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EUROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
PRVI ODJEL
PREDMET ERKAPIĆ protiv HRVATSKE
(Zahtjev br. 51198/08)
PRESUDA
STRASBOURG
25. travnja 2013.
Ova će presuda postati konačnom pod okolnostima utvrđenim u članku 44. stavku 2. Konvencije. Može biti podvrgnuta uredničkim izmjenama.
U predmetu Erkapić protiv Hrvatske, Europski sud za ljudska prava (Prvi odjel), zasjedajući u Vijeću koje čine:
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, predsjednica,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Julia Laffranque,
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,
Ksenija Turković,
Dmitry Dedov, suci,
i Søren Nielsen, tajnik Odjela,
nakon vijećanja zatvorenog za javnost 19. ožujka i 2. travnja 2013. godine, donosi sljedeću presudu koja je usvojena tog datuma:
POSTUPAK
1. Postupak u ovome predmetu pokrenut je na temelju zahtjeva (br. 51198/08) protiv Republike Hrvatske što ga je 17. listopada 2008. godine hrvatski državljanin, g. Mario Erkapić ("podnositelj") podnio Sudu na temelju članka 34. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda ("Konvencija").
2. Podnositelja je zastupala gđa J. Novak, odvjetnica iz Zagreba. Hrvatsku vladu ("Vlada") zastupala je njezina zastupnica, gđa Š. Stažnik.
3. Dana 10. studenog 2010. godine Vladi su priopćeni podnositeljevi prigovori zbog nepoštenosti kaznenog postupka koji se vodio protiv njega. Odlučeno je i da će se istovremeno odlučiti o dopuštenosti i osnovanosti zahtjeva (članak 29., stavak 1.).
ČINJENICE
I. OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA
4. Podnositelj je rođen 1967. godine i živi u Zagrebu.
A. Istraga
5. Dana 19. listopada 2000. godine istražni sudac Županijskog suda u Zagrebu ispitao je svjedoka M.S. o navodnoj nedopuštenoj trgovini heroinom u Zagrebu. M.S. je, inter alia, svjedočio da je u travnju 2000. godine prevezao jedan kilogram heroina od B.S. drugoj osobi koja mu je poznata kao "Mario".
6. Kao dio daljnje policijske istrage organizirane opskrbe heroinom u Zagrebu Policijska uprava zagrebačka, Sektor kriminalističke policije, Odjel kriminaliteta droga (dalje: "policija"), ispitala je osumnjičenika I.G.H. koji je izjavio da je kupio heroin od podnositelja. Tijekom ispitivanja bio je nazočan njegov branitelj H.B. Ispitivanje I.G.H. započelo je u 23:15 sati, nakon što je branitelj pristupio u policijsku postaju u 23:10 sati, a završilo 28. travnja 2001. godine u 1 sat iza ponoći.
7. Dana 31. svibnja 2001. godine policija je ispitala još jednog osumnjičenika, V.Š., koji je izjavio da je ovisnik o heroinu i da je kupovao heroin od podnositelja. Tijekom ispitivanja bio je nazočan njegov branitelj N.D. Njegovo ispitivanje započelo je u 16:26 sati, nakon što je u 15:55 sati u policijsku postaju pristupio branitelj, a završilo u 17:43 sati istog dana.
8. Dana 6. lipnja 2001. godine podnositelj je uhićen pod sumnjom da je nabavljao heroin. Policija je ispitivala podnositelja, ali se on odlučio braniti šutnjom.
9. Podnositelj je sljedećeg dana doveden pred istražnog suca Županijskog suda u Zagrebu. Odbio je sve optužbe protiv sebe, branio se šutnjom i nije dao nikakav iskaz. Podnositelja je ponovno ispitivao istražni sudac dana 11. lipnja 2001. godine, ali on nije dao iskaz.
10. Dana 11. lipnja 2001. godine pred Županijskim sudom u Zagrebu otvorena je istraga u odnosu na podnositelja i još osam osoba, uključujući I.G.H. i V.Š., u vezi sa sumnjom da su se udružili radi opskrbe heroinom u Zagrebu u razdoblju od 1998. do 2001. godine.
11. Dana 17. i 19. lipnja 2001. godine istražni sudac zatražio je saslušanje I.G.H. koji se branio šutnjom te nije dao iskaz. Tijekom ispitivanja I.G.H. pred istražnim sucem, nije bio nazočan branitelj.
12. Dana 21. lipnja 2001. godine istraga je proširena na još jednog okrivljenika, I.S., koji je također odlučio braniti se šutnjom, ali je zanijekao sve optužbe protiv sebe.
13. Dana 25. lipnja 2001. godine policija je ispitala još jednog osumnjičenika, N.S. Izjavio je da je godinama ovisnik o heroinu te da je kupovao heroin od podnositelja. Tijekom ispitivanja bio je nazočan njegov branitelj Ž.S. Njegovo ispitivanje započelo je u 17:50 sati, nakon što je u policijsku postaju pristupio branitelj, a završilo je u 18:55 sati istoga dana.
14. Dana 16. srpnja 2001. godine istražni sudac uzeo je iskaz V.Š. koji se branio šutnjom. Tijekom ispitivanja V.Š. nije bio nazočan branitelj, već je on izjavio da je njegov branitelj I.K.
15. Dana 23. srpnja 2001. godine istražni sudac uzeo je iskaz svjedoka M.S. koji je povukao svoj iskaz od 19. listopada 2000. godine, navodeći da je taj iskaz bio dan pod prisilom istražnog suca i policije. Izjavio je kako nije istina da je prevozio jedan kilogram heroina "Mariu". Također je izjavio da ne poznaje podnositelja.
16. Dana 26. srpnja 2001. godine istražni sudac ispitao je podnositelja u vezi s navodima N.S.-a. Podnositelj je odbio sve optužbe protiv sebe i odbio dati bilo kakav daljnji iskaz.
17. Dana 31. srpnja 2001. godine istražni sudac saslušao je N.S. koji je prigovorio da je svoj iskaz policiji dao pod prisilom te da ga je tijekom ispitivanja zastupao odvjetnik kojeg on nije sam odabrao. Pred istražnim sucem N.S.-a je zastupao odvjetnik D.G. Istoga je dana istražni sudac proširio istragu na N.S. i još dvije osobe.
B. Postupak po optužnici
18. Dana 4. prosinca 2001. godine Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu optužilo je podnositelja i dvanaest drugih osoba pred Županijskim sudom u Zagrebu. Podnositelj je optužen za zavjeru u svrhu opskrbljivanja heroinom u razdoblju od sredine 1998. godine do srpnja 2001. godine, time da su neki od suoptuženika optuženi za opskrbljivanje i posjedovanje heroina.
19. Dana 14. i 21. prosinca 2001. godine podnositelj je uložio prigovore na optužnicu tvrdeći da optužnica ima brojne materijalne i postupovne nedostatke. Zatražio je, inter alia, da sve službene bilješke policijskih razgovora budu izuzete iz spisa predmeta, kao i zapisnik o usmenom iskazu I.G.H.-a danom policiji. Tvrdio je da je I.G.H. ovisnik o heroinu te da je svoj iskaz dao dok je bio u uznapredovaloj fazi apstinencijske krize.
20. Izvanraspravno vijeće Županijskog suda u Zagrebu odbilo je podnositeljeve prigovore protiv optužnice i vratilo predmet na suđenje 11. travnja 2002. godine. Izdvojilo je iz spisa službene zabilješke policije o obavljenim obavijesnim razgovorima, ali ne i zapisnik o iskazu I.G.H.
21. Dana 2. svibnja 2002. godine podnositelj je uložio žalbu Vrhovnom sudu Republike Hrvatske protiv te odluke, a Vrhovni sud ju je dana 21. svibnja 2002. godine odbio kao neosnovanu.
22. Dana 11. srpnja 2002. godine predsjednik raspravnog vijeća Županijskog suda u Zagrebu zatražio je mišljenje sudskog vještaka psihijatra o psihičkoj sposobnosti podnositelja. Vještak psihijatar izradio je nalaz i mišljenje 27. srpnja 2002. godine. U njemu je potvrđeno da je podnositelj potpuno psihički sposoban, te da je intelektualno sposoban sudjelovati u postupku.
23. Nakon što je primio daljnju dokumentaciju od obrane, koja se odnosila na psihijatrijsko liječenje podnositelja, predsjednik raspravnog vijeća zatražio je 8. studenog 2002. godine još jedan nalaz i mišljenje vještaka. Vještak medicinske struke ponovio je sve svoje prethodne nalaze.
24. Na ročištu održanom 25. studenog 2002. godine podnositelj je izjavio da se ne osjeća krivim.
25. Daljnja ročišta održana su 28. studenog 2002. i 21. veljače 2003. godine. Na njima je raspravni sud saslušao šest svjedoka i vještaka toksikologa. Policijski službenik D.Z. dao je usmeni iskaz koji se odnosio na policijsku zamku postavljenu jednom od okrivljenika, D.L.-u, te u odnosu na njegovo ispitivanje jednog drugog okrivljenika, Z.E.
26. Dana 8. travnja 2003. godine predsjednik raspravnog vijeća zatražio je nalaz i mišljenje vještaka o psihičkoj sposobnosti N.S.-a, u vrijeme počinjenja navodnog djela.
27. Vještak psihijatar dao je iskaz na ročištu 29. svibnja 2003. godine da je N.S. u razdoblju koje se odnosi na optužbe protiv njega bio smanjeno ubrojiv, ali da je bio sposoban razumjeti narav svojih čina. U tom je razdoblju bio ovisnik i konzumirao je opojne droge. To znači da nije imao značajnu apstinencijsku krizu. Stranke nisu dale nikakve prigovore na te nalaze.
28. Na istom je ročištu raspravno vijeće zatražilo nalaz i mišljenje vještaka psihijatra u odnosu na ostale okrivljenike, uključujući V.Š. i I.G.H.
29. Dana 9. lipnja 2003. godine predsjednik raspravnog vijeća obavijestio je branitelje da je primio obavijest od talijanskih vlasti da bi se jedan od svjedoka, D.M., mogao saslušati u Italiji jer je tamo služio zatvorsku kaznu. Predsjednik raspravnog vijeća zatražio je od branitelja da ga obavijeste žele li biti nazočni tijekom ispitivanja tog svjedoka u Italiji.
30. Dana 18. lipnja 2003. godine vještak psihijatar dostavio je svoj nalaz i mišljenje, zatraženo na ročištu 29. svibnja 2003. godine. Utvrdio je da su u razdoblju na koje se odnose optužbe V.Š. i I.G.H. bili ovisnici o heroinu. Stoga je njihova psihička sposobnost bila smanjena, ali su u to vrijeme bili sposobni razumjeti narav svog čina. Uz to je I.G.H. imao poremećaj osobnosti.
31. Dana 23. listopada 2003. godine podnositeljev branitelj obavijestio je Županijski sud u Zagrebu da neće putovati u Italiju na ispitivanje svjedoka D.M. Dana 25. listopada 2003. godine istražni sudac u Vastu, Italija, ispitao je svjedoka D.M. On u svom iskazu nije naveo ništa što bi se odnosilo na podnositelja. Zapisnik o ovom iskazu proslijeđen je Županijskom sudu u Zagrebu.
32. Sljedeće ročište održano je 8. ožujka 2004. godine. Na njemu je svjedok M.S. ponovio da je svoj prvi iskaz istražnom sucu 19. listopada 2000. godine dao pod prisilom i u strahu od policijskog zlostavljanja. Tvrdio je da nikada nije prevozio nikakvu drogu kao što je to opisao u svom iskazu.
33. Na ročištu 19. travnja 2004. godine vještak psihijatar potvrdio je svoj nalaz u odnosu na V.Š. i I.G.H. Branitelji su uložili prigovore protiv korištenih metoda i nalaza vještaka.
34. Još jedno ročište održano je 23. ožujka 2005. godine. Na njemu su branitelji zatražili da na glavnoj raspravi bude saslušan D.M., svjedok kojega su saslušale talijanske vlasti. Raspravno vijeće odbilo je taj zahtjev jer su postojale značajne zapreke za osiguranje njegove nazočnosti na ročištu, te stoga što su ga već ispitale talijanske sudske vlasti.
35. Na ročištu 24. ožujka 2005. godine iskaze su dali podnositelj, V.Š. i I.G.H. Podnositelj je ponovno zanijekao sve optužbe i prigovorio da ga je policija zlostavljala.
36. V.Š. je svjedočio da ne poznaje ostale suokrivljenike. Glede izjave koju je dao policiji izjavio je:
“Ja sam naime dugogodišnji ovisnik [o heroinu] i na policiji [policijskoj postaji] me nitko ništa nije pitao već je [policijski službenik] K.A. čije lice neću nikad zaboraviti pisao zapisnik u drugoj sobi. Ja sam tražio da mi pozovu mog odvjetnika K. ali su mi rekli na policiji da je K. mafijaški odvjetnik i da on ne može doći.... Htio bih dodati da su mi policajci kad su me lišili slobode rekli da trebaju još jednu izjavu u smislu moje pomoći, oni su znali da sam ja mekan i ja bih potpisao sve što su oni tražili samo da izađem. Tako je došlo i do potpisivanja ovog zapisnika za kojeg ponavljam da je pisan u drugoj prostoriji ....
Na posebna pitanja predsjednika vijeća odgovaram da sam ja sa [ policijskim službenikom] K.A. par puta davao ovakve slične izjave i razgovarao ali to nikad nije ušlo u spis a on mi je rekao da neće niti ovo [izjava].. Međutim, kako [K.A.] nije htio pozvati mog odvjetnika K. pozvao je ovog jednog odvjetnika koji mi čak nije davao ni nikakav savjet, nije ništa rekao osim da je on potpisao zapisnik a ja neka radim što hoću. Dalje odgovaram da se radilo o odvjetnici. Ništa od onog što je sada pročitano iz tog zapisnika nije istina...što stoji u zapisniku da sam ja ovisnik ja mogu reći da je taj dio istinit. ... odgovaram da su istiniti [u tom iskazu] samo ovi moji osobni podaci istiniti a i činjenica da sam ovisnik, a što i ovako i onako zna [policijski službenik] ovaj dio što stoji da sam navodno rekao da nisam u apstinencijskoj krizi je apsolutno neistinit ...
...ja K. A. poznajem 6 godina, on me više puta hapsio i jednom me je prijavio. Znam da mi je jednom prijetio da ako mu nešto ne kažem da će jednu drugu moju prijavu poslati dalje, ali ta prijava nije nikad išla. On je tolerirao moje narkomanstvo ali je zauzvrat tražio da mu kažem od koga kupujem drogu i ja sam mu nekad rekao Nekad sam mu rekao istinu, uglavnom ne, uglavnom sam pokušavao dobiti na vremenu. ... da sam ja njemu [K.A.] vjerovao, a vjerovao sam mu to kad je on donio taj zapisnik i rekao da neka potpišem i da će sve biti u redu i da onda mogu ići, [K.A.] pa sam ja to onda i potpisao.
Na pitanja [optuženog] odgovara da dok sam bio u policiji jedino mi je bilo važno da se dočepam slobode i da si nabavim fiks ili metadon po koji sam krenuo prije nego me policija uhapsila.”
37. I I.G.H. je svjedočio da ga je zlostavljala policija i da je njegov iskaz rezultat zlostavljanja. Izjavio je:
“ ... U [policijskoj stanici] je odmah počelo maltretiranje, dva tri policajca koja ja inače ne poznajem tražili su da raširim noge, ruke stavim na leđa, i da stojim a glavu prislonim na zid. Kad god bi netko pro5ao pored mene udario me, a kad bi pao nastavili su me udarati nogama, skakali po meni. . To je trebalo neko Vrijeme a onda je krenulo nagovaranje i pregovaranje da dam izjavu a ja sam tražio da pozovu odvjetnicu J.N. ili S.B. a oni su za odvjetnicu [J.N.] rekli da,,šta će ti ona kurvetina", a za [odvjetnika S.B.] su rekli da neće doći.
Onda je opet počelo maltretiranje........, a onda su došli [policijski službenici] [K.]A. i [D.]Z. . koji su rekli da su oni dobri policajci i počeli me nagovarati da dam iskaz. Rekli su da je [V.Š.] već dao i da imaju dva-tri iskaza i da neka ja dam iskaz, potpišem i da mogu ići.Ja sam onda potpisao tu izjavu ali niti sam vidio što piše niti bilo što drugo. Sjećam se da je bio nekakav policijski odvjetnik koji mi je rekao ,,Samo ti mali potpiši'. Još su me policajci ucjenjivali tjeralicom koju sam imao govoreći da ako potpišem da će mi skinuti tjeralicu.
... Ja bi se htio suočiti s policajcima Z. i A. ovo što sam govorio. ...
navodim da mi policajci nisu osigurali niti liječnika, a ja sam ih tražio da mi daju heptanone, međutim oni su rekli da nema šanse da dobijem heptanone prije nego što potpišem.
... Drogu sam nabavljao svugdje ali od nikoga od ovdje prisutnih u sudnici' ...
Ništa od toga nije istina osim možda ovaj dio koji se odnosi na moje osobne podatke. ...
Poznam [policijske službenike] Z. i A. ... Nitko od njih dvojice me nije maltretirao fizički... nagovarali me da radim za njih i tome slično. nije točno ovo što stoji da nisam bio u apstinencijskoj krizi, jesam bio, a policajci su mi još mahali hepatonima pred očima. Otvarali su i pokazivali su drogu. Branitelj to nije vidio, on je osim toga tamo bio samo 10 minuta, potpisao i otišao..”
38. Još jedno ročište održano je 25. ožujka 2005. godine na kojemu je N.S. dao svoj iskaz. Glede svog iskaza danog policiji izjavio je:
“ ... [U policijskoj stanici] su me držali do 4 ili 5 sati, ispitivali su me o Erkapiću i rekli su [policijski službenici] da ako im odgovorim potvrdno na njihova pitanja da će me pustiti van. Ja sam tako i napravio, potpisao sam zapisnik i izašao. To sam napravio zato jer sam imao velikih tjelesnih kriza.
... ja nisam izaabrao branitelja Ž.S. On se samo u jednom trenutku tamo stvorio i policajci su rekli to ti je branitelj. Ne sjedam se točno ali mislim da mu nisam potpisao punomoć.
.. je zapisnik pisan ranije a ne dok je odvjetnik bio tamo, ja sam pred odvjetnikom samo potvrđivao ono što u zapisniku piše i onda sam ga potpisao. Potpisao sam ga bez čitanja jer sam jedva čekao oa izađem van, da mogu uzeti drogu ...
prilikom ispitivanja na policiji meni nisu nudili nikakvu liječničku pomoć iako sam bio u krizi apstinencijskoj.
.. da su policajci vidjeli da ja imam krizu ..... da sam im ja rekao i pitao jel mogu dobiti dokora i heptanone, oni su rekli da ne.
39. Na istom je ročištu svjedočio još jedan suoptuženik, D.L. Izjavio je kako je dok je bio u policijskom pritvoru čuo kako policijski službenici tri sata tuku i ispituju N.S.
40. Nakon što je okrivljenik dao iskaz, njegov je branitelj zatražio da se iz spisa izdvoje zapisnici o usmenim iskazima V.Š., I.G.H. i N.S. koje su dali policiji kao nezakonito pribavljeni dokazi. Branitelj drugog suokrivljenika postavio je isti zahtjev.
41. Na ročištu 14. travnja 2005. godine raspravni sud odbio je njihove zahtjeve jer iz zapisnika o iskazima policiji nije bio razvidan nikakav razlog za njihovo izuzimanje iz spisa predmeta.
42. Na istom je ročištu I.G.H. dodao kako mu je policijski službenik K.A. rekao da žele staviti podnositelja u zatvor na petnaest godina ili ga ubiti. V.Š. i I.G.H. ponovili su da su njihovi iskazi dani policiji bili rezultat simptoma apstinencijske krize.
43. U svojoj su završnoj riječi podnositeljevi branitelji tvrdili da su jedini dokaz protiv podnositelja iskazi njegovih suokrivljenika, dani policiji pod prisilom i pritiskom. Zatražili su oslobađanje podnositelja.
44. Dana 14. travnja 2005. godine Županijski sud u Zagrebu proglasio je podnositelja krivim prema optužnici i osudio ga na kaznu zatvora u trajanju od osam godina te mu je oduzeto 690.134,4 hrvatskih kuna (HRK).
45. Županijski sud u Zagrebu temeljio je podnositeljevu osudu samo na izjavama koje su V.Š., I.G.H. i N.S. dali policiji. Uz to je uzeo u obzir i to da je svjedok M.S. također svjedočio da je prenosio jedan kilogram heroina podnositelju.
46. Glede zakonitosti i dokazne vrijednosti zapisnika o usmenim iskazima koje su V.Š., I.G.H. i N.S. dali policiji taj je sud zabilježio:
“Odbijen je prijedlog branitelja IV optuženog I.G.H. za izdvajanje zapisnika o ispitivanju IV optuženika na policiji od 27. travnja 2001. godine. Izdvajanje je predloženo jer je pri ispitivanju IV optuženik imao apstinencijsku krizu. Iz spomenutog zapisnika o ispitivanju IV optuženog I.G.H...l ne proizlazi niti jedna okolnost koja bi upućivala barem na sumnju da je ..io u apstinencijskoj krizi. Uz to, pri njegovom ispitivanju bio je prisutan branitelj koji nije imao nikakvih primjedbi na način ispitivanja. U navedenom zapisniku ne postoji niti jedna okolnost koja bi upućivala na sumnju da je ispitivanje IV optuženog I.G.H. na policiji dana 27. travnja 2001. godine bilo nezakonito....
Predloženo je i izdvajanje zapisnika o ispitivanju na policiji III optuženog V.Š. IV optuženog I.G.H. i XI optuženog N.S. jer da su svi ti zapisnici pribavljeni korištenjem prijetnji i sile i da kao takvi ne mogu biti korišteni u postupku. U navedenim zapisnicima ne postoji niti jedna okolnost koja bi upućivala na sumnju da su konkretni iskazi pribavljeni korištenjem sile ili prijetnje. Ispitivanjima su bili prisutni branitelji koji nisu imali nikakve primjedbe. ... Nema niti jedna vjerodostojna okolnost koja bi upućivala barem na sumnju da su navedeni zapisnici nezakoniti dokazi i zato je odbijen prijedlog za njihovim izdvajanjem....
Iskaze III optuženog V.Š., IV optuženog I.G.H. i XI optuženog N.S. koje su oni dali na policiji uz prisutnog branitelja sud je u najvećem dijelu prihvatio jer su dani jasno, određeno i precizno. Ti iskazi se međusobno nadopunjuju i potvrđuju, sadrže brojne detalje koji očito mogu biti poznati samo iz neposrednog opažanja i doživljavanja (osobito nakon dolaska u kontakt s I optuženim Mariom Erkapićem i nakon distribucije i sakrivanja opojne droge). ... Iskaze ovih optuženika s glavne rasprave gdje oni nastoje obezvrijediti ranije iskaze prikazujući ih kao posljedicu nezakonitog postupanja policije (prijetnje, obmane, zlostavljanje) sud nije prihvatio jer su očito usmjereni na izbjegavanje kazneno pravne odgovornosti.
Uz to, zapisnici s policije ne sadrže niti jednu okolnost koja bi njihovu zakonitost dovodila u pitanje Neuvjerljivo je da brojne nezakonitosti koje poglavito opisuje na i glavnoj raspravi I.G.H. ostaju bez ikakve životne ili pravne reakcije optuženika, a što oni objašnjavaju da ionako ne bi od toga bilo ništa. Iznošenje navodnih nezakonitosti gotovo četiri godine nakon Sto su se desile zato je neživotno i očito predstavlja konstrukciju usmjerenu na izbjegavanje kazneno pravne odgovornosti.”
47. Dana 3. listopada 2005. godine podnositelj je protiv prvostupanjske presude uložio žalbu Vrhovnom sudu. Tvrdio je, inter alia, da se njegova osuda temeljila isključivo na izjavama koje su suokrivljenici dali policiji, iako su to nezakonito pribavljeni dokazi jer je suokrivljenike policija zlostavljala tijekom ispitivanja. Štoviše, oni su u vrijeme ispitivanja bili ovisnici o heroinu koji su prolazili kroz apstinencijsku krizu.
48. Nadalje prigovara da prvostupanjski sud nije saslušao branitelje koji su navodno bili nazočni tijekom policijskog ispitivanja, te policijske službenike koji su ispitivali suokrivljenike. U situaciji u kojoj su okrivljenici otvorili pitanje prisile i zlostavljanja - tijekom policijskog ispitivanja, i s obzirom na činjenicu da su oni inkriminirali ne samo sebe već i njega, raspravni sud imao je obvezu provjeriti njihove iskaze. Glede izjave svjedoka M.S., podnositelj je istaknuo kako taj svjedok nikada nije rekao da je osoba koju je on znao pod imenom "Mario" bio podnositelj.
49. Dana 22. veljače 2006. godine Vrhovni sud odbio je podnositeljevu žalbu. Potvrdio je utvrđenja Županijskog suda u Zagrebu da u spisu predmeta nije bilo nikakvih dokaza koji bi ukazivali na bilo što nezakonito u zapisnicima o obavijesnim razgovorima policije sa suokrivljenicima. Vrhovni sud je istaknuo da su oni bili ispitani u nazočnosti branitelja i da nema ničega što bi ukazalo na bilo kakve simptome apstinencijske krize, prisile ili pritiska. Vrhovni sud također je dodao:
“Psihijatrijski vještak D.M. mišljenja je da je [I.G.H.] u travnju 2001., kao ovisnik imao veliku toleranciju na heroin, no ne spominje da bi zapao u apstinencijsku krizu ..pri kojem je mišljenju ostao i saslušavan neposredno na glavnoj raspravi, na što obrana nije imala pitanja....
Niti iz jednog dokaza pa niti iz nalaza, i mišljenja psihijatrijskog vještaka D.M. ne proizlazi da bi sposobnost [I.G.H.] razumijevanja djela bila smanjena ili otklonjena a posebno ne proizlazi da on ne bi bio sposoban pred nadležnim tijelima državne vlasti prenositi svoja znanja, bez obzira na ovisništvo o heroinu i smanjenu sposobnost upravljanja vlastitim postupcima pri počinjenju djela. Jednako tako nema niti dokaza da bi suokrivljenici V.Š. i N.S. ..., zbog ovisnosti o opijatima bili smanjeno sposobni razumjeti djelo i prenositi svoja znanja pred nadležnim tijelima državne vlasti. ...”
50. Dana 4. travnja 2006. godine podnositelj je podnio ustavnu tužbu Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske protiv navedene presude, ponovivši svoje ranije tvrdnje.
51. Dana 17. rujna 2008. godine Ustavni sud odbio je podnositeljevu ustavnu tužbu, prihvativši obrazloženje nižih sudova. Odluka Ustavnog suda dostavljena je podnositelju dana 26. rujna 2008. godine.
II. MJERODAVNO DOMAĆE PRAVO
52. Mjerodavne odredbe Ustava Republike Hrvatske (“Narodne novine”, br. 56/1990, 135/1997, 113/2000, 28/2001, 76/2010) glase kako slijedi:
Članak 29.
“Svatko ima pravo da zakonom ustanovljeni neovisni i nepristrani sud pravično i u razumnom roku odluči o njegovim pravima i obvezama, ili o sumnji ili optužbi zbog kažnjivog djela.”
53. Mjerodavni dio članka 62. Ustavnog zakona o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske (“Narodne novine”, br. 99/1999, 29/2002, 49/2002) glasi:
“1. Svatko može podnijeti Ustavnom sudu ustavnu tužbu ako smatra da mu je pojedinačnim aktom tijela državne vlasti, tijela jedinice lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave ili pravne osobe s javnim ovlastima, kojim je odlučeno o njegovim pravima i obvezama ili o sumnji ili optužbi zbog kažnjivog djela, povrijeđeno ljudsko pravo ili temeljna sloboda zajamčena Ustavom, odnosno Ustavom zajamčeno pravo na lokalnu i područnu (regionalnu) samoupravu (u daljnjem tekstu: ustavno pravo)...
2. Ako je zbog povrede ustavnih prava dopušten drugi pravni put, ustavna tužba može se podnijeti tek nakon što je taj pravni put iscrpljen.
3. U stvarima u kojima je dopušten upravni spor, odnosno revizija u parničnom ili izvanparničnom postupku, pravni put je iscrpljen nakon što je odlučeno i o tim pravnim sredstvima.”
54. Mjerodavne odredbe Kaznenog zakona (“Narodne novine”, br. 110/1997, 27/1998, 129/2000, 51/2001) propisuju:
Zlouporaba opojnih droga
Članak 173.
“... (2) Tko neovlašteno proizvodi, prerađuje, prodaje ili nudi na prodaju, ili radi prodaje kupuje, drži ili prenosi, ili posreduje u prodaji ili kupnji, ili na drugi način neovlašteno stavlja u promet tvari ili pripravke koji su propisom proglašeni opojnim drogama,
kaznit će se kaznom zatvora od jedne do deset godina, ili kaznom dugotrajnog zatvora.
(3) Ako je kazneno djelo iz stavka 2. ovoga članka počinilo više osoba koje su se udružile radi činjenja tih djela, ili je počinitelj toga kaznenog djela organizirao mrežu preprodavatelja ili posrednika, počinitelj će se kazniti kaznom zatvora najmanje tri godine, ili kaznom dugotrajnog zatvora.”
55. Mjerodavne odredbe Zakona o kaznenom postupku (“Narodne novine”, br. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002, 143/2002, 62/2003, 84/2005 i 115/2006), glase kako slijedi:
Članak 9.
“(1) Sudske se odluke ne mogu utemeljiti na dokazima pribavljenim na nezakonit način (nezakoniti dokazi).
(2) Nezakoniti jesu oni dokazi koji su pribavljeni kršenjem Ustavom, zakonom ili međunarodnim pravom zajamčenih prava obrane, prava na dostojanstvo, ugled i čast te prava na nepovredivost osobnog i obiteljskog života kao i oni dokazi koji su pribavljeni povredom odredaba kaznenog postupka i koji su izričito predviđeni ovim Zakonom te drugi dokazi za koje se iz njih saznalo.“
Članak 78.
“(1) Kad je u ovom Zakonu propisano da se na nekom dokazu ne može utemeljiti sudska odluka, istražni će sudac na prijedlog stranaka ili po službenoj dužnosti riješiti o izdvajanju toga dokaza iz spisa najkasnije do završetka istrage, odnosno davanja suglasnosti istražnog suca da se optužnica može podignuti bez provođenja istrage (članak 191. stavak 2.). Protiv rješenja istražnog suca o prijedlogu stranaka ili o izdvajanju dopuštena je posebna žalba.
...
(3) Nakon završene istrage te nakon davanja suglasnosti da se optužnica može podignuti bez provođenja istrage (članak 191. stavak 2.) istražni će sudac postupiti prema odredbama stavka 1. i 2. ovoga članka i što se tiče svih obavijesti koje su u skladu sa člankom 174. stavkom 3. i člankom 173. stavkom 3. ovoga Zakona državnom odvjetniku, odnosno redarstvenim vlastima dali građani, odnosno osumnjičenik koji je bio ispitan protivno odredbama članka 177. stavka 5. ovoga Zakona.”
Članak 177.
“ ... (5) U prikupljanju obavijesti redarstvene će vlasti osumnjičenika upozoriti prema odredbama članka 237. stavka 2. ovoga Zakona Na osumnjičenikov zahtjev, redarstvene će mu vlasti omogućiti da uzme branitelja i u tu svrhu zastati s prikupljanjem obavijesti od osumnjičenika do dolaska branitelja a najkasnije do tri sata od kada je osumnjičenik izjavio da želi uzeti branitelja. ... Ako je iz okolnosti vidljivo da izabrani branitelj u tom roku ne može doći, redarstvene će vlasti osumnjičeniku omogućiti da uzme branitelja s liste dežurnih odvjetnika koju za područje županije nadležnim redarstvenim vlastima dostavlja Odvjetnička komora.... Ako osumnjičenik ne uzme branitelja ili pozvani branitelj u tom roku ne dođe, redarstvene vlasti mogu nastaviti s prikupljanjem obavijesti od osumnjičenika.... Državni odvjetnik ima pravo biti nazočan ispitivanju. Zapisnici redarstvenih vlasti o iskazu osumnjičenika u nazočnosti branitelja mogu se upotrijebiti kao dokaz u kaznenom postupku. “
Članak 355.
“(1) Kad optuženik pri ispitivanju na glavnoj raspravi odstupi od svojega prijašnjeg iskaza, predsjednik vijeća upozorit će ga na odstupanje i upitati ga zašto sada iskazuje drukčije, a po potrebi pročitat će se njegov prijašnji iskaz ili dio tog iskaza.
(2) Kad optuženik prije ispitivanja na glavnoj raspravi ne želi iskazivati ili odgovarati na pojedino pitanje, pročitat će se njegovi prijašnji iskazi ili njihov dio.”
Članak 413.
“Odredbe ove glave o obnovi kaznenog postupka će se uporabiti i... na temelju odluke Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske kojom je poništen ili ukinut propis na temelju kojeg je bila donesena pravomoćna osuda ili na temelju odluke Europskog suda za ljudska prava koja se odnosi na neki razlog za obnovu kaznenog postupka ili izvanredno preispitivanje pravomoćne presude.”
Članak 427.
“Zahtjev za izvanredno preispitivanje pravomoćne presude može se podnijeti [u slučaju]:
...
3. zbog povrede prava okrivljenika na obranu na glavnoj raspravi ili zbog povrede odredaba kaznenog postupka u žalbenom postupku, ako je ta povreda mogla utjecati na presudu.”
56. Mjerodavne odredbe izmijenjenog i dopunjenog Zakona o kaznenom postupku (“Narodne novine”, br. 152/2008, 76/2009, 80/2011, 121/2011, 91/2012, 143/2012) propisuju:
Članak 502.
“...
(2) Odredbe o obnovi kaznenog postupka će se primijeniti i u slučaju kada je podnesen zahtjev za izmjenu pravomoćne sudske odluke na temelju konačne presude Europskog suda za ljudska prava kojom je u odnosu na okrivljenika utvrđena povreda prava i sloboda iz Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda.
(3) Zahtjev za obnovom postupka na temelju konačne presude Europskog suda za ljudska prava može se podnijeti u roku od trideset dana od datuma konačnosti presude Europskog suda za ljudska prava.”
Članak 574.
“...
(2) Ako je do stupanja na snagu ovog Zakona donesena kakva odluka protiv koje je po odredbama zakona po kojem je postupak vođen dopušten pravni lijek ili još teče rok za podnošenje pravnog lijeka, ili je pravni lijek podnesen, ali o njemu još nije odlučeno, u tom postupku primijenit će se odredbe zakona po kojem je donesena odluka, osim ako ovim Zakonom nije drukčije propisano.
(3) Odredbe članka 497. – 508. ovog Zakona na odgovarajući način će se primjenjivati i u postupcima povodom zahtjeva za obnovu kaznenog postupka podnesenima po odredbama Zakona o kaznenom postupku (»Narodne novine«, br. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002, 143/2002, 62/2003 i 115/2006).”
PRAVO
I. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANKA 6. KONVENCIJE
57. Podnositelj prigovara da nije imao pošteno suđenje zajamčeno člankom 6., stavkom 1. Konvencije, koji glasi kako slijedi:
“Svatko ima pravo da... sud ...pravično odluči ...o sumnji ili optužbi zbog kažnjivog djela ...”
A. Dopuštenost
1. Tvrdnje stranaka
58. Vlada tvrdi da podnositelj nije iscrpio sva dostupna i djelotvorna domaća pravna sredstva. Po mišljenju Vlade podnositelj je trebao kroz policijski zapovjedni lanac podnijeti prigovor protiv navodnog policijskog zlostavljanja suokrivljenika. To bi dovelo do istrage svih okolnosti predmeta, koju je podnositelj mogao iskoristiti kad je postavio svoj zahtjev za izdvajanje dokaza. Nadalje, podnositelj nije podnio kaznenu prijavu protiv policijskih službenika i odvjetnika koji su sudjelovali u ispitivanju suokrivljenika. Da jest, mogao je iskoristiti rezultat tog postupka povodom kaznene prijave kao dokaz u kaznenom postupku ili kao osnovu na kojoj je mogao zatražiti ponavljanje postupka u svom predmetu. Vlada također ističe kako podnositelj nije podnio prigovor Odvjetničkoj komori protiv odvjetnika koji su sudjelovali u ispitivanju suokrivljenika. Ta bi komora istražila prigovor, a rezultat te istrage mogao se iskoristiti kao dokaz u kaznenom postupku koji se vodio protiv podnositelja.
59. Podnositelj tvrdi kako činjenica da je Ustavni sud ispitao osnovanost njegove ustavne tužbe znači da je iscrpio sva dostupna domaća pravna sredstva. Glede navoda Vlade da je trebao podnijeti kaznenu i stegovnu prijavu protiv policijskih službenika i odvjetnika koji su sudjelovali u ispitivanju suokrivljenika podnositelj tvrdi da to nisu djelotvorna pravna sredstva za njegove prigovore podnesene Sudu, te da nije bio obvezan iskoristiti sva moguća pravna sredstva jer je imao pravo odabrati ono pravno sredstvo koje rješava njegove najbitnije prigovore. Po njegovom mišljenju, Vlada nije dokazala svoje tvrdnje da su to djelotvorna pravna sredstva u smislu članka 35., stavka 1. Konvencije.
2. Ocjena Suda
60. Sud ponavlja kako prema članku 35. stavku 1. Konvencije može rješavati neko pitanje tek nakon što su iscrpljena sva domaća pravna sredstva. Svrha je članka 35. dati svim državama ugovornicama priliku da spriječe ili isprave povrede navedene protiv njih prije nego što ti navodi budu dostavljeni Sudu (vidi, na primjer, presude u predmetima Hentrich protiv Francuske, od 22. rujna 1994., stavak 33., Serija A br.296-A i Remli protiv Francuske, od 23. travnja 96., stavak 33., Izvješća 1996-II).
61. Ipak, obveza iscrpljenja domaćih pravnih sredstava zahtijeva samo da podnositelj redovno upotrijebi pravna sredstva koja su djelotvorna, dostatna i raspoloživa u odnosu na njegove pritužbe na temelju Konvencije (vidi predmete Balogh protiv Mađarske, br. 47940/99, stavak 30., 20. srpnja 2004. i John Sammut and Visa Investments Limited protiv Malte (odl.), br. 27023/03, 28. lipnja 2005.). Postojanje pravnih sredstava mora biti dovoljno izvjesno, u praksi i u teoriji, jer će im u protivnome nedostajati potrebna dostupnost i učinkovitost.
62. Stoga članak 35. stavak 1. ne zahtijeva da se iskoriste pravna sredstva koja su neodgovarajuća ili neučinkovita (vidi Aksoy protiv Turske, 18. prosinca 1996., stavci 51.-52., Izvješća o presudama i odlukama 1996- VI, i Barta protiv Mađarske, br. 26137/04, stavak 45., 10. travnja 2007.). Pravna sredstva na raspolaganju parničnoj stranci na domaćoj razini smatraju se učinkovitim ako sprečavaju navodnu povredu ili njezin nastavak, ili daju odgovarajuću zadovoljštinu za svaku povredu koja se već dogodila (vidi Mifsud protiv Francuske (odl.) [VV], br. 57220/00, stavak 17., ECHR 2002--VIII).
63. Sud bilježi kako je podnositelj tijekom kaznenog postupka protiv njega pred Županijskim sudom u Zagrebu zatražio da iz spisa bude izuzet, kao nezakonito pribavljeni dokaz, zapisnik o usmenom iskazu njegovih suokrivljenika koji su dali policiji. Nadalje, u svojoj je žalbi Vrhovnom sudu i u svojoj ustavnoj tužbi podnositelj prigovorio da se njegova osuda temeljila na nezakonito pribavljenim dokazima, i to na iskazima suokrivljenika danim policiji. Osnovanost tih prigovora ispitali su i Vrhovni i Ustavni sud. Slijedi da je tijekom kaznenog postupka protiv njega podnositelj dao dovoljno prilike domaćim vlastima za rješavanje njegovih prigovora temeljem Konvencije.
64. Glede Vladine tvrdnje da podnositelj nije pokrenuo kazneni i stegovni postupak protiv policijskih službenika i odvjetnika koji su sudjelovali u ispitivanju suokrivljenika, Sud bilježi kako se podnositeljev prigovor odnosi samo na navodnu nepoštenost kaznenog postupka o kojemu je riječ. Po mišljenju Suda, takva pitanja treba razmatrati u kontekstu i tijekom tog postupka, a ne vođenjem brojnih drugih postupaka.
65. Stoga Sud smatra da je podnositelj pravilno iscrpio mjerodavna domaća pravna sredstva te da Vladin prigovor treba odbiti.
66. Sud također smatra da ovaj dio zahtjeva nije očito neosnovan u smislu članka 35., stavka 3. (a) Konvencije. Nadalje primjećuje i da nije nedopušten ni po kojoj drugoj osnovi. Stoga treba utvrditi da je dopušten.
B. Osnovanost
1. Tvrdnje stranaka
67. Podnositelj tvrdi kako nije imao pošteno suđenje jer se njegova osuda temelji isključivo na zapisniku o usmenim iskazima koje su suokrivljenici dali policiji tijekom predkaznenog postupka, čiju su zakonitost oni pobijali na suđenju, tj. pred istražnim sucem. Ističe da nije mogao sudjelovati u ispitivanju suokrivljenika od strane policije, te da su njihovi usmeni iskazi dani policiji iskorišteni kako bi ga se osudilo. Podnositelj ističe da su domaći sudovi, kad su se osloniti na iskaze koji su dali suokrivljenici, trebali te iskaze uzeti s puno više opreza. To stoga što je okrivljenik, za razliku od svjedoka, slobodan odabrati hoće li ili neće dati usmeni iskaz ili čak i lagati ako je to potrebno za potporu svog predmeta.
68. Po mišljenju podnositelja problem u ovom predmetu predstavlja činjenica što nije imao priliku ispitati suokrivljenike kad su davali svoje iskaze kojima su ga inkriminirali. Nadalje, podnositelj ističe kako su suokrivljenici svjedočili pred raspravnim sudom da ih je policija zlostavljala tijekom ispitivanja. Međutim, ti su zapisnici o njihovim iskazima iskorišteni za njegovu osudu. Domaći sudovi nisu nikada ispitali te navode, što je njegovo suđenje učinilo nepoštenim.
69. Vlada tvrdi da su domaći sudovi na više razina i u raznim fazama postupka ispitali podnositeljeve prigovore koji se odnose na navodnu nezakonitost dokaza. Podnositeljev navod da su suokrivljenici dali svoje iskaze dok su bili u apstinencijskoj krizi pobijeni su nalazom i mišljenjem vještaka koje je zatražio raspravni sud, koji je utvrdio da su podnositeljevi suokrivljenici bili sposobni dati iskaz policiji. Na temelju tih nalaza raspravni je sud propisno ispitao ostale dokaze iz spisa predmeta i proglasio podnositelja krivim. Štoviše, Vrhovni sud podrobno je ispitao podnositeljeve prigovore te utvrdio kako ne postoji nikakav dokaz koji bi navodio na zaključak da je u načinu na koji je policija pribavila iskaze suokrivljenika bilo bilo čega nezakonitog. Sve u svemu, Vlada smatra da je podnositelj imao pošteno suđenje u kojem je propisno i djelotvorno sudjelovao.
2. Ocjena Suda
(a) Opća načela
70. Sud je u mnogo navrata presudio da je prema članku 19. Konvencije njegova dužnost osigurati poštovanje obveza koje su preuzele ugovorne stranke Konvencije. Posebice, njegova funkcija nije baviti se činjeničnim ili pravnim pogreškama koje je navodno počinio nacionalni sud, osim i samo u onoj mjeri u kojoj su možebitno povrijedile prava i slobode zaštićene Konvencijom. Članak 6. Konvencije jamči pravo na pošteno suđenje, no on ne navodi pravila o dopuštenosti dokaza kao takvih, što je prvenstveno predmet uređenja temeljem nacionalnog prava (vidi Schenk protiv Švicarske, 12. srpnja 1988., stavci 45.-46., Serija A br. 140; Teixeira de Castro protiv Portugala, 9. lipnja 1998., stavak 34., Izvješća 1998-IV i Heglas poriv Češke Republike, br. 5935/02, stavak 84., 1. ožujka 2007.).
71. Sud ponavlja da iako je prvenstvena svrha članka 6., ukoliko se tiče kaznenog postupka, osigurati pošteno suđenje od strane "suda" nadležnog da odlučuje o svim optužbama za kazneno djelo, iz toga ne slijedi da se taj članak ne primjenjuje na postupak prije glavne rasprave. Prema tome, članak 6. može biti mjerodavan prije nego predmet dođe u fazu suđenja ako i u mjeri u kojoj postoji vjerojatnost da će poštenost suđenja biti ozbiljno narušena početnim nepoštivanjem odredaba tog članka (vidi Imbrioscia protiv Švicarske, 24. studenoga 1993., stavak 36., Serija A br. 275, te Salduz protiv Turske [VV], br. 36391/02, stavak 50., 27. studenoga 2008.).
72. Kad se utvrđuje je li postupak u cjelini bio pošten, potrebno je uzeti u obzir i jesu li poštovana prava obrane. Osobito se mora ispitati je li podnositelju pružena prilika osporiti vjerodostojnost dokaza i usprotiviti se njegovoj uporabi. Uz to, mora se uzeti u obzir kvaliteta dokaza, uključujući i pitanje bacaju li okolnosti u kojima je pribavljen dvojbu na njegovu pouzdanost ili točnost (vidi, između mnogo drugih izvora, Sevinç i ostali protiv Turske (odl.), br. 8074/02, 8. siječnja 2008.; Bykov protiv Rusije [VV], br. 4378/02, stavak 90., 10. ožujka 2009. i Lisica protiv Hrvatske, br. 20100/06, stavak 49., 25. veljače 2010.).
73. U tom kontekstu Sud ponavlja kako je temeljem članka 6. stavka 1. Konvencije njegov zadatak utvrdili jesu li dokazi za ili protiv okrivljenika izvedeni na način koji osigurava pošteno suđenje (vidi Barım protiv Turske (odl.), br. 34536/97, 12. siječnja 1999.), bez obzira na vrstu ili težinu optužbi protiv okrivljenika jer javni interes o kojemu je riječ i kazna za konkretno djelo ne mogu opravdati mjere koje ukidaju samo bit podnositeljevih prava na obranu (Jalloh protiv Njemačke [VV], br. 54810/00, stavak 97., ECHR 2006-IX). Kao što je Sud već naprijed naznačio, na nacionalnim je sudovima da ocjene dokaze koji su im predočeni kao i mjerodavnost dokaza koji okrivljenik nastoji iznijeti. Sud međutim mora utvrditi je li postupak uzet u cjelini, uključujući način na koji su izvedeni dokazi, bio pošten kako to traži članak 6., stavak 1. Konvencije (vidi Laska i Lika protiv Albanije, br. 12315/04 i 17605/04, stavak 57., 20. travnja 2010.).
(b) Primjena tih načela na ovaj predmet
74. Sud u ovome predmetu treba ispitati jesu li zadovoljeni zahtjevi poštenog suđenja glede dopuštenosti kao dokaza inkriminirajućih iskaza koje su dali podnositeljevi suokrivljenici policiji, a onda ih povukli pred raspravnim sudom uz ozbiljne optužbe da su ti iskazi dobiveni protiv njihove volje i pod pritiskom policije.
75. Sud je već presudio kako pojam poštenog i kontradiktornog postupka pretpostavlja da u načelu sud treba dati više težine iskazu svjedoka danom pred sudom nego zapisniku o njegovom ili njezinom ispitivanju u predkaznenom postupku koji je izradio tužitelj, osim ako postoje dobri razlozi da se smatra drugačije. Uz ostale razloge, to je zato što je ispitivanje u predkaznenom postupku prvenstveno proces u kojemu tužitelj prikuplja informacije kao pripremu za suđenje u prilog svog predmeta pred sudom, dok je sud koji vodi postupak pozvan odlučiti o okrivljenikovoj krivnji nakon poštene ocjene svih dokaza koji su zaista bili izvedeni na suđenju, na osnovi izravnog ispitivanja dokaza pred sudom. Iako nije zadatak Suda utvrditi jesu li domaći sudovi počinili neke bitne pogreške pri toj ocjeni, on ipak treba preispitati jesu li sudovi dali obrazloženje svojih odluka u odnosu na sve prigovore koji se tiču izvedenih dokaza (vidi Huseyn i ostali protiv Azarbajdžana, br. 35485/05, 45553/05, 35680/05 i 36085/05, stavak 211., 26. srpnja 2011.).
76. Sud primjećuje kako su I.G.H., V.Š. i N.S. u predkaznenoj fazi postupka dali iskaze policiji koji su bili inkriminirajući za podnositelja u odnosu na djelo nedopuštene trgovine drogom, a podnositelj nije bio nazočan tijekom ispitivanja. Međutim, podnositelj je dobio priliku suočiti se sa suokrivljenicima na suđenju. U toj su fazi postupka suokrivljenici povukli svoje iskaze i mnogo puta naveli kako je policija na njih izvršila pritisak da daju takve iskaze.
77. Sud bilježi da je V.Š., kad je bio ispitan na suđenju, tvrdio kako mu je policija dala prethodno pripremljen iskaz kojim inkriminira podnositelja te zatražila da ga samo potpiše. Navodno su odbili njegov zahtjev da ga zastupa odvjetnik po njegovom izboru te su zanemarili činjenicu da je on bio u heroinskoj apstinencijskoj krizi (vidi stavak 36.). Isto je naveo i I.G.H. koji je zatražio suočenje s policijskim službenicima (vidi stavak 37.), kao i N.S. koji je prvi prigovorio istražnom sucu da je policija na njega izvršila pritisak radi davanja iskaza kojim inkriminira podnositelja (vidi stavak 17.) te je tada tijekom saslušavanja na suđenju povukao taj svoj iskaz (vidi stavak 38.).
78. Nakon tih iskaza koje su dali I.G.H., V.Š. i N.S. na suđenju podnositelj je zatražio izuzimanje iz spisa predmeta zapisnika o njihovim usmenim iskazima danim policiji kao nezakonito pribavljenih dokaza. Međutim, njegov je zahtjev odbijen pri čemu raspravni sud nije poduzeo nikakvu radnju za ispitivanje tih navoda. Tako na primjer nije zatražio ispitivanje branitelja koji, prema navodima suokrivljenika, nisu bili nazočni cijelo vrijeme dok je njih ispitivala policija, ili ispitivanje policijskih službenika koji su vodili razgovore, također nije zatražio podrobno izvješće od policije o toj stvari (vidi, suprotno, naprijed citirani predmet Sevinç) a nije zatražio ni medicinsko izvješće o psihičkom stanju I.G.H., V.Š. i N.S. i njihovoj navodnoj apstinencijskoj krizi u vrijeme kad su dali te izjave. U završnoj riječi branitelja koji je zastupao podnositelja ukazano je na sve te nedostatke. U takvim okolnostima, uzimajući u obzir svrhu Konvencije, a to je zaštita prava koja su praktična i djelotvorna (vidi naprijed citirani predmet Lisica, stavak 60.), Sud nije uvjeren da je podnositelj imao djelotvornu priliku pobijati autentičnost iskaza koje su policiji dali suokrivljenici te se usprotiviti njihovoj upotrebi.
79. Glede načina i okolnosti u kojima su ti dokazi pribavljeni, Sud bilježi da među strankama nije sporno da su I.G.H., V.Š. i N.S. bili ovisnici o heroinu u razdoblju kad su dali svoje iskaze policiji. Uz to, I.G.H. je imao poremećaj osobnosti, što također nije bilo sporno među strankama (vidi stavke 27. i 30.). Svi su tvrdili da su tijekom policijskog ispitivanja trpili posljedice apstinencijske krize, a I.G.H. i N.S. su naveli da im je dok su bili u pritvoru kod policije odbijeno pružanje liječničke pomoći (vidi stavke 37. i 38.). Sud međutim primjećuje kako raspravni sud nije nikada poduzeo nikakve radnje za utvrđivanje okolnosti povezanih s tim prigovorima.
80. Nadalje, Sud bilježi kako su I.G.H. i V.Š. prigovorili pred raspravnim sudom da njihovo pravno zastupanje tijekom policijskog ispitivanja nije ispunilo zahtjeve djelotvorne obrane, budući da im nije bila dana prilika da ih zastupa odvjetnik kojega su sami odabrali (vidi stavke 36. i 37.). I N.S. je uložio iste prigovore. On je već bio prigovorio istražnom sucu da ga je tijekom policijskog ispitivanja zastupao odvjetnik kojeg nije sam odabrao (vidi stavke 17. i 38.). Također su tvrdili kako odvjetnici koje im je nametnula policija nisu u stvari bili nazočni tijekom ispitivanja nego su tek došli kako bi potpisali već pripremljene iskaze.
81. S druge strane, u zapisniku o policijskom ispitivanju I.G.H. navedeno je da je to ispitivanje započelo u 23:15 sati a završilo 28. travnja 2001. godine u 1 sat iza ponoći, te da mu je pomagao odvjetnik s kojim je imao pet minuta priliku savjetovati se (vidi stavak 6.).
82. Sud nadalje bilježi kako I.G.H., V.Š. i N.S. nisu zastupali isti odvjetnici tijekom policijskog ispitivanja i pred istražnim sucem (vidi stavke 6. i 11. glede I.G.H. ; stavke 7. i 14. glede V.Š. i stavke 13. i 17. glede N.S.). S obzirom na njihove prigovore, to se može promatrati u svjetlu činjenice da su I.G.H., V.Š. i N.S. svi dali iskaze policiji kojima inkriminiraju podnositelja. Međutim, kad su bili dovedeni pred istražnog suca I.G.H. i V.Š. branili su se šutnjom (vidi stavke 11. i 14.), a N.S. je prigovorio da je svoj iskaz policiji dao pod pritiskom (vidi stavak 17.), dok ga je zastupao odvjetnik kojeg nije on sam izabrao.
83. Međutim, domaći su se sudovi tek ograničili na nalaz da se u zapisnicima o njihovim iskazima ne nalaze nikakve naznake nezakonitosti, bez ikakve daljnje ocjene okolnosti policijskog ispitivanja. To izgleda osobito nedovoljno s obzirom na suglasne prigovore koje su uložili suokrivljenici, a koji su poduprti iskazima ostalih svjedoka, i to M.S. koji je također prigovorio zbog navodnog pritiska policije (vidi stavke 15. i 32.). Stoga Sud smatra kako nacionalni sudovi nisu proveli propisno ispitivanje tvrdnji podnositelja i njegovih suokrivljenika bez predrasuda.
84. Stoga u nedostatku odgovarajućeg objašnjenja domaćih vlasti, Sud ima ozbiljne dvojbe o pouzdanosti i točnosti iskaza koje su policiji dali I.G.H., V.Š. i N.S kao i o kakvoći takvih dokaza.
85. Glede mjere do koje su se domaći sudovi pouzdali u takve dokaze kad su osudili podnositelja, Sud bilježi da se Županijski sud u Zagrebu, kad je osudio podnositelja, pozvao na iskaze koje su I.G.H., V.Š. i N.S. dali policiji (vidi stavak 45.) te da nije imao nikakve druge konkretne i izravno potvrđujuće dokaze glede podnositeljeve krivnje (vidi Vaquero Hernández i ostali protiv Španjolske, br. 1883/03, 2723/03 i 4058/03, stavak 130., 2. studeni 2010.; vidi također suprotno, Bostancioglu protiv Turske (odl.), br. 36927/04, 7. lipnja 2011. i naprijed citirani predmet Sevinç).
86. Istina je da se Županijski sud u Zagrebu pozvao i na iskaz koji je dao svjedok M.S. Međutim, ne može se smatrati da je taj iskaz dovoljan, a kamoli mjerodavan i konkretan dokaz na temelju kojega se može osuditi podnositelja. Naime, kad ga je istražni sudac ispitivao 19. listopada 2000. godine, taj je svjedok izjavio da je 2000. godine prenosio heroin osobi koju je poznao kao "Mario" (vidi stavak 5.). U svojem iskazu od 23. srpnja 2001. godine koji je dao istražnom sucu u podnositeljevom predmetu, M.S. je povukao svoj prethodni iskaz i izričito izjavio kako ne poznaje podnositelja (vidi stavak 15.). Taj je iskaz ponovio na suđenju od 8. ožujka 2004. godine (vidi stavak 32.).
87. Stoga Sud smatra kako su iskazi koje su I.G.H., V.Š. i N.S. dali policiji bili ako ne jedini, barem odlučni dokazi protiv podnositelja, bez kojih bi osiguranje osude podnositelja ili ne bi bilo moguće ili bi to bilo vrlo teško.
88. Uzevši sve u obzir, Sud smatra kako su naprijed navedena razmatranja uzeta zajedno dovoljna kako bi mogao zaključiti da nacionalni sudovi nisu propisno ispitali sve mjerodavne okolnosti oko policijskog ispitivanja suokrivljenika, te kako pozivajući se na njih pri njegovoj osudi, nisu osigurali podnositelju pošteno suđenje.
89. Stoga je došlo do povrede članka 6., stavka 1. Konvencije.
II. OSTALE NAVODNE POVREDE KONVENCIJE
90. Podnositelj također citira članke 3., 13. i 14. Konvencije, te članak 1. Protokola br 1. bez bilo kakvog propisnog potkrepljivanja svojih tvrdnji.
91. U svjetlu svih materijala koje posjeduje te u mjeri u kojoj su stvari koje su predmet prigovora u njegovoj nadležnosti, Sud smatra da ovaj dio zahtjeva ne upućuje na postojanje bilo kakve povrede Konvencije. Slijedi da je ovaj prigovor nedopušten na temelju članka 35. stavka 3. kao očigledno neosnovan, te da ga treba odbiti na temelju članka 35. stavka 4. Konvencije.
III. PRIMJENA ČLANKA 41. KONVENCIJE
92. Članak 41. Konvencije propisuje:
“Ako Sud utvrdi da je došlo do povrede Konvencije i dodatnih protokola, a unutarnje pravo zainteresirane visoke ugovorne stranke omogućuje samo djelomičnu odštetu, Sud će, prema potrebi, dodijeliti pravednu naknadu povrijeđenoj stranci.”
A. Šteta
93. Podnositelj potražuje 100.000 eura (EUR) na ime nematerijalne štete.
94. Vlada smatra da je podnositeljev zahtjev prekomjeran, neosnovan i nepotkrijepljen.
95. Uzimajući u obzir sve okolnosti ovoga predmeta, Sud prihvaća da je podnositelj pretrpio nematerijalnu štetu koja ne može biti nadoknađena samo utvrđenjem povrede. Sud, odlučujući na pravičnoj osnovi, podnositelju dosuđuje iznos od 1.500 EUR na ime nematerijalne štete, uz sav porez koji bi mu mogao biti zaračunat. Nadalje, Sud bilježi kako temeljem mjerodavnog domaćeg prava (vidi stavak 56.), podnositelj može zatražiti ponavljanje kaznenog postupka u vezi s tim što je Sud utvrdio povredu njegovog prava na pošteno suđenje iz članka 6. Konvencije.
B. Troškovi i izdaci
96. Podnositelj potražuje i 4.025,83 EUR na ime troškova i izdataka nastalih pred Sudom.
97. Vlada smatra da je podnositeljev zahtjev prekomjeran.
98. Prema sudskoj praksi Suda, podnositelj ima pravo na naknadu troškova i izdataka samo u mjeri u kojoj se dokaže da ih je stvarno i neophodno pretrpio te da je njihova visina bila razumna. U ovome predmetu, uzimajući u obzir dokumente koje ima u posjedu i naprijed navedene kriterije, Sud smatra razumnim dosuditi iznos od 2.500 EUR na ime troškova i izdataka pred Sudom, uvećan za sve poreze koji bi mogli biti zaračunati podnositelju na taj iznos.
C. Zatezna kamata
99. Sud smatra primjerenim da se stopa zatezne kamate temelji na najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Europske središnje banke, uvećanoj za tri postotna boda.
IZ TIH RAZLOGA, SUD JEDNOGLASNO
1. Utvrđuje da je prigovor temeljem članka 6., stavka 1. Konvencije koji se tiče navodne nepoštenosti kaznenog postupka dopušten, a ostatak zahtjeva nedopušten;
2. Presuđuje da je došlo do povrede članka 6. stavka 1. Konvencije;
3. Presuđuje
(a) da u roku od tri mjeseca od dana kad presuda postane konačnom u skladu s člankom 44. stavkom 2. Konvencije tužena država podnositelju treba isplatiti sljedeće iznose koje je potrebno preračunati u hrvatske kune prema tečaju važećem na dan namirenja:
(i) 1.500 EUR (tisuću pet stotina eura), na ime nematerijalne štete, uvećanih za sve poreze koji bi se podnositelju mogli zaračunati;
(ii) 2.500 EUR (dvije tisuće pet stotina eura) na ime troškova i izdataka, uvećanih za sve poreze koje bi se podnositelju mogli zaračunati;
(b) da se od proteka naprijed navedena tri mjeseca do naplate na prethodno spomenute iznose plaća obična kamata prema stopi koja je jednaka najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Europske središnje banke tijekom razdoblja neplaćanja, uvećanoj za tri postotna boda;
4. Odbija ostatak podnositeljevog zahtjeva za pravednu naknadu te troškove i izdatke.
Sastavljeno na engleskome jeziku i otpravljeno u pisanom obliku dana 25. travnja 2013. godine, u skladu s pravilom 77. stavcima 2. i 3. Poslovnika Suda.
Søren Nielsen Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre
tajnik predsjednica
_____________________________________________________
Prevod presude preuzet sa stranice Zastupnika Republike Hrvatske pred Evropskim sudom za ljudska prava
https://uredzastupnika.gov.hr/
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF ERKAPIĆ v. CROATIA
(Application no. 51198/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
25 April 2013
FINAL
25/07/2013
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Erkapić v. Croatia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, President,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Julia Laffranque,
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,
Ksenija Turković,
Dmitry Dedov, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 19 March and 2 April 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 51198/08) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Croatian national, Mr Mario Erkapić (“the applicant”), on 17 October 2008
2. The applicant was represented by Ms J. Novak, a lawyer practising in Zagreb. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Š. Stažnik.
3. On 10 November 2010 complaints by the applicant of lack of fairness of the criminal proceedings against him were communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Zagreb.
A. Investigation
5. On 19 October 2000 a Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) investigating judge questioned a witness, M.S., about alleged heroin trafficking in Zagreb. M.S. testified, inter alia, that in April 2000 he had transported one kilogram of heroin from B.S. to another person, known to him as “Mario”.
6. As part of a further police investigation of the organised supply of heroin in Zagreb, on 27 April 2001 the Drug Suppression Unit of the Zagreb Police Department (Policijska uprava Zagrebačka, Sektor kriminalističke policije, Odjel kriminaliteta droga; hereinafter “the police”) questioned a suspect, I.G.H., who stated that he had bought heroin from the applicant. During the questioning he was assisted by lawyer H.B. The questioning of I.G.H. commenced at 11.15 p.m., after a defence lawyer appeared at the police station at 11.10 p.m., and ended on 28 April 2001 at 1 a.m.
7. On 31 May 2001 the police questioned another suspect, V.Š., who stated that he was a heroin addict and that he had bought heroin from the applicant. During the questioning he was assisted by lawyer N.D. His questioning commenced at 4.26 p.m., after a defence lawyer appeared at the police station at 3.55 p.m., and finished at 5.43 p.m. on the same day.
8. On 6 June 2001 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of supplying heroin. The applicant was questioned by the police but chose to remain silent.
9. The next day the applicant was brought before an investigating judge at the Zagreb County Court. He denied all the charges against him but decided to remain silent and not to give any evidence. The applicant was again questioned by the investigating judge on 11 June 2001, but gave no evidence.
10. On 11 June 2001 an investigation was opened in respect of the applicant and eight other individuals, including I.G.H. and V.Š., in the Zagreb County Court in connection with a suspicion of conspiracy to supply heroin in Zagreb in the period between 1998 and 2001.
11. On 17 and 19 June 2001 the investigating judge sought to hear I.G.H., who chose to remain silent and not to give any evidence. When questioned by the investigating judge I.G.H. was not assisted by a lawyer.
12. On 21 June 2001 the investigation was extended to another defendant, I.S., who also chose to remain silent but denied all the charges against him.
13. On 25 June 2001 the police questioned another suspect, N.S. He stated that he had been a heroin addict for years and that he had been buying heroin from the applicant. During the questioning he was assisted by lawyer Ž.S. His questioning commenced at 5.50 p.m., after a defence lawyer appeared at the police station at 5.30 p.m., and finished at 6.55 p.m. on the same day.
14. On 16 July 2001 the investigating judge heard evidence from V.Š., who chose to remain silent. During the questioning V.Š. was not assisted by a lawyer, but he stated that his lawyer was I.K.
15. On 23 July 2001 the investigating judge heard evidence from witness M.S., who retracted his statement of 19 October 2000, stating that it had been given under coercion by the investigating judge and the police. He stated that it was not true that he had transported one kilogram of heroin to “Mario”. He also stated that he did not know the applicant.
16. On 26 July 2001 the investigating judge questioned the applicant in connection with the allegations made by N.S. The applicant denied the charges and refused to make any further statement.
17. On 31 July 2001 the investigating judge heard N.S., who complained that he had given his statement to the police under duress and that during his questioning he had been represented by a lawyer who was not of his choosing. Before the investigating judge N.S. was represented by lawyer D.G. On the same day the investigating judge extended the investigation to N.S. and two other individuals.
B. Proceedings on indictment
18. On 4 December 2001 the Zagreb County State Attorney’s Office (Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu) indicted the applicant and twelve other defendants in the Zagreb County Court. The applicant was charged with conspiracy to supply heroin in the period between mid-1998 and June 2001, whereas some of the co-accused were charged with supplying and possession of heroin.
19. The applicant lodged objections to the indictment on 14 and 21 December 2001, arguing that it had numerous substantive and procedural flaws. He requested, inter alia, that all official notes of the police interviews be excluded from the case file, as well as the record of I.G.H.’s oral statement given to the police. He contended that I.G.H. had been a heroin addict and that he had given his statement while at an advanced stage of withdrawal.
20. A three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant’s objections against the indictment and remitted the case for trial on 11 April 2002. It excluded the official notes of the police interviews from the case file but not the record of I.G.H’s oral statement.
21. On 2 May 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) against that decision, and on 21 May 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded.
22. On 11 July 2002 the president of the trial panel of the Zagreb County Court commissioned a psychiatric report on the applicant’s mental capacity. The psychiatric report was drawn up on 27 July 2002. It confirmed that the applicant had full mental capacity and was intellectually able to participate in the proceedings.
23. After he had received some further documentation from the defence concerning the applicant’s psychiatric treatment, on 8 November 2002 the president of the trial panel commissioned another psychiatric report. The medical expert reiterated all his previous findings.
24. At a hearing held on 25 November 2002 the applicant pleaded not guilty.
25. Further hearings were held on 28 November 2002 and 21 February 2003, at which the trial court heard evidence from six witnesses and an expert witness in toxicology. A police officer, D.Z., gave oral evidence concerning a police trap they had set for one of the accused, D.L., and also concerning his questioning of another accused, Z.E.
26. On 8 April 2003 the president of the trial panel commissioned a psychiatric report on the mental capacity of N.S. at the time the alleged offence was committed.
27. At a hearing on 29 May 2003 a psychiatric expert testified that N.S., in the period concerning the charges held against him, had had diminished mental capacity but that he had been able to understand the nature of his acts. In that period he had been addicted and a user of illegal drugs. This meant that he did not have significant withdrawal crises. The parties made no objections to these findings.
28. At the same hearing the trial panel commissioned a psychiatric report in respect of the other accused, including V.Š. and I.G.H.
29. On 9 June 2003 the president of the trial panel informed the defence lawyers that he had received information from the Italian authorities that one of the witnesses, D.M., could be heard in Italy since he was serving his prison sentence there. The president of the trial panel asked the defence lawyers to inform him whether they wished to be present during the questioning of that witness in Italy.
30. On 18 June 2003 the psychiatric expert submitted his report commissioned at the hearing on 29 May 2003. He found that, in the period concerning the charges, V.Š. and I.G.H. had been heroin addicts. Their mental capacity had therefore been diminished but they were able to understand the nature of their acts at the time. In addition, I.G.H. had a personality disorder.
31. On 23 October 2003 the applicant’s defence lawyer informed the Zagreb County Court that he would not travel to Italy for the questioning of witness D.M. On 25 October 2003 witness D.M. was questioned by an investigating judge in court in Vasto, Italy. He did not provide any evidence concerning the applicant. The record of his statement was forwarded to the Zagreb County Court.
32. A further hearing was held on 8 March 2004, at which witness M.S. reiterated that he had made his first statement, on 19 October 2000, to the investigating judge under coercion and fear of ill-treatment by the police. He claimed that he had never transported any drugs as he had described in his statement.
33. At a hearing on 19 April 2004 the psychiatric expert confirmed his findings in respect of V.Š. and I.G.H. The defence lawyers raised objections concerning the methods used and the expert’s findings.
34. Another hearing was held on 23 March 2005, at which the defence lawyers asked for witness D.M., who had been heard by the Italian authorities, to be heard at the trial. The trial panel dismissed their request, on the grounds that there were significant impediments to securing his presence at the hearing, and that he had already been questioned by the Italian judicial authorities.
35. At a hearing on 24 March 2005 the applicant, V.Š. and I.G.H. all gave evidence. The applicant again denied all the charges against him and complained that he had been ill-treated by the police.
36. V.Š. testified that he did not know the other co-accused. As to the statement he had made to the police, he stated:
“I have been a [heroin] addict for years and when I was in the police [station] nobody asked me anything but [a police officer] K.A., whose face I will never forget, drafted a record in another room. I asked for my lawyer, K. but the police told me that K. was a mafia lawyer and that he could not come ... I would like to add that when I was arrested the police told me that they needed me to give a statement. They knew I was soft and that I would sign everything they asked just to get out. That is how I signed this record, which was, as I said, drafted in another room ...
I can answer the questions of the president of the trial panel by saying that I had a number of interviews with [the police officer] K.A. but he told me that this would never become part of a case file and he told me the same thing for this [statement]. However, since [K.A.] did not want to call my lawyer K., he called this other lawyer who never gave me any advice. He just told me that he had signed the record and that I could do whatever I wanted. I have to say that [this lawyer] was a woman. Nothing I said in that statement is true ... except the part in which I said that I was an addict. ... The only true information [in that statement] is my personal details and the fact that I was an addict but [the police officer] already knew that. The part where I said that I was not in withdrawal was absolutely not true ...
I have known K.A. for six years, he has arrested me on a number of occasions and he once lodged a criminal complaint against me. Once he also threatened me that if I did not tell him something, he would lodge a criminal complaint, which he had previously prepared against me, but that never happened. He tolerated my [heroin] addiction but asked me to tell him from whom I was buying drugs, and sometimes would tell him. Sometimes I would tell him the truth but mostly not, I was trying to gain time. ... I trusted [K.A.] when he brought me that record and told me to sign it and that everything would be all right, that I could go. Therefore I signed it.
As to the questions put by [the accused] I can answer that when I was in the police [station] the only thing that was important for me was to get out and to get myself a heroin fix, or methadone, which I was just going to pick up when the police arrested me.”
37. I.G.H. also testified that he had been ill-treated by police and that his statement was the result of ill-treatment. He stated:
“ ... In [the police station] the ill-treatment started immediately. Two or three police officers, whom I did not know, told me to spread my legs and put my hands behind my back with my head pressed against the wall. Whenever somebody passed by me I was kicked, and when I fell they kicked me on the ground. They were jumping all over me. This lasted for some time and then they started to negotiate, asking me to give a statement. I asked for lawyers J.N. or S.B. but they told me as regards [lawyer J.N.] ‘why do you need that bitch’ and also that [lawyer S.B.] would not come. The ill-treatment ... started again and then [police officers] [K.]A. and [D.]Z. came. They told me that they were good policemen and asked me to give a statement. They also told me that [V.Š.] had already made a statement and that they had two to three other statements and that I should also make a statement, sign it and I could go. Then I signed that statement but I did not see what was in it. I remember that there was some police lawyer who told me ‘you just sign here kid’. The policeman also blackmailed me with an arrest warrant against me which had been issued previously, saying that they would withdraw it if I signed.
... I would like to confront policemen Z. and A. concerning everything I have just said. ...
The policeman also did not provide me with any medical assistance from a doctor and when I asked for heptaton they told me that there was no chance I could get it before I signed.
... I used to buy drugs all over the place, but never from anybody who is present in this courtroom. ...
Nothing [in the statement] is true except my personal details. ...
I know [police officers] Z. and A. ... They did not physically ill-treat me but they were asking me to work for them. It is not true what was written, that I was not in withdrawal. I was, and the policeman waved the heptaton in front of my eyes. They were showing me the drugs. The defence lawyer did not see anything, but he was only there for about ten minutes, he signed [the statement] and left.”
38. Another hearing was held on 25 March 2005, at which N.S. gave evidence. As to his statement given to the police, he stated:
“ ... [In the police station] I was held for four or five hours. I was asked about Erkapić and [the policeman] told me that if I confirmed what they said they would let me go. So I did that, I signed the record and left. I did it because I was having a severe physical crisis.
... I never asked for the defence lawyer Ž.S. He was just there at one moment and the policeman told me that he was my defence lawyer. I don’t remember but I don’t think I ever signed a power of attorney for him.
The record was written previously, and not while the lawyer was there. In the presence of the lawyer I was just confirming what was written in the record and then I signed it. I signed it without reading it, because I could not wait to get out and take drugs ...
During my police questioning I was never offered medical assistance, although I was in withdrawal.
... the policemen saw that I was in withdrawal ... because I told them so, and I asked for a doctor and heptaton, but they said no.
39. At the same hearing another co-accused, D.L., testified that while he had been in police custody he had heard police officers beating and interrogating N.S. for three hours.
40. After the accused had given evidence the applicant’s defence lawyer asked for the records of the oral statements given to the police by V.Š., I.G.H. and N.S. to be excluded from the case file as evidence obtained unlawfully. The defence lawyers of the other co-accused made the same request.
41. At a hearing on 14 April 2005 the trial court dismissed their requests, on the grounds that the records of the statements given to the police did not reveal any reason to exclude them from the case file.
42. At the same hearing I.G.H. added that he had been told by policeman K.A. that they wanted to put the applicant in prison for fifteen years or kill him. V.Š. and I.G.H. reiterated that their statements given to the police had been a result of withdrawal symptoms and crisis.
43. In their closing argument, the applicant’s defence lawyers argued that the only evidence against the applicant was the statements of his co-accused, which had been made to the police under duress and pressure. They asked for the applicant to be acquitted.
44. On 14 April 2005 the Zagreb County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment, and imposed a confiscation order on him in the amount of 690,134.4 Croatian kunas (HRK).
45. The Zagreb County Court based the applicant’s conviction solely on the statements V.Š., I.G.H. and N.S. had made to the police. In addition it considered that witness M.S. had also testified that he had transported one kilogram of heroin to the applicant.
46. As to the lawfulness and probative value of the records of oral statements given to the police by V.Š., I.G.H. and N.S., that court noted:
“The request to exclude the record of the statement made by the fourth accused, I.G.H., to the police on 27 April 2001, made by the defence lawyer of the fourth accused I.G.H., on the ground that when giving the statement [I.G.H.] had been undergoing withdrawal from heroin, was dismissed. [The record of his statement] does not reveal any suspicion that [I.G.H.] was in withdrawal. Moreover, there was a defence lawyer present during his questioning who did not have any objection as to the manner of the questioning. This record does not reveal any circumstances which could raise the suspicion that the questioning of the fourth accused I.G.H. by the police on 27 April 2001 had been unlawful ...
It was also requested that the records of the statements given to the police by the third accused V.Š., the fourth accused, I.G.H., and the eleventh accused, N.S., be excluded from the case file on the ground that these statements were made under duress and that as such they could not be used in the proceedings. The records referred to do not reveal any circumstances which could raise the suspicion that the statements had been made under coercion or pressure. The defence lawyers were present during the questioning and they did not have any objections. ... There is nothing credible to support the suspicion that the records referred to were obtained unlawfully, and therefore the request for their exclusion was dismissed ...
Statements by the third accused, V.Š., the fourth accused, I.G.H., and the eleventh accused, N.S., made to the police in the presence of their defence lawyers, are accepted by this court as they are clear, specific and precise. These statements support each other, they have a number of details which could obviously be known only from personal experience (particularly the details of how they contacted the first accused, Mario Erkapić, and how the drugs were distributed and hidden) ... The statements these accused made during the trial, where they tried to show that their previous statements were a result of unlawful treatment by the police (threats, ploys, ill-treatment), are not accepted by this court, as their aim is to avoid criminal responsibility.
Moreover, the records of the police interviews do not contain any element capable of placing their lawfulness in question. This court is not persuaded that various unlawful aspects [of the police questioning] alleged by I.G.H. did not provoke any reaction by the accused, who argued that [any reaction] would have been futile. These allegations were made almost four years after the events concerned had taken place and are therefore not credible and are an obvious fabrication aimed at avoiding criminal responsibility.”
47. On 3 October 2005 the applicant lodged appeals with the Supreme Court against the first-instance judgment. He argued, inter alia, that his conviction had been based solely on the statements made to police by his co-accused, although that had been evidence obtained unlawfully, as his co-accused had been ill-treated by police during the questioning. Moreover, they had been heroin addicts and at the time of the questioning were going through withdrawal.
48. He further complained that the first-instance court had failed to hear the defence lawyers who had allegedly been present during the police questioning, and the police officers who had questioned his co-accused. In a situation in which his co-accused had raised the issue of coercion and ill‑treatment during the police questioning, and in view of the fact that they had incriminated not only themselves but also him, the trial court had been obliged to check their testimony. As to the statement of witnesses M.S., the applicant pointed out that this witness had never said that the person he knew as “Mario” was the applicant.
49. On 22 February 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It upheld the findings of the Zagreb County Court that there was no evidence in the case file to suggest anything unlawful in the records of interviews with the police by the applicant’s co-accused. The Supreme Court pointed out that they had been questioned in the presence of the defence lawyers and that there was nothing to indicate any withdrawal symptoms, coercion or oppression. The Supreme Court also added:
“The psychiatric expert D.M. found that in April 2001 [I.G.H.], as an addict, had a high tolerance of heroin, but [the expert] did not say that he was experiencing a withdrawal crisis, which [the expert] reiterated at the hearing. The defence had no questions ...
There was not a single piece of evidence, including the report drawn up by psychiatric expert D.M., to suggest that [I.G.H.] had been unable to understand the consequence of his actions, and particularly that he was unable to testify before the relevant authorities, regardless of his heroin addiction and diminished mental capacity at the time the offence was committed. Equally, there is not a single piece of evidence that the accused V.Š., and N.S. ..., on account of their heroin addiction, were unable to understand the nature of their actions or to testify before the authorities. ...“
50. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the above judgment on 4 April 2006, reiterating his previous arguments.
51. On 17 September 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint, endorsing the reasoning of the Supreme Court. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant on 26 September 2008.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
52. The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette no. 56/1990, 135/1997, 113/2000, 28/2001, 76/2010) read as follows:
Article 29
“In the determination of his rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law.”
53. The relevant part of Section 62 of the Constitutional Court Act (Ustavni zakon o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette nos. 99/1999, 29/2002 and 49/2002) reads:
“1. Anyone may lodge a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court if he or she deems that a particular action on the part of a state body, a body of local and regional self-government, or a legal person with public authority, affecting his or her rights and obligations, or placing him under suspicion or accusation of a criminal act, has violated his or her human rights or fundamental freedoms, or his or her right to local and regional self-government guaranteed by the Constitution (hereinafter: “constitutional right”) ...
2. If another legal remedy exists against the violation of the constitutional right [complained of], a constitutional complaint may be lodged only after that remedy has been used.
3. In matters in which an administrative action or, in civil and non-contentious proceedings, an appeal on points of law, is allowed, remedies are exhausted only after the decision on these legal remedies has been given.”
54. The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code (Kazneni zakon, Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 129/2000, 51/2001) provide:
Abuse of Narcotic Drugs
Article 173
“... (2) Whoever, without authorisation, manufactures, processes, sells or offers for sale or buys for the purpose of reselling, keeps, distributes or brokers the sale and purchase of, or, in some other way and without authorisation, puts into circulation, substances or preparations which are designated by regulation as narcotic drugs shall be punished by imprisonment for one to ten years, or by long-term imprisonment.
(3) If the criminal offence referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article is committed while the perpetrator is part of a group or a criminal organisation, or has organised a network to sell drugs, he shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than three years or by long-term imprisonment.”
55. The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002, 143/2002, 62/2003, and 115/2006) are as follows:
Article 9
“(1) The courts’ decisions in criminal proceedings cannot be based on unlawfully obtained evidence (unlawful evidence).
(2) Unlawfully obtained evidence is evidence obtained by means of a breach of the fundamental rights of defence, the right to dignity, reputation, honour and respect for private and family life guaranteed under the Constitution, law and the international law, and evidence obtained in breach of the rules of criminal procedure in so far as set out in this Act, as well as any other evidence obtained unlawfully. “
Article 78
“(1) Where this Act provides that the judicial decision cannot be based on certain evidence, the investigating judge shall, at the motion of the parties or ex officio, exclude such evidence from the file before the conclusion of the investigation or before he gives consent for the indictment to be preferred without investigation (Article 191 paragraph 2). The decision of the investigating judge is subject to appellate review.
...
(3) After the investigation and after the consent is given to prefer the indictment without the investigation (Article 191 paragraph 2), the investigating judge shall also proceed according to the provisions of paragraph 1 and 2 of this Article in respect of all information which according to Article 174 paragraph 4 and Article 173 paragraph 3 of this Act is given to the State Attorney or to police officers by citizens or by a suspect who has been interrogated contrary to the provisions of Article 177 paragraph 5 of this Act.”
Article 177
“ ... (5) In the course of the investigation the police authorities shall inform the suspect pursuant to Article 237 paragraph 2 of this Code. At the request of the suspect the police authorities shall allow him to appoint a lawyer, and for that purpose they shall stop interviewing the suspect until the lawyer appears or at the latest three hours from the moment the suspect requested to appoint a lawyer. ... If the circumstances show that the chosen lawyer will not be able to appear within this period of time, the police authorities shall allow the suspect to appoint a lawyer from the list of lawyers on duty provided to the competent police administrations by the Croatian Bar Association for the territory of a county ... If the suspect does not appoint a lawyer or if the requested lawyer fails to appear within the time period provided, the police authorities may resume their interview with the suspect ... The State Attorney has the right to be present during the interview. The record of any statement made by the defendant to the police authorities in the presence of a lawyer may be used as evidence in the criminal proceedings ... “
Article 355
“(1) If an accused, while being questioned at a trial, contradicts a previous statement he has made, the president of the trial panel shall draw his attention to these contradictory statements and ask him why he is testifying differently. If necessary, his previous statement or part of that statement shall be read out.
(2) If an accused refuses to testify at a hearing or refuses to answer a question, his previous statement or part of that statement shall be read out.”
Article 413
“The provisions of this chapter concerning the reopening of the criminal proceedings shall also be applicable ..., on the basis of a decision of the European Court for Human Rights which refers to some ground for the reopening of criminal proceedings or for an extraordinary review of the final judgement.”
Article 427
“A request for the extraordinary review of a final judgment may be lodged [in respect of]:
...
3. an infringement of the defence rights at the trial or of the procedural rules at the appellate stage, if it may have influenced the judgment.”
56. The relevant provisions of the amended Code of Criminal Procedure (Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 152/2008, 76/2009, 80/2011, 121/2011, 91/2012, 143/2012) provide:
Article 502
“...
(2) The relevant provisions concerning the reopening of the criminal proceedings shall be applicable in the case of a request for revision of any final courts’ decision in connection with the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights by which, in respect of the defendant, a violation of the rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has been found.
(3) The request for reopening of the proceedings in connection with the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights can be lodged within a thirty-day time limit starting from the moment of the finality of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.”
Article 574
“...
(2) If prior to the entry into force of this Code a decision was adopted against which a legal remedy is allowed pursuant to the provisions of the legislation relevant to the proceedings [in which the decision was adopted], ..., the provisions of that legislation shall be applicable [to the proceedings concerning the remedy], unless otherwise provided under this Code.
(3) Articles 497-508 of this Code shall be accordingly applicable to the requests for the reopening of the criminal proceedings made under the Code of Criminal Procedure (Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002, 143/2002, 62/2003, and 115/2006).”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
57. The applicant complained that he had not had a fair trial as provided for in Article 6 § 1, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
1. The parties’ arguments
58. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust all available and effective domestic remedies. In the Government’s view the applicant should have lodged a complaint concerning the alleged ill-treatment of his co-accused by the police through the police chain of command. That would have resulted in the investigation of all the circumstances of the case, which the applicant could have used when making his request for evidence to be excluded. Furthermore, the applicant had failed to lodge a criminal complaint against the police officers and the lawyers who had participated in the questioning of his co-accused. This would have allowed him to use the result of the proceedings concerning his criminal complaint as evidence in his criminal proceedings or as a ground on which he could have asked for his case to be reopened. The Government also pointed out that the applicant had failed to lodge a complaint with the Bar Association against the lawyers who had participated in the questioning of his co-accused; that association would have investigated the complaint and the result of the investigation could have been used as evidence in the applicant’s criminal proceedings.
59. The applicant argued that the fact that the Constitutional Court had examined his constitutional complaint on the merits suggested that he had exhausted all available domestic remedies. As to the Government’s assertion that he should have lodged criminal and disciplinary complaints against the police officers and lawyers who had participated in the questioning of his co-accused, the applicant argued that these had not been effective remedies concerning his complaints brought before the Court, and that he had not been obliged to pursue all possible remedies since he had been entitled to chose a remedy which had addressed his essential grievances. In his view the Government had failed to substantiate their arguments that these were effective remedies within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
2. The Court’s assessment
60. The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, it may only deal with an issue after all domestic remedies have been exhausted. The purpose of Article 35 is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Court (see, for example, Hentrich v. France, 22 September 1994, § 33, Series A no. 296-A, and Remli v. France, 23 April 1996, § 33, Reports 1996-II).
61. Nevertheless, the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires only that an applicant make normal use of remedies which are effective, sufficient and accessible in respect of his Convention grievances (see Balogh v. Hungary, no. 47940/99, § 30, 20 July 2004, and John Sammut and Visa Investments Limited v. Malta (dec.), no. 27023/03, 28 June 2005). The existence of the remedies must be sufficiently certain, in practice as well as in theory, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness.
62. Therefore, Article 35 § 1 does not require that recourse should be had to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, §§ 51-52,Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑VI, and Barta v. Hungary, no. 26137/04, § 45, 10 April 2007). Remedies available to a litigant at the domestic level are considered effective if they prevent the alleged violation or prevent it from continuing, or if they provide adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred (see Mifsud v. France(dec.) [GC], no. 57220/00, § 17, ECHR 2002‑VIII).
63. The Court notes that in the course of the criminal proceedings against him in the Zagreb County Court the applicant requested that the records of the oral statements his co-accused made to the police be excluded as evidence obtained unlawfully. Furthermore, in his appeal to the Supreme Court and his constitutional complaint lodged with the Constitutional Court, the applicant complained that his conviction had been based on evidence obtained unlawfully, namely the statements his co-accused had made to the police. These complaints were examined on the merits before both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. It follows that in the course of the criminal proceedings against him the applicant afforded the domestic authorities sufficient opportunity to address his Convention grievances.
64. As to the Government’s argument that the applicant had failed to lodge criminal and disciplinary complaints against the police officers and lawyers who had participated in the questioning of his co-accused, the Court notes that the applicant’s complaint concerns only the alleged lack of fairness of the criminal proceedings at issue. In the Court’s view, such issues should be considered in the context and course of those proceedings and not in pursuing a number of other proceedings.
65. Therefore, the Court considers that the applicant properly exhausted the relevant domestic remedies and that the Government’s objection must be rejected.
66. The Court also considers that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ arguments
67. The applicant contended that he had not had a fair hearing in that his conviction had been based solely on the record of the oral statements made during the pre-trial proceedings to the police by his co-accused, the lawfulness of which they had denied at the trial, i.e. before the investigating judge. He pointed out that he had not been able to participate in the questioning of his co-accused by the police, and that their oral evidence given to the police had been used to convict him. The applicant pointed out that the domestic courts, when relying on the statements made by the co-accused, had to take them with a higher degree of circumspection. This is because the accused, unlike the witnesses, is free to chose whether to give oral evidence or not or even to lie if necessary in support of his or her case.
68. In the applicant’s view the problem in his case was the fact that he had not had an opportunity to question his co-accused when they had given their statements incriminating him. Furthermore, the applicant pointed out that his co-accused had testified before the trial court that they had been ill-treated by the police during the questioning, but the records of their statements had been later used to convict him. These allegations had never been examined by the domestic courts, which had rendered his trial unfair.
69. The Government argued that the applicant’s complaints concerning the alleged unlawfulness of evidence had been examined by the domestic courts on more levels and at various stages of the proceedings. The applicant’s assertion that his co-accused had made their statements while undergoing withdrawal had been rebutted by the psychiatric reports commissioned by the trial court, which found that the applicant’s co-accused had been capable of making statements to the police. On the basis of these findings the trial court had duly examined the other evidence from the case file and found the applicant guilty. Moreover, the Supreme Court had examined the applicant’s complaints in detail and had found that there was not one piece of evidence to suggest there was anything unlawful in the way the statements of his co-accused had been obtained by the police. In sum, the Government considered that the applicant had had a fair hearing in which he had duly and effectively participated.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) General principles
70. The Court has held on many occasions that its duty, pursuant to Article 19 of the Convention, is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting States to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or of law allegedly committed by a national court, unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. While Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence as such, which is primarily a matter for regulation under national law (see Schenk v. Switzerland, 12 July 1988, §§ 45-46, Series A no. 140; Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, 9 June 1998, § 34, Reports 1998‑IV; and Heglas v. the Czech Republic, no. 5935/02, § 84, 1 March 2007).
71. The Court reiterates that, even if the primary purpose of Article 6, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, is to ensure a fair trial by a “tribunal” competent to determine “any criminal charge”, it does not follow that the Article has no application to pre-trial proceedings. Article 6 may be relevant before a case is sent for trial if and in so far as the fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply with its provisions (see Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24 November 1993, § 36, Series A no. 275, and Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391/02, § 50, 27 November 2008).
72. In determining whether the proceedings as a whole were fair, regard must be had to whether the rights of the defence were respected. It must be examined in particular whether the applicant was given the opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the evidence and to oppose its use. In addition, the quality of the evidence must be taken into consideration, including whether the circumstances in which it was obtained cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy (see, amongst many others, Sevinç and others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 8074/02, 8 January 2008; Bykov v. Russia [GC], no. 4378/02, § 90, 10 March 2009; and Lisica v. Croatia, no. 20100/06, § 49, 25 February 2010).
73. In this context the Court reiterates that, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, its task is to establish whether the evidence produced for or against the accused was presented in such a way as to ensure a fair trial (see Barım v. Turkey (dec.), no. 34536/97, 12 January 1999), irrespective of the type or gravity of the charges held against an accused since the public interest in investigation and punishment of a particular offence cannot justify measures which extinguish the very essence of an applicant’s defence rights (Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, § 97, ECHR 2006‑IX). As the Court has already indicated above, it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them as well as the relevance of the evidence which the accused seeks to adduce. The Court must however determine whether the proceedings considered as a whole, including the way in which evidence was taken, were fair as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Laska and Lika v. Albania, nos. 12315/04 and 17605/04, § 57, 20 April 2010).
(b) Application of these principles to the present case
74. In the present case the Court has to examine whether the requirements of a fair trial have been satisfied as regards the admission into evidence of the incriminating statements made by the applicant’s co-accused to the police and then retracted before the trial court with the serious allegation that these statements had been obtained against their will and under pressure from the police.
75. The Court has already held that the notion of a fair and adversarial trial presupposes that, in principle, a tribunal should attach more weight to a witness’s statement in court than to a record of his or her pre-trial questioning produced by the prosecution, unless there are good reasons to find otherwise. Among other reasons, this is because pre-trial questioning is primarily a process by which the prosecution gather information in preparation for the trial in order to support their case in court, whereas the tribunal conducting the trial is called upon to determine a defendant’s guilt following a fair assessment of all the evidence actually produced at the trial, based on the direct examination of evidence in court. Although it is not the Court’s task to verify whether the domestic courts made any substantive errors in that assessment, it is nevertheless required to review whether the courts gave reasons for their decisions in respect of any objections concerning the evidence produced (see Huseyn and Others v. Azerbaijan, nos. 35485/05, 45553/05, 35680/05and 36085/05, § 211, 26 July 2011).
76. The Court notes that I.G.H., V.Š. and N.S., at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, made statements to the police which were incriminating to the applicant in the offence of drug trafficking, without the applicant being present during the questioning. However, the applicant was given an opportunity to confront his co-accused at the trial. At that stage of the proceedings the co-accused retracted their statements and made numerous allegations that the police had put pressure on them to make such statements.
77. The Court notes that V.Š., when examined at the trial, claimed that the police had provided him with a previously prepared statement incriminating the applicant and had asked him just to sign it; they had allegedly refused his request to be represented by a lawyer of his own choosing and had ignored the fact that he had been in the process of heroin withdrawal (see paragraph 36). The same allegations were made by I.G.H. who asked to be confronted with the police officers (see paragraph 37), and by N.S. who first complained to the investigating judge that he had been put under pressure by the police to make a statement incriminating the applicant (see paragraph 17) and then reiterated his allegations during his testimony at the trial (see paragraph 38).
78. Following these statements given by I.G.H., V.Š. and N.S. at the trial, the applicant requested that the records of their oral statements given to the police be excluded from the case file as evidence obtained unlawfully. However, his request was dismissed without any action being taken by the trial court to examine the allegations, such as questioning the defence lawyers who, according to the applicant’s co-accused, had not been present during their whole police questioning; questioning the police officers who had conducted the interviews; or requesting a detailed report from the police on the matter (see, by contrast, Sevinç, cited above); or commissioning a medical report concerning the mental state of I.G.H., V.Š. and N.S. and their alleged withdrawal crisis at the time they were making their statements. All these shortcomings were pointed out in the closing arguments of the defence lawyer representing the applicant. Under these circumstances, having regard to the purpose of the Convention, which is to protect rights that are practical and effective (see Lisica, cited above, § 60), the Court is not convinced that the applicant had an effective opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the evidence given by his co-accused to the police and to oppose its use.
79. As to the manner and circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the Court notes that there is no dispute between the parties that I.G.H., V.Š. and N.S. were heroin addicts in the period when they gave their statements to the police. In addition, I.G.H. had a personality disorder, which was also not disputed by the parties (see paragraphs 27 and 30). All of them claimed that during the police questioning they had suffered from withdrawal, and I.G.H. and N.S. alleged that they were denied medical assistance during their police custody (see paragraphs 37 and 38). The Court observes, however, that the trial court never took any actions to ascertain the circumstances surrounding these complaints.
80. Furthermore, the Court notes that I.G.H. and V.Š. complained before the trial court that their legal representation during the police questioning had fallen short of the requirements of effective defence, since they had not been given an opportunity to be represented by lawyers of their own choosing (see paragraphs 36 and 37). The same complaints were also raised by N.S., who had already complained to the investigating judge that during the police questioning he had been represented by a lawyer not of his choosing (see paragraphs 17 and 38). They also claimed that the lawyers imposed on them by the police had not in fact been present during the questioning but had only come to sign the ready-prepared statements.
81. On the other hand the record of the questioning of I.G.H. by the police indicates that his questioning commenced at 11.15 p.m. and ended on 28 April 2001 at 1 a.m., and that he was assisted by a lawyer with whom he had a five-minute opportunity for consultation (see paragraph 6).
82. The Court further notes that I.G.H., V.Š. and N.S. were not represented by the same lawyers during the police questioning and before the investigating judge (see paragraphs 6 and 11 concerning I.G.H.; paragraphs 7 and 14 concerning V.Š.; and paragraphs 13 and 17 concerning N.S.). In view of their complaints, this can be observed against the fact that I.G.H., V.Š. and N.S. all provided statements to the police incriminating the applicant. However, when they were brought before the investigating judge I.G.H. and V.Š. remained silent (see paragraph 11 and 14) and N.S. complained that he had given his statement to the police under pressure (see paragraph 17) while represented by a lawyer not of his own choosing.
83. The domestic courts, however, merely limited themselves to the finding that the records of the statements did not provide any indication of unlawfulness, without any further assessment of the circumstances surrounding the police questioning. This appears particularly insufficient in view of the concordant objections raised by the applicant’s co-accused and supported by the statements of other witnesses; namely M.S., who also complained about the alleged pressure by the police (see paragraphs 15 and 32). Therefore, the Court considers that the national courts did not conduct the proper examination of the submissions by the applicant and his co‑accused without prejudice.
84. Consequently, in the absence of an adequate explanation by the domestic authorities, the Court has serious doubts about the reliability and accuracy of the statements given to the police by I.G.H., V.Š. and N.S. as well as about the quality of such evidence.
85. As to the extent to which the domestic courts relied on such evidence when convicting the applicant, the Court notes that the Zagreb County Court relied on the statements I.G.H., V.Š. and N.S. had made to the police when it convicted the applicant (see paragraph 45) and that it had no other concrete and direct corroborative evidence concerning the applicant’s guilt (see Vaquero Hernández and Others v. Spain, nos. 1883/03, 2723/03 and 4058/03, § 130, 2 November 2010; see also, by contrast, Bostancioglu v. Turkey (dec.), no. 36927/04, 7 June 2011; and Sevinç, cited above).
86. It is true that the Zagreb County Court referred also to the statement given by witness M.S., however that statement cannot be held as sufficient, let alone relevant and specific, evidence with which to convict the applicant. Namely, when questioned by the investigating judge on 19 October 2000, that witness stated that in 2000 he had transported heroin to a person he knew as “Mario” (see paragraph 5). In his statement of 23 July 2001, which he made to the investigating judge in the applicant’s case, M.S. retracted his previous statement and expressly stated that he did not know the applicant (see paragraph 15). He reiterated this statement at the trial on 8 March 2004 (see paragraph 32).
87. Therefore the Court considers that the statements I.G.H., V.Š. and N.S. had made to the police were, if not the sole, at least the decisive evidence against the applicant, without which securing a conviction of the applicant would either not be possible or the possibility would have receded very far into the distance.
88. In sum, the Court considers that the foregoing considerations taken together are sufficient to enable it to conclude that the national courts failed to properly examine all relevant circumstances surrounding the police questioning of the applicant’s co-accused, and in relying thereon for his conviction, did not secure the applicant a fair trial.
89. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
90. The applicant also cited Articles 3, 13 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, without any proper substantiation.
91. In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court considers that this part of the application does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention. It follows that it is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
92. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
93. The applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
94. The Government considered the applicant’s claims excessive, unfounded and unsubstantiated.
95. Having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the applicant suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated solely by the finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him. Furthermore, the Court notes that under the relevant domestic law (see paragraph 56) it is opened for the applicant to request the reopening of the criminal proceedings in connection with the Court’s finding of the violation of his right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.
B. Costs and expenses
96. The applicant also claimed EUR 4,025.83 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
97. The Government considered the applicant’s claims unfounded.
98. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 2,500 for costs and expenses before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him on that amount.
C. Default interest rate
99. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the alleged lack of fairness of the criminal proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Croatian kunas at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,500 (two thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction and costs and expenses.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 April 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren NielsenIsabelle Berro-Lefèvre
RegistrarPresident
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