of the principal criminal offence under Article 230(1) of the Criminal Code in respect of which it is not relevant whether it resulted in significant financial gain or significant damage. Exactly for that reason the absence of the defence counsel at the hearing could not have been of influence for the adoption of the impugned judgment and its legality.”
11. The applicant’s subsequent constitutional complaint was dismissed on 28 September 2006 by the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) as being ill-founded.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
12. The relevant part of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002, 143/2002 and 62/2003) provides as follows:
Article 5
“(1) The defendant has the right to defend himself or herself in person or through a legal counsel of his or her own choosing among the members of the Bar ...
...”
CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Article 343
“After the evidence has been heard the president of the chamber shall allow the parties, the victim and defence counsel to present their closing arguments ...”
Article 346
“(1) Defence counsel or the defendant personally shall present in their closing arguments the [main points of] the defence and may reply to the arguments of the [prosecution] and the victim.
...”
13. Pursuant to Article 430 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where the defendant requests an amendment of a final judgment following a finding of a violation of, inter alia, the right to a fair trial, by the European Court of Human Rights, the rules governing a retrial shall apply.
14. Article 230(1) of the Criminal Code (Kaznenei zakon Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 28/1998, 50/2000, 129/2000, 51/2001, 11/2003 and 105/2004) proscribes the criminal offence of unauthorised use of an authorship, carrying a punishment of a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §§ 1 AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION
15. The applicant complained that the hearing of 9 March 2004 had been held in the absence of his counsel. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(c) of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...
...
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights ...
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;
...”
16. The Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
17. The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
18. The applicant argued that his right to a fair trial and in particular his right to be represented by a legal representative of his own choosing in the criminal proceedings against him had been violated in so far as the trial court conducting the proceedings had denied his request that the concluding hearing be adjourned on account of the sudden illness of his counsel. He explained that his counsel had fallen ill a day before the hearing and that he had duly informed the trial court about it on the morning of the hearing by telephone. He argued that according to the relevant provisions of the Croatian Code of Criminal Procedure the trial court was under duty to adjourn a hearing when the defence counsel informed that court about his inability to attend for a good reason. The applicant further emphasised the importance of the concluding hearing in the criminal proceedings as it was the only opportunity for the defence to orally present their view of the results of the proceedings before a trial court and to present their own conclusions and arguments as regards the evidence of the case. He also stressed that the case had concerned complex issues of law, in particular whether his acts could be seen as illegal, and that such arguments could only have been adequately presented by a qualified lawyer.
19. The Government maintained that there was no duty on the part of the trial court to adjourn the hearing in question since all the evidence had already been presented before the concluding hearing and that there had been no special circumstances which would require the presence of the applicant’s counsel at the concluding hearing. They stressed that the applicant’s counsel had fallen ill a day before the hearing and could have informed the trial court about it that very day by means of a telefax. Therefore, the applicant had been deprived of legal representation for reasons entirely imputable to his defence counsel.
20. The Court firstly observes that its task is not to give an answer to the parties’ disputing arguments on whether the Daruvar Municipal Court was, according to the relevant provisions of the Croatian Code of Criminal Procedure, obliged or not to adjourn the concluding hearing in the criminal proceedings against the applicant on account of the justified absence of his defence counsel. The Court’s task is rather to make an assessment whether, from the Convention point of view, the applicant’s defence rights were respected to a degree which satisfies the guarantees of a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. In this connection the Court reiterates at the outset that the requirements of paragraph 3 of Article 6 are to be seen as particular aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by paragraph 1 (see, among other authorities, Balliu v. Albania, no. 74727/01, § 25, 16 June 2005). On the whole, the Court is called upon to examine whether the criminal proceedings against the applicant, in their entirety, were fair (see, among other authorities,Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24 November 1993, Series A no. 275, § 38; S.N. v. Sweden, no. 34209/96, § 43, ECHR 2002-V; and Vanyan v. Russia, no. 53203/99, § 63-68, 15 December 2005).
21. The Court reiterates that, although not absolute, the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer is one of the fundamental features of a fair trial (see Krombach v. France, no. 29731/96, § 89, ECHR 2001-II). A person charged with a criminal offence who does not wish to defend himself in person must be able to have recourse to legal assistance of his own choosing (see Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, Series A no. 80, § 99; d Pakelli v. Germany, 25 April 1983, Series A no. 64, § 31; and Whitfield and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 46387/99, 48906/99, 57410/00 and 57419/00, § 48, 12 April 2005).
22. The Court notes that the applicant in the present case was constantly represented by a lawyer of his own choosing in the criminal proceedings against him, save for the final hearing held before the trial court. Before that hearing the applicant had given his evidence as had all witnesses nominated by the defence. The Court notes further that at the final hearing before the trial court the applicant asked for an adjournment on account of the absence of his defence counsel who had suddenly fallen ill. However, this request was denied. The applicant then gave his further evidence and presented his closing arguments.
23. The Court is aware of the requirement of efficiency of the conduct of the criminal proceedings. However, that requirement cannot run contrary to the protection of the defence rights to a degree incompatible with the guarantees of a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. In this connection the Court notes that it is true that the applicant’s counsel asked for the adjournment of the hearing scheduled for 29 December 2003 on account of a previously planned journey. However, in view of the date of that hearing falling so close to a public holiday and the fact that the counsel had informed the trial court of his inability to attend in advance, the Court considers that these circumstances do not indicate that the applicant or his counsel acted in bad faith or tried to unnecessarily delay the proceedings.
24. As to the circumstances surrounding the request for the adjournment of the final hearing, the Court notes that in his appeal the applicant’s counsel explained in detail that he had suddenly fallen ill a day before the hearing and on the morning of the hearing contacted the trial court by telephone. He gave the name of the usher who had received the call and who had gone to inform the trial judge about his inability to attend. He also enclosed a medical certificate showing that he had been on sick leave as of 8 March 2004. The appellate court made no comments on these circumstances and instead concluded that the counsel’s presence was not necessary in view of the evidence hitherto already presented before the trial court and the features of the crime held against the applicant.
25. The Court cannot endorse the views of the appellate court for the following reasons. The Court notes that one of the most important aspects of a concluding hearing in criminal trials is an opportunity for the defence, as well as for the prosecution, to present their closing arguments, and it is the only opportunity for both parties to orally present their view of the entire case and all the evidence presented at trial and give their assessment of the result of the trial. The Court considers that the choice made by the prosecution not to attend the concluding hearing in the case against the applicant cannot have any effect on the right of the accused to be represented by a lawyer of his own choosing.
26. In the Court’s view the absence of the applicant’s counsel gave good cause for the hearing of 9 March 2004 to be adjourned, in view of the significance of the concluding hearing in the criminal proceedings against the applicant (see paragraph 25 above).
27. This defect was not remedied either in the County Court or the Constitutional Court, since these courts did not hold hearings.
28. Having regard to the purpose of the Convention, which is to protect rights that are practical and effective, and to the prominent place the right to a fair administration of justice holds in a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention, the Court considers that any restrictive interpretation of Article 6 would not correspond to the aim and the purpose of that provision (see, mutatis mutandis, Delcourt v. Belgium, 17 January 1970, Series A no. 11, § 25, and Ryakib Biryukov v. Russia, no. 14810/02, § 37, ECHR 2008‑...).
29. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the applicant was not able to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing to the extent required under the Convention. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 taken together with Article 6 § 3(c) of the Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
30. The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the assessment of evidence and the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him and under Article 7 of the Convention that the acts he had committed did not amount to a criminal offence. Lastly, he invoked Article 17 of the Convention.
31. In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court considers that this part of the application does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention. It follows that it is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
32. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
33. The applicant claimed 100,000 Croatian Kuna (HRK) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
34. The Government deemed the sum claimed excessive.
35. The Court considers that the finding of a violation together with the possibility open to the applicant under national law to seek a fresh trial (under Article 430 of the Croatian Code of Criminal Procedure) constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction in the circumstances of the present case.
B. Costs and expenses
36. The applicant also claimed HRK 39,550 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court and before the domestic courts.
37. The Government left it to the Court to assess the necessity of the costs incurred.
38. Under the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 5,400 in respect of costs and expenses plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount.
C. Default interest
39. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Declares unanimously the complaint concerning the applicant’s right to a fair hearing and to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds by six votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 taken together with Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention;
3. Holds by six votes to one
(a) that the finding of a violation together with the possibility under national law to seek a fresh trial constitute sufficient just satisfaction;
(b) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 5,400 (five thousand four hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(c) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 April 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the dissenting opinion of Judge Jebens is annexed to this judgment.
C.L.R.
S.N.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE JEBENS
I respectfully disagree with the majority that there has been a violation of Article 6 in this case. For the reasons set out below, I am of the opinion that the applicant was afforded a fair trial at the Municipal Court.
I note firstly that the applicant’s defence counsel was present at the previous hearings, including the hearing on 6 October 2003, when the applicant gave evidence. He also assisted the applicant at the examination of all witnesses which were heard at the previous hearings. Furthermore, he had ample opportunity to present his views on the facts of the case and all pertaining legal issues in written submissions before the final hearing. During the final hearing no further witnesses were heard. However, the applicant himself was heard once more at that hearing and he also gave the closing arguments.
It is also in my opinion relevant for the assessment of the complaint that the applicant was represented throughout the proceedings before the appellate Court and the Constitutional Court. The applicant’s counsel thus had a further opportunity to present his views on the case both in an appeal against the first instance judgment and in a constitutional complaint.
More important is, however, in my opinion the fact that the appellate Court carefully examined whether the absence of the defence counsel could possibly have affected the outcome of the case. It answered that question in the negative, and explained it in a concrete and convincing manner, see the quotation in para 10. I see no reason to doubt the validity of the conclusion reached by the appellate Court, bearing in mind also the principle of subsidiarity, with regard to assessment of questions of fact.
Summing up, a scrutiny of the proceedings as a whole leads me to conclude that the applicant was not denied a fair trial (see, mutatis mutandis, Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24 November 1993, § 44, Series A no. 275). In the circumstance of the present case I find that the applicant was able to defend himself through legal assistance to the extent required under the Convention. There has therefore in my opinion not been a violation of Article 6 § 1 taken together with Article 6 § 3 c of the Convention.