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EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
PREDMET TLIMENOS PROTIV GRČKE
(Predstavka br. 34369/97)
PRESUDA
STRAZBUR
6. april 2000.
U predmetu Tlimenos (Thlimmenos) protiv Grčke, Evropski sud za ljudska prava, koji je zasedao u Velikom veću sastavljenom od sledećih sudija:
G. L. VILDHABER (WILDHABER), Predsednik Suda,
Gđa E. PALM,
G. L. FERARI BRAVO (L. FERRARI)
G. L. KAFLIŠ (L. CAFLISCH),
G. Ž.-P. KOSTA (J.-P. COSTA),
G. V. FURMAN (W. FUHRMANN),
G. K. JUNGVIRT (K. JUNGWIERT),
G. M. FIŠBAH (M. FISCHBACH),
G. B. ZUPANČIČ,
Gđa N. VAJIĆ
G. DŽ. HEDIGAN (J. HEDIGAN),
Gđa V. TOMASEN (W. THOMASSEN),
Gđa M. CACA-NIKOLOVSKA (M. TSATSA-NIKOLOVSKA),
G. T. PANCIRU (T. PANTIRU),
G. E. LEVIC (E. LEVITS),
G. K. TRAJA,
G. G. KUMANTOS (G. KOUMANTOS), ad hoc sudija,
kao i Gđa M. BUR-BUKIKIO (M. de BOER-BUQUICCHIO), zamenik Sekretara Suda,
Pošto je zasedao na privatnim sednicama 1. decembra 1999. i 15. marta 2000. godine, Izriče sledeću presudu koja je usvojena poslednjeg pomenutog datuma:
POSTUPAK
Ovaj predmet je Sudu, u skladu s odredbama koje su se primenjivale pre no što je stupio na snagu Protokol br. 11 Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: Konvencija)1, prosledila Evropska komisija za ljudska prava (u daljem tekstu: Komisija) 22. marta 1999. godine (čl. 5 st. 4 Protokola br. 11. i pređašnji članovi 47 i 48. Konvencije).
Predmet je potekao iz predstavke (br. 34369/97) koju je Komisiji protiv Republike Grčke, u skladu s pređašnjim članom 25 Konvencije, podneo grčki državljanin g. Jakovos Tlimenos (Iakovos Thlimmenos) (u daljem tekstu: podnosilac predstavke) 18. decembra 1996. godine. Podnosilac predstavke je tvrdio da je odbijanje vlasti da ga imenuju u zvanje ovlašćenog računovođe zbog toga što je bio osuđen za krivično delo neposlušnosti, i to iz verskih uverenja – u smislu izvršenja naredbe da služi vojni rok u uniformi –predstavljalo kršenje članova 9 i 14 Konvencije. Uz to, podnosilac predstavke je tvrdio da i postupak koji je on tim povodom poveo pred Vrhovnim upravnim sudom nije bio vođen u skladu sa članom 6 stav 1 Konvencije. U pisanim napomenama koje je podneo 20. oktobra 1997. godine, odgovarajući na primedbe grčke vlade (u daljem tekstu: Država) o prihvatljivosti predstavke i o suštini spora, on se takođe žalio da je prekršen član 1 Protokola br. 1.
Komisija je 12. januara 1998. godine proglasila predstavku delimično prihvatljivom. U svom izveštaju od 4. decembra 1998. (pređašnji čl. 31 Konvencije), Komisija je izrazila mišljenje da je prekršen član 9 Konvencije u vezi sa članom 14 (odluka je doneta s dvadeset dva glasa prema šest glasova); takođe je zaključila da nije neophodno razmatrati da li je prekršen član 9 uzet zasebno (dvadeset jedan glas prema sedam glasova); kao i da je prekršen član 6 stav 1 (odluka doneta jednoglasno). 2
Kolegijum Velikog veća 31. marta 1999. godine doneo je odluku da u ovom predmetu treba da odlučuje Veliko veće (pravilo 100, st. 1 Poslovnika Suda). G. C. Rozakis, sudija izabran s liste Grčke, koji je učestvovao kada je Komisija razmatrala ovaj slučaj, povukao se iz zasedanja u Velikom veću (pravilo 28). Država je potom imenovala g. G. Kumantosa (Koumantos) da bude ad hoc sudija (čl. 27 st. 2 Konvencije i pravilo 29 st. 1).
Podnosilac predstavke i Država podneli su svoje pismene primedbe.
Ročište je bilo otvoreno za javnost i održano je u zgradi Suda u Strazburu 1. decembra 1999. godine.
Pred Sudom su se pojavili:
(a) u ime Države
G. P. GEORGAKOPULOS (GEORGAKOPOULOS), pravni savetnik Državni pravni savet, delegat zastupnika,
G. K. GEORGIADIS, advokatski pomoćnik, Državni pravni savet, advokat;
(b) u ime podnosioca predstavke
G. N. ALIVIDZATOS, (ALIVIZATOS), član advokatske komore Atine advokat
Sud je saslušao uvodna izlaganja g. Alividzatosa i g. Georgiadisa.
ČINJENICE
I OKOLNOSTI SLUČAJA
A. Osuda podnosioca predstavke zbog odbijanja da izvrši naredbu
Stalni vojni tribunal u Atini (Diarkes Stratodikio), 9. decembra 1983. godine u veću u kome su zasedali jedan profesionalni vojni sudija i četiri druga oficira, osudio je podnosioca predstavke, inače Jehovinog svedoka, zbog odbijanja da izvrši naredbu koje se ogledalo u tome da je odbio da obuče vojnu uniformu u trenutku opšte mobilizacije. Tribunal je, međutim, smatrao da prema članu 70 (b) Vojnog krivičnog zakonika i prema članu 84 stav 2 (a) Krivičnog zakona postoje olakšavajuće okolnosti u tom slučaju te je podnosioca predstavke osudio na četiri godine zatvora. Podnosilac predstavke je pušten na uslovnu slobodu posle dve godine i jednog dana provedenog u zatvoru.
B. Odbijanje da se podnosilac predstavke imenuje u zvanje ovlašćenog knjigovođe
Juna 1988. godine podnosilac predstavke je polagao javni ispit za imenovanje devet ovlašćenih računovođa, što je u Grčkoj slobodna profesija. Među 60 kandidata, on je položio kao drugi po rezultatima. Međutim, 8. februara 1989. godine Izvršni odbor grčkog Instituta ovlašćenih računovođa (u daljem tekstu: Odbor) odbio je da ga imenuje za ovlašćenog računovođu pozivajući se na to što je prethodno bio osuđen za teško krivično delo (kakuryima).
C. Postupak pred Vrhovnim upravnim sudom
Dana 8. maja 1989. godine podnosilac predstavke se obratio Vrhovnom upravnom sudu (Simvulio Epikratias) pozivajući se, između ostalog, na svoje pravo na slobodu u veroispovesti i na jednakost pred zakonom, kako je to zajamčeno Ustavom i Konvencijom. Podnosilac predstavke je takođe tvrdio da nije bio osuđen za zločin, već za manje težak prekršaj zakona.
Treće veće Vrhovnog upravnog suda 18. aprila 1991. godine zasedalo je u ovom predmetu. To veće je 25. maja 1991. godine odlučilo da ceo predmet uputi na razmatranje kolegijumu suda, zbog važnosti pitanja koja se u njemu pokreću. Sâmo veće je smatralo da član 10 Urebda br. 3329/1955 propisuje da lice koje ne može da se kvalifikuje za imenovanje u državnu službu ne može biti imenovano ni za ovlašćenog računovođu. Međutim, pomenuta odredba se odnosila na sudske presude kojima se utvrđuje krivica optuženih u skladu sa članom 7 stav 1 Ustava. To, međutim, nije slučaj sa stalnim vojnim sudovima, pošto većinu njihovih članova ne čine profesionalne sudije koje uživaju iste one garancije nezavisnosti kakve uživaju njihove civilne kolege, kako je to predviđeno članom 96 stav 5 Ustava. Usled toga, činjenica da je podnosilac predstavke bio osuđen pred Stalnim vojnim sudom u Atini ne može biti uzeta u razmatranje i odluka Odbora da podnosioca predstavke ne imenuje u zvanje ovlašćenog računovođe treba da bude poništena.
Ročište pred Vrhovnim upravnim sudom je održano 21. januara 1994. godine koji je zasedao u kolegijumu. Sud je 11. novembra 1994. godine presudio da je Odbor delovao u skladu sa zakonom kada je, primenjujući član 22 stav 1 Zakona o državnim službenicima uzeo u obzir činjenicu da je Stalni vojni sud u Atini prethodno osudio ovog podnosioca predstavke za ozbiljno krivično delo. Član 96 stav 5 Ustava propisuje da će vojni sudovi nastaviti da funkcionišu kao što su to i ranije činili sve dok ne bude donet novi zakon kojim će se promeniti njihov sastav. Takav zakon još nije donet. Vrhovni upravni sud je sem toga odlučio da vrati ovaj predmet Trećem veću i naložio mu je da razmotri preostala pitanja.
Odluka od 11. novembra 1994. godine bila je doneta većinom glasova. Većina je smatrala da, pošto je prošlo devet godina otkako je Ustav stupio na snagu, a još nije donet zakon predviđen članom 96. stav 5. Ustava, postojeći vojni sudovi treba da pruže one garancije nezavisnosti koje se traže od civilnih sudija. Budući da to nije slučaj sa Stalnim vojnim sudom u Atini, g. Tlimenosu treba usvojiti zahtev za reviziju odluke.
Treće veće je održalo novo ročište 26. oktobra 1995. godine. Ono je 28. juna 1996. godine odbacilo zahtev g. Tlimenosa za reviziju odluke, smatrajući, između ostalog, da to što ga Odbor nije imenovao za ovlašćenog računovođu nije bilo u vezi s njegovim verskim uverenjima već sa činjenicom da je počinio krivično delo.
II RELEVANTNO DOMAĆE PRAVO
A. Imenovanje u zvanje ovlašćenog računovođe
Do 30. aprila 1993. godine u Grčkoj su samo članovi grčkog Instituta ovlašćenih računovođa mogli da pružaju usluge ovlašćenih računovođa. 15. Članom 10 Uredbe br. 3329/1955, koji je izmenjen članom 5 Uredbe predsednika br. 15/1989, propisano je da lice koje se ne kvalifikuje za imenovanje u državnu službu ne može biti imenovano za ovlašćenog računovođu.
Prema članu 22 stav 1 Zakona o državnim službenicima, nijedno lice koje je bilo osuđeno za teško krivično delo ne može biti imenovano u državnu službu.
Monopol Instituta ovlašćenih računovođa ukinut je 30. aprila 1993. godine. Većina ovlašćenih računovođa učlanila se u Preduzeće ovlašćenih računovođa-revizora.
Član 70 Vojnog krivičnog zakonika koji je bio na snazi do 1995. godine propisivao je sledeće:
B. Krivično delo neizvršavanja naredbe
“Pripadnik oružanih snaga koji, pošto mu je njegov komandir naredio da obavi neku dužnost, odbije to da učini ili ne izvrši naredbu biće kažnjen -
(a) ako je čin izvršen pred neprijateljem ili naoružanim pobunjenicima, smrtnom kaznom;
(b) u vreme rata ili oružane pobune ili za vreme opsadnog stanja ili opšte mobilizacije smrtnom kaznom ili, ako postoje olakšavajuće okolnosti, doživotnim zatvorom ili zatvorom u trajanju od najmanje pet godina i
(c) u svim ostalim okolnostima, kaznom zatvora u trajanju od šest meseci do dve godine”.
Na osnovu Uredbe predsednika br. 506/1974, u trenutku kada je podnosilac predstavke bio uhapšen Grčka je bila u stanju opšte mobilizacije. Ta Uredba je još na snazi.
Član 84 stav 2(a) Krivičnog zakona propisuje da će na manju kaznu biti osuđena lica koja su, pre no što su počinila ovo krivično delo, vodila častan život.
Na osnovu člana 1. Vojnog krivičnog zakonika koji je bio na snazi do 1995. godine, krivična dela za koja je zaprećena kazna od najmanje pet godina zatvora smatrana su teškim krivičnim delima (kakuryimata). Krivična dela za koja je bila zaprećena kazna do pet godina zatvora bila su smatrana lakšim krivičnim delima, prekršajima (plimmelimata).
Na osnovu novog vojnog krivičnog zakonika iz 1995. godine odbijanje izvršenja naredbe koje se nije dogodilo u vreme rata ili pred neprijateljem smatra se prekršajem.
C. Pravo na prigovor savesti u pogledu vojne obaveze
Na osnovu dela 2 (čl. 4) Zakona br. 731/1977, oni koji odbiju da se odazovu pozivu na vojnu obavezu bez nošenja oružja na osnovu svojih verskih uverenja kažnjavani su kaznom zatvora čije je vremensko trajanje bilo jednako dužini vojnog roka, to jest, osuđivani su na manje od pet godina zatvora.
Zakon br. 2510/1997, koji je stupio na snagu 27. juna 1997. godine, onima koji se pozovu na prigovor savesti zajamčeno je pravo na civilno služenje vojnog roka, umesto na služenje vojnog roka pod oružjem. Na osnovu člana 23 stavovi 1 i 4 tog Zakona, licima koja su u prošlosti bila osuđena za odbijanje izvršenja naredbe sada je pružena mogućnost da podnesu zahtev da im se prizna status onih koji se pozivaju na prigovor savesti. Jedna od posledica tog priznanja bila je i da se prethodna sudska osuda briše iz kaznene evidencije lica o kojima je reč.
Predstavke u skladu sa članom 23 stavovi 1 i 4 Zakona br. 2510/1997 trebalo je podneti u periodu od tri meseca počev od 1. januara 1998. godine. Te predstavke je razmatrala Komisija koja savetuje Ministra nacionalne odbrane o priznanju statusa licima koja se pozivaju na prigovor savesti. Ta Komisija je morala da primenjuje član 18 Zakona br. 2510/1997, koji propisuje:
“Lica koja se pozovu na svoja verska ili ideološka uverenja kako ne bi služila vojnu obavezu iz razloga savesti mogu biti priznata za lica koja se pozivaju na prigovor savesti...”
PRAVO
I OPSEG OVOG PREDMETA
U svojoj izvornoj predstavci upućenoj Komisiji podnosilac predstavke se žalio na kršenje članova 9 i 14 Konvencije zbog toga što ga vlasti nisu imenovale u zvanje ovlašćenog računovođe, dok se na osnovu člana 6 stav 1 žalio na postupak koji je poveo s tim u vezi (pred domaćim sudovima). On je tek u primedbama kojima je odgovorio na primedbe Države u vezi sa prihvatljivošću predstavke i sa suštinom spora naveo da se žali i zbog kršenja člana 1 Protokola broj 1. Komisija je ovu poslednju pritužbu proglasila neprihvatljivom zbog toga što nije bila podneta u roku od šest meseci koji je propisan Konvencijom.
U podnesku upućenom Sudu podnosilac predstavke je naveo da je po njegovom mišljenju Sud nadležan da ispituje njegovu pritužbu na osnovu člana 1 Protokola broj 1. Iako ta pritužba nije bila eksplicitno navedena u izvornoj predstavci, činjenice na kojima ona počiva već su tamo navedene. Organi Konvencije mogli su slobodno da ih razmotre i daju im odgovarajuću pravnu kvalifikaciju.
Sud podseća da je opseg nadležnosti određen odlukom Komisije kojom je izvornu predstavku proglasila prihvatljivom (vidi predmet Sirek protiv Turske (Surek) (br. 1) (GC), br. 26682/95, st. 40, ECHR 1999-IV). Sem toga, Sud smatra, isto onako kao što je smatrala i Komisija, da je pritužba po osnovu člana 1 Protokola br. 1. odvojena od pritužbi koje su proglašene prihvatljivima. Iz toga sledi da Sud nije nadležan da se bavi ovom pritužbom po osnovu Protokola br. 1.
II PRETHODNE PRIMEDBE DRŽAVE
Država je tvrdila da je podnosilac predstavke, da je samo primenio postupak predviđen članom 23 stavovi 1 i 4 Zakona br. 2510/1997, mogao da izbegne posledice svoje nekadašnje sudske osude. Država je takođe iznela stav da je podnosilac predstavke mogao da zatraži pomilovanje na osnovu člana 47 stav 1 Ustava. Međutim, Država je prihvatila da bi, čak i da je podnosiocu predstavke priznat status lica koje se poziva na prigovor savesti na osnovu Zakona br. 2510/1997, on i dalje bio u nemogućnosti da dobije zadovoljenje za predrasude kojima je bio podvrgnut već zbog same činjenice da je bio sudski osuđen.
Podnosilac predstavke tvrdio je da on nije znao za vremenski rok od tri meseca propisan u članu 23 stavovi 1 i 4 Zakona br. 2510/1997 i da je zbog toga propustio rok. U svakom slučaju, te odredbe su “nerazumljive i nejasne” i samo je mali broj onih koji su se pozvali na prigovor savesti uspeo da im se pređašnje sudske osude izbrišu iz kaznene evidencije.
Sud konstatuje da, čak i da podnosilac predstavke nije propustio rok propisan članom 23 stavovi 1 i 4 Zakona br. 2510/1997, njegovu tvrdnju da ne može da služi vojni rok zbog svojih verskih uverenja ispitivala jedna komisija, koja bi potom savetovala ministra nacionalne odbrane o tome da li njemu treba ili ne treba priznati status lica koje se poziva na prigovor savesti. Ta komisija i ministar ne bi bili dužni da udovolje zahtevu podnosioca predstavke da mu se prizna prigovor savesti budući da su oni, bar u izvesnoj meri, zadržali diskreciono pravo (vidi gore, stav 24. i stav 25). Sem toga, obe stranke su prihvatile da, čak i u slučaju da je podnosilac predstavke uspeo da se izbori za to da iz njegovog dosijea bude izbrisan podatak o njegovoj prethodnoj sudskoj osudi u skladu sa članom 23 stavovi 1 i 4 Zakona br. 2510/1997, on ne bi mogao da dobije nadoknadu za predrasude kojima je do tada bio izložen usled same činjenice da je bio osuđen. Iz istog razloga, podnosilac predstavke nije mogao biti siguran da će njegov zahtev za pomilovanje biti prihvaćen, a čak i da jeste mogao da bude siguran u to, on nikako nije mogao da dobije zadovoljenje.
U svakom slučaju, Sud primećuje da, u meri u kojoj se može smatrati da je Država iznela prethodnu primedbu u vezi sa statusom žrtve podnosioca predstavke u smislu člana 34. Konvencije, ta primedba nije bila izneta onda kada je Komisija razmatrala pitanje prihvatljivosti predstavke. Nije bilo ničega što bi državu sprečavalo da to pitanje pokrene u toj fazi postupka, budući da je Zakon br. 2510/1997. stupio na snagu pre no što je Komisija donela odluku o prihvatljivosti. Iz tih razloga, Sud smatra da je Država bila u nemogućnosti da iznese prethodnu primedbu i tu primedbu odbacuje (vidi predmet Nikolova protiv Bugarske (GC), br. 31195/96, st. 44, ECHR 1999-II).
III NAVODNO KRŠENJE ČLANA 14 KONVENCIJE U VEZI SA ČLANOM 9
Član 14.
“Uživanje prava i sloboda predviđenih u ovoj Konvenciji obezbeđuje se bez diskriminacije po bilo kom osnovu, kao što su pol, rasa, boja kože, jezik, veroispovest, političko ili drugo mišljenje, nacionalno ili socijalno poreklo, veza s nekom nacionalnom manjinom, imovno stanje, rođenje ili drugi status”.
Član 9.
“1. Svako ima pravo na slobodu misli, savesti i veroispovesti; ovo pravo uključuje slobodu promene vere ili uverenja i slobodu čoveka da, bilo sam ili zajedno sa drugima, javno ili privatno, ispoljava veru ili uverenje molitvom, propovedi, običajima i obredom.
2. Sloboda ispovedanja vere ili ubeđenja može biti podvrgnuta samo onim ograničenjima koja su propisana zakonom i neophodna je u demokratskom društvu u interesu javne bezbednosti, radi zaštite javnog reda, zdravlja ili morala, ili radi zaštite prava i sloboda drugih”.
A. Argumenti izneti pred Sudom
Podnosilac predstavke je izneo da je njegovo neimenovanje u zvanje ovlašćenog računovođe bilo direktno povezano sa izražavanjem njegovih verskih uverenja, te je samim tim spadalo u polje člana 9. Konvencije. On je s tim u vezi ukazao da nije bio imenovan zbog toga što je odbio da služi u oružanim snagama; tim odbijanjem je manifestovao svoja verska uverenja kao Jehovin svedok. Podnosilac predstavke je sem toga tvrdio da ne može poslužiti nikakvoj korisnoj svrsi ako se neko isključi iz profesije ovlašćenog računovođe zbog toga što je, iz verskih razloga, odbio da služi u oružanim snagama. Po mišljenju podnosioca predstavke, Zakon nije trebalo da isključi svako lice koje je bilo osuđeno za teško krivično delo. Legitimnost isključenja zavisila je od prirode zvanja (profesije) i od samog krivičnog dela, uključujući tu i motive počinioca, vreme koje je proteklo otkako je krivično delo izvršeno i ponašanje počinioca u tom vremenskom periodu. Ako se stvari gledaju u toj svetlosti, jasno je da to što vlasti nisu pristale da imenuju podnosioca predstavke u željeno zvanje nije bilo neophodno. Klasa ljudi kojoj pripada podnosilac predstavke, konkretno Jehovini svedoci - muškarci čija religija podrazumeva snažne razloge za odbijanje služenja vojnog roka u oružanim snagama, razlikuje se od klase kojoj je pripadala većina drugih počinilaca krivičnih dela. Činjenica da država ovu razliku nije uzela u obzir predstavlja diskriminaciju koja nije dopuštena članom 14. Konvencije, a u vezi sa članom 9.
Država je tvrdila da se član 14 Konvencije ovde ne može primeniti zbog toga što činjenice karakteristične za ovaj slučaj ne spadaju u polje člana 9. Vlasti koje su odbile da imenuju podnosioca predstavke u zvanje ovlašćenog računovođe nisu imale na raspolaganju nikakvu drugu opciju do da primene pravilo kojim se u to zvanje isključuju sva lica koja su prethodno bila osuđena za teška krivična dela. Vlasti nisu mogle da ispituju razloge zbog kojih je neko lice bilo osuđeno. Zbog svoje opštosti, Zakon o kome je reč je neutralan. Sem toga, to je zakon koji služi javnom interesu. Lice koje je bilo osuđeno za teško krivično delo ne može biti imenovano u državnu službu, i, po analogiji, ne može biti imenovano u zvanje ovlašćenog računovođe. Ova zabrana je morala da bude apsolutna i nisu se mogle praviti nikakve razlike od slučaja do slučaja. Države imaju široko unutrašnje polje slobodne procene kada je reč o tome koja krivična dela definišu kao teška, a koja pak ne. Podnosilac predstavke je počinio krivično delo kada je odbio da služi vojni rok bez oružja u vreme opšte mobilizacije, zbog toga što je pokušao da izbegne veoma važnu obavezu prema društvu i državi, obavezu koja je povezana sa odbranom, bezbednošću i nezavisnošću zemlje. Usled svega toga, krivična sankcija na koju je bio osuđen nije bila nesrazmerna delu.
Država je takođe naglasila da Sud nema ovlašćenja da ispituje prvobitnu, izvornu sudsku osudu podnosioca predstavke. U svakom slučaju, to i nema nikakve veze sa njegovim verskim uverenjima. Obaveza služenja vojnog roka odnosi se na sve Grkemuškarce, bez izuzetka po osnovu veroispovesti ili savesti. Sem toga, podnosilac predstavke je bio optužen i osuđen za nepoštovanje naredbe. Disciplina u vojsci ne može zavisiti od toga da li se neki vojnik slaže ili ne slaže sa naredbama koje dobije.
U svetlosti svega navedenog, Država je tvrdila da bi, čak i da se primeni član 14, i dalje postojalo objektivno i razumno opravdanje za to što nije pravljena razlika između ovog podnosioca predstavke i ostalih lica osuđenih za teška krivična dela. Nema nikakve potrebe da se ukazuje na to da bi i grčki pravoslavci ili hrišćani-katolici takođe bili isključeni iz profesije ovlašćenog računovođe da su kojim slučajem i oni sami prethodno počinili neko teško krivično delo.
Komisija je smatrala da se član 14 ovde može primeniti zbog toga što je bila uverena da činjenice vezane za ovaj slučaj spadaju u polje člana 9, kao i to da je, po njenom mišljenju, u ovom slučaju došlo do mešanja u prava zajemčena tim članom. Komisija je, sem toga, iznela mišljenje da je pravo lica da uživa prava i slobode predviđene ovom Konvencijom bez diskriminacije po bilo kom osnovu bilo prekršeno ne samo onda kada su države na različite načine tretirale lica u analognim situacijama bez pružanja objektivnog i razumnog opravdanja, već i onda kada države, bez objektivnog i razumnog opravdanja, nisu različito tretirale lica koja su se nalazila u različitim situacijama. U okolnostima ovog slučaja, nije bilo nikakvog objektivnog niti razumnog opravdanja za to što oni koji su sačinili pravila pristupa profesiji ovlašćenog računovođe nisu na različite načine tretirali lica koja su bila osuđena zbog toga što su odbila da služe vojni rok u oružanim snagama iz verskih razloga od lica koja su bila osuđena zbog počinjenih drugih ozbiljnih krivičnih dela.
B. Procena suda
Sud smatra da pritužba podnosioca predstavke treba da bude razmotrena po osnovu člana 14 Konvencije, a u vezi sa članom 9. iz sledećih razloga.
Sud podseća da član 14 Konvencije ne postoji nezavisno, sam za sebe, budući da on ima efekta isključivo u odnosu na prava i slobode koji su zajemčeni drugim substancijalnim odredbama Konvencije i protokola uz nju. Međutim, primena člana 14. ne pretpostavlja kršenje jedne ili više takvih odredaba i u tom smislu ona jeste autonomna. Da bi član 14 bio primenljiv dovoljno je da činjenice vezane za neki slučaj spadaju u polje neke druge substancijalne odredbe Konvencije i protokola uz nju (vidi predmet Ince protiv Austrije (Inze), presuda od 28. oktobra 1987, Series A br. 126, str. 17, stav 36).
Sud primećuje da podnosilac predstavke nije imenovan u zvanje ovlašćenog računovođe usled toga što je prethodno bio osuđen zbog odbijanja da izvrši naredbu, što se ogledalo u njegovom odbijanju da obuče vojnu uniformu. Prema tome, zbog toga što je imao status lica koje je osuđivano, on je tretiran drugačije od ostalih lica koja su se prijavila za to zvanje. Sud smatra da takva razlika u tretmanu ne spada, obično, u opseg člana 14, barem u onoj meri u kojoj se to odnosi na pristup određenoj profesiji, budući da pravo na slobodu profesije nije zajamčeno Konvencijom.
Međutim, podnosilac predstavke se ne žali zbog distinkcije koju pravila u vezi sa pristupom profesiji prave između osuđenih lica i onih lica koja nikada nisu bila osuđena. On se pre svega žali zbog činjenice da u primeni relevantnog zakona nije napravljena nikakva razlika između lica koja su osuđena za krivična dela počinjena isključivo zbog njihovih verskih uverenja i lica koja su bila osuđena zbog drugih krivičnih dela. U tom kontekstu, Sud uočava da je podnosilac predstavke pripadnik Jehovinih svedoka, verske grupe predane pacifizmu, i da nema ničega u predmetnom spisu što bi osporilo tvrdnju podnosioca predstavke da je odbio da obuče vojnu uniformu samo zbog toga što smatra da mu njegova vera to ne dopušta. U suštini, tvrdnja koju iznosio podnosilac predstavke svodi se na to da on kaže da je bio diskriminisan u ostvarivanju prava na slobodu veroispovesti, koje je zajamčeno članom 9 Konvencije, u tom smislu što je tretiran kao i svako drugo lice osuđeno za teško krivično delo, uprkos tome što je njegova sudska osuda proistekla iz samog vršenja tog prava na slobodu veroispovesti. Sagledano iz te perspektive, Sud prihvata da “niz činjenica” na koje se žali podnosilac predstavke - to što je tretiran kao lice osuđeno za teško krivično delo kod neimenovanja u zvanje ovlašćenog računovođe uprkos činjenici da je krivično delo za koje je osuđen počivalo na njegovim verskim uverenjima - “spada u polje odredbe Konvencije”, konkretno, člana 9.
Da bi doneo ovaj zaključak Sud, za razliku od Komisije, ne smatra da je neophodno da ispita da li izvorna sudska osuda ovog podnosioca predstavke i potonje odbijanje vlasti da ga imenuju u željeno zvanje predstavlja mešanje u njegova prava po osnovu člana 9 stav 1. Pre svega, Sud ne mora u ovom slučaju da se bavi pitanjem da li, bez obzira na formulaciju člana 4 stav 3(b) uvođenje ovakvih sankcija za one koji ne žele da služe vojni rok zbog prigovora savesti može, samo po sebi, predstavljati osujećivanje prava na slobodu misli, savesti i veroispovesti zajamčenog članom 9 stav 1.
Sud je dosad smatrao da pravo koje proističe iz člana 14 da se uživanje prava i sloboda predviđenih Konvencijom, bez ikakve diskriminacije, krši onda kada državeugovornice različito tretiraju lica koja se nađu u analognim situacijama, a da pritom ne navedu objektivna i razumna opravdanja (vidi gore navedenu presudu u predmetu Ince, str. 18, stav 41). Međutim, Sud smatra da to nije jedini aspekt zabrane diskriminacije iz člana 11. Pravo da se prava i slobode predviđene Konvencijom uživaju bez diskriminacije prekršeno je i onda kada države-ugovornice bez objektivnog i razumnog opravdanja ne tretiraju različito ljude koji se nalaze u bitno različitim situacijama.
Iz svega ovoga sledi da je član 14 Konvencije relevantan za pritužbe koje je izneo podnosilac predstavke i primenjuju se na okolnosti ovog slučaja u vezi sa članom 9.
Sledeće pitanje koje treba razmotriti jeste da li je poštovan član 14 Konvencije. U skladu sa svojim običajnim pravom, Sud će morati da ispita da li je to što ovaj podnosilac predstavke nije tretiran različito od drugih lica prethodno osuđenih za teška krivična dela učinjeno u legitimnu svrhu. Ako jeste, onda će Sud morati da ispita da li je postojao opravdani odnos srazmernosti između primenjenih sredstava i cilja čijem se ostvarenju težilo (vidi navedenu presudu u predmetu Ince, ibid).
Sud smatra da države-ugovornice u načelu imaju legitimni interes da neke od počinilaca krivičnih dela isključe iz profesije ovlašćenog računovođe. Sud, međutim, isto tako smatra da, za razliku od drugih osuda za teška krivična dela, sudska osuda zbog toga što je neko lice iz verskih ili filozofskih razloga odbilo da obuče uniformu ne može da podrazumeva nepoštenje niti moralnu izopačenost koja bi, verovatno, podrila sposobnost izvršioca krivičnog dela da se tom profesijom bavi. Prema tome, nije opravdano to što je podnosilac predstavke isključen po osnovu nepodobnosti za posao. Sud uzima u obzir tvrdnju Države da lica koja odbijaju da služe svojoj zemlji moraju biti srazmerno kažnjena. Međutim, Sud isto tako primećuje da je podnosilac predstavke izdržao kaznu zatvora zbog toga što je odbio da ponese vojnu uniformu. U takvim okolnostima, Sud smatra da je uvođenje nove sankcije podnosiocu predstavke nesrazmerno. Iz toga sledi da isključenje podnosioca predstavke iz profesije ovlašćenog računovođe nije bilo izraz težnje legitimnom cilju. Usled toga, Sud zaključuje da nije postojalo nikakvo objektivno ni razumno obrazloženje činjenice da ovaj podnosilac predstavke nije bio tretiran različito od ostalih lica koja su bila osuđena za teško krivično delo.
Tačno je da vlasti nisu imale nikakvu drugu zakonsku mogućnost do da odbiju imenovanje podnosioca predstavke u zvanje ovlašćenog računovođe. Međutim, nasuprot onome što je predstavnik Države tvrdio na ročištu, time se država o kojoj je reč ne može osloboditi odgovornosti koju ima po Konvenciji. Sud nikada nije isključio mogućnost da se utvrdi kako neki zakon predstavlja direktno kršenje Konvencije (vidi, između ostalog, presudu u predmetu Šasanu i drugi protiv Francuske (Chassagnou) (GC), br. 25088/94, br. 28331/95 i br. 28443/95, ECHR 1999-III). U ovom slučaju, Sud smatra da je Država, koja je donela relevantni zakon, zapravo bila ta koja je prekršila pravo podnosioca predstavke da ne bude diskriminisan u uživanju prava i sloboda predviđenih članom 9 Konvencije. Država je to učinila time što nije unela odgovarajuće izuzetke u pravilo kojim se zabranjuje licima osuđivanim za teška krivična dela da se bave profesijom ovlašćenog računovođe.
Iz tih razloga, Sud zaključuje da je prekršen član 14 Konvencije u vezi sa članom 9. Konvencije.
IV NAVODNO KRŠENJE ČLANA 9 KONVENCIJE
Država tvrdi da odbijanje vlasti da podnosioca predstavke imenuju u traženo zvanje nije predstavljalo mešanje u njegova prava proistekla iz člana 9 Konvencije. U svakom slučaju to, po mišljenju Države, jeste neophodno u demokratskom društvu. U trenutku kada je podnosilac predstavke odbio da služi u oružanim snagama, grčki zakon je priznavao samo mogućnost služenja vojnog roka bez oružja, jer se smatralo da bi, ako bi se svakome priznalo pravo na alternativno civilno služenje vojnog roka, to moglo dati maha zloupotrebama. Usled toga sankcije koje su izrečene ovom podnosiocu predstavke nisu bile neproporcionalne i pravilo kojim se isključuju lica koja su osuđivana za teška krivična dela iz određenih profesija mora biti primenjivano na svakog, bez razlike.
Komisija nije smatrala neophodnim da se pozabavi ovim pitanjem.
V. NAVODNO KRŠENJE ČLANA 6 STAV 1 KONVENCIJE
2. Svako, tokom odlučivanja o njegovim građanskim pravima i obavezama..., ima pravo na ... raspravu u razumnom roku pred ... Sudom...”
Podnosilac predstavke je tvrdio da se član 6 stav 1 Konvencije primenjuje na postupak pred Vrhovnim administrativnim sudom o kome je ovde reč zbog toga što se predmet nije odnosio na mogućnost stupanja u državnu službu, već na imenovanje u slobodno, mada propisima strogo urođeno, zvanje i profesiju. Sem toga, podnosilac predstavke je tvrdio da se ovde nije radilo ni o kakvim složenim pravnim pitanjima. Pitanja koja su bila prosleđena na razmatranje u okviru kolegijuma Vrhovnog upravnog suda nisu bila pitanja koja je pokrenuo podnosilac predstavke, već samo Veće Vrhovnog administrativnog suda. U svakom slučaju, time se nije moglo opravdati to što je čitav postupak trajao više od sedam godina.
Država je u svom podnesku navela da član 6 stav 1 ovde nije primenjiv zbog toga što je odbijanje da podnosilac predstavke bude imenovan u zvanje ovlašćenog računovođe predstavljalo upravni akt koji spada u sferu javnog prava. U svakom slučaju, ovaj predmet je pokrenuo brojna i ozbiljna ustavna pitanja. Sem toga, pravnici su bili u štrajku tokom mnogih meseci 1991, 1992, 1993. i 1994. godine. U svetlosti svega navedenog i činjenice da je Vrhovni upravni sud zatrpan predmetima, period od sedam godina predstavljao je razuman rok.
Komisija je smatrala da se član 6 ovde može primeniti, zbog toga što je, mada se ovlašćene računovođe imenuju upravnom odlukom, njihova profesija zapravo nezavisna profesija. Komisija je takođe zaključila da se ovde radilo o složenim pravnim pitanjima. Međutim, podnosilac predstavke ne snosi odgovornost ni za jedno odlaganje ni kašnjenje. Štaviše, postojala su dva perioda neaktivnosti u ukupnom trajanju od gotovo tri godine za koje država nije ponudila nikakvo objašnjenje sem toga što je navela da je Vrhovni upravni sud bio pretrpan predmetima. Po mišljenju Komisije, dužina postupka je bila tolika da se ne može oceniti kao razuman rok.
Sud podseća da je, iako je regulisana upravnim propisima, profesija ovlašćenog računovođe jedna od slobodnih profesija u Grčkoj. Usled toga, postupak koji je podnosilac predstavke poveo ne bi li osporio to što ga vlasti nisu imenovale u zvanje ovlašćenog računovođe podrazumevao je određivanje njegovih građanskih prava u značenju člana 6 stav 1 Konvencije (vidi, između ostalog, presudu u predmetu Kenig protiv Nemačke (Konig) od 28. jula 1978, Series A, br. 27, str. 32, st. 94).
Sud primećuje da je postupak pred Vrhovnim upravnim sudom započet 8. maja 1989. godine, kada je podnosilac predstavke podneo svoj zahtev za pravnu reviziju, a da je okončan 28. juna 1996. godine, kada je Treće veće Suda odbacilo taj zahtev. Prema tome, postupak je trajao sedam godina, jedan mesec i dvadeset dana.
Sud podseća da razumnost dužine trajanja postupka mora biti procenjivana u svetlosti konkretnih okolnosti datog predmeta i uz pomoć sledećih kriterijuma: složenosti predmeta, ponašanja stranaka, ponašanja vlasti koje se bave tim predmetom i toga šta je ishod spora mogao da znači podnosiocu predstavke (vidi presudu u predmetu Laino protiv Italije (GC), br. 33158/96, st. 18, ECHR 1999-I). Sporovi oko zapošljavanja, s kojima se mogu uporediti sporovi koji se tiču mogućnosti stupanja u neku slobodnu profesiju, generalno gledano nalažu ekspeditivnu odluku (vidi predmet Vokaturo protiv Italije (Vocaturo) presuda od 24. maja 1991, Series A, br. 206-C, str. 32-33, st. 17).
Sud primećuje da se u ovom predmetu radilo o pravnim pitanjima koja jesu u izvesnoj meri složena. Međutim, podnosilac predstavke nije sam prouzrokovao nikakvo odlaganje. Sem toga, postojala su dva perioda neaktivnosti, ukupne dužine trajanja od gotovo tri godine. Prvi takav period započet je 8. maja 1989. godine, kada je podnosilac predstavke poveo postupak, a okončan je 18. aprila 1991. godine, kada je Treće odeljenje prvi put razmatralo slučaj. Drugi takav period započet je 11. novembra 1994. godine, kada je kolegijum vratio predmet Trećem veću, a okončan je 26. oktobra 1995. godine, kada je Treće veće donelo konačnu odluku. Jedino objašnjenje koje je Država ponudila za te periode neaktivnosti jeste opterećenost Vrhovnog upravnog suda mnogobrojnim predmetima.
Sud ne može da prihvati to objašnjenje. Prema običajnom pravu ovog Suda, visoke strane ugovornice dužne su da organizuju svoj pravni sistem na takav način da njihovi sudovi mogu da jemče pravo svakog građanina da dobije konačno rešenje sporova u vezi sa građanskim pravima i obavezama u razumnom roku (vidi gore navedenu presudu u predmetu Vokaturo, ibid.). U svetlosti svega navedenog i s obzirom na to da se postupak o kome je reč neposredno ticao profesionalne budućnosti podnosioca predstavke, Sud smatra da je dužina postupka bila takva da nije ispunjen zahtev za “razumnim rokom”.
Iz tih razloga Sud zaključuje da je došlo do kršenja člana 6 stav 1 Konvencije
VI PRIMENA ČLANA 41 KONVENCIJE
“Kada Sud utvrdi prekršaj Konvencije ili Protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo delimičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj stranci”.
A. Materijalna šteta
Podnosilac predstavke je naveo da smatra kako mu pripada svota od 84.140.000 drahmi (GRD) na ime materijalne štete, uključujući u oko 17.000.000 GRD na ime plate koju je izgubio u periodu što je protekao od trenutka kada su vlasti odbile da ga imenuju u zvanje ovlašćenog računovođe do ukidanja monopola Instituta ovlašćenih računovođa. Da bi potkrepio svoj zahtev, podnosilac predstavke se pozvao na “jednu anketu koju su obavili Institut ovlašćenih računovođa i privatno preduzeće ovlašćenih računovođa”.
Država je iznela tvrdnju da sloboda veroispovesti nema nikakve veze sa navedenom štetom. U svakom slučaju, država je naglasila da je tokom celog perioda koji se ovde razmatra podnosilac predstavke radio u privatnom sektoru i da njegovi zahtevi nisu potkrepljeni nikakvim zvaničnim dokumentima.
Sud primećuje da, bez obzira na opšte primedbe Države o vezi između slobode veroispovesti i materijalne štete, nije sporno da bi podnosilac predstavke, da samo vlasti nisu odbile da ga imenuju u zvanje ovlašćenog računovođe, ostvarivao dohodak na osnovu bavljenja tom profesionalnom delatnošću bar do ukidanja monopola Instituta ovlašćenih računovođa. Međutim, Sud isto tako konstatuje da podnosilac predstavke u tom vremenskom periodu nije bio nezaposlen. Sem toga, podnosilac predstavke nije dokazao da bi dohodak koji bi ostvarivao kao ovlašćeni računovođa premašivao dohodak koji je zaista ostvarivao radeći u privatnom sektoru u vremenskom periodu na koji se ovaj predmet odnosi. S tim razloga, Sud ne dodeljuje podnosiocu predstavke nikakvu naknadu na ime materijalne štete.
B. Nematerijalna šteta
Podnosilac predstavke je podneo zahtev za isplatu 15 miliona GRD na ime nematerijalne štete.
Država je zastupala mišljenje da nije utvrđena nikakva uzročno-posledična veza između kršenja Konvencije i navedene svote novca. U svakom slučaju, po mišljenju Države, zahtev je preteran.
Sud smatra da je podnosilac predstavke morao pretrpeti neku nematerijalnu štetu usled toga što je bilo prekršeno njegovo pravo koje proističe iz člana 6. stava 1. Konvencije na to da u razumnom roku bude sproveden sudski postupak, kao i njegovo pravo koje proističe iz člana 14 a u vezi sa članom 9 da ne bude podvrgnut diskriminaciji u ostvarivanju slobode veroispovesti. Trajanje sudskog postupka moralo je izazvati dugotrajni osećaj nesigurnosti i uznemirenja kod podnosioca predstavke u pogledu toga da li će uopšte moći da se bavi profesionalnom delatnošću kojom je želeo da se bavi. Sem toga, kršenje člana 14 Konvencije u vezi sa članom 9 zbilo se u procesu donošenja odluke koja se neposredno ticala mogućnosti podnosioca predstavke da se bavi svojom profesijom, što je centralni element u njegovim životnim planovima. Procenjujući visinu svote na pravičnoj osnovi, Sud dodeljuje podnosiocu predstavke 6.000.000 GRD na ime nematerijalne štete.
C. Sudski i ostali troškovi
Podnosilac predstavke je podneo zahtev da mu se isplati 6.250.000 GRD na ime sudskih i ostalih troškova u postupcima pred domaćim sudovima i pred ustanovama Konvencije. U tu svotu bilo je uračunato i 250.000 GRD na ime honorara advokata koji su zastupali podnosioca predstavke pred Upravnim organima, 1.700.000 GRD na ime honorara advokata koji su ga zastupali u postupku pred Vrhovnim upravnim sudom, 500.000 GRD na ime honorara advokata koji su ga zastupali u postupku pred Komisijom, 2.000.000 GRD na ime honorara advokata koji su ga zastupali pred Sudom, 1.300.000 GRD na ime putnih i smeštajnih troškova koje su podnosilac predstavke i njegov advokat snosili da bi se pojavili na ročištu pred Sudom i 500.000 GRD na ime ostalih troškova.
Država je tvrdila da zahtevu treba udovoljiti samo u meri u kojoj su sudski i ostali troškovi bili stvarni i neophodni i u razumnom iznosu.
Sud se slaže s Državom da treba izvršiti proveru da bi se utvrdilo koje troškove treba uključiti u isplatu zadovoljenja na osnovu člana 41. Konvencije (vidi, između ostalog, gore navedenu presudu u predmetu Nikolova, stav 79). Sem toga, Sud smatra da je zahtev podnosioca predstavke prekomeran. S tih razloga Sud odlučuje da se podnosiocu predstavke isplati 3.000.000 GRD po ovom osnovu.
D. Važeća kamatna stopa
S TIM RAZLOGA, SUD JEDNOGLASNO
Odbacuje prethodnu primedbu Države;
Zaključuje da je došlo do kršenja člana 14 Konvencije, a u vezi sa članom 9;
Zaključuje da nije neophodno ispitati da li je došlo do kršenja člana 9 Konvencije uzetog zasebno;
Zaključuje da je došlo do kršenja člana 6 stav 1 Konvencije;
Zaključuje
(a) da Država treba da isplati podnosiocu predstavke, u roku od tri meseca, sledeće iznose:
(i) 6.000.000 GRD (šest miliona drahmi) na ime nematerijalne štete;
(ii) 3.000.000 GRD (tri miliona drahmi) na ime sudskih i ostalih troškova;
(b) da će od dana isteka gore navedena tri meseca sve do dana isplate, na tu svotu biti zaračunavana kamatna stopa od šest procenata godišnje;
Sačinjeno na engleskom i francuskom jeziku i pročitano na javnom ročištu u zgradi Suda u Strazburu 6. aprila 2000. godine.
LUZIUS WILDHABER, Predsednik
Mod de BUR-BUKIKIO, Zamenik Sekretara Suda
(1) Napomena Sekretara Suda. Protokol br. 11. stupio je na snagu 1. novembra 1998. godine.
(2) Napomena Sekretara Suda. Integralni tekst mišljenja Komisije i dva izdvojena mišljenja sadržana u izveštaju biće objavljeni kao aneks konačne štampane verzije ove presude (u zvaničnim izveštajima o odabranim presudama i odlukama Suda), a u međuvremenu primerak tog izveštaja Komisije mogućno je dobiti u Sekretarijatu Suda.
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Prevod presude preuzet sa https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
Prevod presude Beogradski centar za ljudska prava
In the case of Thlimmenos v. Greece,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of the following judges:
MrL. Wildhaber, President,
MrsE. Palm,
MrL. Ferrari Bravo,
MrL. Caflisch,
MrJ.-P. Costa,
MrW. Fuhrmann,
MrK. Jungwiert,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrB. Zupančič,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrJ. Hedigan,
MrsW. Thomassen,
MrsM. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
MrT. Panţîru,
MrE. Levits,
MrK. Traja,
MrG. Koumantos, ad hoc judge,
and also of Mrs M. de Boer-Buquicchio, Deputy Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 1 December 1999 and 15 March 2000,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last‑mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court in accordance with the provisions applicable prior to the entry into force of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)[1], by the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) on 22 March 1999 (Article 5 § 4 of Protocol No. 11 and former Articles 47 and 48 of the Convention).
2. The case originated in an application (no. 34369/97) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Commission under former Article 25 of the Convention by a Greek national, Mr Iakovos Thlimmenos (“the applicant”), on 18 December 1996. The applicant alleged that the refusal of the authorities to appoint him to a post of chartered accountant on account of his criminal conviction for disobeying, because of his religious beliefs, the order to wear the military uniform was in breach of Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention and that the proceedings he had instituted in the Supreme Administrative Court in this connection were not conducted in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In his observations submitted on 20 October 1997 in reply to the observations of the Greek Government (“the Government”) on the admissibility and merits of the case, he also complained of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
3. The Commission declared the application partly admissible on 12 January 1998. In its report of 4 December 1998 (former Article 31 of the Convention), it expressed the opinion that there had been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 14 (twenty-two votes to six); that it was not necessary to examine whether there had been a violation of Article 9 taken on its own (twenty-one votes to seven); and that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (unanimously)[2].
4. On 31 March 1999 a panel of the Grand Chamber determined that the case should be decided by the Grand Chamber (Rule 100 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Mr C. Rozakis, the judge elected in respect of Greece, who had taken part in the Commission's examination of the case, withdrew from sitting in the Grand Chamber (Rule 28). The Government accordingly appointed Mr G. Koumantos to sit as an ad hoc judge (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1).
5. The applicant and the Government each filed a memorial.
6. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 1 December 1999.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
MrP. Georgakopoulos, Legal Adviser, State Legal Council,Delegate of the Agent,
MrK. Georgiadis, Legal Assistant,State Legal Council,Counsel;
(b) for the applicant
MrN. Alivizatos, of the Athens Bar,Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Alivizatos and Mr Georgiadis.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. The applicant's conviction for insubordination
7. On 9 December 1983 the Athens Permanent Army Tribunal (Diarkes Stratodikio), composed of one career military judge and four other officers, convicted the applicant, a Jehovah's Witness, of insubordination for having refused to wear the military uniform at a time of general mobilisation. However, the tribunal considered under Article 70 (b) of the Military Criminal Code and under Article 84 § 2 (a) of the Criminal Code that there were extenuating circumstances and sentenced the applicant to four years' imprisonment. The applicant was released on parole after two years and one day.
B. The refusal to appoint the applicant to a chartered accountant's post
8. In June 1988 the applicant sat a public examination for the appointment of twelve chartered accountants, a liberal profession in Greece. He came second among sixty candidates. However, on 8 February 1989 the Executive Board of the Greek Institute of Chartered Accountants (hereinafter “the Board”) refused to appoint him on the ground that he had been convicted of a serious crime (kakuryima).
C. The proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court
9. On 8 May 1989 the applicant seised the Supreme Administrative Court (Simvulio Epikratias) invoking, inter alia, his right to freedom of religion and equality before the law, as guaranteed by the Constitution and the Convention. The applicant also claimed that he had not been convicted of a crime but of a less serious offence.
10. On 18 April 1991 the Third Chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court held a hearing. On 25 May 1991 it decided to refer the case to the plenary court because of the important issues it raised. The Chamber's own view was that Article 10 of Legislative Decree no. 3329/1955 provided that a person who would not qualify for appointment to the civil service could not be appointed a chartered accountant. Moreover, according to Article 22 § 1 of the Civil Servants' Code, no person convicted of a serious crime could be appointed to the civil service. However, this provision referred to convictions by courts established in accordance with Article 87 § 1 of the Constitution. This was not the case with the permanent military courts, because the majority of their members were not career judges enjoying the same guarantees of independence as their civilian colleagues, as envisaged by Article 96 § 5 of the Constitution. As a result, the applicant's conviction by the Athens Permanent Army Tribunal could not be taken into consideration and the Board's decision not to appoint the applicant a chartered accountant had to be quashed.
11. On 21 January 1994 a hearing was held before the Supreme Administrative Court, sitting in plenary. On 11 November 1994 the court decided that the Board had acted in accordance with the law when, for the purposes of applying Article 22 § 1 of the Civil Servants' Code, it had taken into consideration the applicant's conviction for serious crime by the Athens Permanent Army Tribunal. Article 96 § 5 of the Constitution provided that the military courts would continue functioning as they had before until the enactment of a new law which would change their composition. Such a law had not yet been enacted. The Supreme Administrative Court further decided to refer the case back to the Third Chamber and ordered it to examine the remaining issues.
12. The decision of 11 November 1994 was taken by a majority. The minority considered that, since nine years had passed since the Constitution had entered into force without the law envisaged in Article 96 § 5 thereof having been enacted, the guarantees of independence required from civilian judges had to be afforded by the existing military courts. Since that was not the case with the Athens Permanent Army Tribunal, Mr Thlimmenos's application for judicial review had to be allowed.
13. On 26 October 1995 the Third Chamber held a further hearing. On 28 June 1996 it rejected Mr Thlimmenos's application for judicial review, considering, inter alia, that the Board's failure to appoint him was not related to his religious beliefs but to the fact that he had committed a criminal offence.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Appointment to a chartered accountant's post
14. Until 30 April 1993 only members of the Greek Institute of Chartered Accountants could provide chartered accountants' services in Greece.
15. Article 10 of Legislative Decree no. 3329/1955, as amended by Article 5 of Presidential Decree no. 15/1989, provided that a person who did not qualify for appointment to the civil service could not be appointed a chartered accountant.
16. According to Article 22 § 1 of the Civil Servants' Code, no person convicted of a serious crime can be appointed to the civil service.
17. On 30 April 1993 the monopoly of the Institute of Chartered Accountants was abolished. Most chartered accountants became members of the Chartered Auditors' Company Ltd.
B. The criminal offence of insubordination
18. Article 70 of the Military Criminal Code in force until 1995 provided:
“A member of the armed forces who, having been ordered by his commander to perform a duty, refuses or fails to execute the order shall be punished –
(a) if the act is committed in front of the enemy or armed insurgents, with death;
(b) in times of war or armed insurgency or during a state of siege or general mobilisation, with death or, if there are extenuating circumstances, with life imprisonment or imprisonment of at least five years and
(c) in all other circumstances, with imprisonment between six months and two years.”
19. By virtue of Presidential Decree no. 506/1974, at the time of the applicant's arrest Greece was deemed to be in a state of general mobilisation. This decree is still in force.
20. Article 84 § 2 (a) of the Criminal Code provides that a lesser penalty shall be imposed on persons who, prior to the crime, had led an honest life.
21. Under Article 1 of the Military Criminal Code in force until 1995, offences punishable with a sentence of at least five years' imprisonment were considered to be serious crimes (kakuryimata). Offences punishable with a sentence of up to five years' imprisonment were considered misdemeanours (plimmelimata).
22. Under the new Military Criminal Code of 1995 insubordination not committed in time of war or in front of the enemy is considered a misdemeanour.
C. The right to conscientious objection to military service
23. Under section 2(4) of Law no. 731/1977, those who refused to perform unarmed military service on the basis of their religious beliefs were sentenced to imprisonment of a duration equivalent to that of the unarmed service, that is, less than five years.
24. Law no. 2510/1997, which entered into force on 27 June 1997, gives conscientious objectors the right to perform civilian, instead of military, service. Under section 23(1) and (4) of this law, persons who had been convicted of insubordination in the past were given the possibility of applying for recognition as conscientious objectors. One of the effects of such recognition was having the conviction expunged from one's criminal record.
25. Applications under section 23(1) and (4) of Law no. 2510/1997 had to be lodged within a period of three months starting from 1 January 1998. They were examined by the commission that advises the Minister of National Defence on the recognition of conscientious objectors. The commission had to apply section 18 of Law no. 2510/1997, which provides:
“Persons who invoke their religious or ideological beliefs in order not to fulfil their military obligations for reasons of conscience may be recognised as conscientious objectors ...”
THE LAW
I. SCOPE OF THE CASE
26. In his original application to the Commission the applicant had complained under Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention about the failure of the authorities to appoint him to a post of chartered accountant and under Article 6 § 1 about the proceedings he had instituted in this connection. Only in his observations in reply to the Government's observations on the admissibility and merits of the application did the applicant also complain of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Commission declared the latter complaint inadmissible on the ground that it had not been submitted within the six-month time-limit provided by the Convention.
27. In his memorial before the Court the applicant contended that the Court was competent to examine his complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Although this complaint had not been expressly raised in the application form, the facts underlying it had been set out therein. The Convention organs were free to give them the proper legal qualification.
28. The Court recalls that the scope of its jurisdiction is determined by the Commission's decision declaring the originating application admissible (see Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, § 40, ECHR 1999-IV). Moreover, it considers, as the Commission did, that the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was separate from the complaints declared admissible. It follows that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this complaint.
II. THE GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
29. The Government argued that the applicant, by using the procedure provided by section 23(1) and (4) of Law no. 2510/1997, could have avoided the consequences of his conviction. They also submitted that he could have applied for a pardon under Article 47 § 1 of the Constitution. However, the Government accepted that, even if the applicant had been recognised as a conscientious objector under Law no. 2510/1997, he would not have been able to obtain reparation for the prejudice he had suffered as a result of his conviction.
30. The applicant claimed that he had not been aware of the three-month time-limit in section 23(1) and (4) of Law no. 2510/1997 and had missed the deadline. In any event, the above provisions were “obscure” and only few conscientious objectors had succeeded in having their past convictions expunged from their criminal records.
31. The Court notes that, even if the applicant had not missed the deadline in section 23(1) and (4) of Law no. 2510/1997, his claim that he could not serve in the armed forces because of his religious beliefs would have been examined by a commission, which would have advised the Minister of National Defence on whether or not he should be recognised as a conscientious objector. This commission and the Minister would not have been obliged to grant the applicant's claim since they, at least to a certain degree, retained discretionary powers (see paragraphs 24 and 25 above). Moreover, it was accepted by the parties that, even if the applicant had obtained the removal of his conviction from his criminal record pursuant to section 23(1) and (4) of Law no. 2510/1997, he would not have been able to obtain reparation for the prejudice he had suffered until then as a result of his conviction. For the same reason the applicant could not have been certain that his request for a pardon would have been granted and, even if it had, the applicant could not have obtained reparation.
32. In any event, the Court notes that, in so far as the Government can be deemed to raise a preliminary objection concerning the applicant's status as a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, this objection had not been put forward when the admissibility of the application was being considered by the Commission. There was nothing preventing the Government from raising it at that stage of the proceedings, since Law no. 2510/1997 had been enacted prior to the Commission's admissibility decision. The Court therefore holds that the Government is estopped from raising this preliminary objection and dismisses it (see Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195/96, § 44, ECHR 1999-II).
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 9
33. The Court notes that the applicant did not complain about his initial conviction for insubordination. The applicant complained that the law excluding persons convicted of a serious crime from appointment to a chartered accountant's post did not distinguish between persons convicted as a result of their religious beliefs and persons convicted on other grounds. The applicant invoked Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 9, which provide:
Article 14
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
Article 9
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
A. Arguments before the Court
34. The applicant submitted that his non-appointment to a post of chartered accountant was directly linked to the manifestation of his religious beliefs and fell within the ambit of Article 9 of the Convention. He pointed out in this connection that he had not been appointed because he had refused to serve in the armed forces; by refusing to do so, he had manifested his religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness. The applicant further argued that it could not serve any useful purpose to exclude someone from the profession of chartered accountants for having refused to serve in the armed forces on religious grounds. In the applicant's view, the law should not have excluded every person convicted of a serious crime. The legitimacy of the exclusion depended on the nature of the post and of the offence, including the motives of the offender, the time elapsed since the offence and the offender's conduct during that time. Seen in this light, the authorities' failure to appoint the applicant was not necessary. The class of persons to which the applicant belonged, namely male Jehovah's Witnesses whose religion involved compelling reasons for refusing to serve in the armed forces, was different from the class of most other criminal offenders. The Government's failure to take account of this difference amounted to discrimination not tolerated by Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 9.
35. The Government argued that Article 14 of the Convention did not apply because the facts of the case did not fall within the ambit of Article 9. The authorities that refused to appoint the applicant a chartered accountant had no option but to apply a rule that excluded all persons convicted of a serious crime from such a post. The authorities could not inquire into the reasons that had led to a person's conviction. Because of its generality, the law in question was neutral. Moreover, it served the public interest. A person convicted of a serious offence could not be appointed to the civil service and, by extension, to a post of chartered accountant. This prohibition had to be absolute and no distinction could be made on a case-by-case basis. States had a wide margin of appreciation in the characterisation of criminal offences as serious crimes or otherwise. The applicant had committed a serious offence by refusing to perform unarmed military service at a time of general mobilisation because he had tried to avoid a very important obligation towards society and the State, linked with the defence, safety and independence of the country. As a result, the sanction was not disproportionate.
36. The Government also stressed that the Court had no competence to examine the applicant's initial conviction. In any event, this had nothing to do with his religious beliefs. The obligation to do military service applied to all Greek males without any exceptions on grounds of religion or conscience. Moreover, the applicant had been convicted of insubordination. Discipline in the army could not be made to depend on whether a soldier agreed with the orders given to him.
37. In the light of all the above, the Government argued that, even if Article 14 applied, there would exist an objective and reasonable justification for the failure to distinguish between the applicant and other persons convicted of a serious crime. There was no need to point out that Greek Orthodox or Catholic Christians would also be excluded from the profession of chartered accountants if they had committed a serious crime.
38. The Commission considered that Article 14 applied because it was sufficient that the facts of the case fell within the ambit of Article 9, and, in its opinion, there had been an interference with the rights protected by that Article in the present case. The Commission further considered that the right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention was violated not only when States treated differently persons in analogous situations without providing an objective and reasonable justification, but also when States, without an objective and reasonable justification, failed to treat differently persons whose situations were different. In the circumstances of the case, there was no objective and reasonable justification for the failure of the drafters of the rules governing access to the profession of chartered accountants to treat differently persons convicted for refusing to serve in the armed forces on religious grounds from persons convicted of other serious crimes.
B. The Court's assessment
39. The Court considers that the applicant's complaint falls to be examined under Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 9 for the following reasons.
40. The Court recalls that Article 14 of the Convention has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. However, the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of one or more of such provisions and to this extent it is autonomous. For Article 14 to become applicable it suffices that the facts of a case fall within the ambit of another substantive provision of the Convention or its Protocols (see the Inze v. Austria judgment of 28 October 1987, Series A no. 126, p. 17, § 36).
41. The Court notes that the applicant was not appointed a chartered accountant as a result of his past conviction for insubordination consisting in his refusal to wear the military uniform. He was thus treated differently from the other persons who had applied for that post on the ground of his status as a convicted person. The Court considers that such difference of treatment does not generally come within the scope of Article 14 in so far as it relates to access to a particular profession, the right to freedom of profession not being guaranteed by the Convention.
42. However, the applicant does not complain of the distinction that the rules governing access to the profession make between convicted persons and others. His complaint rather concerns the fact that in the application of the relevant law no distinction is made between persons convicted of offences committed exclusively because of their religious beliefs and persons convicted of other offences. In this context the Court notes that the applicant is a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious group committed to pacifism, and that there is nothing in the file to disprove the applicant's claim that he refused to wear the military uniform only because he considered that his religion prevented him from doing so. In essence, the applicant's argument amounts to saying that he is discriminated against in the exercise of his freedom of religion, as guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention, in that he was treated like any other person convicted of a serious crime although his own conviction resulted from the very exercise of this freedom. Seen in this perspective, the Court accepts that the “set of facts” complained of by the applicant – his being treated as a person convicted of a serious crime for the purposes of an appointment to a chartered accountant's post despite the fact that the offence for which he had been convicted was prompted by his religious beliefs – “falls within the ambit of a Convention provision”, namely Article 9.
43. In order to reach this conclusion, the Court, as opposed to the Commission, does not find it necessary to examine whether the applicant's initial conviction and the authorities' subsequent refusal to appoint him amounted to interference with his rights under Article 9 § 1. In particular, the Court does not have to address, in the present case, the question whether, notwithstanding the wording of Article 4 § 3 (b), the imposition of such sanctions on conscientious objectors to compulsory military service may in itself infringe the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion guaranteed by Article 9 § 1.
44. The Court has so far considered that the right under Article 14 not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is violated when States treat differently persons in analogous situations without providing an objective and reasonable justification (see the Inze judgment cited above, p. 18, § 41). However, the Court considers that this is not the only facet of the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14. The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different.
45. It follows that Article 14 of the Convention is of relevance to the applicant's complaint and applies in the circumstances of this case in conjunction with Article 9 thereof.
46. The next question to be addressed is whether Article 14 of the Convention has been complied with. According to its case-law, the Court will have to examine whether the failure to treat the applicant differently from other persons convicted of a serious crime pursued a legitimate aim. If it did the Court will have to examine whether there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (see the Inze judgment cited above, ibid.).
47. The Court considers that, as a matter of principle, States have a legitimate interest to exclude some offenders from the profession of chartered accountant. However, the Court also considers that, unlike other convictions for serious criminal offences, a conviction for refusing on religious or philosophical grounds to wear the military uniform cannot imply any dishonesty or moral turpitude likely to undermine the offender's ability to exercise this profession. Excluding the applicant on the ground that he was an unfit person was not, therefore, justified. The Court takes note of the Government's argument that persons who refuse to serve their country must be appropriately punished. However, it also notes that the applicant did serve a prison sentence for his refusal to wear the military uniform. In these circumstances, the Court considers that imposing a further sanction on the applicant was disproportionate. It follows that the applicant's exclusion from the profession of chartered accountants did not pursue a legitimate aim. As a result, the Court finds that there existed no objective and reasonable justification for not treating the applicant differently from other persons convicted of a serious crime.
48. It is true that the authorities had no option under the law but to refuse to appoint the applicant a chartered accountant. However, contrary to what the Government's representative appeared to argue at the hearing, this cannot absolve the respondent State from responsibility under the Convention. The Court has never excluded that legislation may be found to be in direct breach of the Convention (see, inter alia, Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, ECHR 1999-III). In the present case the Court considers that it was the State having enacted the relevant legislation which violated the applicant's right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of his right under Article 9 of the Convention. That State did so by failing to introduce appropriate exceptions to the rule barring persons convicted of a serious crime from the profession of chartered accountants.
49. The Court concludes, therefore, that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 9.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONVENTION
50. The applicant argued that both his initial conviction for insubordination and the authorities' resultant refusal to appoint him as a chartered accountant constituted interference with his right to manifest his religious beliefs under Article 9 of the Convention. The Commission's case‑law to the effect that the Convention did not guarantee the right to conscientious objection to military service had to be reviewed in the light of present-day conditions. Virtually all Contracting States now recognised the right to alternative civilian service. Although the Court was admittedly not competent to examine the interference arising out of the applicant's initial conviction, the applicant submitted that the interference arising out of his non-appointment could not be deemed necessary in a democratic society.
51. The Government argued that the authorities' refusal to appoint the applicant did not constitute an interference with his right under Article 9 of the Convention. In any event, it was necessary in a democratic society. At the time when the applicant refused to serve in the armed forces, Greek law only recognised the possibility of unarmed military service because it was considered that giving everybody the right to alternative civilian service could give rise to abuses. As a result, the sanction imposed on him was not disproportionate and the rule excluding persons convicted of a serious crime from certain positions had to be applied without any distinctions.
52. The Commission did not consider it necessary to address the issue.
53. The Court considers that, since it has found a breach of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 9 and for the reasons set out in paragraph 43 above, it is not necessary also to consider whether there has been a violation of Article 9 taken on its own.
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
54. The applicant also complained that the length of the proceedings he instituted before the Supreme Administrative Court to challenge his non‑appointment gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
55. The applicant submitted that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applied to the Supreme Administrative Court proceedings under examination because they did not concern access to the civil service but to a liberal, albeit tightly regulated, profession. Moreover, he argued that the proceedings were not concluded within a reasonable time. The case did not involve complex legal issues. The issues that were referred to the plenary of the Supreme Administrative Court were not raised by the applicant but by the Supreme Administrative Court's Chamber itself. In any event, they could not justify a delay of more than seven years.
56. The Government submitted that Article 6 § 1 was not applicable because the refusal to appoint the applicant was an administrative act falling within the sphere of public law. In any event, the case raised serious constitutional issues. Moreover, lawyers were on strike during many months in 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994. In the light of all the above and the Supreme Administrative Court's case-load, seven years was a reasonable period.
57. The Commission considered that Article 6 applied because, although chartered accountants were appointed by administrative decision, their occupation was an independent profession. It also considered that complex legal issues were involved. However, the applicant was not responsible for any of the delays. Moreover, there were two periods of inactivity of a total duration of almost three years for which the Government did not offer any explanation apart from the Supreme Administrative Court's case-load. In the view of the Commission, the proceedings were not reasonable in length.
58. The Court recalls that, although regulated by administrative law, the profession of chartered accountants was one of the liberal professions in Greece. As a result, the proceedings instituted by the applicant to challenge the authorities' failure to appoint him to a post of chartered accountant involved a determination of his civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, among others, the König v. Germany judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A no. 27, p. 32, § 94).
59. The Court notes that the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court began on 8 May 1989, when the applicant lodged his application for judicial review, and ended on 28 June 1996, when the Third Chamber of the court rejected it. They lasted, therefore, seven years, one month and twenty days.
60. The Court recalls that the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and with the help of the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties, the conduct of the authorities dealing with the case and what was at stake for the applicant (see Laino v. Italy [GC], no. 33158/96, § 18, ECHR 1999-I). Employment disputes, to which disputes concerning access to a liberal profession can be compared, call generally for expeditious decision (see the Vocaturo v. Italy judgment of 24 May 1991, Series A no. 206‑C, pp. 32-33, § 17).
61. The Court notes that the case involved legal issues of some complexity. However, the applicant did not cause any delays. And there were two periods of inactivity of a total duration of almost three years. The first such period started on 8 May 1989, when the applicant instituted the proceedings, and ended on 18 April 1991, when the Third Chamber first heard the case. The second started on 11 November 1994, when the plenary court referred the case back to the Third Chamber, and ended on 26 October 1995, when the Third Chamber issued the final decision. The only explanation offered by the Government for these periods of inactivity is the Supreme Administrative Court's case-load.
62. The Court cannot accept this explanation. According to its case-law, it is for Contracting States to organise their legal systems in such a way that their courts can guarantee the right of everyone to obtain a final decision on disputes relating to civil rights and obligations within a reasonable time (see the Vocaturo judgment cited above, ibid.). In the light of all the above and given that the proceedings concerned the applicant's professional future, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
63. The Court concludes, therefore, that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
64. Under Article 41 of the Convention,
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Pecuniary damage
65. The applicant claimed 84,140,000 drachmas (GRD) for pecuniary damage, including approximately GRD 17,000,000 in respect of salaries lost between the authorities' refusal to appoint him and the abolition of the monopoly of the Institute of Chartered Accountants. In support of his claim, the applicant invoked “a survey conducted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants and a private chartered accountants' firm”.
66. The Government submitted that freedom of religion had nothing to do with the above damage. In any event, they pointed out that during the entire period under examination the applicant worked in the private sector and that his claims were not supported by any official documents.
67. The Court notes that, the Government's general remarks about the link between freedom of religion and pecuniary damages notwithstanding, it was not disputed that, if the authorities had not refused to appoint the applicant to a chartered accountant's post, he would have received an income related to this professional activity at least until the abolition of the monopoly of the Institute of Chartered Accountants. However, the Court also notes that the applicant was not unemployed during that period of time. Moreover, the applicant has not shown that the income he would have earned as a chartered accountant would have exceeded the income he had actually earned in private practice during the relevant period of time. The Court, therefore, does not award the applicant any compensation for pecuniary damage.
B. Non-pecuniary damage
68. The applicant claimed GRD 15,000,000 for non-pecuniary damage.
69. The Government argued that no causal link was established between the violation of the Convention and the above sum. In any event, the claim was excessive.
70. The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered some non-pecuniary damage as a result of the violation of his right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a hearing within a reasonable time and of his right under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9 to be free from discrimination in the exercise of his freedom of religion. The duration of the proceedings must have caused the applicant prolonged insecurity and anxiety about his eligibility to a professional activity to which he aspired. Moreover, the violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 9 occurred in the making of decisions concerning the applicant's access to a profession, which is a central element for the shaping of one's life plans. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant GRD 6,000,000 for non-pecuniary damage.
C. Costs and expenses
71. The applicant claimed GRD 6,250,000 in respect of costs and expenses incurred in the domestic and Convention proceedings. This amount included GRD 250,000 in lawyers' fees for the applicant's representation before the administrative authorities, GRD 1,700,000 in lawyers' fees for the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court, GRD 500,000 in lawyers' fees for the proceedings before the Commission, GRD 2,000,000 in lawyers' fees for the proceedings before the Court, GRD 1,300,000 for travel and subsistence expenses in connection with the appearance of the applicant and his lawyer at the hearing before the Court and GRD 500,000 for miscellaneous expenses.
72. The Government argued that the claim should be awarded only to the extent that the costs and expenses were actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum.
73. The Court agrees with the Government as to the test to be applied in order for costs and expenses to be included in an award under Article 41 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Nikolova cited above, § 79). Moreover, it considers that the applicant's claim is excessive. The Court therefore awards the applicant GRD 3,000,000 under this head.
D. Default interest
74. According to the information available to the Court, the statutory rate of interest applicable in Greece at the date of adoption of the present judgment is 6% per annum.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Dismisses the Government's preliminary objection;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 9;
3. Holds that it is not necessary to examine whether there has been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention taken on its own;
4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
5. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:
(i) GRD 6,000,000 (six million drachmas) for non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) GRD 3,000,000 (three million drachmas) for costs and expenses;
(b) that simple interest at an annual rate of 6% shall be payable from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement;
6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 6 April 2000.
Luzius Wildhaber
President
Maud de Boer-Buquicchio
Deputy Registrar
[1]. Note by the Registry. Protocol No. 11 came into force on 1 November 1998.
[2]. Note by the Registry. The full text of the Commission’s opinion and of the two separate opinions contained in the report will be reproduced as an annex to the final printed version of the judgment (in the official reports of selected judgments and decisions of the Court), but in the meantime a copy of the Commission’s report is obtainable from the Registry.
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