EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
DRUGI ODJEL
PREDMET ŞAHİN ALPAY protiv TURSKE
(Zahtjev br. 16538/17)
PRESUDA
STRASBOURG
20. ožujka 2018.
KONAČNA
20. 6. 2018.
Ova je presuda postala konačna na temelju članka 44. stavka 2. Konvencije. Može biti podvrgnuta uredničkim izmjenama.
U predmetu Şahin Alpay protiv Turske, Europski sud za ljudska prava (Drugi odjel Suda), zasjedajući u vijeću u sastavu:
Robert Spano, predsjednik,
Paul Lemmens,
Ledi Bianku,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Valeriu Griţco,
Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, suci,
Robert Reed,ad hoc sudac,
i Stanley Naismith, tajnik Odjela,
Nakon vijećanja zatvorenog za javnost 20. veljače 2018. godine, donosi sljedeću presudu koja je usvojena na navedeni datum:
POSTUPAK
Postupak u ovome predmetu pokrenut je na temelju zahtjeva (br. 16538/17) protiv Republike Turske koji je 28. veljače 2017. godine turski državljanin, g. Şahin Alpay („podnositelj zahtjeva”) podnio Sudu na temelju članka 34. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda („Konvencija”).
Podnositelja zahtjeva zastupao je g. F. Çağıl, odvjetnik iz Istanbula. Tursku vladu („Vlada”) zastupao je njezin zastupnik.
Podnositelj je konkretno tvrdio da su njegovim pritvorom prekršeni članci 5., 10. i 18. Konvencije.
Sud je 3. ožujka 2017. odlučio dati prednost zahtjevu (na temelju pravila 41. Poslovnika Suda).
Dana 13. lipnja 2017. Vlada je obaviještena o prigovorima koji se odnose članke 5. stavke 1., 3., 4. i 5. te na članke 10. i 18. Konvencije te je ostatak zahtjeva proglašen nedopuštenim.
Podnositelj i Vlada podnijeli su očitovanje o dopuštenosti i osnovanosti predmeta.
Povjerenik za ljudska prava Vijeća Europe („Povjerenik za ljudska prava”) ostvario je svoje pravo miješanja u postupak i podnio pisana očitovanja (članak 36., stavak 3. Konvencije i pravilo 44. stavak 2.)
Osim toga, pisana očitovanja Sudu podnio je i Posebni izvjestitelj Ujedinjenih naroda za promicanje i zaštitu prava na slobodu mišljenja i izražavanja („Posebni izvjestitelj”), ali i sljedeće nevladine organizacije koje djeluju zajednički: ČLANAK 19., Udruga europskih novinara, Odbor za zaštitu novinara, Europski centar za slobodu tiska i medija, Europska federacija novinara, Human Rights Watch, Indeks o cenzuri, Međunarodna federacija novinara, Međunarodni institut za tisak, Međunarodni PEN i Reporteri bez granica („intervenirajuće nevladine organizacije”). Predsjednik odjela odobrio je posebnom izvjestitelju i predmetnim organizacijama da se miješaju na temelju članka 36., stavka 2. Konvencije i pravila 44., stavka 3.
Vlada i podnositelj zahtjeva odgovorili su na očitovanja intervenirajućih stranaka.
U dopisu od 18. siječnja 2018. podnositelj je obavijestio Sud da je Ustavni sud donio presudu o njegovom pojedinačnom zahtjevu i da je Porotnički sud u Istanbulu odbacio njegov zahtjev za oslobođenje unatoč tome što je Ustavni sud utvrdio povredu. U dopisu od 19. siječnja 2018. Sud je pozvao Vladu da podnese očitovanja u vezi s tim predmetom. Dana 29. siječnja 2018. Vlada je poslala dodatna očitovanja.
ČINJENICE
I. OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA
11. Podnositelj zahtjeva rođen je 1944. godine. Trenutačno je u pritvoru u Istanbulu.
A. Profesionalna karijera podnositelja zahtjeva
Podnositelj zahtjeva je novinar koji je od 2002. radio za dnevne novine Zaman, koje su se smatrale glavnim medijem za objavljivanje mreže „Gülenist” i koje su ugašene nakon usvajanja zakonodavne uredbe br. 668, donesene 27. srpnja 2016. u vezi s izvanrednim stanjima (vidi stavke 14.–18. u nastavku). Od 2001. godine nadalje predavao je komparativnu politiku i političku povijest Turske na privatnom sveučilištu u Istanbulu.
Tijekom godina koje su prethodile pokušaju vojnog udara 15. srpnja 2016. podnositelj zahtjeva bio je poznat po svojim kritičkim stavovima o vladinoj politici.
B. Pokušaj udara 15. srpnja 2016. i proglašenje izvanrednog stanja
Tijekom noći između 15. i 16. srpnja 2016. skupina pripadnika turskih oružanih snaga pod nazivom „Vijeće za mir u kući”, pokušala je provesti vojni udar s ciljem rušenja demokratski izabranog parlamenta, vlade i predsjednika Turske.
Tijekom pokušaja udara vojnici su pod vodstvom pokretača bombardirali nekoliko strateških državnih objekata, uključujući zgradu parlamenta i predsjedničku palaču, izvršili napad na hotel u kojem je predsjednik boravio, držali načelnika Glavnog stožera kao taoca, napali televizijske kanale i pucali u prosvjednike. Tijekom noći sukoba ubijeno je više od 300 ljudi, a ozlijeđeno ih je više od 2.500.
Dan nakon pokušaja vojnog udara državne su vlasti okrivile mrežu povezanu s Fetullahom Gülenom, građaninom Turske koji živi u Pennsylvaniji (u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama) i koji se smatra vođom terorističke organizacije poznate pod nazivom FETÖ/PDY („Gülenistička teroristička organizacija / paralelna državna struktura”). Odgovarajuća tijela kaznenog progona pokrenula se nekoliko kaznenih istraga u vezi s osumnjičenim pripadnicima te organizacije.
Dana 20. srpnja 2016. vlada je proglasila izvanredno stanje u trajanju od tri mjeseca, s početkom 21. srpnja 2016., a Vijeće ministara kojim upravlja predsjednik naknadno je produljilo izvanredno stanje za dodatna tri mjeseca s posljednjim datumom stupanja na snagu 19. siječnja 2018.
Dana 21. srpnja 2016. turske vlasti obavijestile su Glavnog tajnika Vijeća Europe o derogiranju Konvencije na temelju članka 15.
C. Uhićenje i pritvor podnositelja zahtjeva
Dana 27. srpnja 2016. tijekom jedne od kaznenih istraga pokrenutih u odnosu na osumnjičene pripadnike organizacije FETÖ/PDY podnositelj zahtjeva uhićen je u svojem domu u Istanbulu te je zadržan u policijskom pritvoru.
Dana 30. srpnja 2016. podnositelj zahtjeva ispitan je u Upravi za sigurnost u Istanbulu uz pomoć svojeg odvjetnika. Tijekom ispitivanja podnositelj je zanijekao pripadnost ilegalnoj organizaciji. Kasnije tijekom tog dana javni tužitelj u Istanbulu zatražio je sudski nalog za pritvor podnositelja zahtjeva zbog sumnje na pripadnost ilegalnoj organizaciji.
Istoga je dana nekoliko urednika i kolumnista dnevnih novina Zaman, uključujući podnositelja zahtjeva, dovedeno pred 4. prekršajni sud u Istanbulu. Sudac je ispitao podnositelja o navodnim radnjama i optužbama protiv njega. Podnositelj je naveo da se novinama Zaman pridružio radi izražavanja svojeg mišljenja, da podržava demokratski sustav u skladu s europskim standardima, da je sekularna osoba, da nije bio svjestan opasnosti koju predstavlja pokret Fetullaha Gülena sve do pokušaja vojnog udara 15. srpnja 2016. te da se protivi svakom ugrožavanju demokracije.
Na kraju rasprave, uzevši u obzir sadržaj članaka koje je podnositelj pisao i utvrdivši da je promicao predmetnu terorističku organizaciju čak i nakon 17. prosinca 2013., sudac je naložio njegov pritvor. U vezi s tim napomenuo je da, unatoč tome što je protiv E.D.-a (glavnog urednika novina Zaman) pokrenut kazneni postupak prije vojnog udara, podnositelj je nastavio raditi za te novine i unutar medijske strukture te organizacije. Pri obrazlaganju pritvora podnositelja zahtjeva sudac je uzeo u obzir sljedeće čimbenike: snažne sumnje protiv njega, prirodu navodnog prekršaja i činjenicu da je uvršten u prekršaje iz članka 100., stavka 3. Zakona o kaznenom postupku (ZKP) – takozvanog „kataloga prekršaja”, za koji se pritvaranje osumnjičenika smatra opravdanim u slučaju snažne sumnje, opasnosti od bijega, postojećih dokaza i opasnosti od njihova uništenja te opasnost da se drugom mjerom koja nije pritvor ne bi moglo osigurati podnositeljevo sudjelovanje u kaznenom postupku.
Dana 5. kolovoza 2016. podnositelj je podnio prigovor protiv naloga za pritvor. Tvrdio je da nema opravdanja za njegovo pritvaranje. Osim toga, tvrdio je da zbog svog zdravstvenog stanja ne smije biti uzatvorskim uvjetima u kojima je zadržan. Odlukom od 8. kolovoza 2016. 5. prekršajni sud u Istanbulu odbio je prigovor podnositelja.
Dana 17. listopada 2016. podnositelj je podnio novi zahtjev za puštanje na slobodu. Odlukom od 19. listopada 2016., 10. prekršajni sud odbacio je zahtjev. Sudac je u odluci konkretno naveo kako je utvrđeno da su radi pripreme vojnog udara pokretači morali stvoriti dojam da su predmetni državni vođe diktatori. Prema njegovu mišljenju, članci podnositelja u kojima predsjednika Turske naziva diktatorom i poziva ga da napusti dužnost doprinijeli su toj propagandi.
Dana 10. travnja 2017. državni odvjetnik u Istanbulu podnio je optužnicu pred Porotničkim sudom u Istanbulu u odnosu na nekoliko pojedinaca, uključujući podnositelja, koji su osumnjičeni za sudjelovanje u medijskoj mreži organizacije FETÖ/PDY, a kojom ih se na temelju članaka 309., 311. i 312. u vezi s člankom 220., stavkom 6. Kaznenog zakona („KZ”) konkretno optužuje za pokušaj nasilnog rušenja ustavnog poretka, Velike nacionalne skupštine Turske i vlade, te za prekršaje u ime terorističke organizacije bez članstva. Državni odvjetnik zahtijevao je da se osumnjičenima, uključujući podnositelja, odrede tri doživotne kazne bez mogućnosti pomilovanja i kazna do petnaest godina zatvora. Kao dokaze je podnio šest članaka koje je podnositelj napisao 2013. i 2014. godine.
Državni odvjetnik ustvrdio je da se članci koje su napisali podnositelj i drugi pojedinci optuženi u istom kaznenom postupku protiv vodećih članova medijskog ogranka organizacije FETÖ/PDY ne mogu smatrati izrazom autorova suprotstavljanja vladi ili upućivanja kritike. U predmetu podnositelja državni je odvjetnik tvrdio da su izrazi koje je upotrijebio prešli granicu slobode tiska i povrijedili prava službenih tijela te ugrozili društveni mir i javni red. Državni je odvjetnik utvrdio da je podnositelj u svojim člancima bez oklijevanja pozivao na mogućnost vojnog udara i, ukratko, vršio funkcije u službi interesa predmetne terorističke organizacije.
Tijekom kaznenog postupka podnositelj je zanijekao da je počinio kazneno djelo.
Kazneni je postupak trenutno u tijeku pred 13. porotničkim sudom u Istanbulu.
D. Pojedinačni zahtjev Ustavnom sudu
Dana 8. rujna 2016. podnositelj je podnio pojedinačni zahtjev Ustavnom sudu. Prigovorio je da je pritvoren na temelju svojih članaka i tvrdio da mu je time povrijeđeno pravo na slobodu i sigurnost te pravo na slobodu izražavanja i medija. Osim toga, tvrdio je da je njegovo zdravstveno stanje nekompatibilno s uvjetima u produljenom pritvoru s obzirom na to da boluje od benigne hiperplazije prostate, hiperlipidemije, hiperurikemije, multinodularne gušavosti i apneje za vrijeme spavanja. Na temelju navedenog od Ustavnog je suda zatražio određivanje privremene alternativne mjere umjesto pritvora, čime bi se omogućilo njegovo oslobođenje do suđenja.
Odlukom od 26. listopada 2016. Ustavni sud odbio je primijeniti takvu privremenu mjeru. Pri donošenju te odluke prvo je napomenuo da je zdravlje podnositelja pod redovnim nadzorom od početka pritvora te da se u okviru zatvora u koji je smješten nalazi državna bolnica. U vezi s time napomenuo je da je dana 4. listopada 2016. nakon zahtjeva koji je podnio prethodnog dana u tom smislu, podnositelja osobno pregledao liječnik opće prakse te da je premješten na odjel za urologiju državne bolnice, gdje je podvrgnut liječničkom pregledu 20. listopada 2016. te da mu je sljedeći pregled zakazan za 22. ožujak 2017. U takvim je okolnostima Ustavni sud utvrdio da boravak podnositelja u pritvoru ne predstavlja opasnost po njegov život ili zdravlje. Dodao je da bi u slučaju promjene zdravstvenog stanja ili uvjeta pritvora imao pravo podnijeti dodatni zahtjev za privremenu mjeru kojom bi se osiguralo njegovo oslobođenje.
Dana 1. siječnja 2018. Ustavni sud donio je presudu (br. 2016/16092) u kojoj je s jedanaest glasova prema šest utvrdio da je došlo do povrede prava na slobodu i sigurnost te prava na slobodu izražavanja medija.
U odnosu na podnositeljev prigovor u vezi sa zakonitosti pritvora Ustavni je sud prvo primijetio da dokazi na temelju kojih je određen pritvor uključuju: (i) članak naslova „Kao da je u pitanju vjerski rat” (“Din Savaşıymış”) objavljen 21. prosinca 2013., (ii) članak naslova „Predsjednik ne smije ostati promatrač” (“Cumhurbaşkanı Seyirci Kalamaz”), objavljen 24. prosinca 2013., (iii) članak naslova „Između Erdogana i Zapada” (“Erdoğan ile Batı Arasında”) objavljen 28. prosinca 2013., (iv) članak naslova „Da, zločin i kazna su pojedinačni” (“Evet Suç da Ceza da Şahsidir”) objavljen 8. veljače 2014., (v) članak naslova „Ovaj narod nije praznoglav” (“Bu Millet Bidon Kafalı Değildir”), objavljen 1. ožujka 2014. i (vi) članak naslova „Rješenje je vlada bez Erdoğana” (“Çıkar Yol Erdoğan’sız Hükûmet”), objavljen 29. ožujka 2014. Nakon ispitivanja sadržaja tih članaka Ustavni je sud utvrdio da su se oni uglavnom doticali pitanja povezanih s kaznenim istragama u razdoblju „17.–25. prosinca [2013.]”. U njima je podnositelj izrazio svoje mišljenje da bi članovi vlade koji su uključeni u dotičnu kaznenu istragu trebali biti izvedeni pred lice pravde i da je odgovornost predsjednika i čelnika vladajuće stranke da poduzmu mjere u tom smislu. Tvrdio je da je vladina reakcija na istragu nepravedna. Osim toga, Ustavni je sud primijetio da je podnositelj napisao da, kad bi se predmetna istraga provodila u pogledu osumnjičenih članova organizacije FETÖ/PDY, i njih bi trebalo podvrgnuti kaznenoj istrazi. Međutim, smatrao je da je nepravedno optužiti sve pripadnike Gülenističkog pokreta. Ustavni je sud nadalje primijetio da u predmetnim člancima podnositelj nije tvrdio da vladu treba srušiti nasilno. Naprotiv, tvrdio je da će vladajuća stranka izgubiti sljedeće izbore. Ustavni je sud zaključio i da se na temelju članka objavljenog dan prije pokušaja vojnog udara može zaključiti sa se podnositelj protivio državnom udaru. Smatrao je da je izražavao mišljenja o aktualnoj temi koja su bila slična mišljenjima čelnika opozicije. Prema stajalištu Ustavnog suda, istražna tijela nisu mogla dokazati činjeničnu osnovu koja bi mogla upućivati na to da je podnositelj zahtjeva djelovao u skladu s ciljevima organizacije FETÖ/PDY. Dodao je da se činjenica da je izrazio svoje stavove u novinama Zaman ne može smatrati dostatnom da se zaključi da je podnositelj zahtjeva bio svjestan ciljeva ove organizacije. U skladu s time, zaključio je da u podnositeljevu predmetu nisu dostatno utvrđeni „snažni dokazi da je počinjeno kazneno djelo”. Potom je Ustavni sud ispitao je li došlo do povrede prava na slobodu i sigurnost u smislu članka 15. Ustava (kojim se omogućuje obustava ostvarivanja temeljnih prava i sloboda u slučaju rata, opće mobilizacije, stanja opsade ili izvanrednog stanja). U tom je smislu prvo naveo da u slučaju izvanrednog stanja Ustav omogućuje poduzimanje mjera koje derogiraju jamstva navedena u članku 19. u mjeri u kojoj to zahtijeva određena situacija.. Međutim, primijetio je da bi u slučaju prihvaćanja mogućnosti pritvaranja ljudi bez ikakvih snažnih dokaza da su počinili kazneno djelo, jamstva prava na slobodu i sigurnost bila beznačajna. U skladu s time, smatrao je da je pritvor podnositelja bio nerazmjeran strogim potrebama situacije i da je povrijeđeno njegovo pravo na slobodu i sigurnost, kako je zajamčeno člankom 19. stavkom 3. Ustava.
Zatim, glede prigovora o slobodi izražavanja i medija, Ustavni je sud primijetio da je početni i produljeni pritvor podnositelja na temelju njegovih članaka doveo do uplitanja u ostvarivanje tog prava. Uzimajući u obzir njegove tvrdnje o zakonitosti pritvora, Ustavni je sud smatrao da se u demokratskom društvu takva mjera, koja je rezultirala ozbiljnim posljedicama s obzirom na to da je dovela do lišavanja slobode, ne može smatrati nužnim i razmjernim miješanjem. Nadalje je primijetio da se iz razloga navedenih za donošenje i produljenje pritvora podnositelja ne može jasno utvrditi je li mjera ispunjavala hitnu društvenu potrebu niti zašto je bila potrebna. Naposljetku, utvrdio je da je jasno da bi pritvor podnositelja mogao negativno utjecati na slobodu izražavanja i medija ako se nije temeljio na konkretnim dokazima osim njegovih članaka (vidi stavak 140. presude Ustavnog suda). Glede primjene članka 15. Ustava, pozvao se na svoje zaključke o zakonitosti pritvora (kako je navedeno u stavcima 108.–110. presude Ustavnog suda – vidi gornji stavak 32.) i zaključio da je i u tom smislu došlo do povrede slobode izražavanja i slobode medija kako je sadržano u člancima 26. i 28. Ustava.
Glede podnositeljeva prigovora da su uvjeti u pritvoru bili nekompatibilni s poštovanjem ljudskog dostojanstva, Ustavni je sud primijetio da je imao pristup liječenju primjerenom njegovu stanju u zatvoru u kojem je bio smješten, te je taj prigovor proglasio nedopuštenim kao očigledno neosnovan.
Podnositelj zahtjeva nije podnio tužbeni zahtjev za naknadu na ime nematerijalne štete. U skladu s time, Ustavni mu sud nije dosudio ništa po toj osnovi. Podnositelj je potraživao neodređeni iznos na ime nematerijalne štete koju je navodno pretrpio. Ustavni sud nije utvrdio nikakvu uzročnu vezu između utvrđene povrede i navodne štete u tom smislu te je odbio zahtjev. Međutim, zaključio je da podnositelju treba dodijeliti 2.219,50 turskih lira (TRY – približno 500 eura (EUR)) na ime troškova i izdataka.
Budući da je podnositelj na dan donošenja presude još uvijek bio u pritvoru, Ustavni je sud odlučio prenijeti presudu 13. porotničkom sudu u Istanbulu kako bi poduzeo „odgovarajuće korake”.
E. Reakcija porotničkih sudova u Istanbulu na presudu Ustavnog suda
Dana 11. siječnja 2018. odvjetnik podnositelja podnio je 13.porotničkom sudu u Istanbulu zahtjev za oslobođenje svojeg klijenta.
Istoga je dana 13. porotnički sud u Istanbulu odbacio zahtjev na temelju toga što još nije dobio službenu obavijest o presudi Ustavnog suda.
Dana 12. siječnja 2018., nakon što je primijetio da je presuda Ustavnog suda objavljena na internetskoj stranici, 13. porotnički sud u Istanbulu je proprio motu razmotrio pitanje podnositeljeva pritvora. Prvo je primijetio da je razmatranje osnove pojedinačnog zahtjeva upućenog Ustavnom sudu protiv sudske odluke uključivalo utvrđivanje je li došlo do povrede temeljnih prava kao i primjerenih mjera kojima bi se povreda okončala, a zatim i da Ustavni sud ne može razmatrati osnove za reviziju u kontekstu pojedinačnog zahtjeva te je utvrdio da Ustavni sud nema nadležnost za ocjenjivanje dokaza u spisu predmeta. U tom smislu presuda Ustavnog suda br. 2016/16092 nije bila u skladu sa zakonom te je predstavljala uzurpaciju ovlasti (görev gasbı). Glede učinaka presude Ustavnog suda, Porotnički je sud dodao da se isključivo presude koje su u skladu s Ustavom i zakonom trebaju smatrati konačnima i obvezujućima. Štoviše, primijetio je da je moguće navesti opširnije razloge koji opravdavaju zadržavanje podnositelja zahtjeva u pritvoru i da je spis u tom smislu sadržavao dovoljno dokaza protiv njega. Međutim, to bi dovelo do opasnosti od prejudiciranja predmeta (ihsas-ı rey), s obzirom na to da bi se detaljno obrazlaganje razloga koji opravdavaju produljenje pritvora moglo smatrati izražavanjem mišljenja sudaca prije određivanja osnovanosti slučaja. U skladu s time, Porotnički je sud zaključio da nije moguće prihvatiti presudu Ustavnog suda. Naposljetku, ponovivši da predmetna presuda predstavlja uzurpaciju ovlasti, zaključio je, s dva glasa prema jednom, da nema potrebe za donošenjem odluke o pritvoru podnositelja.
Sudac u manjini naveo je u svom suprotstavljenom mišljenju da se slaže sa zaključkom većine da presuda Ustavnog suda nije u skladu sa zakonom. Međutim, napomenuvši da su presude Ustavnog suda konačne i obvezujuće za Porotnički sud, izrazio je stav da treba naložiti oslobođenje podnositelja.
Dana 12. siječnja 2018. podnositelj je podnio prigovor kako bi ishodio oslobođenje.
Odlukom od 15. siječnja 2018. 14. porotnički sud u Istanbulu jednoglasno je odbacio podnositeljev prigovor, uglavnom na istoj osnovi kao i 13. porotnički sud.
Dana 1. veljače 2018. podnositelj je podnio dodatni pojedinačni zahtjev Ustavnom sudu. Pozivajući se na članke 5., 6., i 18. Ustava, prigovorio je uglavnom da je zadržan u pritvoru unatoč presudi Ustavnog suda od 11. siječnja 2018.
II. MJERODAVNO DOMAĆE PRAVO I PRAKSA
A. Mjerodavne odredbe Ustava
Članak 11. Ustava glasi:
„Odredbe Ustava su temeljna pravna pravila koja obvezuju zakonodavne, izvršne i sudske organe, upravne vlasti te sve druge institucije i pojedince. Zakoni ne smiju biti protivni Ustavu.”
Članak 15. Ustava glasi kako slijedi:
„U slučaju rata, opće mobilizacije, opsade ili izvanrednog stanja, ostvarivanje temeljnih prava i sloboda može biti djelomično ili potpuno obustavljeno ili se mogu poduzeti mjere koje derogiraju jamstva sadržana u Ustavu u mjeri u kojoj to zahtijeva određena situacija, pod uvjetom da se ne krše obveze iz međunarodnog prava.
Čak i u okolnostima navedenima u prvom stavku, ne smije se prekršiti: pravo pojedinca na život, osim u slučaju smrti zbog djela sukladnih ratnim zakonima; pravo na tjelesni i duhovni integritet; sloboda vjeroispovijesti, savjesti i misli ili pravilo da se nitko ne može prisiliti na otkrivanje svojih uvjerenja ili biti okrivljen ili optužen na temelju njih; zabrana retrospektivne kazne; ili pretpostavka o nevinosti optuženika do konačne presude.”
„Svatko ima pravo na osobnu slobodu i sigurnost.
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Pojedinci protiv kojih postoje jake pretpostavke krivnje mogu se pritvoriti samo po nalogu suca i radi sprečavanja bijega ili uništavanja ili izmjene dokaza ili u bilo kojim drugim okolnostima predviđenima zakonom koje također zahtijevaju pritvor. Nitko se ne smije uhititi bez naloga suca, osim ako je uhvaćen in flagrante delicto ili ako bi odgađanje imalo štetan učinak, pri čemu se uvjeti za taj korak utvrđuju zakonom.
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„Svatko ima pravo izraziti svoje misli i mišljenja pojedinačno ili kolektivno te ih širiti usmeno, pisano, putem slike ili na bilo koji drugi način. Ovo pravo također uključuje slobodu primanja ili širenja ideja ili informacija bez uplitanja službenih vlasti. Ovaj stavak ne isključuje nametanje pravila koja se odnose na licenciranje radija, televizije, kinematografije ili drugih sličnih poduzeća.
Ostvarivanje tih sloboda može se ograničiti radi očuvanja nacionalne sigurnosti, javnog reda, javne sigurnosti, temeljnih obilježja Republike i nedjeljivog integriteta države u smislu njezinog teritorija i naroda, s ciljem sprečavanja zločina, kažnjavanja počinitelja kaznenih dijela, sprečavanja otkrivanja informacija obuhvaćenih državnom tajnom, zaštite časti, prava te privatnog i obiteljskog života drugih, kao i profesionalne tajne, kako je predviđeno zakonom, i radi osiguranja ispunjavanja sudbene dužnosti u skladu s njezinom svrhom.”
„Mediji su slobodni i ne smiju se cenzurirati. ...
Država je dužna poduzeti odgovarajuće mjere kojima će osigurati slobodu medija i informiranja. Odredbe članaka 26. i 27. Ustava primjenjuju se u odnosu na ograničavanje slobode medija.
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„Međunarodni ugovori koji su uredno na snazi su pravno obvezujući. Njihova ustavnost ne može se osporiti na Ustavnom sudu. U slučaju sukoba između uredno primjenjivih međunarodnih ugovora o temeljnim pravima i slobodama i domaćih statuta, prevladavaju relevantne odredbe međunarodnih ugovora.”
„Odluke Ustavnog suda su konačne. Odluke koje se odnose na poništenje ne objavljuju se sve dok se ne sastavi obrazloženje.
...
Odluke Ustavnog suda objavljuju se bez odgode u Službenom glasniku i obvezujuće su za zakonodavne, izvršne i sudske organe, upravne vlasti te fizičke i pravne osobe.”
B. Zakon br. 6216 o uspostavi i poslovniku Ustavnog suda
„(1.) Svatko tko tvrdi da je javno tijelo povrijedilo jedno od njegovih ili njezinih temeljnih prava i sloboda koji su zaštićeni Ustavom i osigurani na temelju Europske konvencije o ljudskim pravima i njezinim protokolima koje je Turska ratificirala, može podnijeti zahtjev Ustavnom sudu.
(2) Pojedinačni zahtjev može se podnijeti tek nakon iscrpljenja svih upravnih i sudskih pravnih sredstava predviđenih zakonom u odnosu na mjeru, čin ili nemar koji je predmet žalbe.”
„(1) Nakon ispitivanja osnovanosti donosi se odluka o tome je li došlo do povrede prava podnositelja zahtjeva. Ako se utvrdi da je došlo do povrede, mjere koje će se poduzeti kako bi se uklonila povreda i ispravile njezine posljedice moraju biti navedene u operativnim odredbama odluke. Nije moguće preispitivati primjerenost upravnog akta, niti se može donijeti ikakva odluka koja odgovara toj radnji.
(2) Ako je povreda utvrđena na temelju sudske odluke, spis se šalje nadležnom sudu radi obnove postupka s ciljem da se obustavi povreda i isprave njezine posljedice. Ako nema pravnog interesa za obnovu postupka, podnositelju zahtjeva može se dosuditi naknada ili ga se može pozvati na pokretanje postupka pred odgovarajućim sudom. Sud pred kojim se postupak obnavlja donosi odluku, po mogućnosti na temelju spisa predmeta radi obustavljanja povrede koju je Ustavni sud utvrdio u svojoj odluci i ispravljanja učinaka povrede.”
C. Mjerodavne odredbe Kaznenog zakona („KZ-a”)
„Svatko tko pokuša nasilno srušiti ustavni poredak koji predviđa Ustav Republike Turske ili uspostaviti drugačiji poredak, ili de facto spriječiti njegovu provedbu, bilo u cijelosti ili djelomično, osuđuje se na doživotni zatvor bez mogućnosti pomilovanja.”
„Svatko tko pokuša nasilno srušiti Veliku nacionalnu skupštinu Turske ili spriječiti obavljanje njezinih dužnosti, bilo u cijelosti ili djelomično, osuđuje se na doživotni zatvor bez mogućnosti pomilovanja.”
„Svatko tko pokuša nasilno srušiti Vladu Republike Turske ili spriječiti obavljanje njezinih dužnosti, bilo u cijelosti ili djelomično, osuđuje se na doživotni zatvor bez mogućnosti pomilovanja.”
„Svatko tko izvrši kazneno djelo u ime [nezakonite] organizacije također se osuđuje za pripadanje toj organizaciji, čak i ako on nije član.”
„1. Svatko tko oformi ili vodi organizaciju s ciljem počinjenja kaznenih djela navedenih u četvrtom i petom dijelu ovog poglavlja osuđuje se na zatvorsku kaznu od deset do petnaest godina.
2. Svaki član organizacije iz gornjeg prvog stavka osuđuje se na pet do deset godina zatvora.”
D. Mjerodavne odredbe Zakona o kaznenom postupku („ZKP-a”)
Pritvor se regulira člancima 100. et seq. ZKP-a. U skladu s člankom 100., osoba može biti smještena u pritvor ako postoje činjenični dokazi koji dovode do snažne sumnje da je počinila kazneno djelo i ako je pritvaranje opravdano na jednoj od osnova navedenih u predmetnom članku: ako je osumnjičenik bježao ili postoji rizik da će to učiniti i ako postoji rizik da će osumnjičenik sakriti ili izmijeniti dokaze ili utjecati na svjedoke. Za određena kaznena djela, osobito kaznena djela protiv državne sigurnosti i ustavnog poretka, postojanje snažne sumnje dostatno je opravdanje za pritvor.
Članak 101. ZKP-a predviđa da pritvor nalaže sudac u fazi istrage na zahtjev državnog odvjetnika ili nadležni sud u fazi suđenja, bilo na vlastitu inicijativu ili na zahtjev tužitelja. Drugom sucu ili drugom sudu može se podnijeti prigovor protiv odluka kojima se nalaže ili produljuje pritvor. Te odluke moraju uključivati pravne i činjenične razloge.
U skladu s člankom 108. ZKP-a, tijekom istrage sudac mora ocijeniti pritvor osumnjičenika u redovnim razdobljima koji ne premašuju trideset dana. U istom razdoblju pritvorenik može podnijeti zahtjev za puštanje na slobodu. Tijekom suđenja pitanje pritvora osumnjičenika ocjenjuje nadležni sud na kraju svake rasprave, a u svakom slučaju u razdobljima od najviše trideset dana.
Članak 141. stavak 1., točke (a) i (d) ZKP-a glase kako slijedi:
„Naknadu štete ... od države može potraživati svatko...:
(a) tko je uhićen ili zadržan u pritvoru u uvjetima ili okolnostima koje nisu u skladu sa zakonom;
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(d) tko nije izveden pred sudbeno tijelo u razumnom roku i nije u razumnom roku dobio presudu o osnovanosti, iako je bio zakonito pritvoren tijekom istrage ili suđenja;
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„Tužbeni zahtjev za naknadu štete može se podnijeti u roku od tri mjeseca nakon što je predmetna osoba obaviještena da je odluka ili presuda postala konačna, a u svakom slučaju u roku od godinu dana nakon što je odluka ili presuda postala konačna.”
E. Sudska praksa Ustavnog suda
U odluci od 4. kolovoza 2016. (br. 2016/12) o razrješenju dvojice članova Ustavnog suda i odluci od 20. lipnja 2017. (Aydın Yavuz i drugi, br. 2016/22169) o pritvoru osobe, Ustavni je sud pružio informacije i ocjene o pitanjima koja uključuju pokušaj vojnog udara i njegove posljedice. Iz perspektive ustava proveo je detaljno ispitivanje činjenica koje su dovele do proglašenja izvanrednog stanja. Kao rezultat ispitivanja utvrdio je da je pokušaj vojnog udara predstavljao jasan i ozbiljan napad na ustavna načela prema kojima je suverenost bezuvjetno i bezrezervno povjerena narodu, koji ju je ostvarivao putem ovlaštenih tijela, i da nijedan pojedinac ili tijelo ne smije ostvariti nikakvu državnu ovlast koja ne proizlazi iz Ustava ili iz načela demokracije, vladavine zakona i ljudskih prava. Prema stajalištu Ustavnog suda, pokušaj vojnog udara predstavljao je praktičnu ilustraciju ozbiljnosti prijetnji za demokratski ustavni poredak i ljudska prava. Nakon sažimanja napada izvedenih tijekom noći između 15. i 16. srpnja 2016., naglasio je da je radi procjene ozbiljnosti prijetnje koju predstavlja vojni udar potrebno razmotriti rizike do kojih je moglo doći da udar nije bio spriječen. Utvrdio je da je zbog činjenice da se pokušaj udara dogodio u trenutku kada je Turska bila izložena nasilnom napadu brojnih terorističkih organizacija država postala još ranjivijom te je znatno porasla ugroženost opstanka i postojanja naroda. Ustavni je sud primijetio da u nekim slučajevima država ne može ukloniti prijetnje demokratskom ustavnom poretku, temeljnim pravima i nacionalnoj sigurnosti putem uobičajenih administrativnih postupaka. Stoga može biti potrebno uvesti izvanredne administrativne postupke kao što je izvanredno stanje sve dok te prijetnje ne budu otklonjene. Imajući na umu prijetnje koje su proizašle iz pokušaja vojnog udara od 15. srpnja 2016., Ustavni je sud prihvatio ovlasti Vijeća ministara, kojim upravlja Predsjednik, za donošenje zakonodavnih uredbi o pitanjima koja zahtijevaju izvanredno stanje. U tom je kontekstu naglasio i da je izvanredno stanje privremeni pravni režim u kojem svako uplitanje u temeljna prava mora biti predvidljivo, a cilj je vratiti uobičajeni režim radi zaštite temeljnih prava.
III. OBAVIJEST TURSKE O DEROGIRANJU
„Priopćavam sljedeću obavijest Vlade Republike Turske.
Dana 15. srpnja 2016. u Republici Turskoj održan je pokušaj udara velikih razmjera s ciljem rušenja demokratski izabrane vlade i ustavnog poretka. Taj gnjusni pokušaj osujetili su turska država i narod, ujedinjeno i solidarno. Pokušaj udara i njegove posljedice, zajedno s drugim terorističkim aktivnostima predstavljaju ozbiljnu opasnost za javnu sigurnost i red, te odgovaraju prijetnji opstanku naroda u smislu članka 15. Konvencije o zaštiti ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda.
Republika Turska poduzima odgovarajuće mjere propisane zakonom, u skladu s nacionalnim zakonodavstvom i međunarodnim obvezama. U tom kontekstu, dana 20. srpnja 2016. Vlada Republike Turske proglasila je izvanredno stanje u trajanju od tri mjeseca, u skladu s Ustavom (članak 120.) i Zakonom br. 2935 o izvanrednom stanju (članak 3/1b). ... Odluka je objavljena u Službenom glasniku te ju je odobrila Velika nacionalna skupština Turske 21. srpnja 2016. Stoga izvanredno stanje stupa na snagu od današnjeg datuma. Mjere poduzete u tom postupku mogu uključivati derogiranje obveza na temelju Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda, što je dopušteno u članku 15. Konvencije. Stoga bih htio naglasiti da ovaj dopis predstavlja obavijest u smislu članka 15. Konvencije. Vlada Republike Turske u cijelosti će Vas obavijestiti, glavni tajniče, o mjerama poduzetima u tom smislu. Vlada će vas obavijestiti kada mjere budu obustavljene.
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PRAVO
I. PRETHODNO PITANJE O DEROGIRANJU OD STRANE TURSKE
„1. U vrijeme rata ili drugog izvanrednog stanja koje ugrožava opstanak naroda svaka visoka ugovorna stranka može, u opsegu koji je strogo određen potrebama tih izvanrednih prilika, poduzeti mjere koje derogiraju njezine obveze iz ove Konvencije, uz uvjet da te mjere nisu nespojive s njezinim ostalim obvezama prema međunarodnom pravu.
2. Na temelju te odredbe ne može se derogirati članak 2., osim u pogledu slučajeva smrti prouzročenih zakonitim ratnim radnjama, niti članci 3., 4. (stavak 1.) i 7.
3. Svaka visoka ugovorna stranka koja se posluži tim pravom derogiranja svojih obveza mora Glavnog tajnika Vijeća Europe u cijelosti obavijestiti o mjerama koje je poduzela i o razlozima iz kojih je to učinila. Ona je također dužna obavijestiti Glavnog tajnika Vijeća Europe o prestanku djelovanja tih mjera i o ponovnoj punoj primjeni svih odredaba ove Konvencije.
A. Tvrdnje stranaka
Vlada je ustvrdila da ostvarivanjem prava na derogiranje Konvencije Turska nije prekršila odredbe Konvencije. U tom je kontekstu primijetila da je došlo do izvanrednog stanja koje je ugrožavalo opstanak naroda na temelju rizika koje je izazvao pokušaj vojnog udara i da je nužnost situacije strogo zahtijevala mjere koje su državne vlasti poduzele kao odgovor na izvanredno stanje.
Podnositelj zahtjeva je ustvrdio da se obavijest o derogiranju ne može tumačiti na način da ograniči njegova prava i slobode zbog članaka koje je napisao znatno prije pokušaja vojnog udara.
Povjerenik za ljudska prava pri svojoj intervenciji nije komentirao obavijest o derogiraju Konvencije.
Posebni izvjestitelj ustvrdio je da u slučaju prestanka postojanja okolnosti koje opravdavaju proglašenje izvanrednog stanja, prava pojedinaca više se ne mogu ograničavati u vezi s prethodno spomenutim derogiranjem.
Intervenirajuće nevladine organizacije ustvrdile su da Vlada nije dokazala da postoji izvanredno stanje koje ugrožava opstanak naroda. Osim toga, tvrdile su da se podnositeljev početni i produljeni pritvor ne može smatrati strogom potrebom nužnosti situacije.
B. Ocjena suda
Sud smatra da proizlazi pitanje jesu li uvjeti navedeni u članku 15. Konvencije za ostvarivanje iznimnog prava na derogiranje zadovoljeni u ovome predmetu
U vezi s time, Sud prvo primjećuje da obavijest Turske o derogiranju, u kojoj je navedeno da je izvanredno stanje proglašeno radi rješavanja prijetnje opstanku naroda koju predstavljaju ozbiljne opasnosti proizašle iz pokušaja vojnog udara i drugih terorističkih aktivnosti, ne sadrži izrijekom navedene članke Konvencije koji podliježu derogiranju. Umjesto toga, samo je najavljeno da „poduzete mjere mogu uključivati derogiranje obveza na temelju Konvencije”. Međutim, Sud primjećuje da nijedna stranka nije osporila da je obavijest Turske o derogiranju zadovoljila formalnu pretpostavku navedenu u članku 15., stavku 3. Konvencije, koji se odnosi na cjelovito obavještavanje Glavnog tajnika Vijeća Europe o mjerama koje će se poduzeti u okviru derogiranja Konvencije i o razlozima za te mjere. U skladu s time, spreman je prihvatiti da je ta formalna pretpostavka zadovoljena.
Sud nadalje primjećuje da na temelju članka 15. Konvencije u vrijeme rata ili drugog izvanrednog stanja koje ugrožava opstanak naroda svaka visoka ugovorna stranka može poduzeti mjere koje derogiraju njezine obveze iz ove Konvencije, osim mjera navedenih u stavku 2. tog članka, pod uvjetom su te mjere strogo razmjerne nužnosti situacije i da nisu nespojive s njezinim ostalim obvezama po međunarodnom pravu (vidi Lawless protiv Irske (br. 3), 1. srpnja 1961., stavak 22., str. 55, Serija A br.3).
Sud ponavlja da je svaka država ugovornica sa svojom odgovornosti „za opstanak naroda” dužna odrediti je li taj opstanak ugrožen „izvanrednim stanjem”, i ako je tako, odlučiti koliko će daleko otići u pokušaju otklanjanja izvanrednog stanja (vidi A. i drugi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [VV], br. [VV] 3455/05, stavak 173., ESLJP 2009.). Zbog njihova izravnog i neprekidnog kontakta s nužnosti trenutka, nacionalne vlasti u pravilu su u boljem položaju od međunarodnog suca za donošenje odluke o postojanju takvog izvanrednog stanja te o prirodi i opsegu derogiranja potrebnog da bi se ono otklonilo. U skladu s time, nacionalnim vlastima treba omogućiti široku slobodu procjene glede tih pitanja. Međutim, Sud želi naglasiti da u tom pogledu države ne uživaju neograničene diskrecijske ovlasti. Domaću slobodu procjene prati europski nadzor (vidi Brannigan i McBride protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 26. svibnja 1993., stavak 43., serija A br. 258-B).
U ovom predmetu Sud prima na znanje Vladin stav da pokušaj vojnog udara i njegove posljedice predstavljaju ozbiljnu opasnost demokratskom ustavnom poretku i ljudskim pravima, te odgovaraju ugrožavanju opstanku naroda u smislu članka 15. Konvencije i primjećuje da podnositelj nije osporio tu ocjenu.
Sud primjećuje da je Ustavni sud, nakon što je iz perspektive Ustava razmotrio činjenice koje su dovele do proglašenja izvanrednog stanja, zaključio da pokušaj vojnog udara predstavlja ozbiljno ugrožavanje opstanka i postojanja naroda (vidi stavak 64. gore). S obzirom na zaključke Ustavnog suda i sve ostale materijale koji su mu dostupni, Sud također smatra da je pokušaj vojnog udara otkrio postojanje „izvanrednog slučaja koji ugrožava opstanak naroda” u smislu Konvencije.
Što se tiče pitanja je li nužnost situacije strogo zahtijevala poduzete mjere u ovome predmetu i jesu li one u skladu s ostalim obvezama prema međunarodnom pravu, Sud smatra potrebnim ispitati podnositeljeve prigovore o osnovanosti i to će učiniti u nastavku.
II. PRETHODNI PRIGOVORI VLADE
A. Prigovor na temelju nepodnošenja tužbenog zahtjeva za naknadu
U pogledu podnositeljevih prigovora povezanih s pritvorom, Vlada je tvrdila da mu je tužbeni zahtjev za naknadu bio dostupan na temelju članka 141., stavka 1., točaka (a) i (d) ZKP-a. Tvrdila je da je mogao i trebao podnijeti tužbeni zahtjev za naknadu na osnovi tih odredbi.
Podnositelj je osporio Vladinu tvrdnju. Konkretno je tvrdio da tužbeni zahtjev za naknadu nije nudio razumnu mogućnost uspjeha u smislu ostvarivanja njegova oslobođenja.
Sud ponavlja da pravno sredstvo povezano sa zakonitosti postojeće lišenosti slobode mora nuditi mogućnost oslobođenja kako bi bio učinkovit (vidi Gavril Yosifov protiv Bugarske, br. 74012/01, stavak 40., 6. studenoga 2008., i Mustafa Avci protiv Turske, br. 39322/12, stavak 60., 23. svibnja 2017.). Međutim, primjećuje da pravno sredstvo predviđeno člankom 141. ZKP-a ne može okončati podnositeljevu lišenost slobode.
Sud stoga zaključuje da prigovor koji je Vlada uložila na toj osnovi mora biti odbijen.
B. Prigovor na temelju nepodnošenja pojedinačnog zahtjeva Ustavnom sudu
Pozivajući se uglavnom na zaključke suda u predmetima Uzun protiv Turske ((odl.), br. 10755/13, 30. travnja 2013.) i Mercan protiv Turske ((odl.), br. 56511/16, 8. studenoga 2016.), Vlada je tvrdila da podnositelj nije primijenio pravno sredstvo pojedinačnog zahtjeva Ustavnom sudu.
Podnositelj je odbacio Vladinu tvrdnju.
Sud ponavlja da se usklađenost podnositelja s pretpostavkom o iscrpljenju domaćih pravnih sredstava obično ocjenjuje u odnosu na datum podnošenja zahtjeva Sudu (vidi Baumann protiv Francuske, br. 33592/96, stavak 47., ESLJP 2001-V (izvadci)). Ipak, Sud prihvaća da se posljednja faza određenog pravnog sredstva može ostvariti nakon podnošenja zahtjeva, ali prije nego što se utvrdi njegova dopuštenost (vidi Karoussiotis protiv Portugala, br. 23205/08, stavak 57., ESLJP 2011. (izvadci); Stanka Mirković i drugi protiv Crne Gore, br. 33781/15 i 3 druga predmeta, stavak 48., 7. ožujka 2017.; i Azzolina i drugi protiv Italije, br. 28923/09 i 67599/10, stavak 105., 26. listopada 2017.).
Sud primjećuje da je 8. rujna 2016. podnositelj podnio pojedinačni zahtjev Ustavnom sudu, koji je donio presudu o osnovanosti dana 11. siječnja 2018. (vidi stavke 29. i 31. gore).
U skladu s time, Sud odbija prigovor koji je Vlada uložila.
III. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANKA 5. STAVAKA 1.I 3. KONVENCIJE
„1. Svatko ima pravo na slobodu i na osobnu sigurnost. Nitko se ne smije lišiti slobode, osim u sljedećim slučajevima i u postupku propisanom zakonom:
...
(c) ako je zakonito uhićen ili pritvoren radi dovođenja nadležnoj sudbenoj vlasti kad postoji osnovana sumnja da je počinio kazneno djelo ili kad je razumno vjerovati da je to nužno radi sprječavanja izvršenja kaznenog djela ili bijega nakon njegova počinjenja;
...
3. Svatko uhićen ili pritvoren u uvjetima predviđenim stavkom 1. (c) ovoga članka mora se u najkraćem roku izvesti pred suca, ili pred drugo zakonom određeno tijelo sudbene vlasti, i ima pravo u razumnom roku biti suđen ili pušten na slobodu do suđenja. Puštanje na slobodu može se uvjetovati davanjem jamstva da će ta osoba pristupiti suđenju.”
A. Tvrdnje stranaka
1. Vlada
Pozivajući se na načela utvrđena sudskom praksom Suda u ovom području (citirajući predmete Klass i drugi protiv Njemačke, 6. rujna 1978., Serija A br. 28; Murray protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 28 listopada 1994., Serija A br. 300-A; i İpek i drugi protiv Turske, br. 17019/02 i 30070/02, 3. veljače 2009.), Vlada je prvo ustvrdila da je podnositelj uhićen i smješten u pritvor tijekom kaznene istrage pokrenute s ciljem suzbijanja terorističke organizacije čiji su se pripadnici infiltrirali u državne institucije i medije.
Vlada je na temelju sadržaja prethodno spomenutih članaka koje je podnositelj napisao ustvrdila da je objektivno moguće zaključiti da postoji opravdana sumnja da je počinio kaznena djela za koja je optužen. Na temelju fizičkih dokaza prikupljenih tijekom istrage pokrenut je kazneni postupak protiv nekoliko pojedinaca, uključujući podnositelja zahtjeva; a postupak je u tom trenutku bio u tijeku na Porotničkom sudu u Istanbulu.
Naposljetku, Vlada je ustvrdila da bi podnositeljeve prigovore trebalo ocijeniti s obzirom na obavijest o derogiranju prenesenu dana 21. srpnja 2016. na temelju članka 15. Konvencije.
2. Podnositelj zahtjeva
Podnositelj zahtjeva je tvrdio da ne postoje činjenice ili informacije koje bi objektivnog promatrača uvjerile da je počinio kaznena djela za koja je optužen. Članci koje su državni odvjetnik i Vlada podnijeli kao opravdanje njegova pritvaranja bili su zaštićeni slobodom izražavanja.
Osim toga, podnositelj je naveo da bez obzira na konačnu i obvezujuću presudu kojom je Ustavni sud utvrdio povredu njegova prava na slobodu i sigurnost te na slobodu izražavanja i medija, Porotnički sud u Istanbulu ga je zadržao u pritvoru. U skladu s time, također je u korespondenciji od 18. siječnja 2018. prigovorio da njegov zahtjev podnesen Ustavnom sudu nije doveo do njegova oslobođenja.
3. Treće stranke
(a) Povjerenik za ljudska prava
(b) Posebni izvjestitelj
(c) Intervenirajuće nevladine organizacije
B. Ocjena suda
1. Dopuštenost
Sud primjećuje da je razmotrio i odbio Vladine prigovore da podnositelj nije iscrpio domaća pravna sredstva (vidi stavke 82.–83. i 88. gore).
Sud primjećuje da ti prigovori nisu očigledno neosnovan u smislu članka 35. stavka 3. točke (a) Konvencije i da nisu nedopušten ni po kojoj drugoj osnovi. Stoga ih proglašava dopuštenim.
2. Osnovanost
Sud prvo ponavlja da se člankom 5. Konvencije jamči pravo od primarne važnosti u „demokratskom društvu” u smislu Konvencije, temeljno pravo na slobodu i sigurnost (vidi Assanidze protiv Gruzije [VV], br. 71503/01, stavak 169., ESLJP 2004.-II).
Sve osobe imaju pravo na zaštitu tog prava, dakle prava da ne budu lišene slobode ili da se lišavanje njihove slobode ne nastavi (vidi Weeks protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 2. ožujak 1987., stavak 40., Serija A br. 114), osim u skladu s uvjetima navedenima u stavku 1. članka 5. Konvencije. Popis iznimaka naveden u članku 5., stavku 1. je ograničen (vidi Labita protiv Italije [VV], br. 26772/95, stavak 170., ESLJP 2000.-IV) i samo je usko tumačenje tih iznimaka u skladu s ciljem te odredbe, koji se odnosi na to da se nitko ne smije proizvoljno lišiti slobode (vidi Assanidze, citirano gore, stavak 170.; Al-Jedda protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [VV], br. 27021/08, stavak 99., ESLJP 2011.; i Buzadji protiv Republike Moldavije [VV], br. 23755/07, stavak 84., ESLJP 2016. (izvadci)).
Sud nadalje ponavlja da osoba može biti pritvorena na temelju članka 5. stavka 1. točke (c) Konvencije samo u kontekstu kaznenog postupka, radi dovođenja nadležnoj sudbenoj vlasti kad postoji opravdana sumnja da je počinio kazneno djelo (vidi Jėčius protiv Litve, br. 34578/97, stavak 50., ESLJP 2000-IX; Włoch protiv Poljske, br. 27785/95, stavak 108., ESLJP 2000.-XI; i Poyraz protiv Turske (odl.), br. 21235/11, stavak 53., 17.veljače 2015.). „Osnovanost” sumnje na kojoj se uhićenje mora temeljiti bitan je dio zaštite utvrđene člankom 5. stavkom 1. točkom (c). Osnovana sumnja podrazumijeva postojanje činjenica ili informacija koje bi objektivnog promatrača uvjerile da je dotična osoba možda počinila kazneno djelo. Međutim, što se smatra „osnovanim” ovisi o okolnostima (vidi Fox, Campbell i Hartley protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 30. kolovoza 1990., stavak 32., Serija A br. 182; O’Hara protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, br. 37555/97, stavak 34., ESLJP 2001.-X; Korkmaz i drugi protiv Turske, br. 35979/97, stavak 24., 21. ožujka 2006.; Süleyman Erdem protiv Turske, br. 49574/99, stavak 37., 19. rujna 2006.; i Çiçek protiv Turske (odl.), br. 72774/10, stavak 62., 3. ožujka 2015.).
Sud je također smatrao da se člankom 5. stavkom 1. točkom (c) Konvencije ne pretpostavlja da su istražna tijela u trenutku uhićenja prikupila dovoljno dokaza za podizanje optužnice. Svrha ispitivanja tijekom pritvora na temelju članka 5. stavka 1. točke (c) jest nastavljanje kaznene istrage potvrđivanjem ili otklanjanjem konkretnih sumnji koje su bile osnova za uhićenje. Stoga, činjenice koje izazivaju sumnju ne moraju biti jednake razine kao činjenice potrebne za opravdanje osuđujuće presude ili čak podnošenje kaznene prijave, koje predstavlja sljedeću fazu postupka kaznene istrage (vidi Murray, citirano gore, stavak 55.; Metin protiv Turske (odl.), br. 77479/11, stavak 57., 3. ožujka 2015; i Yüksel i drugi protiv Turske, br. 55835/09 i 2 druga predmeta, stavak 52., 31. svibnja 2016.).
Zadaća je Suda utvrditi jesu li u dotičnom predmetu ispunjeni uvjeti utvrđeni u članku 5. stavku 1. točki (c) Konvencije, uključujući i traženje propisane legitimne svrhe. U tom kontekstu nije uobičajeno da Sud svoju vlastitu ocjenu činjenica zamijeni ocjenom domaćih sudova koji su na boljem položaju za ocjenjivanje predloženih dokaza (vidi Ersöz protiv Turske (odl.), br. 45746/11, stavak 50., 17. veljače 2015., i Mergen i drugi protiv Turske, br. 44062/09 i 4 druga predmeta, stavak 48., 31. svibnja 2016).
U ovom predmetu Sud primjećuje da je podnositelj zahtjeva priveden dana 27. srpnja 2016. zbog sumnje da je pripadnik terorističke organizacije te je smješten u pritvor 30. srpnja 2016. Nadalje primjećuje da je u optužnici podnesenoj 10. travnja 2017. državni odvjetnik u Istanbulu zatražio osudu podnositelja zbog nasilnog pokušaja rušenja ustavnog poretka, Velike nacionalne skupštine Turske i vlade, te za kaznena djela u ime terorističke organizacije bez članstva, kao i da je kazneni postupak u tijeku pred 13. porotničkim sudom u Istanbulu. Osim toga, Sud primjećuje da su tijekom kaznene istrage i suđenja svi podnositeljevi zahtjevi za oslobođenje odbačeni i da je on i dalje u zatvoru.
Sud nadalje primjećuje da je nakon što je podnositelj podnio pojedinačni zahtjev Ustavnom sudu taj sud u presudi od 11. siječnja 2018. koja je objavljena u Službenom glasniku 19. siječnja 2018. utvrdio da istražna tijela nisu mogla dokazati činjeničnu osnovu koja bi mogla upućivati na to da je podnositelj zahtjeva djelovao u skladu s ciljevima organizacije FETÖ/PDY. Na temelju dokaza koje je podnijelo tužiteljstvo, Ustavni sud je zaključio da nema čvrstih naznaka da je podnositelj zahtjeva počinio kaznena djela za koja je optužen. U odnosu na primjenu članka 15. Ustava (kojim se omogućuje obustava ostvarivanja temeljnih prava i sloboda u slučaju rata, opće mobilizacije, stanja opsade ili izvanrednog stanja), zaključio je da bi pravo na slobodu i sigurnost bilo beznačajno kad bi se prihvatilo da se ljudi mogu pritvoriti bez ikakvih snažnih dokaza da su počinili kazneno djelo. Prema stajalištu Ustavnog suda, podnositeljevo lišavanje slobode stoga je bilo nerazmjerno strogim potrebama situacije.
Sud primjećuje da je Ustavni sud utvrdio da je podnositelj smješten i zadržan u pritvoru, čime je došlo do kršenja članka 19. stavka 3. Ustava (vidi stavak 103. presude Ustavnog suda). Smatra da taj zaključak sadržajno odgovara potvrdi da je njegova lišenost slobode protivna članku 5. stavku 1. Konvencije. U konkretnim okolnostima ovog predmeta Sud podržava zaključke Ustavnog suda donesene nakon temeljitog ispitivanja.
Stoga će nadzor Suda biti ograničen na utvrđivanje jesu li nacionalne vlasti pružile odgovarajuće i dostatno ispravljanje utvrđene povrede i jesu li ispunile svoje obveze na temelju članka 5. Konvencije. S tim u vezi Sud primjećuje da, iako je Ustavni sud utvrdio povredu članka 19. stavka 3. Ustava, 13. i 14. porotnički sud u Istanbulu odbili su osloboditi podnositelja pri donošenju konačnog rješenja o njegovu zahtjevu za puštanje na slobodu, pri čemu je 13. porotnički sud konkretno utvrdio da presuda Ustavnog suda nije u skladu sa zakonom i da odgovara uzurpaciji ovlasti.
Sud primjećuje da Ustav i Zakon br. 6216 priznaju nadležnost Ustavnog suda za ispitivanje zahtjeva koje pojedinci podnose nakon iscrpljivanja uobičajenih pravnih sredstava i u kojima tvrde da su povrijeđena njihova temeljna prava i slobode zaštićeni Ustavom i Konvencijom te njezinim protokolima.
Sud primjećuje da je već ispitao pravno sredstvo pojedinačnog zahtjeva Ustavnom sudu na temelju članka 5. Konvencije, konkretno u predmetu Koçintar protiv Turske ((osl.), br. 77429/12, 1. srpnja 2014.). U tom je predmetu nakon ispitivanja dotičnog pravnog sredstva utvrdio da nijedan dostupan materijal ne upućuje na to da pojedinačni zahtjev Ustavnom sudu ne može ishoditi odgovarajuće ispravljanje za prigovor podnositelja na temelju članka 5. Konvencije, ili da ne nudi mogućnost uspjeha. Pri donošenju tog zaključka konkretno je primijetio da Ustavni sud ima nadležnost utvrditi povrede odredbi Konvencije te su mu dodijeljene odgovarajuće ovlasti kojima može osigurati ispravljanje povrede, dosuđivanjem odštete i/ili određivanjem sredstva naknade; u tom smislu Ustavni sud prema potrebi može i treba zabraniti dotičnom tijelu nastavak kršenja predmetnog prava i naložiti mu da vrati, koliko je to moguće, status quo ante (vidi Koçintar, citirano gore, stavak 41.). Sud je primijetio da, u slučajevima kada Ustavni sud utvrdi povredu prava na slobodu zajamčenu člankom 19. Ustava, a podnositelj je zadržan u pritvoru, sud odlučuje prenijeti presudu koja sadrži taj zaključak odgovarajućem sudu kako bi mogao „poduzeti odgovarajuće korake”. Uzimajući u obzir obvezujuću prirodu odluka Ustavnog suda u skladu s člankom 153., stavkom 6. Ustava (na temelju kojeg su takve odluke obvezujuće za sva državna tijela i sve fizičke i pravne osobe), Sud je utvrdio da praktična usklađenost s odlukama tog suda o pojedinačnim zahtjevima u načelu ne bi trebala biti upitna u Turskoj i da nema razloga za sumnju da će se presude u kojima je Ustavni sud utvrdio povredu učinkovito provesti (ibid., stavak 43.).
Kao što je prethodno navedeno (vidi stavke 37.–42.), nakon objave presude Ustavnog suda na internetskoj stranici (vidi stavke 39.–40. gore), 13.porotnički sud u Istanbulu većinski je odbacio podnositeljev zahtjev za oslobođenje, uglavnom zato što je smatrao da Ustavni sud nema nadležnost ocjenjivati dokaze u spisu predmeta. U skladu s time zaključio je da presuda Ustavnog suda nije bila u skladu sa zakonom te je predstavljala uzurpaciju ovlasti. Prema stajalištu Prekršajnog suda, presude Ustavnog suda koje nisu u skladu sa zakonom ne trebaju se smatrati obvezujućima. Dodao je da protiv podnositelja postoji dovoljno dokaza kojima se može opravdati njegovo pritvaranje, ali se ti dokazi ne mogu detaljno obrazložiti pri odlukama o produljenju pritvora, jer bi to dovelo do opasnosti od prejudiciranja predmeta. Naposljetku, budući da je presuda Ustavnog suda predstavljala uzurpaciju ovlasti, zaključio je, s dva glasa prema jednom, da nema potrebe za donošenjem odluke o pritvoru podnositelja.
S obzirom na prethodno navedeno, iz tijeka domaćeg postupka proizlazi da su porotnički sudovi odbili osloboditi podnositelja unatoč tome što je Ustavni sud zaključio da je njegovim pritvaranjem narušeno njegovo pravo na slobodu i sigurnost i slobodu novinarskog izražavanja koju štiti turski Ustav i Konvencija. Sud je stoga pozvan ispitati u kojoj mjeri ta situacija na domaćoj razini utječe na njegovu vlastitu ocjenu prigovora podnositelja zahtjeva na temelju članka 5. stavka 1. Konvencije.
Sud primjećuje da se na temelju turskog zakona mjera pritvora uglavnom regulira člankom 19. Ustava i člankom 100. ZKP-a. S tim u vezi, primjećuje da se ocjenjivanje Ustavnog suda u osnovi provodi sa stajališta članka 19. Ustava, dok kazneni sud razmatra pitanje pritvora pojedinca prvenstveno u odnosu na članak 100. ZKP-a. Stoga ističe da razlozi navedeni u presudi Ustavnog suda i odluci koju je donio 13. porotnički sud upućuju na istodobno postojanje kriterija koje primjenjuju dva suda, osobito u pogledu diskrecije za procjenu dokaza u spisu predmeta. U tom kontekstu, Sud ne može prihvatiti argument 13. porotničkog suda da Ustavni sud nije trebao ocjenjivati dokaze u spisu predmeta. Drugačiji zaključak implicirao bi da je Ustavni sud mogao ispitati prigovor podnositelja o zakonitosti njegova početnog i trajnog pritvora bez razmatranja sadržaja dokaza koji su protiv njega izneseni.
Nadalje, Sud primjećuje da je u ovome predmetu, prije presude Ustavnog suda od 11. siječnja 2018. godine Vlada izrijekom pozvala Sud da odbaci zahtjev podnositelja zbog neiscrpljivanja domaćih pravnih sredstava, s obrazloženjem da je njegov pojedinačni zahtjev Ustavnom sudu još uvijek u tijeku (vidi stavak 84. gore). Taj je argument potvrdio stajalište Vlade da je pojedinačni zahtjev Ustavnom djelotvorno pravno sredstvo u smislu članka 5. Konvencije. Štoviše, takvo je stajalište u skladu sa zaključcima Suda u predmetu Koçintar (citirano gore). Ukratko, Sud smatra da se taj argument Vlade može tumačiti jedino tako da prema turskom zakonu, ako Ustavni sud odluči da se pritvaranjem podnositelja krši Ustav, odgovor sudova nadležnih za odlučivanje o pitanju pritvora nužno mora uključivati oslobađanje podnositelja, osim ako se iznesu nove osnove i dokazi kojima se opravdava produljenje pritvora. Međutim, u ovom je predmetu 13. porotnički sud odbacio zahtjev za oslobođenje podnositelja nakon presude Ustavnog suda od 11. siječnja 2018. tumačenjem i primjenom domaćeg zakona na način koji odstupa od pristupa koji je Vlada opisala pred Sudom.
Kao što Sud redovito potvrđuje, premda nacionalne vlasti, osobito sudovi, imaju prioritet pri tumačenju i primjeni domaćeg prava, na temelju članka 5. stavka 1. nepridržavanje domaćeg prava povlači za sobom povredu Konvencije, a Sud može i stoga treba ocijeniti je li domaći zakon uvažen (vidi Mooren protiv Njemačke [VV], br. 11364/03, članak 73, 9. srpnja 2009.).Štoviše, Sud mora utvrditi je li sam domaći zakon u skladu s Konvencijom, uključujući izražena ili implicirana opća načela. Što se tiče posljednje točke, Sud naglašava da je u pogledu lišavanja slobode posebno važno zadovoljiti opće načelo pravne sigurnosti (ibid., stavak 76.). Kada utvrđuje da svako lišavanje slobode mora biti „zakonito” i biti provedeno „u skladu s postupkom propisanim zakonom”, članak 5. stavak 1. ne odnosi se samo na domaće pravo, primjerice u izrazima „u skladu sa zakonom” i „propisanim zakonom” u drugom stavku članaka 8.–11., odnosi se također i na kvalitetu zakona, pri čemu oni moraju biti u skladu s vladavinom prava, konceptom svojstvenim svim člancima Konvencije. Konačno i nadasve, nikakav proizvoljni pritvor ne može biti u skladu s člankom 5. stavkom 1., pri čemu se pojam „proizvoljnosti” u ovom kontekstu proteže izvan okvira neusklađenosti s nacionalnim pravom. U kontekstu točke (c) članka 5. stavka 1., obrazloženje odluke kojom se nalaže pritvaranje osobe relevantan je čimbenik pri određivanju treba li se pritvor smatrati proizvoljnim (ibid., stavci 77. i 79.).
Sud primjećuje da je u odluci Uzun (citirano gore) već utvrđeno da je tursko zakonodavstvo dokazalo svoju namjeru povjeriti Ustavnom sudu nadležnost za utvrđivanje povreda odredbi Konvencije i odgovarajuće ovlasti za određivanje ispravljanja za takve povrede (vidi Uzun, citirano gore, stavci 62.–64.). Nadalje, u odnosu na prigovore na temelju članka 5. Konvencije, u predmetu Koçintar (citirano gore) Sud je razmotrio prirodu i učinak odluka Ustavnog suda u skladu s turskim Ustavom. Člankom 153., stavkom 1. Ustava utvrđeno je da su presude Ustavnog suda „konačne”. Štoviše, kao što je Sud primijetio u predmetu Koçintar, člankom 153. stavkom 6. propisano je da su odluke Ustavnog suda obvezujuće za zakonodavne, izvršne i sudske organe (vidi, slično, Uzun, citirano gore, stavak 66.). Stoga je prema stajalištu Suda jasno da je Ustavni sud sastavni dio pravosuđa unutar ustavne strukture Turske i da, kako je Sud prethodno primijetio u predmetu Koçintar i kako je Vlada izrijekom ustvrdila pred Sudom u ovom predmetu, igra važnu ulogu u zaštiti slobode i sigurnosti na temelju članka 19. Ustava i članka 5. Konvencije time što nudi učinkovito pravno sredstvo za pojedince u pritvoru tijekom kaznenih postupaka (vidi i Mercan, citirano gore, stavci 17.–30.).
Na toj osnovi i imajući u vidu osobito tvrdnje Vlade glede učinkovitosti pojedinačnog zahtjeva Ustavnom sudu u smislu članka 5. Konvencije, Sud primjećuje da se ne može smatrati da razlozi koje je 13. porotnički sud u Istanbulu naveo pri odbacivanju zahtjeva podnositelja nakon „konačne” i „obvezujuće” presude vrhovne ustavnosudske vlasti, zadovoljavaju pretpostavke članka 5. stavka 1. Konvencije. Ako drugi sud dovodi u pitanje ovlasti dodijeljene ustavnom sudu za donošenje konačnih i obvezujućih presuda o pojedinačnim zahtjevima, protivi se temeljnim načelima vladavine prava i pravne sigurnosti. Sud ponavlja da su ta načela, svojstvena zaštiti osiguranoj člankom 5. Konvencije, kamen temeljac jamstava protiv proizvoljnosti (vidi stavak 116. gore). Iako je Ustavni sud prenio presudu Porotničkom sudu kako bi mogao poduzeti „odgovarajuće korake”, Porotnički se sud opirao Ustavnom sudu odbivši osloboditi podnositelja, što je rezultiralo neispravljanjem povrede koju je utvrdio Ustavni sud. Sud je već naveo (vidi stavak 108. gore) da potvrđuje zaključke koje je Ustavni sud donio u presudi od 11. siječnja 2018. o razdoblju pritvora do dana donošenja presude. Primjećuje da u spisu predmeta nema novih osnova ili dokaza koji bi upućivali na promjenu osnove za pritvor nakon presude Ustavnog suda. U vezi s tim, osobito primjećuje da Vlada nije pokazala da su dokazi koji su navodno dostupni 13. porotničkom sudu u Istanbulu, a koji opravdavaju snažnu sumnju protiv podnositelja zahtjeva, zapravo drugačiji od dokaza koji je ispitivao Ustavni sud. U tom smislu, Sud smatra da se produljenje pritvora podnositelja zahtjeva, nakon što je Ustavni sud donio jasnu i nedvosmislenu presudu kojom je utvrdio povredu članka 19. stavka 3. Ustava, ne može smatrati „zakonitim” i „u skladu s postupkom propisanim zakonom” kao što zahtijeva pravo na slobodu i sigurnost.
Što se tiče derogiranja od strane Turske, Sud primjećuje da je Ustavni sud izrazio svoj stav o primjenjivosti članka 15. turskog Ustava, pri čemu je smatrao da bi jamstva prava na slobodu i sigurnost bila beznačajna u slučaju prihvaćanja mogućnosti pritvaranja ljudi bez ikakvih snažnih dokaza da su počinili kazneno djelo (vidi stavak 109. presude Ustavnog suda). U skladu s time, utvrdio je da je podnositeljevo lišavanje slobode bilo nerazmjerno strogim potrebama situacije. Taj je zaključak valjan i za ispitivanje koje je Sud proveo. S obzirom na članak 15. Konvencije i derogiranje od strane Turske, Sud smatra, kao i Ustavni sud u svojoj presudi, da se mjeru pritvora, koja nije „zakonita” i nije provedena „u skladu s postupkom propisanim zakonom” uslijed nedostatka osnovane sumnje, ne može smatrati strogom potrebom nužnosti situacije (vidi mutatis mutandis, A. i drugi, citirano gore, stavic 182.–190.). U tom kontekstu Sud dodatno primjećuje da Vlada nije iznijela nijedan dokaz kojim bi ga uvjerila da odstupi od zaključka koji je donio Ustavni sud.
S obzirom na gore navedeno, u ovom predmetu došlo je do povrede članka 5. stavka 1. Konvencije.
Sud bi htio naglasiti da produljenje pritvora podnositelja zahtjeva, čak i nakon presude Ustavnog suda, kao rezultat odluka koje je donio 13. porotnički sud u Istanbulu, postavlja ozbiljne sumnje u učinkovitost pravnog sredstva pojedinačnog zahtjeva Ustavnom sudu u predmetima povezanima s pritvorom. Međutim, s obzirom na situaciju, Sud neće odstupiti od prethodnog zaključka da pravo podnošenja pojedinačnog zahtjeva Ustavnom sudu predstavlja učinkovito pravno sredstvo u odnosu na prigovore osoba lišenih slobode na temelju članka 19. Ustava (vidi Koçintar, citirano gore, stavak 44.). Ipak, zadržava pravo ispitati učinkovitost sustava pojedinačnih zahtjeva Ustavnom sudu u odnosu na zahtjeve na temelju članka 5. Konvencije, posebice s obzirom na kasniji razvoj događaja u sudskoj praksi prvostupanjskih sudova, osobito porotničkih sudova, u odnosu na ovlasti presuda Ustavnog suda. S tim u vezi, Vlada će biti dužna dokazati da je ovo pravno sredstvo učinkovito, kako u teoriji tako i u praksi (vidi Uzun, gore citirano, stavak 71.).
S obzirom na zaključak na temelju članka 5. stavka 1. Konvencije o prigovoru podnositelja zahtjeva zbog nedostatka osnovane sumnje da je počinio kazneno djelo, Sud smatra da nije potrebno ispitati jesu li ga vlasti zadržale u pritvor iz razloga koji bi se mogli smatrati „relevantnima” i „dovoljnima” kako bi opravdali njegov početni i produljeni pritvor na temelju članka 5. stavka 3 Konvencije.
IV. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANKA 5. STAVKA 4. KONVENCIJE ZBOG PREDUGOG TRAJANJA POSTUPKA ZBOG NEDOSTATKA BRZE SUDSKE OCJENE USTAVNOG SUDA
„Svatko tko je lišen slobode uhićenjem ili pritvaranjem ima pravo pokrenuti sudski postupak u kojem će se brzo odlučiti o zakonitosti njegova pritvaranja ili o njegovu puštanju na slobodu ako je pritvaranje bilo nezakonito.”
A. Tvrdnje stranaka
1. Vlada
Prije svega, Vlada je tvrdila da turski zakon sadržava dovoljne zakonske zaštitne mjere kojima se pritvorenicima omogućuje učinkovito osporavanje lišenosti slobode. Primijetila je da pritvorenici mogu podnijeti zahtjev za oslobođenje u bilo kojoj fazi istrage ili suđenja i da se protiv svake odluke o odbacivanju tih zahtjeva može podnijeti prigovor. Pitanje produljenog pritvora osumnjičenika automatski se ocjenjuje u redovnim razdobljima od najviše trideset dana. U tom je kontekstu Vlada naglasila da se Ustavni sud ne može smatrati žalbenim sudom u smislu članka 5. stavka 4. Konvencije.
Zatim, pozivajući se na statistiku broja predmeta Ustavnog suda, Vlada je navela da je 2012. godine tom sudu podneseno 1.342 zahtjeva, 2013. godine broj se povisio na 9.897, a 2014. i 2015. godine podneseno je 20.578 i 20.376 zahtjeva. Od pokušaja vojnog udara broj zahtjeva podnesenih Ustavnom sudu drastično se povećao: podneseno je ukupno 103.496 zahtjeva u razdoblju između 15. srpnja 2016. i 9. listopada 2017. Imajući na umu ovaj iznimni broj predmeta Ustavnog suda i obavijest o derogiranju od 21. srpnja 2016., Vlada je ustvrdila da se ne može zaključiti da sud nije usklađen s pretpostavkom „brzine”.
2. Podnositelj zahtjeva
3. Treće stranke
(a) Povjerenik za ljudska prava
(b) Posebni izvjestitelj
(c) Intervenirajuće nevladine organizacije
B. Ocjena suda
1. Dopuštenost
Sud ponavlja da je utvrdio da je članak 5. stavak 4. Konvencije primjenjiv na postupke pred domaćim ustavnim sudovima (vidi Smatana protiv Češke Republike, br. 18642/04, stavci 119.–24., 27. rujna 2007., i Žúbor protiv Slovačke, br. 7711/06, stavci 71.-77., 6. prosinca 2011.). U skladu s time, uzimajući u obzir nadležnost turskog Ustavnog suda (vidi, primjerice, Koçintar, citirano gore, stavci 30.-46.), Sud zaključuje da je članak 5. stavak 4. također primjenjiv na postupke pred tim sudom.
Sud dalje primjećuje da ovaj prigovor nije očigledno neosnovan u smislu članka 35. stavka 3. točke (a) Konvencije niti je nedopušten na kojim drugim osnovama. Stoga se mora proglasiti dopuštenim.
2. Osnovanost
Sud ponavlja da se u članku 5. stavku 4. uz jamstvo pritvorenim osobama prava na pokretanje postupka za osporavanje zakonitosti njihovog pritvaranja, također navodi njihovo pravo, nakon pokretanja takvog postupka, na brzu sudsku odluku o zakonitosti pritvora i naređivanje njegovog prekida ako se pokaže nezakonitim (vidi Mooren, citirano gore, stavak 106., iIdalov protiv Rusije [VV], br. 5826/03, stavak 154., 22. svibnja 2012.).
Pitanje da li se pravo na brzu odluku poštuje mora se – kao što je slučaj s odredbom „razumnog roka” u članku 5. stavku 3. i članku 6., stavku 1. Konvencije – odrediti s obzirom na okolnosti svakog slučaja, uključujući složenost postupka, njegovu provedbu od strane domaćih vlasti i podnositelja zahtjeva i ono što je dovedeno u pitanje za podnositelja (vidi Mooren, citirano gore, stavak 106., s dodatnim referencama; S.T.S. protiv Nizozemske, br. 277/05, stavak 43., ESLJP 2011.; i Shcherbina protiv Rusije, br. 41970/11, stavak 62., 26. lipnja 2014.).
Kako bi se odredilo je li uvažena pretpostavka o „brzom” donošenju odluke, potrebno je izvršiti sveobuhvatnu procjenu kada je postupak proveden na više od jedne razine nadležnosti (vidi Navarra protiv Francuske, 23. studenoga 1993., stavak 28, Serija A br. 273-B, i Mooren, citirano gore, stavak 106.). Kad je izvorno rješenje ili naknadne odluke o produljenju pritvora donio sud (odnosno, nezavisno i nepristrano sudbeno tijelo) u postupku koji pruža odgovarajuća jamstva zakonom propisanog postupka, i kada je domaćim pravom predviđen sustav žalbe, Sud je spreman tolerirati dulja razdoblja preispitivanja u postupku pred drugostupanjskim sudom (vidi Lebedev protiv Rusije, br. 4493/04, stavak 96., 25. listopada 2007., i Shcherbina, citirano gore, stavak 65.). Ova se razmatranja primjenjuju a fortiori na žalbe na temelju članka 5., stavka 4. o postupcima pred ustavnim sudovima koji su bili odvojeni od postupaka pred redovnim sudovima (vidi Žúbor, citirano gore, stavak 89.). U tom kontekstu Sud primjećuje da su postupci pred ustavnim sudovima kao što je turski Ustavni sud posebne prirode. Doduše, Ustavni sud preispituje zakonitost početnog i produljenog pritvora podnositelja zahtjeva. Međutim, pritom ne djeluje kao „četvrtostupanjsko” tijelo nego samo određuje jesu li odluke kojima se određuje početni pritvor ili produljenje pritvora u skladu s Ustavom.
U ovom predmetu Sud primjećuje da je podnositelj podnio pojedinačni zahtjev Ustavnom sudu 8. rujna 2016. Dana 26. listopada 2016. Ustavni je sud odbacio zahtjev podnositelja za privremenu mjeru kojom bi se naložilo njegovo puštanje na slobodu, a konačnu je presudu donio 11. siječnja 2018. Razdoblje koje je trebalo uzeti u obzir stoga je obuhvaćalo šesnaest mjeseci i tri dana.
Sud primjećuje da u turskom pravnom sustavu svatko tko je u pritvoru može podnijeti zahtjev za puštanje na slobodu u bilo kojoj fazi postupka te može uložiti prigovor ako se zahtjev odbaci. Primjećuje da je u ovom predmetu podnositelj podnio nekoliko takvih zahtjeva za oslobođenje, koji su ispitani u skladu s pretpostavkom „brzine” (vidi stavke 23.–24. gore). Osim toga, Sud primjećuje da se pitanje nastavka pritvora osumnjičenika automatski ocjenjuje u redovnim razdobljima od najviše trideset dana (vidi stavak 60. gore). U takvom sustavu Sud može tolerirati dulja razdoblja ocjenjivanja koje provodi Ustavni sud. Ako je početni pritvor ili produljenje pritvora odredio sud u postupku koji pruža odgovarajuća jamstva zakonom propisanog postupka, naknadni postupci pred višim sudovima manje se bave proizvoljnošću, ali osiguravaju dodatna jamstva prvenstveno na temelju procjene prikladnosti produljenog pritvora. Ipak, Sud smatra da se čak i s obzirom na ta načela, u normalnim okolnostima razdoblje od šesnaest mjeseci i tri dana ne može smatrati „brzim” (vidi G.B. protiv Švicarske, br. 27426/95, stavci 28.–39., 30. studenoga 2000.; Khudobin protiv Rusije, br. 59696/00, stavci 115.–124., ESLJP 2006.-XII (izvadci); i Shcherbina, citirano gore, stavci 62.-71.). Međutim, u ovom predmetu Sud primjećuje da je podnositeljev zahtjev Ustavnom sudu bio složen, s obzirom na to da se radilo o prvom u nizu slučajeva u kojima se iznose nova i složena pitanja povezana s pravom na slobodu i sigurnost i slobodu izražavanja u izvanrednom stanju nakon pokušaja vojnog udara. Štoviše, imajući na umu broj predmeta Ustavnog suda nakon proglašenja izvanrednog stanja, Sud primjećuje da se radi o iznimnoj situaciji.
Međutim, taj zaključak ne znači da Ustavni sud ima neograničenu slobodu pri rješavanju sličnih prigovora podnesenih na temelju članka 5. stavka 4. Konvencije. U skladu s člankom 19. Konvencije Sud zadržava svoju krajnju nadzornu nadležnost za prigovore drugih podnositelja zahtjeva, u kojima navode da nakon podnošenja pojedinačnog zahtjeva Ustavnom sudu nisu dobili brzu sudsku odluku o zakonitosti njihovog pritvaranja.
S obzirom na gore navedeno, iako se trajanje od šesnaest mjeseci i tri dana pred Ustavnim sudom ne može opisati kao „brzo” u uobičajenom kontekstu, u specifičnim okolnostima predmeta nije došlo do povrede članka 5. stavka 4. Konvencije.
V. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANKA 5. STAVKA 5. KONVENCIJE
„5. Svatko tko je žrtva uhićenja ili pritvaranja suprotno odredbama ovoga članka ima izvršivo pravo na odštetu.”
Vlada je osporila tvrdnju podnositelja zahtjeva. Navela je da su podnositelju bila dostupna dva pravna sredstva, zahtjev za naknadu od države na temelju članka 141. stavka 1. ZKP-a i pojedinačni zahtjev Ustavnom sudu. Prema njihovoj tvrdnji, putem tih pravnih sredstava moglo se ishoditi ispravljanje u pogledu prigovora o pritvoru podnositelja.
Podnositelj zahtjeva je ustvrdio da pravna sredstva koje je predložila Vlada nisu bili učinkoviti.
Intervenirajuće stranke nisu iznijele nikakve tvrdnje u pogledu ovog prigovora.
Sud ponavlja da pravo na odštetu utvrđeno u članku 5. stavku 5. Konvencije pretpostavlja da je bilo od strane državnog tijela bilo od strane institucija Konvencije utvrđena povreda nekog od preostalih stavaka (vidi N.C. protiv Italije [VV], br. 24952/94, stavak 49., ESLJP 2002.-X). U ovom predmetu preostaje utvrditi je li podnositelj imao mogućnost podnijeti tužbeni zahtjev za naknadu pretrpljene štete.
U mjeri u kojoj se ovaj prigovor odnosi na članak 5. stavak 4. Konvencije, Sud smatra da, s obzirom na nepostojanje zaključka o povredi te odredbe u svojim zaključcima navedenim u gore navedenim stavcima 133.– 139., prigovor je nespojiv ratione materiae s odredbama Konvencije u smislu članka 35. stavka 3. (a) i mora se odbaciti u skladu s člankom 35. stavkom 4.
Sud primjećuje da je već utvrdio povredu članka 5. stavka 1. Što se tiče mogućnosti potraživanja naknade za tu povredu, Sud primjećuje da se člankom 141. ZKP-a specifično ne predviđa tužbeni zahtjev za naknadu štete koju je osoba pretrpjela kao rezultat nedostatka osnovne sumnje da je počinila kazneno djelo. U vezi s time, Vlada na osnovi ove odredbe ZKP-a nije donijela nikakvu sudsku odluku o dodjeli naknade ni za jednu osobu koja je u položaju sličnome podnositelju.
Međutim, Sud smatra da se isto ne može reći za mogućnost potraživanja naknade pred Ustavnim sudom. Ponavlja da je Ustavni sud nadležan za nalaganje ispravljanja u obliku dodjele naknade (vidi stavak 111. gore). Sud dalje primjećuje da je u presudi donesenoj na isti dan kao i presuda u ovom predmetu, a koja se također tiče novinara u pritvoru, Ustavni sud podnositelju dosudio naknadu na ime utvrđenih povreda (zahtjev br. 2016/23672).
Stoga Sud smatra da je podnositelj na raspolaganju imao pravno sredstvo kojim je mogao ishoditi naknadu na ime prigovora na temelju članka 5. stavka 1. Konvencije. Iz toga slijedi da je zahtjev očigledno neosnovan i mora se odbaciti u skladu s člankom 35. stavcima 3 (a) i 4 Konvencije.
VI. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANKA 10. KONVENCIJE
„1. Svatko ima pravo na slobodu izražavanja. To pravo obuhvaća slobodu mišljenja i slobodu primanja i širenja informacija i ideja bez uplitanja javne vlasti i bez obzira na granice. Ovaj članak ne sprječava države da podvrgnu režimu dozvola ustanove koje obavljaju djelatnosti radija ili televizije te kinematografsku djelatnost.
2. Kako ostvarivanje tih sloboda obuhvaća dužnosti i odgovornosti, ono može biti podvrgnuto formalnostima, uvjetima, ograničenjima ili kaznama propisanim zakonom, koji su u demokratskom društvu nužni radi interesa državne sigurnosti, teritorijalne cjelovitosti ili javnog reda i mira, radi sprečavanja nereda ili zločina, radi zaštite zdravlja ili morala, radi zaštite ugleda ili prava drugih, radi sprečavanja odavanja povjerljivih informacija ili radi očuvanja autoriteta i nepristranosti sudbene vlasti.”
A. Tvrdnje stranaka
1. Vlada
Vlada je prije svega tvrdila da se podnositeljev prigovor na temelju članka 10. treba proglasiti nedopuštenim zbog neiscrpljivanja domaćih pravnih sredstava, s obzirom na to da je kazneni postupak koji je protiv njega pokrenut i dalje u tijeku.
Zatim je Vlada ustvrdila da nalog za pritvor podnositelja ne predstavlja miješanje u smislu članka 10. Konvencije jer predmet postupka koji je protiv njega pokrenut nije povezan s njegovim novinarskim aktivnostima. U vezi s time naglasila je da je podnositelj smješten i zadržan u pritvoru na osnovi sumnje za pokušaj nasilnog rušenja ustavnog poretka, Velike nacionalne skupštine Turske i vlade, te za počinjenje kaznenih djela u ime naoružane terorističke organizacije bez članstva.
Vlada je ustvrdila da bi, u slučaju da Sud ipak zaključi da je došlo do miješanja, u svakom slučaju trebao zaključiti da je miješanje bilo „propisano zakonom”, da je provedeno s legitimnim ciljem i da je bilo „potrebno u demokratskom društvu” za postizanje tog cilja, te da je stoga bilo opravdano.
U tom smislu primijetila je da je kazneni postupak protiv podnositelja zahtjeva bio predviđen člankom 309. stavkom 1., člankom 311. stavkom 1. i člankom 314. stavcima 1. i 2. KZ-a. Nadalje, sporno uplitanje imalo je nekoliko ciljeva u smislu drugog stavka iz članka 10. Konvencije, odnosno zaštitu nacionalne sigurnosti ili javne sigurnosti, te sprečavanje nereda i zločina.
Što se tiče pitanja je li miješanje bilo neophodno u demokratskom društvu, Vlada je ustvrdila da su terorističke organizacije, iskorištavanjem raspoloživih mogućnosti u demokratskim sustavima, stvorile brojne naoko zakonite strukture kako bi ostvarile svoje ciljeve. Prema stajalištu Vlade, ne može se smatrati da je kaznena istraga pojedinaca umiješanih u takve strukture povezana s njihovim profesionalnim aktivnostima. S tim u svezi, FETÖ/PDY je složena, sui generis teroristička organizacija koja obavlja aktivnosti pod krinkom zakonitosti. U tom kontekstu, medijski ogranak organizacije FETÖ/PDY prvenstveno je bio usmjeren na legitimiziranje aktivnosti organizacije manipulacijom javnoga mnijenja. Vlada je istaknula da je podnositelj pritvoren u kontekstu takve istrage.
Vlada je nadalje tvrdila da se prava i slobode ne mogu koristiti za rušenje tuđih prava i sloboda. U tom kontekstu, ističući da su uvredljivi članci podnositelja promicali naoružanu terorističku organizaciju i predstavljali poticaj na nasilje, Vlada je smatrala da se upotreba medija kao alata za uništavanje temeljnih sloboda ne može tolerirati. U skladu s time, ustvrdila je da je uplitanje koje je predmet prigovora bilo razmjerno i potrebno u demokratskom društvu.
2. Podnositelj zahtjeva
3. Treće stranke
(a) Povjerenik za ljudska prava
Oslanjajući se uglavnom na zaključke donesene tijekom posjeta Turskoj u travnju i rujnu 2016., Povjerenik za ljudska prava je prije svega primijetio da je u više navrata istaknuo učestalo kršenje slobode izražavanja i slobode medija u Turskoj. Izrazio je stajalište da tursko tužiteljstvo i sudovi tumače antiterorističke zakone u vrlo širokom smislu. Mnogi novinari koji su izrazili neslaganje ili kritiku protiv državnih tijela pritvoreni su isključivo zbog novinarske aktivnosti, bez konkretnih dokaza. Povjerenik za ljudska prava stoga je odbacio tvrdnju Vlade da kazneni postupak pokrenut protiv novinara nije bio povezan s njegovim profesionalnim aktivnostima, utvrdivši da nije vjerodostojna s obzirom na to da su često jedini dokazi koji su uključeni u istražne spise novinara povezani s njihovim novinarskim aktivnostima.
Osim toga, Povjerenik za ljudska prava ustvrdio je da ni pokušaj udara ni opasnosti koje predstavljaju terorističke organizacije ne mogu opravdati mjere koje uključuju ozbiljno uplitanje u slobodu medija, kao što su mjere koje je kritizirao.
(b) Posebni izvjestitelj
Posebni izvjestitelj ustvrdio je da se antiterorističko zakonodavstvo u Turskoj već dugo iskorištava protiv novinara koji izražavaju kritičke stavove o vladinoj politici. Međutim, od proglašenja izvanrednog stanja pravo na slobodu izražavanja dodatno je oslabjelo. Od 15. srpnja 2016. uhićen je 231 novinar, a više od 150 ih je ostalo u zatvoru.
Posebni izvjestitelj tvrdio je da je svako uplitanje protivno članku 10. Konvencije osim ako je „propisano zakonom”. Nije dovoljno da mjera ima osnovu u domaćem pravu, treba uzeti u obzir i kvalitetu zakona. U skladu s time, relevantne osobe trebale su predvidjeti posljedice zakona u svojem predmetu, a domaće pravo mora osigurati određene mjere zaštite od proizvoljnog uplitanja u slobodu izražavanja.
Posebni izvjestitelj je tvrdio da kombinacija činjenica povezanih s kaznenim progonom novinara upućuje na to da državne vlasti pod izlikom suzbijanja terorizma naširoko i proizvoljno suzbijaju slobodu izražavanja kaznenim progonima i pritvorom.
(c) Intervenirajuće nevladine organizacije
B. Ocjena suda
1. Dopuštenost
S obzirom na prigovor Vlade da podnositelj zahtjeva nije iscrpio domaća pravna sredstva jer je kazneni postupak protiv njega još uvijek u tijeku pred domaćim sudovima, Sud smatra da prigovor postavlja pitanja koja su usko povezana s ispitivanjem je li došlo do uplitanja u podnositeljevo ostvarivanje prava na slobodu izražavanja, pa stoga i na ispitivanje osnovanosti njegova prigovora na temelju članka 10. Konvencije. Stoga će Sud analizirati ovo pitanje u kontekstu ispitivanja osnovanosti.
U ovom predmetu Sud primjećuje da je Ustavni sud utvrdio povrede članaka 26. i 28. turskog Ustava zbog podnositeljeva početnog i produljenog pritvora te mu je dosudio naknadu ispravljanjem te povrede. Međutim, unatoč presudi Ustavnog suda nadležni porotnički sud odbacio je podnositeljev zahtjev za oslobođenje. U skladu s time, Sud smatra da presuda nije osigurala primjereno i dostatno ispravljanje podnositelju i nije ga lišila statusa „žrtve”.
Sud dalje primjećuje da ovaj prigovor nije očigledno neosnovan u smislu članka 35. stavka 3. Konvencije niti je nedopušten na kojim drugim osnovama. Stoga se mora proglasiti dopuštenim.
2. Osnovanost
(a) Je li došlo do uplitanja
Sud se ponajprije poziva na svoju sudsku praksu u smislu da će određene okolnosti koje imaju negativni učinak na slobodu izražavanja podnositeljima zahtjeva koji još nisu pravomoćno osuđeni pružiti status žrtava uplitanja u predmetnu slobodu (vidi Dink protiv Turske, br. 2668/07 i 4 druga predmeta, stavak 105., 14. rujna 2010.; Altuğ Taner Akçam protiv Turske, br. 27520/07, stavci 70.–75., 25. listopada 2011.; i Nedim Şener protiv Turske, br. 38270/11, stavak 94., 8. srpnja 2014.).
U ovom predmetu Sud primjećuje da je protiv podnositelja pokrenut kazneni postupak na osnovi sumnje za pokušaj nasilnog rušenja ustavnog poretka, Velike nacionalne skupštine Turske i vlade, te za počinjenje kaznenih djela u ime naoružane terorističke organizacije bez članstva. Kazneni postupak koji je u tom smislu pokrenut protiv podnositelja i dalje je u tijeku, a on je zadržan u pritvoru više od godinu dana i šest mjeseci.
Sud također primjećuje da je u presudi od 11. siječnja 2018. Ustavni sud presudio da je pritvaranje podnositelja na temelju njegovih članaka odgovaralo uplitanju u ostvarivanje njegova prava na slobodu izražavanja i medija. Sud potvrđuje taj konkretni zaključak Ustavnog suda.
S obzirom na presudu Ustavnog suda, Sud smatra da pritvor podnositelja predstavlja „uplitanje” u njegovu slobodu izražavanja u smislu članka 10. Konvencije (vidi Şık protiv. Turske, br. 53413/11, stavak 85., 8. srpnja 2014.).
Iz istih razloga Sud odbija prigovor Vlade o neiscrpljivanju domaćih pravnih sredstava u vezi s prigovorima na temelju članka 10. Konvencije.
(b) Je li uplitanje opravdano
Sud ponavlja da se uplitanjem krši članak 10. Konvencije osim ako zadovoljava pretpostavke drugog stavka tog članka. Stoga preostaje odrediti je li uplitanje utvrđeno u ovom predmetu bilo „propisano zakonom”, je li provedeno s jednim ili više legitimnih ciljeva iz stavka 2. i je li bilo „potrebno u demokratskom društvu” kako bi se ti ciljevi postigli.
S tim u vezi Sud ponavlja da se izrazom „propisano zakonom” u smislu članka 10. stavka 2. prije svega pretpostavlja da sporna mjera mora imati određenu osnovu u domaćem pravu, a također se odnosi i na kvalitetu predmetnog zakona, pri čemu on mora biti dostupan dotičnoj osobi, koja također mora moći predvidjeti njegove posljedice, te mora biti u skladu s vladavinom prava (vidi Müller i drugi protiv Švicarske, 24. svibnja 1988., stavak 29., Serija A br. 133).
U ovom predmetu nijedna stranka nije osporila da je pritvor podnositelja imao pravnu osnovu, u relevantnim odredbama KZ-a i ZKP-a.
Stoga proizlazi pitanje može li tumačenje i primjena odredbi KZ-a umanjiti njihovu dostupnost i predvidljivost. U ovom predmetu, s obzirom na to da je državni odvjetnik pri podizanju optužnice protiv podnositelja zahtjeva i da su suci, odlučivši ga zadržati u pritvoru, protumačili te odredbe kao da se odnose na članke koje je on napisao, Sud smatra da su moguće ozbiljne sumnje u to je li podnositelj zahtjeva mogao predvidjeti početni pritvor koji je protiv njega određen, kao i produljenja pritvora na temelju članaka 309., 311. i 312. u vezi s člankom 220. stavkom 6. KZ-a. Međutim, s obzirom na niže navedene zaključke o nužnosti miješanja, Sud smatra da ne mora rješavati ovo pitanje.
Što se tiče „legitimnog cilja” miješanja, Sud je spreman prihvatiti da je njegova namjera bila spriječiti nered i zločine. Stoga preostaje utvrditi je li miješanje bilo „potrebno” za postizanje tih ciljeva.
U ovom predmetu Sud primjećuje da je Ustavni sud zaključio da podnositeljev početni i produljeni pritvor nakon izražavanja mišljenja predstavlja ozbiljnu mjeru koja se ne može smatrati potrebnim i razmjernim miješanjem u demokratskom društvu u smislu članaka 26. i 28. Ustava. Utvrdivši da predmetni suci nisu dokazali da se lišavanjem podnositelja slobode ispunjava hitna društvena potreba, Ustavni je sud utvrdio da bi pritvor podnositelja mogao negativno utjecati na slobodu izražavanja i medija ako se nije temeljio na konkretnim dokazima osim njegovih članaka (vidi stavak 33. gore).
U okolnostima predmeta Sud ne vidi razlog za donošenje zaključka koji bi bio drugačiji od zaključka Ustavnog suda. U vezi s time, također se poziva na vlastite zaključke na temelju članka 5. stavka 1. Konvencije (vidi stavke 106.–120. gore).
U tom kontekstu Sud primjećuje da su intervenirajuće stranke istaknule prisutnost općenitog problema u Turskoj povezanog s načinom na koji tužiteljstvo i nadležni sudovi tumače antiterorističko zakonodavstvo. Ustvrdile su da se novinari često podvrgavaju ozbiljnim mjerama kao što je pritvor jer se bave pitanjima od javnog interesa. U vezi s time Sud primjećuje da je dosljedno donosio presude prema kojima, u slučajevima kada izraženi stavovi ne predstavljaju poticanje nasilja – drugim riječima, osim ako se zalažu za pribjegavanje nasilnim djelima ili nasilnoj osveti, opravdavaju počinjenje terorističkih aktivnosti radi ostvarivanja ciljeva pripadnika i mogu se tumačiti kao da potiču nasilje usađivanjem duboke i iracionalne mržnje prema određenim pojedincima – države ugovornice ne mogu ograničiti pravo javnosti da o njima bude obaviješteno, čak i u pogledu ciljeva navedenih u članku 10. stavku 2., odnosno zaštite teritorijalnog integriteta ili nacionalne sigurnosti ili sprečavanja nereda ili zločini (vidi Sürek protiv Turske (br.4) [VV], br. 24762/94, stavak 60., 8. srpnja 1999., i Şık,citirano gore, stavak 85.).
Sud je spreman uzeti u obzir okolnosti povezane s predmetima koji su pred njime pokrenuti, osobito probleme s kojima se Turska suočava kao posljedicom vojnog udara. Pokušaj vojnog udara i druge terorističke aktivnosti očigledno su predstavljale veliku prijetnju demokraciji u Turskoj. S tim u vezi, Sud pripisuje znatnu težinu zaključcima Ustavnog suda, koji je između ostalog primijetio da je zbog činjenice da se pokušaj dogodio u trenutku kada je Turska bila izložena nasilnom napadu brojnih terorističkih organizacija država postala još ranjivijom (vidi stavak 64. gore). Međutim, Sud smatra da je jedna od glavnih značajki demokracije mogućnost rješavanja problema javnom raspravom. U više je navrata naglasio da demokracija napreduje u uvjetima slobode izražavanja (vidi, među ostalim izvorima, Ujedinjena Komunistička Partija Turske i drugi protiv Turske, 30. siječnja 1998., stavak 57., Izvješća o presudama i odlukama 1998-I, Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. i Di Stefano protiv Italije [VV], br. 38433/09, stavak 129., ESLJP 2012.; i Stranka za Demokratsko društvo (DTP) i drugi protiv Turske, br. 3840/10 i 6 drugih predmeta, stavak 74., 12. siječnja 2016.). U tom kontekstu, prisutnost „izvanrednog stanja koje ugrožava opstanak naroda” ne smije služiti kao izlika za ograničavanje slobodne političke rasprave, koja predstavlja srž pojma demokratskog društva. Prema stajalištu Suda, čak i u izvanrednom stanju – koje predstavlja, kako je opisao Ustavni sud, zakoniti režim čiji je cilj vratiti uobičajeni režim jamčenjem temeljnih prava (vidi stavak 64. gore) – države ugovornice moraju imati na umu da bi cilj svih poduzetih mjera trebao biti zaštita demokratskog poretka od prijetnji i da je potrebno uložiti maksimalan trud u zaštitu vrijednosti demokratskog društva, kao što su pluralizam, tolerancija i slobodoumlje.
U tom kontekstu Sud smatra da kritiziranje vlade i objava informacija za koje državni vođe smatraju da ugrožavaju nacionalne interese ne bi trebali biti povod za kaznenu prijavu za osobito ozbiljna kaznena djela kao što su pripadnost ili pružanje pomoći terorističkoj organizaciji, pokušaj rušenja vlade ili ustavnog poretka ili širenje terorističke propagande. Štoviše, čak i kada se podigne takva ozbiljna optužnica, pritvor se treba koristiti samo kao krajnja iznimna mjera kada se pokaže da nijedna druga mjera ne može potpuno jamčiti pravilno vođenje postupka. Ako to nije slučaj, tumačenje nacionalnih sudova ne može se smatrati prihvatljivim.
182. Sud dalje smatra da pritvaranje osobe koja je izrazila kritičko mišljenje izaziva niz štetnih učinaka za pritvorenike i za društvo u cjelini, s obzirom na to da primjena mjere koja uključuje lišavanje slobode, kao što je to slučaj u ovom predmetu, neizbježno negativno utječe na slobodu izražavanja zastrašivanjem civilnog društva i ušutkavanjem suprotstavljenih mišljenja (vidi, slično, stavak 140. presude Ustavnog suda). Sud dalje smatra da do takvog negativnog učinka može doći čak i ako se pritvorenik oslobodi optužbi (vidi Şık, citirano gore, stavak 83.).
Naposljetku, u pogledu derogiranja od strane Turske, Sud se poziva na vlastite zaključke iz stavka 119. ove presude. U nedostatku ikakvih snažnih razloga za odstupanje od vlastite ocjene u pogledu primjene članka 15. u odnosu na članak 5. stavak 1. Konvencije, Sud smatra da su ti zaključci valjani i u kontekstu ispitivanja na temelju članka 10.
S obzirom na gore navedeno, Sud zaključuje da je došlo do povrede članka 10. Konvencije.
VII. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANKA 18. KONVENCIJE
„Ograničenja prava i sloboda dopuštena ovom Konvencijom neće se primjenjivati u druge svrhe osim onih za koje su propisana.”
VIII. PRIMJENA ČLANKA 41. KONVENCIJE
„Ako Sud utvrdi da je došlo do povrede Konvencije i dodatnih protokola, a unutarnje pravo zainteresirane visoke ugovorne stranke omogućava samo djelomičnu odštetu, Sud će, prema potrebi, dodijeliti pravednu naknadu povrijeđenoj stranci.”
A. Naknada štete
Podnositelj zahtjeva potražuje 1.000 eura (EUR) na ime nematerijalne štete za svaki dan koji je proveo u pritvoru.
Vlada je ustvrdila da je to potraživanje neutemeljeno i da je traženi iznos prekomjeran.
Sud ponavlja da u kontekstu izvršenja presuda u skladu s člankom 46. Konvencije, presuda kojom utvrdi povredu nameće tuženoj državi zakonsku obvezu na temelju te odredbe da obustavi povredu i da ispravi njezine posljedice tako da se što prije vrati situacija koja je postojala prije povrede. S druge strane, ako nacionalno pravo ne dopušta – ili dopušta samo djelomično – ispravljanje posljedica povrede, članak 41. omogućuje Sudu da oštećenoj stranci dodijeli naknadu koju smatra primjerenom. Slijedi, među ostalim, da presuda kojom Sud utvrđuje povredu Konvencije ili njezinih protokola tuženoj državi nameće zakonitu obvezu koja uključuje ne samo isplatu predmetnim osobama iznosa koji je dodijeljen pravednom naknadom, nego i odabir, koji podliježe nadzoru Vijeća ministara, općenitih i/ili, prema potrebi, pojedinačnih mjera koje će se usvojiti u domaćem pravnom poretku kako bi se obustavila povreda koju je Sud utvrdio i omogućilo ispravljanje njezinih posljedica tako da se što prije vrati situacija koja je postojala prije povrede (vidi Maestri protiv Italije [VV], br. 39748/98, stavak 47., ESLJO 2004.-I; Assanidze, citirano gore, stavak 198.; Ilaşcu i drugi protiv Moldavije i Rusije [VV], br. 48787/99, stavak 487., ESLJP 2004.-VII; i Fatullayev protiv Azarbajdžana, br. 40984/07, stavak 172., 22. travnja 2010.).
Nadalje, iz Konvencije, osobito članka 1., proizlazi da se pri ratificiranju Konvencije države ugovornice obvezuju osigurati usklađenost domaćeg zakonodavstva s Konvencijom. Slijedom toga, tužena država dužna je ukloniti sve prepreke u svom domaćem pravnom sustavu koje bi mogle spriječiti odgovarajuće ispravljanje situacije podnositelja zahtjeva (vidi Maestri, citirano gore, stavak 47. i Assanidze, citirano gore, stavak 199.).
U ovom predmetu, što se tiče nematerijalne štete, Sud smatra da je povredom Konvencije podnositelju neosporno nanesena znatna šteta. U skladu s time, procjenjujući na pravičnoj osnovi, Sud smatra primjerenim podnositelju dodijeliti 21.500 EUR na ime naknade nematerijalne štete.
Što se tiče mjera koje bi tužena država trebala usvojiti (vidi stavak 189. gore), s koje podliježu nadzoru Vijeća ministara, kako bi se obustavila povreda, Sud ponavlja da su njegove presude uglavnom deklarativne prirode i da je općenito dotična država prvenstveno zadužena za odabir sredstava koja će se koristiti u njezinom domaćem pravnom poretku radi ispunjavanja zakonske obveze na temelju članka 46. Konvencije, pod uvjetom da su takva sredstva u skladu sa zaključcima navedenim u presudi Suda. Ova diskrecija glede načina izvršenja presude odražava slobodu izbora koja se pridaje primarnoj obvezi država ugovornica na temelju Konvencije da osiguraju zajamčena prava i slobode (vidi, među ostalim izvorima, Fatullayev, citirano gore, stavak 173., i citirana sudska praksa).
Ipak, ako je priroda utvrđene povrede takva da ne dopušta nikakav izbor u pogledu mjera potrebnih za njezino otklanjanje, Sud može odrediti samo jednu pojedinačnu mjeru, kao što je to učinio u predmetu Assanidze (citirano gore, stavci 202.–203.), Ilaşcu i drugi (citirano gore, stavak 490.); Aleksanyan protiv Rusije (br. 46468/06, stavci 239.-240., 22. prosinca 2008.); Fatullayev (citirano gore, stavci 176.–177.); i Del Río Prada protiv Španjolske ([VV], br. 42750/09, stavci 138.–139., ESLJP 2013.). S obzirom na svoj pristup u tim predmetima, smatra da bi svako produljenje podnositeljeva pritvora u ovom predmetu podrazumijevalo produljenje povrede članka 5. stavka 1. i kršenje obveza tuženih država o pridržavanju presude Suda u skladu s člankom 46. stavkom 1. Konvencije.
Prema tome, imajući u vidu posebne okolnosti predmeta, razloge za utvrđivanje povrede i hitnu potrebu za obustavljanjem povrede članka 5. stavka 1. Konvencije, Sud smatra da tužena država mora osigurati prekid pritvora podnositelja zahtjeva na najraniji mogući datum.
B. Troškovi i izdaci
C. Zatezna kamata
IZ TIH RAZLOGA SUD
Osnovanosti dodaje, većinom glasova, prethodni prigovor o neiscrpljivanju domaćih pravnih sredstava u vezi s prigovorom na temelju članka 10. Konvencije i odbija ga.
Proglašava, većinom glasova, zahtjev dopuštenim u odnosu na prigovore na temelju članka 5. stavaka 1., 3. i 4. i članka 10. Konvencije.
Proglašava nedopuštenim, jednoglasno, prigovor na temelju članka 5. stavka 5. Konvencije.
Presuđuje, sa šest glasova prema jednom, da je došlo do povrede članka 5. stavka 1. Konvencije.
Jednoglasno presuđuje da nije potrebno zasebno ispitati prigovor na temelju članka 5. stavka 3. Konvencije.
Jednoglasno presuđuje da nije došlo do povrede članka 5. stavka 4. Konvencije.
Presuđuje, sa šest glasova prema jednom, da je došlo do povrede članka 10. Konvencije.
Jednoglasno presuđuje kako nema potrebe zasebno ispitati prigovor na temelju članka 18. Konvencije.
Presuđuje, sa šest glasova prema jednom,
(a) da je tužena država dužna poduzeti sve potrebne mjere kako bi prekinula pritvor podnositelja;
(b) da tužena država treba isplatiti podnositelju zahtjeva, u roku od tri mjeseca od datuma kada presuda postane konačna u skladu s člankom 44. stavkom 2. Konvencije, 21.500,00 eura (EUR) (dvadesetjednu tisuću petsto eura), na ime nematerijalne štete, koje je potrebno preračunati u valutu tužene države po tečajnoj stopi važećoj na dan namirenja, uz sve poreze koji bi mogli biti obračunati.
(c) da se od proteka prethodno navedena tri mjeseca do namirenja na prethodno spomenute iznose plaća obična kamata prema stopi koja je jednaka najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Europske središnje banke tijekom razdoblja neplaćanja, uvećanoj za tri postotna poena;
Sastavljeno na francuskom jeziku i otpravljeno u pisanom obliku 20. ožujka 2018. godine u skladu s pravilom 77. stavcima 2. i 3. Poslovnika Suda.
Stanley Naismith | Robert Spano |
Tajnik | Predsjednica |
U skladu s člankom 45. stavkom 2. Konvencije i člankom 74. stavkom 2. Poslovnika Suda, ovoj se presudi prilažu sljedeća posebna mišljenja:
(a) Suglasno mišljenje suca Spana kojem su se priključili suci Bianku, Vučinić, Lemmens i Griţco;
(b) Djelomično izdvojeno mišljenje suca Ergüla.
R.S.
S.H.N.
SUGLASNO MIŠLJENJE SUCA SPANA KOJEM SU SE PRIKLJUČILI SUCI BIANKU, VUČINIĆ, LEMMENS I GRIŢCO;
1. Sud danas donosi važne presude o osnovanosti predmeta koje su pokrenula dva istaknuta novinara pritvorena u Turskoj nakon pokušaja državnog udara od 15. srpnja 2016. Slažem se sa svakom riječi snažnog obrazloženja Suda. Međutim, pišem zasebno kako bih komentirao tvrdnje koje je iznio ad hoc nacionalni sudac u izdvojenom mišljenju, s kojim se uz dužno poštovanje ne slažem, osobito s njegovim stavovima o načelu supsidijarnosti (vidi konkretno stavke 2, 21., 23. i 24. njegova mišljenja).
2. Načelo supsidijarnosti obuhvaća normu distribucije ovlasti između Suda i država članica, s krajnjim ciljem da se svakoj osobi u nadležnosti države osiguraju prava i slobode predviđeni Konvencijom. Važno je napomenuti da svakodnevna odgovornost zaštite prava iz Konvencije nije povjerena Sudu u Strasbourgu, nego državama članicama. Drugim riječima, u skladu s člankom 1. Konvencije, nacionalne vlasti glavni su jamci ljudskih prava, pri čemu podliježu nadzoru Suda. Kada države članice ispunjavaju svoju ulogu iz Konvencije primjenjujući u dobroj vjeri opća načela koja proizlaze iz sudske prakse Suda, načelo supsidijarnosti podrazumijeva da Sud može prihvatiti njihove zaključke u određenom slučaju. Stoga, njegov je cilj potaknuti nacionalne vlasti na ispunjavanje obveza zaštite prava iz Konvencije, i podizanja cjelokupne razine zaštite ljudskih prava u europskom pravnom prostoru.
3. Ovlasti i nadležnost Suda utvrđene su u člancima 19. i 32. Konvencije. Sud je konačni arbitar opsega i sadržaja Konvencije. Države članice svojim djelima, osobito obrazloženjima koja daju nacionalni sudovi, pokazuju hoće li doći do prihvaćanja na temelju načela supsidijarnosti. Slijedi da operacionalizacija načela prema procesno usmjerenom ocjenjivanju donošenja odluka na domaćoj razini unutar konceptualnog okvira doktrine o slobodnoj procjeni ni na koji način ne ograničava nadležnost Suda za krajnju ocjenu materijalnih zaključaka na nacionalnoj razini u fazi primjene načela Konvencije ukorijenjenih u domaće pravne sustave. Kratko i jasno, rigidna i koherentna primjena načela supsidijarnosti od strane Suda nema nikakve veze s oduzimanjem ovlasti Suda.
4. Štoviše, kao što je izravno jasno iz sadržaja članka 15. Konvencije, ta se načela primjenjuju jednako u slučajevima kada je država suočena s izvanrednim stanjem koji ugrožava opstanak naroda. Takva situacija državama ne omogućuje neograničene ovlasti. Drugim riječima, izvanredno stanje ne predstavlja otvoreni poziv državama članicama da urušavaju temelje demokratskog društva zasnovanog na vladavini prava i zaštiti ljudskih prava. Isključivo mjere koje su strogo u skladu s potrebama situacije mogu se opravdati na temelju Konvencije, a Sud donosi krajnju presudu na europskoj razini o tome je li opravdanje primjereno potkrijepljeno činjenicama.
5. Konačno, države članice imaju obvezu međunarodnog prava, koja je izražena u članku 46. Konvencije, da izvrše presude koje je donio Sud. Kada država odluči svima u okviru svoje nadležnosti osigurati prava i slobode zajamčene Konvencijom, a istodobno odluči pridružiti se nadležnosti Suda, ta obveza izvršenja presuda Suda postaje obavezna i bez iznimke. Slijedi da su nadležna turska tijela dužna točno i brzo provesti današnje presude pod nadzorom Vijeća ministara na način koji je u skladu s obvezama Turske na temelju Konvencije.
DJELOMIČNO IZDVOJENO MIŠLJENJE SUCA ERGÜLA
(Prijevod)
I
1. U potpunosti se slažem sa zaključkom svojih kolega da prigovori o povredama članka 5. stavaka 3., 4. i 5. i članka 18. Konvencije trebaju biti odbačeni kao nedopušteni ili kao da ne otkrivaju nikakvu povredu ili iz bilo kojeg drugog razloga navedenog u presudi. Međutim, nažalost se ne mogu pridružiti većini Suda u mišljenju da su članak 5. stavak 1. i članak 10. Konvencije dopušteni i da su prekršeni. Stoga se ne slažem s mišljenjem većine po pitanju povrede iz dva razloga, jedan se odnosi na dopuštenost, a drugi na osnovanost.
2. Što se tiče dopuštenosti, prvo moram ponoviti jasno utvrđena načela i rješenja iz sudske prakse iz ovog područja. Članak 35. Europske konvencije o ljudskim pravima glasi: „Sud može razmotriti predmet tek nakon što se iscrpe sva domaća pravna sredstva ...” Iz toga slijedi da su domaći sudovi u sustavu Konvencije redovni sudovi u odnosu na zakon Konvencije. Njima se povjerava primarna odgovornost za provođenje prava koje Konvencija štiti. To je jednako načelu supsidijarnosti, koje služi kao temelj Konvencije (Frédéric Sudre, Droit européen et international des droits de l’homme, 9. izdanje, PUF, Pariz 2008, str. 204). Sud je više navrata istaknuo da je „zaštitni mehanizam uspostavljen Konvencijom supsidijaran nacionalnim sustavima za zaštitu ljudskih prava (vidi Handyside protiv Ujedinjene Kraljevine, 7. prosinca 1976., serija A br. 24Vučković i drugi protiv Srbije (prethodni prigovor) [VV], br. 17153/11 i 29 drugih, stavci 69-70, 25. ožujka 2014.; i Brusco protiv Italije (odl.), br. 69789/01, ESLJP 2001-IX). Konvencija odgovornost uživanja prava i sloboda koje štiti primarno predviđa za nacionalne vlasti, točnije, sudovima s nadležnosti za pitanja koja se odnose na Konvenciju. Konvencija stoga ima sekundarnu narav u odnosu na nacionalno zakonodavstvo, a njena temeljna pravila ni na koji način nisu namijenjena kao zamjena za pravila iz domaćeg prava. To se pravilo temelji na pretpostavci, koja se odražava u članku 13. Konvencije, s kojom je blisko povezana, da postoji djelotvorno pravno sredstvo u vezi s navodnim kršenjem u domaćem sustavu. Na taj način, to je važan aspekt načela da je zaštitni mehanizam koji se uspostavlja Konvencijom supsidijaran nacionalnim sustavima koji štite ljudska prava (vidi Vučković i drugi, citirano gore, stavci 69.-70. i Brusco, citirano gore).
3. Prema sudskoj praksi ovog Suda, u pravnom sustavu namijenjenom zaštiti temeljnih prava i sloboda, odgovornost je oštećene osobe ispitivanje opsega takve zaštite (vidi Mirazović protiv Bosne i Hercegovine (odl.), br. 13628/03, 16. svibnja 2006. i Independent News and Media i Independent Newspapers Ireland Limited protiv Irske (odl.), br. 55120/00, 19. lipnja 2003.). Nadalje, usklađenost podnositelja s pretpostavkom o iscrpljenju domaćih pravnih sredstava obično se ocjenjuje u odnosu na datum podnošenja zahtjeva Sudu (vidi Baumann protiv Francuske, br. 33592/96, stavak 47., ESLJP 2001.-V (izvadci)). Ipak, u određenim iznimnim slučajevima „Sud prihvaća da se posljednja faza takvih pravnih sredstava može ostvariti ubrzo nakon podnošenja zahtjeva, ali prije nego što se utvrdi njegova dopuštenost” (vidi Karoussiotis protiv Portugala, br. 23205/08, stavak 57., ESLJP 2011. (izvadci)). Nadalje, u skladu sa sudskom praksom ovog Suda, postojanje samo sumnje u izglede za uspjeh određenog pravnog lijeka koje nije očigledno uzaludno nije dovoljan razlog za propust iskorištavanja domaćih pravnih sredstava (vidi Vučković i drugi, gore citirano, stavak 74.). Prema mom mišljenju, posljednje bi se navedeno načelo moralo primjenjivati mutatis mutandis na situaciju gdje je podnositelj zahtjeva podnio Sudu zahtjev dok je njegov predmet bio na čekanju kod domaćeg suda uz mogućnost učinkovitog pravnog sredstva.
4. Što se tiče pojedinačnog zahtjeva Ustavnom sudu, Sud je već ustvrdio da „ne vidi razloga sumnjati u namjeru zakonodavstva, što se očituje u izvješću s obrazloženjem o ustavnim amandmanima..., kako bi se osigurala identična zaštita onoj koja se pruža zaštitnim mehanizmima Konvencije: U zakonu br. 6216 izričito se navodi da nadležnost turskog Ustavnog suda ratione materiae obuhvaća temeljna prava i slobode koje štiti Europska konvencija o ljudskim pravima i njezini protokoli te da se ta prava i slobode nalaze i u samom turskom ustavu” (vidi Uzun protiv Turske (odl.), br. 10755/13, stavak 62., 30. travnja 2013.).
5. U ovom predmetu podnositelj je podnio pojedinačni zahtjev Ustavnom sudu 8. rujna 2016. Također je podnio zahtjev Europskom sudu dana 28. veljače 2017., na temelju članka 34. Konvencije, dok je njegov zahtjev i dalje bio u tijeku pred Ustavnim sudom. Dana 11. siječnja 2018. Ustavni sud donio je presudu u kojoj je s jedanaest glasova prema šest utvrdio da je došlo do povrede prava na slobodu i sigurnost te prava na slobodu izražavanja medija. Stoga, podnositelj zahtjeva nije čekao na rješenje svojeg pojedinačnog zahtjeva Ustavnom sudu.
II
6. Pregled ovog predmeta u svjetlu gore navedenih načela otkriva, prvo, da podnositelj zahtjeva nije ispunio pretpostavku iscrpljivanja domaćih pravnih sredstava. Nadalje, prema mojem mišljenju, pristup iz predmeta Karoussiotis protiv Portugala i drugih predmeta navedenih u presudi ne može se primijeniti na ovaj predmet. Ovaj predmet uključuje specifičan pravni sustav za zaštitu temeljnih prava i sloboda, a pojedinačni zahtjevi Ustavnom sudu Turske smatraju se djelotvornim pravnim sredstvima koja se moraju iskoristiti prije prijave Sudu, što je stav kojeg se Sud dosljedno držao (vidi Uzun, gore citirano, iMercan protiv Turske (odl.), br. 56511/16, 8. studeni 2016.).
7. Nadalje, ispitivanje Europskog suda u vezi s ovim predmetom ne može dovesti do utvrđivanja da je Ustavni sud donio presudu i da su stoga iscrpljena domaća pravna sredstva. Umjesto toga, budući da je presuda Ustavnog suda bila u korist podnositelja zahtjeva, više nije mogao tvrditi da je „žrtva” u smislu članka 34. Konvencije u ovom predmetu. Tako je Sud dosljedno izražavao svoja stajališta, „ako su nacionalne vlasti utvrdile povredu, a njihova odluka predstavlja odgovarajuće i dovoljno ispravljanje, osoba na koju se to odnosi više ne može tvrditi da je žrtva u smislu članka 34. Konvencije” i „ako su ta dva uvjeta ispunjena, supsidijarnost zaštitnog mehanizma Konvencije isključuje ispitivanje od strane Suda” (vidi Eckle protiv Njemačke, 15. srpnja 1982., stavci 64.-70., serija A br. 51; Caraher protiv Ujedinjene Kraljevine (odl.), br. 24520/94, ESLJP 2000-I; Hay protiv Ujedinjene Kraljevine (odl.), br. 41894/98, ESLJP 2000-XI; Cataldo protiv Italije (odl.), br. 45656/99, ESLJP 2004-VI, Göktepe protiv Turske (odl.), br. 64731/01, 26. travnja 2005.; i Yüksel protiv Turske (odl.), br. 51902/08, stavak 46, 9. travnja 2013.).
8. Što se tiče odluka porotničkih sudova kojima se odbija oslobađanje podnositelja zahtjeva nakon presude Ustavnog suda, on će sigurno imati pravo podnijeti zahtjev Sudu ponovo nakon što Ustavni sud donese presudu o odbijanju porotničkih sudova. Doista, 30. siječnja 2018. podnositelj zahtjeva podnio je novi pojedinačni zahtjev Ustavnom sudu, pozivajući se na članke 5., 6. i 18. Konvencije te uglavnom uložio prigovor o produljenom pritvoru prije suđenja unatoč presudi Ustavnog suda od 11. siječnja 2018. godine. Ustavni je sud odlučio tretirati zahtjev podnositelja zahtjeva kao prioritet.
9. Stoga me argumenti većine za pravdanje svojih stajališta u ovom predmetu nisu uvjerili da se dosadašnja sudska praksa i jasno utvrđena načela koja su gore navedena moraju zanemariti. Stoga ne vidim razlog za odstupanje od gore navedene sudske prakse i općenitih načela u ovom predmetu.
10. U skladu s preambulom Ustava Republike Turske: „S obzirom na apsolutnu vrhovnu vlast volje naroda, suverenost se potpuno i bezuvjetno stavlja u turski narod, a niti jedan pojedinac niti tijelo ovlašteno za ostvarivanje takvog suvereniteta u ime naroda ne smije ometati liberalnu demokraciju sadržanu u Ustavu ili pravni poredak uspostavljen u skladu sa zahtjevima za njegovo provođenje”. Navedena načela iz preambule odgovaraju načelima demokracije, vladavine prava i zaštite ljudskih prava navedenih u preambuli Statuta Vijeća Europe, u kojem je Turska jedan od osnivača. Nažalost, 15. srpnja 2016. pokušaj državnog udara u Turskoj prekršio je ta načela i njime se željelo suzbiti temeljna prava i slobode i zanemariti volju naroda.
III.
11. Što se tiče osnovanosti, prvo bih želio naglasiti opseg i ozbiljnost prijetnje Turskoj tijekom noći 15. srpnja 2016. Tijekom nje se odvio krvavi pokušaj vojnog udara članova terorističke organizacije sui generis koja se infiltrirala u sva područja društva i državnog aparata. Nikada nije bilo tako ozbiljne prijetnje opstanku naroda, demokracije i temeljnih prava u bilo kojoj od država potpisnica Europske konvencije o ljudskim pravima.
12. Tijekom noći između 15. i 16. srpnja 2016. skupina pripadnika turskih oružanih snaga povezanih s terorističkom organizacijom poznatom kao FETÖ/PDY („Gülenistička teroristička organizacija / paralelna društvena struktura”) pokušala je provesti vojni udar s ciljem rušenja demokratski izabrane vlade i predsjednika Turske i okončavanja demokracije. Ta je organizacija već proglašena terorističkom organizacijom odlukom suda i u savjetodavnoj odluci Vijeća za nacionalnu sigurnost. Pokretači udara izdali su priopćenje u ime „Vijeća za mir kod kuće”, objavivši da je na snazi izvanredno stanje i policijski sat na čitavom državnom području. Također su izjavili da je Velika nacionalna skupština Turske zbačena s vlasti, da su sve aktivnosti političkih stranaka prekinute i da je policija pod kontrolom zapovjednika u skladu s izvanrednim stanjem.
13. S pomoću helikoptera i borbenih zrakoplova, pokretači vojnog udara napadali su i bombardirali veliki broj lokacija, uključujući zgradu Velike nacionalne skupštine Turske, predsjedničku bazu, sjedište Uprave za sigurnost, Zapovjedništvo za posebne operacije nacionalne policije i sjedište Nacionalne obavještajne organizacije u glavnom gradu, Ankari. Napali su i hotel u kojem je Predsjednik odsjedao. Nekoliko visokih vojnih časnika, uključujući načelnika Glavnog stožera i zapovjednika oružanih snaga, uzeti su kao taoci. Osim toga, mostovi nad Bosporom koji povezuju Europu i Aziju bili su blokirani, kao i zračne luke u Istanbulu, s pomoću tenkova i oklopnih vozila. Mnoge javne institucije na mjestima diljem zemlje bile su okupirane ili ih se pokušalo okupirati. Tijekom pokušaja državnog udara napadnute su različite institucije i organizacije, kao što je tvrtka Türksat za satelitske komunikacije i kabelsku televiziju, s ciljem prekida televizijskih prijenosa i pristupa internetu diljem zemlje. Okupirane su lokacije određenih privatnih televizijskih postaja i pokušalo se prekinuti njihove prijenose.
14. Pokušaj državnog udara odbili su predstavnici svih ustavnih tijela, u prvom redu predsjednik i premijer te Ustavni sud. Na predsjednikov nagovor, ljudi su se okupili na ulicama i javnim trgovima s ciljem djelovanja protiv vođa državnog udara. Snage sigurnosti, djelujući prema zapovijedima i uputama legitimne vlasti, poduzele su korake kako bi se suprotstavile pokušaju državnog udara. Sve političke stranke zastupljene u Velikoj nacionalnoj skupštini Turske, zajedno s organizacijama civilnoga društva, osudile su uznemirujući pokušaj državnog udara i izjavile da neće prihvatiti nikakvu nedemokratsku vladu. Civili koji su se okupili na javnim trgovima i ulicama odupirali su sudionicima državnog udara zajedno sa snagama sigurnosti, unatoč napadima borbenim zrakoplovima, helikopterima, tenkovima, drugim oklopnim vozilima i oružjima koje su pokrenuli vođe državnog udara. Kao što se navodi u presudi, stotine civila izgubilo je živote u tim napadima i tisuće ljudi je ozlijeđeno, od kojih su većina civili.
15. Tužiteljstvo je pravodobno postupilo u pokretanju istraga onih koji su sudjelovali u pokušaju puča; to je vrijedno istaknuti, s obzirom na to da se državni udar tada još nije obustavio. Posljedica toga je potpuno obustavljanje državnog udara dana 16. srpnja zahvaljujući naporima legitimnih ustavnih institucija i nacionalnoj solidarnosti. Nadalje, milijuni građana preko noći su organizirali bdijenja za demokraciju na gradskim trgovima u znak prosvjeda protiv pokušaja državnog udara.
IV.
16. Treba imati na umu da se u Statutu Vijeća Europe navodi, u preambuli, uvjerenje država članica da je „težnja za mirom temeljenom na pravdi i međunarodnoj suradnji od vitalnog značaja za očuvanje ljudskog društva i civilizacije”. Ibn Khaldun (1332. - 1406.), veliki mislilac, pravni učenjak, povijesni filozof i sociolog te utemeljitelj znanosti civilizacije (umran), objašnjava u svojem remek-djelu Muqaddimah kako „ne možemo zamisliti [državu] bez civilizacije, a civilizacija bez [države ili] vlasti nije moguća” (Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah: Uvod u povijest, IV, 19, na engleski preveo Franz Rosental, Princeton University Classics, 1967.) te da kršenje ljudskih prava (ili nepravde) uništava civilizaciju, a propast civilizacije dovodi do potpunog uništenja države (ibid., III, 41). Unatoč različitim razdobljima, između te dvije perspektive mogu se primijetiti upečatljive sličnosti. Te riječi i načela stječu svoje puno značenje za vrijeme izvanrednog stanja nakon pokušaja vojnog udara. Radi procjene ozbiljnosti prijetnje koju predstavlja vojni udar potrebno je razmotriti rizike do kojih je moglo doći da udar nije bio spriječen. Dosadašnja je praksa pokazala da se najteža kršenja temeljnih prava obično događaju tijekom tih razdoblja. Nadalje, alarmantni uvjeti u mnogim državama kojima dominiraju režimi postavljeni nakon vojnog udara i tragične situacije u takvim društvima, u ovom trenutku i širom svijeta, potvrđuju gore spomenuta razmišljanja velikog mislioca i osnivačka načela Vijeća Europe. Sprječavanjem te ozbiljne javne opasnosti koja je prijetila opstanku naroda, turski su građani pokazao kako narod može očuvati demokraciju, vladavinu zakona i civilizaciju i preuzeti kontrolu nad vlastitom sudbinom.
17. U obzir treba uzeti činjenicu da je Turska izdala obavijest o derogiranju Konvencije na temelju članka 15. dana 21. srpnja 2016. godine nakon proglašenja izvanrednog stanja. Dijelim mišljenje većine da se prva formalna pretpostavka lako zadovoljava, kao i da je, s obzirom na široku slobodu procjene koja je prepuštena nacionalnim tijelima u vezi s time, pokušaj vojnog udara nesumnjivo izazvao „izvanredno stanje koje prijeti opstanku naroda” u smislu članka 15. Konvencije. Nadalje, pritužbe podnositelja zahtjeva ne odnose se na prava za koja nije dopušteno derogiranje. Što se tiče razmjernosti mjera poduzetih u kontekstu izuzeća, moje se mišljenje razlikuje od većine, jer po mom mišljenju ova točka zahtijeva pažljivo ispitivanje u svjetlu prijetnje opstanku naroda i vladavini zakona, demokraciji, ustavnom poretku i ljudskim pravima u Turskoj.
18. U presudi donesenoj prije pokušaja državnog udara, turski sudovi utvrdili su da je FETÖ/PDY oružana teroristička organizacija (porotnički sud Erzincan, presuda od 16. lipnja 2016.). Nadalje, presude donesene nakon 15. srpnja 2016. godine prepoznale su povezanost ove terorističke organizacije s pokušajem državnog udara. Zaključci koje je donio Kazneni odjel Plenarnog Kasacijskog suda po tom pitanju prilično su poučni: „Od prvih godina postojanja organizacije ... čini se iz izjava pojedinaca koji su ranije bili aktivni u organizaciji da je njihov cilj preuzimanje kontrole nad svim ustavnim institucijama (zakonodavnim, izvršnim i sudskim) u Republici Turskoj te da istodobno organizacija postane glavna politička/ekonomska moć s međunarodnim utjecajem iskorištavanjem učenika koji su obučeni u skladu s njihovim načelima i ciljevima u obrazovnim ustanovama koje su osnovane u inozemstvu i u Turskoj putem sredstava prikupljenih „uslugama” (himmet) i korištenjem tako stečene ekonomske i političke moći za promicanje interesa organizacije i njihove ideologije.” Kazneni odjel je napomenuo: “Zaključuje se da FETÖ/PDY koristi javne ovlasti koje bi trebale biti pod državnom kontrolom za ispunjavanje vlastitih organizacijskih interesa. Nakon prolaska kroz različite stadije, članovi organizacije koji su započeli karijeru, a da su pritom ostali vojnici organizacije FETÖ/PDY i održavali vrlo snažne veze s tom organizacijom, unutar turskih oružanih snaga, policije i Nacionalne obavještajne organizacije moraju proći ideološku obuku da budu spremni iskoristiti vlastito ovlaštenje za uporabu oružja i sile za ispunjavanje zapovijedi ove ilegalne organizacijske hijerarhije. Vođa organizacije opisuje takvu osobu kao slugu: „osobe vezane za službu moraju biti odlučne, uporne, poslušne, odgovorne za sve, ne smiju ustuknuti kada ih se napada, moraju dati prednost svojem položaj unutar službe u odnosu na vlastiti čin kada dođu do visokog čina, moraju biti svjesni da dužnosti koje treba izvršiti u službi mogu biti teške i moraju biti spremne žrtvovati cijelo svoje postojanje, život i ljubav za službu [tj. terorističku organizaciju] ... ” Prema zaključcima pravosudnih tijela, uspostavljena su sljedeća tri načela kao funkcionalna načela organizacije FETÖ: povjerljivost, unutarorganizacijska solidarnost i strogi hijerarhijski odnosi. Složena struktura organizacije FETÖ temelji se na načelu povjerljivosti, koju je vjerno održavala od samog početka, od najniže ćelije do najviših grana.
19. Dana 20. srpnja 2016. proglašeno je izvanredno stanje na razdoblje od tri mjeseca od 21. srpnja 2016. godine radi zaštite demokracije, ljudskih prava i vladavine zakona, uklanjanja elemenata koji su se infiltrirali u državna tijela i uklanjanja mogućih prijetnji u budućnosti. Vijeće ministara kojim upravlja predsjednik naknadno je nekoliko puta produljilo izvanredno stanje, s posljednjim datumom stupanja na snagu 19. siječnja 2018. Pri svakoj od tih odluka poslana je obavijest Glavnom tajniku Vijeća Europe o derogiranju Konvencije na temelju članka 15.
20. U praksi su istrage, sudski postupci i sudske presude pokazale da je FETÖ/PDY složena, sui generis teroristička organizacija koja obavlja svoje aktivnosti pod krinkom zakonitosti. U tom je kontekstu medijski ogranak organizacije FETÖ/PDY odigrao značajnu ulogu u legitimaciji djela koja su dovela do svirepog pokušaja vojnog udara manipulacijom javnog mišljenja. Podnositelj zahtjeva je smješten u pritvor u kontekstu istrage medijskog ogranka organizacije.
V
21. Pokušaj udara i njegove posljedice, zajedno s drugim terorističkim aktivnostima predstavljaju ozbiljnu opasnost za ustavni poredak, ljudska prava te javnu sigurnost i red, te odgovaraju prijetnji opstanku naroda u smislu članka 15. Konvencije. Stoga bi podnositeljeve prigovore trebalo ocijeniti s obzirom na obavijest o derogiranju objavljenu dana 21. srpnja 2016. (i kasnije ponovljenu) na temelju članka 15. Konvencije. Sud je zaključio da je pokušaj vojnog udara stvorio „izvanredno stanje koje ugrožava opstanak naroda” u smislu Konvencije. Međutim, u pogledu razmjernosti mjera donio je drugačiji zaključak bez navođenja detaljnih razloga. Pri ocjenjivanju razmjernosti treba uzeti u obzir dvije dimenzije. Prvo, treba imati na umu da se prigovori podnositelja zahtjeva odnose samo na prava za koja je dopušteno derogiranje. Prema tome, država je trebala imati veću slobodu procjene, a Sud je trebao uzeti u obzir opasnosti i probleme s kojima je država suočena.
22. Nadalje, ocjena Suda ne bi trebala dovesti do pravne hijerarhije između prava za koja je dopušteno derogiranje. Kao što je naglašeno u Bečkoj deklaraciji i programu djelovanja, usvojenoj konsenzusom na Svjetskoj konferenciji o ljudskim pravima od strane predstavnika 171 država dana 25. lipnja 1993., pravna hijerarhija ljudskih prava u načelu ne bi trebala biti prihvaćena: “Sva ljudska prava su univerzalna, nedjeljiva te međusobno ovisna i međusobno povezana. Međunarodna zajednica mora poštovati ljudska prava na globalnoj razini na pravedan i jednak način, na istoj osnovi, s istim naglaskom.” Međutim, člankom 15. Konvencije predviđa se određena vrsta hijerarhije prava, s obzirom na to da su ona podijeljena na prava koja se mogu derogirati i prava koja se ne mogu derogirati. Unatoč jasnoći teksta članka 15., zaključak koji stvara pravnu hijerarhiju između prava za koja je dopušteno odstupanje bit će u suprotnosti s pitanjem praktičnosti koje su izrazili autori Konvencije. Cilj je mehanizma derogiranja promicati ravnotežu koju države moraju osigurati između poštovanja ljudskih prava i očuvanja opstanka naroda.
23. Nadalje, valja odrediti postoji li dovoljna osnova za donošenje zaključka da je mjera pritvora koja je povezana s pravom koje ostaje u opsegu derogiranja strogo u skladu s potrebama situacije izvanrednog stanja u kojemu je ugrožen opstanak naroda. S tim u vezi, Sudu je poznato nekoliko čimbenika, poput ozbiljnosti prijetnje opstanku nacije, činjenice da se prigovor odnosi na sudsku mjeru protiv koje se može uložiti prigovor, krajnje složenosti predmeta koji se odnosi na medijski ogranak terorističke organizacije odgovorne za ozbiljnu prijetnju, značajne uloge medijskog ogranka organizacije FETÖ / PDY u prikrivanju nezakonitih aktivnosti organizacije i legitimiranja aktivnosti koje su dovele do gnjusnog pokušaja vojnog udara, proglašenja izvanrednog stanja zbog pokušaja udara i njegova produljenja od 21. srpnja 2016., svaki put uz odobrenje Velike nacionalne skupštine Turske. Zbog tih čimbenika, a budući da je predmet strogo povezan s incidentima koji su doveli do izvanrednog stanja i derogiranja, treba zaključiti da su poduzete mjere strogo u skladu s potrebama situacije. Iz tog razloga, derogiranje koje je povezano s iznimno ozbiljnom prijetnjom trebalo bi imati prioritet pri ocjenjivanju osnovanosti predmeta.
24. Zaključno smatram da bi u okolnostima ovog predmeta, iako je povezan s člancima 5. i 10. Konvencije, u kontekstu dopuštenosti trebalo prevladati načelo supsidijarnosti. Osim toga, derogiranje koje je povezano s iznimno ozbiljnom prijetnjom trebalo bi imati prioritet pri ocjenjivanju osnovanosti predmeta. Uzimajući u obzir prethodno navedena razmatranja i protivno većini zaključujem da nije došlo do povrede odredbi Konvencije.
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Prevod presude preuzet sa stranice Zastupnika Republike Hrvatske pred Evropskim sudom za ljudska prava
https://uredzastupnika.gov.hr/
SECOND SECTION
(Application no. 16538/17)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20 March 2018
FINAL
20/06/2018
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Şahin Alpay v. Turkey,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Robert Spano, President,
Paul Lemmens,
Ledi Bianku,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Valeriu Griţco,
Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, judges,
Ergin Ergül,ad hoc judge,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 20 February 2018,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 16538/17) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr Şahin Alpay (“the applicant”), on 28 February 2017.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr F. Çağıl, a lawyer practising in Istanbul. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that his pre-trial detention had breached Articles 5, 10 and 18 of the Convention.
4. On 3 March 2017 the Court decided to give priority to the application (Rule 41 of the Rules of Court).
5. On 13 June 2017 the Government were given notice of the complaints concerning Article 5 §§ 1, 3, 4 and 5 and Articles 10 and 18 of the Convention and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible.
6. The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the admissibility and merits of the case.
7. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (“the Commissioner for Human Rights”) exercised his right to intervene in the proceedings and submitted written comments (Article 36 § 3 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2).
8. In addition, written comments were submitted to the Court by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (“the Special Rapporteur”), and also by the following non-governmental organisations acting jointly: ARTICLE 19, the Association of European Journalists, the Committee to Protect Journalists, the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, the European Federation of Journalists, Human Rights Watch, Index on Censorship, the International Federation of Journalists, the International Press Institute, PEN International and Reporters Without Borders (“the intervening non-governmental organisations”). The Section President had granted leave to the Special Rapporteur and the organisations in question to intervene under Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3.
9. The Government and the applicant each replied to the intervening parties’ comments.
10. In correspondence of 18 January 2018 the applicant informed the Court that the Constitutional Court had delivered a judgment on his individual application and that the Istanbul Assize Court had rejected his request for release despite the Constitutional Court’s finding of a violation. In a letter dated 19 January 2018 the Court invited the Government to submit comments on the matter. On 29 January 2018 the Government sent their further comments.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
11. The applicant was born in 1944. He is currently detained in Istanbul.
A. The applicant’s professional career
12. The applicant is a journalist who had been working since 2002 for the daily newspaper Zaman, which was viewed as the principal publication medium of the “Gülenist” network and was closed down following the adoption of Legislative Decree no. 668, issued on 27 July 2016 in connection with the state of emergency (see paragraphs 14-18 below). From 2001 onwards, he also lectured on comparative politics and Turkish political history at a private university in Istanbul.
13. In the years leading up to the attempted military coup of 15 July 2016 the applicant had been known for his critical views on the serving government’s policies.
B. The attempted coup of 15 July 2016 and the declaration of a state of emergency
14. During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces calling themselves the “Peace at Home Council” attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically elected parliament, government and President of Turkey.
15. During the attempted coup, soldiers under the instigators’ control bombarded several strategic State buildings, including the parliament building and the presidential compound, attacked the hotel where the President was staying, held the Chief of General Staff hostage, attacked television channels and fired shots at demonstrators. During the night of violence, more than 300 people were killed and more than 2,500 were injured.
16. The day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities blamed the network linked to Fetullah Gülen, a Turkish citizen living in Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to be the leader of a terrorist organisation known as FETÖ/PDY (“Gülenist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure”). Several criminal investigations were subsequently initiated by the appropriate prosecuting authorities in relation to suspected members of that organisation.
17. On 20 July 2016 the government declared a state of emergency for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was subsequently extended for further periods of three months by the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President, most recently with effect from 19 January 2018.
18. On 21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention under Article 15.
C. The applicant’s arrest and pre-trial detention
19. On 27 July 2016, in the course of one of the criminal investigations initiated in respect of suspected members of FETÖ/PDY, the applicant was arrested at his home in Istanbul and taken into police custody.
20. On 30 July 2016 the applicant, assisted by his lawyer, was questioned at the Istanbul Security Directorate. During the questioning the applicant denied that he belonged to an illegal organisation. Later that day, the Istanbul public prosecutor sought a judicial order for the applicant’s pre-trial detention on suspicion of belonging to an illegal organisation.
21. On the same day, several editors and columnists of the daily newspaper Zaman, including the applicant, were brought before the Istanbul 4th Magistrate’s Court. The magistrate questioned the applicant about his alleged acts and the accusations against him. The applicant stated that he had joined Zaman in order to be able to express his opinions; that he was in favour of a democratic system corresponding to European standards; that he was a secular person; that he had not been aware of the threat posed by Fetullah Gülen’s movement until after the attempted military coup of 15 July 2016; and that he was opposed to any attack on democracy.
22. At the end of the hearing, the magistrate, taking into account the contents of the articles written by the applicant – and finding that they had promoted the terrorist organisation in question, even after 17 December 2013 – ordered his pre-trial detention. He noted in that connection that although criminal proceedings had been instituted against E.D. (the editor-in-chief of Zaman) before the attempted military coup, the applicant had continued to work for the newspaper and within the organisation’s media structure. In the reasons given for ordering the applicant’s pre-trial detention, the magistrate took the following factors into consideration: the strong suspicions against him; the nature of the alleged offence and the fact that it was among the offences listed in Article 100 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) – the so-called “catalogue offences”, for which a suspect’s pre-trial detention was deemed justified in the event of strong suspicion; the risk of absconding; the state of the evidence and the risk of its deterioration; and the risk that alternative measures to detention might be insufficient to ensure the applicant’s participation in the criminal proceedings.
23. On 5 August 2016 the applicant lodged an objection against the order for his pre-trial detention. He argued that there was no justification for detaining him. He also contended that his state of health was incompatible with the conditions in the prison where he was being held. In a decision of 8 August 2016 the Istanbul 5th Magistrate’s Court dismissed the applicant’s objection.
24. On 17 October 2016 the applicant lodged a fresh application for his release. In a decision of 19 October 2016 the Istanbul 10th Magistrate’s Court rejected the application. In his decision, the magistrate stated in particular that it was an established fact that in order to prepare the ground for a military coup, the instigators needed to create the perception that the leaders of the country concerned were dictators. In his view, the applicant’s articles accusing the President of Turkey of being a dictator and calling for him to leave office had contributed to propaganda of that kind.
25. On 10 April 2017 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court in respect of several individuals, including the applicant, who were suspected of being part of the FETÖ/PDY media network, in particular accusing them, under Articles 309, 311 and 312 in conjunction with Article 220 § 6 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”), of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the government by force and violence, and of committing offences on behalf of a terrorist organisation without being members of it. The public prosecutor sought the imposition of three aggravated life sentences and a sentence of up to fifteen years’ imprisonment on the suspects, including the applicant. As evidence, he produced six articles written by the applicant in 2013 and 2014.
26. The public prosecutor submitted that the articles by the applicants and other individuals being charged in the same criminal proceedings against leading members of FETÖ/PDY’s media wing could not be regarded as an expression of the authors’ opposition to or criticism of the government. In the applicant’s case, the public prosecutor contended that the expressions he had used had gone beyond the limits of freedom of the press in that they had undermined the rights of the official authorities and endangered social peace and public order. The public prosecutor found that the applicant had not hesitated to call for a possible military coup in his articles and, in short, had discharged functions serving the interests of the terrorist organisation in question.
27. During the criminal proceedings, the applicant denied having committed any criminal offence.
28. The criminal proceedings are currently pending before the Istanbul 13th Assize Court.
D. Individual application to the Constitutional Court
29. On 8 September 2016 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court. He complained that he had been placed in pre-trial detention on account of his articles and alleged that this infringed his right to liberty and security and his right to freedom of expression and of the press. He also contended that his state of health was incompatible with the conditions of his continued detention since he was suffering from benign prostate hyperplasia, hyperlipidaemia, hyperuricemia, a multinodular goitre and sleep apnoea. On that account he asked the Constitutional Court to indicate an interim alternative measure to detention, thus allowing him to be released pending trial.
30. In a decision of 26 October 2016 the Constitutional Court refused to apply an interim measure of that kind. In reaching that decision, it noted firstly that the applicant’s health had been regularly monitored from the start of his pre-trial detention, and that there was a State hospital inside the prison where he was being held. In that connection, it noted that on 4 October 2016, following a request he had made to that effect the previous day, the applicant had been examined in prison by a general practitioner and had then been transferred to the urology department of the State hospital, where he had undergone a medical examination on 20 October 2016, and that his next appointment had been scheduled for 22 March 2017. In those circumstances, the Constitutional Court found that keeping the applicant in pre-trial detention did not currently constitute a danger to his life or health. It added that should there be a change in his health or the conditions of his detention, he would be entitled to make a further application for an interim measure to secure his release.
31. On 11 January 2018 the Constitutional Court gave a judgment (no. 2016/16092) in which it held, by eleven votes to six, that there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security and the right to freedom of expression and of the press.
32. With regard to the applicant’s complaint concerning the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court noted firstly that the evidence forming the basis for his detention had included: (i) an article entitled “As if it were a religious war” (“Din Savaşıymış”), published on 21 December 2013; (ii) an article entitled “The President must not remain a spectator” (“Cumhurbaşkanı Seyirci Kalamaz”), published on 24 December 2013; (iii) an article entitled “Between Erdogan and the West” (“Erdoğan ile Batı Arasında”), published on 28 December 2013; (iv) an article entitled “Yes, both the crime and the punishment are individual” (“Evet Suç da Ceza da Şahsidir”), published on 8 February 2014; (v) an article entitled “This nation is not empty-headed” (“Bu Millet Bidon Kafalı Değildir”), published on 1 March 2014; and (vi) an article entitled “The solution is a government without Erdoğan” (“Çıkar Yol Erdoğan’sız Hükûmet”), published on 29 March 2014. After examining the substance of these articles, the Constitutional Court found that they mainly dealt with matters relating to the “17-25 December [2013]” criminal investigations. In them the applicant had set out his opinion that the government members implicated in the criminal investigation in question should be brought to justice and that it was the responsibility of the President and the ruling party’s leaders to take action to that end. He had contended that the government’s reaction to the investigation had been unjust. The Constitutional Court also observed that the applicant had written that if the investigation in question had been carried out on the orders of suspected members of FETÖ/PDY, they too should be the subject of a criminal investigation. However, he had maintained that it was unfair to accuse all members of the Gülenist movement. The Constitutional Court further noted that in the articles in question, the applicant had not argued that the government should be overthrown by force. On the contrary, he had asserted that the ruling party would lose in the next elections. The Constitutional Court also found that the article published one day before the attempted military coup suggested that the applicant was opposed to coups d’état. It held that he had been expressing opinions on a topical issue that were similar to those of the opposition leaders. In the Constitutional Court’s view, the investigating authorities had been unable to demonstrate any factual basis that might indicate that the applicant had been acting in accordance with the aims of FETÖ/PDY. It added that the fact that he had expressed his views in Zaman could not in itself be deemed sufficient to infer that the applicant was aware of that organisation’s goals. Accordingly, it concluded that “strong evidence that an offence had been committed” had not been sufficiently established in the applicant’s case. Next, the Constitutional Court examined whether there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security in the light of Article 15 of the Constitution (providing for the suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms in the event of war, general mobilisation, a state of siege or a state of emergency). On this point, it noted firstly that in a state of emergency, the Constitution provided for the possibility of taking measures derogating from the guarantees set forth in Article 19, to the extent required by the situation. It observed, however, that if it were accepted that people could be placed in pre-trial detention without any strong evidence that they had committed an offence, the guarantees of the right to liberty and security would be meaningless. Accordingly, it held that the applicant’s pre-trial detention was disproportionate to the strict exigencies of the situation and that his right to liberty and security, as safeguarded by Article 19 § 3 of the Constitution, had been breached.
33. Next, with regard to the complaint concerning freedom of expression and of the press, the Constitutional Court observed that the applicant’s initial and continued pre-trial detention on account of his articles amounted to interference with the exercise of that right. Taking into account his arguments regarding the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court held that such a measure, which had serious consequences since it resulted in deprivation of liberty, could not be regarded as a necessary and proportionate interference in a democratic society. It further noted that it could not be clearly established from the reasons given for ordering and extending the applicant’s pre-trial detention whether the measure met a pressing social need or why it was necessary. Lastly, it found that it was clear that the applicant’s pre-trial detention could have a chilling effect on freedom of expression and of the press, in so far as it had not been based on any concrete evidence other than his articles (see paragraph 140 of the Constitutional Court’s judgment). Regarding the application of Article 15 of the Constitution, it referred to its findings concerning the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention (as set out in paragraphs 108-10 of the Constitutional Court’s judgment – see paragraph 32 above) and held that there had also been a violation of freedom of expression and freedom of the press as enshrined in Articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution.
34. With regard to the applicant’s complaint that the conditions of his detention were incompatible with respect for human dignity, the Constitutional Court noted that he had access to the treatment required for his condition within the prison where he was being held, and declared this complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded.
35. The applicant did not submit a claim for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court made no award under that head. The applicant claimed an unspecified sum in respect of the pecuniary damage he had allegedly sustained. The Constitutional Court found no causal link between the violation established and the damage alleged on that account and dismissed the claim. However, it held that the applicant was to be awarded 2,219.50 Turkish liras (TRY – approximately 500 euros (EUR)) in respect of costs and expenses.
36. As the applicant was still in pre-trial detention on the date of delivery of its judgment, the Constitutional Court decided to transmit the judgment to the Istanbul 13th Assize Court so that it could take “the necessary action”.
E. Reaction of the Istanbul assize courts to the Constitutional Court’s judgment
37. On 11 January 2018 the applicant’s lawyer applied to the Istanbul 13th Assize Court for his client’s release.
38. On the same day, the Istanbul 13th Assize Court rejected the application, on the grounds that it had not yet received official notification of the Constitutional Court’s judgment.
39. On 12 January 2018 the Istanbul 13th Assize Court, having observed that the Constitutional Court’s judgment had been published on its website, examined of its own motion the question of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. Noting firstly that the examination of the merits of an individual application to the Constitutional Court against a judicial decision entailed determining whether there had been a violation of fundamental rights and what measures would be appropriate to put an end to the violation, and secondly that grounds of appeal on points of law could not be examined by the Constitutional Court in the context of an individual application, it found that the Constitutional Court did not have jurisdiction to assess the evidence in the case file. On that account, the Constitutional Court’s judgment no. 2016/16092 was not in compliance with the law and amounted to usurpation of power (görev gasbı). Regarding the effects of the Constitutional Court’s judgments, the Assize Court added that only judgments that were in accordance with the Constitution and the law should be deemed to be final and binding. It noted, moreover, that more extensive reasoning could be given to justify keeping the applicant in pre-trial detention and that the file contained sufficient evidence against him in that regard. However, this would create the risk of prejudging the case (ihsas-ı rey), seeing that a detailed explanation of the reasons justifying continued detention could be seen as an expression of the judges’ opinions before they had determined the merits of the case. Accordingly, the Assize Court held that it was impossible to accept the Constitutional Court’s judgment. Lastly, reiterating that the judgment in question amounted to usurpation of power, it held, by two votes to one, that there was no need for it to give a decision on the applicant’s pre-trial detention.
40. The judge in the minority observed in his dissenting opinion that he agreed with the majority’s conclusion that the Constitutional Court’s judgment was not in compliance with the law. However, noting that the Constitutional Court’s judgments were final and binding on the Assize Court, he expressed the view that the applicant’s release should be ordered.
41. On 12 January 2018 the applicant lodged an objection with a view to securing his release.
42. In a decision of 15 January 2018 the Istanbul 14th Assize Court unanimously dismissed the applicant’s objection, essentially on the same grounds as the 13th Assize Court had done.
43. On 1 February 2018 the applicant lodged a further individual application with the Constitutional Court. Relying on Articles 5, 6 and 18 of the Convention, he complained mainly that he had been kept in pre-trial detention despite the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 11 January 2018.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Relevant provisions of the Constitution
44. Article 11 of the Constitution provides:
“The provisions of the Constitution are fundamental legal rules binding on the legislative, executive and judicial organs, the administrative authorities and all other institutions and individuals. Laws shall not be contrary to the Constitution.”
45. Article 15 of the Constitution reads as follows:
“In the event of war, general mobilisation, a state of siege or a state of emergency, the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms may be partially or fully suspended, or measures derogating from the guarantees enshrined in the Constitution may be taken to the extent required by the situation, provided that obligations under international law are not violated.
Even in the circumstances listed in the first paragraph, there shall be no violation of: the individual’s right to life, except where death occurs as a result of acts compatible with the law of war; the right to physical and spiritual integrity; freedom of religion, conscience and thought or the rule that no one may be compelled to reveal his or her beliefs or blamed or accused on account of them; the prohibition of retrospective punishment; or the presumption of the accused’s innocence until a final conviction.”
46. The relevant parts of Article 19 of the Constitution read as follows:
“Everyone has the right to personal liberty and security.
...
Individuals against whom there are strong presumptions of guilt may be detained only by order of a judge and for the purposes of preventing their absconding or the destruction or alteration of evidence, or in any other circumstances provided for by law that also necessitate their detention. No one shall be arrested without an order by a judge except when caught in flagrante delicto or where a delay would have a harmful effect; the conditions for such action shall be determined by law.
...”
47. The first two paragraphs of Article 26 of the Constitution provide:
“Everyone has the right to express, individually or collectively, his or her thoughts and opinions and to disseminate them orally, in writing, through image or by any other means. This right also includes the freedom to receive or impart ideas or information without interference by the official authorities. This paragraph shall not preclude the imposition of rules concerning the licensing of radio, television, cinema or other similar enterprises.
The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted to preserve national security, public order, public safety, the fundamental characteristics of the Republic and the indivisible integrity of the State in terms of its territory and nation, to prevent crime, to punish offenders, to prevent the disclosure of information covered by State secrecy, to protect the honour, rights and private and family life of others, as well as professional secrecy as provided for by law, and to ensure the fulfilment of the judicial function in accordance with its purpose.”
48. The relevant parts of Article 28 of the Constitution read as follows:
“The press is free and shall not be censored. ...
The State shall take the necessary measures to ensure freedom of the press and of information. The provisions of Articles 26 and 27 of the Constitution shall apply with regard to the restriction of freedom of the press.
...”
49. Article 90 § 5 of the Constitution provides:
“International treaties that are duly in force are legally binding. Their constitutionality cannot be challenged in the Constitutional Court. In the event of conflict between duly applicable international treaties on fundamental rights and freedoms and domestic statutes, the relevant provisions of the international treaties shall prevail.”
50. Article 153 §§ 1 and 6 of the Constitution reads as follows:
“The decisions of the Constitutional Court are final. Decisions entailing annulment shall not be made public until a statement of reasons has been drafted.
...
Decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be published immediately in the Official Gazette, and shall be binding on the legislative, executive and judicial organs, the administrative authorities and natural and legal persons.”
B. Law no. 6216on the establishment and rules of procedure of the Constitutional Court
51. Section 45(1) and (2) of Law no. 6216 provides:
“(1) Anyone claiming that a public authority has violated one of his or her fundamental rights and freedoms as protected by the Constitution and secured under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Protocols thereto that have been ratified by Turkey may apply to the Constitutional Court.
(2) An individual application may be lodged only after the exhaustion of all the administrative and judicial remedies provided for by law in relation to the measure, act or negligence complained of.”
52. Section 50(1) and (2) of Law no. 6216 reads as follows:
“(1) Following the examination on the merits, a decision shall be given as to whether or not there has been a violation of the applicant’s right. If a violation is established, the measures to be taken to put an end to the violation and redress its effects shall be specified in the operative provisions of the decision. No review of the appropriateness of an administrative act may be carried out, and no decision amounting to such an act may be given.
(2) Where a violation is established on account of a judicial decision, the file shall be sent to the relevant court for reopening of the proceedings with a view to putting an end to the violation and redressing its effects. Where there is no legal interest in reopening the proceedings, the applicant may be awarded compensation or be invited to institute proceedings in the appropriate courts. The court before which the proceedings are reopened shall deliver a decision, if possible on the basis of the case file, with a view to putting an end to the violation found by the Constitutional Court in its decision and redressing the effects of the violation.”
C. Relevant provisions of the Criminal Code (“the CC”)
53. Article 309 § 1 of the CC is worded as follows:
“Anyone who attempts to overthrow by force or violence the constitutional order provided for by the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey or to establish a different order in its place, or de facto to prevent its implementation, whether fully or in part, shall be sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment.”
54. Article 311 § 1 of the CC reads as follows:
“Anyone who attempts to overthrow the Turkish Grand National Assembly by force or violence or to prevent it, whether fully or in part, from discharging its duties shall be sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment.”
55. Article 312 § 1 of the CC provides:
“Anyone who attempts to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Turkey by force or violence or to prevent it, whether fully or in part, from discharging its duties shall be sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment.”
56. In addition, Article 220 § 6 of the CC, on punishment of offences committed on behalf of an illegal organisation, reads as follows:
“Anyone who commits an offence on behalf of an [illegal] organisation shall also be sentenced for belonging to that organisation, even if he or she is not a member of it.”
57. Article 314 §§ 1 and 2 of the CC, which provides for the offence of belonging to an illegal organisation, reads as follows:
“1. Anyone who forms or leads an organisation with the purpose of committing the offences listed in the fourth and fifth parts of this chapter shall be sentenced to ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
2. Any member of an organisation referred to in the first paragraph above shall be sentenced to five to ten years’ imprisonment.”
D. Relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”)
58. Pre-trial detention is governed by Articles 100 et seq. of the CCP. In accordance with Article 100, a person may be placed in pre-trial detention where there is factual evidence giving rise to strong suspicion that the person has committed an offence and where the detention is justified on one of the grounds laid down in the Article in question, namely: if the suspect has absconded or there is a risk that he or she will do so, and if there is a risk that the suspect will conceal or tamper with evidence or influence witnesses. For certain offences, in particular offences against State security and the constitutional order, the existence of strong suspicion is sufficient to justify pre-trial detention.
59. Article 101 of the CCP provides that pre-trial detention is ordered at the investigation stage by a magistrate at the request of the public prosecutor and at the trial stage by the competent court, whether of its own motion or at the prosecutor’s request. An objection may be lodged with another magistrate or another court against decisions ordering or extending pre-trial detention. Such decisions must include legal and factual reasons.
60. Pursuant to Article 108 of the CCP, during the investigation stage, a magistrate must review a suspect’s pre-trial detention at regular intervals not exceeding thirty days. Within the same period, the detainee may also lodge an application for release. During the trial stage, the question of the accused’s detention is reviewed by the competent court at the end of each hearing, and in any event at intervals of no more than thirty days.
61. Article 141 § 1 (a) and (d) of the CCP provides:
“Compensation for damage ... may be claimed from the State by anyone ...:
(a) who has been arrested or taken into or kept in detention under conditions or in circumstances not complying with the law;
...
(d) who, even if he or she was detained lawfully during the investigation or trial, has not been brought before a judicial authority within a reasonable time and has not obtained a judgment on the merits within a reasonable time;
...”
62. Article 142 § 1 of the CCP reads as follows:
“The claim for compensation may be lodged within three months after the person concerned has been informed that the decision or judgment has become final, and in any event within one year after the decision or judgment has become final.”
63. According to the case-law of the Court of Cassation, it is not necessary to wait for a final decision on the merits of the case before ruling on a compensation claim lodged under Article 141 of the CCP on account of the excessive length of pre-trial detention (decisions of 16 June 2015, E. 2014/21585 – K. 2015/10868 and E. 2014/6167 – K. 2015/10867).
E. Case-law of the Constitutional Court
64. In its decision of 4 August 2016 (no. 2016/12) concerning the dismissal of two members of the Constitutional Court and its decision of 20 June 2017 (Aydın Yavuz and Others, no. 2016/22169) concerning a person’s pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court provided information and assessments on matters including the attempted military coup and its consequences. It carried out a detailed examination, from a constitutional perspective, of the facts leading to the declaration of the state of emergency. As a result of this examination, it found that the attempted military coup had been a clear and serious attack both on the constitutional principles that sovereignty was unconditionally and unreservedly vested in the people, who exercised it through authorised organs, and that no individual or body could exercise any State authority not emanating from the Constitution, and also on the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. According to the Constitutional Court, the attempted military coup had been a practical illustration of the severity of the threats posed to the democratic constitutional order and human rights. After summarising the attacks carried out during the night of 15 to 16 July 2016, it emphasised that in order to assess the severity of the threat posed by a military coup, it was also necessary to consider the risks that might have arisen had the coup attempt not been thwarted. It found that the fact that the attempted coup had taken place at a time when Turkey had been under violent attack from numerous terrorist organisations had made the country even more vulnerable and considerably increased the severity of the threat to the life and existence of the nation. The Constitutional Court noted that in some cases, it might not be possible for a State to eliminate threats to its democratic constitutional order, fundamental rights and national security through ordinary administrative procedures. It might therefore be necessary to impose extraordinary administrative procedures, such as a state of emergency, until such threats were eliminated. Bearing in mind the threats resulting from the attempted military coup of 15 July 2016, the Constitutional Court accepted the power of the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President, to issue legislative decrees on matters necessitating the state of emergency. In that context, it also emphasised that the state of emergency was a temporary legal regime, in which any interference with fundamental rights had to be foreseeable and the aim was to restore the normal regime in order to safeguard fundamental rights.
III. NOTICE OF DEROGATION BY TURKEY
65. On 21 July 2016 the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the Council of Europe sent the Secretary General of the Council of Europe the following notice of derogation:
“I communicate the following notice of the Government of the Republic of Turkey.
On 15 July 2016, a large-scale coupattempt was staged in the Republic of Turkey to overthrow the democratically-elected government and the constitutional order. This despicable attempt was foiled by the Turkish state and people acting in unity and solidarity. The coupattempt and its aftermath together with other terrorist acts have posed severe dangers to public security and order, amounting to a threat to the life of the nation in the meaning of Article 15 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
The Republic of Turkey is taking the required measures as prescribed by law, in line with the national legislation and its international obligations. In this context, on 20 July 2016, the Government of the Republic of Turkey declared a State of Emergency for a duration of three months, in accordance with the Constitution (Article 120) and the Law No. 2935 on State of Emergency (Article 3/1b). ... The decision was published in the Official Gazette and approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 21 July 2016. Thus, the State of Emergency takes effect as from this date. In this process, measures taken may involve derogation from the obligations under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, permissible in Article 15 of the Convention.
I would therefore underline that this letter constitutes information for the purposes of Article 15 of the Convention. The Government of the Republic of Turkey shall keep you, Secretary General, fully informed of the measures taken to this effect. The Government shall inform you when the measures have ceased to operate.
...”
THE LAW
I. PRELIMINARY QUESTION CONCERNING THE DEROGATION BY TURKEY
66. The Government emphasised at the outset that all of the applicant’s complaints should be examined with due regard to the derogation of which the Secretary General of the Council of Europe had been notified on 21 July 2016 under Article 15 of the Convention. Article 15 provides:
“1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under [the] Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefore. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.”
A. The parties’ submissions
67. The Government submitted that in availing itself of its right to make a derogation from the Convention, Turkey had not breached the provisions of the Convention. In that context, they noted that there had been a public emergency threatening the life of the nation on account of the risks caused by the attempted military coup and that the measures taken by the national authorities in response to the emergency had been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.
68. The applicant submitted that the notice of derogation could not be interpreted in such a way as to limit his rights and freedoms on account of articles he had written long before the attempted military coup.
69. The Commissioner for Human Rights did not make any comments about the notice of derogation from the Convention in his intervention.
70. The Special Rapporteur stated that if the circumstances justifying the declaration of a state of emergency ceased to exist, individuals’ rights could no longer be restricted in connection with the aforementioned derogation.
71. The intervening non-governmental organisations submitted that the Government had not shown that there was currently a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. They contended in addition that the applicant’s initial and continued pre-trial detention could not be regarded as strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.
B. The Court’s assessment
72. The Court considers that the question thus arising is whether the conditions laid down in Article 15 of the Convention for the exercise of the exceptional right of derogation were satisfied in the present case.
73. In this connection, the Court notes firstly that the notice of derogation by Turkey, indicating that a state of emergency has been declared in order to tackle the threat posed to the life of the nation by the severe dangers resulting from the attempted military coupand other terrorist acts, does not explicitly mention which Articles of the Convention are to form the subject of a derogation. Instead, it simply announces that “measures taken may involve derogation from the obligations under the Convention”. Nevertheless, the Court observes that none of the parties have disputed that the notice of derogation by Turkey satisfied the formal requirement laid down in Article 15 § 3 of the Convention, namely to keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures taken by way of derogation from the Convention and the reasons for them. Accordingly, it is prepared to accept that this formal requirement has been satisfied.
74. The Court further notes that under Article 15 of the Convention, any High Contracting Party has the right, in time of war or public emergency threatening the life of the nation, to take measures derogating from its obligations under the Convention, other than those listed in paragraph 2 of that Article, provided that such measures are strictly proportionate to the exigencies of the situation and that they do not conflict with other obligations under international law (see Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1 July 1961, § 22, p. 55, Series A no. 3).
75. The Court reiterates that it falls to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for “the life of [its] nation”, to determine whether that life is threatened by a “public emergency” and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the emergency (see A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, § 173, ECHR 2009). By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it. Accordingly, in this matter a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national authorities. Nevertheless, the Court would emphasise that States do not enjoy an unlimited discretion in this respect. The domestic margin of appreciation is accompanied by European supervision (see Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 26 May 1993, § 43, Series A no. 258‑B).
76. In the present case, the Court takes note of the Government’s position that the attempted military coup and its aftermath have posed severe dangers to the democratic constitutional order and human rights, amounting to a threat to the life of the nation within the meaning of Article 15 of the Convention; it also notes that the applicant has not disputed this assessment.
77. The Court observes that the Constitutional Court, having examined from a constitutional perspective the facts leading to the declaration of a state of emergency, concluded that the attempted military coup had posed a severe threat to the life and existence of the nation (see paragraph 64 above). In the light of the Constitutional Court’s findings and all the other material available to it, the Court likewise considers that the attempted military coup disclosed the existence of a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” within the meaning of the Convention.
78. As to whether the measures taken in the present case were strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and consistent with the other obligations under international law, the Court considers it necessary to examine the applicant’s complaints on the merits, and will do so below.
II. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
79. The Government raised two objections of failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
A. Objection of failure to bring a compensation claim
80. Regarding the applicant’s complaints concerning his pre-trial detention, the Government stated that a compensation claim had been available to him under Article 141 § 1 (a) and (d) of the CCP. They contended that he could and should have brought a compensation claim on the basis of those provisions.
81. The applicant contested the Government’s argument. He asserted in particular that a compensation claim did not offer any reasonable prospect of success in terms of securing his release.
82. The Court reiterates that for a remedy in respect of the lawfulness of an ongoing deprivation of liberty to be effective, it must offer a prospect of release (see Gavril Yosifov v. Bulgaria, no. 74012/01, § 40, 6 November 2008, and Mustafa Avci v. Turkey, no. 39322/12, § 60, 23 May 2017). It notes, however, that the remedy provided for in Article 141 of the CCP is not capable of terminating the applicant’s deprivation of liberty.
83. The Court therefore concludes that the objection raised by the Government on this account must be dismissed.
B. Objection of failure to lodge an individual application with the Constitutional Court
84. The Government, relying mainly on the Court’s findings in Uzun v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 10755/13, 30 April 2013) and Mercan v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 56511/16, 8 November 2016), contended that the applicant had failed to use the remedy of an individual application before the Constitutional Court.
85. The applicant rejected the Government’s argument.
86. The Court reiterates that the applicant’s compliance with the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies is normally assessed with reference to the date on which the application was lodged with the Court (see Baumann v. France, no. 33592/96, § 47, ECHR 2001‑V (extracts)). Nevertheless, the Court accepts that the last stage of a particular remedy may be reached after the application has been lodged but before its admissibility has been determined (see Karoussiotis v. Portugal, no. 23205/08, § 57, ECHR 2011 (extracts); Stanka Mirković and Others v. Montenegro, nos. 33781/15 and 3 others, § 48, 7 March 2017; and Azzolina and Others v. Italy, nos. 28923/09 and 67599/10, § 105, 26 October 2017).
87. The Court observes that on 8 September 2016 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court, which gave its judgment on the merits on 11 January 2018 (see paragraphs 29 and 31 above).
88. Accordingly, the Court also dismisses this objection raised by the Government.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 §§ 1 AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION
89. The applicant complained that his initial pre-trial detention and its continuation were arbitrary. He argued that there had been no evidence grounding a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence necessitating his pre-trial detention. Furthermore, he complained that he had been kept in pre-trial detention despite the Constitutional Court’s finding of a violation of his right to liberty and security in its judgment of 11 January 2018. He also contended that the duration of his pre-trial detention was excessive and that insufficient reasons had been given for the judicial decisions ordering and extending the detention. He complained that in those respects there had been a violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
...
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
90. The Government contested that argument.
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The Government
91. The Government, referring to the principles established in the Court’s case-law in this area (citing Klass and Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28; Murray v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1994, Series A no. 300‑A; and İpek and Others v. Turkey, nos. 17019/02 and 30070/02, 3 February 2009), stated firstly that the applicant had been arrested and placed in pre-trial detention in the course of a criminal investigation initiated with a view to combating a terrorist organisation whose members had infiltrated State institutions and the media.
92. The Government submitted that from the contents of the above-mentioned articles written by the applicant, it was objectively possible to conclude that there had been a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences of which he was accused. On the strength of the physical evidence obtained during the investigation, criminal proceedings had been instituted against several individuals, including the applicant; the proceedings were currently ongoing before the Istanbul Assize Court.
93. Lastly, the Government submitted that the applicant’s complaints should be assessed in the light of the notice of derogation given on 21 July 2016 under Article 15 of the Convention.
2. The applicant
94. The applicant argued that there were no facts or information that could satisfy an objective observer that he had committed the offences of which he was accused. The articles submitted by the public prosecutor and the Government to justify his pre-trial detention were covered by his freedom of expression.
95. In addition, the applicant stated that notwithstanding the final and binding judgment in which the Constitutional Court had found a violation of his right to liberty and security and to freedom of expression and of the press, the Istanbul Assize Court had kept him in pre-trial detention. Accordingly, he also complained in correspondence of 18 January 2018 that his application to the Constitutional Court had not led to his release.
3. The third parties
(a) The Commissioner for Human Rights
96. The Commissioner for Human Rights pointed out that excessive recourse to detention was a long-standing problem in Turkey. In that connection he noted that 210 journalists had been placed in pre-trial detention during the state of emergency, not including those who had been arrested and released after being questioned. One of the underlying reasons for the high numbers of journalists being detained was the practice of judges, who often tended to disregard the exceptional nature of detention as a measure of last resort that should only be applied when all other options were deemed insufficient. In the majority of cases where journalists had been placed in pre-trial detention, they had been charged with terrorism-related offences without any evidence corroborating their involvement in terrorist activities. The Commissioner for Human Rights was struck by the weakness of the accusations and the political nature of the decisions ordering and extending pre-trial detention in such cases.
(b) The Special Rapporteur
97. The Special Rapporteur noted that since the declaration of a state of emergency, a large number of journalists had been placed in pre-trial detention on the basis of vaguely worded charges without sufficient evidence.
(c) The intervening non-governmental organisations
98. The intervening non-governmental organisations stated that since the attempted military coup, more than 150 journalists had been placed in pre-trial detention. Emphasising the crucial role played by the media in a democratic society, they criticised the use of measures depriving journalists of their liberty.
B. The Court’s assessment
1. Admissibility
99. The Court observes that it has examined and dismissed the Government’s objections that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies (see paragraphs 82-83 and 88 above).
100. The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and are not inadmissible on any other grounds. It therefore declares them admissible.
2. Merits
101. The Court reiterates firstly that Article 5 of the Convention guarantees a right of primary importance in a “democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention, namely the fundamental right to liberty and security (see Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, § 169, ECHR 2004‑II).
102. All persons are entitled to the protection of that right, that is to say, not to be deprived, or to continue to be deprived, of their liberty (see Weeks v. the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, § 40, Series A no. 114), save in accordance with the conditions specified in paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Convention. The list of exceptions set out in Article 5 § 1 is an exhaustive one (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 170, ECHR 2000‑IV), and only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the aim of that provision, namely to ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived of his or her liberty (see Assanidze, cited above, § 170; Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08, § 99, ECHR 2011; and Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755/07, § 84, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).
103. The Court further reiterates that a person may be detained under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention only in the context of criminal proceedings, for the purpose of bringing him or her before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence (see Jėčius v. Lithuania, no. 34578/97, § 50, ECHR 2000‑IX; Włoch v. Poland, no. 27785/95, § 108, ECHR 2000‑XI; and Poyraz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 21235/11, § 53, 17 February 2015). The “reasonableness” of the suspicion on which an arrest must be based forms an essential part of the safeguard laid down in Article 5 § 1 (c). Having a reasonable suspicion presupposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence. What may be regarded as “reasonable” will, however, depend upon all the circumstances (see Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, 30 August 1990, § 32, Series A no. 182; O’Hara v. the United Kingdom, no. 37555/97, § 34, ECHR 2001‑X; Korkmaz and Others v. Turkey, no. 35979/97, § 24, 21 March 2006; Süleyman Erdem v. Turkey, no. 49574/99, § 37, 19 September 2006; and Çiçek v. Turkey (dec.), no. 72774/10, § 62, 3 March 2015).
104. The Court has also held that Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention does not presuppose that the investigating authorities have obtained sufficient evidence to bring charges at the time of arrest. The purpose of questioning during detention under Article 5 § 1 (c) is to further the criminal investigation by confirming or dispelling the concrete suspicion grounding the arrest. Thus, facts which raise a suspicion need not be of the same level as those necessary to justify a conviction or even the bringing of a charge, which comes at the next stage of the process of criminal investigation (see Murray, cited above, § 55; Metin v. Turkey (dec.), no. 77479/11, § 57, 3 March 2015; and Yüksel and Others v. Turkey, nos. 55835/09 and 2 others, § 52, 31 May 2016).
105. The Court’s task is to determine whether the conditions laid down in Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, including the pursuit of the prescribed legitimate purpose, have been fulfilled in the case brought before it. In this context it is not normally for the Court to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts, which are better placed to assess the evidence adduced before them (see Ersöz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 45746/11, § 50, 17 February 2015, and Mergen and Others v. Turkey, nos. 44062/09 and 4 others, § 48, 31 May 2016).
106. In the present case the Court observes that the applicant was taken into police custody on 27 July 2016 on suspicion of belonging to a terrorist organisation and was placed in pre-trial detention on 30 July 2016. It further notes that in a bill of indictment filed on 10 April 2017 the Istanbul public prosecutor sought the applicant’s conviction for attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the government by force and violence and for committing offences on behalf of a terrorist organisation, and that the criminal proceedings are still ongoing before the Istanbul 13th Assize Court. The Court also observes that during the criminal investigation and the trial, all of the applicant’s applications for release have been rejected and that he remains in prison.
107. The Court further notes that after the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court, that court held, in a judgment of 11 January 2018 which was published in the Official Gazette on 19 January 2018, that the investigating authorities had been unable to demonstrate any factual basis that might indicate that the applicant had been acting in accordance with the aims of FETÖ/PDY. On the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the Constitutional Court held that there were no strong indications that the applicant had committed the offences with which he was charged. With regard to the application of Article 15 of the Constitution (providing for the suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms in the event of war, general mobilisation, a state of siege or a state of emergency), it concluded that the right to liberty and security would be meaningless if it were accepted that people could be placed in pre-trial detention without any strong evidence that they had committed a criminal offence. In the Constitutional Court’s view, the applicant’s deprivation of liberty was therefore disproportionate to the strict exigencies of the situation.
108. The Court observes that it has been established by the Constitutional Court that the applicant was placed and kept in pre-trial detention in breach of Article 19 § 3 of the Constitution (see paragraph 103 of the Constitutional Court’s judgment). It considers that this conclusion amounts in substance to an acknowledgment that his deprivation of liberty contravened Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. In the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court endorses the findings which the Constitutional Court reached following a thorough examination.
109. The Court’s scrutiny will therefore be limited to determining whether the national authorities afforded appropriate and sufficient redress for the violation found and whether they complied with their obligations under Article 5 of the Convention. In this connection the Court observes that although the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 19 § 3 of the Constitution, the Istanbul 13thand 14th Assize Courts refused to release the applicant when ruling at final instance on his applications for release, the 13th Assize Court finding in particular that the Constitutional Court’s judgment was not in compliance with the law and amounted to usurpation of power.
110. The Court notes that the Constitution and Law no. 6216 confer jurisdiction on the Constitutional Court to examine applications lodged, following the exhaustion of ordinary remedies, by individuals claiming that their fundamental rights and freedoms as protected by the Constitution and the Convention and Protocols thereto have been violated.
111. The Court observes that it has already examined the remedy of an individual application to the Constitutional Court under Article 5 of the Convention, in particular in the case of Koçintar v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 77429/12, 1 July 2014). In that case, after examining the remedy in question, it found that none of the material in its possession suggested that an individual application to the Constitutional Court was not capable of affording appropriate redress for the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 of the Convention, or that it did not offer reasonable prospects of success. In reaching that finding, it noted in particular that the Constitutional Court had jurisdiction to find violations of Convention provisions and was vested with appropriate powers to secure redress for violations, by granting compensation and/or indicating the means of redress; on that account the Constitutional Court could and should be able, if necessary, to prohibit the authority concerned from continuing to breach the right in question and to order it to restore, as far as possible, the status quo ante (see Koçintar, cited above, § 41). The Court observed that where the Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to liberty as guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution and the applicant remained in detention, it decided to transmit its judgment containing that finding to the appropriate court so that it could take “the necessary action”. Taking into account the binding nature of the Constitutional Court’s decisions in accordance with Article 153 § 6 of the Constitution (by which such decisions are binding on all State authorities and on all natural and legal persons), the Court found that the question of compliance in practice with that court’s decisions on individual applications should not in principle arise in Turkey and that there was no cause to doubt that the judgments in which the Constitutional Court found a violation would be effectively implemented (ibid., § 43).
112. As indicated above (see paragraphs 37-42), following the publication of the Constitutional Court’s judgment on its website (see paragraphs 39-40 above), the Istanbul 13th Assize Court, by a majority, rejected the applicant’s request for release, mainly because it considered that the Constitutional Court did not have jurisdiction to assess the evidence in the case file. Accordingly, it held the Constitutional Court’s judgment was not in compliance with the law and amounted to usurpation of power. In the Assize Court’s view, judgments of the Constitutional Court that did not comply with the law should not be deemed to be binding. It added that there was sufficient evidence against the applicant to justify keeping him in pre-trial detention but that such evidence could not be explained in detail in decisions on his continued detention, since this would prompt the risk of prejudging the case. In conclusion, seeing that the Constitutional Court’s judgment amounted to usurpation of power, it held that there was no need to give a decision on the applicant’s pre-trial detention.
113. In the light of the foregoing, it appears from developments in the domestic proceedings that, notwithstanding the Constitutional Court’s finding that the applicant’s pre-trial detention had infringed his right to liberty and security and his freedom of journalistic expression as safeguarded by the Turkish Constitution and the Convention, the assize courts refused to release him. The Court is therefore called upon to examine the extent to which this state of affairs at domestic level has a bearing on its own assessment of the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
114. The Court observes that under Turkish law, the measure of pre-trial detention is chiefly governed by Article 19 of the Constitution and Article 100 of the CCP. In this connection, it notes that the Constitutional Court’s review is essentially performed from the standpoint of Article 19 of the Constitution, whereas the criminal courts consider the matter of an individual’s detention primarily in relation to Article 100 of the CCP. It thus observes that the reasons given in the Constitutional Court’s judgment and in the decision delivered by the 13th Assize Court suggest that the criteria applied by the two courts coexist, particularly as regards the discretion to assess the evidence in the case file. In this context, the Court cannot accept the 13th Assize Court’s argument that the Constitutional Court should not have assessed the evidence in the case file. To hold otherwise would amount to maintaining that the Constitutional Court could have examined the applicant’s complaint concerning the lawfulness of his initial and continued pre-trial detention without considering the substance of the evidence produced against him.
115. Next, the Court observes that in the present case, prior to the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 11 January 2018, the Government had explicitly urged the Court to reject the applicant’s application for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, on the grounds that his individual application to the Constitutional Court was still pending (see paragraph 84 above). This argument reinforced the Government’s view that an individual application to the Constitutional Court was an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 5 of the Convention. Such a position is, moreover, consistent with the Court’s findings in the case of Koçintar (cited above). To put it briefly, the Court considers that this argument by the Government can only be interpreted as meaning that under Turkish law, if the Constitutional Court has ruled that the applicant’s pre-trial detention is in breach of the Constitution, the response by the courts with jurisdiction to rule on the issue of pre-trial detention must necessarily entail releasing him, unless new grounds and evidence justifying his continued detention are put forward. However, in the event, the 13th Assize Court rejected the application for the applicant’s release following the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 11 January 2018 by interpreting and applying domestic law in a manner departing from the approach indicated by the Government before the Court.
116. As the Court has regularly confirmed, although it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, under Article 5 § 1 failure to comply with domestic law entails a breach of the Convention, and the Court can and should therefore review whether the domestic law has been complied with (see Mooren v. Germany [GC], no. 11364/03, § 73, 9 July 2009). The Court must, moreover, ascertain whether the domestic law itself is in conformity with the Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied therein. On this last point, the Court emphasises that where deprivation of liberty is concerned, it is particularly important that the general principle of legal certainty should be satisfied (ibid., § 76). In laying down that any deprivation of liberty must be “lawful” and be effected “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”, Article 5 § 1 does not merely refer back to domestic law; like the expressions “in accordance with the law” and “prescribed by law” in the second paragraphs of Articles 8 to 11, it also relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, a concept inherent in all the Articles of the Convention. Lastly and above all, no detention which is arbitrary can be compatible with Article 5 § 1, the notion of “arbitrariness” in this context extending beyond the lack of conformity with national law. In the context of sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1, the reasoning of the decision ordering a person’s detention is a relevant factor in determining whether the detention should be regarded as arbitrary (ibid., § 77 and 79).
117. The Court observes that it has already found in the Uzun decision (cited above) that the Turkish legislature has demonstrated its intention to entrust the Constitutional Court with jurisdiction to find violations of Convention provisions and with appropriate powers to provide redress for such violations (see Uzun, cited above, §§ 62-64). Furthermore, with regard to complaints under Article 5 of the Convention, in Koçintar (cited above) the Court considered the nature and effects of decisions delivered by the Constitutional Court in accordance with the Turkish Constitution. Article 153 § 1 of the Constitution provides that the Constitutional Court’s judgments are “final”. Moreover, as the Court noted in Koçintar, Article 153 § 6 provides that decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding on the legislative, executive and judicial organs (see, to similar effect, Uzun, cited above, § 66). In the Court’s view, therefore, it is clear that the Constitutional Court forms an integral part of the judiciary within the constitutional structure of Turkey and that – as the Court has previously noted in Koçintar, and as the Government explicitly submitted before the Court in the present case – it plays an important role in protecting the right to liberty and security under Article 19 of the Constitution and Article 5 of the Convention by offering an effective remedy to individuals detained during criminal proceedings (see also Mercan, cited above, §§ 17-30).
118. On that basis, and having regard in particular to the Government’s arguments before it as to the effectiveness of an individual application to the Constitutional Court for the purposes of Article 5 of the Convention, the Court observes that the reasons given by the Istanbul 13th Assize Court in rejecting the application for the applicant’s release, following a “final” and “binding” judgment delivered by the supreme constitutional judicial authority, cannot be regarded as satisfying the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. For another court to call into question the powers conferred on a constitutional court to give final and binding judgments on individual applications runs counter to the fundamental principles of the rule of law and legal certainty. The Court reiterates that these principles, inherent in the protection afforded by Article 5 of the Convention, are the cornerstones of the guarantees against arbitrariness (see paragraph 116 above). Although the Constitutional Court transmitted its judgment to the Assize Court so that it could take “the necessary action”, the Assize Court resisted the Constitutional Court by refusing to release the applicant, with the result that the violation found by the Constitutional Court was not redressed. The Court has already stated (see paragraph 108 above) that it endorses the findings reached by the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 11 January 2018 regarding the period of pre-trial detention up to the date of that judgment. It observes that the case file discloses no new grounds or evidence showing that the basis for the detention has changed following the Constitutional Court’s judgment. In that connection, it notes in particular that the Government have not demonstrated that the evidence purportedly available to the 13th Istanbul Assize Court justifying the strong suspicion against the applicant was in fact any different from the evidence examined by the Constitutional Court. That being so, the Court considers that the applicant’s continued pre-trial detention, after the Constitutional Court had given its clear and unambiguous judgment finding a violation of Article 19 § 3 of the Constitution, cannot be regarded as “lawful” and “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” as required by the right to liberty and security.
119. Turning to the derogation by Turkey, the Court observes that the Constitutional Court expressed its position on the applicability of Article 15 of the Turkish Constitution, holding that the guarantees of the right to liberty and security would be meaningless if it were accepted that people could be placed in pre-trial detention without any strong evidence that they had committed an offence (see paragraph 109 of the Constitutional Court’s judgment). Accordingly, it found that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty was disproportionate to the strict exigencies of the situation. This conclusion is also valid for the Court’s examination. Having regard to Article 15 of the Convention and the derogation by Turkey, the Court considers, as the Constitutional Court did in its judgment, that a measure of pre-trial detention that is not “lawful” and has not been effected “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” on account of the lack of reasonable suspicion cannot be said to have been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation (see, mutatis mutandis, A. and Others, cited above, §§ 182-90). In that context, the Court notes in addition that the Government have not provided it with any evidence that could persuade it to depart from the conclusion reached by the Constitutional Court.
120. In the light of the foregoing, there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in the present case.
121. The Court would emphasise that the applicant’s continued pre-trial detention, even after the Constitutional Court’s judgment, as a result of the decisions delivered by the Istanbul 13th Assize Court, raises serious doubts as to the effectiveness of the remedy of an individual application to the Constitutional Court in cases concerning pre-trial detention. However, as matters stand, the Court will not depart from its previous finding that the right to lodge an individual application with the Constitutional Court constitutes an effective remedy in respect of complaints by persons deprived of their liberty under Article 19 of the Constitution (see Koçintar, cited above, § 44). Nevertheless, it reserves the right to examine the effectiveness of the system of individual applications to the Constitutional Court in relation to applications under Article 5 of the Convention, especially in view of any subsequent developments in the case-law of the first-instance courts, in particular the assize courts, regarding the authority of the Constitutional Court’s judgments. In that regard, it will be for the Government to prove that this remedy is effective, both in theory and in practice (see Uzun, cited above, § 71).
122. In view of its finding under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention concerning the applicant’s complaint of a lack of reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether the authorities have kept him in detention for reasons that could be regarded as “relevant” and “sufficient” to justify his initial and continued pre-trial detention under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE LACK OF A SPEEDY JUDICIAL REVIEW BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
123. The applicant submitted that the proceedings he had brought before the Constitutional Court with a view to challenging the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention had not complied with the requirements of the Convention in that the Constitutional Court had failed to observe the requirement of “speediness”. On that account he relied on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, which provides:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
124. The Government contested the applicant’s argument.
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The Government
125. First of all, the Government submitted that Turkish law contained sufficient legal safeguards enabling detainees to effectively challenge their deprivation of liberty. They noted that detainees could apply for release at any stage of the investigation or the trial and that an objection could be lodged against any decisions rejecting such applications. The question of a suspect’s continued detention was automatically reviewed at regular intervals of no more than thirty days. In that context, the Government emphasised that the Constitutional Court was not to be regarded as a court of appeal for the purposes of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
126. Next, referring to statistics on the Constitutional Court’s caseload, the Government stated that in 2012 1,342 applications had been lodged with that court; in 2013 that number had risen to 9,897, and in 2014 and 2015 respectively there had been 20,578 and 20,376 applications. Since the attempted military coup, there had been a dramatic increase in the number of applications to the Constitutional Court: a total of 103,496 applications had been lodged with it between 15 July 2016 and 9 October 2017. Bearing in mind this exceptional caseload for the Constitutional Court and the notice of derogation of 21 July 2016, the Government submitted that it could not be concluded that that court had failed to comply with the requirement of “speediness”.
2. The applicant
127. The applicant reiterated his assertion that the Constitutional Court had not given a speedy decision as required by Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
3. The third parties
(a) The Commissioner for Human Rights
128. The Commissioner for Human Rights observed that, in relation to Article 5 of the Convention, the Constitutional Court had developed an approach in line with the principles established by the Court in its own case-law. While acknowledging the size of the Constitutional Court’s caseload since the attempted military coup, he emphasised that it was essential for the proper functioning of the judicial system that that court should give its decisions speedily.
(b) The Special Rapporteur
129. The Special Rapporteur likewise noted that since the declaration of the state of emergency, the Constitutional Court had been faced with an unprecedented caseload.
(c) The intervening non-governmental organisations
130. The intervening non-governmental organisations did not make submissions on this complaint.
B. The Court’s assessment
1. Admissibility
131. The Court reiterates that it has found Article 5 § 4 of the Convention to be applicable to proceedings before domestic constitutional courts (see Smatana v. the Czech Republic, no. 18642/04, §§ 119-24, 27 September 2007, and Žúbor v. Slovakia, no. 7711/06, §§ 71‑77, 6 December 2011). Accordingly, having regard to the jurisdiction of the Turkish Constitutional Court (see, for example, Koçintar, cited above, §§ 30‑46), the Court concludes that Article 5 § 4 is also applicable to proceedings before that court.
132. The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
133. The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 4, in guaranteeing detainees a right to institute proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of their deprivation of liberty, also proclaims their right, following the institution of such proceedings, to a speedy judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of detention and ordering its termination if it proves unlawful (see Mooren, cited above, § 106,and Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826/03, § 154, 22 May 2012).
134. The question whether the right to a speedy decision has been respected must – as is the case for the “reasonable time” stipulation in Article 5 § 3 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention – be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case, including the complexity of the proceedings, their conduct by the domestic authorities and by the applicant and what was at stake for the latter (see Mooren, cited above, § 106, with further references; S.T.S. v. the Netherlands, no. 277/05, § 43, ECHR 2011; and Shcherbina v. Russia, no. 41970/11, § 62, 26 June 2014).
135. In order to determine whether the requirement that a decision be given “speedily” has been complied with, it is necessary to effect an overall assessment where the proceedings were conducted at more than one level of jurisdiction (see Navarrav. France, 23 November 1993, § 28, Series A no. 273-B, and Mooren, cited above, § 106). Where the original detention order or subsequent decisions on continued detention were given by a court (that is to say, by an independent and impartial judicial body) in a procedure offering appropriate guarantees of due process, and where the domestic law provides for a system of appeal, the Court is prepared to tolerate longer periods of review in proceedings before a second-instance court (see Lebedev v. Russia, no. 4493/04, § 96, 25 October 2007, and Shcherbina, cited above, § 65). These considerations apply a fortiori to complaints under Article 5 § 4 concerning proceedings before constitutional courts which were separate from proceedings before ordinary courts (see Žúbor, cited above, § 89). In this context, the Court notes that the proceedings before constitutional courts such as the Turkish Constitutional Court are of a specific nature. Admittedly, the Constitutional Court does review the lawfulness of an applicant’s initial and continued pre-trial detention. However, in doing so it does not act as a “fourth-instance” body but determines solely whether the decisions ordering the initial and continued detention complied with the Constitution.
136. In the present case the Court observes that the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court on 8 September 2016. On 26 October 2016 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s application for an interim measure ordering his release; it gave its final judgment on 11 January 2018. The period to be taken into consideration thus amounted to sixteen months and three days.
137. The Court observes that in the Turkish legal system, anyone in pre-trial detention may apply for release at any stage of the proceedings and may lodge an objection if the application is rejected. It notes that in the present case the applicant made several such applications for release, which were examined in conformity with the “speediness” requirement (see paragraphs 23-24 above). The Court observes in addition that the question of a suspect’s detention is automatically reviewed at regular intervals of no more than thirty days (see paragraph 60 above). In a system of that kind, the Court can tolerate longer periods of review by the Constitutional Court. Where an initial or further detention order was imposed by a court in a procedure offering appropriate guarantees of due process, the subsequent proceedings are less concerned with arbitrariness, but provide additional guarantees based primarily on an evaluation of the appropriateness of continued detention. Nevertheless, the Court considers that even in the light of those principles, in normal circumstances a period of sixteen months and three days cannot be regarded as “speedy” (see G.B. v. Switzerland, no. 27426/95, §§ 28-39, 30 November 2000; Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696/00, §§ 115-24, ECHR 2006‑XII (extracts); and Shcherbina, cited above, §§ 62‑71). However, in the present case the Court observes that the applicant’s application to the Constitutional Court was a complex one, being one of the first of a series of cases raising new and complicated issues concerning the right to liberty and security and freedom of expression under the state of emergency following the attempted military coup. Moreover, bearing in mind the Constitutional Court’s caseload following the declaration of a state of emergency, the Court notes that this is an exceptional situation.
138. That conclusion does not mean, however, that the Constitutional Court has carte blanche when dealing with any similar complaints raised under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. In accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, the Court retains its ultimate supervisory jurisdiction for complaints submitted by other applicants alleging that, after lodging an individual application with the Constitutional Court, they have not had a speedy judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of their detention.
139. In the light of the foregoing, although the duration of sixteen months and three days before the Constitutional Court could not be described as “speedy” in an ordinary context, in the specific circumstances of the case there has been no violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 5 OF THE CONVENTION
140. The applicant also complained that he had not had access to an effective remedy by which he could have obtained compensation for the damage sustained on account of his pre-trial detention. He alleged a violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention, which provides:
“5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”
141. The Government contested the applicant’s argument. They stated that two remedies had been available to the applicant, namely a claim for compensation from the State under Article 141 § 1 of the CCP and an individual application to the Constitutional Court. In their submission, these remedies were capable of affording redress in respect of the complaint concerning the applicant’s pre-trial detention.
142. The applicant submitted that the remedies suggested by the Government were not effective.
143. The intervening parties made no submissions on this complaint.
144. The Court reiterates that the right to compensation set forth in Article 5 § 5 of the Convention presupposes that a violation of one of the other paragraphs of that Article has been established, either by a domestic authority or by the Convention institutions (see N.C. v. Italy [GC], no. 24952/94, § 49, ECHR 2002‑X). In the present case, it remains to be determined whether the applicant had the opportunity to claim compensation for the damage sustained.
145. In so far as this complaint concerns Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, the Court considers that in view of the absence of a finding of a violation of that provision in its conclusions set out in paragraphs 133-39 above, the complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention for the purposes of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
146. The Court observes that it has already found a violation of Article 5 § 1. Regarding the possibility of claiming compensation for that violation, the Court notes that Article 141 of the CCP does not specifically provide for a compensation claim for damage sustained by a person as a result of the lack of reasonable suspicion that he or she has committed a criminal offence. In that connection, the Government have failed to produce any judicial decision concerning the award of compensation, on the basis of this provision of the CCP, to anyone in a similar position to the applicant.
147. The Court considers, however, that the same cannot be said of the possibility of claiming compensation before the Constitutional Court. It reiterates that the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to order redress in the form of an award of compensation (see paragraph 111 above). The Court further observes that in a judgment delivered on the same day as the one in the present case, likewise concerning a journalist in pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court awarded compensation to the applicant in respect of the violations it had found (application no. 2016/23672).
148. The Court therefore considers that the applicant had a remedy by which he could have obtained compensation in respect of his complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
149. The applicant also complained of interference with his freedom of expression, in breach of Article 10 of the Convention, on account of his initial and continued pre-trial detention. Article 10 provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
150. The Government contested the applicant’s argument.
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The Government
151. The Government argued firstly that the applicant’s complaint under Article 10 should be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, given that the criminal proceedings brought against him were still ongoing.
152. Next, the Government submitted that the order for the applicant’s pre-trial detention did not constitute interference within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention, since the subject matter of the proceedings instituted against him did not relate to his activities as a journalist. In that connection, they emphasised that the applicant had been placed and kept in pre-trial detention on suspicion of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the government through force and violence, and committing offences on behalf of an armed terrorist organisation without being a member of it.
153. The Government submitted that, should the Court nevertheless conclude that there had been an interference, it should in any event find that the interference had been “prescribed by law”, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been “necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve that aim, and therefore justified.
154. To that end, they noted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been provided for in Article 309 § 1, Article 311 § 1 and Article 314 §§ 1 and 2 of the CC. Furthermore, the impugned interference had pursued several aims for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention, namely protection of national security or public safety, and prevention of disorder and crime.
155. As to whether the interference had been necessary in a democratic society, the Government submitted that by making use of the opportunities available in democratic systems, terrorist organisations were able to form numerous ostensibly legal structures in order to achieve their aims. In the Government’s view, the criminal investigations into individuals operating within such structures could not be said to concern their professional activities. In that regard, FETÖ/PDY was a complex, sui generis terrorist organisation carrying out activities under the guise of lawfulness. Against this background, the FETÖ/PDY media wing was primarily concerned with legitimising the organisation’s activities by manipulating public opinion. The Government emphasised that the applicant had been placed in pre-trial detention in the context of an investigation of that nature.
156. The Government further contended that rights and freedoms could not be used to destroy other rights and freedoms. In that context, emphasising that the offending articles by the applicant had promoted an armed terrorist organisation and had constituted incitement to violence, the Government maintained that the use of the media as a tool for destroying fundamental freedoms could not be tolerated. Accordingly, they submitted that the interference complained of had been proportionate and necessary in a democratic society.
2. The applicant
157. The applicant submitted that his pre-trial detention, without any concrete evidence that he had committed the alleged offences, amounted to unjustified interference with his freedom of expression.
3. The third parties
(a) The Commissioner for Human Rights
158. Relying mainly on the findings made during his visits to Turkey in April and September 2016, the Commissioner for Human Rights noted firstly that he had repeatedly highlighted the widespread violations of freedom of expression and media freedom in Turkey. He expressed the view that Turkish prosecutors and courts interpreted anti-terrorism legislation in a very broad manner. Many journalists expressing dissent or criticism against the government authorities had been placed in pre-trial detention purely on account of their journalistic activities, without any concrete evidence. The Commissioner for Human Rights thus rejected the Government’s assertion that the criminal proceedings instituted against journalists were unconnected to their professional activities, finding that it lacked credibility in that often the only evidence included in investigation files concerning journalists related to their journalistic activities.
159. In addition, the Commissioner for Human Rights submitted that neither the attempted coup nor the dangers represented by terrorist organisations could justify measures entailing severe interference with media freedom, such as the measures he had criticised.
(b) The Special Rapporteur
160. The Special Rapporteur submitted that anti-terrorism legislation had long been used in Turkey against journalists expressing critical opinions about government policies. Nevertheless, since the declaration of the state of emergency, the right to freedom of expression had been weakened even further. Since 15 July 2016, 231 journalists had been arrested and more than 150 remained in prison.
161. The Special Rapporteur stated that any interference would contravene Article 10 of the Convention unless it was “prescribed by law”. It was not sufficient for a measure to have a basis in domestic law; regard should also be had to the quality of the law. Accordingly, the persons concerned had to be able to foresee the consequences of the law in their case, and domestic law had to provide certain safeguards against arbitrary interference with freedom of expression.
162. In the Special Rapporteur’s submission, the combination of facts surrounding the prosecution of journalists suggested that, under the pretext of combating terrorism, the national authorities were widely and arbitrarily suppressing freedom of expression through prosecutions and detention.
(c) The intervening non-governmental organisations
163. The intervening non-governmental organisations submitted that restrictions on media freedom had become significantly more pronounced and prevalent since the attempted military coup. Stressing the important role played by the media in a democratic society, they stated that journalists were often detained for dealing with matters of public interest. They complained on that account of arbitrary recourse to measures involving the detention of journalists. In their submission, detaining a journalist for expressing opinions that did not entail incitement to terrorist violence amounted to an unjustified interference with the journalist’s exercise of the right to freedom of expression.
B. The Court’s assessment
1. Admissibility
164. With regard to the Government’s objection that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as the criminal proceedings against him were still ongoing in the domestic courts, the Court considers that the objection raises issues that are closely linked to the examination of whether there has been an interference with the applicant’s exercise of his right to freedom to of expression, and hence to the examination of the merits of his complaint under Article 10 of the Convention. The Court will therefore analyse this question in the context of its examination on the merits.
165. In the present case, the Court observes that the Constitutional Court found violations of Articles 26 and 28 of the Turkish Constitution on account of the applicant’s initial and continued pre-trial detention and awarded him compensation by way of redress for those violations. However, despite the Constitutional Court’s judgment, the competent assize courts rejected the applicant’s application for release. Accordingly, the Court considers that the judgment did not afford appropriate and sufficient redress to the applicant and did not deprive him of his “victim” status.
166. The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
(a) Whether there was an interference
167. The Court refers first of all to its case-law to the effect that certain circumstances with a chilling effect on freedom of expression will confer on applicants who have yet to be convicted in a final judgment the status of victims of an interference with the freedom in question (see Dink v. Turkey, nos. 2668/07 and 4 others, § 105, 14 September 2010; Altuğ Taner Akçam v. Turkey, no.27520/07, §§ 70-75, 25 October 2011; and Nedim Şenerv. Turkey, no. 38270/11, § 94, 8 July 2014).
168. In the present case, the Court observes that criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the government by force and violence, and of committing offences on behalf of an armed terrorist organisation without being a member of it. The criminal proceedings brought against the applicant on that account are still ongoing, and he has remained in pre-trial detention for more than one year and six months.
169. The Court also notes that in its judgment of 11 January 2018, the Constitutional Court held that the applicant’s detention on account of his articles amounted to interference with the exercise of his right to freedom of expression and of the press. The Court endorses this particular finding by the Constitutional Court.
170. The Court considers, in the light of the Constitutional Court’s judgment, that the applicant’s pre-trial detention accordingly constitutes an “interference” with his right to freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention (see Şık v. Turkey, no. 53413/11, § 85, 8 July 2014).
171. For the same reasons, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of the complaints under Article 10 of the Convention.
(b) Whether the interference was justified
172. The Court reiterates that an interference will breach Article 10 of the Convention unless it satisfies the requirements of the second paragraph of that Article. It therefore remains to be determined whether the interference observed in the present case was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 and was “necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve them.
173. In this connection, the Court reiterates that the expression “prescribed by law”, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, requires firstly that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law; it also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the person concerned, who must moreover be able to foresee its consequences, and that it should be compatible with the rule of law (see Müller and Others v. Switzerland, 24 May 1988, § 29, Series A no. 133).
174. In the present case, none of the parties disputed that the applicant’s pre-trial detention had had a legal basis, namely the relevant provisions of the CC and the CCP.
175. The question then arising is whether the interpretation and application of the provisions of the CC may reduce their accessibility and foreseeability. In the present case, given that the public prosecutor, in bringing the charges against the applicant, and the judges, in deciding to keep him in pre-trial detention, interpreted those provisions as covering the articles written by him, the Court considers that serious doubts may arise as to whether he could have foreseen his initial and continued pre-trial detention on the basis of Articles 309, 311 and 312 in conjunction with Article 220 § 6 of the CC. However, in view of its findings below concerning the necessity of the interference, the Court considers that it does not have to settle this question.
176. As regards the “legitimate aim” pursued by the interference, the Court is prepared to accept that it was intended to prevent disorder and crime. It thus remains to be determined whether the interference was “necessary” to achieve those aims.
177. In the present case the Court observes that the Constitutional Court concluded that the applicant’s initial and continued pre-trial detention, following his expression of his opinions, constituted a severe measure that could not be regarded as a necessary and proportionate interference in a democratic society for the purposes of Articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution. Finding that the judges concerned had not shown that depriving the applicant of his liberty met a pressing social need, the Constitutional Court held that in so far as his detention was not based on any concrete evidence other than his articles, it could have had a chilling effect on freedom of expression and of the press (see paragraph 33 above).
178. In the circumstances of the case, the Court can see no reason to reach a different conclusion from that of the Constitutional Court. In this connection, it also refers to its own conclusions under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see paragraphs 106-20 above).
179. Against this background, the Court notes that the intervening parties highlighted the existence of a general problem in Turkey concerning the interpretation of anti-terrorism legislation by prosecutors and the competent courts. They submitted that journalists were often subjected to severe measures such as detention for dealing with matters of public interest. The Court notes in this connection that it has consistently held that where the views expressed do not constitute incitement to violence – in other words, unless they advocate recourse to violent actions or bloody revenge, justify the commission of terrorist acts in pursuit of their supporters’ goals and can be interpreted as likely to encourage violence by instilling deep-seated and irrational hatred towards specified individuals – the Contracting States cannot restrict the right of the public to be informed of them, even with reference to the aims set out in Article 10 § 2, namely the protection of territorial integrity or national security or the prevention of disorder or crime (see Sürek v. Turkey (no. 4) [GC], no. 24762/94, § 60, 8 July 1999, and Şık,cited above, § 85).
180. The Court is prepared to take into account the circumstances surrounding the cases brought before it, in particular the difficulties facing Turkey in the aftermath of the attempted military coup. The coup attempt and other terrorist acts have clearly posed a major threat to democracy in Turkey. In this connection, the Court attaches considerable weight to the conclusions of the Constitutional Court, which noted, among other things, that the fact that the attempt had taken place at a time when Turkey had been under violent attack from numerous terrorist organisations had made the country even more vulnerable (see paragraph 64 above). However, the Court considers that one of the principal characteristics of democracy is the possibility it offers of resolving problems through public debate. It has emphasised on many occasions that democracy thrives on freedom of expression (see, among other authorities, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 57, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 129, ECHR 2012; and Party for a Democratic Society (DTP) and Others v. Turkey, nos. 3840/10 and 6 others, § 74, 12 January 2016). In this context, the existence of a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” must not serve as a pretext for limiting freedom of political debate, which is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society. In the Court’s view, even in a state of emergency – which is, as the Constitutional Court noted, a legal regime whose aim is to restore the normal regime by guaranteeing fundamental rights (see paragraph 64 above) – the Contracting States must bear in mind that any measures taken should seek to protect the democratic order from the threats to it, and every effort must be made to safeguard the values of a democratic society, such as pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness.
181. In this context, the Court considers that criticism of governments and publication of information regarded by a country’s leaders as endangering national interests should not attract criminal charges for particularly serious offences such as belonging to or assisting a terrorist organisation, attempting to overthrow the government or the constitutional order or disseminating terrorist propaganda. Moreover, even where such serious charges have been brought, pre-trial detention should only be used as an exceptional measure of last resort when all other measures have proved incapable of fully guaranteeing the proper conduct of proceedings. Should this not be the case, the national courts’ interpretation cannot be regarded as acceptable.
182. The Court further notes that the pre-trial detention of anyone expressing critical views produces a range of adverse effects, both for the detainees themselves and for society as a whole, since the imposition of a measure entailing deprivation of liberty, as in the present case, will inevitably have a chilling effect on freedom of expression by intimidating civil society and silencing dissenting voices (see, to similar effect, paragraph 140 of the Constitutional Court’s judgment). The Court further notes that a chilling effect of this kind may be produced even when the detainee is subsequently acquitted (see Şık, cited above, § 83).
183. Lastly, with regard to the derogation by Turkey, the Court refers to its findings in paragraph 119 of this judgment. In the absence of any strong reasons to depart from its assessment concerning the application of Article 15 in relation to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Court considers that these conclusions are also valid in the context of its examination under Article 10.
184. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
VII. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 18 OF THE CONVENTION
185. On the basis of the same facts and relying on Article 18 of the Convention, the applicant complained that he had been detained for expressing critical opinions about the government authorities.
Article 18 of the Convention reads as follows:
“The restrictions permitted under [the] Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.”
186. Having regard to the conclusions reached above under Article 5 § 1 and Article 10 of the Convention, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine this complaint separately.
VIII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
187. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
188. In respect of non-pecuniary damage, the applicant claimed 1,000 euros (EUR) for each day he had spent in detention.
189. The Government submitted that this claim was unfounded and that the amount claimed was excessive.
190. The Court reiterates that, in the context of the execution of judgments in accordance with Article 46 of the Convention, a judgment in which it finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation under that provision to put an end to the breach and to make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach. If, on the other hand, national law does not allow – or allows only partial – reparation to be made for the consequences of the breach, Article 41 empowers the Court to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate. It follows, inter alia, that a judgment in which the Court finds a violation of the Convention or its Protocols imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and make all feasible reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach (see Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 47, ECHR 2004‑I; Assanidze, cited above, § 198; Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 487, ECHR 2004‑VII; and Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, no. 40984/07, § 172, 22 April 2010).
191. Furthermore, it follows from the Convention, and from Article 1 in particular, that in ratifying the Convention the Contracting States undertake to ensure that their domestic legislation is compatible with it. Consequently, it is for the respondent State to remove any obstacles in its domestic legal system that might prevent the applicant’s situation from being adequately redressed(see Maestri, cited above, § 47, and Assanidze, cited above, § 199).
192. In the present case, as regards non-pecuniary damage, the Court considers that the violation of the Convention has indisputably caused the applicant substantial harm. Accordingly, making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court finds it appropriate to award the applicant EUR 21,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
193. Concerning the measures to be adopted by the respondent State (see paragraph 189 above), subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, to put an end to the violations found, the Court reiterates that its judgments are essentially declaratory in nature and that, in general, it is primarily for the State concerned to choose the means to be used in its domestic legal order to discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court’s judgment. This discretion as to the manner of execution of a judgment reflects the freedom of choice attaching to the primary obligation of the Contracting States under the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed (see, among other authorities, Fatullayev, cited above, § 173, and the case-law cited therein).
194. Nevertheless, where the nature of the violation found is such as to leave no real choice as to the measures required to remedy it, the Court may decide to indicate only one individual measure, as it did in the cases of Assanidze (cited above, §§ 202-03); Ilaşcu and Others (cited above, § 490); Aleksanyan v. Russia (no. 46468/06, §§ 239-40, 22 December 2008); Fatullayev (cited above, §§ 176-77); and Del Río Pradav. Spain ([GC], no. 42750/09, §§ 138-39, ECHR 2013). In the light of its approach in those cases, it considers that any continuation of the applicant’s pre-trial detention in the present case will entail a prolongation of the violation of Article 5 § 1 and a breach of the obligations on respondent States to abide by the Court’s judgment in accordance with Article 46 § 1 of the Convention.
195. Accordingly, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the reasons for its finding of a violation and the urgent need to put an end to the violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Court considers that the respondent State must ensure the termination of the applicant’s pre-trial detention at the earliest possible date.
B. Costs and expenses
196. The applicant did not seek reimbursement of any costs and expenses incurred before the Convention institutions and/or the domestic courts. That being so, the Court considers that no sum is to be awarded on that account to the applicant.
C. Default interest
197. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Joins to the merits, by a majority, the preliminary objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of the complaint under Article 10 of the Convention and dismisses it;
2. Declares, by a majority, the application admissible as regards the complaints under Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4 and Article 10 of the Convention;
3. Declares inadmissible, unanimously, the complaint under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention;
4. Holds, by six votes to one, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention;
5. Holds, unanimously, that there is no need to examine separately the complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;
6. Holds, unanimously, that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;
7. Holds, by six votes to one, that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention;
8. Holds, unanimously, that there is no need to examine separately the complaint under Article 18 of the Convention;
9. Holds, by six votes to one,
(a) that the respondent State is to take all necessary measures to put an end to the applicant’s pre-trial detention;
(b) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 21,500 (twenty-one thousand five hundred euros), to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(c) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
10. Dismisses, unanimously, the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in French, and notified in writing on 20 March 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Robert Spano
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) Concurring opinion of Judge Spano joined by Judges Bianku, Vučinić, Lemmens and Griţco;
(b) Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Ergül.
R.S.
S.H.N.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE SPANO JOINED BY JUDGES BIANKU, VUČINIĆ, LEMMENS AND GRIŢCO
1. Today the Court delivers important judgments on the merits in cases brought by two prominent journalists detained in Turkey after the attempted coup d’état of 15 July 2016. I agree with every word in the Court’s forceful reasoning. However, I write separately to comment on the arguments made by the ad hoc national judge in his dissenting opinion, which I respectfully disagree with, in particular his views on the principle of subsidiarity (see in particular paragraphs 2, 21, 23 and 24 of his opinion).
2. The principle of subsidiarity encapsulates a norm of power distribution between the Court and the member States, with the ultimate aim of securing to every person who finds himself or herself within the jurisdiction of a State the rights and freedoms provided by the Convention. Importantly, it is not the Strasbourg Court that is entrusted with the day-to-day responsibility of securing Convention rights; it is the member States. In other words, in accordance with Article 1 of the Convention, it is the national authorities which are the primary guarantors of human rights, subject to the supervision of the Court. When the member States fulfil their Convention role by applying in good faith the general principles deriving from the Court’s case-law, the principle of subsidiarity implies that the Court may defer to their findings in a particular case. Its aim is thus to incentivise national authorities to fulfil their obligations to secure Convention rights, thus raising the overall level of human rights protection in the European legal space.
3. The Court’s powers and jurisdictional competence are entrenched in Articles 19 and 32 of the Convention. It is the Court that is the final arbiter of the scope and content of the Convention. Member States demonstrate with their actions, in particular the reasoning provided by national courts, whether deference is due under the principle of subsidiarity. It follows that the operationalisation of the principle towards a more process-based review of domestic decision-making, within the conceptual framework of the margin of appreciation doctrine, does not in any way limit the Court’s competence to ultimately review substantive findings at national level at the stage of the application of Convention principles embedded in the domestic legal systems. In short and to be clear, the robust and coherent application of the principle of subsidiarity by the Court has nothing to do with taking power away from the Court.
4. Moreover, as flows directly from the language of Article 15 of the Convention, these principles apply equally where a State is confronted with a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Such a situation does not give States carte blanche. In other words, a state of emergency is not an open invitation to member States to erode the foundations of a democratic society based on the rule of law and the protection of human rights. Only measures which are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation can be justified under the Convention, and it is ultimately for the Court to pass judgment at the European level on whether such justification has been adequately demonstrated on the facts.
5. Finally, the member States are under an international-law obligation, finding its expression in Article 46 of the Convention, to execute judgments rendered by the Court. When a State has decided to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention and at the same time has decided to come within the jurisdiction of the Court, this obligation to execute the Court’s judgments becomes mandatory and without exception. It follows that it is now for the competent Turkish authorities to faithfully and expeditiously execute today’s judgments under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers in a manner consistent with Turkey’s obligations under the Convention.
PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ERGÜL
(Translation)
I
1. I fully agree with my colleagues’ conclusion that the complaints alleging a violation of Article 5 §§ 3, 4 and 5 and Article 18 of the Convention should be rejected as inadmissible, or as disclosing no violation, or for any of the other reasons given in the judgment. However, I regret that I am unable to join the majority of the Court in finding that Article 5 § 1 and Article 10 of the Convention are both admissible and have been violated. I therefore disagree with the majority’s findings of a violation for two reasons, one relating to admissibility and the other to the merits.
2. Regarding admissibility, I would first like to reiterate the well-established principles and settled case-law in this area. Article 35 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: “The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted ...” It follows that in the Convention system, the domestic courts are the ordinary courts in relation to Convention law. They are entrusted with primary responsibility for enforcing the rights safeguarded by the Convention. This equates to the principle of subsidiarity, which underpins the Convention system (Frédéric Sudre, Droit européen et international des droits de l’homme, 9th edition, PUF, Paris 2008, p. 204). The Court has repeatedly stated that “the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights” (see Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24; Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69-70, 25 March 2014; and Brusco v. Italy (dec.), no. 69789/01, ECHR 2001‑IX). The Convention leaves it first and foremost to the national authorities – and more specifically, the courts with jurisdiction in matters relating to the Convention – to secure the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it enshrines. The Convention is therefore of a secondary nature in relation to national legislation, and its fundamental rules are in no way intended to replace the rules of domestic law. This rule is based on the assumption, reflected in Article 13 of the Convention – with which it has close affinity – that there is an effective remedy available in respect of the alleged breach in the domestic system. In this way, it is an important aspect of the principle that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights (see Vučković and Others, cited above, §§ 69-70, and Brusco, cited above).
3. According to the Court’s case-law, in a legal system designed to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, it is incumbent on the aggrieved individual to test the extent of such protection (see Mirazović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), no. 13628/03, 16 May 2006, and Independent News and Media and Independent Newspapers Ireland Limited v. Ireland (dec.), no. 55120/00, 19 June 2003). Furthermore, the applicant’s compliance with the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies is normally assessed with reference to the date on which the application was lodged with the Court (see Baumann v. France, no. 33592/96, § 47, ECHR 2001‑V (extracts)). Nevertheless, in certain exceptional cases “the Court accepts that the last stage of such remedies may be reached shortly after the lodging of the application but before it determines the issue of admissibility” (see Karoussiotis v. Portugal, no. 23205/08, § 57, ECHR 2011 (extracts)). Moreover, according to the Court’s case-law, the existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of success of a particular remedy which is not obviously futile is not a valid reason for failing to exhaust domestic remedies (see Vučković and Others, cited above, § 74). In my view, the last-mentioned principle should apply mutatis mutandis to a situation where the applicant has applied to the Court while his case was pending before a domestic court offering an effective remedy.
4. With regard to an individual application to the Constitutional Court, the Court has already held that it “can see no reason to doubt the legislature’s intention – as manifested in the explanatory report on the constitutional amendments ... – to ensure identical protection to that provided by the Convention machinery: Law no. 6216 expressly states that the [Turkish Constitutional Court’s] jurisdiction ratione materiae covers the fundamental rights and freedoms safeguarded by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Protocols thereto, such rights and freedoms also featuring in the Turkish Constitution itself” (see Uzun v. Turkey (dec.), no. 10755/13, § 62, 30 April 2013).
5. In the present case, the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court on 8 September 2016. He also applied to the European Court on 28 February 2017, under Article 34 of the Convention, while his application was still pending before the Constitutional Court. On 11 January 2018 the Constitutional Court gave a judgment in which it held, by eleven votes to six, that there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security and the right to freedom of expression and of the press. Therefore, the applicant did not await the outcome of his individual application to the Constitutional Court.
II
6. An examination of this case in the light of the above principles reveals, firstly, that the applicant has not satisfied the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Furthermore, in my opinion, the approach taken in Karoussiotis v. Portugal and other cases cited in the judgment cannot be applied to the present case. The case involves a specific legal system for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and individual applications to the Turkish Constitutional Court are regarded as effective remedies that must be used before an application can be lodged with the Court, as the Court has consistently held (see Uzun, cited above, and Mercan v. Turkey (dec.), no. 56511/16, 8 November 2016).
7. In addition, the European Court’s examination the present case cannot lead to a finding that the Constitutional Court has given judgment and that domestic remedies have therefore been exhausted. Instead, since the Constitutional Court’s judgment was in the applicant’s favour, he could no longer claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention in this case. As the Court has consistently held, “where the national authorities have found a violation and their decision constitutes appropriate and sufficient redress, the party concerned can no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention” and “[w]hen those two conditions are satisfied, the subsidiary nature of the protective mechanism of the Convention precludes an examination by the Court” (see Eckle v. Germany, 15 July 1982, §§ 64-70, Series A no. 51; Caraher v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 24520/94, ECHR 2000-I; Hay v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 41894/98, ECHR 2000-XI; Cataldo v. Italy (dec.), no. 45656/99, ECHR 2004-VI, Göktepe v. Turkey (dec.), no. 64731/01, 26 April 2005; and Yüksel v. Turkey (dec.), no. 51902/08, § 46, 9 April 2013).
8. Regarding the assize courts’ decisions refusing to release the applicant following the Constitutional Court’s judgment, he will certainly be entitled to apply to the Court anew once the Constitutional Court has given its judgment on the assize courts’ refusal. Indeed, on 30 January 2018 the applicant lodged a fresh individual application with the Constitutional Court, relying on Articles 5, 6 and 18 of the Convention and complaining mainly about his continued pre-trial detention despite the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 11 January 2018. The Constitutional Court has decided to treat the applicant’s application as a priority.
9. Hence, the reasons given by the majority to justify their position in the present case were unable to persuade me that the settled case-law and well-established principles outlined above should be disregarded. I can therefore see no reason to depart from the above-mentioned case-law and general principles in the present case.
10. According to the Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey: “Having regard to the absolute supremacy of the will of the nation, sovereignty is vested fully and unconditionally in the Turkish nation and no individual or body authorised to exercise such sovereignty in the name of the nation may interfere with the liberal democracy enshrined in the Constitution or the legal order instituted in accordance with its requirements”. The above principles from the Preamble correspond to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights referred to in the Preamble to the Statute of the Council of Europe, of which Turkey is one of the founding members. Unfortunately, on 15 July 2016 an attempted coup in Turkey flouted those principles and sought to suppress fundamental rights and freedoms and to disregard the will of the nation.
III
11. As to the merits, I would like first of all to stress the scale and the severity of the threat to Turkey during the night of 15 July 2016. It involved a bloody attempted military coup by members of a sui generis terrorist organisation that had infiltrated all areas of society and the State apparatus. There has never been such a serious threat to the life of the nation, democracy and fundamental rights in any of the States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights.
12. During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a faction of the Turkish armed forces linked to a terrorist organisation known as FETÖ/PDY (“Gülenist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure”) attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically elected government and President of Turkey and ending democracy. The organisation had already been declared a terrorist organisation in a court judgment and in an advisory decision by the National Security Council. The coup instigators issued a statement on behalf of the “Peace at Home Council”, announcing that martial law and a curfew had been declared throughout national territory. They also stated that the Turkish Grand National Assembly had been overthrown, that all political parties’ activities had been terminated and that all the police had been placed under the control of the martial-law commanders.
13. Using helicopters and fighter planes, the coup instigators attacked and bombarded a large number of locations, including the Turkish Grand National Assembly building, thepresidential compound, the Security Directorate headquarters, the Special Operations Command of the national police and the National Intelligence Organisation headquarters in the capital city, Ankara. They also attacked the hotel where the President was staying. Several senior military officers, including the Chief of General Staff and the commanders of the armed forces, were held hostage. In addition, the bridges over the Bosphorus linking Europe and Asia were sealed off, as were Istanbul’s airports, by tanks and armoured vehicles. Many public institutions in locations across the country were occupied, or attempts were made to occupy them. During the coup attempt, various institutions and organisations, such as the Türksat satellite communications and cable television operations company, were attacked with the aim of interrupting television broadcasts and Internet access throughout the country. The premises of certain private television broadcasters were occupied and attempt were made to interrupt their broadcasts.
14. The coup attempt was rejected by representatives of all constitutional authorities, first and foremost the President and also the Prime Minister and the Constitutional Court. At the President’s urging, the people gathered in the streets and public squares to act against the coup leaders. The security forces, acting under the orders and instructions of the legitimate authorities, took steps to counter the attempted coup. All political parties represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, together with civil-society organisations, condemned the despicable coup attempt and declared that they would not accept any undemocratic government. The civilians who gathered in public squares and the streets resisted the coup participants alongside the security forces, despite the attacks from fighter planes, helicopters, tanks, other armoured vehicles and weapons deployed by the coup leaders. As the judgment points out, hundreds of civilians lost their lives in these attacks and thousands of people were injured, most of them civilians.
15. The prosecuting authorities acted promptly in initiating investigations in respect of those taking part in the attempted coup; this is worth highlighting, since the coup had not yet been foiled. As a result, the attempted coup was entirely averted on 16 July thanks to the efforts of the legitimate constitutional institutions and national solidarity. Moreover, millions of citizens organised overnight democracy vigils in city squares for about a month in protest against the attempted coup.
IV
16. It should be borne in mind that the Statute of the Council of Europe affirms, in its Preamble, the member States’ conviction “that the pursuit of peace based upon justice and international cooperation is vital for the preservation of human society and civilisation”. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), a great thinker, legal scholar, historical philosopher and sociologist and the founder of the science of civilisation (umran), explains in his masterpiece Muqaddimah that “one cannot imagine a [State] without civilisation, while a civilisation without [a State or] authority is impossible” (Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah: an Introduction to History, IV, 19, translated by Franz Rosenthal, Princeton University Classics, 1967) and that human rights violations (or injustices) ruin civilisation, and the ruin of civilisation leads to the complete destruction of the State (ibid., III, 41). Despite the difference in eras, some striking similarities can be noted between the two perspectives. These words and principles assume full significance during a state of emergency following an attempted military coup. In order to assess the severity of the threat posed by an attempted military coup, consideration should also be given to the risks that might have arisen had the coup attempt not been foiled. Practice has shown that the most serious violations of fundamental rights tend to occur during such periods. Moreover, the alarming conditions in a number of States dominated by regimes installed as a result of a military coup and the tragic situation in such societies, at the present time and throughout the world, corroborate the aforementioned great thinker’s observations and the Council of Europe’s founding principles. By preventing this serious public emergency threatening the life of the nation, the Turkish people have demonstrated how a people can preserve democracy, the rule of law and civilisation and take control of its own destiny.
17. Consideration should be given to the fact that Turkey gave notice of a derogation from the Convention under Article 15 on 21 July 2016 following the declaration of the state of emergency. I share the majority’s opinion that the first formal requirement is easily satisfied, and also that, in view of the wide margin of appreciation left to the national authorities in this sphere, the attempted military coup undoubtedly gave rise to a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” within the meaning of Article 15 of the Convention. Furthermore, the applicant’s complaints do not concern rights from which no derogation is permitted. As regards the proportionality of the measures taken in the context of the derogation, I differ from the majority, since in my view this point warrants a careful examination in the light of the threat to the life of the nation and to the rule of law, democracy, the constitutional order and human rights in Turkey.
18. In a judgment delivered before the attempted coup, the Turkish courts found that FETÖ/PDY was an armed terrorist organisation (Erzincan Assize Court, judgment of 16 June 2016,). Furthermore, judgments delivered after 15 July 2016 have established a link between this terrorist organisation and the attempted coup. The conclusions reached on this point by the Criminal Division of the Plenary Court of Cassation are fairly instructive: “From the first years of the organisation’s existence ... it appears from statements by individuals who were formerly active in the organisation that their goal was to take control of all constitutional institutions (legislature, executive, judiciary) of the Republic of Turkey, and at the same time to become a major political/economic power with an international impact by taking advantage of pupils who were trained in accordance with their principles and aims in educational establishments set up abroad and in Turkey through funds collected by way of ‘favour’ (himmet), and by making use of the economic and political power thus acquired to promote the organisation’s interests and their ideology.” The Criminal Division went on to observe: “It is understood that FETÖ/PDY uses public powers that should be under State control to further its own organisational interests. After going through various stages, members of the organisation embarking on a career – while remaining FETÖ/PDY soldiers and maintaining very strong links to that organisation – within the Turkish armed forces, the police and the National Intelligence Organisation are required to undergo ideological training so that they are ready to exploit their own authorisation to use weapons and force in following the orders of this illegal organisational hierarchy. A person in this position is [described] as a servant by the head of the organisation: ‘persons linked to the service must be determined, persistent, obedient, responsible for everything, must not falter when attacked, must prioritise their rank within the service over their own rank when they have attained a high rank, must be aware that the duties to be accomplished can be difficult in the service, and must be ready to sacrifice their entire existence, life and love for the service [that is, the terrorist organisation] ...” According to the judicial authorities’ findings, the following three principles have been established as FETÖ’s working principles: confidentiality, intra-organisational solidarity and strict hierarchical relations. FETÖ’s complex organisation is based on the principle of confidentiality, which it has faithfully observed since its creation, from the lowest cell to the highest branches.
19. On 20 July 2016 a state of emergency was declared for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016 to safeguard democracy, human rights and the rule of law, to remove elements that had infiltrated the State authorities and to eliminate any potential threats in future. The state of emergency has subsequently been extended several times by the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President, most recently with effect from 19 January 2018. On each occasion a notice of derogation from the Convention under Article 15 has been transmitted to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
20. In practice, the investigations and judicial proceedings and court judgments have shown that FETÖ/PDY is a complex, sui generis terrorist organisation carrying out its activities under a cloak of legality. In this context, the FETÖ/PDY media wing has played a significant role in legitimising the actions that gave rise to this organisation’s despicable attempted military coup by manipulating public opinion. The applicant was placed in pre-trial detention in the context of an investigation into the organisation’s media wing.
V
21. The attempted military coup and its aftermath, together with other terrorist acts, have posed severe dangers to the democratic constitutional order, human rights and public security and order, amounting to a threat to the life of the nation within the meaning of Article 15 of the Convention. The applicant’s complaints should therefore be assessed with due regard to the notice of derogation issued on 21 July 2016 (and subsequently reiterated) under Article 15 of the Convention. The Court has found that the attempted military coup created a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” within the meaning of the Convention. However, it reached a different conclusion concerning the proportionality of the measures, without giving detailed reasons. In the assessment of proportionality, two dimensions must be taken into account. Firstly, it must be borne in mind that the applicant’s complaints relate only to rights from which a derogation is permitted. That being so, the State should have had a greater margin of appreciation and the Court should have had regard to the risks and the difficulties with which the State was confronted.
22. Next, the Court’s assessment should not give rise to a legal hierarchy between rights from which a derogation is permitted. As was emphasised in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by consensus at the World Conference on Human Rights by the representatives of 171 States on 25 June 1993, a legal hierarchy between human rights should not in principle be accepted: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.” However, Article 15 of the Convention does provide for a kind of hierarchy between right by classifying rights as derogable and non-derogable. Despite the clarity of the text of Article 15, a conclusion that creates a legal hierarchy between rights from which a derogation is permitted will run counter to the concern for practicality expressed by the drafters of the Convention. The derogation mechanism seeks to promote the balance which States must ensure between respect for human rights and preservation of the life of their nation.
23. In addition, it should be determined whether there is a sufficient basis to conclude that the measure of pre-trial detention linked to a right that remains within the scope of the derogation is strictly required by the exigencies of the situation of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. In that regard, several factors are known to the Court, such as the severity of the threat to the life of the nation, the fact that the complaint concerns a judicial measure against which an objection may be lodged, the extreme complexity of the case concerning the media wing of the terrorist organisation behind the severe threat, the significant role of the FETÖ/PDY media wing in concealing the organisation’s illegal activities and in legitimising the actions that gave rise to the despicable attempted military coup, the declaration of a state of emergency on account of the coup attempt and its extension since 21 July 2016, on each occasion with the approval of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. On account of those factors, and as the case is strictly linked to the incidents that gave rise to the state of emergency and the derogation, it has to be concluded that the measures taken were strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. For that reason, the derogation relating to an exceptionally severe threat should have prevailed in the assessment of the merits of the case.
24. In conclusion, I consider that in the circumstances of the case, even though it concerned Articles 5 and 10 of the Convention, the subsidiarity principle should have prevailed in the context of admissibility. In addition, the derogation relating to an exceptionally severe threat should have prevailed in the assessment of the merits of the case. Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, and contrary to the majority, I conclude that there has been no violation of the provisions of the Convention.