Centar za pravnu pomoć u ime Valentina Câmpeanua protiv Rumunije

Država na koju se presuda odnosi
Rumunija
Institucija
Evropski sud za ljudska prava
Broj predstavke
47848/08
Stepen važnosti
Referentni slučaj
Jezik
Bosanski
Datum
17.07.2014
Članovi
2
2-1
13
13+2
34
46
46-2
Kršenje
2
2-1
13
13+2
Nekršenje
nije relevantno
Ključne reči po HUDOC/UN
(Čl. 2) Pravo na život
(Čl. 2) Pozitivne obaveze
(Čl. 2-1) Efikasna istraga
(Čl. 2-1 / ICCPR-6) Život
(Čl. 13) Pravo na delotvorni pravni lek
(Čl. 13 / CAT-13 / ICCPR-2 / CEDAW-2f) Delotvorni pravni lek
(Čl. 34) Pojedinačne predstavke
(Čl. 34) Locus standi
(Čl. 46) Obaveznost i izvršenje presuda
(Čl. 46-2) Izvršenje presude
(Čl. 46-2) Mere opšteg karaktera
Tematske ključne reči
VS deskriptori
Zbirke
Sudska praksa
Presuda ESLJP
Veliko veće
Sažetak
Predstavku je podnela nevladina organizacija, Centar za pravne resurse (Centre for Legal Resources - CLR) u ime mladog Roma g. Câmpeanu koji je preminuo 2004. godine kada je imao 18 godina.

G. Câmpeanu je po rođenju, kada ga je napustila majka, smešten u sirotište. Dok je još bio dete uspostavljena mu je dijagnoza kao HIV pozitivnom pacijetnu i pacijentu koji ima teško duševno oboljenje. Kada je odrastao, g. Câmpeanu morao je napustiti centar za decu sa smetnjama u razvoju gde je do tada boravio i prošao je kroz niz procena sa ciljem da se smesti u neku specijalizovanu instituciju. Nakon što je niz institucija odbilo da ga primi zbog stanja u kome je bio, na kraju je primljen u centar za medicinsku i socijalnu zaštitu, gde je utvrđeno da je u stanju duboke psihijatrijske i fizičke degradacije, da nije dobijao antiretrovirusnu terapiju i da je neuhranjen. Nekoliko dana kasnije primljen je u psihijatrijsku bolnicu nakon što je ispoljio hiper-agresivno ponašanje. Ta bolnica je ranije navela da ne poseduje kapacitete za pacijente sa HIV-om. Tamo ga je video tim posmatrača iz CLR koji su izvestili da su ga zatekli samog u sobi bez grejanja sa krevetom bez posteljine obučenog samo u gornji dio pidžame. Iako nije mogao bez pomoći da jede niti da koristi toalet, bolničko osoblje odbijalo je da mu pomogne iz straha da će se zaraziti HIV-om. On je odbijao hranu i lekove tako da je samo dobijao glukozu putem infuzije. Posmatrači CLR zaključili su da mu bolnica nije obezbedila najosnovnije lečenje i negu. G. Câmpeanu preminuo je iste večeri.

Prema izvještaju CPT, iz 2004. godine, tokom zime 2003. i 2004. godine 109 pacijenata je umrlo u sumnjivim okolnostima u psihijatrijskoj bolnici o kojoj je ovde reč, pri čemu je najznačajniji uzrok smrti bio srčani zastoj, infarkt miokarda i bronhopneumonia, dok je prosečna starost pacijenata koji su preminuli bila 56 godina, a određeni broj pacijenata bio je mlađi od 40 godina. CPT je utvrdio da nekima od tih pacijenata nije pružena dovoljna njega. Takođe je konstatovano da postoji nedostatak ljudskih i materijalnih resursa u toj bolnici, te da postoje nedostaci u kvalitetu i količini hrane, a i da nema grejanja.

Pravo - Član 34: Sud je odbacio prethodni prigovor Vlade da CLR nema pravni legitimitet da podnese predstavku. Sud je prihvatio da CLR ne može da se smatra žrtvom navodnih povreda Konvencije, pošto je nesporno direktna žrtva bio g. Câmpeanu, a CLR nije pokazao dovoljno "blisku vezu" sa njim niti je pokazao "lični interes" da se o njegovim pritužbama raspravlja pred Sudom da bi se mogao smatrati posrednom žrtvom. Međutim, u izuzetnim okolnostima predmeta i s obzirom na težinu navoda, mora se omogućiti CLR da bude zastupnik g. Câmpeanu iako nema punomoćje da deluje u njegovo ime i iako je g. Câmpeanu preminuo pre nego što je predstavka podnešena.

Našavši kako je navedeno, Sud je konstatovao da se predmet odnosi na mladog Roma u izuzetno osetljivom stanju koji je bolovao od teških duševnih oboljenja, bio zaražen HIV-om i proveo čitav svoj život pod zaštitom države, a preminuo u bolnici zbog navodnog zanemarivanja. S obzirom na njegovu izuzetnu osetljivost, g. Câmpeanu nije mogao da pokrene postupak pred domaćim sudovima bez odgovarajuće pravne podrške i saveta. U vreme smrti g. Câmpeanu nije imao poznatih rođaka. Nakon što je preminuo, CLR je pokrenuo postupak pred domaćim sudovima sa ciljem da rasvetli okolnosti njegove smrti. Od velikog je značaja bilo i to što pred domaćim zdravstvenim i sudskim vlastima nisu ni na koji način ispitivani niti osporavani ni kapacitet CLR da deluje u ime g. Câmpeanu niti zastupanje g. Câmpeanu od strane CLR-a. Država nije postavila kompetentno lice ili staratelja da se brine za njegove interese iako je imala zakonsku obavezu da to uradi. CLR se uključio tek nedugo pre smrti g. Câmpeanu - u vreme kada on sasvim jasno nije mogao da izrazi bilo kakve želje ili stavove u vezi sa svojim potrebama i interesima, a kamoli da potraži bilo kakve pravne lekove. Kada bi se utvrdilo da CLR ne može da zastupa g. Câmpeanu u ovim okolnostima to bi sa sobom nosilo rizik da bi tuženoj državi bilo dozvoljeno da izbegne odgovornost svojim sopstvenim propustom da postupi u skladu sa svojom zakonskom obavezom da postavi pravnog zastupnika.

Nadalje, davanje legitimiteta CLR-u da istupa kao zastupnik g. Câmpeanu bilo je u skladu sa pristupom Suda u predmetima koji se odnose na pravo na sudsku reviziju po članu 5 stav 4 Konvencije u slučaju "duševno poremećenih lica" (član 5 stav 1 (e)). U takvim slučajevima, od suštinskog je značaja bilo da je trebalo da ta lica imaju pristup sudu i mogućnost da budu saslušani lično ili, ako je potrebno, preko nekog oblika zastupanja. CLR je stoga imalo legitimitet kao de facto zastupnik g. Câmpeanu.
Zaključak: prethodni prigovor odbijen (jednoglasno)

Član 2: Odluke o tome gde će biti smešten g. Câmpeanu uglavnom su se zasnivale na tome koja je ustanova voljna da ga primi, a ne na tome gde će on moći da dobije odgovarajuću zdravstvenu negu i podršku.
Sud je istakao da je čitav svoj život g. Câmpeanu bio u rukama vlasti koje su stoga imale obavezu da se pobrinu za njegovo lečenje. Vlasti su bile svesne užasnih uslova u psihijatrijskog bolnici gde su nedostatak grejanja i odgovarajuće hrane, te nedovoljnost medicinskog osoblja i lekova vodile do povećanja u broju preminulih tokom zime 2003. godine. Međutim, njihova je reakcija bila neadekvatna. Odlučivši da g. Câmpeanu smeste u tu bolnicu bez obzira na to što je već bio u izuzetno osjetljivom stanju, vlasti su nerazumno ugrozile njegov život, a kontinuirano nepružanje odgovarajuće nege i lečenja od strane medicinskog osoblja, bio je samo još jedan odlučujući faktor koji je doveo do njegove prevremene smrti. Sve u svemu, vlasti nisu pružile potrebni standard zaštite života g. Câmpeanu.
Zaključak: utvrđuje se povreda Konvencije (jednoglasno)

Sud je takođe jednoglasno utvrdio povredu procesnog dela člana 2 zbog toga što tužena država nije sprovela delotvornu istragu okolnosti vezanih za smrt g. Câmpeanu, te povredu člana 13 u vezi sa članom 2 zbog toga što nije obezbeđen i realizovan odgovarajući pravni okvir koji bi omogućio da navode g. Câmpeanu vezane za povrede njegovog prava na život ispita nezavisan organ.

Član 46: Preporučuje se da Rumunija predvidi opšte mere kojima će se obezbediti da duševno obolela lica u sličnim situacijama imaju nezavisnog zastupnika koji će im omogućiti da njihove pritužbe po Konvenciji, a u vezi njihovog zdravlja i lečenja ispita sud ili neki drugi nezavisni organ.

Preuzmite presudu u pdf formatu

 EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA  

VELIKO VIJEĆE

CENTAR ZA PRAVNU POMOĆ U IME VALENTINA CÂMPEANUA protiv RUMUNIJE

(Predstavka br. 47848/08)

PRESUDA

STRASBOURG

17. juli 2014.

Ova presuda je konačna ali može biti predmetom redakcijskih izmjena.

U predmetu Centar za pravnu pomoć u ime Valentina Câmpeanua protiv Rumunije, Evropski sud za ljudska prava, zasjedajući u Velikom vijeću u sastavu:

Dean Spielmann, predsjednik,
Guido Raimondi,
Ineta Ziemele,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
Alvina Gyulumyan,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Luis López Guerra,
Ledi Bianku,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Kristina Pardalos,
Vincent A. de Gaetano,
Angelika Nußberger,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Paul Mahoney,
Johannes Silvis, sudije,
i Michael O’Boyle, zamjenik registrara,

nakon vijećanja zatvorenih za javnost, koja su održana 4. septembra 2013. i 26. maja 2014., donosi sljedeću presudu, koja je usvojena posljednjeg spomenutog datuma:

POSTUPAK

  1. Postupak u ovom predmetu pokrenut je temeljem predstavke (br. 47848/08) protiv Rumunije, koju je Sudu podnijela rumunska nevladina organizacija, Centar za pravnu pomoć (“CLR”) u ime gospodina Valentina Câmpeanua 2. oktobra 2008., u skladu sa članom 34. Konvencije o zaštiti ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda (“Konvencija”).
  2. Organizaciju Interights, koja je do 27. maja 2014. djelovala kao savjetnik advokata CLR-a, zastupao je gospodin C. Cojocariu, advokat iz Londona. Vladu Rumunije (“Vlada”) je zastupala njezina zastupnica, gospođa C. Brumar, iz Ministarstva vanjskih poslova.
  3. CLR je, u ime Valentina Câmpeanua, tvrdio da je potonji bio žrtva povreda članova 2., 3., 5., 8., 13. i 14. Konvencije.
  4. Dana 7. juna 2011. Vlada je obaviještena o podnesenoj predstavci. Odlučeno je, također, da će se istovremeno odlučivati o dopuštenosti i osnovanosti predstavke (član 29., stav1.).
  5. Zaprimljena su i pisana očitovanja organizacija Human Rights Watch, Euroregionalni centar za javne inicijative, bugarski Helsinški komitet i Centar za zagovaranje prava osoba sa mentalnim smetnjama, kojima je predsjednik Vijeća dozvolio ovu vrstu intervencije u postupku (član 36., stav 2. Konvencije i Pravilo 44., stav 3. Poslovnika Suda). Povjerenik za ljudska prava pri Vijeću Evrope iskoristio je svoje pravo učešća u postupku i dostavio svoja pismena očitovanja (član 36., stav 3. Konvencije i Pravilo 44., stav 2.). Vlada se izjasnila u vezi s tim očitovanjima (Pravilo 44., stav 5.).
  6. Javna rasprava je održana 4. septembra 2013. u Zgradi ljudskih prava u Strasbourgu (Pravilo 59., stav 3.).

Pred Sudom su se pojavili:

(a) u ime Vlade
gđa C. BRUMAR, agentica,
g. G. CAIAN, advokat,
g. D. DUMITRACHE, ko-agent;

(b) u ime CLR-a
gđa G. IORGULESCU, izvršna direktorica CLR,
gđa G. PASCU, voditeljica programa CLR,
g. C. COJOCARIU, pravnik, Interights, advokat;

(c) u ime Povjerenika za ljudska prava pri Vijeću Evrope
g. N. MUIŽNIEKS, povjerenik za ljudska prava,
gđa I. GACHET, direktorica, Ured povjerenika za ljudska prava,
gđa A. WEBER, savjetnica, Ured povjerenika za ljudska prava.

Sud je saslušao obraćanja gđe Brumar, g. Caiana, g. Cojocariua, gđe  Iorgulescu i g. Muižnieksa.

Gđa Brumar, g. Cojocariu i gđa  Iorgulescu su naknadno odgovorili na pitanja koja im je uputio Sud.

ČINJENICE

I.  OKOLNOSTI SLUČAJA

A.  Smrt Valentina Câmpeanua

1.  Činjenična pozadina

  1. Valentin Câmpeanu, po etničkoj pripadnosti Rom, rođen je 15. septembra 1985. godine. Otac je nepoznat, a majka, Florica Câmpeanu, koja je umrla 2001. godine, napustila ga je po rođenju. G. Câmpeanu je potom smješten u sirotište, Corlate Centre, gdje je odrastao. Godine 1990. je ustanovljeno da je g. Câmpeanu HIV pozitivan. Kasnije su mu dijagnosticirane “ozbiljne intelektualne poteškoće, IQ od 30 i HIV”, na temelju čega je klasificiran u grupu osoba s “teškim” invaliditetom. S vremenom je razvio s tim povezane simptome kao što su plućna tuberkuloza, upala pluća i hronični hepatitis. U martu 1992. godine prebačen je u Centar za hendikepiranu djecu u Craiovi, a nešto kasnije u Centar br. 7 u Craiovi (“Centar za skrb”).

2.  Medicinski pregledi 2003. -2004. godine

  1. Dana 30. septembra 2003. Odbor za zaštitu djece Okruga Dolj (“Odbor”) naložio je da se g. Câmpeanu ukine državno staranje. Odluku je temeljio na činjenici da je g. Câmpeanu nedavno bio navršio osamnaest godina i da u to vrijeme nije pohađao nijedan vid obrazovanja. Premda je socijalni radnik koji je radio sa g. Câmpeanuom preporučio da se on prebaci u lokalni Centar za neuropsihološki oporavak i rehabilitaciju, Odbor je naložio da nadležni socijalni radnik poduzme sve neophodne mjere i da g. Câmpeanua prebaci u neuropsihijatrijsku bolnicu Poiana Mare (“PMH”). Prema mjerodavnom pravu, na ovu odluku se mogla uložiti žalba pred Okružnim sudom u Craiovi. G. Câmpeanu nije bio lično prisutan niti ga je neko zastupao na sastanku Odbora.
  2. Dana 14. oktobra 2003. Odbor Vijeća za zdravstvenu procjenu odraslih osoba s invaliditetom Okruga Dolj napravio je ponovnu procjenu zdravstvenog stanja g. Câmpeanua. Procjenom je ustanovljen isključivo HIV, koji potpada u grupaciju “prosječnog” invaliditeta. Navedeno je, također, da je pacijent “socijalno integriran”.
  3. Nakon toga, tačno neutvrđenog datuma u oktobru ili novembru 2003. godine, socijalni radnik i doktor iz Centra za staranje proveli su procjenu zdravstvenog i socijalnog stanja g. Câmpeanua, kao preduvjet za prijem u Centar za zdravstvenu i socijalnu njegu. U rubrici “Zakonski staratelj” naveli su “napušten po rođenju”, dok je rubrika “Kontakt osobe u slučaju nužde” ostavljena prazna. U dijagnozi se navodi da pati od “ozbiljnih mentalnih poteškoća, da je HIV-pozitivan”, bez ikakvog osvrta na prethodnu dijagnozu (v. stav 9. ove presude). U izvještaju o procjeni navedeno je sljedeće: “zahtijeva nadzor i povremenu pomoć i ličnu njegu”, a izvještaj završava navodom da je g. Câmpeanu u stanju da se stara o sebi, ali isto tako, da zahtijeva značajnu podršku.
  4. Pismom od 16. oktobra 2003. PMH je informirala Odbor da nije u prilici prihvatiti g. Câmpeanua, kojemu su dijagnosticirani HIV i mentalne poteškoće, jer bolnica nema potrebna odjeljenja za liječenje pojedinaca sa takvom dijagnozom.
  5. Nakon te odbijenice, između oktobra 2003. i januara 2004., Odbor i Okružni odjel za zaštitu prava djece (“Odjel za zaštitu djece”) kontaktirali su niz ustanova, tražeći pomoć u pronalaženju socijalne njege ili psihijatrijske ustanove koja bi bila voljna prihvatiti g. Câmpeanua. Iako se navodi da je MNH odbila prihvatiti pacijenta zato što je imao HIV, Odjel za zaštitu djece je od dotičnih ustanova tražio saradnju, ističući da zdravstveno stanje g. Câmpeanua ne zahtijeva neophodno hospitalizaciju već kontinuirani nadzor u specijaliziranoj ustanovi”.

3.  Prihvat u Cetate Centar za zdravstvenu i socijalnu skrb

  1. Odbor je na koncu pronašao Cetate Centar za zdravstvenu i socijalnu skrb u Dolju (“CMSC”) kao primjerenu ustanovu u koju bi se Valentin Câmpeanu mogao smjestiti. U svom zahtjevu upućenom CMSC-u, Odbor je samo naveo da je g. Câmpeanu HIV pozitivan, te da po klasifikaciji spada u kategoriju prosječnog invaliditeta, ne ukazujući na poteškoće koje je imao u učenju.
  2. Dana 5. februara 2004. g. Câmpeanu je bio primljen u CMSC. Prema zapisniku koji je CMSC sastavio i dostavio CLR-u 5. marta 2004, a u kojem se detaljno opisuje njegovo stanje prilikom prijema, g. Câmpeanu je bio u poodmakloj fazi “psiho-somatske degradacije”, obučen u dronjavu trenerku, bez donjeg rublja ili cipela i bez ikakvih antiretrovirusnih lijekova (“ARV”) ili informacija o njegovom zdravstvenom stanju. Navedeno je da je pacijent “odbio saradnju”. U svojoj izjavi koju je dala tužitelju 22. jula 2004. u kontekstu domaćeg postupka (opisan u djelu B u nastavku), M. V., doktorica koja je liječila g. Câmpeanua u Centru za staranje, svoj propust da mu dâ lijekove ili informacije opravdavala je time što nije znala hoće li se, ovisno o rezultatima najnovijih pretraga (v. stav 9. ove presude), njegov tretman možda morati modificirati. Zdravstvenim pregledom, koji je izvršen prilikom prijema g. Câmpeanua u CMSC, zaključeno je da je patio od “ozbiljnih mentalnih poteškoća, HIV infekcije i pothranjenosti”. U to vrijeme bio je visok 168 cm i imao je 45 kilograma. Naglašeno je da se “nije mogao orijentirati u prostoru i vremenu, da nije mogao jesti niti samostalno voditi računa o ličnoj higijeni”.
  3. Tokom večeri, 6. februara 2004., g. Câmpeanu se uzrujao. Prema ranije spomenutom zapisniku CMSC-a (v. stav 14. Ove presude), u jutarnjim satima, 7. februara 2004., “postao je nasilan, napadao je druge pacijente, razbio je prozor i pocijepao madrac, svoju odjeću i plahte.” Da bi ga smirili, dati su mu fenobarbital, a potom i dijazepam.

4.  Pretrage u psihijatrijskoj bolnici Poiana Mare (PHM)

  1. Dana 9. februara 2004. g. Câmpeanu je odveden  u Neuropsihijatrijsku bolnicu Poiana Mare (PMH) na pregled, uspostavljanje dijagnoze i liječenje, budući da je to bila najbliža psihijatrijska ustanova. Potvrđena mu je dijagnoza “ozbiljnih intelektualnih poteškoća”. Međutim, njegovo stanje nije opisano kao “hitno psihijatrijsko stanje”, budući da “nije bio uznemiren”. Dr L. G. mu je dijagnosticirao “srednje intelektualne poteškoće” i propisao mu sedative (karbamazepin i dijazepam). Prema medicinskom kartonu u PMH-u, od g. Câmpeanua se prilikom prijema nisu mogle dobiti nikakve informacije o njegovoj medicinskoj historiji jer je “odbio saradnju”. U izjavi koju je dala istražnim organima, 8. decembra 2005., dr D. M. iz PMH-a je navela da je pacijent bio drugačiji po tome “što se s njim nije moglo komunicirati i da je mentalno zaostao u razvoju”.

5.  Povratak u CMSC

  1. G. Câmpeanu se vratio u CMSC istog dana, ali se njegovo zdravstveno stanje značajno pogoršalo. Tog dana je CMSC zaprimio isporuku ARV lijekova, nakon čega je nastavljen njegov tretman liječenja ARV lijekovima. Uprkos ovim mjerama, njegovo stanje se nije poboljšalo, a iz zdravstvenog kartona proizilazi da je i dalje bio “uzrujan” i “nasilan”.
  2. CMSC je odlučio, budući da nije imao odgovarajuće odjeljenje za liječenje g. Câmpeanua, da je nemoguće da ga tamo zadrže. Bolnica je uputila zahtjev Centru za skrb, tražeći da ga upute u neku drugu ustanovu. Međutim, Centar za skrb je odbio taj zahtjev uz obrazloženje da on više nije u “njihovoj nadležnosti”.
  3. Dana 11. februara 2004. E. O., direktorica CMSC, navodno je nazvala Odjel za javno zdravstvo Okruga Dolj i tražila da pronađu rješenje kojim će se omogućiti da se g. Câmpeanu prebaci u primjereniju ustanovu koja može osigurati tretman za njegove zdravstvene probleme. Čini se da joj je sugerirano da ga prebace u PMH na period od 5 dana na psihijatrijsko liječenje.

6.  Transfer u PMH

  1. Dana 13. februara 2004. g. Câmpeanu je prebačen iz CMSC-a u PMH, s namjerom da mu se u toku 3-4 dana boravka tamo pokuša osigurati tretman za njegovo hiperagresivno ponašanje. Smješten je na psihijatrijsko odjeljenje V.
  2. Dana 15. februara 2004. g. Câmpeanu je povjeren doktorici L. G. S obzirom da je g. Câmpeanu bio HIV pozitivan, doktorica ga je odlučila prebaciti u psihijatrijsko odjeljenje VI. Ostala je glavna doktorica zadužena za njegovo psihijatrijsko liječenje, s obzirom da u tom odjeljenju nije bilo psihijatara već samo dva ljekara opće prakse.
  3. Dana 19. februara 2004. g. Câmpeanu je prestao jesti i odbio uzimati lijekove. Zbog toga mu je propisan intravenozni tretman, koji je obuhvatao glukozu i vitamine. Nakon što ga je doktor pregledao, ustanovljeno je da “generalno nije dobro”.

7.  Posjeta osoblja iz CLR-a

  1. Dana 20. februara 2004. godine psihijatrijsku bolnicu Poiana Mare je posjetio tim posmatrača iz CLR-a, koji je obaviješten o stanju g. Câmpeanua. Prema informacijama koje su članovi tima iz CLR-a zabilježili u izvještaju, g. Câmpeanu je bio sam u izoliranoj sobi bez grijanja, koja je bila zaključavana i u kojoj se nalazio samo jedan krevet bez posteljine. Na sebi je imao samo gornji dio pidžame. U to vrijeme nije bio u stanju samostalno jesti ili koristiti toalet. Međutim, osoblje PMH-a mu je odbilo pružiti pomoć, navodno zbog straha od zaraze HIV-om. Prema tome, jedina hrana koju je g. Câmpeanu unosio u organizam bila je glukoza koja mu je administrirana kroz drip. U izvještaju se zaključuje da mu bolnica nije pružila najosnovnije usluge liječenja i njege. Predstavnici CLR-a su istakli da su tražili da se odmah prebaci u Bolnicu za infektivne bolesti u Craiovi, gdje je mogao dobiti odgovarajući tretman. Međutim, direktor bolnice je odbio taj zahtjev, uvjeren da pacijent ne predstavlja “hitni već socijalni slučaj” i da, u svakom slučaju, ne bio izdržao putovanje.
  2. Valentin Câmpeanu je preminuo u večer 20. februara 2004. godine. Prema smrtnom listu koji je izdat 23. februara 2004. godine, neposredni uzrok smrti bila je kardiorespiratorna insuficijencija. U potvrdi je također navedeno da je HIV infekcija bila „izvorna bolest“, dok su navedene „intelektualne poteškoće“ predstavljale samo „još jedno veoma važno oboljenje“.
  3. Uprkos zakonskim odredbama koje propisuju obavezu provođenja obdukcije u slučaju kada smrt nastupi u psihijatrijskog bolnici (Zajednički nalog Ministarstva pravde i Ministarstva zdravstva br. 1134/255/2000), PMH nije provela obdukciju tijela, navodeći “da se nije smatralo da je smrt nastupila u sumnjivim okolnostima, s obzirom na dva veoma ozbiljna stanja od kojih je pacijent bolovao” (intelektualne poteškoće i HIV infekcija).
  4. Još uvijek neupoznati sa smrću g. Câmpeanua, 21. februara 2004. godine, CLR je napisao niz urgentnih pisama i poslao ih brojnim lokalnim i centralnim službenicima, između ostalog i ministru zdravstva, prefektu Okruga Dolj, gradonačelniku Poiana Marea i direktoru Odjeljenja za javno zdravstvo Okruga Dolj, naglašavajući izuzetno kritično stanje g. Câmpeanua i činjenicu da je prebačen u ustanovu koja mu ne može pružiti odgovarajuću njegu u smislu tretmana za HIV. CLR je nadalje kritizirao neadekvatan tretman koji mu je pružen i tražio da se poduzmu hitne mjere kako bi se riješila ova situacija. Naveli su, također, da su primanjem g. Câmpeanua u CMSC i njegovim naknadnim transferom na PMH povrijeđena njegova ljudska prava, te zatražio da se u tom smislu pokrene odgovarajuća istraga. Dana 22. februara 2004. godine, CLR je izdao saopćenje za javnost u kojem je naglasio uvjete i tretmane koji dobijaju pacijenti u PMH-u, naročito se osvrćući na slučaj g. Câmpeanua i pozivajući na hitne mjere.

B.  Domaći postupak

1.  Krivične prijave koje je podnio CLR

  1. U dopisu od 15. juna 2004. godine upućenom glavnom tužitelju Rumunije CLR je tražio informacije o fazi postupka koji je uslijedio nakon podnošenja krivične prijave, koja je ovoj ustanovi podnesena 23. februara 2004. u vezi sa okolnostima koje su dovele do smrti Valentina Câmpeanua. U svojoj tužbi su istakli da g. Câmpeanu nije bio smješten u adekvatnu medicinsku ustanovu, shodno svom zdravstvenom i mentalnom stanju.
  2. Istog dana CLR je podnio još dvije krivične prijave, jednu tužilaštvu pri Okružnom sudu u Craiovi, a drugu tužilaštvu pri Županijskom sudu u Craiovi. CLR je ponovio svoj zahtjev za provođenje krivične istrage u vezi s okolnostima koje su se ticale i u konačnici dovele do smrti g. Câmpeanua, navodeći da su počinjena sljedeća krivična djela:

(i)  nemar, u odnosu na uposlenike Odjela za zaštitu djece i Centra za staranje (član 249., stav 1. Krivičnog zakona);

(ii)  činjenje i nečinjenje uposlenika CMSC-a u odnosu na interese osobe i ugrožavanje osobe koja nije u stanju da se sama brine za sebe (članovi 246. i 314. Krivičnog zakona); i

(iii)  ubistvo iz nehata ili ugrožavanje osobe koja nije u stanju da se sama brine za sebe od strane osoblja PMH-a (član 178., stav 2. i član 314. Krivičnog zakona).

CLR je nadalje tvrdio da je Odbor za ljekarske preglede pogrešno klasificirao g. Câmpeanua u kategoriju osoba srednjeg invaliditeta, suprotno ranijim i naknadnim dijagnozama (v. stav 9. ove presude). S druge strane, Odjel za zaštitu djece propustio je pokrenuti postupak za imenovanje skrbnika kada je g. Câmpeanu dosegao punoljetstvo, kršeći time primjenjivo zakonodavstvo. Štaviše, Centar za staranje je propustio dostaviti neophodne ARV lijekove osoblju CMSC-a kada je g. Câmpeanu prebačen tamo, 5. februara 2004., što je možda izazvalo njegovu smrt dvije sedmice kasnije. CLR je također tvrdio da je prebacivanje iz CMSC-a u PMH bilo nepotrebno, nepravilno i suprotno mjerodavnim zakonima, budući da je prema Zakonu o pravima pacijenata (Zakon br. 46/2003) za ovakvu mjeru neophodna saglasnost pacijenta ili njegovog pravnog zastupnika, a koje u ovom slučaju nije bilo. Konačno, CLR je tvrdio da g. Câmpeanu nije dobio adekvatnu njegu, tretman ili ishranu u PMH-u.

  1. Dana 22. augusta 2004. godine Ured glavnog tužitelja obavijestio je CLR da je predmet upućen tužilaštvu pri Okružnom sudu u Dolju na istragu. Dana 31. augusta 2004. godine tužilaštvo pri Okružnom sudu u Dolju je informiralo CLR da je u odgovoru na krivičnu tužbu otvoren krivični spis i da je za provođenje istrage nadležan Krivično-istražni odjel Okružne policijske uprave u Dolju (“Policijska uprava”).

2.  Forenzički izvještaj

  1. Dana 14. septembra 2004., na zahtjev tužilaštva, Institut forenzičke medicine u Craiovi izradio je forenzički izvještaj. Na temelju dostavljene medicinske dokumentacije, u izvještaju je zaključeno:

“ Propisan je medicinski tretman za [pacijentov] HIV i za njegovo psihijatrijsko oboljenje, koji je ispravan i primjeren u pogledu doze i primjeren pacijentovom kliničkom i imunološkom stanju.

Ne može se utvrditi je li pacijent zaista uzimao propisane lijekove, s obzirom na njegovo uznapredovalo stanje psihosomatskog propadanja.”

  1. Dana 22. oktobra 2004. godine tijelo Valentina Câmpeanua je ekshumirano i provedena je obdukcija. Forenzički izvještaj je izdat naknadno, 2. februara 2005. godine, u kojem je zabilježeno da je su na tijelu pronađeni znakovi uznapredovale kaheksije i zaključeno sljedeće:

“... smrt nije bila nasilna. Nastala je uslijed kardiorespiratorne insuficijencije koja je prouzrokovana upalom pluća, što je komplikacija koja je nastala uslijed uznapredovale infekcije HIV virusom. Prilikom ekshumacije nisu uočeni nikakvi znakovi nasilja.”

3.  Odluke tužilaštava

  1. Dana 19. jula 2005. godine tužilaštvo pri Okružnom sudu u Dolju donijelo je odluku o nepokretanju krivičnog postupka, smatrajući između ostalog, da je, prema predočenim dokazima, medicinska terapija koja je pružena pacijentu bila odgovarajuća i da smrt g. Câmpeanu nije bila nasilna već da je uzrokovana komplikacijama koje su nastale uslijed uznapredovale infekcije HIV virusom.
  2. Dana 8. augusta 2005. godine CLR je podnio žalbu na tu odluku glavnom tužitelju tužiteljstva pri Okružnom sudu u Dolju, tvrdeći, između ostalog, da neki od njihovih podnesaka, koji se odnose na liječnički tretman pacijenta, navodni prekid ARV tretmana i životne uvjete u bolnici, uopće nisu bili ispitani. Dana 23. augusta 2005. godine glavni tužilac je uvažio tužbu, ukidajući time odluku od 19. jula 2005. i naložio je ponovno otvaranje istrage kako bi se ispitali svi aspekti predmeta. Date su i konkretne instrukcije u smislu medicinskih dokumenata koje treba pribaviti od Bolnice za infektivne bolesti u Craiovi, Centra za staranje, CMSC-a i PMH-a i ispitati. Doktore koji su liječili g. Câmpeanua trebalo je ispitati. Trebalo je razjasniti okolnosti u kojima je ARV tretman bio ili nije bio pružan pacijentu dok je boravio u CMSC-u i u PMH-u, naročito zato što u medicinskoj dokumentaciji u PMH-u nema nikakvog spomena o tome.
  3. Dana 11. decembra 2006. godine tužilaštvo pri Okružnom sudu u Dolju odlučilo je da, u skladu sa novim proceduralnim pravilima koja su na snazi, nema nadležnost za provođenje istrage te je predmet uputilo tužilaštvu pri Okružnom sudu u Calafatu.

4.  Disciplinski postupak

  1. Dana 11. januara 2006. policijska uprava zatražila je od Medicinskog udruženja Okruga Dolj (“Medicinsko udruženje”) da daju svoje mišljenje o tome “je li terapeutski pristup [koji je usvojen] bio ispravan s obzirom na dijagnozu [utvrđenu u obdukcijskom nalazu] odnosno, da li on sadrži bilo kakve naznake nesavjesnog liječenja.” Dana 20. jula 2006. godine Disciplinski odbor Medicinskog udruženja ustanovio je da nema osnova za poduzimanje disciplinski mjera protiv osoblja PMH-a:

“... psihotropno liječenje, kao što je navedeno u bilješkama sa kliničkih opservacija na PMH-u, bilo je primjereno... [i stoga] ... zaprimljene informacije ukazuju da su liječničke odluke bile ispravne i da nema nikakve sumnje na medicinske pogreške [u smislu] nepravilnog tretiranja oportunističke infekcije povezane s HIV-om.”

Policijska uprava je osporavala ovu odluku ali je 23. novembra 2006. njihova žalba odbačena kao neblagovremena.

5.  Nova odluka o neprocesuiranju i naknadnih žalbi

  1. Dana 30. marta 2007. tužilaštvo pri Okružnom sudu u Calafatu donijelo je novu odluku o neprocesuiranju. Tužilac se u svom obrazloženju oslonio na dokaze izvedene u spisu i na odluku Disciplinskog odbora Medicinskog udruženja.
  2. CLR je uložio žalbu protiv ove odluke, navodeći da je većina instrukcija koje su navedene u odluci glavnog tužitelja od 23. augusta 2005 (v. stav 33. ove presude) zanemarena. Glavni tužilac tužilaštva pri Okružnom sudu u Calafatu je odbio ovu žalbu 4. juna 2007. godine. Kratko obrazloženje odluke odnosilo se na zaključke forenzičkog nalaza od 14. septembra 2004. i odluku Medicinskog udruženja od 20. jula 2006. godine. Dana 10. augusta 2007. godine CLR je ovu odluku osporio pred Okružnim sudom u Calafatu. 
  3. Dana 3. oktobra 2007. Okružni sud u Calafatu je prihvatio žalbu, ukidajući time odluke od 30. marta 2007. i 4. juna 2007. godine, te naložio ponovno otvaranje istrage, konstatirajući da brojni aspekti smrti g. Câmpeanua nisu bili ispitani i da u tom smislu treba pribaviti više dokaza. Nedostaci koje je sud istakao bili su sljedeći: većina dokumenata koje je trebalo pribaviti iz Bolnice za infektivne bolesti u Craiovi i Centru za skrb nisu dodani u spis (forenzički nalaz na osnovu kojeg je g. Câmpeanu primljen u CMSC i prebačen u PMH; izvršeni klinički i paraklinički testovi; zapisnik o ispitivanju ljekara i medicinskih sestara koje su vodili brigu o g. Câmpeanuu; i smjernice za testiranje HIV-a). Kontradikcije u izjavama onih koji su sudjelovali u prijemu g. Câmpeanua u CMSC nisu pojašnjene, kao ni okolnosti u kojima je došlo do prekida ARV tretmana nakon što je prebačen u PMH. Pored toga, nisu razjašnjene ni kontradiktorne tvrdnje medicinskog osoblja CMSC-a i PMH-a u vezi sa navodnim “stanjem uznemirenosti” g. Câmpeanua. Istražitelji su također propustili utvrditi da li je medicinsko osoblje PMHa provelo neophodne testove nakon što je g. Câmpeanu primljen tamo i da li je primao ARV ili neke druge odgovarajuće lijekove. Istražitelji su propustili utvrditi porijeklo edema koji je primijećen na licu i donjim ekstremitetima g. Câmpeanua, kao i primjerenost terapeutskog pristupa u PMH-u. Imajući u vidu ove nedostatke, zahtjev za mišljenjem Medicinskog udruženja je bio preuranjen i trebalo ga je ponovo tražiti nakon što se istražni spis upotpuni.
  4. Tužilaštvo pri Okružnom sudu u Calafatu je uložilo žalbu na ovu presudu. Dana 4. aprila 2008. Okružni sud u Dolju prihvatio je žalbu, ukidajući time presudu Okružnog suda u Calafatu i odbacujući žalbu CLR-a na odluku od 30. marta 2007. o neprocesuiranju. Sud se uglavnom oslanjao na zaključke forenzičkog i obdukcijskog nalaza i odluku Medicinskog udruženja, u kojima je stajalo da ne postoji uzročna veza između liječničkog tretmana koji je pružan g. Câmpeanuu i njegove smrti.

C.  Drugi postupci koje je pokrenuo CLR

1.  U odnosu na g. Câmpeanua

  1. U odgovoru na pritužbe CLR-a (v. stav 26. ove presude), 8. marta 2004., prefekt Okruga Dolj formirao je komisiju čiji je zadatak bio da provede istragu o okolnostima smrti Valentina Câmpeanua. Komisiju su činili predstavnici Odjela za zaštitu djece, Ministarstva za javno zdravstvo, Odjela za krivične istrage Policijske uprave i Ureda prefekta. Komisija je dobila deset dana da provede istragu i da o svojim nalazima sačini izvještaj. U izvještaju komisije je zaključeno da su svi postupci koji se tiču liječenja g. Câmpeanua nakon njegovog otpuštanja iz Centra za skrb bili zakoniti i opravdani s obzirom na njegovu dijagnozu. Komisija je ustanovila samo jednu nepravilnost, a to je da obdukcija nije provedena odmah nakon smrti g. Câmpeanua, čime je prekršeno mjerodavno zakonodavstvo (v. stav 25. ove presude).
  2. Dana 26. juna 2004. CLR je podnio tužbu kod Državne uprave za zaštitu i usvajanje djece (“Državna uprava”), kritizirajući brojne nedostatke, a naročito propust da se g. Câmpeanu imenuje skrbnik i da se smjesti u odgovarajuću zdravstvenu ustanovu. U svojoj pritužbi CLR je ponovio svoj prigovor od 4. augusta 2004. godine, tvrdeći da nezakonito prebacivanje g. Câmpeanua u PMH može potaknuti na pitanja u smislu člana 5., stav 1. (e) Konvencije. U odgovoru na ove navode, Državna uprava je izdala izvještaj 21. oktobra 2004. godine o okolnostima koje su okruživale smrt g. Câmpeanua. Državna uprava je priznala da je djelovala izvan svoje nadležnosti kada je naložila da se g. Câmpeanu primi u PMH. Međutim, navela je da, u svakom slučaju, taj nalog nije imao nikakve posljedice, budući da je ta ustanova prvobitno odbila prihvatiti g. Câmpeanua (v. stav 11. ove presude). Državna uprava je zaključila da je Odjel za zaštitu djece djelovao u skladu s načelima profesionalne etike i najbolje prakse kada su g. Câmpeanua prebacili u CMSC. U isto vrijeme, Državna uprava je istakla da nije bila ovlaštena donositi odluku o naknadnom transferu g. Câmpeanua u PMH. Slično tome, Državna uprava je odbila dati svoje mišljenje o navodnoj pogrešnoj kategorizaciji g. Câmpeanua u grupu osoba srednjeg stepena invaliditeta ili o događajima koji su nastali nakon njegovog prijema u CMSC.
  3. Dana 24. marta 2004. Ministarstvo javnog zdravstva Okruga Dolj je obavijestilo CLR da je komisija, u čijem sastavu su bili službenici sa različitih razina u okrugu, zaključila da “nije došlo do kršenja ljudskih prava u vezi s smrću g. Câmpeanua, jer su njegove sukcesivne hospitalizacije bile opravdane članom 9. Zakona br. 584/2002 o mjerama sprečavanja širenja HIV infekcije i zaštite osoba zaraženih HIV-om ili osoba koje pate od AIDS-a.

2.  U odnosu na druge pacijente

  1. Dana 16. marta 2005. godine, nakon krivične istrage u vezi sa smrću sedamnaest pacijenata PMH, Ured glavnog tužitelja poslao je dopis Ministarstvu zdravlja, zahtijevajući da se poduzmu odgovarajuće upravne mjere kako bi se riješila situacija u ovoj bolnici. Premda je stajalo da nisu utvrđene nikakve nepravilnosti u vezi sa spomenutim smrtnim slučajevima, u pismu je istaknuto da su u bolnici ustanovljene “administrativne nepravilnosti” i da se zahtijevaju odgovarajuće mjere kako bi se otklonili sljedeći problemi:

“ nedostatak grijanja u sobama pacijenata; hipokalorična hrana; nedovoljno osoblja, osoblje slabo obučeno za njegu pacijenata sa mentalnim smetnjama; nedostatak djelotvornih lijekova; izuzetno ograničene prilike za provođenje parakliničkih istraživanja..., jer svi ovi faktori potiču izbijanje zaraznih bolesti kao i njihovo kobno napredovanje. ...”

  1. U odluci od 15. juna 2006. godine u vezi sa krivičnom tužbom koju je podnio CLR u ime jednog drugog pacijenta, P. C., koji je umro u PMH-u, Visoki kasacijski sud pravde odbacio je prigovor javnog tužitelja da CLR nije imao locus standi. Utvrdio je da je CLR imao legitimni interes da se pojavi u postupku ove prirode kako bi razjasnio okolnosti u kojima je umrlo sedamnaest pacijenata u PMH-u u januaru i februaru 2004., s obzirom na svoje polje djelovanja i iskazane ciljeve usmjerene na zaštitu ljudskih prava. Sud je utvrdio sljedeće:

“ Visoki sud smatra da se CLR može smatrati kao ‘bilo koja druga osoba čiji su legitimni interesi povrijeđeni’ u smislu člana 278.1 Zakona o krivičnom postupku. Legitimnost njegovih interesa počiva na zahtjevu CLR-a da se utvrde i rasvijetle okolnosti koje su dovele do smrti sedamnaest pacijenata u PMH-u u januaru i februaru 2004. godine, čiji je cilj, dakle, očuvanje prava na život i zabrana mučenja i zlostavljanja ... pokretanjem zvanične krivične istrage koja će biti djelotvorna i iscrpna na način da se utvrdi identitet onih koji su odgovorni za kršenja gore navedenih prava, u skladu sa uvjetima članova 2. i 3. Evropske konvencije o ljudskim pravima. [Cilj mu je bio i] podizanje svijesti društva o potrebi zaštite osnovnih ljudskih prava i sloboda i osiguravanje pristupa pravdi, što korespondira sa istaknutim ciljevima ove nevladine organizacije.

Njegov legitimni interes je demonstriran pokretanjem istraga, koje su još uvijek u toku.

U isto vrijeme, mogućnost CLR-a da podnese tužbu u skladu sa članom 278. (1) ... predstavlja pravni lijek kojim se tužitelj poslužio, također u skladu sa odredbama člana 13. Evropske konvencije o ljudskim pravima. ...”

D.  Izvještaj vještaka CLR-a

  1. CLR je podnio mišljenje vještaka, koje je 4. januara 2012. godine izdao dr Adriaan van Es, član savjetodavnog forenzičkog tima i direktor Međunarodnog saveza zdravstvenih organizacija i organizacija za ljudska prava (IFHHRO), uz pomoć Anca Boeriu, projektnog službenika pri IFHHRO-u. Mišljenje je bilo zasnovano na primjercima dokaza koje je CLR također dostavio Sudu, uključujući i medicinsku dokumentaciju iz CMSC-a i PMH-a. Mišljenje vještaka ukazuje na “veoma lošu, nekvalitetnu i često nepostojeću ili nedostajuću” medicinsku dokumentaciju u PMH-u i CMSCu, koja nudi “oskudan” opis kliničkog stanja g. Câmpeanua. U mišljenju se navodi da, za vrijeme boravka u PMH-u, pacijenta nikada nije konsultirao specijalista za infektivne bolesti. Također, suprotno rumunskom zakonu, obdukcija nije obavljena odmah nakon smrti pacijenta. Što se tiče ARV tretmana, dostupni dokumenti nisu ponudili pouzdane informacije o tome da li je ARV priman na kontinuiranoj osnovi. Prema tome, kao rezultat neprimjerenog liječenja, g. Câmpeanu je možda bolovao od uznapredovalog HIV-a i, također, od oportunističke infekcije kao što je upala pluća (upala pluća se pojavila u obdukcijskom nalazu kao uzrok smrti). U mišljenju se navodi da upala pluća nije bila dijagnosticirana niti tretirana dok je pacijent bio u PMH-u ili u CMSC-u, premda je to veoma često oboljenje kod pacijenata koji boluju od HIV-a. Uobičajene laboratorijske pretrage za praćenje HIV statusa kod pacijenta nikada nisu provedene. U stručnom mišljenju se navodi da su neki znakovi ponašanja, koji su tumačeni kao psihijatrijski poremećaji, mogli biti uzrokovani septikemijom. Dakle, zbog rizika obustavljenog ARV tretmana, mogućnosti oportunističkih infekcija i prethodne tuberkuloze kod pacijenta, g. Campeanua je trebalo smjestiti na odjel za infektivne bolesti opće bolnice, a ne u psihijatrijsku ustanovu.
  2. U mišljenju se zaključuje da je smrt g. Câmpeanua u PMH-u nastala kao posljedica “ozbiljnog liječničkog nemara”. Liječenje HIV-a i oportunističke infekcije nije bilo u skladu s međunarodnim standardima i medicinskom etikom, kao ni savjetovanje i liječenje pacijenta sa ozbiljnim intelektualnim poteškoćama. Štaviše, disciplinski postupak pred Disciplinskim odborom Medicinskog udruženja je bio nekvalitetan i nemaran, u nedostatku veoma važne medicinske dokumentacije.

E.  Osnovne informacije u vezi s zdravstvenim ustanovama Cetate i Poiana Mare

1.  Neuropsihijatrijska bolnica Poiana Mare

  1. PMH se nalazi u okrugu Dolj u južnoj Rumuniji, 80 km od Craiove, u bivšoj vojnoj bazi i prostire se na 36 ha zemlje. PMH može primiti 500 pacijenata, kako na dobrovoljnoj tako i na prisilnoj osnovi, u potonjem slučaju se radi o pacijentima koji se upućuju u bolnicu na osnovu građanskog ili krivičnog postupka. Do unazad nekoliko godina, bolnica je također imala odjeljenje za pacijente koji boluju od tuberkuloze. To odjeljenje je prebačeno u obližnji grad zbog pritisaka brojnih domaćih i međunarodnih agencija, uključujući i Evropski komitet za sprečavanje mučenja (“CPT”). U vrijeme relevantnih događaja, odnosno u februaru 2004. Godine, u PMH je bilo 436 pacijenata. Medicinsko osoblje je činilo 5 psihijatara, 4 psihijatrijska specijalizanta i 6 ljekara opće prakse. Prema izvještaju CPT-a iz 2004. godine (v. stav 77. ove presude), u toku dvije uzastopne zime u PMH-u je umrlo 109 pacijenata pod sumnjivim okolnostima - 81 u periodu između januara i decembra 2003. godine i 28 u prvih pet mjeseci 2004. godine. CPT je posjetio PMH tri puta, 1995., 1999. i 2004. godine. Njihova posljednja posjeta je konkretno bila usmjerena na istraživanje alarmantnog povećanja stope smrtnosti. Nakon svake posjete CPT je izdao veoma kritične izvještaje, naglašavajući “nehumane i ponižavajuće životne uvjete” u PMH. Nakon posjete brojnim zdravstvenim ustanovama koje su u izvještajima CPT-a naznačene kao problematične, a među njima i PMH, Ministarstvo zdravlja je 2. septembra 2003. godine izdalo izvještaj. Izvještaj navodi da lijekovi koji se daju pacijentima u PMH nisu adekvatni, bilo zato što nema povezanosti između psihijatrijske dijagnoze i određenog liječenja ili zato što su medicinska istraživanja bila veoma ograničena. Ustanovljeni su brojni nedostaci u pogledu efikasnog upravljanja i nedovoljnog broja zdravstvenih radnika u odnosu na broj pacijenata.

2.  Centar za zdravstvenu i socijalnu skrb Cetate

  1. Iz informacija dobivenih od CLR-a čini se da je CMSC bio mali centar za zdravstvenu i socijalnu skrb kapaciteta od 20 kreveta na početku 2004. godine, koji je u relevantno vrijeme imao 18 pacijenata. Prije 1. januara 2004. godine, kada je proglašen centrom za zdravstvenu i socijalnu skrb, CMSC je bio psihijatrijska bolnica. Prema potvrdi o akreditaciji za period 2006. - 2009., CMSC je bio ovlašten za pružanje usluga odraslim licima koja proživljavaju teške porodične situacije sa naglaskom na socijalnu komponentu zdravstvene i socijalne skrbi.

II.  RELEVANTNO DOMAĆE PRAVO I PRAKSA

A.  Krivični zakon Rumunije

  1. Relevantni dijelovi Krivičnog zakona Rumunije koji su bili na snazi u vrijeme spornih događaja glase:

Član 114. – Prihvat u zdravstvenu ustanovu

“(1)  Kada je prestupnik duševno bolestan ili ovisnik o drogama i u stanju koje predstavlja opasnost po društvo, može mu se naložiti smještanje u specijaliziranu zdravstvenu ustanovu dok se ne oporavi.

(2)  Ova mjera se može izreći privremeno za vrijeme trajanja krivičnog gonjenja ili suđenja.”

Član 178. –Ubistvo iz nehata

“(2)  Ubistvo iz nehata kao posljedica nepostupanja sa zakonskim odredbama ili preventivnim mjerama koje se odnose na obavljanje određene profesije ili zanata, ili kao posljedica obavljanja određene aktivnosti kaznit će se kaznom zatvora u trajanju od 2 do 7 godina.”

Član 246. – Nezakonito činjenje i nečinjenje protiv interesa neke osobe

“Državni službenik koji, prilikom obavljanja službene dužnosti, svjesno propusti uraditi određenu radnju ili je pogrešno uradi i time povrijedi zakonske interese druge osobe kaznit će se kaznom zatvora u trajanju od 6 mjeseci do 3 godine.”

Član 249. – Nemar u obavljanju službene dužnosti

“(1)  Povreda službene dužnosti kao rezultat nemara državnog službenika, koji propusti uraditi određenu radnju ili je pogrešno uradi i time uzrokuje značajan zastoj u pravilnom radu javnog tijela ili ustanove ili nekog pravnog lica, ili štetu njegovoj imovini ili ozbiljnu štetu pravnim interesima drugog lica, kaznit će se kaznom zatvora u trajanju od 1 mjesec do 2 godine ili novčanom kaznom.”

Član 314. – Ugrožavanje osobe koja nije u stanju da se stara o sebi

“(1)  Napuštanje, otpuštanje ili ostavljanje, na bilo koji način, bespomoćnog djeteta ili osobe koja nije u stanju da se o sebi stara od strane osobe kojoj je povjerena na nadzor ili staranje [ili] dovođenje njezinog života, zdravlja ili fizičkog integriteta u neposrednu opasnost kaznit će se kaznom zatvora u trajanju od 1 do 3 godine. ...”

B.  Zakon o krivičnom postupku Rumunije

  1. Postupak razmatranja pritužbi koje su podnesene sudu na odluke tužitelja tokom krivičnih istraga propisan je u članovima 275.-278.1 Zakona koji bio na snazi u vrijeme spornih događaja. Relevantni dijelovi ovih članova glase:

Član 275

“Svaka osoba može podnijeti tužbu protiv mjera i odluka koje su donesene u toku krivično-istražnog postupka ukoliko one štete njegovim, odnosno njezinim legitimnim interesima. ...”

Član 278

“Tužbe protiv mjera ili odluka tužitelja ili onih koje provedene na njegov zahtjev ispitat će ... glavni tužilac relevantnog odjela. ...”

Član 2781

“(1)  Nakon što tužilac odbaci tužbu koja je podnesena u skladu s članovima 275.278. u odnosu na obustavu krivične istrage ... kroz odluku o neprocesuiranju (neurmărire penală) ..., oštećena strana ili bilo koja druga osoba čiji su legitimni interesi ugroženi može podnijeti žalbu u roku od 20 dana od dana objave sporne odluke, sudiji suda koji bi inače imao nadležnost da odlučuje u prvom stepenu. ...

(4) Osobe u odnosu na koje je tužitelj obustavio krivičnu istragu, kao i osobe koje su podnijele žalbu protiv takve odluke biće pozvane pred sud. Ako su zakonito pozvane na sud, ali se te osobe ne odazovu i ne pojave pred sudom, to neće ometati ispitivanje predmeta. ...

(5)  Prisustvo tužitelja pred sudom je obavezujuće.

(6) Sudija će dati riječ podnositelju žalbe, a potom i osobi protiv koje je krivična istraga obustavljena, a na kraju i tužilaštvu.

(7)  Kod ispitivanja predmeta, sudija će cijeniti osporavanu odluku u svjetlu postojećih akata i materijala ali i u svjetlu svih novih dokumenata koji budu dostavljeni.

(8)  Sudija će presuditi na jedan od sljedećih načina:

(a)  odbacit će žalbu kao nepravovremenu, nedopustivu ili neutemeljenu i potvrditi prethodnu odluku;

(b)  usvojiti će žalbu, ukinuti spornu odluku i poslati predmet natrag tužitelju i naložiti da pokrene ili ponovo otvori krivičnu istragu. Od sudije se zahtijeva da navede obrazloženje za vraćanje predmeta, ali isto tako i da naznači činjenice i okolnosti koje treba rasvijetliti, odnosno relevantne dokaze koje treba prikupiti;

(c)  usvojiti žalbu, ukinuti spornu odluku i, ako u spisu ima dovoljno dokaza, zadržati predmet na daljnjem postupanju u skladu s pravilima postupka koji se primjenjuju na prvostepeni postupak i, gdje je primjereno, na žalbeni postupak....

(12)  Sudija će ispitati žalbu u roku od 30 dana od dana primitka.

(13) Žalba koja je dostavljena pogrešnom tijelu uputit će se, kao administrativni korak, onom tijelu koje je nadležno za njeno ispitivanje.”

C.  Sistem socijalne pomoći

  1. Odjeljak 2. Državnog zakona o socijalnoj pomoći (Zakon br. 705/2001), koji je bio na snazi u relevantno vrijeme, definira sistem socijalne pomoći na sljedeći način:

“... sistem institucija i mjera kroz koje država, organi vlasti i građansko društvo osiguravaju prevenciju, ograničavanje, privremeno ili trajno uklanjanje posljedica situacija koje kod nekih pojedinaca mogu dovesti do marginalizacije ili stanja socijalne isključenosti.”

Odjeljak 3. definira opseg sistema socijalne pomoći:

“... zaštititi pojedince koji, zbog ekonomskih, fizičkih, mentalnih ili socijalnih razloga nemaju sposobnost da sami ispunjavaju svoje socijalne potrebe, razviju vlastite sposobnosti i vještine socijalne integracije.”

  1. Propis br. 68/2003 socijalnoj pomoći utvrđuje ciljeve državne socijalne službe i detaljno propisuje proces odlučivanja o dodjeli socijalne pomoći.

D.  Zakonodavstvo o zdravstvenom sistemu

  1. Detaljan opis relevantnih pravnih odredbi o mentalnom zdravlju može se naći u predmetu B. protiv Rumunije (br. 2) (br. 1285/03, §§ 42-66, 19. februar 2013.). Zakon br. 487/2002 o mentalnom zdravlju i zaštiti osoba sa mentalnim poremećajima (“Zakon o mentalnom zdravlju iz 2002.”), koji je stupio na snagu u augustu 2002., propisuje postupak za obavezno liječenje pojedinca. U roku od 72 sata od prijema pacijenta u bolnicu posebni psihijatrijski panel treba odobriti odluku nadležnog psihijatra da se pacijent zadrži u bolnici na obaveznom liječenju. Pored toga, javni tužilac, na čiju odluku se može podnijeti žalba sudu, treba preispitati ovu procjenu u roku od 24 sata. Provedba odredbi ovog zakona ovisila je o usvajanju neophodnih propisa za njegovo izvršenje. Ti propisi su usvojeni 2. maja 2006. godine.
  2. Zakon o bolnicama (Zakon br.270/2003), u članu 4., propisuje da su bolnice dužne “osigurati adekvatan smještaj i hranu te sprečavanje infekcija”. Ovaj zakon je ukinut 28. maja 2006., nakon što je na snagu stupio Zakon o reformi zdravstva iz 2006. godine (Zakon br. 95/2006).
  3. Zakon o pravima pacijenata (Zakon br. 46/2003) u članu 3. propisuje da “pacijent ima pravo da bude poštovan kao ljudsko biće, bez diskriminacije”. Član 35. propisuje da pacijent ima “pravo na kontinuiranu medicinsku njegu sve dok se njegovo, odnosno njezino zdravstveno stanje ne popravi”. Nadalje, “pacijent ima pravo na palijativnu njegu kako bi bio u stanju umrijeti dostojanstveno”. U slučaju bilo kakve medicinske intervencije potrebna je saglasnost pacijenta.
  4. Propis 1134/25.05.2000, koji je donijelo Ministarstvo pravde i Propis 255/4.04.2000, koji je donijelo Ministarstvo zdravstva, odobrili su pravila postupka koja se odnose na medicinska mišljenja i druge forenzičkomedicinske usluge, a koja u članu 34. propisuju da se obdukcija treba provesti onda kada smrt nastupi u psihijatrijskoj bolnici. Prema članu 44. uprava zdravstvene ustanove dužna je obavijestiti krivično-istražne organe, koji moraju zahtijevati provođenje obdukcije.
  5. Zakon br. 584/2002 o mjerama prevencije širenja HIV infekcije i zaštite osoba zaraženih HIV-om ili koje boluju od AIDS-a, u svom članu 9. propisuje da medicinski centri i doktori moraju hospitalizirati takve pojedince i pružiti im odgovarajuću medicinsku njegu shodno njihovim specifičnim simptomima.

E.  Sistem starateljstva

1.  Starateljstvo nad maloljetnicima

  1. Članovi od 113. do 141. Porodičnog zakona koji je bio na snazi u vrijeme spornih događaja, uređivali su starateljstvo nad maloljetnikom čiji su roditelji umrli, nepoznati, lišeni svojih roditeljskih prava, poslovno nesposobni, nestali ili koje je sud proglasio mrtvima. Porodični zakon uređivao je uvjete određivanja starateljstva, imenovanje staratelja (tutora), odgovornosti staratelja, smjenjivanje staratelja i ukidanje starateljstva. Ustanova sa najširim opsegom odgovornosti u ovoj oblasti bio je organ staranja (autoritatea tutelară), kojem je povjeren, inter alia, nadzor nad radom staratelja. Trenutno, starateljstvo je uređeno članovima 110.-163. Zakona o građanskom postupku. Novi Zakon o građanskom postupku objavljen je 24. jula 2009. godine u Službenom listu br. 511 i naknadno je ponovo objavljen 15. jula 2011. u Službenom listu br. 505. Na snagu je stupio 1. oktobra 2011. godine.

2.  Postupak proglašavanja poslovne nesposobnosti i starateljstva nad osobama sa invaliditetom

  1. Članovi 142. do 151. Porodičnog zakona koji je bio na snazi u vrijeme činjenica ovog predmeta uređivali su postupak proglašavanja poslovne nesposobnosti (interdicţie), u kojem je, ako se dokaže da je osoba poslovno nesposobna da upravlja vlastitim poslovima, ta osoba gubila svoju poslovnu sposobnost. Nalog o proglašavanju nesposobnosti donosi i ukida sud u odnosu na “one osobe koje nemaju sposobnost da vode brigu o svojim interesima zbog mentalnih poremećaja ili poteškoća”. Postupak proglašavanja nesposobnosti može pokrenuti i šira grupa osoba, među kojima je i relevantni državni organ za zaštitu maloljetnika ili bilo koja druga osoba koja ima interes. Kada je osoba lišena poslovne sposobnosti, imenuje joj se staratelj koji je zastupa i koji ima ovlaštenja koja su slična ovlaštenjima osoba koje su staratelji maloljetnim licima. Iako se postupak proglašavanja poslovne nesposobnosti može primijeniti i na maloljetnike, one je prevashodno namijenjen odraslim osobama s poteškoćama. Gore spomenute odredbe su otada uključene, zajedno sa amandmanima, u Zakon o građanskom postupku (članovi 164.-177.).
  2. Članovi 152.-157. Porodičnog zakona koji je bio na snazi u materijalno vrijeme propisivali su postupak dodjele privremenog staratelja (curatela), koji pokriva situacije onih osoba koje, čak i kada nisu poslovno nesposobne, nisu u stanju zaštititi svoje interese na zadovoljavajući način ili imenovati zastupnika. Relevantni dijelovi ovih članova glase:

Član 152.

“ Osim u drugim slučajevima određenim zakonom, organ starateljstva će imenovati privremenog staratelja u sljedećim okolnostima:

(a)  kada, zbog duboke starosti, bolesti ili fizičke nemoći osoba, čak i kada je poslovno sposobna, nije u stanju lično upravljati svojim dobrima ili na zadovoljavajući način braniti svoje interese i, iz valjanih razloga, ne može imenovati zastupnika;

(b) kada, zbog bolesti ili iz drugih razloga osoba, čak i kada je poslovno sposobna, nije u stanju lično ili preko zastupnika poduzeti odgovarajuće mjere u situacijama koje zahtijevaju hitno djelovanje;

(c)  kada, zbog bolesti ili iz drugih razloga roditelj ili imenovani staratelj (tutore) nije u stanju obavljati dotične radnje. ...”

Član 153.

“U situacijama opisanim u članu 152., imenovanje privremenog staratelja (curator) ne utiče na sposobnost osobe koju zastupa staratelj.”

Član 154.

“(1)  Privremeno starateljstvo (curatela) može se pokrenuti na zahtjev osobe koja želi biti zastupljena, odnosno na zahtjev bračnog druga ili rođaka te osobe, ili bilo koje osobe spomenute u članu 115. ili na zahtjev staratelja (tutore) u situacijama opisanim u članu 152. (c). Organ za starateljstvo također može postaviti staratelja i na vlastitu inicijativu.

(2)  Staratelj se može postaviti samo uz saglasnot osobe kojoj se staratelj imenuje, osim u situacijama kada je takvu saglasnost nemoguće dobiti. ...”

Član 157.

“ Ako su razlozi koji su doveli do postavljanja staratelja prestali, organ starateljstva će ukinuti mjeru na zahtjev staratelja, osobe koju staratelj zastupa ili bilo koje od osoba iz člana 115. ili na vlastitu inicijativu.”

Gore spomenute odredbe su otada uključene, zajedno sa amandmanima, u Zakon o građanskom postupku (članovi 178.-186.).

  1. Propis o hitnim situacijama br. 26/1997 o djeci u teškim situacijama, koji je bio na snazi u vrijeme spornih događaja, derogirao je odredbe o starateljstvu iz Porodičnog zakona. Član 8. (1) Propisa propisuje:

“... ukoliko su roditelji djeteta umrli, nepoznati, poslovno nesposobni, sudski proglašeni umrlima, nestali ili lišeni svojih roditeljskih prava i ako nije određeno starateljstvo, odnosno ako je dijete konačnom sudskom odlukom proglašeno napuštenim i ako sud nije odlučio dijete smjestiti u neku porodicu ili ga dodijeliti pojedincu u skladu sa zakonom, roditeljska prava nad tim djetetom imat će Okružno vijeće, ... preko [svog ] Odbora za zaštitu djece”.

Propis o hitnim situacijama br. 26/1997 ukinut je 1. januara 2005. godine, kada je donesen i na snagu stupio novi Zakon o zaštiti i afirmaciji prava djece (Zakon br. 272/2004).

  1. Propis br. 726/2002 o kriterijima na osnovu kojih se utvrđuje kategorija invaliditeta odraslih lica, osobe sa “ozbiljnim intelektualnim poteškoćama” opisuje na sljedeći način:

“ oni imaju smanjen psihomotorni razvoj i malo ili nimalo jezičkih vještina, mogu naučiti da govore, mogu se upoznati sa abecedom i osnovnim računskim radnjama. Mogu biti u stanju izvršiti neke jednostavnije zadatke pod strogim nadzorom. Mogu se prilagoditi životu u zajednici u domovima za staranje ili u svojim porodicama, pod uvjetom da nemaju još neku poteškoću koja zahtijeva posebnu njegu.”

  1. Zakon br. 519/2002 o posebnoj zaštiti i zapošljavanju osoba sa poteškoćama navodi socijalna prava koja uživaju osobe sa poteškoćama u razvoju. Ovaj zakon je ukinut Zakonom o zaštiti osoba sa invaliditetom (Zakon br. 448/2006), koji je na snagu stupio 21. decembra 2006. godine. Član 23. tog zakona, kada je stupio na snagu, propisivao je da su osobe sa invaliditetom zaštićene od nemara i zlostavljanja, između ostalog, kroz usluge pravne pomoći i, ako je neophodno, kroz stavljanje pod starateljstvo. Prema članu 25. tog zakona, koji je izmijenjen i dopunjen 2008. godine, osobe sa invaliditetom zaštićene su od nemara i zlostavljanja, kao i od diskriminacije po osnovu lokacije. Osobe koje su u potpunosti ili djelomično nesposobne da upravljaju svojim poslovima imaju pravo na pravnu zaštitu u obliku potpunog ili djelomičnog starateljstva, kao i u obliku pravne pomoći. Nadalje, ako osobe sa invaliditetom nema roditelje ili bilo koju drugu osobu koja bi pristala da bude njezin staratelj, sud može kao staratelja imenovati lokalni javni organ ili privatno pravno lice koji će se starati za takvu osobu.

III.  RELEVANTNO MEĐUNARODNO PRAVO

A.  Pitanje locus standi

1.  Generalna skupština Ujedinjenih nacija usvojila je 13. decembra 2006. Konvenciju Ujedinjenih nacija o pravima osoba sa invaliditetom (“CRPD”), (Rezolucija A/RES/61/106).

  1. Konvenciju o pravima osoba s invaliditetom (CRPD), koja je namijenjena da promovira, zaštiti i osigura potpuno i jednako uživanje svih ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda svih osoba s invaliditetom i da promovira poštivanje njihovog urođenog dostojanstva, Rumunija je ratificirala 31. januara 2011. U svojim relevantnim dijelovima ona glasi:

Član 5. – Jednakost i nediskriminacija

“1.  Države potpisnice prihvaćaju da su sve osobe jednake pred zakonom te da imaju jednako pravo, bez ikakve diskriminacije, na jednaku zaštitu i dobrobit od zakona.

2. Države potpisnice će zabraniti bilo kakvu diskriminaciju po osnovu invaliditeta i zajamčiti osobama s invaliditetom jednaku i djelotvornu pravnu zaštitu od diskriminacije po bilo kojoj osnovi.

3. Da bi promovirale jednakost i eliminirale diskriminaciju, države potpisnice će poduzeti sve odgovarajuće korake kako bi osigurale razumne prilagodbe.

4. Posebne mjere potrebna za ubrzavanje i ostvarivanje de facto jednakosti osoba s invaliditetom neće se smatrati diskriminacijom u smislu odredbi ove Konvencije.”

Član 10. – Pravo na život

“Države potpisnice ponovo potvrđuju da sva ljudska bića imaju urođeno pravo na život, te će poduzimati sve potrebne mjere kako bi osigurale učinkovito uživanje tog prava osobama s invaliditetom, ravnopravno s drugim osobama.”

Član 12. – Jednakost pred zakonom

“1.  Države potpisnice ponovo potvrđuju da osobe s invaliditetom imaju pravo svugdje biti prihvaćene kao osobe s poslovnom sposobnošću.

2. Države potpisnice prihvaćaju da osobe s invaliditetom u svim područjima života uživaju pravnu i poslovnu sposobnost ravnopravno s drugim osobama.

3. Države potpisnice će poduzeti odgovarajuće mjere da osobama s invaliditetom osiguraju potrebnu pomoć za ostvarivanje njihove pravne i poslovne sposobnosti.

4. Države potpisnice će osigurati da sve mjere koje se odnose na uživanje pravne i poslovne sposobnosti predviđaju odgovarajuće i djelotvorne mehanizme zaštite koji će sprečavati zloupotrebu, u skladu s odredbama međunarodnog prava o ljudskim pravima. Ti mehanizmi zaštite će osigurati da mjere koje se odnose na uživanje pravne i poslovne sposobnosti poštuju prava, volju i sklonosti te osobe, da se isključi sukob interesa i zloupotreba uticaja, da su proporcionalne i prilagođene okolnostima u kojima se nalazi ta osoba, da se primjenjuju u najkraćem mogućem vremenu, te da podliježu redovnoj reviziji nadležnog,, nezavisnog i nepristrasnog tijela vlasti ili sudskog tijela. Mehanizmi zaštite trebaju biti proporcionalni stepenu u kojem takve mjere utiču na prava i interese osobe. ...”

Član 13. – Pristup pravdi

“1.  Države potpisnice osigurat će učinkovit pristup pravdi osobama s invaliditetom, ravnopravno s drugim osobama, uključujući osiguravanje proceduralnih i dobi primjerenih prilagodbi kako bi se olakšala njihova stvarna uloga, bilo kao direktnih ili indirektnih učesnika, uključujući i svjedočenje, u svim sudskim postupcima, uključujući istražni postupak i druge prethodne faze postupka.

2.  Kako bi pomogle u osiguravanju učinkovitog pristupa pravdi osobama s invaliditetom, države potpisnice promoviraju odgovarajuću obuku osoba koje rade u pravosuđu, uključujući policiju i zatvorsko osoblje.”

2.  Relevantni stavovi UN Komiteta za ljudska prava

  1. Prvi opcionalni protokol uz Međunarodni pakt o građanskim i političkim pravima daje Komitetu za ljudska prava (“HRC”) ovlaštenje da ispituje pojedinačne pritužbe u vezi s navodnim povredama Pakta od strane država potpisnica Protokola (članovi 1. i 2. Opcionalnog protokola). Ovim se podnošenje pritužbe izričito ograničava na pojedince. Prema tome, pritužbe koje su podnijele nevladine organizacije, udruženja, političke stranke ili korporacije u svoje lično ime općenito su nedopuštene zbog nedostatka locus standi (v. na primjer Invalidne i hendikepirane osobe u Italiji protiv Italije (predstavka br. 163/1984)).
  2. U iznimnim slučajevima, predstavku može podnijeti treće lice u ime žrtve. Predstavka koju podnese treće lica u ime navodne žrtve može se uzeti u razmatranje samo ako to treće lice dokaže da ima legitimni interes za podnošenje predstavke. Navodna žrtva može imenovati zastupnika koji će podnijeti predstavku u njeno ime.
  3. Predstavka koju je u ime navodne žrtve podnijelo neko drugo lice može se prihvatiti ako se dokaže da dotični pojedinac nije u stanju lično podnijeti pritužbu (v. pravilo 96. Poslovnika o radu HRC-a):

Pravilo 96.

“Kod odlučivanja o prihvatljivosti predstavke, Komitet ili radna grupa formirana u skladu s pravilom 95., stav 1., ovih pravila treba utvrditi sljedeće:

...

(b)  da pojedinac tvrdi, i na odgovarajući način potkrjepljuje, da je žrtva povrede prava, odnosno da je država potpisnica povrijedila bilo koje od prava zajamčenih u Paktu. Obično, predstavku podnosi pojedinac lično ili putem svog zastupnika. Podnesak koji je podnesen u ime navodne žrtve može, međutim, biti prihvaćen kada je nemoguće da istu dotični pojedinac lično podnese. ...”

  1. Tipični primjeri ove situacije bi bili kada je žrtva navodno oteta, nestala ili kada ne postoji način da se utvrdi njeno mjesto boravka ili kada je žrtva u zatvoru ili mentalnoj ustanovi. Treće lice (obično bliski srodnici) mogu podnijeti predstavku u ime preminule osobe (v. na primjer, G.  Saimijon i g-đa Malokhat Bazarov protiv Uzbekistana (predstavka br. 959/2000); Panayote Celal protiv Grčke (predstavka br. 1235/2003); Yuliya Vasilyevna Telitsina protiv Ruske Federacije (predstavka br. 888/1999); José Antonio Coronel et al. protiv Kolumbije (predstavka br. 778/1997); i Jean Miango Muiyo protiv Zaira (predstavka br.  194/1985)).

3.  Specijalna izvjestiteljica Ujedinjenih nacija o pitanjima invaliditeta

  1. U svom izvještaju o napretku, koji je objavljen 2006. godine, specijalna izvjestiteljica je navela:

“2.  Osobe s teškoćama u razvoju su posebno podložne povredama ljudskih prava. Također, osobe s invaliditetom rijetko se uzimaju u obzir, s obzirom da one nemaju politički glas i često predstavljaju podgrupu već marginaliziranih društvenih skupina, te stoga nemaju moć utjecaja na vlasti. Oni nailaze na ogromne probleme u pristupu pravosudnom sistemu kada traže zaštitu svojih prava ili pravne lijekove za povrede, a njihov pristup organizacijama koje mogu zaštititi njihova prava uglavnom je ograničen. Dok je osobama bez invaliditeta potrebno neovisno nacionalno i međunarodno tijelo da zaštiti njihova ljudska prava, postoje i dodatna opravdanja da se ljudima sa invaliditetom i njihovim pravima posveti posebna pažnja kroz neovisne domaće i međunarodne mehanizme nadzora.”

4.  Relevantna praksa Interameričke komisije za ljudska prava

  1. Član  44. Američke konvencije o  ljudskim pravima daje Interameričkoj komisiji za ljudska prava nadležnost da zaprima podneske od bilo koje osobe ili grupe osoba ili bilo koje nevladine organizacije koja je pravno priznata u jednoj ili više država članica Organizacije američkih država (OAS). Ona propisuje sljedeće:

“Svaka osoba ili grupa osoba ili bilo koja nevladina organizacija pravno priznata u jednoj ili više država članica Organizacije može podnijeti predstavku Komisiji, koja sadrži optužbe ili pritužbe na kršenje ove Konvencije od strane bilo koje države potpisnice.”

Član 23. Poslovnika Interameričke komisije za ljudska prava navodi da se takvi podnesci mogu podnijeti i u ime trećih lica. On glasi:

“Svaka osoba ili grupa osoba ili bilo koja nevladina organizacija pravno priznata u jednoj ili više država članica OAS-a može podnijeti predstavku Komisiji u svoje ime ili u ime trećih lica, a u vezi sa navodnim povredama ljudskih prava sadržanim u, ovisno o slučaju, Američkoj deklaraciji o pravima i dužnostima čovjeka, Američkoj konvenciji o ljudskim pravima ‘Pakt iz San Joséa, Costa Rica’ ..., u skladu sa relevantnim odredbama pobrojanih dokumenata, Statutom Komisije i ovim Poslovnikom. Podnositelj predstavke može, u samoj predstavci ili zasebno, u drugom dokumentu, odrediti advokata ili neko drugo lice da ga zastupa pred Komisijom.”

  1. Interamerička komisija je ispitivala slučajeve koje su podnijele nevladine organizacije u ime direktnih žrtava, uključujući i nestale ili umrle osobe. Na primjer, u predmetu Gomes Lund et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguaia”) protiv Brazila (predstavka br. 33/01), podnositelj predstavke je bio Centar za pravdu i međunarodno pravo, koji je zastupao nestale osobe i njihove neposredne srodnike. Što se tiče nadležnosti ratione personae, Komisija je priznala da podnositelj predstavke može podnijeti predstavku u ime direktnih žrtava u tom slučaju, u skladu s članom 44. Američke konvencije o ljudskim pravima. U predmetu Teodoro Cabrera Garcia i Rodolfo Montiel Flores protiv Meksika (predstavka br. 11/04), Komisija je potvrdila svoju ratione personae nadležnost da ispituje tvrdnje različitih organizacija i pojedinaca koji su tvrdili da su druga dva pojedinca bila nezakonito pritvorena i mučena, te zatvorena nakon nepravilnog suđenja. U predmetu Escher et al. protiv Brazila (predstavka br. 18/06), Komisija je potvrdila svoju ratione personae nadležnost da ispituje predstavke koje su podnijele dvije asocijacije (Nacionalna advokatska mreža i Centar za globalnu pravdu), koje su ukazivale na navodne povrede prava na odgovarajući pravni postupak, prava na poštivanje lične časti i dostojanstva, te prava na postupak pred sudovima pripadnika dviju zadruga koje su povezane sa Pokretom radnika bez zemlje, koja su povrijeđena kroz nezakonito prisluškivanje i praćenje njihovih telefonskih linija.
  2. Predmete koje su inicijalno podnijele nevladine organizacije (NVO), Komisija može naknadno podnijeti Intermaeričkom sudu za ljudska prava, nakon usvajanja izvještaja Komisije o osnovanosti zahtjeva (v. na primjer predmet “Las Dos Erres” Massacre protiv Gvatemale, koji su podnijeli Ured za ljudska prava Nadbiskupije Gvatemale i Centar za pravdu i međunarodno pravo; vidi također Escher et al. protiv Brazila).

5.  Izvještaj Agencije Evropske unije za osnovna prava (“FRA”): Pristup pravdi u Evropi: pregled izazova i prilika

  1. Izvještaj koji je FRA objavila u martu 2011. godine ističe da je traženje djelotvorne zaštite prava ranjivih osoba na domaćoj razini vrlo često onemogućeno, između ostalog, visokim troškovima i usko definiranim pravnim statusom (v. strane 37.-54. izvještaja).

B.  Relevantni izvještaji u vezi s uvjetima u PMH-u

1.  Izvještaj Evropskog komiteta za sprečavanje mučenja i nehumanog i ponižavajućeg postupanja (CPT) za Rumuniju

  1. CPT je dokumentirao stanje u PMH tokom tri posjete: 1995., 1999. i 2004. godine.
  2. Godine 1995. su životni uvjeti na PMH bili toliko jadni da je CPT odlučila pribjeći članu 8., stav 5. Evropske konvencije o sprječavanju mučenja i nečovječnog ili ponižavajućeg postupanja ili kažnjavanja, koji joj omogućava, u iznimnim okolnostima, da Vladi uputi određene primjedbe tokom same posjete. Konkretno, CPT je istaknula da je u razdoblju od sedam mjeseci 1995. godine preminuo ukupno šezdeset i jedan pacijent, od čega je dvadeset i jedan pacijent bio “izuzetno pothranjen” (vidi stav 177. izvještaja iz 1995. godine). CPT je odlučila zatražiti od rumunske vlade da poduzme hitne mjere kako bi se u PMH osigurali “osnovni uvjeti za život”. Ostala područja koje je CPT identificirala tom prilikom bili su praksa izoliranja pacijenata u samice kao vid kažnjavanja, te nedostatak zaštitnih mjera u slučaju prisilnog prijema u bolnicu.
  3. CPT se vratila u PMH ponovo 1999. godine. Najozbiljniji nedostaci utvrđeni tom prilikom odnosili su se na činjenicu da je broj osoblja - kako specijaliziranog tako i pomoćnog - bio manji nego 1995. godine i da nikakav napredak nije postignut u pogledu prisilnog smještanja u bolnicu.
  4. U junu 2004. godine, CPT je posjetio PMH po treći put, ovaj put kao odgovor na izvještaj o porastu broja umrlih pacijenata. CPT je u svom izvještaju istakla da je 2003. godine umro osamdeset i jedan pacijent, a u prvih pet mjeseci 2004. dvadeset i osam. Porast broja umrlih se desio uprkos izmještanju pacijenata koji boluju od aktivne tuberkuloze iz bolnice 2002. godine. Glavni uzroci smrti bili su zastoj srca, infarkt miokarda i bronhopneumonija. Prosječna dob bolesnika koji su umrli bila je pedeset i šest godina, a šesnaest pacijenata je bilo mlađe od četrdeset godina. CPT je izjavila da se “takve prerane smrti ne mogu objasniti samo na temelju simptoma bolesnika u vrijeme njihovog boravka u bolnici” (vidi stav 13. izvještaja iz 2004. godine). CPT je također napomenula da neki od ovih pacijenata “očito nisu primali valjanu njegu” (stav 14.). CPT je sa zabrinutošću “konstatirala oskudnost ljudskih i materijalnih resursa” kojima bolnica raspolaže (stav 16.). Istakla je ozbiljne nedostatke u kvaliteti i količini hrane koja se daje pacijentima i nedostatak grijanja u bolnici. S obzirom na nedostatke pronađene u PMH-u, CPT je u stavu 20. svog Izvještaja navela sljedeće:

“... ne možemo isključiti mogućnost da je kombinacija teških životnih uvjeta - naročito nestašica hrane i grijanja - dovela do progresivnog pogoršanja općeg zdravstvenog stanja nekih od najslabijih pacijenata, a da oskudnost medicinskih pomagala nije mogla spriječiti njihovu smrt u većini slučajeva. Prema mišljenju CPTa, situacija zatečena u bolnici Poiana Mare je vrlo zabrinjavajuća i zahtijeva poduzimanje radikalnih mjera usmjerenih na poboljšanje životnih uvjeta, ali i njege koja se pruža pacijentima. Nakon treće posjete CPT-a bolnici Poiana Mare u manje od deset godina, krajnje je vrijeme da vlasti konačno shvate pravi opseg problema koji vlada u ustanovi.”

Konačno, kad je riječ o prisilnom smještanju putem parničnog postupka, CPT je istakla da nedavno doneseni Zakon o mentalnom zdravlju iz 2002. godine još uvijek nije u potpunosti u primijeni, budući da su naišli na pacijente koji su prisilno hospitalizirani protivno zaštitnim mjerama sadržanim u zakonu (stav 32.).

2.  Specijalni izvještač Ujedinjenih nacija o pravu na zdravlje

  1. Dana 2. marta 2004. godine specijalni izvještač o pravu na zdravlje, zajedno sa specijalnim izvještačem UN-a o pravu na hranu i specijalnim izvještačem UN-a o mučenju, pisao je rumunskoj vladi, izražavajući zabrinutost zbog alarmntnih izvještaja o uvjetima života u PMH i tražeći pojašnjenje o tome. Vlada je odgovorila na sljedeći način (vidi sažetak dokumenta specijalnog izvještača o pravu na zdravlje UN E / CN.4 / 2005 /51 / Add.1):

“54.  U pismu od 8. marta 2004. godine, Vlada je odgovorila na dopis specijalnog izvještača u vezi sa stanjem u psihijatrijskoj bolnici Poiana Mare. Vlada je potvrdila da su rumunske vlasti apsolutno svjesne i da dijele njihovu zabrinutost u vezi s ovom bolnicom. Osiguravanje zaštite hendikepiranih osoba i dalje ostaje vladin prioritet i Ministarstvo zdravstva će pokrenuti istragu u svim sličnim medicinskim ustanovama kako bi provjerili je li Poiana Mare izolirani slučaj u ovom smislu. Što se tiče bolnice Poiana Mare, poduzete su hitne mjere unapređenja životnih uvjeta pacijenata i ti koraci će se nastaviti poduzimati sve dok se bolnica u potpunosti ne sanira. Dana 25. februara 2004. godine Ministarstvo zdravstva je provelo istragu u bolnici Poiana Mare. Ustanovljeni su nedostaci u pogledu sistema grijanja i opskrbe vodom, pripreme hrane, odlaganja otpada, životnih i sanitarnih uvjeta i medicinske pomoći. Većina problema vezanih za medicinsku pomoć rezultat je nedovoljnih sredstava i lošeg upravljanja. Vlada je potvrdila da je potrebno poduzeti sljedeće mjere: dobiti pojašnjenje forenzičkog stručnjaka o uzroku smrti onih pacijenata čija smrt nije povezana sa prethodno dijagnosticiranim bolestima ili dubokom starošću; provesti bolnički plan iz 2004. godine; uposliti dodatne specijalizirane medicinske radnike; reorganizirati radni raspored ljekara kako bi se uvele noćne smjene; osigurati specijaliziranu medicinsku pomoć na redovnoj osnovi; i dodijeliti dodatna sredstva za unapređenje životnih uvjeta. Vlada je također potvrdila da su državni sekretar u Ministarstvu zdravstva, kao i državni sekretar u Državnoj upravi za hendikepirane osobe razriješeni dužnosti zbog ovih nepravilnosti u bolnici Poiana Mare, a da je direktora bolnice zamijenio privremeni direktor dok se ne obavi javni natječaj i popuni ovo upražnjeno mjesto. Vlada je potvrdila da će bolnica biti pod pažljivim nadzorom predstavnika Ministarstva zdravstva tokom čitave 2004. godine, a da će predstavnici lokalne uprave biti direktno uključeni u aktivnosti unapređenja stanja u ovoj bolnici. Konačno, Vlada je potvrdila da će Ministarstvo zdravstva vrlo brzo pokrenuti neovisnu istragu svih sličnih jedinica, te da će poduzeti sve neophodne mjere kako bi spriječili da se ovakvi nemili događaji ikada više ponove.”

Tokom zvanične posjete Rumuniji u augustu 2004. godine specijalni izvještač za pravo na zdravlje napravio je inspekciju nekoliko zdravstvenih ustanova, među kojima i PMH. Izvještaj koji je objavljen 21. februara 2005., nakon posjete specijalnog izvještača, u relevantnom dijelu kaže sljedeće:

“61.  Ipak, tokom svoje misije specijalni izvještač stekao je mišljenje da, uprkos zakonskim i političkim opredjeljenjima Vlade, uživanje prava na zdravstvenu zaštitu mentalnog zdravlja ostaje više težnja nego stvarnost za većinu osoba s duševnim smetnjama u Rumuniji.

Psihijatrijska bolnica Poiana Mare

...

63.  Tokom svoje misije, specijalni izvještač je imao priliku posjetiti PMH i razgovarati o događajima koji su se događali od februara 2004. godine i imenovanju novog direktora bolnice. Direktor je informirao specijalnog izvještača da je Vlada dodijelila sredstva (5,7 milijardi lei) za unapređenja. Povećane su porcije hrane, popravljen je sistem grijanja, a odjeljenja i drugi objekti u bolničkom krugu su obnovljeni. Premda je specijalni izvještač pozdravio ta poboljšanja i pohvalio sve one koji su zaslužni, ipak je pozvao Vladu da osigura, na održivoj osnovi, izdvajanje odgovarajućih sredstva za finansiranje ovih promjena. Vlada također treba podržati i druge potrebne mjere, između ostalog, osigurati dostupnost odgovarajućih lijekova, omogućiti odgovarajuću rehabilitaciju za pacijente, osigurati da pacijenti imaju pristup djelotvornim mehanizama žalbe, te osigurati obuku o ljudskim pravima za bolničko osoblje. Specijalni izvještač je shvatio da su istrage o smrtnim slučajevima još uvijek u toku. On će i dalje budno pratiti sva zbivanja u PMH. Specijalni izvještač koristi ovu priliku da naglasi važnu ulogu koju su mediji i nevladine organizacije imale u vezi sa bolnicom Poiana Mare.”

PRAVO

I.  NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANOVA 2., 3. i 13. KONVENCIJE

  1. Postupajući u ime gospodina Câmpeanua, CLR se žalio da je g. Câmpeanu nezakonito lišen života uslijed posljedica kombiniranih radnji i propusta više državnih agencija da djeluju, protivno svojim zakonskim obvezama da mu pruže njegu i liječenje. Osim toga, vlasti su propustile uspostaviti učinkovit mehanizam za zaštitu prava osoba s invaliditetom koje su dugoročno smještene u ustanove, između ostalog, i zato što su propustile pokrenuti istragu u slučaju sumnjivih smrtnih slučajeva. Nadalje, CLR se žalio da su ozbiljni propusti u njezi i liječenju gospodina Câmpeanua u CMSC-u i PMH-u, životni uvjeti u PMH-u, i opći stav vlasti i pojedinaca koji su bili uključeni u njegovo liječenje i skrb tokom posljednjih mjeseci njegovog života, zajedno ili odvojeno, predstavljali nečovječno i ponižavajuće postupanje. Osim toga, službena istraga tih navoda o zlostavljanju nije bila u skladu sa proceduralnim obavezama države prema članu 3. Na temelju člana 13. u vezi sa članovima 2. i 3., CLR je tvrdio da u domaćem pravnom sistemu Rumunije ne postoji djelotvorni pravni lijek u odnosu na sumnjive smrti i/ili zlostavljanja u psihijatrijskim bolnicama. Članovi 2., 3. i 13. Konvencije, u svojim relevantnim dijelovima, glase:

Član 2.

“1.  Pravo na život svake osobe zaštićeno je zakonom....”

Član 3.

“Niko ne smije biti podvrgnut mučenju, ili nečovječnom ili ponižavajućem postupanju ili kažnjavanju.”

Član 13

“Svako kome su povrijeđena prava i slobode predviđeni u ovoj Konvenciji ima pravo na djelotvoran pravni lijek pred nacionalnim vlastima, bez obzira jesu li povredu izvršila lica koja su postupala u službenom svojstvu.”

A.  Prihvatljivost

  1. Vlada tvrdi da CLR nije imao legitimni interes da podnese ovu predstavku u ime pokojnog Valentina Câmpeanua. Slučaj je stoga neprihvatljiv jer je ratione personae nekompatibilan s odredbama člana 34. Konvencije, koji glasi:

“Sud može primati predstavke bilo koje fizičke osobe, nevladine organizacije ili grupe pojedinaca koji tvrde da su žrtve povrede prava priznatih u ovoj Konvenciji ili dodatnim protokolima što ih je počinila jedna od visokih ugovornih strana. Visoke ugovorne strane se obavezuju da ni na koji način neće sprečavati djelotvorno ostvarivanje ovog prava.”

1.  Podnesci Sudu

(a)  Vlada

  1. Vlada je tvrdila da u ovom predmetu nisu ispunjeni uvjeti koje zahtijeva član 34. za podnošenje predstavke Sudu. S jedne strane, CLR nije imala status žrtve, a s druge strane, udruženje nije dokazalo da je valjan zastupnik direktne žrtve. Svjesna dinamike i razvoja tumačenja Konvencije u sudskoj praksi Suda, Vlada je ipak naglasila da, iako je sudsko tumačenje dopušteno, bilo kakvo pisanje zakona od strane sudova kroz dodavanje teksta Konvenciji nije dopušteno. Prema tome, član 34. treba tumačiti kao da znači da podnositelji pojedinačnih predstavki mogu biti samo pojedinci, nevladine organizacije ili skupine pojedinaca koji tvrde da su žrtve ili predstavnici navodnih žrtava.
  2. Vlada je osporavala da se CLR može se smatrati direktnom žrtvom ili neposrednom, odnosno potencijalnom žrtvom. Prvo, u ovom predmetu CLR nije tvrdio da je njegovo pravo bilo povrijeđeno, pa se stoga ne može smatrati direktnom žrtvom (Vlade je citirala predmet Čonka i drugi i Liga za ljudska prava protiv Belgije ( dec.), br. 51564 / 99, 13. mart 2001.). Drugo, prema sudskoj praksi Suda, indirektna ili potencijalna žrtva mora dokazati, s dovoljno dokaza, ili postojanje rizika od povrede ili učinak koje su povreda prava treće strane imale na njega ili nju kao posljedica već postojeće bliske veze, bilo prirodne (na primjer, u slučaju jednog člana porodice) ili pravne (na primjer, kao rezultat kazne zatvora). Vlada je, dakle, tvrdila da sama činjenica da su okolnosti gospodina Câmpeanua, kao ranjive osobe, bile u fokusu pažnje CLR, koji je tada odlučio podnijeti tužbu pred domaćim sudovima, nije dovoljna da CLR dobije status indirektne žrtve. U odsustvo snažne veze između direktne žrtve i CLR-a ili bilo kakve odluke kojom se CLR-u povjerava zadaća zastupnika ili staratelja g. Câmpeanua, CLR ne može tvrditi da je žrtva, direktna ili indirektna, bez obzira na nespornu ranjivost g. Câmpeanua ili činjenicu da je bio siroče i da nije imao imenovanog pravnog skrbnika (Vlada se, poređenja radi, pozvala na predmet Becker protiv Danske, br. 7011/75, odluka Komisije od 3. oktobra 1975.). 
  3. Nadalje, u nedostatku bilo kakvih dokaza o bilo kakvom obliku punomoći, CLR također nije mogao tvrditi da je zastupnik direktne žrtve (Vlada je navela predmet Skjoldager protiv Švedske, br. 22504/93 , odluka Komisije od 17. maja 1995.). Vlada je tvrdila da učešće CLR -a u domaćem postupku o smrti gospodina Câmpeanua ne podrazumijeva da su nacionalne vlasti priznale njihov legitimni interes za postupanje u ime direktne žrtve. Status CLR -a pred domaćim sudovima bio je status osobe čiji su interesi povrijeđeni odlukom tužitelja, a ne status predstavnika oštećene strane. U tom pogledu, domaće pravo, kako ga tumači Visoki kasacioni sud pravde Rumunije u svojoj odluci od 15. juna 2006. godine (vidi stav 44. ove presude), predstavljalo je priznanje statusa actio popularis u domaćim postupcima. 
  4. Vlada je tvrdila da je ovaj predmet pred Sudom trebao biti odbačen kao actio popularis, primjećujući da je Sud takve predmete prihvatao isključivo u kontekstu člana 33. Konvencije u odnosu na ovlaštenja država da nadziru jedna drugu. Premda je istakla da druga međunarodna tijela nisu izričito spriječila actio popularis (citirajući član 44. Američke konvencije o ljudskim pravima),Vlada je tvrdila da svaki mehanizam ima svoje granice, nedostatke i prednosti, a da je usvojeni model isključivo rezultat pregovora između ugovornih strana.
  5. Vlada je nadalje tvrdila da su rumunske vlasti uzele u obzir konkretne preporuke CPT-a i da su u Univerzalnom periodičnom pregledu UN-a iz 2013. godine istaknuti pozitivni pomaci u pogledu stanja osoba s invaliditetom u Rumuniji. Pomaci su napravljeni i u pogledu domaćeg zakonodavstva o starateljstvu i zaštiti prava osoba s invaliditetom. Osim toga, budući da su se presude Suda već bavile pitanjem prava ugroženih pacijenata smještenih u velikim ustanovama (Vlada je navela predmet CB protiv Rumunije, br. 21207/03, 20. april 2010. godine, i Stanev protiv Bugarske [GC], br. 36760/06, ECHR 2012), Vlada je tvrdila da nema posebnog razloga koji se tiče ljudskih prava, kako je to definirano u Konvenciji, zbog kojeg bi se predstavka trebala ispitivati.

(b)  CLR

  1. CLR je tvrdio da iznimne okolnosti ove predstavke zahtijevaju ispitivanje osnovanosti. Sud bi mogao napraviti takvu procjenu bilo da prihvati da je CLR indirektna žrtva ili da djeluje kao zastupnik gospodina Câmpeanua.
  2. S obzirom na načelo Suda o fleksibilnom tumačenju kriterija prihvatljivosti, kada to zahtijevaju interesi ljudskih prava i kada postoji potreba da se osigura praktičan i djelotvoran pristup postupku pred Sudom, CLR je smatrao da bi Sud trebao prihvatiti njegov locus standi kao zastupnika g. Câmpeanua. U takvoj odluci, u obzir treba uzeti iznimne okolnosti slučaja i činjenicu da je za g. Câmpeanua bilo nemoguće da ostvari pristup pravdi, bilo direktno ili preko posrednika, kao i činjenicu da su domaći sudovi priznali legitimni interes CLR-a kao zastupnika koji djeluje u njegovo ime i, na kraju, ali ne manje važno, da CLR ima dugogodišnju ekspertizu u zastupanju osoba s invaliditetom. CLR je nadalje istakao da je Sud prilagodio svoja pravila kako bi omogućio pristup svojim postupcima žrtvama kojima je izuzetno teško ili pak nemoguće ispuniti kriterije prihvatljivosti, zbog faktora koji su izvan njihove kontrole ali koji su vezani za povrede na koje se žale: očigledne poteškoće za žrtve mjera tajnog nadzora ili ranjive osobe koje su onemogućene dubokom starošću, spolom ili invaliditetom (naveli su, kao primjer, S.P., D.P. i A.T. protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, br. 23715/94, odluka Komisije od 20. maja 1996.; Storck protiv Njemačke, br. 61603/00, ECHR 2005-V; i Öcalan protiv Turske [GC], br. 46221/99, ECHR 2005-IV). Sud je također odstupio od pravila o “statusu žrtve” na temelju “interesa ljudskih prava”, smatrajući da njegove presude služe ne samo kao odluke u predmetima koji se pred njima razmatraju već općenito da “rasvijetle, zaštite i razvijaju pravila utemeljena Konvencijom, doprinoseći time poštivanju obaveza koje su ugovorne strane preuzele na sebe” (CLR se pozvao na predmet Karner protiv Austrije, br. 40016/98, § 26, ECHR 2003-IX). CLR je nadalje tvrdio da je država imala određene dužnosti prema članu 2., na primjer, bez obzira na postojanje bliskih srodnika ili njihovu spremnost za pokrenu postupak u ime podnositelja predstavke; Nadalje, uvjetovati da nadzor poštivanja obaveza države iz člana 2. mogu vršiti samo bliski srodnici za sobom povlači rizik od nepoštivanja zahtjeva iz člana 19. Konvencije.
  3. CLR se osvrnuo na međunarodnu praksu Interameričke komisije za ljudska prava i Afričke komisije o ljudskim pravima i pravima ljudi, koja u izuzetnim okolnostima omogućava da predstavke podnesu druga lica u ime navodnih žrtava, ukoliko su žrtve u nemogućnosti da same podnesu predstavke. Nevladine organizacije su u takvim situacijama među najaktivnijim braniteljima ljudskih prava. Nadalje, sudovi u mnogim zemljama članicama Vijeća Evrope često prihvataju njihov legitimni interes za pokretanje postupka u ime žrtve ili nastupanja kao njenog zastupnika (prema Izvještaju Agencije EU o fundamentalnim pravima iz 2011. godine, koji nosi naslov Pristup pravdi u Evropi: Pregled izazova i prilika).
  4. Vraćajući se na posebnosti ovog slučaja, CLR je naglasio da je značajan faktor u procjeni pitanja locus standi to da su njihovi posmatrači uspostavili kratki vizualni kontakt s gospodinom Câmpeanuom tokom posjeta PMH-u i da su svjedočili njegovoj patnji. Slijedom toga, CLR je poduzeo hitne radnje i obratio se brojnim predstavnicima vlasti, pozivajući ih da daju rješenja za njegovo kritično stanje. U tom kontekstu, dugogodišnje iskustvo organizacije u odbrani ljudskih prava osoba s invaliditetom odigralo je važnu ulogu. Ističući da je na domaćoj razini njihov status prihvaćen, CLR je tvrdio da Sud često u obzir uzima pravila domaćeg postupka o zastupanju kada odlučuje o tome ko ima pravo podnijeti predstavku u ime osoba s invaliditetom (pozvali su se na predmet Glass protiv Velike Britanije, br. 61827/00 , ECHR 2004 II ). Štaviše, Sud je utvrdio povrede u slučajevima kada su domaće vlasti primjenjivale pravila postupka na nefleksibilan način koji je osobama s invaliditetom ograničavao pristup pravdi (primjerice, X i Y protiv Nizozemske, 26. mart 1985., Serija A br. 91). U tom kontekstu, CLR je tvrdio da je postupak koji su oni pokrenuli pred domaćim vlastima bio drugačiji od postupka koji je pokrenula nevladina organizacija u svojstvu podnositelja predstavke u skorijem predmetu Nencheva i ostali protiv Bugarske (br. 48609 / 06,18. juna 2013.) u vezi sa smrću petnaestoro djece i mladih s invaliditetom u jednom centru za socijalno staranje. U tom slučaju, primjećujući, općenito, da su ponekad potrebne posebne mjere kako bi se osiguralo da ljudi koji se ne mogu braniti imaju pristup odbrani, Sud je istaknuo da Udruženje za evropske integracije i ljudska prava nije prethodno pokrenulo postupak na domaćoj razini. Sud je zbog toga odbacio predstavku kao ratione persona nekompatibilnu sa odredbama Konvencije u odnosu na dotičnu nevladinu organizaciju (ibid, § 93).
  5. Pozivajući se na komentare povjerenika Vijeća Evrope za ljudska prava u kojima je naglasio poteškoće na koje osobe s invaliditetom nailaze kod ostvarivanja pristupa pravdi i, također, na zabrinutost specijalnog izvještača Ujedinjenih nacija o pitanjima mučenja koji je kazao da praksa zlostavljanja osoba s invaliditetom izoliranih u državnim ustanovama često “ostaje nevidljiva”, CLR je tvrdio da “interesi ljudskih prava” zahtijevaju da se ispita meritum ovog predmeta. CLR je nadalje ukazao i na nekoliko kriterija koje je smatrao korisnim za utvrđivanje locus standi u predmetima sličnim ovom predmetu: ranjivost žrtve, koja podrazumijeva potencijalno apsolutnu nesposobnost da se žale; praktične i prirodne prepreke koje sprječavaju žrtvu da iscrpi domaće pravne lijekove, kao što su lišavanje slobode ili nemogućnost da kontaktira advokata ili bliže srodnike; priroda povrede, posebno u slučaju člana 2. gdje direktna žrtva ipso facto nije u poziciji da trećoj osobi dâ pisanu punomoć; nedostatak adekvatnih alternativnih institucionalnih mehanizama koji osiguravaju učinkovito zastupanje za žrtve; priroda povezanosti između treće strane koja tvrdi da ima legitimni interes i direktne žrtve; povoljni domaći propisi o legitimnom interesu; i da li se navodi tiču ozbiljnih pitanja od opće važnosti.
  6. U svjetlu gore navedenih kriterija i u mjeri u kojoj su djelovali u ime direktne žrtve, g. Câmpeanua, kako prije njegove smrti - podnošenjem molbe za njegov transfer iz PMH tako i odmah nakon toga i tokom naredne četiri godine, tražeći odgovornost za njegovu smrt pred domaćim sudovima, CLR je tvrdio da ima pravo podnijeti predstavku Sudu u ovom slučaju. CLR je zaključio da bi onemogućavanje CLR-u da djeluje u ime g. Câmpeanua značilo da se Vladi prepušta da iskoristi njegove nesretne okolnosti kako bi izbjegla ispitivanje Suda, čime bi se blokirao pristup Sudu za najranjivije članove društva.

(c)  Relevantni podnesci trećih strana

(i)  Povjerenik Vijeća Evrope za ljudska prava

  1. Povjerenik Vijeća Evrope za ljudska prava, čija je intervencija pred Sudom bila ograničena na prihvatljivost ove predstavke, tvrdio je da je pristup pravdi za osobe s invaliditetom vrlo problematičan, posebice u pogledu neadekvatnih zakonskih procedura za proglašavanje poslovne nesposobnosti i restriktivnih pravila o pravnom položaju. Prema tome, česta zlostavljanja počinjena nad osobama s invaliditetom često ostaju neprijavljena vlastima i ignorirana, a ove povrede okružuje atmosfera nekažnjavanja. Nevladine organizacije igraju veoma važnu ulogu u kontekstu sprečavanja i dokidanja takvih zlostavljanja, između ostalog, kroz omogućavanje pristupa pravdi najugroženijim osobama. U tom smislu, dozvoljavanje nevladinim organizacijama da podnesu predstavku Sudu u ime osoba s invaliditetom bilo bi u potpunosti u skladu s načelom djelotvornosti na kojem Konvencija počiva, ali i sa trendovima prisutnim na domaćoj razini u mnogim evropskim zemljama i sudskom praksom drugih međunarodnih sudova, kao što je Interamerički sud za ljudska prava, koji je dodijelio locus standi nevladinim organizacijama koje su djelovala u ime navodnih žrtava, čak i kada te žrtve nisu imenovale te organizacije kao svoje zastupnike (na primjer, u predmetu Yatama protiv Nigerije, presuda od 23. juna 2005.). Prema mišljenju povjerenika, striktan pristup pitanju kriterija za locus standi u vezi s osobama s invaliditetom (u ovom slučaju, intelektualnim) imao bi neželjeni učinak lišavanja te ranjive grupe svake prilike da traži i dobije odštetu za povredu svojih ljudskih prava, čime bi se proizveo suprotan efekt od temeljnog cilja Konvencije.
  2. Povjerenik je također naveo da u iznimnim okolnostima, koje će definirati Sud, nevladinim organizacijama treba omogućiti da podnesu predstavke Sudu u ime identificiranih žrtava koje su direktno pogođene navodnom povredom. Takve iznimne okolnosti mogu se ticati izuzetno ranjivih žrtava, na primjer, osoba zatočenih u psihijatrijskim ustanovama i ustanovama socijalne skrbi, bez porodica i alternativnih sredstava zastupanja, čije predstavke, koje su u njihovo ime podnijele osobe ili organizacije sa kojima je uspostavljena valjana veza, predstavljaju pitanja od općeg interesa. Takav pristup bi bio u skladu s evropskim trendom koji ide u smjeru širenja legitimnog interesa i prepoznavanja neprocjenjivog doprinosa nevladinih organizacija u oblasti ljudskih prava za osobe s invaliditetom; a u isto vrijeme, to bi bilo u skladu sa relevantnom sudskom praksom Suda, koja se u posljednjih nekoliko godina izuzetno razvila, dobrim dijelom upravo zahvaljujući intervencijama nevladinih organizacija.

(ii)     Bugarski Helsinški komitet

  1. Bugarski Helsinški komitet je tvrdio, na temelju svog bogatog iskustva kao nevladina organizacija za ljudska prava, da su institucionalizirane osobe s invaliditetom lišene zaštite krivičnog zakona, osim ako neka nevladina organizacija ne djeluje u njihovo ime, koristeći pravne lijekove u kombinaciji sa javnim zagovaranjem, ali čak i u takvim okolnostima, praktični rezultati ostaju nedovoljni jer ovim žrtvama i dalje ostaje uskraćen osnovni pristup sudovima, a sve češće i pristup pravdi iz proceduralnih razloga. Kao rezultat toga, zločin protiv institucionaliziranih osoba s duševnim smetnjama ostaje zaštićen od provođenja zakona, koji su doneseni s ciljem sprečavanja, kažnjavanja i obeštećenja žrtava.

(iii)   Centar za zagovaranje prava osoba sa duševnim smetnjama

  1. Centar za zagovaranje prava osoba s duševnim smetnjama je tvrdio da činjenična ili poslovna nesposobnost pojedinaca s intelektualnim poteškoćama da ostvare pristup pravdi, što je pitanje koje je Sud već ispitivao u svojim brojnim presudama (na primjer, Stanev, citiran u ovoj presudi), može u konačnici dovesti do nekažnjavanja povreda njihovih prava. U situacijama u kojima su ranjive žrtve lišene poslovne sposobnosti i/ili pritvorene u državnim ustanovama, države bi mogle “izbjeći” svaku odgovornost za zaštitu njihovih života nepružanjem bilo kakve pomoći u pravnim stvarima, između ostalog i u smislu zaštite njihovih ljudskih prava. Citirana je sudska praksa Vrhovnog suda Kanade, Vrhovnog suda Irske i Visokog suda Engleske i Velsa, koji su nevladinim organizacijama priznali legitimni interes u situacijama u kojima niko drugi nije bio u mogućnosti da iznese problem od javnog interesa pred sudove. Odluke gore navedenih sudova o pitanju locus standi nevladinih organizacija su se uglavnom temeljile na procjeni je li slučaj u pitanju predstavljao neko ozbiljno pitanje, da li je podnositelj predstavke imao pravi interes da podnese predstavku, da li je podnositelj predstavke imao ekspertizu u relevantnom području i da li je postojao bilo koji drugi razumni i učinkovit način da se to pitanje predoči sudovima.

2.  Ocjena Suda

(a)  Pristup Suda u ranijim predmetima

(i)  Direktne žrtve

  1. Da bi se mogla podnijeti predstavka u skladu s članom 34. pojedinac mora biti u stanju pokazati da je on ili ona “direktno pogođena” mjerom na koju se žali (v. Burden protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [GC], br.13378/05, § 33, ECHR 2008, i İlhan protiv Turske [GC], br. 22277/93, §52, ECHR 2000-VII). To je neophodno za aktiviranje mehanizma zaštite Konvencije, premda se ovaj kriterij ne treba primjenjivati na krut, mehanički i nefleksibilan način tokom postupka (v. Karner, citiran u ovoj presudi, § 25, i Fairfield i ostali protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (dec.), br. 24790/04, ECHR 2005-VI). Osim toga, prema sudskoj praksi Suda i u skladu s članom 34. Konvencije, predstavku može podnijeti samo pojedinac koji je živ, ili neko drugo lice u njegovo ime (vidi Varnava i drugi protiv Turske [GC], br. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 i 16073/90, § 111, ECHR 2009). Dakle, u velikom broju slučajeva u kojima je direktna žrtva umrla prije podnošenja predstavke, Sud nije prihvatao da ta direktna žrtva, čak i kada ima zastupnika, ima pravni status podnositelja predstavke u smislu člana 34. Konvencije (v. Aizpurua Ortiz i ostali protiv Španije, br. 42430/05, § 30, 2. februar 2010.; Dvořáček i Dvořáčková protiv Slovačke, br. 30754/04, §41, 28. juli 2009.; i Kaya i Polat protiv Turske (dec.), br. 2794/05 i 40345/05, 21. oktobar 2008.).

(ii)  Indirektne žrtve

  1. Slučajevi gore navedenog tipa razlikuju se od slučajeva u kojima je nasljednicima podnositelja predstavke bilo dopušteno da nastave postupak po predstavci koja je već podnesena. Standard za ovo pitanje je predmet Fairfield i ostali (citiran u ovoj presudi), gdje je kćerka podnijela predstavku nakon smrti svog oca, tvrdeći da su njegova prava na slobodu misli, vjere i govora bila povrijeđena (članovi 9. i 10. Konvencije). Iako su domaći sudovi dopustili da gđa Fairfield uloži žalbu nakon smrti njezina oca, Sud nije prihvatio njezin status žrtve i razlikovao je ovaj slučaj od situacije u predmetu Dalban protiv Rumunije ([GC], br. 28114/95 , ECHR 1999 VI ), u kojem je predstavku podnio sam podnositelj predstavke, a čija je udovica nastavila postupak tek nakon njegove smrti.U tom pogledu, Sud je napravio razliku između predstavki u kojima je direktna žrtva umrla nakon što je predstavka dostavljena Sudu i onih gdje su direktne žrtve umrle prije toga. Gdje je podnositelj predstavke umro nakon što je predstavka podnesena, Sud je prihvatio da njegovi najbliži srodnici nastave postupak, pod uvjetom da imaju dostatan interes u predmetu (vidi, naprimjer, udovica i djeca u predmetu Raimondo protiv Italije, 22. februar 1994., § 2, Serija A, br. 281-A, i Stojkovic protiv “bivše Jugoslovenske Republike Makedonije”, br. 14818/02, § 25, 8. novembar 2007.; roditelji u predmetu X protiv Francuske, br. 18020/91, § 26, 31. mart 1992.; nećak i potencijalni nasljednik u predmetu Malhous protiv Češke Republike (dec.), br. 33071/96, ECHR 2000-XII; ili nevjenčani ili de facto partner u predmetu Velikova protiv Bugarske (dec.), br. 41488/98, 18. maja 1999.; i uporedi univerzalnog nasljednika koji nije u srodstvu s pokojnikom u predmetu Thévenon protiv Francuske (dec.), br. 2476/02, ECHR 200 –III; nećak u predmetu Léger protiv Francuske (izbrisano) [GC], br. 19324/02, § 50, 30. mart 2009.; i kćerka jednog od izvornih podnositelja predstavke u predmetu koji se tiče neprenosivih prava prema članu 3. i 8., gdje nije bilo nikakvog interesa, M.P. i ostali protiv Bugarske, br. 22457/08, §§ 96-100, 15. novembar 2011.).
  2. Međutim, situacija se razlikuje ako direktna žrtva umre prije nego predstavka bude podnesena Sudu. U takvim slučajevima Sud je, pozivajući se na autonomno tumačenje pojma “žrtva”, bio spreman priznati pravni interes srodnika, onda kada se radi o problemu koji je od općeg interesa za “poštivanje ljudskih prava” (članak 37., § 1 in fine Konvencije) i kada podnositelji predstavke kao nasljednici imaju legitimni interes u ostvarivanju predstavke, ili na temelju direktnog utjecaja na vlastita prava podnositelja predstavke (vidi Micallef protiv Malte [GC], br. 17056 / 06, §§ 44-51, ECHR 2009 i Marie - Louise Loyen i Bruneel protiv Francuske, br. 55929/00, §§ 21-31, 5. juli 2005.). Kao što se može primijetiti, potonji slučajevi su podneseni Sudu nakon ili u vezi sa domaćim postupkom u kojem je direktna žrtva lično sudjelovala dok je bila živa. Dakle, Sud je priznao status najbližih srodnika žrtve i dopustio im da podnesu predstavku u ime žrtve koja je umrla ili nestala u okolnostima u koje je navodno umiješana država (vidi Çakıcı protiv Turske [GC], br. 23657 / 94, § 92, ECHR 1999 IV, i Bazorkina protiv Rusije ( dec.), br. 69481/01, 15. septembra 2005. godine).
  3. U predmetu Varnava i ostali (citiran u ovoj presudi) podnositelji predstavke su podnijeli predstavku i u vlastito ime i u ime svojih nestalih rođaka. Sud nije smatrao potrebnim da donese odluku o tome treba li ili ne nestalim osobama dodijeliti status podnositelja predstavke budući da, u svakom slučaju, bliski srodnici nestalih osoba imaju pravo podnijeti tužbu u vezi sa njihovim nestankom (ibid., § 112). Sud je ispitivao slučaj na temelju činjenice da su rođaci nestalih osoba podnositelji predstavke u smislu člana 34. Konvencije.
  4. U predmetima u kojima povreda Konvencije nije bila usko povezana s nestankom i smrti, koje su se dovodile u vezu sa članom 2., Sud je zauzeo restriktivniji pristup, kao u predmetu Sanles Sanles protiv Španije ((dec.), br. 48335/99, ECHR 2000-XI), koji se ticao zabrane potpomognutog samoubistva. Sud je smatrao da su prava na koja se podnositeljica predstavke pozivala prema članovima 2., 3., 5., 8., 9. i 14. Konvencije pripadala kategoriji neprenosivih prava, pa je shodno tome zaključio da podnositeljica predstavke, koja je pokojnikova snaha i pravna nasljednica, ne može tvrditi da je žrtva povrede u ime svog pokojnog zeta. Isti zaključak je donesen i u odnosu na prigovore na temelju članova 9. i 10., koje je podnijela navodna kćerka žrtve (vidi Fairfield i ostali, prethodno citirano). U drugim predmetima koji se odnose na prigovore na temelju članova 5., 6. ili 8. Sud je rodbini odobrio status žrtve, dopuštajući im da podnesu predstavku jer su dokazali moralni interes da pokojnu žrtvu oslobode svake krivnje (v. Nölkenbockhoff protiv Njemačke, br. 10300/83, § 33, 25. august 1987., i Grădinar protiv Moldavije, br. 7170/02, §§ 95 i 97-98, 8. april 2008.) ili da zaštite svoju vlastitu reputaciju i reputaciju svoje porodice (v. Brudnicka i ostali protiv Poljske, br. 54723/00, §§27-31, ECHR 2005-II; Armonienė protiv Litvanije, br. 36919/02, § 29, 25. novembar 2008.; i Polanco Torres i Movilla Polanco protiv Španije, br.34147/06, §§31-33, 21. septembar 2010.), ili gdje su pokazali materijalni intres na osnovu direktnog uticaja na njihova imovinska prava (v. Ressegatti protiv Švicarske, br. 17671/02, §§ 23-25, 13. juli 2006.; i Marie-Louise Loyen i Bruneel, §§ 2930; Nölkenbockhoff, §33;Grădinar, § 97; i Micallef, § 48, svi prethodno citirani). Postojanje općeg interesa zbog čega je bilo neophodno nastaviti razmatranje predstavke je također uzimano u obzir (v. Marie-Louise Loyen i Bruneel, § 29; Ressegatti, § 26; Micallef, §§ 46 i 50, svi prethodno citirani; i Biç i ostali protiv Turske, br. 55955/00,§§ 22-23, 2. februar 2006.). Učešće podnositelja predstavke u domaćem postupku je samo jedan od nekoliko relevantnih kriterija (v. Nölkenbockhoff, § 33; Micallef, §§ 48-49; Polanco Torres i Movilla Polanco, § 31; i Grădinar, §§ 98-99, svi prethodno citirani; i Kaburov protiv Bugarske (dec.), br. 9035/06, §§ 52-53, 19. juni 2012.).

(iii)  Potencijalne žrtve i actio popularis

  1. Član 34. Konvencije ne dopušta tužbe in abstracto za navodnu povredu Konvencije. Konvencija ne omogućava institut actio popularis (v. Klass i ostali protiv Njemačke, 6. septembar 1978., § 33, Serija A br. 28; Gruzijska stranka rada protiv Gruzije (dec.), br. 9103/04, 22. maj 2007.; i Burden, citirano ranije, § 33), što znači da podnositelji predstavke ne mogu podnositi tužbe protiv odredbe domaćeg prava, domaće prakse ili javnih akata samo zato što se oni čine suprotnim Konvenciji. Da bi podnositelji predstavke mogli tvrditi da su žrtve, oni moraju predočiti razumne i uvjerljive dokaze o vjerovatnosti nastanka povrede koja će uticati na njih lično. Sama sumnja ili pretpostavka je nedovoljna u tom pogledu (v. Tauira i 18 drugih protiv Francuske, predstavka br . 28204/95 , odluka Komisije od 4. decembra 1995. godine, odluke i izvještaji (DR) 83 - B, str. 131 , i Monnat protiv Švicarske, br. 73604/01 , §§ 31-32, ECHR 2006 - X ).

(iv)  Zastupanje

  1. Prema dobro utvrđenoj sudskoj praksi Suda (vidi stav 96. ove presude), predstavku Sudu može podnijeti samo živa osoba ili neko drugo lice u njezino ime. Kada se podnositelji predstavke odluče na zastupanje prema pravilu 36., § 1. Poslovnika Suda umjesto da sami podnesu predstavku, pravilo 45., § 3 od njih zahtijeva da u tom smislu sačine pismenu punomoć i da je potpišu. Suštinski je važno da zastupnici pokažu da su dobili konkretne i izričite upute od navodne žrtve u smislu člana 34. u čije ime oni namjeravaju pokrenuti postupak pred Sudom (vidi Post protiv Nizozemske ( dec.), br . 21727/08, 20. januar 2009. godine u odnosu na valjanost punomoći, pogledajte Aliev protiv Gruzije, br 522/04 , §§ 44-49 , 13. januara 2009.).
  2. Međutim, institucije Konvencije su smatrale da se mogu pojaviti posebne okolnosti u slučaju žrtava navodnih povreda članova 2., 3. i 8 od strane domaćih vlasti.Predstavke koje su podnijeli pojedinci u ime žrtve, odnosno žrtava, čak i kada nije predočena valjana punomoć za podnošenje predstavke su, dakle, bile proglašene dopuštenim. Posebna pažnja je posvećena ranjivosti žrtava u smislu njihove starosne dobi, spola ili invaliditeta, zbog koje nisu bili u stanju da podnesu predstavke Sudu, vodeći također računa i o vezi između osobe koja je podnijela predstavku i žrtve (vidi mutatis mutandis, İlhan, citirano ranije u ovoj presudi, § 55, gdje je tužbu podnio podnositelj predstavke u ime svoga brata koji je zlostavljan; Y.F. protiv Turske, br. 24209/94, § 29, ECHR 2003–IX, gdje se suprug žalio da je njegova supruga bila prisiljena da obavi ginekološki pregled; i S.P., D.P. i A.T. protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, citiran ranije, gdje je predstavku podnio advokat u ime djece koju je zastupao u domaćem postupku, a kojega je imenovao staratelj ad litem). Nasuprot tome, u predmetu Nencheva i drugi (citiran ranije, § 93) Sud nije priznao status žrtve udruženju koje je podnijelo predstavku u ime direktnih žrtava, ističući da udruženje nije učestvovalo u postupku pred domaćim sudovima i da činjenice na koje su se žalili nisu imale nikakav utjecaj na njihove aktivnosti jer je udruženje bilo u stanju nastaviti raditi na ostvarenju svojih ciljeva. Iako je srodnicima nekih od žrtava priznao status žrtve, Sud je ipak ostavio otvorenim pitanje zastupanja žrtava koje nisu bile u mogućnosti da se same pojave pred Sudom, prihvatajući da iznimne okolnosti mogu zahtijevati vanredne mjere.

(b)  Da li CLR ima legitimni interes u ovom predmetu

  1. Ovaj slučaj se tiče veoma ranjive osobe koja nema nikakvih bližih srodnika, g. Câmpeanua, mladog Roma sa veoma ozbiljnim duševnim poteškoćama koji je zaražen HIV-om i koji je čitav svoj život proveo u državnim ustanovama za staranje i koji je umro u bolnici, navodno zbog zanemarivanja. Nakon njegove smrti, i bez ikakvog značajnijeg kontakta s njim dok je bio živ (vidi stav 23. ove presude), ili bez ikakve punomoći ili njegove upute ili upute nekog drugog nadležnog tijela, Udruženjepodnositelj predstavke (CLR) sada traži da podnese predstavku Sudu u vezi sa, između ostalog, okolnostima njegove smrti.
  2. Po mišljenju Suda, ovaj predmet ne potpada lako u bilo koju od kategorija koje pokriva ranije spomenuta sudska praksa i stoga postavlja teško pitanje tumačenja Konvencije koji se odnosi na pravni položaju CLR-a. U rješavanju ovog pitanja Sud će uzeti u obzir činjenicu da se Konvencija mora tumačiti na način da jamči prava koja su praktična i djelotvorna, a ne teoretska i iluzorna (vidi Artico protiv Italije, 13. maja 1980., § 33 , Serija A br. 37 i u njoj navedeni izvori). Na umu također mora imati da presude Suda “ne služe samo da se odluči o predmetima koji su predočeni Sudu već općenito, da se rasvijetle, zaštite i razviju pravila uspostavljena Konvencijom, čime se doprinosi poštivanju obaveza koje su državne potpisnice preuzele na sebe” (v. Irska protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 18. januar 1978., § 154, Serija A br. 25, i Konstantin Markin protiv Rusije [GC], br. 30078/06, § 89, ECHR 2012). U isto vrijeme, kao što je manifestirano u ranije spomenutoj sudskoj praksi u pogledu statusa žrtve i pojma “pravnog položaja”, Sud mora osigurati da se uvjeti dopuštenosti kojima se uređuje pristup Sudu uvijek dosljedno tumače.
  3. Sud smatra da je nesporno da je gospodin Câmpeanu bio direktna žrtva, u smislu člana 34. Konvencije, okolnosti koje su u konačnici dovele do njegove smrti i koje su u središtu glavnog prigovora podnesenog Sudu u ovom predmetu, odnosno predstavke koje je podnesena temeljem člana 2. Konvencije.
  4. S druge strane, Sud ne može pronaći dovoljno relevantne razloge zbog kojih bi CLR smatrao direktnom žrtvom u smislu svoje sudske prakse. Ono što je presudno je to da CLR nije pokazao dovoljno “blisku vezu” sa direktnom žrtvom niti je tvrdio da ima “lični interes” u ostvarivanju ove tužbe pred Sudom, što su koncepti čije definicije su date u sudskoj praksi Suda (v. stavove 97.-100. ove presude).
  5. Dok je bio živ, g. Câmpeanu nije pokrenuo nikakav postupak pred domaćim sudovima kako bi se žalio na svoje zdravstveno i pravno stanje. Premda je formalno smatran osobom koja ima punu poslovnu sposobnost, čini se jasnim da je u praksi tretiran kao osoba koja nije bila poslovno sposobna (v. stavove  14. i 16. ove presude). U svakom slučaju, s obzirom na njegovo stanje izuzetne ugroženosti, Sud smatra da on nije bio u stanju samostalno pokrenuti bilo kakav postupak, bez odgovarajuće pravne podrške i savjeta. On je dakle bio u potpuno drugačijem i manje povoljnom položaju nego osobe u predmetima o kojima je Sud ranije odlučivao. To su bili predmeti koji su se odnosili na osobe koje su bile poslovno sposobne ili barem nisu bile spriječene da pokrenu postupak tokom svog života (v. stavove 98. i 100. ove presude, i u čije ime su predstavke podnesene nakon njihove smrti.
  6. Nakon smrti g. Câmpeanua, CLR je pokrenuo čitav niz domaćih postupaka s ciljem rasvjetljavanja okolnosti koje su dovele i okruživale njegovu smrt. Konačno, nakon što je istraga pokazala da u smrti g. Câmpeanua nema nikakvih elemenata krivičnog djela, CLR je podnio ovu predstavku Sudu.
  7. Sud poseban značaj pridaje činjenici da niko od domaćih i pravosudnih organa ni na koji način nije dovodio u pitanje ili osporavao položaj CLR-a da zastupa g. Câmpeanua, odnosno da djeluje u njegovo ime (v. stavove 23., 27.-28., 33., 37.-38. i 40.-41. ove presude); takve inicijative, koje bi uobičajeno bile odgovornost staratelja ili zastupnika, CLR je preuzeo na sebe bez ikakvih prigovora od nadležnih organa vlasti, koji su prećutno pristali na ove postupke i koji su se bavili svim predstavkama koje su im podnesene.
  8. Sud također primjećuje, kao što je već spomenuto, da u vrijeme smrti g Câmpeanu nije imao poznatih srodnika, a u vrijeme kada je dostigao punoljetstvo država mu nije imenovala nadležnu osobu ili skrbnika koji bi vodio računa o njegovim interesima, pravnim ili drugim, bez obzira na zakonske obveze da to učini. Na domaćoj razini, CLR se uključio kao zastupnik malo prije njegove smrti - u vrijeme kad je bio očigledno nesposoban da izrazi bilo kakve želje ili stavove u vezi vlastitih potreba i interesa, a kamoli o tome želi li pokrenuti sudski postupak. Zbog propusta vlasti da mu imenuju pravnog staratelja ili nekog drugog zastupnika, on nije imao niti mu je stavljena na raspolaganje bilo kakva vrsta zastupnika koji bi ga štitio i u njegovo ime podnosio zahtjeve bolničkim vlastima, domaćim sudovima i Sudu (vidi mutatis mutandis, P., C. i S. protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (dec.), br. 56547/00, 11. decembar 2001., i B. protiv Rumunije (br. 2), ranije citiran, §§ 96-97). Također je značajno da se glavni prigovor na temelju Konvencije odnosi na prava iz člana 2. (“Pravo na život), koje g Câmpeanu, iako direktna žrtva, očigledno nije mogao tražiti zbog smrti.
  9. Prema tome, Sud je uvjeren da bi u iznimnim okolnostima ovog slučaja i imajući u vidu ozbiljnu prirodu navoda, CLR-u trebalo dozvoliti da djeluje kao predstavnik gospodina Câmpeanua, bez obzira na činjenicu da nema punomoć da djeluje u njegovo ime i da je on umro prije nego što je predstavka podnesena temeljem Konvencije. Utvrditi drugačije značilo bi spriječiti ispitivanja tako ozbiljnih navoda o povredi Konvencije na međunarodnoj razini, uz rizik da bi tužena država mogla pobjeći od odgovornosti prema Konvenciji zato što je propustila imenovati pravnog zastupnika koji bi djelovao u njegovo ime, a što je bila dužna uraditi prema domaćem pravu (vidi stavove 59. i 60. ove presude, vidi također, mutatis mutandis, P., C. i S. protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, naprijed citirano, Argeş College pravnih savjetnika protiv Rumunije, br. 2162/05, § 26., 8. mart 2011.). Dopustiti tuženoj državi da pobjegne od odgovornosti na ovaj način ne bi bilo u skladu s općim duhom Konvencije niti s obavezama visokih ugovornih strana iz člana 34. Konvencije da ni na koji način ne ometaju učinkovito ostvarivanje prava na podnošenje predstavke Sudu.
  10. Odobravanje pravnog položaja CLR-u da djeluje kao zastupnik gospodina Câmpeanua je pristup koji je u skladu sa pristupom omogućavanja prava na sudsku reviziju iz člana 5., § 4. Konvencije u slučaju “umobolnih osoba”(član 5., § 1 (e)). U tom kontekstu može se ponoviti da je bitno da osoba mora imati pristup sudu i mogućnost da bude saslušana, bilo lično ili, ako je potrebno, kroz neki oblik zastupanja, a ako joj to ne bude omogućeno, ostat će uskraćena za “temeljna jamstva postupka koja se primjenjuju u pitanjima lišavanja slobode” (v. De Wilde, Ooms i Versyp protiv Belgije, 18. juna 1971. godine, § 76 , Serija A br. 12). Mentalna bolest može značiti ograničavanje ili modificiranje načina ostvarivanja tog prava (vidi Golder protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 21. februara 1975. godine, § 39, Serija A br . 18 ), ali to ne može opravdati ometanje same suštine prava. Doista, mogu biti potrebne posebne mjere zaštite postupka da bi se zaštitili interesi osoba koje, zbog svojih mentalnih poteškoća, nisu u potpunosti sposobne djelovati samostalno (v. Winterwerp protiv Nizozemske, 24. oktobra 1979, § 60 , Serija A br. 33). Smetnja u stvari može biti u suprotnosti s Konvencijom baš poput neke pravne prepreke (vidi Golder, ranije citirano, § 26 ).
  11. Shodno tome, Sud odbija prigovor Vlade da CLR nema locus standi, s bzirom na potonji pravni položaj de facto zastupnika g. Câmpeanua. Sud nadalje primjećuje da prigovori iz ovog podnaslova nisu očigledno neosnovani u smislu člana 35., § 3. (a) Konvencije ili nedopušteni ni po kojoj drugoj osnovi. Oni se, stoga, moraju proglasiti prihvatljivima.

B.  Osnovanost

1.  Podnesci Sudu

(a)  CLR

  1. CLR je tvrdio da su svojim neprimjerenim odlukama o prebacivanju gospodina Câmpeanua u ustanovu koja nema potrebne vještine i pretpostavke da se bavi njegovim stanjem, a potom i neprimjerenim medicinskim postupcima ili propustima, vlasti doprinijele, direktno ili indirektno, njegovoj preranoj smrti. CLR je naglasio da, iako su liječnički pregledi kojima je gospodin Câmpeanu bio podvrgnut tokom mjeseci prije prelaska u CMSC i, kasnije, u PMH potvrdili da je njegovo “opće stanje dobro” i bez značajnijih zdravstvenih problema, njegovo zdravlje se naglo pogoršalo u dvije sedmice prije njegove smrti, u vrijeme kad je bio pod nadzorom vlasti. U skladu s opsežnom sudskom praksom Suda u pogledu člana 2., koji je relevantan za ovaj slučaj, država je bila dužna dati objašnjenje u vezi sa medicinskom njegom koja je pružana g. Câmpeanu i uzroku njegove smrti (CLR se pozvao, između ostalih izvora, na Kats i ostali protiv Ukrajine, br. 29971/04, § 104, 18. decembar 2008.; Dodov protiv Bugarske, br. 59548/00, § 81, 17. januar 2008.; Aleksanyan protiv Rusije, br. 46468/06, § 147, 22. decembar 2008.; Khudobin protiv Rusije, br. 59696/00, § 84, ECHR 2006-XII; i Z.H. protiv Mađarske, br. 28973/11, §§ 31-32, 8. novembar 2012.). Vlada nije ispunila ovu obavezu, iako je s jedne stane propustila da dostavi važne medicinske dokumente vezane za g Câmpeanua, dok je, s druge strane, Sudu dostavila duplikat medicinske dokumentacije o boravku pacijenta u PMH, u kojem je jedan važan podatak bio izmijenjen. U izvornom zdravstvenom kartonu - koji je predočavan u različitim fazama u domaćem postupku - nije bilo pomena o tome da su g. Câmpeanu davani ARV lijekovi, dok su u novom dokumentu različitim rukopisom dopisane reference na ARV lijekove, čime se sugerira da je pacijentu administriran takav lijek. Kako se Vlada oslanjala na novi dokument da bi osporila prigovore CLR-a u vezi sa nedostatkom ARV terapije (vidi stav 122. u nastavku), CLR je tvrdio da je taj dokument, po svemu sudeći, proizveden nakon događaja kako bi podržao argumente Vlade pred ovim Sudom.
  2. CLR nadalje tvrdi da nekoliko dokumenata koji su nastali o ovom događaju, a naročito oni u vezi sa ličnim posjetama CPT-a, dokazuju da su vlasti itekako bile svjesne nekvalitetnih životnih uvjeta i loše njege i liječenja u PMH-u i prije 2004. godine pa čak i oko relevantnog događaja (vidi stavove 47., 74. i 78. ove presude).
  3. Propust da se g. Câmpeanu pruži odgovarajuća njega i liječenje naglašen je i lošim održavanjem medicinske dokumentacije i nepropisno zabilježenim uzastopnim transferima pacijenta iz jednog bolničkog odjeljenja u drugo. Takvi propusti su značajni jer je očito da se pacijentovo zdravstveno stanje pogoršalo tokom tog relevantnog perioda, pa je stoga bilo potrebno hitno liječenje. Također, kao što je gore navedeno, premda pacijent nije primao ARV lijekove tokom svog kratkog boravka u CMSC, vrlo je vjerovatno da ih g. Câmpeanu nije primao ni tokom svog boravka u PMH. U isto vrijeme, iako je trebalo obaviti niz medicinskih pretraga, ništa od toga nije urađeno. Službena istraga nije uspjela razjasniti te ključne aspekte slučaja, iako bi moglo biti više mogućih objašnjenja za pacijentovo navodno psihotično ponašanje, kao što su sepsa ili njegova prisilna izolacija u zasebnu prostoriju. S obzirom na navedeno, CLR je ustvrdio da tužena država očito nije bila ispunila svoje materijalne obaveze iz člana 2. Konvencije.
  4. CLR nadalje tvrdi da su životni uvjeti u PMH i smještanje pacijenta u odvojenu sobu predstavljali zasebnu povredu člana 3. Konvencije. Čvrsti dokazi u spisu, uključujući i dokumente koje su izdale rumunske vlasti, kao što su Vlada, tužilaštvo pri Visokom sudu, Nacionalni institut za forenziku i osoblje PMH, ukazuju na nezadovoljavajuće uvjete u PMH u relevantno vrijeme, a posebno u pogledu manjka hrane, grijanja i prisustva zaraznih bolesti. Nesporno je da je g. Câmpeanu bio smješten sam u zasebnu sobu; Posmatrači CLR-a su tokom svoje posjete PMH-u primijetili da pacijent nije bio adekvatno obučen, da je soba bila hladna i da mu je osoblje bolnice odbilo pružiti podršku u zadovoljavanju njegovih osnovnih potreba. Premda je Vlada navela da ova mjera nije poduzeta sa bilo kakvom namjerom da se pacijent diskriminira, ipak su propustili ponuditi valjano opravdanje za tu mjeru. Tvrdnja da je dotična soba bila jedina dostupna soba u suprotnosti je sa brojnim izvještajima koji ukazuju da u to vrijeme bolnica nije radila svojim punim kapacitetom.
  5. CLR je tvrdila da službena istraga u ovom slučaju nije bila u skladu sa zahtjevima iz Konvencije iz sljedećih razloga: njezin opseg je bio preuzak, fokusirala se na samo dva liječnika, jednog iz CMSC i drugog iz PMH, ignorirajući ostalo osoblje ili druge agencije koje su bile uključene; analiziran je samo neposredni uzrok smrti i razdoblje neposredno prije smrti; dok su vlasti propustile pravovremeno prikupiti bitne dokaze i rasvijetliti sporne činjenice, između ostalog i uzrok smrti u ovom slučaju. Propust da se odmah nakon pacijentove smrti obavi obdukcija i propusti u pružanju medicinske njege bili su nedostaci koji su naglašeni i u prvostepenoj sudskoj odluci, koju je, međutim, drugostepeni sud ukinuo. CLR je u zaključku tvrdio da istraga nije ispunila uvjete iz članova 2. i 3. Konvencije jer njome nije utvrđeno činjenično stanje, niti su utvrđeni uzrok smrti i kažnjeni počinitelji.
  6. CLR je tvrdio da u slučaju osoba s invaliditetom koji su smještene u državne ustanove, član 13. zahtijeva od država da poduzmu pozitivne mjere kako bi osigurale da ti ljudi imaju pristup pravdi, između ostalog, kreiranjem neovisnog nadzornog mehanizma za primanje pritužbi o takvim stvarima, istraživanjem zlostavljanja, nametanjem sankcija ili upućivanjem predmeta nadležnom tijelu.
  7. Tvrdili su da je u nekoliko prethodnih slučajeva protiv Rumunije Sud utvrdio povredu zbog nedostatka adekvatnih pravnih lijekova koji se odnose na osobe s invaliditetom koji su se žalile temeljem članova 3. i 5. Konvencije(pozvali su se na predmete Filip protiv Rumunije, br. 41124/02, § 49, 14. decembar 2006; C.B. protiv Rumunije, citiran ranije, §§ 65-67; Parascineti protiv Rumunije, br.32060/05, §§ 34-38, 13. mart 2012.; i B. protiv Rumunije (br. 2), citiran ranije, §97). Isti zaključak proizilazi iz dosljedne dokumentacije međunarodnih nevladinih organizacija, kao što su Human Rights Watch ili Mental Disability Rights International, a sam CLR je također izvještavao o nedostatku zaštite od zlostavljanja i činjenici da su stanovnici psihijatrijskih ustanovama u velikoj mjeri nesvjesni svojih prava, dok uposlenici nisu obučeni da se bave navodima o zlostavljanju. CLR je nadalje tvrdio da, prema njihovim saznanjima, uprkos vrlo vjerodostojnim navodima o sumnjivim smrtnim slučajevima u psihijatrijskim ustanovama, tamo nikad nije bilo nikakve konačne odluke kojom je neko od uposlenika proglašen krivično ili građanski odgovornim za nesavjesno postupanje u vezi sa tim smrtnim slučajevima. U slučaju 129 smrtnih slučajeva prijavljenih na PMH u razdoblju od 2002. do 2004. godine krivična istraga nije rezultirala bilo kakvim prijestupima, a sudovi su naknadno potvrdili odluke o neprocesuiranju. U zaključku, rumunskom pravosudnom sistemu nedostaju djelotvorna pravna sredstva u smislu člana 13. u odnosu na osobe s mentalnim invaliditetom u cjelini, a posebno u odnosu na prava gospodina Câmpeanua, koja su zaštićena članovima 2. i 3.

(b)  Vlada

  1. Vlada je ustvrdila da, budući da je HIV vrlo ozbiljna progresivna bolest, činjenica da je gospodin Câmpeanu umro od toga nije sama po sebi dokaz da je njegova smrt bila uzrokovana nedostacima u zdravstvenom sistemu. Nadalje, nisu izvedeni dokazi koji ukazuju da vlasti nisu g. Câmpeanu pružile ARV tretman. Naprotiv, Vlada je dostavila kopiju pacijentovog zdravstvenog kartona iz PMH iz kojeg se vidi da je za vrijeme boravka u bolnici primao ARV lijekove. Zaključak Disciplinskog odbora Medicinskog udruženja također je potvrdio adekvatnost tretmana koji je pružan g. Câmpeanu (v. stav 35. ove presude). Član 2. u svom materijalnom dijelu, prema tome, nije primjenjiv na ovaj slučaj.
  2. Kada je riječ o članu 3., Vlada je ustvrdila da su opći uvjeti u CMSC-u i u PMH-u (higijena, hrana, grijanje, kao i ljudski resursi) bili primjereni i u skladu sa standardima koji su bili na snazi u relevantno vrijeme. Medicinska njega koju je imao gospodin Câmpeanu bila je primjerena njegovom zdravstvenom stanju. On je primljen u CMSC dok je njegovo “opće stanje bilo dobro”, a kada su počeli njegovi “nasilni ispadi” on je prebačen u PMH. Pacijent je bio smješten sam u sobi u PMH, ne s namjerom da ga se izolira već zato što je to bila jedina slobodna soba. Unatoč intravenoznom hranjenju, pacijent je 20. februara 2004. godine umro uslijed kardiorespiratorne insuficijencije.U tom kontekstu,Vlada tvrdi da, s obzirom na kratko vrijeme koje je gospodin Câmpeanu proveo u PMH, član 3. nije primjenjiv u odnosu na materijalne uvjete u bolnici.
  3. Vlada tvrdi da su krivične optužbe koje je CLR podnio u vezi s okolnostima smrti gospodina Câmpeanu detaljno razmotrene pred domaćim organima - sudovima, komisijama ili istražnim tijelima, koji su detaljno i uvjerljivo obrazložili svoje presude. Prema tome, država se ne može pozivati na odgovornost shodno članovima 2. i 3.
  4. Što se tiče člana 13., Vlada je ustvrdila da, budući da se ovaj prigovor odnosi na ostale pritužbe CLR-a, nema potrebe da se navodi posebno ispituju. U svakom slučaju, pritužbe iz ovog člana su neosnovane. Alternativno, Vlada je tvrdila da domaće zakonodavstvo pruža djelotvorne pravne lijekove u smislu člana 13. za prigovore iznesene u predstavci. Vlada je navela rumunskog javnog pravobranitelja kao jedno od dostupnih pravnih sredstava. Prema statističkim podacima dostupnim na internet stranici javnog pravobranitelja, javni pravobranitelj je bio uključen u nekoliko slučajeva koji su se ticali navodnih kršenja ljudskih prava od 2003. do 2011. godine. Pozivajući se na dvije domaće presude, kao odgovor na zahtjev Suda, Vlada je tvrdila da su, kada su se bavili predmetima u kojima je jedna od strana bila osoba s duševnim poteškoćama, rumunjski sudovi postupali vrlo ozbiljno i odluke donosili na osnovu merituma.
  5. Konkretnije, u odnosu na članak 2., Vlada je tvrdila da se situacija u PMH značajno poboljšala, nakon pritužbi o životnim i medicinskim uvjetima u bolnici. U tom smislu tužba, čini se, predstavlja djelotvorno pravno sredstvo u odnosu na standarde Konvencije. Pozivajući se na član 3., Vlada je tvrdila da je CLR također mogao podnijeti tužbu tražeći odštetu za nesavjestan medicinski rad. Zbog gore navedenih razloga, Vlada je ustvrdila da je gospodin Câmpeanu imao, lično ili podsredstvom zastupnika, razna djelotvorna pravna sredstva za svaki od prigovora iznesenih u predstavci. Prema tome, prigovor temeljem člana 13. je stoga neprihvatljiv.

(c)  Treća strana umješač

(i)  Centar za zagovaranje prava osoba sa duševnim smetnjama

  1. Centar za zagovaranje prava osoba sa duševnim smetnjama (MDAC) tvrdio je da su diljem Evrope dokumentirani slučajevi po život opasnih uvjeta u ustanovama u kojima borave djeca s mentalnim poteškoćama ili HIV-om, kao i da postoje izvještaji koji ukazuju da se oboljela djeca ne primaju u bolnice, bez obzira na ozbiljnost njihovog stanja, i da se ostavljaju da umru u tim ustanovama. U svom izvještaju o stanu ljudskih prava u Rumuniji za 2009. godinu, američki State Department je upozorio na konstantno loše uvjete u PMH, ukazujući na pretrpanost, nedostatak osoblja i lijekova, loše higijenske uvjete i široku upotrebu sedativa i mjera obuzdavanja. Pozivajući se na međunarodnu sudsku praksu o pravu na život (primjerice, presude Interameričkog suda za ljudska prava u predmetu Villagrán Morales et al. protiv Gvatemale, 19. novembar 1999. godine, u vezi s petero djece koja su živjela na ulici, i Velásquez Rodríguez protiv Hondurasa, 29. juli 1988.), MDAC je tvrdio da je država bila obavezna da zaštiti život i da pruži neophodni liječnički tretman, poduzimajući, istovremeno, sve potrebne preventivne mjere i aktivirajući mehanizme praćenja, istraživanja i krivičnog progona protiv onih koji su odgovorni. Pri tome, žrtvama treba pružiti djelotvornu i praktičnu mogućnost da traže zaštitu svog prava na život. Propust države da izuzetno ranjivim osobama osigura takvu priliku dok su bili živi ne bi u konačnici trebao rezultirati nekažnjavanjem države nakon njihove smrti.

(ii)  Euroregionalni centar za javne inicijative

  1. Euroregionalni centar za javne inicijative (ECPI) je tvrdio da Rumunija ima najveći broj osoba koje žive sa HIV-om (PLHIV) u centralnoj i istočnoj Evropi, uglavnom zato što je, u periodu između 1986. i 1991., nekih 10,000 djece bilo smješteno u javne bolnice i sirotišta u kojima su bili izloženi riziku od zaraze HIV-om kroz višestruko korištenje igala i mikrotransfuzija neprovjerene krvi. U decembru 2004. godine registrirano je 7,088 slučajeva AIDS-a i 4,462 slučaja HIV infekcije kod djece. Od toga, 3,482 djece je umrlo od AIDS-a do kraja 2004. godine. ECPI navodi da je visoka učestalost HIV infekcije kod djece rezultat tretmana kojem su bili podvrgnuti u sirotištima i bolnicama, s obzirom na činjenicu da su djeca s teškoćama u razvoju bila smatrana “neizlječivima” i “neproduktivnima” i zato što bolničko osoblje nije bilo kvalificirano ni zainteresirano da im pruži odgovarajuću medicinsku njegu. ECPI se pozvao na činjenicu da je UN Komitet za prava djece 2003. godine izrazio zabrinutost da je ARV tretman dostupan samo ograničenom broju ljudi u Rumuniji i da je kontinuirani ARV tretman obično prekidan zbog nedostatka sredstava. Štaviše, čak i krajem 2009. godine, zalihe ARV lijekova su bile oskudne zbog nedostatka finansijskih sredstava u državnom Fondu zdravstvenog osiguranja i lošeg upravljanja državnim programom za HIV. ECPI je nadalje tvrdio da je djeci oboljeloj od HIV-a koja su živjela u zatvorenim ustanovama ili bolnicama neki duži period, pristup ARV lijekovima ovisio, u velikoj mjeri, od koraka koje je ustanova poduzimala da nabavi zalihe lijekova od doktora za infektivne bolesti kod kojeg je pacijent registriran. Obično, pacijenti zaraženi HIV-om nisu imali informacije koje su im bile potrebne da ostvare svoja zakonita prava u smislu pristupa zdravstvenim uslugama. Godine 2009. UN-ov Komitet za prava djeteta izrazio je zabrinutost da djeca pogođena HIV-om često nailaze na prepreke u pristupu zdravstvenim uslugama. Što se tiče konkretnog slučaja osobe zaražene HIV-om koja je također patila od psihičkih problema, ECPI navodi da psihijatrijske bolnice ponekad odbijaju da liječe HIV-pozitivnu djecu i mlade zbog straha od zaraze. Pozvali su se na dokument organizacije Human Rights Watch iz 2007. godine u kojem se govori o takvim situacijama (Život ne čeka. Propust Rumunije da zaštiti i pruži podršku djeci i mladima koji žive sa HIV-om).

(iii)  Human Rights Watch

  1. Human Rights Watch je u svojim pisanim očitovanjima spomenuo zaključke UN Komiteta za privredna, socijalna i kulturna prava, koji ukazuju da zdravstvene ustanove i usluge moraju biti dostupne svima, a posebno najugroženijem stanovništvu, te da su vlasti propustile da osiguraju takve usluge zato što nisu donijele nacionalnu zdravstvenu politiku kojom bi se pravo na zdravlje osiguralo svima, ali i zbog lošeg upravljanja i raspoređivanja javnih sredstava, te propusta da smanje stopu smrtnosti novorođenčadi i majki.

2.  Ocjena Suda

(a)  Član 2. Konvencije

(i)  Opća načela

  1. Prva rečenica člana 2. § 1 nalaže državi ne samo da se suzdrži od namjernog i nezakonitog uzimanja života već i da poduzme odgovarajuće mjere kako bi zaštitila živote onih koji žive u njenoj nadležnosti (vidi LCB protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, 9. juni 1998., § 36 , Izvještaji o presudama i odlukama 1998 III). Pozitivne obaveze iz člana 2. moraju se tumačiti na način da se primjenjuju u kontekstu bilo koje aktivnosti, bilo javno ili privatne, u kojoj pravo na život može biti ugroženo. To je slučaj, primjera radi, u sektoru zdravstvene skrbi u odnosu na djela i propuste zdravstvenih radnika (vidi Dodo, ranije citirano, §§ 70, 79-83 i 87 , i Vo protiv Francuske [GC], br. 53924/00, §§ 89 90, ECHR 2004 VIII, uz dodatne izvore), gdje se od države traži da donese propise kojima će bolnice, kako javne tako i privatne, natjerati da donesu odgovarajuće mjere za zaštitu života svojih pacijenata (vidi Calvelli i Ciglio protiv Italije [GC], br.32967 / 96, §49, ECHR 2002 I). To posebno vrijedi u slučajevima kada je sposobnost pacijenta da se brine sam za sebe ograničena (vidi Dodov, naprijed citirano, § 81 ); u pogledu upravljanja opasnim aktivnostima (vidi Öneryıldız protiv Turske [GC], br. 48939/99, § 71, ECHR 2004 XII); u poslovanju sa školskim vlastima, koje imaju obavezu štititi zdravlje i dobrobit učenika, naročito male djece koja su posebno ranjiva i pod njihovom isključivom kontrolom (vidi Ilbeyi Kemaloğlu i Meriye Kemaloğlu protiv Turske, br. 19986 / 06, § 35, 10. april 2012.); ili, na sličan način, u odnosu na medicinsku njegu i pomoć za djecu institucionaliziranu u državnim ustanovama (vidi Nencheva i drugi, ranije citirano, §§ 105-116). Takve pozitivne obaveze nastaju u slučajevima kada je vlastima poznato ili bi trebalo biti poznato, s obzirom na okolnosti, da je žrtva bila izložena stvarnoj i neposrednoj opasnost od krivičnog djela treće osobe (v. Nencheva i ostali, prethodno citirano, § 108) i, ako su u tom slučaju, propustili poduzeti mjere u okviru svojih nadležnosti kojima bi se, razumno sudeći, moglo očekivati da će se izbjeći taj rizik (vidi A. i ostali protiv Turske, br. 30015/96, §§ 44-45, 27. juli 2004.).
  2. U svjetlu važnosti zaštite koju pruža član 2, Sud lišavanje života mora veoma pomno ispitati, uzimajući u obzir ne samo radnje državnih agenata već i sve okolnosti koje su okruživale slučaj. Osobe u pritvoru su u ranjivom položaju i vlasti su dužne da ih zaštite. Kada vlasti odluče staviti i držati u pritvoru osobe s invaliditetom, dužne su demonstrirati posebnu brigu tako što će im osigurati takve uvjete koji odgovaraju njihovim posebnim potrebama zbog njihovog invaliditeta (vidi Jasinskis protiv Latvije, br. 45744/08, §59, 21. decembar 2010, s daljnjim referencama). U širem smislu, Sud je smatrao da države imaju obavezu da poduzmu određene mjere kako bi osigurale učinkovitu zaštitu ugroženih osoba od zlostavljanja sa kojim su vlasti upoznate ili bi trebale biti upoznate (Z i ostali protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [GC], br. 29392/95, § 73, ECHR 2001 V). Prema tome, kada se neki pojedinac stavi u pritvor u dobrom zdravlju, ali kasnije umre, država je dužna dati zadovoljavajuće i uvjerljivo objašnjenje događaja koji su doveli do njegove smrti (vidi Carabulea protiv Rumunije, br. 45661/99, § 108, 13. juli 2010.), i dostaviti dokaze koji bacaju sumnju na istinitost navoda žrtve, pogotovo ako su ti navodi potkrijepljeni medicinskim izvještajima (vidi Selmouni protiv Francuske [GC], br. 25803/94, § 87, ECHR 1999V, i Abdülsamet Yaman protiv Turske, br. 32446/96, § 43, 2. novembar 2004.). U ocjeni dokaza, Sud primjenjuje standard dokazivanja “izvan razumne sumnje”. Međutim, takav dokaz može proizlaziti iz postojanja dovoljno jakih, jasnih i konzistentnih zaključaka ili sličnih neosporenih pretpostavki stvari (vidi Orhan protiv Turske, br. 25656/94, § 264, 18. juni 2002., § 264 , i Irska protiv Velike Britanije, naprijed citirano, § 161).
  3. Dužnost države da štiti pravo na život mora se smatrati ne samo obavezom poduzimanja razumnih mjera kako bi se osigurala sigurnost osoba na javnim mjestima već i uspostavljanja djelotvornog i neovisnog pravosudnog sistema koji će, u slučaju ozbiljne ozljede ili smrti, biti u stanju brzo utvrditi činjenice, prozvati na odgovornost one koji su odgovorni za greške i pružiti odgovarajuću zadovoljštinu žrtvi (v. Dodov, naprijed citirano, § 83 ). Ova obaveza ne zahtijeva nužno primjenu krivičnih pravnih sredstava u svakom slučaju. Na primjer, kada se radi o nemaru, ova obaveza se može ispuniti i kroz pružanje pravnog lijeka žrtvi kroz građanski postupak, zasebno ili u kombinaciji sa pravnim lijekovima u krivičnom postupku. Međutim, član 2. Konvencije neće biti zadovoljen ako je zaštita prema domaćem pravu pružena samo u teoriji: ona prije svega mora biti djelotvorna u praksi (vidi Calvelli i Ciglio, naprijed citirano, § 53).
  4. S druge strane, nacionalni sudovi ne smiju dozvoliti da ugrožavanje života prođe nekažnjeno. To je suštinski bitno radi održavanja povjerenja javnosti i poštivanja vladavine zakona, te sprečavanja svakog privida tolerancije prema nezakonitom djelovanju (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Nikolova i Velichkova protiv Bugarske, br. 7888/03, § 57, 20. decembar 2007.). Zadaća Suda je, stoga, da razmotri jesu li i u kojoj mjeri sudovi, prilikom donošenja zaključaka, pomno ispitali sve okolnosti kako je to propisano članom 2. Konvencije, kako bi očuvali odvraćajući učinak pravosudnog sistema i osigurali da su povrede prava na život ispitane i ispravljene (vidi Öneryıldız, naprijed citirano, § 96).

(ii)  Primjena ovih načela u ovom predmetu

(α)  Materijalni aspekt

  1. Pozivajući se na činjenice ovog slučaja, Sud na početku primjećuje da je gospodin Câmpeanu čitav svoj život živio u rukama domaćih vlasti: Rastao je u sirotištu nakon što je napušten po rođenju, a kasnije je prebačen u Centar za staranje, potom u CMSC i konačno u PMH, gdje je 20. februara 2004. godine, prerano preminuo.
  2. Tokom svih ovih faza pa do njegovog punoljetstva nije mu imenovan skrbnik, bilo trajni ili privremeni. Pretpostavka je bila, dakle, da je imao punu poslovnu sposobnost, usprkos svom teškom duševnom poremećaju. Ako je to doista tako, Sud primjećuje da je način na koji su medicinski organi obrađivali slučaj g. Câmpeanua bio protivan odredbama Zakona o mentalnom zdravlju u slučaju pacijenata s punom poslovnom sposobnošću: od pacijenta nije pribavljena saglasnost za stalne transfere iz jednog odjeljenja u drugo; Nakon što je navršio osamnaest, nije pribavljena njegova saglasnost za smještanje u psihijatrijsku bolnicu Poiana Mare; Pacijent nije bio informiran niti je konsultiran u vezi sa medicinskom njegom koja mu je pružana niti je obaviješten o mogućnosti da odbije bilo koju od gore navedenih mjera. Opravdanje vlasti je to da pacijent “nije želio sarađivati”, ili da “s njim nije bilo moguće komunicirati” (vidi stavove 14. i 16. ove presude). U tom kontekstu, Sud ponavlja da je u predmetu B. protiv Rumunije (br. 2) (citirano ranije, §§ 93.-98.) istakao ozbiljne nedostatke u načinu na koji su vlasti provele odredbe Zakona o mentalnom zdravlju vlasti u odnosu na ranjive pacijente koji su ostali bez ikakve pravne pomoći ili zaštite kada su primljeni u psihijatrijske ustanove u Rumuniji.
  3. Štaviše, Sud primjećuje da su se odluke domaćih vlasti da gospodina Câmpeanua prebace prvo u CMSC, a kasnije u PMH uglavnom zasnivale na spremnosti ustanova da prime pacijenta, a ne na mogućnostima tih ustanova da pacijentu omoguće odgovarajuću medicinsku skrb i podršku (vidi stavove 12.-13. ove presude). S tim u vezi, Sud ne može zanemariti činjenicu da je gospodin Câmpeanu bio prvo smješten u CMSC, odjeljenje koje nije opremljeno da se bavi pacijentima sa psihičkim problemima, i da je na kraju prebačen u PMH, unatoč činjenici da ga je ta bolnica ranije odbila prihvatiti zato što nisu imali potrebnu opremu za liječenje HIV-a (vidi stav 11. ove presude).
  4. Sud stoga smatra da je prebacivanje g Câmpeanua iz jednog odjeljenja u drugo vršeno bez odgovarajuće dijagnoze i njege, potpuno zanemarujući njegovo trenutno zdravstveno stanje i njegove najosnovnije medicinske potrebe. Od posebnog je značaja nemar vlasti, koja je propustila da osigura primjenu odgovarajućeg ARV tretmana, najprije nepružanjem tih lijekova tokom njegovih prvih nekoliko dana u CMSC-u, a nakon toga, potpunim prekidom tog tretmana za vrijeme boravka u PMH (vidi stavove 14. i 115. ove presude). U tim zaključcima Sud se oslanjao na podneske CLR-a, koji su potkrijepljeni medicinskim dokumentima koji su predočeni domaćim sudovima i mišljenjima stručnjaka koji su pozvani da daju svoje mišljenje o terapijskom pristupu koji je primjenjivan u slučaju gospodina Câmpeanua (vidi stavove 33., 38. i 45. ove presude), kao i na informacijama koje je dostavio ECPI u vezi sa općim uvjetima u kojima se ARV tretman pruža djeci zaraženoj HIV-om (vidi stav 128. ove presude), koji su podnesak CLR-a učinili uvjerljivijim. U svjetlu tih elemenata, Sud smatra da su tvrdnje Vlade, nasuprot tome, neuvjerljive jer ih nisu potkrijepili bilo kakvim dokazima, koji bi ih dokazali van svake razumne sumnje.
  5. Nadalje, činjenično stanje upućuje na to da su, suočene s iznenadnim promjenama u ponašanju pacijenta koji je postao hiperagresivan i nervozan, medicinske vlasti odlučile da ga prebace u psihijatrijsku ustanovu, odnosno PMH, gdje je smješten u odjeljenje u kojem nije bilo psihijatrijskog osoblja (vidi stav 21. ove presude). Kao što je već spomenuto, bolnici su, u to vrijeme, nedostajale odgovarajuće prostorije za liječenje osoba zaraženih HIV-om. Štaviše, dok je boravio u PMH, pacijenta nikada nije konsultirao specijalista za infektivne bolesti. Jedini tretman koji je g. Câmpeanu primao bili su sedativi i vitamini, a nikada nije urađen svrsishodan medicinski pregled kojim bi se ustanovio uzrok njegovog mentalnog stanja (vidi stavove 16. i 22. ove presude). U stvari, vlasti nikada nisu napravile medicinske kartone u koje bi upisali kliničko stanje g. Câmpeanua dok je bio u CMSC i PMH. Isto tako, nedostajao je i detaljan podatak o mogućem uzroku smrti g. Câmpeanua: u smrtnom listu se spominju HIV i intelektualne poteškoće kao bitni faktori koji su doveli do smrti, što navodno opravdava odluku vlasti da ne provedu obaveznu obdukciju tijela (vidi stavove 24. i 25. ove presude).
  6. Sud se poziva na zaključke medicinskog nalaza vještaka kojeg je angažirao CLR, a koji opisuju “vrlo loše i nekvalitetne” medicinske dokumente o zdravstvenom stanju g. Câmpeanua (vidi stav 45. ove presude). Prema tom izvještaju, medicinski nadzor u obje ustanove bio je “slab”, dok su medicinske vlasti, suočene s pogoršanjem zdravstvenog stanja pacijenta, poduzele mjere koje se u najboljem slučaju mogu opisati kao palijativne. Vještak je također naveo nekoliko potencijalnih uzroka smrti, između ostalog, upalu pluća (koja se spominje u nalazu obdukcije), koja nikada nije istražena ili dijagnosticirana, a kamoli liječena, bilo u CMSC-u ili u PMH-u (ibid.). U mišljenju se zaključuje da je smrt g. Câmpeanua u PMH-u nastala kao posljedica “ozbiljnog liječničkog nemara” (v. stav 46. ove presude).
  7. Sud ponavlja, u ovom kontekstu, da kod ocjene izvedenih dokaza posebnu pažnju treba posvetiti ranjivom stanju g. Câmpeanu (vidi stav 7. ove presude) i činjenici da je tokom cijelog svog života bio u rukama vlasti, koje su dakle bile dužne voditi računa o njegovom liječenju i dati uvjerljivo objašnjenje za takav tretman (vidi stav 131. ove presude). Sud primjećuje, kao prvo, da su podnesci CLR-a koji opisuju događaje koji su doveli do smrti g. Câmpeanu snažno potkrijepljeni ozbiljnim nedostacima koji su ustanovljeni u odlukama medicinskih vlasti. Ti nedostaci su opisani u obrazloženju odluke glavnog tužitelja od 23. augusta 2005. godine (vidi stavak 33. ove presude); u odluci prvostepenog suda od 3. oktobra 2007. godine, kojom je sud odlučio predmet vratiti na ponovnu istragu (vidi stav 38. ove presude); i u zaključcima medicinskog nalaza koje je CLR dostavio u ovom predmetu. Drugo, Vlada je propustila dostaviti dovoljno dokaza koji bi bacili sumnju na istinitost navoda iznesenih u ime žrtve. Iako priznaje da HIV može biti vrlo ozbiljna progresivna bolest, Sud ne može ignorirati jasne i konzistentne zaključke koji ukazuju na ozbiljne nedostatke u procesu odlučivanja o davanju odgovarajućih lijekova i njezi g. Câmpeanua (v. stavove 137.-138. ove presude). Vlada također nije ispunila praznine koje se odnose na nedostatak odgovarajućih medicinskih dokumenata koji opisuju stanje g. Câmpeanua prije njegove smrti i nedostatak relevantnih objašnjenja o pravim uzrocima njegove smrti.
  8. Štaviše, stavljajući individualnu situaciju g. Câmpeanua u opći kontekst, Sud primjećuje da je u relevantno vrijeme, u PMH-u već prijavljeno nekoliko desetaka smrtnih slučajeva (osamdeset jedan u 2003. i dvadeset i osam na početku 2004. godine). Kao što je istaknuto u izvještaju CPT-a iz 2004., ustanovljeni su ozbiljni nedostaci u pogledu ishrane pacijenata i neadekvatno grijanje i loši opći životni uvjeti, koji su doveli do postepenog pogoršanja zdravlja pacijenata, naročito onih najranjivijih (vidi stav 77. ove presude). Nekoliko drugih međunarodnih organizacija je također izvještavalo o užasnim uvjetima u PMH, kao što je gore opisano (vidi stav 78.). Domaće vlasti su, dakle, bile u potpunosti svjesne vrlo teške situacije u toj bolnici. Usprkos tvrdnjama Vlade da su životni uvjeti u PMH bili adekvatni (vidi stav 123. ove presude), Sud primjećuje da su u relevantno vrijeme, domaće vlasti priznale pred brojnim međunarodnim tijelima nedostatke u PMH u pogledu sistema grijanja i vode, životnih i sanitarnih uvjeta i medicinske pomoći koja se pruža pacijentima (vidi stav 78. ove presude).
  9. Sud primjećuje da je u slučaju Nencheva i ostali (gore citirano) utvrđeno da je država Bugarska prekršila svoju obavezu iz člana 2. zato što nije poduzela dovoljno brze radnje i osigurala učinkovitu i dovoljnu zaštitu života mladih ljudi u centrima za socijalno staranje. Sud je uzeo u obzir činjenicu da smrt djeteta nije bila iznenadna jer su vlasti već bile upoznate sa užasnim uvjetima života u centrima za socijalno staranje i rastuće stope smrtnosti u mjesecima koji su prethodili relevantnom događaju (ibid., §§ 121.-123.).
  10. Sud smatra da je, na sličan način, i u ovom slučaju odgovor domaćih vlasti na tešku situaciju u PMH bio neadekvatan, smatrajući da su vlasti bile potpuno svjesne činjenice da je nedostatak grijanja i odgovarajuće hrane, nedostatak medicinskog osoblja i medicinskih sredstava, uključujući i lijekove, doveo do povećanja broja umrlih tokom zime 2003. godine. Sud smatra da je u tim okolnostima sve očitije da su domaće vlasti, odlukom da g. Câmpeanua smjeste u PMH, bez obzira na njegovo već pogoršano stanje ranjivosti, nerazumno dovele njegov život u opasnost. Stalno propuštanje medicinskog osoblja da g. Câmpeanu pruže odgovarajuću njegu i liječenje još je jedan presudni faktor koji je doveo do njegove prerane smrti.
  11. Naprijed navedena razmatranja dovoljna su da bi omogućila Sudu da zaključi da su domaće vlasti propustile da ispoštuju materijalne zahtjeve člana 2. Konvencije, time što nisu osigurale potrebni standard zaštite života gospodina Câmpeanua.

(β)  Proceduralni aspekti

  1. Sud nadalje smatra da vlasti nisu samo propustile da zadovolje neke od najosnovnijih medicinskih potreba g Câmpeanua dok je bio živ već su također propustile razjasniti okolnosti njegove smrti i identificirati odgovorne osobe.
  2. Sud primjećuje da je više proceduralnih nepravilnosti naglašeno u raznim izvještajima domaćih vlasti u to vrijeme, između ostalog, neobavljanje obdukcije odmah nakon smrti g. Câmpeanua, protivno odredbama domaćeg zakona, te nedostatak učinkovite istrage u pogledu terapijskog pristupa u njegovom slučaju (v. stavove 33., 38. i 40. ove presude). Štaviše, ozbiljni proceduralni nedostaci su istaknuti i u presudi Okružnog suda u Calafatu, uključujući i propust vlasti da prikupe bitne medicinske dokaze i da daju objašnjenje za kontradiktorne izjave medicinskog osoblja (vidi stav 38. ove presude). Međutim, budući da Okružni sud nije potvrdio tu presudu, ti nedostaci nikada nisu razmotreni, a kamoli ispravljeni. U svom kratkom obrazloženju, Okružni sud se uglavnom oslanjao na odluku Medicinskog udruženja i forenzički nalaz, koji su odbacili svaki ljekarski nemar, zaključivši da je pacijent imao odgovarajući medicinski tretman. Sud ove zaključke smatra neobično lakonskim, s obzirom da su priznali da je medicinska dokumentacija o g. Câmpeanu sadržavala izuzetno šture podatke (vidi stav 45. ove presude) i s obzirom na objektivnu situaciju u PMH u pogledu dostupnih ljudskih i medicinskih sredstava (vidi stavove 77.-78. ove presude). Sud nadalje primjećuje tvrdnju CLR-a da je u periodu između 2002. i 2004. bilo prijavljeno 129 smrtnih slučajeva u kojima su krivične istrage okončane, a da pri tome niko nije krivično ili građanski odgovoran za nesavjesno postupanje.
  3. Uzimajući u obzir sve ove elemente, Sud zaključuje da su vlasti propustile detaljno pregledati slučaj g. Câmpeanua, kako je to propisano članom 2. Konvencije, i time provesti djelotvornu istragu okolnosti njegove smrti. Shodno tome, došlo je do povrede člana 2. Konvencije u njegovom proceduralnom dijelu.

(b)  Član 13. u vezi s članom 2.

(i)  Opća načela

  1. Član 13. Konvencije jamči dostupnost pravnog sredstva na nacionalnoj razini za izvršenje suštine prava i sloboda iz Konvencije u bilo kojem obliku u kojem se mogu osigurati u skladu sa domaćim pravnim poretkom. Učinak člana 13. je, dakle, da zahtijeva postojanje domaćeg pravnog sredstva kojim će se razmotriti suština “podobnog prigovora” na temelju Konvencije i osigurati odgovarajuća zaštita, iako je državama ugovornicama data određena diskrecija u pogledu načina ispunjavanja obaveza iz Konvencije temeljem ove odredbe. Opseg obaveze iz člana 13. varira ovisno o prirodi prigovora, koji je podnositelj predstavke podnio temeljem Konvencije. Ipak pravno sredstvo iz člana 13. mora biti “djelotvorno” u praksi kao i u zakonu. Konkretno, njegovo ostvarivanje ne smije biti neopravdano ometano radnjama ili propustima vlasti tužene države (vidi Paul i Audrey Edwards protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, br . 46477/99, §§ 96-97 , ECHR 2002 II).
  2. Kada se radi o takvom jednom temeljnom pravu kao što je pravo na život ili zabrana mučenja, nehumanog i ponižavajućeg postupanja, član 13. zahtijeva, uz plaćanje naknade, kada je to prikladno, temeljitu i djelotvornu istragu koja će identificirati i kazniti odgovorne, uključujući i djelotvoran pristup istražnom postupku za podnositelja tužbe. Kad je riječ o navodnom propustu vlasti da zaštite pojedinca od djela drugih, član 13. ne može uvijek zahtijevati od vlasti da preuzmu odgovornost za istraživanje takvih navoda. Tu žrtvama i njihovim porodicama, međutim, treba staviti na raspolaganje mehanizam za utvrđivanje odgovornosti državnih dužnosnika ili tijela za djela ili propuste kojima su povrijeđena njihova prava iz Konvencije (vidi Z i ostali protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [GC], ranije citirano, § 109 ). Po mišljenju Suda, organi iz člana 13. ne moraju neophodno u svim slučajevima biti pravosudni organi u strogom smislu te riječi. Ipak, ovlasti i proceduralna jamstva koje neki organ posjeduje predstavljaju relevantan faktor u utvrđivanju je li neko pravno sredstvo djelotvorno ili ne (vidi Klass i drugi, ranije citirano, § 67). Sud je konstatirao da pravni lijekovi predstavljaju snažne garancije nezavisnosti, pristup za žrtve i porodice, te izvršnost odluka u skladu sa zahtjevima iz člana 13. (vidi Z i ostali protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, ranije citirano, § 110).

(ii)   Primjena ovih načela u ovom predmetu

  1. Kao što je ranije spomenuto, član 13. mora se tumačiti na način da jamči “djelotvorno pravno sredstvo pred domaćim tijelima” svakoj osobi koja tvrdi da su njegova ili njezina prava i slobode zajamčene u Konvenciji povrijeđena. Temeljni uvjet takvog sredstva je da žrtva ima djelotvoran pristup takvom sredstvu.
  2. U ovom slučaju, Sud je već utvrdio da je ranjivost g Câmpeanua, zajedno s propustom vlasti da provedu postojeće zakone i da mu osiguraju odgovarajuću pravnu podršku, bila faktor koji je potkrijepio pravni osnov za izuzetno priznavanje locus standi CLR-a (vidi stav 112. ove presude). Da nije bilo CLR-a, slučaj gospodina Câmpeanu nikada ne bi bilo u fokusu pažnje vlasti, bilo domaćih ili međunarodnih. Međutim, Sud primjećuje da je inicijativa CLR-a u ime gospodina Câmpeanua po prirodi više bila sui generis nego što je spadala u postojeći pravni okvir o pravima osoba sa duševnim poteškoćama, s obzirom da je taj okvir bio neprimjeren za rješavanje specifičnih potreba takvih osoba, naročito u smislu praktične mogućnosti takvih osoba da ostvare pristup bilo kojem dostupnom pravnom lijeku. Doista, Sud je prethodno utvrdio da je tužena država prekršila članove 3. i 5. Konvencije zbog nepostojanja adekvatnih lijekova za osobe s invaliditetom, uključujući i njihov ograničen pristup takvim potencijalnim lijekovima (vidi CB protiv Rumunije, §§ 6567; Parascineti, §§ 34.-38., i B. protiv Rumunije (br. 2), §97 svi ranije citirani).
  3. Na temelju izvedenih dokaza u ovom predmetu, Sud je već utvrdio da je tužena država bila odgovorna prema članu 2. zbog propusta da zaštiti život g. Câmpeanua dok je bio u rukama domaćih medicinskih organa i zbog propusta da provede učinkovitu istragu o okolnostima koje su dovele do njegove smrti. Vlada se nije pozvala na bilo koji drugi postupak kojim bi se mogla ustanoviti odgovornost vlasti na nezavisan, javan i djelotvoran način. Sud nadalje smatra da su primjeri koje je Vlada spomenula u prilog postojanja odgovarajućih pravnih lijekova prema članku 13. (vidi stav 125. ove presude) su ili nedovoljni ili nedjelotvorni, s obzirom na njihov ograničen uticaj i nedostatak proceduralnih jamstava koji nude.
  4. U pogledu navedenih razmatranja, Sud smatra da je tužena država propustila osigurati odgovarajući mehanizam koji bi osobama s mentalnim poteškoćama koje vjeruju da su njihova prava iz člana 2. Konvencije povrijeđena omogućio pravno obeštećenje. Konkretnije, Sud je utvrdio povredu člana 13. u vezi s članom 2. Konvencije, zato što je tužena država propustila osigurati i provesti odgovarajuće pravne mjere koje bi omogućile da se navodi g. Câmpeanua o povredi njegovog prava na život ispitaju pred neovisnim tijelom.

(c)  Član 3. zasebno i u vezi s članom 13. Konvencije

  1. S obzirom na svoje nalaze u stavovima 140. do 147. ove presude i svoj zaključak u stavu 153. ove presude, Sud smatra da nema zasebnog pitanja glede navodne povrede člana 3., posmatrano zasebno ili zajedno s članom 13. (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Nikolova i Velichkova protiv Bugarske, ranije citirana, § 78, i Timus Tarus protiv Republike Moldavije, br. 70077/11, § 58, 15. oktobar 2013.).

II.  DRUGE NAVODNE POVREDE KONVENCIJE

  1. CLR je nadalje tvrdio da su prava g. Câmpeanua zajamčena u članovima 5., 8. i 14. Konvencije povrijeđena.
  2. Međutim, s obzirom na činjenice slučaja, očitovanja strana i svoje nalaze u vezi sa članovima 2. i 13. Konvencije, Sud smatra da je ispitao glavna pravna pitanja koja su mu predočena u predstavci i da nema potrebe da donosi zasebnu presudu o ostatku prigovora u predstavci (v. između ostalih izvora, Kamil Uzun protiv Turske, br. 37410/97, § 64, 10. maj 2007.; Argeş College pravnih savjetnika, ranije citiran, § 47; Žene na valovima i ostali protiv Portugala, br. 31276/05, § 47, 3. februar 2009.; Velcea i Mazăre protiv Rumunije, br. 64301/01, § 138, 1. decembar 2009.; Villa protiv Italije, br. 19675/06, § 55, 20. april 2010.; Ahmet Yıldırım protiv Turske, br. 3111/10, § 72, ECHR 2012; i Mehmet Hatip Dicle protiv Turske, br. 9858/04, § 41, 15. oktobar 2013.; v. također Varnava i ostali, citiran ranije, §§ 210-211).

IV.  ČLANOVI 46. i 41. KONVENCIJE

A.  Član 46. Konvencije

157. Relevantni dijelovi člana 46. glase:

“1.  Visoke strane ugovornice preuzimaju obavezu da se povinuju konačnoj presudi Suda u svakom predmetu u kome su stranke.

2.  Konačna odluka Suda se dostavlja Komitetu ministara koji nadgleda njeno izvršenje. ....”

  1. Sud ponavlja da su se, članom 46. Konvencije, ugovorne strane obavezale da će se povinovati konačnoj presudi Suda u svakom sporu u kojem su stranke, a da će nadzor nad njihovim izvršenjem vršiti Komitet ministara. Iz toga slijedi, između ostalog, da presuda kojom je Sud utvrdio povredu Konvencije ili njezinih dodatnih protokola nameće tuženoj državi pravnu obvezu ne samo da plati oštećenim stranama dosuđene iznose pravičnog zadovoljenja već i da odabere, pod nadzorom Komiteta ministara, opće i/ili, ako je to primjereno, pojedinačne mjere koje treba usvojiti u domaćem pravnom poretku kako bi dokinula utvrđene povrede i ispravila njihove učinke, koliko je to moguće (vidi Scozzari i Giunta protiv Italije [GC], br. 39221/98 i 41963/98, § 249, ECHR 2000-VIII, i Stanev, ranije citiran, § 254). Sud nadalje primjećuje da je, u prvom redu, ta država dužna odabrati, uz nadzor Komiteta ministara, sredstva koja će koristiti u domaćem pravnom poretku kako bi ispunila svoju obvezu iz člana 46. Konvencije (v. Scozzari i Giunta, ranije citiran, i Brumărescu protiv Rumunije (pravično zadovoljenje) [GC], br. 28342/95, § 20, ECHR 2001-I).
  2. Međutim, u nastojanju da tuženoj državi pomogne da ispuni svoje obaveze iz člana 46., Sud može tražiti da država navede vrstu pojedinačnih i/ili općih mjera koje se mogu poduzeti kako bi se određena utvrđena povreda otklonila (vidi, između ostalih izvora, Vlad i ostali protiv Rumunije, br. 40756/06, 41508/07 i 50806/07, § 162, 26. novembar 2013.).
  3. U ovom predmetu, Sud podsjeća da zbog propusta vlasti da imenuje skrbnika ili drugog predstavnika, g. Câmpeanu nije imao niti mu je stavljen na raspolaganje bilo kakav vid zastupnika koji bi ga štitio ili zastupao njegove interese pred bolničkim vlastima, domaćim sudovima i ovim Sudom (vidi stav 111. ove presude). U iznimnim okolnostima koje su ga potaknule da dozvoli CLR-u da djeluje u ime gospodina Câmpeanua (vidi zaključak u stavu 112. gore), Sud je utvrdio povredu člana 13. u vezi s članom 2. Konvencije zato što država nije osigurala i provela odgovarajući pravni okvir koji bi omogućio da se pritužbe u vezi gospodina Câmpeanua ispitaju pred neovisnim tijelom (vidi stavove 150.-153. ove presude, vidi također stav 154. u vezi sa prigovorima temeljem člana 3., posmatranog zasebno i u vezi sa članom 13.). Dakle, činjenice i okolnosti za koje je Sud utvrdio povredu članova 2. i 13. otkrivaju postojanje šireg problema, koji zahtijeva da se navedu opće mjere za izvršenje ove presude.
  4. U tom kontekstu, Sud preporučuje da tužena država predvidi neophodne opće mjere kojima će osigurati da se osobama s duševnim smetnjama koje su usporedivoj situaciji gospodina Câmpeanu dodijeli nezavisni zastupnik i kojima će se omogućiti da se njihovi prigovori temeljem Konvencije u vezi sa njihovim zdravljem i tretmanom ispitaju pred sudom ili drugim neovisnim tijelom (vidi mutatis mutandis, stav 113. ove presude i Stanev, ranije citiran, § 258).

B.  Član 41. Konvencije

162.  Član 41. Konvencije propisuje:

“Kada Sud utvrdi prekršaj Konvencije ili Protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo djelomičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj stranci.”

1.  Šteta

  1. CLR nije podnio nikakav zahtjev u odnosu na materijalnu i nematerijalnu štetu.

2.  Sudski troškovi i izdaci

  1. CLR je tražio 11,455.25 eura na ime sudskih troškova i izdataka nastalih pred domaćim sudovima u odnosu na istrage PMH i pred ovim Sudom; INTERIGHTS, djelujući kao savjetnik advokata CLR-a, tražio je 25.800 eura na ime sudskih troškova i izdataka pred Vijećem, što odgovara 215 sati rada, i dodatnih 14.564 eura za postupak pred Velikim vijećem, što odgovara 111 sati rada. U prilogu je dostavljen pregled tih troškova razvrstan po stavkama.
  2. Vlada je tvrdila da nisu svi troškovi i izdaci detaljno dokumentirani na odgovarajući način i da su, u svakom slučaju, prekomjerni.
  3. Prema sudskoj praksi Suda, podnositelj predstavke ima pravo na naknadu troškova i izdataka samo u mjeri u kojoj je dokazano da su oni stvarno i nužno nastali i da su bili razumni u pogledu količine. U ovom slučaju, Sud je uvjeren da je angažiranje organizacije INTERIGHTS u postupku koji je CLR pokrenuo, kako je ranije opisano, bilo opravdano (vidi, na primjer, Yaşa protiv Turske, 2. septembar 1998., § 127, Izvještaji 1998 VI, i Menteş i drugi protiv Turske, 28. novembar 1997., § 107, izvještaji 1997 VIII). Uzimajući u obzir dokumente koji su mu bili predočeni, broj i složenost činjeničnih i pravnih pitanja, te gore pomenute kriterije, Sud smatra da je razumno da se CLR-u dosudi 10,000 eura , a Interights-u 25,000 eura.

3.  Zatezna kamata

  1. Sud smatra primjerenim da se zatezna kamata temelji na najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke, uvećanoj za tri procentna poena.

 

IZ OVIH RAZLOGA, SUD

  1. Proglašava, jednoglasno, prigovore prema članu 2., 3. i 13. Konvencije dopustivim;

  2. Presuđuje, jednoglasno, da je došlo do povrede člana 2. Konvencije, kako u materijalnim tako i u proceduralnim aspektima;

  3. Presuđuje, jednoglasno, da je došlo do povrede člana 13. u vezi sa članom 2. Konvencije;

  4. Presuđuje, sa četrnaest glasova za i tri glasa protiv, da nije neophodno ispitivati prigovor temeljem člana 3., posmatrano zasebno ili u vezi sa članom 13. Konvencije;

  5. Presuđuje, jednoglasno, da nije neophodno ispitivati prihvatljivost i osnovanost prigovora temeljem članova 5. i 8. Konvencije;

  6. Presuđuje, sa petnaest glasova za i dva glasa protiv, da nije neophodno ispitivati prihvatljivost i osnovanost prigovora temeljem člana14. Konvencije;

  7. Presuđuje, jednoglasno,

(a)  da tužena država mora platiti, u roku od tri mjeseca, sljedeće iznose po osnovu sudskih i drugih troškova, koji će se konvertirati u valutu tužene države po kursu primjenjivom na dan izmirenja, i uvećane za iznos koji bi podnositelj predstavke mogao platiti po osnovu poreza:

(i)  10,000 eura (desethiljada eura) u odnosu na CLR; i

(ii)  25,000 eura (dvedesetpethiljada eura) u odnosu na Interights;

(b)  da će se od navedenog roka od tri mjeseca do isplate za period kašnjenja obračunavati fiksna kamata na dosuđeni iznos po stopi koja je jednaka najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Evropske centralne banke, uvećanoj za tri procentna poena;

  1. Odbija, jednoglasno, ostatak zahtjeva za pravično zadovoljenje.

Presuda je sastavljena na engleskom i francuskom jeziku i objavljena na javnom ročištu u Zgradi ljudskih prava u Strasbourgu 17. jula 2014. godine.

Michael O’Boyle

Dean Spielmann

Zamjenik registrara

Predsjednik

 

U skladu sa članom 45, § 2 Konvencije i pravilom 74, stav 2 Poslovnika Suda, izdvojena mišljenja nalaze se u prilogu ove presude:

(a)    saglasno mišljenje sudije Pintoa de Albuquerquea;

(b)    djelomično izdvojeno mišljenje sudija Spielmanna, Biankua i Nußbergera;

(c)    djelomično izdvojeno mišljenje sudija Ziemelea i Biankua.

D.S. M.O.B.

Izdvojena mišljenja nisu prevedena, ali ih sadrži presuda na engleskom i/ili francuskom jeziku, kao službenim jezicima, te se mogu pročitati u bazi podataka o sudskoj praksi Suda, HUDOC.

 

____________________________________________________ 

 Prevod presude preuzet sa https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/

Ovaj prevod je finansiran uz podršku Human Rights Trust-a Vijeća Evrope (www.coe.int/humanrightstrustfund).

 

 

 

GRAND CHAMBER

CASE OF CENTRE FOR LEGAL RESOURCES ON BEHALF OF VALENTIN CÂMPEANU v. ROMANIA

(Application no. 47848/08)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

17 July 2014

This judgment is final.

In the case of Centre for Legal Resources obehalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. RomaniaThe European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:

Dean Spielmann, President,
Guido Raimondi,
Ineta Ziemele,
Isabelle Berro,
Alvina Gyulumyan,
Davíd Thór Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Luis López Guerra,
Ledi Bianku,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Kristina Pardalos,
Vincent A. De Gaetano,
Angelika Nußberger,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Paul Mahoney,
Johannes Silvis, judges,
and Michael OBoyleDeputy Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 4 September 2013 and 26 May 2014,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 47848/08) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Romanian non-governmental organisationthe Centre for Legal Resources (“the CLR”), on behalf of Mr Valentin Câmpeanu, on 2 October 2008.

2.  Interights, acting until 27 May 2014 as adviser to counsel for the CLR, was represented by Mr C. Cojocariu, a lawyer practising in LondonThe Romanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms C. Brumarfrom the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3.  The CLR alleged on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu that the latter had been the victim of breaches of Articles 2, 3, 5, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention.

4.  On 7 June 2011 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1 of the Convention).

5.  Third-party comments were received from Human Rights Watch, the Euroregional Center for Public Initiatives, the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee and the Mental Disability Advocacy Centernon-governmental organisations (NGOs) which had all been given leave by the President to intervene in the proceedings (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3 of the Rules of Court). The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights exercised his right to intervene in the proceedings and submitted written comments (Article 36 § 3 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2).

The Government replied to those comments (Rule 44 § 5).

6.  A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 4 September 2013 (Rule 59 § 3).

There appeared before the Court:

(a)  for the Government
MsC. Brumar,Agent,
MrG. Caian,Counsel,
MrD. Dumitrache,Co-Agent;

(b)  for the CLR
MsG. IorgulescuExecutive Director, CLR,
MsG. PascuProgramme Manager, CLR,
MrC. Cojocariulawyer, Interights, Counsel;

(c)  for the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights
MrN. MuižnieksCommissioner for Human Rights,
MsI. GachetDirector, Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights,
MsA. WeberAdvisor, Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights.

 

The Court heard addresses by Ms Brumar, Mr Caian, Mr Cojocariu, Ms Iorgulescu and Mr Muižnieks. Ms Brumar, Mr Cojocariu and Ms Iorgulescu subsequently gave their answers to questions put by the Court.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

A.  The death of Valentin Câmpeanu

1.  Factual background

7.  Valentin Câmpeanu, a man of Roma ethnicity, was born on 15 September 1985. His father was unknown, and his mother, Florica Câmpeanu, who died in 2001, abandoned him at birth. Mr Câmpeanu was therefore placed in an orphanage, the Corlate Centre, where he grew up.

In 1990 Mr Câmpeanu was diagnosed as HIV-positive. He was later diagnosed with “profound intellectual disability, an IQ of 30 and HIV” and was accordingly classified as belonging to the “severe” disability group. In time, he also developed associated symptoms such as pulmonary tuberculosis, pneumonia and chronic hepatitis.

In March 1992 he was transferred to the Craiova Centre for Disabled Children and at a later date to the Craiova no. 7 Placement Centre (“the Placement Centre”).

2.  Assessments in 2003 and 2004

8.  On 30 September 2003 the Dolj County Child Protection Panel (“the Panel”) ordered that Mr Câmpeanu should no longer be cared for by the State. The decision was justified on the grounds that Mr Câmpeanu had recently turned eighteen and was not enrolled in any form of education at the time.

Although the social worker dealing with Mr Câmpeanu had recommended transferring him to the local Neuropsychological Recovery and Rehabilitation Centre, the Panel ordered that a competent social worker should take all measures necessary for Mr Câmpeanu to be transferred to the Poiana Mare Neuropsychiatric Hospital (“the PMH”). According to the relevant law, the decision could be challenged before the Craiova District Court.

Mr Câmpeanu was not present in person and was not represented at the hearing held by the Panel.

9.  On 14 October 2003 Mr Câmpeanus health was reassessed by the Dolj County Council Disabled Adults Medical Examination Panel. The assessment resulted solely in a finding of HIV infection, corresponding to the “average” disability group. It was also mentioned that the patient was “socially integrated”.

10.  Subsequently, on an unspecified date in October or November 2003, a medical and welfare assessment of Mr Câmpeanu was carried out by a social worker and a doctor from the Placement Centre as a prerequisite for his admission to a medical and social care centre. Under the heading “Legal representative” they indicated “abandoned at birth”, while the space next to Person to contact in case of emergency” was left blank. The diagnosis indicated was “severe intellectual disability, HIV-positive”, without any reference to the previous diagnosis (see paragraph 9 above). The following information was included in the assessment report: “requires supervision and intermittent assistance with personal care”, and the report concluded that Mr Câmpeanu was able to take care of himself, but at the same time required considerable support.

11.  By letter dated 16 October 2003, the PMH informed the Panel that it could not admit Mr Câmpeanu, who had been diagnosed with HIV and mental disability, as the hospital lacked the facilities necessary to treat individuals with such a diagnosis.

12.  Following this refusal, between October 2003 and January 2004 the Panel and the County Department for the Protection of the Rights of the Child (“the Child Protection Department”) contacted a series of institutions, asking for assistance in identifying a social care or psychiatric establishment willing to admit Mr Câmpeanu. While stating that the PMH had refused to admit the patient because he had HIV, the Child Protection Department asked for the cooperation of the institutions concerned, mentioning that Mr Câmpeanus condition “did not necessitate hospitalisation, but rather continuous supervision in a specialist institution”.

3.  Admission to the Cetate-Dolj Medical and Social Care Centre

13.  The Panel eventually identified the Cetate-Dolj Medical and Social Care Centre (“the CMSC”) as an appropriate establishment where Valentin Câmpeanu could be placed. In its request to the CMSC, the Panel mentioned only that Mr Câmpeanu was HIV-positive, corresponding to the average disability group, without referring to his learning difficulties.

14.  On 5 February 2004 Mr Câmpeanu was admitted to the CMSC. According to a report issued by the CMSC and sent to the CLR on 5 March 2004 detailing his condition upon admission, Mr Câmpeanu was in an advanced state of “psychiatric and physical degradation”, was dressed in a tattered tracksuit, with no underwear or shoes, and did not have any antiretroviral medication or information concerning his medical condition. It was noted that the patient “refused to cooperate”.

In her statement to the prosecutor on 22 July 2004 in the context of the domestic proceedings (described in section B below), M.V., the doctor who had treated Mr Câmpeanu at the Placement Centre, justified the failure to provide appropriate medication or information on the basis that she did not know whether, depending on the results of the most recent investigation (see paragraph 9 above), it would be necessary to modify his treatment.

A medical examination carried out upon Mr Câmpeanus admission to the CMSC concluded that he suffered from “severe intellectual disability, HIV infection and malnutrition”. At that time, he was 168 centimetres tall and weighed 45 kilograms. It was mentioned that “he could not orient himself in time and space and he could not eat or care for his personal hygiene by himself”.

15.  During the evening of 6 February 2004 Mr Câmpeanu became agitated. According to the above-mentioned report by the CMSC (see paragraph 14 above), on the morning of 7 February 2004 he “became violent, assaulted other patients, broke a window and tore up a mattress and his clothes and sheets”. He was given phenobarbital and then diazepam to calm him down.

4.  Examination at the PMH

16.  On 9 February 2004 Mr Câmpeanu was taken to the PMH for examination, diagnosis and treatment, as it was the nearest psychiatric establishment. He was again diagnosed with “severe intellectual disability”. However, his condition was described as “not a psychiatric emergency”, as “he was not agitated”. Dr L.G. diagnosed him with “medium intellectual disability” and prescribed sedative medicines (carbamazepine and diazepam).

According to the medical records kept at the PMH, no information regarding Mr Câmpeanus medical history could be obtained upon his admission to the hospital, as he would not cooperateIn the statement she gave to the investigative authorities on 8 December 2005Dr D.M. from the PMH stated that the patient was different in that it was not possible to communicate with him and he had mental disabilities”.

5.  Return to the CMSC

17.  Mr Câmpeanu was returned to the CMSC on the same day, by which time his health had worsened considerably. At that time, the CMSC had received a supply of antiretroviral medication and thus his treatment was resumed. Despite these measures, his condition did not improve, and his medical records noted that he continued to be “agitated” and “violent”.

18.  The CMSC decided that because it lacked the facilities needed to treat Mr Câmpeanus condition, it was impossible to keep him there any longer. The hospital sent a request to the Placement Centre asking it to refer him to a different establishment. However, the Placement Centre refused the request on the ground that he was already “outside its jurisdiction”.

19.  On 11 February 2004 E.O., the Director of the CMSC, allegedly called the Dolj County Public Health Department and asked it to come up with a solution that would allow Mr Câmpeanu to be transferred to a facility which was more suitable for the treatment of his health problems. It appears that she was advised to transfer him to the PMH for a period of four to five days for psychiatric treatment.

6.  Transfer to the PMH

20.  On 13 February 2004 Mr Câmpeanu was transferred from the CMSC to the PMH, on the understanding that his stay at the PMH would last for three or four days with the purpose of attempting to provide treatment for his hyperaggressive behaviour. He was placed in Psychiatric Department V.

21.  On 15 February 2004 Mr Câmpeanu was placed under the care of Dr L.G. Given the fact that Mr Câmpeanu was HIV-positive, the doctor decided to transfer him to Psychiatric Department VI. She continued to be in charge of his psychiatric treatment, as that department had only two general, non-specialist doctors and no psychiatrists on its staff.

22.  On 19 February 2004 Mr Câmpeanu stopped eating and refused to take his medication. He was therefore prescribed an intravenous treatment which included glucose and vitamins. Upon examination by the doctor, he was found to be “generally unwell”.

7.  Visit by staff of the CLR

23.  On 20 February 2004 a team of monitors from the CLR visited the PMH and noticed Mr Câmpeanus condition. According to the information included in a report by CLR staff on that visit, Mr Câmpeanu was alone in an isolated, unheated and locked room, which contained only a bed without any bedding. He was dressed only in a pyjama top. At the time he could not eat or use the toilet without assistance. However, the staff at the PMH refused to help him, allegedly for fear that they would contract HIV. Consequently, the only nutrition provided to Mr Câmpeanu was glucose, through a drip. The report concluded that the hospital had failed to provide him with the most basic treatment and care services.

The CLR representatives stated that they had asked for him to be transferred immediately to the Infectious Diseases Hospital in Craiova, where he could receive appropriate treatment. However, the hospital manager had decided against that request, believing that the patient was not an “emergency case, but a social case”, and that in any event he would not be able to withstand the trip.

24.  Valentin Câmpeanu died on the evening of 20 February 2004. According to his death certificate, issued on 23 February 2004, the immediate cause of death was cardiorespiratory insufficiency. The certificate also noted that his HIV infection was the “original morbid condition” and designated “intellectual disability” as “another important morbid condition”.

25.  In spite of the legal provisions that made it compulsory to carry out an autopsy when a death occurred in a psychiatric hospital (Joint Order no. 1134/255/2000 of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Health), the PMH did not carry out an autopsy on the body, stating that “it was not believed to be a suspicious death, taking into consideration the two serious conditions displayed by the patient” (namely intellectual disability and HIV infection).

26.  Unaware of Mr Câmpeanus death, on 21 February 2004 the CLR had drafted several urgent letters and then sent them to a number of local and central officials, including the Minister of Health, the prefect of Dolj County, the mayor of Poiana Mare and the director of the Dolj County Public Health Department, highlighting Mr Câmpeanus extremely critical condition and the fact that he had been transferred to an institution that was unable to provide him with appropriate care, in view of his HIV infection; the CLR further criticised the inadequate treatment he was receiving and asked for emergency measures to be taken to address the situation. It further stated that Mr Câmpeanus admission to the CMSC and subsequent transfer to the PMH had been in breach of his human rights, and urged that an appropriate investigation of the matter be launched.

On 22 February 2004 the CLR issued a press release highlighting the conditions and the treatment received by patients at the PMH, making particular reference to the case of Mr Câmpeanu and calling for urgent action.

B.  The domestic proceedings

1.  Criminal complaints lodged by the CLR

27.  In letter of 15 June 2004 to the Prosecutor General of Romania, the CLR requested an update on the state of proceedings following the criminal complaint it had lodged with that institution on 23 February 2004 in relation to the circumstances leading up to Valentin Câmpeanus deathin the complaint it had emphasised that Mr Câmpeanu had not been placed in an appropriate medical institution, as required by his medical and mental condition.

28.  On the same day, the CLR lodged two further criminal complaints, one with the prosecutoroffice attached to the Craiova District Court and the other with the prosecutoroffice attached to the Craiova County Court. The CLR repeated its request for a criminal investigation to be opened in relation to the circumstances leading up to and surrounding Mr Câmpeanus death, alleging that the following offences had been committed:

(i)  negligence, by employees of the Child Protection Department and of the Placement Centre (Article 249 § 1 of the Criminal Code);

(ii)  malfeasance and nonfeasance against a persons interests and endangering a person unable to care for himself or herself, by employees of the CMSC (Articles 246 and 314 of the Criminal Code); and

(iii)  homicide by negligence or endangering a person unable to care for himself or herself, by employees of the PMH (Article 178 § 2 and Article 314 of the Criminal Code).

The CLR further argued that the Medical Examination Panel had wrongly classified Mr Câmpeanu as being in the medium disability group, contrary to previous and subsequent diagnoses (see paragraph 9 above). In turn, the Child Protection Department had failed to institute proceedings for the appointment of a guardian when Mr Câmpeanu had reached the age of majority, in breach of existing legislation.

Moreover, the Placement Centre had failed to supply the required antiretroviral medication to CMSC staff when Mr Câmpeanu had been transferred there on 5 February 2004, which might have caused his death two weeks later.

The CLR also claimed that the transfer from the CMSC to the PMH had been unnecessary, improper and contrary to existing legislation, the measure having been taken without the patients or his representatives consent, as required by the Patients Rights Act (Law no. 46/2003).

Lastly, the CLR argued that Mr Câmpeanu had not received adequate care, treatment or nutrition at the PMH.

29.  On 22 August 2004 the General Prosecutors Office informed the CLR that the case had been sent to the prosecutoroffice attached to the Dolj County Court for investigation.

On 31 August 2004 the prosecutoroffice attached to the Dolj County Court informed the CLR that a criminal file had been opened in response to its complaint, and that the investigation had been allocated to the Criminal Investigation Department of the Dolj County Police Department (“the Police Department”).

2.  Forensic report

30.  On 14 September 2004, at the request of the prosecutoroffice, a forensic report was issued by the Craiova Institute of Forensic Medicine. Based on the medical records submitted, the report concluded as follows:

Medical treatment was prescribed for [the patients] HIV and his psychiatric condition, the treatment [being] correct and appropriate as to the dosage, in connection with the patientclinical and immunological condition.

It cannot be ascertained whether the patient had indeed taken his prescribed medication, having regard to his advanced state of psychosomatic degradation.”

31.  On 22 October 2004 Valentin Câmpeanus body was exhumed and an autopsy carried out. A forensic report was subsequently issued on 2 February 2005, recording that the body showed advanced signs of cachexia and concluding as follows:

“... the death was not violent. It was due to cardiorespiratory insufficiency caused by pneumonia, a complication suffered during the progression of the HIV infection. Upon exhumation, no traces of violence were noticed.”

3.  Prosecutors decisions

32.  On 19 July 2005 the prosecutoroffice attached to the Dolj County Court issued a decision not to prosecute, holding, inter alia, that, according to the evidence produced, the medical treatment provided to the patient had been appropriate, and that the death had not been violent, but rather had been caused by a complication which had occurred during the progression of Mr Câmpeanus HIV infection.

33.  On 8 August 2005 the CLR lodged a complaint against that decision with the Chief Prosecutor of the prosecutoroffice attached to the Dolj County Court, claiming, inter alia, that some of the submissions it had made concerning the medical treatment given to the patient, the alleged discontinuation of the antiretroviral treatment and the living conditions in the hospitals had not been examined.

On 23 August 2005 the Chief Prosecutor allowed the complaint, set aside the decision of 19 July 2005 and ordered the reopening of the investigation so that all aspects of the case could be examined. Specific instructions were given as to certain medical documents that needed to be examined, once they had been obtained from the Infectious Diseases Hospital in Craiova, the Placement Centre, the CMSC and the PMH. The doctors who had treated Mr Câmpeanu were to be questioned. The circumstances in which the antiretroviral treatment had or had not been provided to the patient while he was in the CMSC and in the PMH were to be clarified, especially as the medical records at the PMH did not mention anything on that account.

34.  On 11 December 2006 the prosecutoroffice attached to the Dolj County Court decided that, pursuant to new procedural rules in force, it lacked jurisdiction to carry out the investigation, and referred the case file to the prosecutoroffice attached to the Calafat District Court.

4.  Disciplinary proceedings

35.  On 11 January 2006 the Police Department asked the Dolj County Medical Association (“the Medical Association”) to provide it with an opinion on “whether the therapeutic approach [adopted] was correct in view of the diagnosis [established in the autopsy report] or whether it contains indications of medical malpractice”.

On 20 July 2006, the Disciplinary Board of the Medical Association ruled that there were no grounds for taking disciplinary action against staff at the PMH:

“... the psychotropic treatment, as noted in the general clinical observation notes from the PMH, was appropriate ... [and therefore] ... the information received suggests that the doctors decisions were correct, without any suspicion of medical malpractice [arising from] an opportunistic infection associated with HIV [being] incorrectly treated.

That decision was challenged by the Police Department, but on 23 November 2006 the challenge was rejected as out of time.

5.  New decision not to prosecute and subsequent appeals

36.  On 30 March 2007 the prosecutoroffice attached to the Calafat District Court issued a fresh decision not to prosecute. The prosecutor relied in his reasoning on the evidence adduced in the file, as well as on the decision issued by the Disciplinary Board of the Medical Association.

37.  The CLR lodged a complaint against that decision, submitting that the majority of the instructions given in the Chief Prosecutors decision of 23 August 2005 (see paragraph 33 above) had been ignored. The complaint was dismissed by the Chief Prosecutor of the prosecutoroffice attached to the Calafat District Court on 4 June 2007. The brief statement of reasons in the decision referred to the conclusions of the forensic report of 14 September 2004 and the Medical Associations decision of 20 July 2006.

On 10 August 2007 the CLR challenged that decision before the Calafat District Court.

38.  On 3 October 2007 the Calafat District Court allowed the complaint, set aside the decisions of 30 March 2007 and 4 June 2007 and ordered the reopening of the investigation, holding that several aspects of Mr Câmpeanus death had not been examined and that more evidence needed to be produced.

Among the shortcomings highlighted by the court were the following: most of the documents which were supposed to have been obtained from the Infectious Diseases Hospital in Craiova and the Placement Centre had not actually been added to the investigation file (the forensic documents on the basis of which Mr Câmpeanu had been admitted to the CMSC and transferred to the PMH; the clinical and paraclinical tests undertaken; the records of questioning of the doctors and nurses who had been responsible for Mr Câmpeanus care; and the HIV testing guidelines). Contradictions in the statements of those involved in Mr Câmpeanus admission to the CMSC had not been clarifiedand neither had the circumstances relating to the interruption of his antiretroviral treatment after being transferred to the PMH. In addition, the contradictory claims of medical personnel from the CMSC and the PMH regarding Mr Câmpeanus alleged “state of agitation” had not been clarified.

The investigators had also failed to ascertain whether the medical staff at the PMH had carried out the necessary tests after Mr Câmpeanu had been admitted there and whether he had received antiretrovirals or any other appropriate medication. The investigators had failed to establish the origin of the oedema noted on Mr Câmpeanus face and lower limbs and whether the therapeutic approach adopted at the PMH had been correct. Given these failures, the request for an opinion from the Medical Association had been premature and should be resubmitted once the investigation file had been completed.

39.  The prosecutoroffice attached to the Calafat District Court appealed against that judgment. On 4 April 2008 the Dolj County Court allowed the appeal, quashed the judgment delivered by the Calafat District Court and dismissed the CLRcomplaint concerning the decision of 30 March 2007 not to prosecute.

The court mainly relied on the conclusions of the forensic report and the autopsy report, and also on the decision of the Medical Association, all of which had stated that there had been no causal link between the medical treatment given to Mr Câmpeanu and his death.

C.  Other proceedings initiated by the CLR

1.  In relation to Mr Câmpeanu

40.  In response to the complaints lodged by the CLR (see paragraph 26 above), on 8 March 2004 the prefect of Dolj County established a commission with the task of carrying out an investigation into the circumstances surrounding Valentin Câmpeanus death. The commission was made up of representatives of the Child Protection Department, the Public Health Department, the Criminal Investigations Department of the Police Department and the prefectoffice. The commission was given ten days to complete the investigation and submit a report on its findings.

The commissions report concluded that all procedures relating to Mr Câmpeanus treatment after his discharge from the Placement Centre had been lawful and justified in view of his diagnosis. The commission found only one irregularity, in that an autopsy had not been carried out immediately after Mr Câmpeanus death, in breach of existing legislation (see paragraph 25 above).

41.  On 26 June 2004 the CLR filed a complaint with the National Authority for the Protection and Adoption of Children (“the National Authority”)criticising several deficiencies concerning mainly the failure to appoint a guardian for Mr Câmpeanu and to place him in an appropriate medical institution. The CLR reiterated its complaint on 4 August 2004, submitting that the wrongful transfer of Mr Câmpeanu to the PMH could raise issues under Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention.

In response to those allegations, the National Authority issued a report on 21 October 2004 on the circumstances surrounding Mr Câmpeanus death. The National Authority acknowledged that the Panel had acted ultra vires when ordering Mr Câmpeanus admission to the PMH. However, it stated that in any event, the order had been of no consequence, given that the institution had initially refused to accept Mr Câmpeanu (see paragraph 11 above).

The National Authority concluded that the Child Protection Department had acted in line with the principles of professional ethics and best practice when it had transferred Mr Câmpeanu to the CMSC. At the same time, the National Authority stated that it was not authorised to pass judgment on Mr Câmpeanus subsequent transfer to the PMH.

Similarly, the National Authority declined to express an opinion on the allegedly wrongful categorisation of Mr Câmpeanu as belonging to the medium disability group, or on the events which had occurred after his admission to the CMSC.

42.  On 24 March 2004 the Dolj County Public Health Department informed the CLR that a commission made up of various county-level officials had concluded that “no human rights were breached” in connection with Mr Câmpeanus death, as his successive admissions to hospital had been justified by Article 9 of Law no. 584/2002 on measures for the prevention of the spread of HIV infection and the protection of persons infected with HIV or suffering from AIDS.

2.  In relation to other patients

43.  On 16 March 2005, following criminal investigation concerning the death of seventeen patients at the PMHthe General Prosecutors Office sent a letter to the Ministry of Health, requiring it to take certain administrative measures to address the situation at the hospital. While noting that no criminal wrongdoing was detectable in connection with the deaths in question, the letter highlighted “administrative deficiencies” observed at the hospital and called for appropriate measures to be taken as regards the following problems:

[L]ack of heating in the patients rooms; hypocaloric food; insufficient staff, poorly trained in providing care to mentally disabled patients; lack of effective medication; extremely limited opportunities to carry out paraclinical investigations ..., all these factors having encouraged the onset of infectious diseases, as well as their fatal progression ...”

44.  In decision of 15 June 2006 concerning a criminal complaint lodged by the CLR on behalf of another patient, P.C., who had died at the PMH, the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed an objection by the public prosecutor that the CLR did not have locus standiIt found that the CLR did indeed have locus standi to pursue proceedings of this nature with a view to elucidating the circumstances in which seventeen patients had died at the PMH in January and February 2004, in view of its field of activity and stated aims as a foundation for the protection of human rights. The court held as follows:

The High Court considers that the CLR may be regarded as any other person whose legitimate interests are harmed within the meaning of Article 2781 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The legitimacy of its interest lies in the CLRs request that the circumstances which led to the death of seventeen patients at the PMH in January and February 2004 be determined and elucidated; its aim was thus to safeguard the right to life and the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment ... by initiating an official criminal investigation that would be effective and exhaustive so as to identify those responsible for breaches of the above-mentioned rights, in accordance with the requirements of Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention oHuman Rights. [It also aimed] to raise the awareness of society as to the need to protect fundamental human rights and freedoms and to ensure access to justice, which corresponds to the NGOs stated goals.

Its legitimate interest has been demonstrated by the initiation of investigations, which are currently pending.

At the same time, the possibility for the CLR to lodge a complaint in accordance with Article 2781 ... represents a judicial remedy of which the complainant availed itselfalso in compliance with the provisions of Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights ...

D.  Expert report submitted by the CLR

45.  The CLR submitted an expert opinion, dated 4 January 2012 and issued by Dr Adriaan van Esmember of the Forensic Advisory Team and director of the International Federation of Health and Human Rights Organisations (IFHHRO), assisted by Anca Boeriu, Project Officer at the IFHHRO. The opinion was based on copies of the evidence which the CLR also submitted to the Court, including the medical records from the CMSC and the PMH.

The expert opinion referred to the “very poor, substandard, often absent or missing” medical records at the PMH and the CMSC, in which the description of Mr Câmpeanus clinical situation was “scant”. It noted that while at the PMH the patient had never been consulted by an infectiousdisease specialist. Also, contrary to Romanian law, no autopsy had taken place immediately after the patients death.

Concerning the antiretroviral treatment, the documents available did not provide reliable information as to whether it had been received on a continuous basis. Therefore, as a result of inappropriate treatment, Mr Câmpeanu might have suffered from a relapse of HIV, and also from opportunistic infections such as pneumocystis pneumonia (pneumonia appeared in the autopsy report as the cause of death). The opinion noted that pneumonia had not been diagnosed or treated while the patient was at the PMH or the CMSC, even though it was a very common disease in HIV patients. Common laboratory tests to monitor the patients HIV status had never been carried out.

The expert opinion stated that certain behavioural signs interpreted as psychiatric disorders might have been caused by septicaemia.

Therefore, the risks of discontinued antiretroviral treatment, the possibility of opportunistic infections and the patients history of tuberculosis should have led to Mr Câmpeanu being admitted to an infectious-disease department of a general hospital, and not to a psychiatric institution.

46.  The report concluded that Mr Câmpeanus death at the PMH had been the result of “gross medical negligence”. The management of HIV and opportunistic infections had failed to comply with international standards and medical ethics, as had the counselling and treatment provided to the patient for his severe intellectual disability. Moreover, the disciplinary proceedings before the Disciplinary Board of the Medical Association had been substandard and negligent, in the absence of important medical documentation.

E.  Background information concerning the Cetate and Poiana Mare medical institutions

1.  Poiana Mare Neuropsychiatric Hospital

47.  The PMH is located in Dolj County in southern Romania, 80 km from Craiova, on a former army base occupying thirty-six hectares of land. The PMH has the capacity to admit 500 patients, both on a voluntary and an involuntary basisin the latter case as a result of either civil or criminal proceedings. Until a few years ago, the hospital also included a ward for patients suffering from tuberculosis. The ward was relocated to a nearby town as a result of pressure from a number of national and international agencies, including the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT).

At the time of the relevant events, namely in February 2004, there were 436 patients at the PMH. The medical staff included five psychiatrists, four psychiatry residents and six general practitioners.

According to the CPTs report of 2004 (see paragraph 77 below), during two consecutive winters, 109 patients died in suspicious circumstances at the PMH – eighty-one between January and December 2003 and twentyeight in the first five months of 2004. The CPT had visited the PMH three times, in 1995, 1999 and 2004; its last visit was specifically aimed at investigating the alarming increase in the death rate. After each visit, the CPT issued very critical reports, highlighting the “inhuman and degrading living conditions” at the PMH.

Following a visit to several of the medical institutions indicated as problematic in the CPTs reports, among them the PMH, the Ministry of Health issued a report on 2 September 2003It concluded that at the PMH the medication provided to patients was inadequate, either because there was no link between the psychiatric diagnosis and the treatment provided, or because the medical examinations were very limited. Several deficiencies were found concerning management efficiency and the insufficient number of medical staff in relation to the number of patients.

2.  Cetate-Dolj Medical and Social Care Centre

48.  It appears from the information received from the CLR that the CMSC was a small centre for medical and social care, with a capacity of twenty beds at the beginning of 2004; at the time, there were eighteen patients at the CMSC. Before 1 January 2004 – when it was designated as a medical and social care centre – the CMSC was a psychiatric hospital.

According to its accreditation certificate for 2006 to 2009, the CMSC was authorised to provide services for adults experiencing difficult family situations, with an emphasis on the social component of medical and social care.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A.  Romanian Criminal Code

49.  The relevant parts of the Romanian Criminal Code as in force at the time of the impugned events read as follows:

Article 114 – Admission to a medical facility

1.  When an offender is mentally ill or a drug addict and is in a state that presents a danger to society, his or her admission to a specialist medical institution may be ordered until he or she returns to health.

2.  This measure may also be taken temporarily during a criminal prosecution or trial.

Article 178  Negligent homicide

Negligent homicide as a result of failure to observe legal provisions or preventive measures relating to the practice of a profession or trade, or as a result of the performance of a particular activity, shall be punishable by immediate imprisonment for two to seven years.

Article 246  Malfeasance and nonfeasance against a persons interests

A public servant who, in the exercise of official duties, knowingly fails to perform an act or performs it erroneously and in doing so infringes another persons legal interests shall be punishable by immediate imprisonment for six months to three years.

Article 249 § 1  Negligence in the performance of an official duty

The breach of an official dutyas a result of negligence on the part of a public servant, by failing to perform it or performing it erroneously, if such breach has caused significant disturbance to the proper operation of a public authority or institution or of a legal entity, or damage to its property or serious damage to another personlegal interests, shall be punishable by imprisonment for one month to two years or by a fine.

Article 314 – Endangering a person unable to look after himself or herself

1.  The act of abandoning, sending away or leaving helpless a child or a person unable to look after himself or herself, committed in any manner by a person entrusted with his or her supervision or care, [or of] placing his or her life, health or bodily integrity in imminent danger, shall be punishable by immediate imprisonment for one to three years ...

B.  Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure

50.  The procedure governing complaints lodged with a court against decisions taken by prosecutor during criminal investigations was set out in Articles 275-2781 of the Code as in force at the time of the impugned eventsThe relevant parts of these Articles read as follows:

Article 275

Any person may lodge a complaint in respect of measures and decisions taken during criminal investigation proceedings, if these have harmed his or her legitimate interests ...

Article 278

Complaints against measures or decisions taken by prosecutor or implemented at the latters request shall be examined by ... the chief prosecutor in the relevant department. ...

Article 2781

 

1.  Following the dismissal by the prosecutor of complaint lodged in accordance with Articles 275-278 in respect of the discontinuation of a criminal investigation ... through a decision not to prosecute (neurmărire penală..., the injured party, or any other person whose legitimate interests have been harmed, may complain within twenty days following notification of the impugned decision, to the judge of the court that would normally have jurisdiction to deal with the case at first instance. ...

4.  The person in respect of whom the prosecutor has decided to discontinue the criminal investigation, as well as the person who lodged the complaint against that decision, shall be summoned before the court. If they have been lawfully summoned, the failure of these persons to appear before the court shall not impede the examination of the case. ...

5.  The presence of the prosecutor before the court is mandatory.

6.  The judge shall give the floor to the complainant, and then to the person in respect of whom the criminal investigation has been discontinued, and finally, to the prosecutor.

7.  In the examination of the case, the judge shall assess the impugned decision on the basis of the existing acts and material, and on any new documents submitted.

8.  The judge shall rule in one of the following ways:

(a)  dismiss the complaint as out of time, inadmissible or ill-founded and uphold the decision;

(b)  allow the complaint, overturn the decision and send the case back to the prosecutor in order to initiate or reopen the criminal investigation. The judge shall be required to give reasons for such remittal and, at the same time, to indicate the facts and circumstances that require elucidation, as well as the relevant evidence that needs to be produced;

(c)  allow the complaint, overturn the decision and, when the evidence in the file is sufficient, retain the case for further examination, in compliance with the rules of procedure that apply at first instance and, as appropriate, on appeal. ...

12.  The judge shall examine the complaint within thirty days from the date of receipt.

13.  complaint lodged with the incorrect body shall be sent, as an administrative step, to the body with jurisdiction to examine it. [footnote omitted]

C.  Social assistance system

51.  Article 2 of the National Social Assistance Act (Law no. 705/2001), as in force at the relevant time, defines the social assistance system as follows:

“... the system of institutions and measures through which the State, the public authorities and civil society ensure the prevention, the limitation or the removal of the temporary or permanent consequences of situations that may cause the marginalisation or social exclusion of some individuals.”

Article 3 defines the scope of the social assistance system, which is:

“... to protect individuals who, for economic, physical, mental or social reasons, do not have the ability to meet their social needs and to develop their own capabilities and social integration skills.”

52.  Ordinance no. 68/2003 concerning social services identifies the objectives of State social services and details the decision-making process concerning the allocation of social services.

D.  Legislation regarding the health system

53.  A detailed description of the relevant legal provisions on mental health is to be found in B. v. Romania (no. 2) (no. 1285/03§§ 42-66, 19 February 2013).

Law no. 487/2002 on Mental Health and the Protection of People with Psychological Disorders (“the Mental Health Act 2002”), which came into force in August 2002, prescribes the procedure for compulsory treatment of an individual. A special psychiatric panel should approve a treating psychiatrists decision that a person remain in hospital for compulsory treatment within seventy-two hours of his or her admission to a hospital. In addition, this assessment should be reviewed within twenty-four hours by a public prosecutor, whose decision, in turn, may be appealed against to a court. The implementation of the provisions of the Act was dependent on the adoption of the necessary regulations for its enforcement. The regulations were adopted on 2 May 2006.

54.  The Hospitals Act (Law no. 270/2003) provided in Article 4 that hospitals had an obligation to ensure the provision of adequate accommodation and food and the prevention of infections. It was repealed on 28 May 2006, once the Health Care Reform Act 2006 (Law no. 95/2006) came into force.

55.  The Patients Rights Act (Law no. 46/2003) provides in Article 3 that “the patient shall be entitled to respect as a human being, without discrimination”. Article 35 provides that patient has “the right to continuous medical care until his or her health improves or he or she recovers”. Furthermore, “the patient has the right to palliative care in order to be able to die with dignity”. The patients consent is required for any form of medical intervention.

56.  Order no. 1134/25.05.2000, issued by the Minister of Justice, and Order no. 255/4.04.2000, issued by the Minister of Health, approved the rules on procedures relating to medical opinions and other forensic medical services, which provide in Article 34 that an autopsy should be conducted when a death occurs in a psychiatric hospital. Article 44 requires the management of medical establishments to inform the criminal investigation authorities, who must request that an autopsy be carried out.

57.  Law no. 584/2002 on measures for the prevention of the spread of HIV infection and the protection of persons infected with HIV or suffering from AIDS provides in Article 9 that medical centres and doctors must hospitalise such individuals and provide them with appropriate medical care in view of their specific symptoms.

E.  The guardianship system

1.  Guardianship of minors

58.  Articles 113 to 141 of the Family Code, as in force at the time of the events in question, regulated guardianship of a minor whose parents were dead, unknown, deprived of their parental rights, incapacitated, missing or declared dead by a court. The Family Code regulated the conditions making guardianship necessary, the appointment of a guardian (tutore), the responsibilities of the guardian, the dismissal of the guardian, and the end of guardianship. The institution with the widest range of responsibilities in this field was the guardianship authority (autoritatea tutelară), entrusted, inter alia, with supervising the activity of guardians.

At present, guardianship is governed by Articles 110 to 163 of the Civil Code. The new Civil Code was published in Official Gazette no. 511 of 24 July 2009 and subsequently republished in Official Gazette no. 505 of 15 July 2011. It came into force on 1 October 2011.

2.  The incapacitation procedure and guardianship of people with disabilities

59.  Articles 142 to 151 of the Family Code, as in force at the time of the facts of the present case, governed the procedure of incapacitation (interdicţie), whereby a person who has proved to be incapable of managing his or her affairs loses his or her legal capacity.

An incapacitation order could be made and revoked by a court in respect of “those lacking the capacity to take care of their interests because of mental disorder or disability”. Incapacitation proceedings could be initiated by a wide group of persons, among which were the relevant State authorities for the protection of minors, or any interested person. Once a person was incapacitated, a guardian was appointed to represent him or her, with powers similar to those of a guardian of a minor.

Although the incapacitation procedure could also be applied to minors, it was particularly geared towards disabled adults.

The above-mentioned provisions have since been included, with amendments, in the Civil Code (Articles 164 to 177).

60.  Articles 152 to 157 of the Family Code, as in force at the material time, prescribed the procedure for temporary guardianship (curatela), designed to cover the situation of those who, even if not incapacitated, are not able to protect their interests in a satisfactory manner or to appoint a representative. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:

Article 152

Besides the other cases specified by law, the guardianship authority shall appoint a temporary guardian in the following circumstances:

(a)  whereon account of old age, illness or physical infirmity, a person, even if he or she retains legal capacity, is unable personally to manage his or her goods or to satisfactorily defend his or her interests and, for good reasons, cannot appoint a representative;

(b)  where, on account of illness or for other reasons, a person – even if he or she retains legal capacity – is unable, either personally or through a representative, to take the necessary measures in situations requiring urgent action;

(c)  where, because of illness or other reasons, the parent or the appointed guardian (tutore) is unable to perform the act in question; ...

Article 153

In the situations referred to in Article 152, the appointment of a temporary guardian (curator) does not affect the capacity of the person represented by the guardian.

Article 154

(1)  Temporary guardianship (curatelamay be instituted at the request of the person who wishes to be represented, that persons spouse or relatives, any of the persons referred to in Article 115, or the guardian (tutorein the situation referred to in Article 152 (c). The guardianship authority may also institute the guardianship of its own motion.

(2)  The guardianship may only be instituted with the consent of the person to be represented, except in situations when such consent cannot be given. ...

Article 157

If the reasons that led to the institution of temporary guardianship have ceased, the measure shall be lifted by the guardianship authority at the request of the guardian, the person being represented or any of the persons referred to in Article 115, or of its own motion.

The above-mentioned provisions have since been included, with amendments, in the Civil Code (Articles 178 to 186).

61.  Emergency Ordinance no. 26/1997 regarding children in difficult situations, in force at the time of the events in question, derogated from the provisions on guardianship in the Family Code. Article 8 (1) of the Ordinance provided:

“... if the parents of the child are dead, unknown, incapacitated, declared dead by a court, missing or deprived of their parental rights, and if guardianship has not been instituted, if the child has been declared abandoned by a final court judgment, and if a court has not decided to place the child with a family or an individual in accordance with the law, parental rights shall be exercised by the County Council, ... through [its Child Protection] Panel”.

Emergency Ordinance no. 26/1997 was repealed on 1 January 2005, when new legislation concerning the protection and promotion of childrens rights (Law no. 272/2004) came into force.

62.  Order no. 726/2002, concerning the criteria on the basis of which the categories of disability for adults were established, described people with “severe intellectual disability” as follows:

... they have reduced psychomotor development and few or no language skills; they can learn to talk; they can become familiar with the alphabet and basic counting. They may be capable of carrying out simple tasks under strict supervision. They can adapt to living in the community in care homes or in their families, as long as they do not have another disability which necessitates special care.

63.  Law no. 519/2002 on the special protection and employment of people with disabilities listed the social rights to which people with disabilities were entitled. It was repealed by the Protection of People with Disabilities Act (Law no. 448/2006), which came into force on 21 December 2006. Article 23 of the Act, as initially in force, provided that people with disabilities were protected against negligence and abuse, including by means of legal assistance services and, if necessary, by being placed under guardianship. Under Article 25 of the Act as amended in 2008, people with disabilities are protected against negligence and abuse, and against any discrimination based on their location. People who are entirely or partially incapable of managing their affairs are afforded legal protection in the form of full or partial guardianship, as well as legal assistance. Furthermore, if a person with disabilities does not have any parents or any other person who might agree to act as his or her guardian, a court may appoint as guardian the local public authority or private-law entity that provides care for the person concerned.

III.  RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW MATERIAL

A.  The issue of locus standi

1.  United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“the CRPD”), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 2006 (Resolution A/RES/61/106)

64.  The CRPD, designed to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by persons with disabilities and to promote respect for their inherent dignity, was ratified by Romania on 31 January 2011. It reads in its relevant parts as follows:

Article 5  Equality and non-discrimination

1.  States Parties recognize that all persons are equal before and under the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law.

2.  States Parties shall prohibit all discrimination on the basis of disability and guarantee to persons with disabilities equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on all grounds.

3.  In order to promote equality and eliminate discrimination, States Parties shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided.

4.  Specific measures which are necessary to accelerate or achieve de facto equality of persons with disabilities shall not be considered discrimination under the terms of the present Convention.

Article 10  Right to life

States Parties reaffirm that every human being has the inherent right to life and shall take all necessary measures to ensure its effective enjoyment by persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others.

Article 12  Equal recognition before the law

1.  States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to recognition everywhere as persons before the law.

2.  States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.

3.  States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.

4.  States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with international human rights law. Such safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue influence, are proportional and tailored to the persons circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body. The safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the persons rights and interests.

...”

Article 13  Access to justice

1.  States Parties shall ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others, including through the provision of procedural and
age-appropriate accommodations, in order to facilitate their effective role as direct and indirect participants, including as witnesses, in all legal proceedings, including at investigative and other preliminary stages.

2.  In order to help to ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities, States Parties shall promote appropriate training for those working in the field of administration of justice, including police and prison staff.”

2.  Relevant Views of the United Nations Human Rights Committee

65.  The First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights gives the Human Rights Committee (“the HRC”) competence to examine individual complaints with regard to alleged violations of the Covenant by States Parties to the Protocol (Articles 1 and 2 of the Optional Protocol). This expressly limits to individuals the right to submit a communication. Therefore, complaints submitted by NGOs, associations, political parties or corporations on their own behalf have generally been declared inadmissible for lack of personal standing (see, for instance, Disabled and handicapped persons in Italy v. Italy (Communication No. 163/1984)).

66.  In exceptional cases, a third party may submit a communication on behalf of a victim. A communication submitted by a third party on behalf of an alleged victim can only be considered if the third party can demonstrate its authority to submit the communication. The alleged victim may appoint a representative to submit the communication on his or her behalf.

67.  A communication submitted on behalf of an alleged victim may also be accepted when it appears that the individual in question is unable to submit the communication personally (see Rule 96 of the Rules of Procedure of the HRC):

 

Rule 96

“With a view to reaching a decision on the admissibility of a communication, the Committee, or a working group established under rule 95, paragraph 1, of these rules shall ascertain:

...

(b)  That the individual claims, in a manner sufficiently substantiated, to be a victim of a violation by that State party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. Normally, the communication should be submitted by the individual personally or by that individuals representative; a communication submitted on behalf of an alleged victim may, however, be accepted when it appears that the individual in question is unable to submit the communication personally;

...”

68.  Typical examples of this situation would be when the victim has allegedly been abducted, has disappeared or there is no other way of knowing his or her whereabouts, or the victim is imprisoned or in a mental institution. A third party (normally close relatives) may submit a communication on behalf of a deceased person (see, for instance, Mr Saimijon and Mrs Malokhat Bazarov v. Uzbekistan (communication no. 959/2000); Panayote Celal v. Greece (communication no. 1235/2003); Yuliya Vasilyevna Telitsina v. Russian Federation (communication no. 888/1999); José Antonio Coronel et al. v. Colombia (communication no. 778/1997); and Jean Miango Muiyo v. Zaire (communication no. 194/1985)).

3.  The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Disability

69.  In her report on the question of monitoring, issued in 2006, the Special Rapporteur stated:

“2.  People with developmental disabilities are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations. Also, people with disabilities are rarely taken into account, they have no political voice and are often a sub group of already marginalized social groups, and therefore, have no power to influence governments. They encounter significant problems in accessing the judicial system to protect their rights or to seek remedies for violations; and their access to organizations that may protect their rights is generally limited. While non-disabled people need independent national and international bodies to protect their human rights, additional justifications exist for ensuring that people with disabilities and their rights be given special attention through independent national and international monitoring mechanisms.”

4.  Relevant case-law of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

70.  Article 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights gives the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights the competence to receive petitions from any person or group of persons, or any non-governmental entity legally recognised in one or more member States of the Organization of American States (OAS). It provides:

“Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party.”

Article 23 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights states that such petitions may be brought on behalf of third parties. It reads as follows:

“Any person or group of persons or nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more of the Member States of the OAS may submit petitions to the Commission, on their behalf or on behalf of third persons, concerning alleged violations of a human right recognized in, as the case may be, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the American Convention on Human Rights Pact of San José, Costa Rica ..., in accordance with their respective provisions, the Statute of the Commission, and these Rules of Procedure. The petitioner may designate an attorney or other person to represent him or her before the Commission, either in the petition itself or in a separate document.”

71.  The Inter-American Commission has examined cases brought by NGOs on behalf of direct victims, including disappeared or deceased persons. For instance, in the case of Gomes Lund et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguaia”) v. Brazil (report no. 33/01), the petitioner was the Center for Justice and International Law, acting in the name of disappeared persons and their next of kin. Regarding its competence ratione personae, the Commission acknowledged that the petitioning entity could lodge petitions on behalf of the direct victims in the case, in accordance with Article 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights. In Teodoro Cabrera Garcia and Rodolfo Montiel Flores v. Mexico (report no. 11/04), the Commission affirmed its jurisdiction ratione personae to examine claims brought by different organisations and individuals alleging that two other individuals had been illegally detained and tortured, and imprisoned following an unfair trial. In Arely José Escher et al. v. Brazil (report no. 18/06), the Commission affirmed its jurisdiction ratione personae to examine a petition brought by two associations (the National Popular Lawyers Network and the Center for Global Justice) alleging violations of the rights to due legal process, to respect for personal honour and dignity, and to recourse to the courts, to the detriment of members of two cooperatives associated with the Landless Workers Movement, through the illegal tapping and monitoring of their telephone lines.

72.  Cases initially brought by NGOs may subsequently be submitted by the Commission to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, after the adoption of the Commissions report on the merits (see, for instance, Case of the “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala (preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs), (judgment of 24 November 2009, Series C no. 211) brought by the Office of Human Rights of the Archdiocese of Guatemala and the Center for Justice and International Law; see also Arely José Escher et al., cited above).

5.  European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) report: Access to justice in Europe: an overview of challenges and opportunities

73.  The report issued by the FRA in March 2011 emphasises that the ability to seek effective protection of the rights of vulnerable people at the domestic level is often hindered, inter alia, by legal costs and a narrow construction of legal standing (see pages 37-54 of the report).

B.  Relevant reports concerning the conditions at the PMH

1.  European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) reports on Romania

74.  The CPT has documented the situation at the PMH during three visits: in 1995, 1999 and 2004.

75.  In 1995 the living conditions at the PMH were considered to be so deplorable that the CPT decided to make use of Article 8 § 5 of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which enables it in exceptional circumstances to make certain observations to the Government concerned during the visit itself. In particular, the CPT noted that in a period of seven months in 1995 sixty-one patients had died, of whom twenty-five had been “severely malnourished” (see paragraph 177 of the 1995 report). The CPT decided to ask the Romanian Government to take urgent measures to ensure that “basic living conditions” existed at the PMH.

Other areas of concern identified by the CPT on this occasion were the practice of secluding patients in isolation rooms as a form of punishment, and the lack of safeguards in relation to involuntary admission.

76.  In 1999 the CPT returned to the PMH. The most serious deficiencies found on this occasion related to the fact that the number of staff – both specialised and auxiliary – had been reduced from the 1995 levels, and to the lack of progress in relation to involuntary admission.

77.  In June 2004 the CPT visited the PMH for the third time, this time in response to reports concerning an increase in the number of patients who had died. At the time of the visit, the hospital, with a capacity of 500 beds, accommodated 472 patients, of whom 246 had been placed there on the basis of Article 114 of the Romanian Criminal Code (compulsory admission ordered by a criminal court).

The CPT noted in its report that eighty-one patients had died in 2003 and twenty-eight in the first five months of 2004. The increase in the number of deaths had occurred despite the transfer from the hospital in 2002 of patients suffering from active tuberculosis. The main causes of death were cardiac arrest, myocardial infarction and bronchopneumonia.

The average age of the patients who had died was 56, with sixteen being under 40. The CPT stated that “such premature deaths could not be explained exclusively on the basis of the symptoms of the patients at the time of their hospitalisation” (see paragraph 13 of the 2004 report). The CPT also noted that some of these patients “were apparently not given sufficient care” (see paragraph 14 of the report).

The CPT noted with concern “the paucity of human and material resources” available to the hospital (see paragraph 16 of the report). It singled out serious deficiencies in the quality and quantity of food provided to the patients and the lack of heating in the hospital.

In view of the deficiencies found at the PMH, the CPT made the following statement in paragraph 20 of the report:

“... we cannot rule out the possibility that the combined impact of difficult living conditions – in particular the shortages of food and heating – resulted in the progressive deterioration of the general state of health of some of the weakest patients, and that the paucity of medical supplies available could not prevent their death in most cases.

In the opinion of the CPT, the situation found at the Poiana Mare Hospital is very concerning and warrants taking strong measures aimed at improving the living conditions and also the care provided to patients. Following the third visit of the CPT to the Poiana Mare Hospital in less than ten years, it is high time the authorities finally grasped the real extent of the situation prevailing in the establishment.”

Finally, in relation to involuntary admission through civil proceedings, the CPT noted that the recently enacted Mental Health Act 2002 had not been implemented comprehensively, as it had encountered patients who had been admitted involuntarily in breach of the safeguards included in the law (see paragraph 32 of the report).

2.  The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health

78.  On 2 March 2004 the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, together with the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, wrote to the Romanian Government, expressing concern about alarming reports received with regard to the living conditions at the PMH and asking for clarification on the matter. The response from the Government was as follows (see summary by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health in UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/51/Add.1):

“54.  By letter dated 8 March 2004, the Government responded to the communication sent by the Special Rapporteur regarding the situation of the Poiana Mare Psychiatric Hospital. The Government confirmed that the Romanian authorities fully understood and shared the concerns about the hospital. Ensuring the protection of handicapped persons remained a governmental priority and the Ministry of Health would start inquiries into all similar medical institutions in order to make sure Poiana Mare was an isolated case. Regarding Poiana Mare, immediate measures had been taken to improve the living conditions of the patients and these steps would continue until the hospital was completely rehabilitated. On 25 February 2004, the Minister of Health conducted an enquiry into Poiana Mare. There were deficiencies with the heating and water systems, food preparation, waste disposal, living and sanitary conditions, and medical assistance. Most of the problems connected with medical assistance were caused by the insufficiency of resources and bad management. The Government confirmed that the following measures were required: clarification by forensic specialists of the cause of death of those patients whose death was unrelated to pre-existing disease or advanced age; implementing the hospitals plan of 2004; hiring supplementary specialized health professionals; reorganizing the working schedule of physicians to include night shifts; ensuring specialized medical assistance on a regular basis; and allocating supplementary funding to improve living conditions. The Government also confirmed that the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Health, as well as the Secretary of State of the National Authority for Handicapped Persons, had been discharged following the irregularities found at the Poiana Mare Psychiatric Hospital, and that the Director of the Hospital had been replaced by an interim director until a competitive selection for the vacant position was finalized. The Government confirmed that the hospital would be carefully monitored by representatives of the Ministry of Health throughout 2004 and that representatives of the local administration would be directly involved in improving the situation at the hospital. Finally, the Government confirmed that the Ministry of Health would start very soon an independent investigation of all other similar units, and would take all necessary measures to prevent any such unfortunate situations from ever happening again.”

During his official visit to Romania in August 2004, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health inspected several mental health facilities, including the PMH. The report (UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/51.Add.4) following the visit of the Special Rapporteur, issued on 21 February 2005, reads as follows, in so far as relevant:

“61.  Nonetheless, during his mission the Special Rapporteur formed the view that, despite the legal and policy commitments of the Government, the enjoyment of the right to mental health care remains more of an aspiration rather than a reality for many people with mental disabilities in Romania.

Poiana Mare Psychiatric Hospital

...

63.  During his mission, the Special Rapporteur had the opportunity to visit [the PMH] and to discuss developments which had taken place since February 2004 and the appointment of a new director of the hospital. The director informed the Special Rapporteur that funding (5.7 billion lei) had been received from the Government to make improvements. Food allocations had been increased, the heating system had been repaired, and wards and other buildings at the hospital were being refurbished. While the Special Rapporteur welcomes these improvements and commends all those responsible, he urges the Government to ensure that it provides adequate resources to support the implementation of these changes on a sustainable basis. The Government should also support other needed measures including: making appropriate medication available, providing adequate rehabilitation for patients, ensuring that patients are able to access effective complaint mechanisms, and the provision of human rights training for hospital staff. The Special Rapporteur understands that criminal investigations into the deaths are still ongoing. He will continue to closely monitor all developments at PMH. The Special Rapporteur takes this opportunity to acknowledge the important role that the media and NGOs have played in relation to Poiana Mare.”

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2, 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION

79.  The CLR, acting on behalf of Mr Câmpeanu, complained that he had been unlawfully deprived of his life as a result of the combined actions and failures to act by a number of State agencies, in contravention of their legal obligation to provide him with care and treatment. In addition, the authorities had failed to put in place an effective mechanism to safeguard the rights of people with disabilities placed in long-stay institutions, including by initiating investigations into suspicious deaths.

Furthermore, the CLR complained that serious flaws in Mr Câmpeanus care and treatment at the CMSC and the PMH, the living conditions at the PMH, and the general attitude of the authorities and individuals involved in his care and treatment over the last months of his life, together or separately amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. In addition, the official investigation into those allegations of ill-treatment had not complied with the States procedural obligation under Article 3.

Under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3, the CLR submitted that no effective remedy existed in the Romanian domestic legal system in respect of suspicious deaths and/or ill-treatment in psychiatric hospitals.

The relevant parts of Articles 2, 3 and 13 of the Convention read as follows:

Article 2

“1.  Everyones right to life shall be protected by law. ...”

Article 3

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

Article 13

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

A.  Admissibility

80.  The Government contended that the CLR did not have locus standi to lodge the present application on behalf of the late Valentin Câmpeanu; the case was therefore inadmissible as incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of Article 34 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.”

1.  The parties’ submissions

(a)  The Government

81.  The Government argued that the conditions required by Article 34 for an application to the Court were not met in the present case; on the one hand, the CLR did not have victim status and on the other hand, the association had not shown that it was the valid representative of the direct victim.

Being aware of the dynamic and evolving interpretation of the Convention by the Court in its case-law, the Government nevertheless pointed to the fact that while judicial interpretation was permissible, any sort of legislating by the judiciary, by adding to the text of the Convention, was not acceptable; therefore, Article 34 should still be construed as meaning that the subjects of the individual petition could only be individuals, NGOs or groups of individuals claiming to be victims, or representatives of alleged victims.

82.  The Government disputed that the CLR could be regarded either as a direct victim, or as an indirect or potential victim.

Firstly, in the present case the CLR had not submitted that its own rights had been violated, and therefore it could not be regarded as a direct victim (the Government cited Čonka and the Human Rights League v. Belgium (dec.), no. 51564/9913 March 2001).

Secondly, according to the Courts case-law, an indirect or potential victim had to demonstrate, with sufficient evidence, either the existence of a risk of a violation, or the effect that a violation of a third partys rights had had on him or her, as a consequence of a pre-existing close link, whether natural (for example, in the case of a family member) or legal (for example, as a result of custody arrangements). The Government therefore submitted that the mere fact that Mr Câmpeanus vulnerable personal circumstances had come to the attention of the CLR, which had then decided to bring his case before the domestic courts, was not sufficient to transform the CLR into an indirect victim; in the absence of any strong link between the direct victim and the CLR, or of any decision entrusting the CLR with the task of representing or caring for Mr Câmpeanu, the CLR could not claim to be a victim, either directly or indirectly, and this notwithstanding Mr Câmpeanus undisputed vulnerability, or the fact that he was an orphan and had had no legal guardian appointed (the Government referred, by way of contrast, to Becker v. Denmark, no. 7011/75, Commission decision of 3 October 1975, Decisions and Reports (DR) 4, p. 215).

83.  Furthermore, in the lack of any evidence of any form of authorisation, the CLR could not claim to be the direct victims representative either (the Government cited Skjoldager v. Sweden, no. 22504/93, Commission decision of 17 May 1995, unpublished).

The Government argued that the CLRs involvement in the domestic proceedings concerning the death of Mr Câmpeanu did not imply an acknowledgment by the national authorities of its locus standi to act on behalf of the direct victim. The CLRs standing before the domestic courts was that of a person whose interests had been harmed by the prosecutors decision, and not that of a representative of the injured party. In that respect, the domestic law, as interpreted by the Romanian High Court of Cassation and Justice in its decision of 15 June 2006 (see paragraph 44 above), amounted to an acknowledgment of an actio popularis in domestic proceedings.

84.  The Government argued that the present case before the Court should be dismissed as an actio popularis, observing that such cases were accepted by the Court solely in the context of Article 33 of the Convention in relation to the power of States to supervise one another. While noting that other international bodies did not expressly preclude an actio popularis (citing Article 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights), the Government maintained that each mechanism had its own limits, shortcomings and advantages, the model adopted being exclusively the result of negotiations between the Contracting Parties.

85.  The Government further maintained that the Romanian authorities had addressed the specific recommendations of the CPT, with the result that a 2013 United Nations Universal Periodic Review had acknowledged positive developments concerning the situation of persons with disabilities in Romania. Further improvements had also been made concerning the domestic legislation on guardianship and protection of persons with disabilities.

Moreover, in so far as several of the Courts judgments had already addressed the issue of the rights of vulnerable patients placed in large-scale institutions (the Government cited C.B. v. Romania, no. 21207/03, 20 April 2010, and Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760/06, ECHR 2012), the Government argued that no particular reason relating to respect for human rights as defined in the Convention required that the examination of the application be pursued.

(b)  The CLR

86.  The CLR submitted that the exceptional circumstances of this application required an examination on the merits; the Court could make such an assessment either by accepting that the CLR was an indirect victim, or by considering that the CLR was acting as Mr Câmpeanus representative.

87.  In view of the Courtprinciple of flexible interpretation of its admissibility criteria when this was required by the interests of human rights and by the need to ensure practical and effective access to proceedings before it, the CLR submitted that its locus standi to act on behalf of Mr Câmpeanu should be accepted by the Court. In such a decision, regard should be had to the exceptional circumstances of the caseto the fact that it was impossible for Mr Câmpeanu to have access to justice, either directly or through a representative, to the fact that the domestic courts had acknowledged the CLRs standing to act on his behalf and, last but not least, to the CLRs long-standing expertise in acting on behalf of people with disabilities.

The CLR further mentioned that the Court had adapted its rules in order to enable access to its proceedings for victims who found it excessively difficult, or even impossible, to comply with certain admissibility criteria, owing to factors outside their control but linked to the violations complained of: evidentiary difficulties for victims of secret surveillance measures, or vulnerability due to such factors as age, gender or disability (citing, for instance, S.P., D.P. and A.T. v. the United Kingdom, no. 23715/94, Commission decision of 20 May 1996unreportedStorck v. Germany, no. 61603/00, ECHR 2005V; and Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, ECHR 2005IV).

The Court had also departed from the “victim status” rule on the basis of the “interests of human rights”, holding that its judgments served not only to decide the cases brought before it, but more generally, “to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States of the engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties” (the CLR referred to Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, § 26, ECHR 2003IX).

The CLR further submitted that the State had certain duties under Article 2, for instance, irrespective of the existence of next of kin or their willingness to pursue proceedings on the applicants behalf; furthermore, to make the supervision of States compliance with their obligations under Article 2 conditional on the existence of next of kin would entail the risk of disregarding the requirements of Article 19 of the Convention.

88.  The CLR referred to the international practice of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, which in exceptional circumstances allowed cases lodged by others on behalf of alleged victims if the victims were unable to submit the communication by themselves. NGOs were among the most active human rights defenders in such situations; furthermore, their standing to take cases to court on behalf of or in support of such victims was commonly accepted in many Council of Europe member States (according to a 2011 report by the European Unions Fundamental Rights Agency entitled Access to Justice in Europe: aoverview of challenges and opportunities).

89.  Turning to the particularities of the present case, the CLR underlined that a significant factor in the assessment of the locus standi issue was that its monitors had established brief visual contact with Mr Câmpeanu during their visit to the PMH and witnessed his plight; consequently, the CLR had taken immediate action and applied to various authorities, urging them to provide solutions to his critical situation. In this context, the associations long-standing expertise in defending the human rights of people with disabilities played an essential role.

Pointing out that at domestic level its locus standi was acknowledged, the CLR contended that the Court frequently took into account domestic procedural rules on representation in order to decide who had locus standi to lodge applications on behalf of people with disabilities (it cited Glass v. the United Kingdom, no. 61827/00, ECHR 2004II). Moreover, the Court had found violations in cases when domestic authorities had applied procedural rules in an inflexible manner that restricted access to justice for people with disabilities (for example, X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91).

In this context, the CLR argued that the initiatives it had taken before the domestic authorities essentially differentiated it from the applicant NGO in the recent case of Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 48609/06, 18 June 2013), concerning the death of fifteen children and young people with disabilities in a social care home. In that case, while observing in general that exceptional measures could be required to ensure that people who could not defend themselves had access to representation, the Court had noted that the Association for European Integration and Human Rights had not previously pursued the case at domestic level. The Court had therefore dismissed the application as incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention in respect of the NGO in question (ibid., § 93).

90.  Referring to the comments by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights highlighting the difficulties that people with disabilities had in securing access to justice, and also to concerns expressed by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture that practices of abuse against people with disabilities secluded in State institutions often “remained invisible”, the CLR submitted that the “interests of human rights” would require an assessment of the present case on the merits.

The CLR further indicated a few criteria that it considered useful for the determination of locus standi in cases similar to the present one: the vulnerability of the victim, entailing a potential absolute inability to complain; practical or natural obstacles preventing the victim from exhausting domestic remedies, such as deprivation of liberty or inability to contact a lawyer or next of kinthe nature of the violation, especially in the case of Article 2, where the direct victim was ipso facto not in a position to provide written form of authority to third parties; the lack of adequate alternative institutional mechanisms ensuring effective representation for the victim; the nature of the link between the third party claiming locus standi and the direct victim; favourable domestic rules on locus standiand whether the allegations raised serious issues of general importance.

91.  In the light of the above-mentioned criteria and in so far as it had acted on behalf of the direct victim, Mr Câmpeanu – both prior to his death, by launching an appeal for his transfer from the PMH, and immediately afterwards and throughout the next four years, by seeking accountability for his death before the domestic courts – the CLR asserted that it had the right to bring his case before the Court.

The CLR concluded that not acknowledging its standing to act on behalf of Mr Câmpeanu would amount to letting the Government take advantage of his unfortunate circumstances in order to escape the Courts scrutiny, thus blocking access to the Court for the most vulnerable members of society.

(c)  Relevant submissions by the third parties

(i)  The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights

92.  The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, whose intervention before the Court was limited to the admissibility of the present application, submitted that access to justice for people with disabilities was highly problematic, especially in view of inadequate legal incapacitation procedures and restrictive rules on legal standing. Consequently, the frequent abuses committed against people with disabilities were often not reported to the authorities and were ignored, and an atmosphere of impunity surrounded these violations. In order to prevent and put an end to such abuses, NGOs played an important role, including by facilitating vulnerable peoples access to justice. Against that backdrop, allowing NGOs to lodge applications with the Court on behalf of people with disabilities would be fully in line with the principle of effectiveness underlying the Convention, and also with the trends existing at domestic level in many European countries and the case-law of other international courts, such as the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, which granted locus standi to NGOs acting on behalf of alleged victims, even when the victims had not appointed these organisations as their representatives (for instance, in the case of Yatama v. Nicaragua (preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs), judgment of 23 June 2005, Series C No. 127).

In the Commissioners view, a strict approach to locus standi requirements concerning people with disabilities (in this case, intellectual) would have the undesired effect of depriving this vulnerable group of any opportunity to seek and obtain redress for breaches of their human rights, thus running counter to the fundamental aims of the Convention.

93.  The Commissioner also submitted that in exceptional circumstances, to be defined by the Court, NGOs should be able to lodge applications with the Court on behalf of identified victims who had been directly affected by the alleged violation. Such exceptional circumstances could concern extremely vulnerable victims, for example persons detained in psychiatric and social care institutions, with no family and no alternative means of representation, whose applications, made on their behalf by a person or organisation with which a sufficient connection was established, gave rise to important questions of general interest.

Such an approach would be in line with the European trend towards expanding legal standing and recognising the invaluable contribution made by NGOs in the field of human rights for people with disabilitiesat the same time, it would also be in line with the Courtrelevant case-law, which had evolved considerably in recent years, not least as a result of the intervention of NGOs.

(ii)  The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee

94.  The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee contended that, based on its extensive experience as a human rights NGO, institutionalised people with disabilities were devoid of the protection of the criminal law, unless an NGO acted on their behalf using legal remedies in addition to public advocacy, and even in such circumstances, the practical results remained insufficient in that there remained a lack of basic access to the courts for such victims, who at present were often denied justice on procedural grounds. As a result, crime against institutionalised individuals with mental disabilities was shielded from the enforcement of laws designed to ensure its prevention, punishment and redress.

(iii)  The Mental Disability Advocacy Center

95.  The Mental Disability Advocacy Center submitted that the factual or legal inability of individuals with intellectual disabilities to have access to justice, an issue already examined by the Court in several of its cases (for instance, Stanevcited above), could ultimately lead to impunity for violations of their rights. In situations where vulnerable victims were deprived of their legal capacity and/or detained in State institutions, States could “avoid” any responsibility for protecting their lives by not providing them with any assistance in legal matters, including in relation to the protection of their human rights. The case-law of the Canadian Supreme Court, the Irish Supreme Court and the High Court of England and Wales granting legal standing to NGOs in situations where no one else was able to bring an issue of public interest before the courts was cited. The abovementioned courts decisions on the issue of the locus standi of NGOs had mainly been based on an assessment of whether the case concerned a serious matter, whether the claimant had a genuine interest in bringing the case, the claimants expertise in the area involved in the matter and whether there was another reasonable and effective means of bringing the issue before the courts.

2.  The Courts assessment

(a)  The Courts approach in previous cases

(i)  Direct victims

96.  In order to be able to lodge an application in accordance with Article 34, an individual must be able to show that he or she was “directly affected” by the measure complained of (see Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, § 33, ECHR 2008, and İlhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, § 52, ECHR 2000VII). This is indispensable for putting the protection mechanism of the Convention into motion, although this criterion is not to be applied in a rigid, mechanical and inflexible way throughout the proceedings (see Karnercited above, § 25, and Fairfield and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 24790/04, ECHR 2005VI).

Moreover, in accordance with the Courts practice and with Article 34 of the Convention, applications can only be lodged by, or in the name of, individuals who are alive (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/9016065/9016066/9016068/9016069/9016070/9016071/9016072/90 and 16073/90, § 111, ECHR 2009). Thus, in a number of cases where the direct victim has died prior to the submission of the application, the Court has not accepted that the direct victim, even when represented, had standing as an applicant for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention (see Aizpurua Ortiz and Others v. Spain, no. 42430/05, § 30, 2 February 2010; Dvořáček and Dvořáčková v. Slovakia, no. 30754/04, § 41, 28 July 2009; and Kaya and Polat v. Turkey (dec.), nos. 2794/05 and 40345/05, 21 October 2008).

(ii)  Indirect victims

97.  Cases of the above-mentioned type have been distinguished from cases in which an applicants heirs were permitted to pursue an application which had already been lodgedAn authority on this question is Fairfield and Others (cited above), where a daughter lodged an application after her fathers death, alleging a violation of his rights to freedom of thought, religion and speech (Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention). While the domestic courts granted Ms Fairfield leave to pursue the appeal after her fathers death, the Court did not accept the daughters victim status and distinguished this case from the situation in Dalban v. Romania ([GC], no. 28114/95, ECHR 1999VI), where the application had been brought by the applicant himself, whose widow had pursued it only after his subsequent death.

In this regard, the Court has differentiated between applications where the direct victim has died after the application was lodged with the Court and those where he or she had already died beforehand.

Where the applicant has died after the application was lodged, the Court has accepted that the next of kin or heir may in principle pursue the application, provided that he or she has sufficient interest in the case (see, for instance, the widow and children in Raimondo v. Italy, 22 February 1994, § 2, Series A no. 281A, and Stojkovic v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 14818/02, § 25, 8 November 2007; the parents in X v. France31 March 1992, § 26, Series A no. 234-C; the nephew and potential heir in Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071/96, ECHR 2000XII; or the unmarried or de facto partner in Velikova v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 41488/98ECHR 1999-V; and contrast the universal legatee not related to the deceased in Thévenon v. France (dec.), no. 2476/02, ECHR 2006-III; the niece in Léger v. France (striking out) [GC], no. 19324/02, § 50, 30 March 2009; and the daughter of one of the original applicants in a case concerning non-transferable rights under Articles 3 and 8 where no general interest was at stake, in M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 22457/08, §§ 96-100, 15 November 2011).

98.  However, the situation varies where the direct victim dies before the application is lodged with the Court. In such cases the Court has, with reference to an autonomous interpretation of the concept of “victim”, been prepared to recognise the standing of a relative either when the complaints raised an issue of general interest pertaining to “respect for human rights” (Article 37 § 1 in fine of the Convention) and the applicants as heirs had a legitimate interest in pursuing the application, or on the basis of the direct effect on the applicants own rights (see Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, §§ 44-51, ECHR 2009, and Marie-Louise Loyen and Bruneel v. France, no. 55929/00, §§ 21-31, 5 July 2005). The latter cases, it may be noted, were brought before the Court following or in connection with domestic proceedings in which the direct victim himself or herself had participated while alive.

Thus, the Court has recognised the standing of the victimnext of kin to submit an application where the victim has died or disappeared in circumstances allegedly engaging the responsibility of the State (see Çakıcı v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657/94, § 92, ECHR 1999IV, and Bazorkina v. Russia (dec.), no69481/01, 15 September 2005).

99.  In Varnava and Others (cited above) the applicants lodged the applications both in their own name and on behalf of their disappeared relatives. The Court did not consider it necessary to rule on whether the missing men should or should not be granted the status of applicants since, in any event, the close relatives of the missing men were entitled to raise complaints concerning their disappearance (ibid., § 112). The Court examined the case on the basis that the relatives of the missing persons were the applicants for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention.

100.  In cases where the alleged violation of the Convention was not closely linked to disappearances or deaths giving rise to issues under Article 2, the Courts approach has been more restrictiveas in the case of Sanles Sanles v. Spain ((dec.), no. 48335/99ECHR 2000XI), which concerned the prohibition of assisted suicide. The Court held that the rights claimed by the applicant under Articles 2, 3, 5, 8, 9 and 14 of the Convention belonged to the category of non-transferable rights, and therefore concluded that the applicant, who was the deceaseds sister-in-law and legal heir, could not claim to be the victim of a violation on behalf of her late brother-in-law. The same conclusion has been reached in respect of complaints under Articles 9 and 10 brought by the alleged victims daughter (see Fairfield and Others, cited above).

In other cases concerning complaints under Articles 5, 6 or 8 the Court has granted victim status to close relatives, allowing them to submit an application where they have shown a moral interest in having the late victim exonerated of any finding of guilt (see Nölkenbockhoff v. Germany, 25 August 1987, § 33, Series A no. 123, and Grădinar v. Moldova, no. 7170/02§§ 95 and 97-98, 8 April 2008) or in protecting their own reputation and that of their family (see Brudnicka and Others v. Poland, no. 54723/00§§ 27-31, ECHR 2005IIArmonienė v. Lithuania, no. 36919/02, § 29, 25 November 2008; and Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, no. 34147/06, §§ 31-33, 21 September 2010), or where they have shown a material interest on the basis of the direct effect on their pecuniary rights (see Ressegatti v. Switzerland, no. 17671/02§§ 23-25, 13 July 2006and Marie-Louise Loyen and Bruneel§§ 29-30Nölkenbockhoff, § 33; Grădinar, § 97; and Micallef, § 48, all cited above). The existence of a general interest which necessitated proceeding with the consideration of the complaints has also been taken into consideration (see Marie-Louise Loyen and Bruneel, § 29; Ressegatti, § 26; Micallef, §§ 46 and 50, all cited above; and B and Others v. Turkey, no. 55955/00, §§ 2223, 2 February 2006).

The applicants participation in the domestic proceedings has been found to be only one of several relevant criteria (see Nölkenbockhoff, § 33; Micallef, §§ 48-49; Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco, § 31; and Grădinar, §§ 98-99, all cited above; and Kaburov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 9035/06, §§ 52-53, 19 June 2012).

(iii)  Potential victims and actio popularis

101.  Article 34 of the Convention does not allow complaints in abstracto alleging a violation of the Convention. The Convention does not provide for the institution of an actio popularis (see Klass and Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, § 33, Series A no. 28; The Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia (dec.), no. 9103/04, 22 May 2007; and Burden, cited above, § 33), meaning that applicants may not complain against a provision of domestic law, a domestic practice or public acts simply because they appear to contravene the Convention.

In order for applicants to be able to claim to be a victim, they must produce reasonable and convincing evidence of the likelihood that a violation affecting them personally will occur; mere suspicion or conjecture is insufficient in this respect (see Tauira and 18 Others v. France, no. 28204/95, Commission decision of 4 December 1995, DR 83-B, p. 112 at p. 131, and Monnat v. Switzerland, no. 73604/01, §§ 31-32, ECHR 2006X).

(iv)  Representation

102.  According to the Courts well-established case-law (see paragraph 96 above), applications can be lodged with it only by living persons or on their behalf.

Where applicants choose to be represented under Rule 36 § 1 of the Rules of Court, rather than lodging the application themselves, Rule 45 § 3 requires them to produce a written authority to act, duly signed. It is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions from the alleged victim, within the meaning of Article 34, on whose behalf they purport to act before the Court (see Post v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 21727/08, 20 January 2009; as regards the validity of an authority to act, see Aliev v. Georgia, no. 522/04, §§ 44-49, 13 January 2009).

103.  However, the Convention institutions have held that special considerations may arise in the case of victims of alleged breaches of Articles 2, 3 and 8 at the hands of the national authorities.

Applications lodged by individuals on behalf of the victim(s), even though no valid form of authority was presented, have thus been declared admissible. Particular consideration has been shown with regard to the victims vulnerability on account of their age, sex or disability, which rendered them unable to lodge a complaint on the matter with the Court, due regard also being paid to the connection between the person lodging the application and the victim (see, mutatis mutandisİlhan, cited above, § 55, where the complaints were brought by the applicant on behalf of his brother, who had been ill-treated; Y.F. v. Turkey, no. 24209/94, § 29, ECHR 2003IX, where a husband complained that his wife had been compelled to undergo a gynaecological examination; and S.P., D.P. and A.T. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, where a complaint was brought by a solicitor on behalf of children he had represented in domestic proceedings, in which he had been appointed by the guardian ad litem).

By contrast, in Nencheva and Others (cited above, § 93) the Court did not accept the victim status of the applicant association acting on behalf of the direct victims, noting that it had not pursued the case before the domestic courts and also that the facts complained of did not have any impact on its activities, since the association was able to continue working in pursuance of its goals. The Court, while recognising the standing of the relatives of some of the victims, nevertheless left open the question of the representation of victims who were unable to act on their own behalf before it, accepting that exceptional circumstances might require exceptional measures.

(b)  Whether the CLR had standing in the present case

104.  This case concerns a highly vulnerable person with no next of kin, Mr Câmpeanu, a young Roma man with severe mental disabilities who was infected with HIV, who spent his entire life in the care of the State authorities and who died in hospital, allegedly as a result of neglect. Following his death, and without having had any significant contact with him while he was alive (see paragraph 23 above) or having received any authority or instructions from him or any other competent person, the applicant association (the CLR) is now seeking to bring before the Court a complaint concerning, amongst other things, the circumstances of his death.

105.  In the Courts view the present case does not fall easily into any of the categories covered by the above case-law and thus raises a difficult question of interpretation of the Convention relating to the standing of the CLR. In addressing this question the Court will take into account the fact that the Convention must be interpreted as guaranteeing rights which are practical and effective as opposed to theoretical and illusory (see Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980, § 33, Series A no. 37, and the authorities cited therein). It must also bear in mind that the Courts judgments “serve not only to decide those cases brought before the Court but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States of the engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties” (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 154, Series A no. 25, and Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], no. 30078/06, § 89, ECHR 2012). At the same time and, as reflected in the above case-law concerning victim status and the notion of “standing”, the Court must ensure that the conditions of admissibility governing access to it are interpreted in a consistent manner.

106.  The Court considers it indisputable that Mr Câmpeanu was the direct victim, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, of the circumstances which ultimately led to his death and which are at the heart of the principal grievance brought before the Court in the present case, namely the complaint lodged under Article 2 of the Convention.

107.  On the other hand, the Court cannot find sufficiently relevant grounds for regarding the CLR as an indirect victim within the meaning of its case-law. Crucially, the CLR has not demonstrated a sufficiently “close link” with the direct victim; nor has it argued that it has a “personal interest” in pursuing the complaints before the Court, regard being had to the definition of these concepts in the Courts case-law (see paragraphs 97-100 above).

108.  While alive, Mr Câmpeanu did not initiate any proceedings before the domestic courts to complain about his medical and legal situation. Although he was considered formally to be a person with full legal capacity, it appears clear that in practice he was treated as a person who did not have such capacity (see paragraphs 14 and 16 above). In any event, in view of his state of extreme vulnerability, the Court considers that he was not capable of initiating any such proceedings by himself, without proper legal support and advice. He was thus in a wholly different and less favourable position than that dealt with by the Court in previous cases. These concerned persons who had legal capacity, or at least were not prevented from bringing proceedings during their lifetime (see paragraphs 98 and 100 above), and on whose behalf applications were lodged after their death.

109.  Following the death of Mr Câmpeanu, the CLR brought various sets of domestic proceedings aimed at elucidating the circumstances leading up to and surrounding his death. Finally, once the investigations had concluded that there had been no criminal wrongdoing in connection with Mr Câmpeanus death, the CLR lodged the present application with the Court.

110.  The Court attaches considerable significance to the fact that neither the CLRcapacity to act for Mr Câmpeanu nor their representations on his behalf before the domestic medical and judicial authorities were questioned or challenged in any way (see paragraphs 2327-283337-38 and 40-41 above); such initiatives, which would normally be the responsibility of a guardian or representative, were thus taken by the CLR without any objections from the appropriate authorities, who acquiesced in these procedures and dealt with all the applications submitted to them.

111.  The Court also notes, as mentioned above, that at the time of his death Mr Câmpeanu had no known next of kin, and that when he reached the age of majority no competent person or guardian had been appointed by the State to take care of his interests, whether legal or otherwise, despite the statutory requirement to do so. At domestic level the CLR became involved as a representative only shortly before his death – at a time when he was manifestly incapable of expressing any wishes or views regarding his own needs and interests, let alone on whether to pursue any remedies. Owing to the failure of the authorities to appoint a legal guardian or other representative, no form of representation was or had been made available for his protection or to make representations on his behalf to the hospital authorities, the national courts and to the Court (see, mutatis mutandisP., C. and S. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 56547/00, 11 December 2001, and B. v. Romania (no. 2), no. 1285/03, §§ 96-97, 19 February 2013). It is also significant that the main complaint under the Convention concerns grievances under Article 2 (“Right to life”), which Mr Câmpeanualthough the direct victim, evidently could not pursue by reason of his death.

112.  Against the above background, the Court is satisfied that in the exceptional circumstances of this case and bearing in mind the serious nature of the allegations, it should be open to the CLR to act as a representative of Mr Câmpeanu, notwithstanding the fact that it had no power of attorney to act on his behalf and that he died before the application was lodged under the Convention. To find otherwise would amount to preventing such serious allegations of a violation of the Convention from being examined at an international level, with the risk that the respondent State might escape accountability under the Convention as a result of its own failure to appoint a legal representative to act on his behalf as it was required to do under national law (see paragraphs 59-60 above; see alsomutatis mutandisP., C. and S. v. the United Kingdomcited above; and The Argeş College of Legal Advisers v. Romania, no. 2162/05, § 26, 8 March 2011). Allowing the respondent State to escape accountability in this manner would not be consistent with the general spirit of the Convention, nor with the High Contracting Parties obligation under Article 34 of the Convention not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of the right to bring an application before the Court.

113.  Granting standing to the CLR to act as the representative of Mr Câmpeanu is an approach consonant with that applying to the right to judicial review under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in the case of “persons of unsound mind” (Article 5 § 1 (e)). In this context it may be reiterated that it is essential that the person concerned should have access to a court and the opportunity to be heard either in person or, where necessary, through some form of representation, failing which he will not have been afforded the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of deprivation of liberty (see De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 18 June 1971, § 76, Series A no. 12). Mental illness may entail restricting or modifying the manner of exercise of such a right (see Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, § 39, Series A no. 18), but it cannot justify impairing the very essence of the right. Indeed, special procedural safeguards may prove called for in order to protect the interests of persons who, on account of their mental disabilities, are not fully capable of acting for themselves (see Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, § 60, Series A no. 33). A hindrance in fact can contravene the Convention just like a legal impediment (see Golder, cited above, § 26).

114.  Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Governments objection concerning the lack of locus standi of the CLR, in view of the latters standing as de facto representative of Mr Câmpeanu.

The Court further notes that the complaints under this heading are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

1.  Submissions to the Court

(a)  The CLR

115.  The CLR submitted that as a result of their inappropriate decisions concerning Mr Câmpeanus transfer to institutions lacking the requisite skills and facilities to deal with his condition, followed by inappropriate medical actions or omissions, the authorities had contributed, directly or indirectly, to his untimely death.

The CLR emphasised that although the medical examinations undergone by Mr Câmpeanu during the months prior to his admission to the CMSC and subsequently the PMH had attested to his “generally good state” without any major health problems, his health had deteriorated sharply in the two weeks before his death, at a time when he had been under the authorities supervision. In accordance with the extensive case-law of the Court under Article 2, as relevant to the present case, the State was required to give an explanation as to the medical care provided and the cause of Mr Câmpeanus death (the CLR cited, among other authorities, Kats and Others v. Ukraine, no. 29971/04, § 104, 18 December 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, no. 59548/00, § 81, 17 January 2008; Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468/06, § 147, 22 December 2008; Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696/00, § 84, 26 October 2006and Z.H. v. Hungary, no. 28973/11, §§ 31-32, 8 November 2012).

This obligation had not been fulfilled by the Government, who on the one hand had failed to submit important medical documents concerning Mr Câmpeanu, and on the other hand had submitted before the Court a duplicate medical record covering the patients stay at the PMH, in which important information had been altered. While the original medical record – as presented at various stages in the domestic proceedings – had not referred to any antiretroviral medication being provided to Mr Câmpeanu, the new document, written in different handwriting, included references to antiretroviral medication, thus suggesting that such medication had been given to the patient. As the Government had relied on the new document to dispute before the Court the CLRs submissions concerning the lack of antiretroviral treatment (see paragraph 122 below), the CLR submitted that the document had in all likelihood been produced after the event, to support the Governments arguments before the Court.

116.  The CLR further submitted that several documents produced in the case, especially in connection with the CPTs on-site visits, proved that the authorities had definitely been aware of the substandard living conditions and provision of care and treatment at the PMH, both prior to 2004 and even around the relevant time (see paragraphs 4774 and 78 above).

117.  The failure to provide adequate care and treatment to Mr Câmpeanu was highlighted by the very poorly kept medical records and the improperly recorded successive transfers of the patient between different hospital units. Such omissions were significant, since it was obvious that the patients state of health had deteriorated during the relevant period and thus emergency treatment had been required. Also, as mentioned above, while the patientantiretroviral medication had been discontinued during his short stay at the CMSC, it was very plausible that during his stay at the PMH Mr Câmpeanu had not received any antiretroviral medication either. At the same time, although a series of medical tests had been required, they had never been carried out. The official investigation had failed to elucidate such crucial aspects of the case, notwithstanding that there might have been more plausible explanations for the patients alleged psychotic behaviour, such as septicaemia or his enforced segregation in a separate room.

In view of the above, the CLR submitted that the substantive obligations under Article 2 had clearly not been fulfilled by the respondent State.

118.  The CLR further maintained that the living conditions at the PMH and the patients placement in a segregated room amounted to a separate violation of Article 3.

Solid evidence in the file, including documents issued by Romanian authorities, such as the Government, the prosecutors office attached to the High Court, the National Forensic Institute or the staff of the PMH itself, highlighted the substandard conditions at the PMH at the relevant time, especially concerning the lack of food, lack of heating and presence of infectious diseases.

It was undisputed that Mr Câmpeanu had been placed alone in a separate room; the CLR monitors had noted at the time of their visit to the PMH that the patient was not dressed properly, the room was cold and the staff refused to provide him with any support in meeting his basic personal needs. Whilst the Government alleged that this measure had been taken without any intention to discriminate against the patient, they had failed to provide any valid justification for it. The assertion that the room in question was the only space available was contradicted by numerous reports showing that the hospital had not been operating at full capacity at the time.

119.  The CLR contended that the official investigation conducted in the case had not complied with the requirements of the Convention, for the following reasons: its scope was too narrow, focusing only on two doctors, one from the CMSC and the other from the PMH, while ignoring other staff or other agencies involved; only the immediate cause of death and the period immediately before it had been analysed; and the authorities had failed to collect essential evidence in good time or to elucidate disputed facts, including the cause of death in the case. The failure to carry out an autopsy immediately after the patients death and failures in the provision of medical care were shortcomings emphasised in the first-instance courts decision, which had, however, been overturned by the appellate court.

The CLR submitted in conclusion that the investigation had fallen short of the requirements set out in Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention in that it had failed to establish the facts, identify the cause of death and punish the perpetrators.

120.  The CLR argued that in the case of people with disabilities who were confined in State institutions, Article 13 required States to take positive steps to ensure that these people had access to justice, including by creating an independent monitoring mechanism able to receive complaints on such matters, investigate abuse, impose sanctions or refer the case to the appropriate authority.

121.  The CLR submitted that in several previous cases against Romania, the Court had found a violation on account of the lack of adequate remedies concerning people with disabilities complaining under Articles 3 or 5 of the Convention (it cited Filip v. Romania, no. 41124/02, § 49, 14 December 2006; C.B. v. Romaniacited above, §§ 65-67Parascineti v. Romania, no. 32060/05, §§ 34-38, 13 March 2012; and B. v. Romaniacited above, § 97).

The same conclusions emerged from the consistent documentation issued by international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch or Mental Disability Rights International, and the CLR itself had also reported on the lack of safeguards against ill-treatment and the fact that residents of psychiatric institutions were largely unaware of their rights, while staff were not trained in handling allegations of abuse.

The CLR further contended that to its knowledge, despite highly credible allegations concerning suspicious deaths in psychiatric institutions, there had never been any final decision declaring a staff member criminally or civilly liable for misconduct in relation to such deaths. In the case of the 129 deaths reported at the PMH during the period from 2002 to 2004, criminal investigations had not resulted in any finding of wrongdoing, the decisions not to bring charges having been subsequently upheld by the courts.

In conclusion, the Romanian legal system lacked effective remedies within the meaning of Article 13 in relation to people with mental disabilities in general, but more particularly in relation to Mr Câmpeanus rights as protected by Articles 2 and 3.

(b)  The Government

122.  The Government contended that since HIV was a very serious progressive disease, the fact that Mr Câmpeanu had died from it was not in itself proof that his death had been caused by shortcomings in the medical system.

Furthermore, no evidence had been adduced to show that the authorities had failed to provide Mr Câmpeanu with antiretroviral treatment; on the contrary, the Government submitted a copy of the patients medical records at the PMH, confirming that he had received the required antiretroviral treatment while at the hospital.

The conclusion of the Disciplinary Board of the Medical Association also confirmed the adequacy of the treatment given to Mr Câmpeanu (see paragraph 35 above). Article 2 under its substantive head was therefore not applicable to the case.

123.  Under Article 3, the Government submitted that both at the CMSC and at the PMH, the general conditions (hygiene, nutrition, heating and also human resources) had been adequate and in accordance with the standards existing at the material time.

The medical care received by Mr Câmpeanu had been appropriate to his state of health; he had been admitted to the CMSC while in a “generally good state” and transferred to the PMH once the “violent outbursts” had begun. The patient had been placed alone in a room at the PMH, not with the intention of isolating him, but because that had been the only spare room. In spite of his treatment through intravenous feeding, the patient had died on 20 February 2004 of cardiorespiratory insufficiency.

In this context, the Government argued that given the short period of time which Mr Câmpeanu had spent at the PMH, Article 3 was not applicable in relation to the material conditions at the hospital.

124.  The Government contended that the criminal complaints lodged by the CLR in connection with the circumstances of Mr Câmpeanus death had been thoroughly considered by the domestic authorities – courts, commissions or investigative bodies – which had all given detailed and compelling reasons for their rulings. Therefore, the States liability under Articles 2 or 3 could not be engaged.

125.  Concerning Article 13, the Government submitted that as this complaint related to the other complaints brought by the CLR, no separate examination was necessary; in any event, the complaints under this Article were ill-founded.

In the alternative, the Government maintained that the domestic legislation provided effective remedies within the meaning of Article 13 for the complaints raised in the application.

The Government indicated the Romanian Ombudsman as one of the available remedies. According to the statistical information available on the Ombudsmans website, the Ombudsman had been involved in several cases concerning alleged human rights infringements between 2003 and 2011.

Referring to two domestic judgments provided as evidence at the Courts request, the Government asserted that when dealing with cases involving people with mental disabilities, the Romanian courts acted very seriously and regularly gave judgments on the merits.

126.  On a more specific level, in relation to Article 2, the Government submitted that the situation at the PMH had significantly improved, following complaints relating to the living and medical conditions at the hospital. In that respect a complaint appeared to constitute an effective remedy, in terms of the Convention standards.

Referring to Article 3, the Government argued that the CLR could also have brought an action seeking compensation for medical malpractice.

For the above-mentioned reasons, the Government submitted that Mr Câmpeanu had, either in person or through representation, had various effective remedies for each of the complaints raised in the application; the complaint under Article 13 was therefore inadmissible.

(c)  Third-party interveners

(i)  The Mental Disability Advocacy Center

127.  The Mental Disability Advocacy Center (“the MDAC) argued that cases of life-threatening conditions in institutions housing children with mental disabilities or HIV had been documented throughout Europe, with reports suggesting that sick children tended not to be admitted to hospital, regardless of the seriousness of their condition, and that they were left to die in those institutions. In its 2009 Human Rights Report on Romania, the US Department of State had drawn attention to the continuing poor conditions at the PMH, referring to overcrowding, shortage of staff and medication, poor hygiene, and the widespread use of sedation and restraint.

Referring to international case-law on the right to life (for example, the judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in The “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala (merits)judgment of 19 November 1999, Series C No. 63, concerning five children who lived on the streets, and Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (merits)judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C No. 4)the MDAC submitted that the States obligation to protect life included providing necessary medical treatment, taking any necessary preventive measures and implementing mechanisms capable of monitoring, investigating and prosecuting those responsible; at the same time, victims should be afforded an effective or practical opportunity to seek protection of their right to life. Failure by the State to provide extremely vulnerable persons with such an opportunity while alive should not ultimately lead to the States impunity after their death.

(ii)  The Euroregional Center for Public Initiatives

128.  The Euroregional Center for Public Initiatives (“the ECPI) submitted that Romania had one of the largest groups of people living with HIV in central and eastern Europe, mainly because between 1986 and 1991 some 10,000 children institutionalised in public hospitals and orphanages had been exposed to the risks of HIV transmission through multiple use of needles and microtransfusions with unscreened blood. In December 2004 there had been 7,088 cases of AIDS and 4,462 cases of HIV infections registered among children. Out of these, 3,482 children had died of AIDS by the end of 2004.

The ECPI alleged that the high incidence of HIV infection among children was due to the treatment to which they had been subjected in orphanages and hospitals, in view of the fact that children with disabilities were considered “beyond recovery” and “unproductive” and because the personnel lacked the qualifications and interest to provide them with appropriate medical care.

The ECPI referred to the fact that in 2003 the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child had expressed its concern that antiretroviral treatment was accessible to only a limited number of people in Romania and its continuous provision was usually interrupted owing to lack of funds. Moreover, even at the end of 2009, stocks of antiretroviral medication had been scarce because of a lack of financial resources from the National Health Insurance Fund and the mismanagement of the national HIV programme.

The ECPI further submitted that when people living with HIV lived in closed institutions or hospitals for an extended period, their access to antiretroviral medication was heavily reliant on the steps taken by the institution to obtain supplies from the infectious-diseases doctor with whom the patient was registered. Commonly, HIV-infected patients usually lacked the information they needed in order to assert their lawful rights in accessing medical services.

In 2009 the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child had expressed concern that children affected by HIV often experienced barriers in accessing health services.

Concerning the particular case of people living with HIV who also suffered from mental health problems, the ECPI alleged that psychiatric hospitals sometimes refused to treat HIV-positive children and young people for fear of infection. Reference was made to a Human Rights Watch document of 2007 reporting on such situations (Life Doesnt Wait. Romanias Failure to Protect and Support Children and Youth Living with HIV).

(iii)  Human Rights Watch

129.  Human Rights Watch made reference in its written submissions to the conclusions of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rightsto the effect that health facilities and services must be accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable population, and that failure by governments to provide such services included the lack of a national health policy designed to ensure the right to health for everyone, bad management in the allocation of available public resources, and failure to reduce infant and maternal mortality rates.

2.  The Courts assessment

(a)  Article 2 of the Convention

(i)  General principles

130.  The first sentence of Article 2 § 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, § 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998III).

The positive obligations under Article 2 must be construed as applying in the context of any activity, whether public or not, in which the right to life may be at stakeThis is the case, for example, in the health-care sector as regards the acts or omissions of health professionals (see Dodovcited above, §§ 70, 79-83 and 87, and Vo v. France [GC], no. 53924/00§§ 8990, ECHR 2004VIII, with further references), States being required to make regulations compelling hospitals, whether public or private, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of their patients lives (see Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967/96, § 49, ECHR 2002I). This applies especially where patients capacity to look after themselves is limited (see Dodov, cited above, § 81); in respect of the management of dangerous activities (see Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, § 71, ECHR 2004XII); in connection with school authorities, which have an obligation to protect the health and well-being of pupils, in particular young children who are especially vulnerable and are under their exclusive control (see Ilbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, no. 19986/06, § 35, 10 April 2012); or, similarly, regarding the medical care and assistance given to young children institutionalised in State facilities (see Nencheva and Others, cited above, §§ 105-16).

Such positive obligations arise where it is known, or ought to have been known to the authorities in view of the circumstances, that the victim was at real and immediate risk from the criminal acts of a third party (see Nencheva and Others, cited above, § 108) and, if so, that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see A. and Others v. Turkey, no. 30015/96, §§ 44-45, 27 July 2004).

131.  In the light of the importance of the protection afforded by Article 2, the Court must subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, taking into consideration not only the actions of State agents but also all the surrounding circumstances. Persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them. Where the authorities decide to place and maintain in detention a person with disabilities, they should demonstrate special care in guaranteeing such conditions as correspond to any special needs resulting from his disability (see Jasinskis v. Latvia, no. 45744/08, § 59, 21 December 2010, with further references). More broadly, the Court has held that States have an obligation to take particular measures to provide effective protection of vulnerable persons from ill-treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge (see Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392/95, § 73, ECHR 2001V). Consequently, where an individual is taken into custody in good health but later dies, it is incumbent on the State to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation of the events leading to his death (see Carabulea v. Romania, no. 45661/99, § 10813 July 2010) and to produce evidence casting doubt on the veracity of the victims allegations, particularly if those allegations are backed up by medical reports (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 87, ECHR 1999V, and Abdülsamet Yaman v. Turkey, no. 32446/96, § 43, 2 November 2004).

In assessing evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”. However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, § 264, 18 June 2002, and Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 161).

132.  The States duty to safeguard the right to life must be considered to involve not only the taking of reasonable measures to ensure the safety of individuals in public places but also, in the event of serious injury or death, having in place an effective independent judicial system securing the availability of legal means capable of promptly establishing the facts, holding accountable those at fault and providing appropriate redress to the victim (see Dodov, cited above, § 83).

This obligation does not necessarily require the provision of a criminallaw remedy in every case. Where negligence has been shown, for example, the obligation may for instance also be satisfied if the legal system affords victims a remedy in the civil courts, either alone or in conjunction with a remedy in the criminal courts. However, Article 2 of the Convention will not be satisfied if the protection afforded by domestic law exists only in theory: above all, it must also operate effectively in practice (see Calvelli and Ciglio, cited above, § 53).

133.  On the other hand, the national courts should not permit lifeendangering offences to go unpunished. This is essential for maintaining public confidence and ensuring adherence to the rule of law and for preventing any appearance of tolerance of or collusion in unlawful acts (see, mutatis mutandis, Nikolova and Velichkova v. Bulgaria, no. 7888/03, § 57, 20 December 2007). The Courts task therefore consists in reviewing whether and to what extent the courts, in reaching their conclusion, have carried out the careful scrutiny required by Article 2 of the Convention, so as to maintain the deterrent effect of the judicial system in place and ensure that violations of the right to life are examined and redressed (see Öneryıldız, cited above, § 96).

(ii)  Application of these principles in the present case

(α)  Substantive head

134.  Referring to the background to the case, the Court notes at the outset that Mr Câmpeanu lived his whole life in the hands of the domestic authorities: he grew up in an orphanage after being abandoned at birth, and he was later transferred to the Placement Centre, then to the CMSC and finally to the PMH, where on 20 February 2004 he met his untimely death.

135.  Throughout these stages no guardian, whether permanent or temporary, was appointed after Mr Câmpeanu turned eighteen; the presumption therefore was that he had full legal capacity, in spite of his severe mental disability.

If that was indeed so, the Court notes that the manner in which the medical authorities handled Mr Câmpeanus case ran counter to the requirements of the Mental Health Act in the case of patients with full legal capacity: no consent was obtained for the patients successive transfers from one medical unit to another, after he had turned eighteen; no consent was given for his admission to the PMH, a psychiatric institution; the patient was neither informed nor consulted regarding the medical care that was given to him, nor was he informed of the possibility for him to challenge any of the above-mentioned measures. The authorities justification was that the patient “would not cooperate”, or that “it was not possible to communicate with him” (see paragraphs 14 and 16 above).

In this context, the Court reiterates that in the case of B. v. Romania (cited above, §§ 93-98) it highlighted serious shortcomings in the manner in which the provisions of the Mental Health Act were implemented by the authorities with respect to vulnerable patients who were left without any legal assistance or protection when admitted to psychiatric institutions in Romania.

136.  Moreover, the Court observes that the decisions of the domestic authorities to transfer Mr Câmpeanu and to place him firstly in the CMSC and later in the PMH were mainly based on what establishment would be willing to accommodate the patient, rather than on where he would be able to receive appropriate medical care and support (see paragraphs 12-13 above). In this connection, the Court cannot ignore the fact that Mr Câmpeanu was first placed in the CMSC, unit not equipped to handle patients with mental health problems, and was ultimately admitted to the PMH, despite the fact that that hospital had previously refused to admit him on the ground that it lacked the necessary facilities to treat HIV (see paragraph 11 above).

137.  The Court therefore considers that Mr Câmpeanus transfers from one unit to another took place without any proper diagnosis and aftercare and in complete disregard of his actual state of health and his most basic medical needs. Of particular note is the authorities negligence in omitting to ensure the appropriate implementation of the patientcourse of antiretroviral treatment, firstly by not providing him with the medication during his first few days in the CMSC, and subsequently by failing altogether to provide him with the medication while in the PMH (see paragraphs 14 and 115 above).

In reaching these conclusions, the Court relies on the CLRs submissions, supported by the medical documents produced before the domestic courts and the conclusions of the expert called to give an opinion on the therapeutic approach applied in Mr Câmpeanus case (see paragraphs 3338 and 45 above), as well as on the information provided by the ECPI concerning the general conditions in which antiretroviral treatment was provided to HIV-infected children (see paragraph 128 above), making the CLRs assertions plausibleIn view of these elements, the Court considers that the Governments allegations to the contrary are unconvincing in so far as they are not corroborated by any other evidence proving them beyond reasonable doubt.

138.  Furthermore, the facts of the case indicate that, faced with a sudden change in the behaviour of the patient, who became hyperaggressive and agitated, the medical authorities decided to transfer him to a psychiatric institution, namely the PMH, where he was placed in a department that had no psychiatrists on its staff (see paragraph 21 above)As mentioned above, the PMH lacked the appropriate facilities to treat HIV-infected patients at the time; moreover, while at the PMH, the patient was never examined by an infectious-diseases specialist.

The only treatment provided to Mr Câmpeanu included sedatives and vitamins, and no meaningful medical investigation was conducted to establish the causes of the patientmental state (see paragraphs 16 and 22 above). In fact, no relevant medical documents recording Mr Câmpeanus clinical condition while at the CMSC and the PMH were produced by the authorities. The information concerning the possible causes of Mr Câmpeanus death was likewise lacking in detail: the death certificate mentioned HIV and intellectual disability as important factors leading to his death which allegedly justified the authorities decision not to carry out the compulsory autopsy on the body (see paragraphs 24-25 above).

139.  The Court refers to the conclusions of the medical report issued by the expert instructed by the CLR, describing the “very poor and substandard” medical records relating to Mr Câmpeanus state of health (see paragraph 45 above). According to this report, the medical supervision in both establishments was “scant”, while the medical authorities, confronted with the patients deteriorating state of health, had taken measures that could at best be described as palliative. The expert further mentioned that several potential causes of death, including pneumocystis pneumonia (which was also mentioned in the autopsy report), had never been investigated or diagnosed, let alone treated, either at the CMSC or at the PMH (ibid.). The report concluded that Mr Câmpeanus death at the PMH had been caused by “gross medical negligence” (see paragraph 46 above).

140.  The Court reiterates in this context that in assessing the evidence adduced before it, particular attention should be paid to Mr Câmpeanus vulnerable state (see paragraph 7 above) and the fact that for the duration of his whole life he was in the hands of the authorities, which are therefore under an obligation to account for his treatment and to give plausible explanations concerning such treatment (see paragraph 131 above).

The Court notes, firstly, that the CLRsubmissions describing the events leading to Mr Câmpeanus death are strongly supported by the existence of serious shortcomings in the medical authorities decisions. Such shortcomings were described in the reasoning of the Chief Prosecutor in the decision of 23 August 2005 (see paragraph 33 above); in the firstinstance courts decision of 3 October 2007, in which it decided to send the case back for further investigation (see paragraph 38 above); and in the conclusions of the medical report submitted by the CLR in the case.

Secondlythe Government have failed to produce sufficient evidence casting doubt on the veracity of the allegations made on behalf of the victim. While acknowledging that HIV may be a very serious progressive disease, the Court cannot ignore the clear and concordant inferences indicating serious flaws in the decision-making process concerning the provision of appropriate medication and care to Mr Câmpeanu (see paragraphs 137-38 above). The Government have also failed to fill in the gaps relating to the lack of relevant medical documents describing Mr Câmpeanus situation prior to his death, and the lack of pertinent explanations as to the real cause of his death.

141.  Moreover, placing Mr Câmpeanus individual situation in the general context, the Court notes that at the relevant time, several dozen deaths (eighty-one in 2003 and twenty-eight at the beginning of 2004) had already been reported at the PMH; as mentioned in the CPT report of 2004, serious deficiencies were found at the relevant time in respect of the food given to the patients, and in respect of the insufficient heating and generally difficult living conditions, which had led to gradual deterioration in the health of patients, especially those who were the most vulnerable (see paragraph 77 above). The appalling conditions at the PMH had been reported by several other international bodies, as described above (see paragraph 78); the domestic authorities were therefore fully aware of the very difficult situation in the hospital.

Despite the Governments assertions that the living conditions at the PMH were adequate (see paragraph 123 above), the Court notes that at the relevant time, the domestic authorities had acknowledged before the various international bodies the deficiencies at the PMH regarding the heating and water systems, the living and sanitary conditions and the medical assistance provided (see paragraph 78 above).

142.  The Court observes that in Nencheva and Others (cited above) the Bulgarian State was found to be in breach of its obligations under Article 2 for not having taken sufficiently prompt action to ensure effective and sufficient protection of the lives of young people in social care home. The Court took into consideration the fact that the childrendeath was not a sudden event, in so far as the authorities had already been aware of the appalling living conditions in the social care home and of the increase in the mortality rate in the months prior to the relevant time (ibid., §§ 12123).

143.  The Court finds that, similarly, in the present case the domestic authorities response to the generally difficult situation at the PMH at the relevant time was inadequate, seeing that the authorities were fully aware of the fact that the lack of heating and appropriate food, and the shortage of medical staff and medical resources, including medication, had led to an increase in the number of deaths during the winter of 2003.

The Court considers that in these circumstances, it is all the more evident that by deciding to place Mr Câmpeanu in the PMH, notwithstanding his already heightened state of vulnerability, the domestic authorities unreasonably put his life in danger. The continuous failure of the medical staff to provide Mr Câmpeanu with appropriate care and treatment was yet another decisive factor leading to his untimely death.

144.  The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the domestic authorities have failed to comply with the substantive requirements of Article 2 of the Convention, by not providing the requisite standard of protection for Mr Câmpeanus life.

(β)  Procedural head

145.  The Court further considers that the authorities failed not only to meet Mr Câmpeanus most basic medical needs while he was alive, but also to elucidate the circumstances surrounding his death, including the identification of those responsible.

146.  The Court notes that several procedural irregularities were singled out in various reports by the domestic authorities at the time, among them the failure to carry out an autopsy immediately after Mr Câmpeanus death, in breach of the domestic legal provisions, and the lack of an effective investigation concerning the therapeutic approach applied in his case (see paragraphs 3338 and 40 above).

Moreover, serious procedural shortcomings were highlighted in the Calafat District Courtjudgmentincluding the failure to collect essential medical evidence and to provide an explanation for the contradictory statements by the medical staff (see paragraph 38 above). However, athat judgment was not upheld by the County Court, the shortcomings noted have never been addressed, let alone remedied. In its brief reasoning, the County Court relied mainly on the decision of the Medical Association and the forensic report, which ruled out any medical negligence in the case while concluding that the patient had been provided with appropriate medical treatment.

The Court finds these conclusions to be strikingly terse, in view of the acknowledged scarcity of medical information documenting the treatment provided to Mr Câmpeanu (see paragraph 45 above) and in view of the objective situation of the PMH as regards the human and medical resources available to it (see paragraph77-78 above).

The Court further takes note of the CLRs assertion that in the case of the 129 deaths at the PMH reported between 2002 and 2004 the criminal investigations were all terminated without anyone being identified or held civilly or criminally liable for misconduct.

147.  Having regard to all these elements, the Court concludes that the authorities have failed to subject Mr Câmpeanus case to the careful scrutiny required by Article 2 of the Convention and thus to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances surrounding his death.

There has accordingly also been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural limb.

(b)  Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 2

(i)  General principles

148.  Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order.

The effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an “arguable complaint” under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their Convention obligations under this provision.

The scope of the obligation under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicants complaint under the Convention. Nevertheless the remedy required by Article 13 must be “effective” in practice as well as in law. In particular, its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the respondent State (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, §§ 96-97, ECHR 2002II).

149.  Where a right of such fundamental importance as the right to life or the prohibition against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment is at stake, Article 13 requires, in addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible, including effective access for the complainant to the investigation procedure. Where alleged failure by the authorities to protect persons from the acts of others is concerned, Article 13 may not always require the authorities to assume responsibility for investigating the allegations. There should, however, be available to the victim or the victims family a mechanism for establishing any liability of State officials or bodies for acts or omissions involving the breach of their rights under the Convention (see Z and Others v. the United Kingdomcited above, § 109).

In the Courts opinion, the authority referred to in Article 13 may not necessarily in all instances be a judicial authority in the strict sense. Nevertheless, the powers and procedural guarantees an authority possesses are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is effective (see Klass and Others, cited above, § 67). The Court has held that judicial remedies furnish strong guarantees of independence, access for the victim and family, and enforceability of awards in compliance with the requirements of Article 13 (see Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 110).

(ii)  Application of these principles in the present case

150.  As mentioned above, Article 13 must be interpreted as guaranteeing an effective remedy before a national authority to everyone who claims that his or her rights and freedoms under the Convention have been violated. The fundamental requirement of such a remedy is that the victim has effective access to it.

151.  In the present case, the Court has already established that Mr Câmpeanus vulnerability, coupled with the authorities failure to implement the existing legislation and to provide him with appropriate legal support, were factors that supported the legal basis for its exceptional recognition of the locus standi of the CLR (see paragraph 112 above). Had it not been for the CLR, the case of Mr Câmpeanu would never have been brought to the attention of the authorities, whether national or international.

However, the Court notes that the CLRinitiatives on behalf of Mr Câmpeanu were of a more sui generis nature, rather than falling within the existing legal framework relating to the rights of mentally disabled individuals, in view of the fact that this framework was ill-suited to address the specific needs of such individuals, notably regarding the practical possibility for them to have access to any available remedy. Indeed, the Court has previously found the respondent State to be in breach of Articles 3 or 5 of the Convention on account of the lack of adequate remedies concerning people with disabilities, including their limited access to any such potential remedies (see C.B. v. Romania, §§ 65-67; Parascineti, §§ 34-38; and B. v. Romania, § 97, all cited above).

152.  On the basis of the evidence adduced in the present case, the Court has already found that the respondent State was responsible under Article 2 for failing to protect Mr Câmpeanus life while he was in the care of the domestic medical authorities and for failing to conduct an effective investigation into the circumstances leading to his death. The Government have not referred to any other procedure whereby the liability of the authorities could be established in an independent, public and effective manner.

The Court further considers that the examples mentioned by the Government as indicative of the existence of appropriate remedies under Article 13 (see paragraph 125 above) are either insufficient or lacking in effectiveness, in view of their limited impact and the lack of procedural safeguards they afford.

153.  In view of the above-mentioned considerations, the Court considers that the respondent State has failed to provide an appropriate mechanism capable of affording redress to people with mental disabilities claiming to be victims under Article 2 of the Convention.

More particularly, the Court finds a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 2, on account of the States failure to secure and implement an appropriate legal framework that would have enabled Mr Câmpeanus allegations relating to breaches of his right to life to have been examined by an independent authority.

(c)  Article 3, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention

154.  Having regard to its findings in paragraphs 140 to 147 and its conclusion in paragraph 153 above, the Court considers that no separate issue arises concerning the alleged breaches of Article 3, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 13 (see, mutatis mutandis, Nikolova and Velichkovacited above, § 78, and Timus and Tarus v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 70077/11, § 58, 15 October 2013).

II.  OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

155.  The CLR further submitted that Mr Câmpeanu had suffered a breach of his rights protected by Articles 5, 8 and 14 of the Convention.

156.  However, having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties and its findings under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention, the Court considers that it has examined the main legal questions raised in the present application and that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the remaining complaints (see, among other authorities, Kamil Uzun v. Turkey, no. 37410/97, § 64, 10 May 2007; The Argeş College of Legal Advisers, cited above, § 47; Women On Waves and Others v. Portugal, no. 31276/05, § 47, 3 February 2009; Velcea and Mazăre v. Romania, no. 64301/01, § 138, 1 December 2009; Villa v. Italyno. 19675/06, § 55, 20 April 2010Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, no. 3111/10, § 72, ECHR 2012; and Mehmet Hatip Dicle v. Turkey, no. 9858/04, § 41, 15 October 2013; see also Varnava and Others, cited above, §§ 210-11).

III.  ARTICLES 46 AND 41 OF THE CONVENTION

A.  Article 46 of the Convention

157.  The relevant parts of Article 46 read as follows:

“1.  The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.

2.  The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.

...

158.  The Court reiterates that under Article 46 of the Convention the Contracting Parties have undertaken to abide by the final judgments of the Court in any case to which they are parties, execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers. It follows, inter alia, that a judgment in which the Court finds a breach of the Convention or the Protocols thereto imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress as far as possible the effects (see Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 249, ECHR 2000VIII, and Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760/06§ 254, ECHR 2012). The Court further notes that it is primarily for the State concerned to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means to be used in its domestic legal order to discharge its obligation under Article 46 of the Convention (see Scozzari and Giunta, cited above, and Brumărescu v. Romania (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 28342/95, § 20, ECHR 2001I).

159.  However, with a view to assisting the respondent State to fulfil its obligations under Article 46, the Court may seek to indicate the type of individual and/or general measures that might be taken in order to put an end to the situation it has found to exist (see, among many other authorities, Vlad and Others v. Romania, nos. 40756/0641508/07 and 50806/07, § 162, 26 November 2013).

160.  In the present case the Court observes that owing to the failure of the authorities to appoint a legal guardian or other representative, no form of representation was or had been made available for Mr Câmpeanus protection or to make representations on his behalf to the hospital authorities, the national courts or this Court (see paragraph 111 above). In the exceptional circumstances that prompted it to allow the CLR to act on behalf of Mr Câmpeanu (see conclusion in paragraph 112 above) the Court has also found a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 2 on account of the States failure to secure and implement an appropriate legal framework that would have enabled complaints concerning Mr Câmpeanus allegations to have been examined by an independent authority (see paragraphs 150-53 above; see also paragraph 154 regarding the complaints under Article 3, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 13). Thus, the facts and circumstances in respect of which the Court found a violation of Articles 2 and 13 reveal the existence of a wider problem calling for it to indicate general measures for the execution of its judgment.

161.  Against this background, the Court recommends that the respondent State envisage the necessary general measures to ensure that mentally disabled persons in a situation comparable to that of Mr Câmpeanuare afforded independent representation, enabling them to have Convention complaints relating to their health and treatment examined before a court or other independent body (see, mutatis mutandis, paragraph 113 above and Stanev, cited above, § 258).

B.  Article 41 of the Convention

162.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

1.  Damage

163.  The CLR did not submit any claims in respect of pecuniary or nonpecuniary damage.

2.  Costs and expenses

164.  The CLR claimed 11,455.25 euros (EUR) for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts in relation to the investigations into the PMH and before this CourtInterights, acting as adviser to counsel for the CLR, claimed EUR 25,800 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Chamber, corresponding to 215 hours work, and an additional EUR 14,564 for the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, corresponding to 111 hours work. An itemised schedule of these costs was submitted.

165.  The Government contended that not all the costs and expenses were documented and detailed appropriately and that in any event they were excessive.

166.  According to the Courts case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, the Court is satisfied that the CLRs recourse to Interights participation in the proceedings as described above was justified (see, for example, Yaşa v. Turkey, 2 September 1998, § 127, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998VI; and Menteş and Others v. Turkey, 28 November 1997, § 107, Reports 1997VIII). Regard being had to the documents in its possession, to the number and complexity of issues of fact and law dealt with and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 10,000 to the CLR and EUR 25,000 to Interights.

3.  Default interest

167.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1.  Declares, unanimously, the complaints under Articles 2, 3 and 13 of the Convention admissible;

2.  Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention, in both its substantive and procedural aspects;

3.  Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 2;

4.  Holds, by fourteen votes to three, that it is not necessary to examine the complaint under Article 3, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention;

5.  Holds, unanimously, that it is not necessary to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention;

6.  Holds, by fifteen votes to two, that it is not necessary to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Article 14 of the Convention;

7.  Holds, unanimously,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay, within three months, the following amounts in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable:

(i)  EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros) to the CLR; and

(ii)  EUR 25,000 (twenty-five thousand euros) to Interights;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

8.  Dismisses, unanimously, the remainder of the just satisfaction claims.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 17 July 2014.

Michael OBoyle                       Dean Spielmann
Deputy Registrar                       President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:

(a)  concurring opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque;

(b)  partly dissenting opinion of Judges SpielmannBianku and Nußberger;

(c)  partly dissenting opinion of Judges Ziemele and Bianku.

D.S.
M.OB.

 

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE PINTO DE ALBUQUERQUE

1.  Valentin Câmpeanu is a notorious case of judge-made law. In addition to the fundamental question of the legitimacy of this mode of exercising judicial power, the majoritys judgment also raises the crucial question of the method of reasoning used to establish the findings of the case and the scope of those findings. Ultimately, the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) is faced with these questions: Can judges create law? And if they can, how should they proceed, and within what limits? Without expecting to solve problems of this magnitude in the limited confines of a separate opinion, I felt that, nevertheless, I had an obligation to explain my vote for the majority position with a concurring opinion, in which these problems could at least be approached. What apparently seemed a case involving a simple procedural problem of legal representation could have become a groundbreaking case in which the Court addressed, in novel and solid terms, the interplay between legal principles and rules in the task of human rights treaty interpretation, and the limits of the Courtown legal creativity. None of this happened, unfortunately.

2.  Mr Câmpeanu died at the age of 18 in the Poiana Mare Neuropsychiatric Hospital. He was a severely mentally disabledHIVpositive Roma teenager, who at a certain point in time suffered from pulmonary tuberculosis, pneumonia and chronic hepatitis. He had no relatives, legal guardians or representatives, was abandoned at birth and lived in various public orphanages, centres for disabled children and medical facilities, where he allegedly did not receive proper health and educational treatment. Since these facts were abundantly proven and revealed ad nauseam a flagrant violation of the deceased teenagers human rights, the only apparent question to be determined in this case was the right of the Centre for Legal Resources (CLR) to act on his behalf before the Court. As the Commissioner for Human Rights stressed, an intolerable legal gap in the protection of human rights emerged in this situation in view of Mr Câmpeanus lifelong state of extreme vulnerability, the absence of any relatives, legal guardians or representatives and the unwillingness of the respondent State to investigate his death and bring to justice those responsible. This legal black hole, where extremely vulnerable victims of serious breaches of human rights committed by public officials may linger for the rest of their lives without any possible way of exercising their rights, warranted a principled response by the Court. Regrettably, nothing of the kind was forthcoming.

The Courts case-specific reasoning

3.  My point of discontent lies in the fact that the majority chose to approach the legal issue at stake in a casuistic and restricted manner, ignoring the need for a firm statement on a matter of principle, namely the requisites for representation in international human rights law. The judgment was simply downgraded to an act of indulgence on the part of the Court, which was willing to close its eyes to the rigidity of the requirements of the concept of legal representation under the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) and the Rules of Court in “the exceptional circumstances of this case” (see paragraphs 112 and 160 of the judgment), and to admit the CLR as a “de facto representative of Mr Câmpeanu” (see paragraph 114 of the judgment). To use the words of Judge Bonello, this is yet another example of the “patchwork case-law” to which the Court sometimes resorts when faced with issues of principle[1].

4.  Contrary to the statement made in paragraph 110 of the judgment, I consider that the fact that the domestic courts and other public authorities accepted the CLR as having standing to act on behalf of the victim is irrelevant. Otherwise, that would make accountability for a human rights violation dependent on the de facto acknowledgment of the applicant by those same institutions which might be responsible for the violation. Also irrelevant is the close link established in the last sentence of paragraph 111 of the judgment between the nature of the grievance (an Article 2 complaint) and the right of the CLR to act on behalf of the victim. This supposed link prejudices applications based exclusively or cumulatively on Articles 3, 4 or 5 of the Convention, and therefore on situations where an extremely vulnerable person has been tortured, ill-treated, enslaved or illegally detained and is not in a position to exercise his or her right of access to a court. Furthermore, in relation to Article 2 cases, I do not agree with the statement that the applicant must have become involved as a representative before the alleged victims death. In the case at hand, it is certainly a fiction to assume that the CLR became “involved as a representative” on the day of Mr Câmpeanus death (see paragraph 111 of the judgment). The only action undertaken by the CLR was to take notice of Mr Câmpeanus deplorable situation and to suggest that the hospitals manager transfer him to another facility, and this laudable, but limited, action by the CLR cannot be characterised as “legal representation” for the purposes of national law or the Convention. Putting fictions aside, the Court does not have to consider whether the applicant has ever interviewed the alleged victim of human rights, or even seen him or her alive, because that would make the application depend on fortuitous facts which are not within the applicants power.

5.  More importantly, the majorityreasoning is logically contradictory in itself. On the one hand, they affirm that the case at hand is “exceptional” (see paragraph 112 of the judgment), but on the other hand, they consider that this case reveals “the existence of a wider problem calling for [the Court] to indicate general measures for the execution of its judgment” (see paragraph 160 of the judgment). If the case reveals a wider problem, then it is not exceptional. Ultimately, the majority acknowledge that this is not an exceptional case, but this acknowledgment is conceded only for the purpose of imposing a positive obligation on the respondent State. This way of proceeding based on double standards is not acceptable. It is not acceptable that the same set of facts is exceptional for the purpose of the definition of the Courts remit and the conditions of admissibility of applications, whereas it is not exceptional and even “reveals a wider problem” for the purpose of imposing positive obligations on the respondent State.

6.  In the end, the majority have one sole true argument in support of the admissibility of the CLRs application as a representative of the deceased teenager, lodged with the Court after his death without any power of attorney. The argument is purely consequentialist: “To find otherwise would amount to preventing such serious allegations of a violation of the Convention from being examined at an international level ...” (see paragraph 112 of the judgment). Hence, the majority admit the applicant association as a “representative” of the victim because they want to examine the alleged violation, and rejecting the application would prevent them from doing so. This self-authenticating proposition begs the question. Such a strictly opportunistic and utilitarian case-sifting methodology cannot in my view suffice. The words that follow in the argument are even less fortunate: “... with the risk that the respondent State might escape accountability under the Convention.” Whilst expressing the purpose of ensuring that the respondent State is held accountable, which is again stressed in the next sentence of the same paragraph, the majority imply that the selection of the case for examination is, ultimately, determined by the need to punish the respondent State with a finding of a violation, and the subsequent imposition of general remedial measures. In simpler terms, this line of argument puts the cart before the horse.

7.  Finally, in stressing the “exceptional” character of the case, the majority regrettably close the door to any future extension of the present finding, concerning the situation of a mentally disabled person, to cover other victims of human rights violations, such as elderly people or members of minorities or groups facing discrimination, who might have had no access to justice in their own countries. The reason is quite obvious: exceptional findings cannot be extended to other situations. What I regret most is the fact that, by treating this case on the basis of the “exceptional circumstances”, the majority have in fact assumed that the Convention is not a living instrument and does not have to adapt to other new circumstances where the applicability of a concept of de facto representation might be called for[2]. Moreover, the implicit claim that each case is sui generis is subversive in international law, indeed in any field of law, since it frequently leads, as experience has shown, to a discretionary understanding of justice determined by non-legal – that is, political, social or purely emotional – considerations on the part of those tasked with the sifting of cases. The input of the court is determined not by the intrinsic merit of the claim, but by the intended strategic output. This brings me closer to the core of the case.

An alternative principled reasoning

8.  Instead of relying on the “exceptional circumstances” of the case, and basing the purported legal solution on case-specific reasoning, I would have preferred to rise above the specificities of the case, and address the question of principle raised by the case: what are the contours of the concept of representation of extremely vulnerable persons before the Court?

It seems to me that this question could, and should, have been answered on the basis of the general principle of equality before the law applied in accordance with the traditional instruments for the interpretation of international human rights law. I refer to the theory of interpretation of human rights treaties in a way which not only secures their effet utile (ut res magis valeat quam pereat)[3], but is also the most protective of the rights and freedoms which they enshrine[4]. Both these interpretation theories evidently apply to the conditions of admissibility of applications[5].

9.  The principle of equality permeates the whole European human rights protection system, and is particularly visible in Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12, as well as Article 20 and Article E in Part V of the Revised European Social Charter, Articles 4, 6 (2) and 9 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Article of the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings, Article 2 (1) of the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents and Articles 3 to 5 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime[6]. Applied in the light of the interpretative theories referred to above, the principle of equality could have filled the legal gap that I mentioned earlier, by providing a principled basis for expanding the limits of the concept of representation for the purposes of the Convention. When confronted with a situation where the domestic authorities ignored the fate of the alleged victim of human rights violations, and he or she was unable to reach the Court by his or her own means or those of a relative, legal guardian or representative, the Court has to interpret the conditions of admissibility of applications in the broadest possible way in order to ensure that the victims right of access to the European human rights protection system is effective. Only such an interpretation of Article 34 of the Convention accommodates the intrinsically different factual situation of extremely vulnerable persons who are or have been victims of human rights violations and are deprived of legal representation[7]. Any other interpretation, which would equate the situation of extremely vulnerable persons to that of other victims of human rights violations, would in fact result in discriminatory treatment of the former[8]. Different situations must be treated differently[9]. Thus, the right of access to court for extremely vulnerable persons warrants positive discrimination in favour of these persons when assessing their representation requirements before the Court[10].

10.  The proposed principled construction of the Convention is supported by a literal interpretation of the final sentence of Article 34 of the Convention. Extremely vulnerable persons who have been hindered “in any way” – that is, by actions or omissions on the part of the respondent State – in the exercise of their rights must be provided with an alternative means of access to the Court. The present case is, in fact, the perfect example of a continuing omission by the respondent State, which, by not providing any kind of legal representation or guardianship to Mr Câmpeanu while he was alive and while there was an arguable claim against the State as regards the health care and educational treatment he received, did indeed hinder the exercise of his Convention and domestic rights[11].

11.  Based on this proposed principled interpretation of the Convention, the Court should have established a concept of de facto representation for cases involving extremely vulnerable victims who have no relatives, legal guardians or representatives. These two cumulative conditions, namely the extreme vulnerability of the alleged victim and the absence of any relatives, legal guardians or representatives, should have been laid down clearly by the Court[12]. Extreme vulnerability of a person is a broad concept that should include, for the above purposes, people of tender age, or elderly, gravely sick or disabled people, people belonging to minorities, or groups subject to discrimination based on race, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation or any other ground. The absence of relatives, legal guardians or representatives is an additional condition that must be assessed according to the facts known to the authorities at the material time. What is relevant is the fact that the victim has no known next of kin and no representative or guardian appointed by the competent authority to take care of his or her interests[13]. These two conditions would have provided legal certainty to the Contracting Parties to the Convention and guidance to any interested institutions and persons who might be willing in future to lodge applications on behalf of other extremely vulnerable victims of human rights violations. By not providing clear and general criteria, and by linking its finding to the “extraordinary circumstances” of the case, the Courts judgment not only weakens the authority of its reasoning and restricts the scope of its findings and their interpretative value, but also provides less guidance, or no guidance at all, to States Parties and interested institutions and persons who might be willing to intervene in favour of helpless, vulnerable victims of human rights violations. Instead of extending the benefit of its work to as many individuals as possible, the Court has restricted the reach of its work to the bare confines of the present case.

12.  Judge-made law is inevitable in international law, and particularly in international human rights law, in view of the inherent indeterminacy of legal terminology and the high potential for conflicts between norms in this area of law, which is intimately connected with the fundamentals of human life in society[14]. The Janus-faced nature of the interpretation of international human rights texts – both remedial and backward-looking on the one hand and promotional and forward-looking on the other – further propels judges into becoming “subsidiary legislators” (Ersatzgesetzgeber). But the promotional role of international courts, which is aimed ultimately at the furtherance of human rights across the domestic jurisdictions under their supervision, is circumscribed by the judges responsibility to be “faithful” to pre-existing treaty law, and especially to the legal principles upon which it is based[15]. In the Convention, these principles are the “principles of law recognised by civilised nations”, to which explicit reference is made in Article 7. Such principles are posited in the domestic laws of European and non-European nations at any given moment[16]. Only such legal principles can provide a solid basis for the interpretative work of the international judge, and for limiting his or her remit. Only they can furnish the intersubjectively controllable passerelle between the letter of the treaty and the “law of the case” when no specific rules are applicable[17]. Only they can assist the judge in his or her tasks of optimising conflicting rights and freedoms[18], distinguishing cases from one another and overruling a precedent[19]. By preferring fact-sensitive reasoning based on the “exceptional circumstances of this case”, and not displaying greater congruence with the principles embedded in the Convention, in practical terms the Court exponentially increases the impact of the element of irreducible subjectivity in the adjudicative process, and by so doing, it promotes the very judicial activism that it apparently seeks to limit. Without solid principled grounds, judge-made law is nothing but a disguised policy decision in the epiphenomenal form of a self-fulfilling prophecy based on the judgepersonal predilections[20].

The Courts judgment as an act of auctoritas

13.  I started by referring to the procedural problem raised by this case. I added that this was the problem raised on the surface, because below the surface a much bigger problem lies before the Court, namely how it envisages its adjudicative power and the impact of its judgments and decisions on the development of international law and the furtherance of human rights protection in Europe, as the preamble to the Convention puts it. The Court may envisage it in one of two ways, as an act of auctoritas or as an act of potestas.

Auctoritas is exercised by way of reasoning, an intellectual act which aims to convince the addressees of the Courts judgments and decisions and the much wider audience of the legal community and the public in general. It gains its legitimacy through the intrinsic strength of the principles upon which those judgments and decisions are based and the coherence and persuasiveness of the inferences drawn from these principles for the case at hand[21]. In this case, the decision-maker – that is, the judges of the Court – is guided by a complex set of criteria of practical rationality with a view to weighing up which is the most coherent of the propositions presented by the parties[22].

Potestas is exercised by way of a decision, an act of will whose legitimacy lies in the power which the decision-maker is acknowledged as having to take the decision in accordance with a procedure. In this case, guided by a pragmatic assessment of the consequences of its decision, the decision-maker is moved to act whenever the advantages of a course of action outweigh its disadvantages[23].

14.  The Court must evidently exercise its power within the confines of the Convention, and the legitimacy of its judgments and decisions is dependent on formal compliance with the admissibility conditions and the procedure laid down in the Convention. While performing its tasks under the Convention, the Court must take into consideration, but not be conditioned by, the consequences of its judgments and decisions, not only for the parties involved, but also for all Contracting Parties to the Convention[24]To this extent, the Courts judgments and decisions are acts of potestas. But the Court should also aim to provide authoritative legal statements based on the intrinsic strength of the principles enshrined in the Convention and developed in the Courts own case-law in the light of the “general principles recognised by civilised nations”. For it is through principled reasoning that judicial statements are normative, and it is only by being normative that they can be fully intelligible and implemented[25]. In their substance, the Courts judgments and decisions are acts of auctoritas, which must avoid a fallacious over-simplification of the factual and legal problems raised by the case and resist the easy temptation of convenient omissions. Such auctoritas can be exercised only when the judge shies away from a one-sided selection of the domestic and international case-law and does not turn a blind eye to fundamental scholarly work pertinent to the discussion of the case under adjudication[26]. Most importantly of all, the consistency and coherency of the Courts output cannot be secured if the judge runs away from definitional issues, leaving to legal writers the sometimes extremely difficult exercise of putting order into a chaotic sample of disparate legal statements[27]. Otherwise, the direction of the Courts case-law will rely on an opportunistic, cherry-picked list of cases, selected and adjudicated in accordance with an unpredictable measuring stick, which can vary according to the power of the respondent State and the notoriety of the alleged victim involved in the dispute. Otherwise, the domestic courts will be strongly tempted to neglect, or even purposely flout, their duty to implement the Courts case-law, when they are faced with judgments and decisions based on vague, succinct formulations that they do not understand. Otherwise, the lack of clarity and guidance of the Courts judgments and decisions will prompt more and more applications, drowning the Court in a vicious circle of case-specific jurisprudence, an increasing number of applications and discretionary disposal of cases. Otherwise, the Court will shift to politicians, namely the Committee of Ministers, the quintessential judicial tasks of standard-setting and affording general remedies.

15.  The pressure of numbers must not be taken as the decisive factor in the choice between the two mentioned approaches. The increasing demand for the Court to respond to human rights violations across Europe brings additional responsibility to the institution, but does not discharge the Court from all its Convention obligations, including those resulting from the overarching provision of Article 45 of the Convention. Justice cannot be sacrificed on the altar of expediency. It is precisely at a time of growth that sufficiently clear reasons are most needed, not only for all the Courts final Committee, Chamber and Grand Chamber decisions and judgments (output), but also for the sifting (input) of cases by the single judge and the Grand Chamber panel. A minimalist form of reasoning only weakens the Courts credibility. No reasoning at all is even worse. It simply kills all credibility of the Court as a champion of procedural justice and undermines its current efforts to cope with the many challenges it is faced with[28].

Conclusion

16.  Following the applicant associations main argument that the “public interest requires a decision on the merits of this case”[29], the majority pursued the utilitarian maxim salus publica suprema lex est, and took the opportunity afforded by this case to impose positive general obligations on the respondent State in relation to “mentally disabled persons in a situation comparable to that of Mr Câmpeanu” (see paragraph 161 of the judgment). I disagree with this methodological approach. In order for this case not to be an exhortation to bend the law on account of exceptional individual hardship, and consequently a free-riding exercise of judicial creativity and reconstruction of treaty obligations, the Court should have addressed the case on the basis of legal principles, namely the principle of equality before the law. If we cannot delude ourselves into dreaming of uniquely correct legal answers to hard cases, we can at least assume that the exercise of distilling from the principle of equality, which is firmly embedded in the Convention and the European human rights protection system, a rule on “de facto representation” before the Court would have avoided a strictly consequentialist application of the Convention.

The methodology of the Courts sifting and assessment of cases must be above any suspicion of arbitrariness. That impression would betray the remarkable sixty-year history of this formidable institution and undermine the efforts of many generations of dedicated judges, lawyers and linguists to pursue the ideal of the construction of a pan-European standard of human rights. The present case is a good example of how the Court sometimes reaches the right results by unconvincing, awkward means. Some of its working methods must change in order to achieve the right results by righteous means. Legal principles can provide the appropriate tools for that task, since a court of law is, to borrow the expression of Ronald Dworkin, the privileged forum of legal principles[30].

 

JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES SPIELMANN, BIANKU AND NUßBERGER

We have voted against the finding of the majority that it is not necessary to examine the complaint under Article 3, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention.

Firstly, we consider that the finding under Article 2 does not cover the violation of Article 3 in Mr Câmpeanus case. As the facts of the case reveal, Mr Câmpeanu was diagnosed as HIV-positive when he was 5 years old, was later diagnosed with “profound intellectual disability” (see paragraph 7 of the judgment) and developed pulmonary tuberculosis, pneumonia and chronic hepatitis. It seems clear from the facts of the case that the particular situation of Mr Câmpeanu did not meet with an appropriate response or treatment on the part of the competent authorities. On that basis the majority rightly find a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. While we agree with this conclusion, we do not agree that no separate issues arise under Article 3 of the Convention. We are of the opinion that the Romanian authorities should have taken concrete steps to protect Mr Câmpeanu from the suffering related to his condition, and of which the authorities were perfectly aware (see Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392/95, § 73, ECHR 2001–V). Mr Câmpeanus death was the result of a long period during which the authorities response to his situation was insufficient and inadequate; during this time he clearly suffered a violation of his Article 3 substantive rights, having received neither appropriate medical treatment nor even food and adequate shelter in the medical centres where he was kept. The “psychiatric and physical degradation” of Mr Câmpeanu when he was admitted to the Cetate-Dolj Medical and Social Care Centre (see paragraph 14 of the judgment) or when he was visited by the Centre for Legal Resources team at the Poiana Mare Neuropsychiatric Hospital (see paragraph 23 of the judgment) were evidence of long periods of neglect based on a complete lack of compassion.

Therefore, this case has to be distinguished from those cases in which the death, or threats to the life, of the applicants have been a direct and immediate consequence of the use of force and in which the Court has found no separate issue under Article 3, having regard to its finding of a breach of Article 2 (see, for example, Nikolova and Velichkova v. Bulgaria, no. 7888/03, 20 December 2007, and Shchiborshch and Kuzmina v. Russia, no. 5269/08, 16 January 2014).

Finding a separate violation of Article 3 could also contribute to enhancing the protection under Article 2 in such cases. If over a long period of time the positive obligations under Article 3 are not fulfilled by the authorities and no appropriate treatment is provided for the most vulnerable individuals, it might be too late to save these individuals lives and thus to fulfil the authorities obligations under Article 2.

Secondly, we find it regrettable that the Court has omitted the opportunity to clarify further the question of locus standi of a non-governmental organisation in connection with a complaint on the basis of Article 3. The gist of the case lies in determining the extent to which the most vulnerable persons interests can be defended before the Court by non-governmental organisations acting on their behalf, but without having any “close link” or “personal interest” as required by the Courts case-law. The situation concerning Article 2 complaints is fundamentally different from Article 3 complaints in this respect. Article 2 complaints based on the victims death can never be brought before the Court by the victims themselves, whereas this is not true for Article 3 complaints. This is one of the aspects highlighted by the majority in their finding on the locus standi of the applicant (see paragraph 112 of the judgment). A separate analysis of the complaint of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention would have enabled the Court also to elaborate explicitly on the related questions in respect of Article 3.

 

JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES ZIEMELE AND BIANKU

1.  We regrettably do not agree with the conclusion of the majority that there is no need for a separate ruling concerning Article 14 taken together with Article 2 in this case.

2.  Turning to the circumstances of the case, we are stunned by the situation of Mr Câmpeanu. He was born in September 1985 and was of Roma ethnicity. His father was unknown and he was abandoned by his mother at birth; he was diagnosed at the age of 5 with HIV and later with profound intellectual disability and other acute medical problems. It would be very difficult to find another case examined by the Court in which the vulnerability of an applicant is based on so many grounds covered by Article 14 of the Convention. In our opinion, just one of these grounds would suffice to require the national authorities to devote particular attention to Mr Câmpeanus situation. The facts of the case, as set out in the judgment, clearly indicate that the measures taken by the authorities were totally inadequate in addressing Mr Câmpeanus circumstances.

3.  It is rather worrying that only two weeks after Mr Câmpeanu turned eighteen, the Dolj County Child Protection Panel, without any individual assessment of his extremely particular situation, suggested that he should no longer be cared for by the State as he was not enrolled in any form of education at the time. This would suffice to conclude that his situation was considered to be the same as that of any other orphan who turns eighteen in perfectly good health and is able to look after himself or herself. The confusion that followed as to the identification of the appropriate institution to deal with Mr Câmpeanus condition is a sign of a lack of understanding and a careless approach to Mr Câmpeanus special needs (see paragraphs 822 of the judgment). In addition, and this in our opinion is crucial to the Article 14 analysis, it appears that the staff at the Poiana Mare Neuropsychiatric Hospital refused to help Mr Câmpeanu, allegedly for fear that they would contract HIV.

4.  In view of the above, and also taking into account the special nature of the States obligations as regards persons with disabilities (see, among other authorities, Jasinskis v. Latvia, no. 45744/08, 21 December 2010, and Kiyutin v. Russia, no. 2700/10, ECHR 2011), we are of the opinion that in the case of Mr Câmpeanu, a person who was in an extremely vulnerable position and completely dependent on the State institutions, there has been a violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 2 of the Convention.


[1].  See Judge Bonello’s separate opinion in Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, ECHR 2011.  I have already had the opportunity to draw attention to this unfortunate method of reasoning and the problems it raises in my separate opinions appended to the judgments of Fabris v. France [GC], no. 16574/08, ECHR 2013, and De Souza Ribeiro v. France [GC], no. 22689/07, ECHR 2012.

[2].  Evolutive interpretation of human rights treaty law has been the position adopted by the Court since Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, § 31, Series A no. 26, as well as by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights since The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC–16/99, 1 October 1999, §114, Series No. 16, and The “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala (merits), judgment of 19 November 1999, § 193, Series C No. 63, and the United Nations Human Rights Committee, since Judge v. Canada, no. 829/1998, communication of 5 August 2002, UN Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998, paragraph 10.3.

[3].  See Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, § 24, Series A no. 32, and in general international law, among many other references, Lighthouses Case between France and Greece, judgment no. 22 (1934), PCIJ, Series A/B no. 62, p. 27, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, p. 21, and Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel (1977) 21 RIAA 231.

[4].  The Court established this principle in Wemhoff v. Germany, 27 June 1968, p. 23, § 8, Series A no. 7. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights did the same in Compulsory Membership in an Association prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 13 November 1985, § 52, Series A No. 5, and Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama (merits, reparations and costs), judgment of 2 February 2001, § 189Series C No. 72. There is therefore no in dubio mitius presumptive rule that human rights treaties should be interpreted in such a way as to minimise encroachment on State sovereignty.

[5].  See S.P., D.P., A.T. v. the United Kingdom, no. 23715/94, Commission decision of 20 May 1996unreportedİlhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, § 55, ECHR 2000-VII; and Y.F. v. Turkey, no. 24209/94, § 29, ECHR 2003-IX.

[6].  It is worth pointing out that the Court has applied Article 14 to grounds of discrimination not explicitly mentioned in that provision, such as sexual orientation (see Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, no. 33290/96, ECHR 1999-IX) and mental or physical disabilities (see Glor v. Switzerland, no. 13444/04, § 53, ECHR 2009). This latter judgment is particularly important in view of the fact that it made explicit reference to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) as the basis for “the existence of a European and worldwide consensus on the need to protect people with disabilities from discriminatory treatment” despite the fact that the relevant events had taken place before the adoption of the CRPD by the General Assembly, and regardless of the fact that the respondent State had not signed it. On two other occasions, the Court has referred to the CRPD, even though the relevant events had occurred before the respondent States signed it (see Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, no. 38832/06, § 44, 20 May 2010, and Jasinskis v. Latvia, no. 45744/08, § 40, 21 December 2010).

[7].  Although Mr Câmpeanu’s “wholly different” factual situation was acknowledged by the Court itself in paragraph 108 of the judgment, it drew no legal inferences from this acknowledgment.

[8].  The equation of different situations would amount to “indirect discrimination”, which occurs when a provision, criterion or practice would put persons with a characteristic associated with a prohibited ground at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons. For the various facets of the principle of equality, and the Convention obligation to extend favourable provisions to persons who are discriminated against, see my separate opinion in Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, ECHR 2013.

[9].  On reverse or positive discrimination in favour of minorities and vulnerable persons who do not have access to basic public goods, such as education and justice, as a basic requirement of justice, see Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 1977, pp. 223-40; A Matter of Principle, 1986, pp. 293-33; Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 1996, pp. 26-29; Law’s Empire, 1998, pp. 386-97; and Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, 2001, pp. 409-26.

[10].  See the Case “relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” (merits), 23 July 1968, p. 34, § 10, Series A no. 6: “certain legal inequalities tend only to correct factual inequalities”. Thus, the State obligation to counterbalance factual inequalities and pay special attention to the most vulnerable emanates directly from the Convention. Within the European framework, see Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Revised European Social Charter; Recommendation Rec(2006)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the Council of Europe Action Plan to promote the rights and full participation of people with disabilities in society: improving the quality of life of people with disabilities in Europe 2006-2015, and especially its Action Line no. 12 on legal protection, referring to objective (i):  “to ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others” and to the specific action to be taken by member States (iv): to encourage non-governmental advocacy networks working in defence of people with disabilities’ human rights”; Recommendation 1592 (2003) of the Parliamentary Assembly towards full social inclusion of people with disabilities; Recommendation No. R (99) 4 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on principles concerning the legal protection of incapable adults; the Handbook on European non-discrimination law, 2010, p. 78, jointly produced by the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights; the Fundamental Rights Agency, Access to justice in Europe: an overview of challenges and opportunities, 2011, pp. 37-54; the European Network of Equality Bodies, Influencing the law through legal proceedings – The powers and practices of equality bodies, 2010, p. 6; and the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) General Policy Recommendation No. 7, 13 December 2002, paragraph 25. In the universal context, see also Article 13 of the CRPD, which imposes an obligation to “facilitate” access to and participation in justice for persons with disabilities, and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ General Comment No. 1 (2014), CRPD/C/GC/1, 19 May 2014, paragraphs 24-31 and 34, on State obligations deriving from the United Nations Convention, in particular the obligation to provide support in the exercise of legal capacity.

[11].  In a way, the principle of good faith in the performance of treaties (Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) is also engaged, since the respondent State cannot plead its own wrong. But this principle alone could not have resolved the procedural question raised by the present case, which required not only differentiation of the situation of extremely vulnerable persons, but also a measure of positive discrimination which could provide them with access to the right of which they had been deprived. Only the principle of equality, in its positive facet, could go that far.

[12].  A similar approach was rightly suggested to the Court by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights in his submissions to the Grand Chamber (14 October 2011, paragraph 39).

[13].  This condition is formulated explicitly in Rule 96 (b) in fine of the Rules of Procedure of the United Nations Human Rights Committee.

[14].  This is not the moment to take a position on the dispute about the alleged non-existence of a general method of treaty interpretation and the alleged methodological difference between the interpretation of international human rights law and other international law, or between contractual and law-making treaties. In a perfunctory way, I would add at this juncture that I depart from the traditional position that there are “self-contained regimes” within international law (see, for example, Case of the SS “Wimbledon” (1923), PCIJ, Series A no. 1, p. 15, and Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, p. 40). Without prejudice to the tenets of a systemic interpretation of treaties, I do not think that rigid boundaries can be established between international human rights law and other international law (see, for example, the recent practice of the ICJ in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010pp. 662-73), and therefore I assume that the same interpretative methods can be applied in both fields of international law. One of the practical consequences of this assumption is that I favour cross-fertilisation of soft-law instruments and case-law of international courts and supervisory bodies. International courts are not isolated “little empires”, as Judges Pellonpää and Bratza put it in their concurring opinion appended to Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97, ECHR 2001-XI.

[15].  In the South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, Judgment of 18 July 1966, ICJ Reports 1966, p. 6, the ICJ stated that it “can take account of moral principles only in so far as these are given sufficient expression in legal form”. On textual fidelity or Gesetztreu as a limit for judge-made law, see EsserVorverständnis und Methodenwahl in der RechtsfindungRationalitätsgrundlagen richterlicher Entscheidungspraxis, 1970, pp. 196-99, 283-89; KrieleRechtVernunftWirklichkeit, 1990, pp. 519-38; and Dworkin, Justice in Robes, 2006, pp. 118-38.

[16].  See Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, § 71, ECHR 2008. In fact, at the plenary session of the Consultative Assembly on 7 September 1949 (see the Travaux Préparatoires of the Convention, “References to the notion of the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations” (CDH(74)37)), Mr Teitgen stated: “organised international protection shall have as its aim, among other things, to ensure that internal laws on guaranteed freedoms are in conformity with the fundamental principles of law recognised by civilised nations. What are these principles? They are laid down in much doctrinal work and by a jurisprudence which is their authority. These are the principles and legal rules which, since they are formulated and sanctioned by the internal law of all civilised nations at any given moment, can therefore be regarded as constituting a principle of general common law, applicable throughout the whole of international society.”

[17].  If this is true for national judges, it is even truer for international judges, in the light of Article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute, the preamble to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. On principles as “norm-sources”, see, among others, Pellet, annotation of Article 38, and Kolb, note on General Principles of Procedural Law, in Zimmermann et al.The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, 2006, pp. 766-73 and 794-805 respectively; ThirlwayThe Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: fifty years of jusrisprudencevol. I, 2013, pp. 232-46, and vol. II, 2013, pp. 1,201-05; and Larenz and CanarisMethodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 1995, pp. 240-41.

[18].  On principles as Optimierungsgebote in domestic law, see, for example, the contributions by Alexy and Koch in Alexy et al.Elemente einer juristischen Begründungslehre, 2003, pp. 217-98; AlexyA Theory of Constitutional Rights, 2009, pp. 401 and 405; and in international law, DucoulombierLes conflits de droits fondamentaux devant la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme, 2011, pp. 564-67.

[19].  See AlexyA Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification, 2009, pp. 279 and 285.

[20].  The most emblematic advocate of this working method, Justice Holmes, argued that principles do not solve cases. Law is, in his view, what the courts say it is, by deciding first the case and determining afterwards the grounds for the decision. His voice was not alone. In his autobiography, Justice Douglas relates that Chief Justice Hughes once told him: “Justice Douglas, you must remember one thing. At the constitutional level where we work, 90 percent of any decision is emotional. The rational part of us supplies the reasons for supporting our predilections.” For this reason, Justice Frankfurter would say: “The Constitution is the Supreme Court”. To all this, Rawls gave the famous rebuttal: “The Constitution is not what the Court says it is” (Political Liberalism, 1993, p. 237).

[21]. Principles are “starting-points” for case sifting and for shaping the case rule, on the basis of a “universal rationality-bound concept of legal rationality” (EsserVorverständnis und Methodenwahl, cited above, p. 212, and Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Fortbildung des PrivatrechtsRechtsvergleichende Beiträge zur Rechtsquellen- und Interpretationslehre, 1990, pp. 183-86). Hence, a judicial decision deals with matters of principle, not matters of compromise and strategy resolved according to arguments of political policy, general welfare or public interest (Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, cited above, p. 83, and A Matter of Principle, cited above, p. 11). In this context, the publication of separate opinions plays the important role of avoiding the fiction of unanimity which in reality results from a negotiation that sacrifices the best possible solution to the lowest common denominator (KrieleTheorie der Rechtsgewinnung entwickelt am Problem der Verfassungsinterpretation, 1976, p. 309).

[22].  Without entering into the dispute over the applicability of general discursive coherence criteria to the field of legal reasoning, it is worth mentioning the fundamental work by Alexy and Peczenik, who listed the following ten criteria by reference to which discursive coherence can be evaluated: (1) the number of supportive relations, (2) the length of the supportive chains, (3) the strength of the support, (4) the connection between supportive chains, (5) priority orders between arguments, (6) reciprocal justification, (7) generality, (8) conceptual cross-connections, (9) number of cases a theory covers, and (10) diversity of fields of life to which the theory is applicable (Alexy and Peczenik, “The Concept of Coherence and Its Significance for Discursive Rationality”, in Ratio Juris, 1990,
pp. 130-47). One of the basic criteria formulated by the authors was that “When justifying a statement, one should support it with a chain of reasons as long as possible”. In fact, the use of legal principles implies a special onus of argumentation and justification imposed on the judge (see Larenz and CanarisMethodenlehre, cited above, p. 247; BydlinskiGrundzüge der juristischen Methodenlehre, 2005, p. 72; and ProglDer Prinzipienbegriff: Seine Bedeutung für die juristische Argumentation und seine Verwendung in den Urteilen des Bundesgerichtshofes für Zivilsachen, 2001, p. 132).

[23].  See EsserGrundsatz und Norm, cited above, pp. 235-41; and Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, cited above, pp. 22-28, 90-100, 273-78, and Justice in Robes, cited above, pp. 8081, 248-50, on the two different types of argumentation based on arguments of principle and arguments of utilitarian or ideal policy.

[24].  The consideration of consequences in legal reasoning results not only from the finalistic structure of legal provisions, as Esser has demonstrated in his Vorverständnis und Methodenwahl, cited above, p. 143, but more generally from the use of such arguments as the ad absurdum argument and such maxims as summum ius summa iniuria, as Perelman explained in Logique juridique. Nouvelle rhétorique, 1979, pp. 87-96, and as Deckert expounded in her list of twenty-three arguments drawn from consequences, in Folgenorientierung in der Rechtsanwendung, 1995, p. 252.

[25].  Normative is used here in the sense of universalisable, as for example in Kaufmann, Das Verfahren der RechtsgewinnungEine rationale Analyse, 1999, p. 85, and MacCormickRhetoric and The Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning, 2005, pp. 14849.

[26].  As Wittgenstein put it in Philosophische Untersuchungen, 1953, Part I, § 593, one of the main causes of intellectual error is a “unilateral diet” (einseitige Diät), where one feeds one’s thought with only one kind of example.  This “pragmatic error” (pragmatische Fehler) is frequent in legal reasoning (F. Haft, Juristiche Rhetorik, 2009, p. 149).

[27].  At this juncture it is useful to remember the words of Cardozo on the courts’ failure to put forward a comprehensive definition of the due process clause: “The question is how long we are to be satisfied with a series of ad hoc conclusions. It is all very well to go on pricking the lines, but the time must come when we shall do prudently to look them over, and see whether they make a pattern or a medley of scraps and patches” (Selected Writings, 1947, p. 311).

[28].  See Maria Cruz Achabal Puertas v. Spain, United Nations Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1945/2010, 18 June 2013, where the author was informed that a Committee of the Court, composed of three judges, had decided to declare her application inadmissible, since it did not find “any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols”, but the Human Rights Committee concluded that “the limited reasoning contained in the succinct terms of the Court’s letter does not allow the Committee to assume that the examination included sufficient consideration of the merits”, and therefore decided there was no obstacle to its examining the communication under Article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and found that that the facts before it disclosed a violation of Article 7 of the Covenant, read independently and in conjunction with Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. The materials submitted to the Court by the author were similar to those presented to the Human Rights Committee. The Court cannot, as it so frequently does, require the domestic courts to indicate with sufficient clarity the grounds on which they base their decision, while at the same time not living up to the same standards itself. One could read the Human Rights Committee’s message as implying that the limits of forbearance of an unacceptable policy of judicial pragmatism have been reached, as Schwarzenberger once wrote (International Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals, volume IV, 1986, p. 627).

[29].  See page 8 of the applicant association’s submissions to the Grand Chamber of 3 June 2013.

[30].  Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, 1986, p. 33.

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