EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
ČETVRTI ODJEL
AL HANCHI protiv BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE
(Aplikacija br. 48205/09)
PRESUDA
STRASBOURG
15. novembar 2011.
Ova presuda postaće konačna pod uslovima propisanim u članu 44. stav 2. Konvencije. Ona može biti predmet redakcijskih izmjena.
U predmetu Al Hanchi protiv Bosne i Hercegovine, Evropski sud za ljudska prava (Četvrti odjel), zasjedajući u vijeću sastavljenom od:
Nicolas Bratza, predsjednik,
Lech Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
Päivi Hirvelä,
George Nicolaou,
Ledi Bianku,
Vincent A. De Gaetano, sudije,
i Lawrence Early, registrar Odjela,
Nakon vijećanja zatvorenog za javnost, održanog 18. oktobra 2011. donosi sljedeću presudu koja je usvojena istog dana:
POSTUPAK
1. Ovaj slučaj je pokrenut tako što je g. Ammar Al Hanchi (aplikant), državljanin Tunisa, dana 19. avgusta 2009. podnio Sudu aplikaciju (br. 48205/09) protiv Bosne i Hercegovine na temelju člana 34. Konvencije o ljudskim pravima i osnovnim slobodama (Konvencija).
2. Aplikanta su zastupali g. K. Kolić i Vaša prava, lokalna nevladina organizacija. Vladu Bosne i Hercegovine (Vlada) zastupala je agentica gđa M. Mijić. 3. Aplikant se žalio da bi u slučaju deportacije bio izložen riziku od postupanja suprotnog članu 3. Konvencije i da njegovo lišavanje slobode predstavlja povredu člana 5. stav 1. Konvencije.
4. Dana 10. decembra 2009. predsjednik Četvrtog odjela Suda odlučio je, u interesu strana u postupku i pravilnog vođenja postupka, da ukaže Vladi da aplikant ne bi trebao biti protjeran u Tunis do 15. januara 2010. (Pravilo 39. Poslovnika Suda).
5. Dana 12. januara 2010. Vijeće Četvrtog odjela Suda odlučilo je da aplikaciju proslijedi Vladi. Vijeće je takođe odlučilo da meritum i dopustivost aplikacije ispita istovremeno (član 29. stav 1), kao i da gore pomenutu privremenu mjeru produži do donošenja odluke Ustavnog suda po zahtjevu aplikanta za privremenu mjeru, uz dodatni period od sedam dana po obavještenju aplikanta da je odluka donesena.
6. Dana 2. februara 2010. Sud je donio odluku da produži privremenu mjeru od 10. decembra 2009. do daljnjeg.
7. U svjetlu promjene režima u Tunisu, Vijeće je dana 8. marta 2011 odlučilo da pozove strane u postupku da dostave dodatna pismena zapažanja u vezi sa dopustivošću i meritumom aplikacije (Pravilo 54 stav 2(c) Poslovnika Suda).
ČINJENICE
I. OKOLNOSTI SLUČAJA
8. Aplikant je rođen 1965. godine u Tunisu. U Bosnu i Hercegovinu stigao je tokom rata 1992-95. i pridržio se stranim mudžahedinima. Fenomen mudžahedina objašnjen je u presudi Međunarodnog Krivičnog Tribunala za bivšu Jugoslaviju u slučaju Hadžihasanović i Kubura, IT-01-47-T, para. 411-18, od 15. marta 2006:
411. Svjedoci optužbe i odbrane slažu se u tome da su strani mudžahedini u Zenicu i Travnik počeli pristizati tokom 1992. godine, tačnije u drugoj polovici 1992.
412. U to vrijeme granice RBiH (Republike Bosne i Hercegovine) bile su pod kontrolom organa Republike Srpske ili organa HVO-a, zbog čega je legalnim vlastima RBiH, konkretno MUP-u, bilo vrlo teško kontrolisati ulazak i kretanje stranaca na teritoriji RBiH. Strani mudžahedini su stizali u Bosnu preko Republike Hrvatske i preko Hercegovine gdje je HVO uspostavio svoju vlast. Oni su često stizali kao pripadnici humanitarnih organizacija i nisu se prijavljivali organima vlasti RBiH.
413. Većina stranih mudžahedina stizala je iz sjevernoafričkih zemalja, s Bliskog i Dalekog istoka, npr. Alžira, Afganistana, Saudijske Arabije, Katara, Egipta, Irana, Pakistana, Tunisa, Turske i Jemena. Neki od njih stizali su iz evropskih zemalja, ali nije poznato koliko.
414. Strane mudžahedine bilo je lako raspoznati zbog njihove tradicionalne odjeće i tamnije puti.Nosili su dugačke brade, turbane ili pokrivala za glavu. Neki su bili odjeveni u maskirne uniforme ili u dijelove maskirnih uniformi, dok su drugi nosili dugačke bijele halje.Neki su oko glave ili vrata imali marame. Većina nije poznavala bosanski jezik i govorili su isključivo arapski. Strani mudžahedini nosili su automatske puške i bacače raketa. Neki su nosili sablje ili duge noževe. Pojedini svjedoci prepoznali su oznake koje su strani mudžahedini nosili na ramenu.
415. Na osnovu dokaza koji upućuju na poziciju stranih mudžahedina slijedi da se termin “mudžahedini” odnosi na muslimane borce džihada, odnosno koji vode sveti rat. Strani mudžahedini dolazili su u Bosnu kako bi svojoj muslimanskoj braći pomogli u odbrani protiv srpskog agresora, s namjerom da nakon uspostavljanja mira napuste zemlju. Iz istih izvora slijedi da su strani mudžahedini uz to željeli širiti svoja uvjerenja i da su smatrali da oni na najvjerniji način prenose tekstove Islama.
416. Čini se da je većina stranih mudžahedina u srednju Bosnu stigla u svojstvu pripadnika humanitarnih organizacija. Svjedoci odbrane slažu se u tome da su se oni u prvoj fazi doista bavili humanitarnim aktivnostima. Lokalnom stanovništvu donosili su značajnu pomoć, naročito u hrani. Organizovali su obuku i vjersku nastavu.
417. U drugoj polovici 1992. godine, kada je izbio sukob u srednjoj Bosni, strani mudžahedini uključili su se u borbu. Nabavljali su oružje i uniforme za lokalno stanovništvo i organizovali vojnu obuku. Kao što će kasnije biti objašnjeno, strani mudžahedini sistematski su učestvovali u borbama na strani ABiH.
418. S obzirom na svoj humanitarni angažman, strani mudžahedini su na početku među lokalnim stanovništvom uživali određen stepen povjerenja i podrške. Pristupali su im mladi muškarci, čak i maloljetnici; vojnici ABiH dezertirali su iz vlastitih jedinica kako bi se pridružili stranim mudžahedinima, naročito zbog materijalne koristi. Neki od stranih mudžahedina ženili su se s domaćim djevojkama. No, s vremenom su strani mudžahedini počeli širiti fundamentalističku viziju islama. Nalagali su bosanskim ženama da se pokrivaju, osuđivali konzumaciju alkohola i od domaćih muslimana tražili da prakticiraju svoju vjeru. Strani mudžahedini upadali su u kafiće i restorane u kojima se služio alkohol. Kada bi vidjeli neku ženu ili mladu djevojku da je odjevena na način koji su oni smatrali nepropisnim, žestoko bi reagovali. Zbog tako strogih stavova odnosi između stranaca i domaćih ljudi postajali su sve lošiji“
9. Iako nikada nije stekao državljanstvo niti dozvolu boravka u Bosni i Hercegovini, dana 28. decembra 1995. aplikant je dobio ličnu kartu BiH na osnovu krivotvorene odluke od 15. februara 1992. kojom je izvjesni Marvon Mufti stekao državljanstvo (ta lična karta je poništena 2002). Godine 1997. aplikant se oženio državljankom Bosne i Hercegovine. Dobili su dvoje djece, rođene 1998. i 2000. Čini se da se aplikant nakon rata 1992-95. nije nikada vraćao u Tunis.
10. Dana 24. aprila 2009., tokom rutinske kontrole, Služba za poslove sa strancima u sastavu Ministarstva sigurnosti utvrdila je da je aplikant ilegalno ušao u Bosnu i Hercegovinu i stavljen je pod nadzor u Imigracioni centar u Istočnom Sarajevu u cilju protjerivanja. Dana 14. maja 2009. aplikant je preko svog zastupnika tražio sudsko preispitivanje odluke, ali njegov zahtjev je odbačen kao neblagovremen. Prvobitno određeni period pritvora produžavan je svakog mjeseca. Svaka naredba o produženju pritvora potvrđena je od strane Suda Bosne i Hercegovine (Državni sud), a neke je potvrdio i Ustavni sud BiH. Žalbe protiv preostalih rješenja o produženju pritvora još uvijek su u postupku pred Ustavnim sudom.
11. Dana 19. maja 2009. Služba za poslove sa strancima donijela je rješenje kojim se aplikant protjeruje sa teritorije BiH i zabranjuje mu se ulazak i boravak na teritoriji BiH u periodu od 5 godina, jer je utvrđeno da njegovo prisustvo predstavlja prijetnju nacionalnoj sigurnosti BiH. Ovakvo rješenje doneseno je na osnovu tajnih izvještaja obavještajne službe. Ministarstvo sigurnosti je 22. juna 2009. potvrdilo ovu odluku. Dana 10. novembra 2009. Državni sud, koji ima pristup tajnim podacima, takođe je potvrdio odluku o protjerivanju. Postupak po apelaciji protiv ove odluke vodi se pred Ustavnim sudom.
12. Dana 24. jula 2009. aplikant je podnio zahtjev za azil. On je tvrdio da su tuniski državljani koji su se pridružili stranim mudžahedinima tokom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini tretirani u Tunisu kao osumnjičenici za terorizam i podvrgavani mučenju. Dodao je kako su predstavnici tuniske vlasti posjetili njegovu porodicu i raspitivali se o njemu ubrzo nakon što je pokrenut postupak za njegovu deportaciju. Aplikant, međutim, nije mogao objasniti kako su organi vlasti saznale o njegovim aktivnostima u Bosni i Hercegovini. Aplikant je dostavio izjavu gosp. Kousri-a, tuniskog aktiviste za ljudska prava, koji je tvrdio da je vojni sud u Tunisu osudio izvjesnog Badredine Ferchichi-a na kaznu zatvora od tri godine zbog njegovog učešća u ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini.
13. Dana 27. jula 2009. godine Sektor za azil obavio je razgovor sa aplikantom preko prevodioca pošto aplikant ne govori niti jedan od službenih jezika u Bosni i Hercegovini. Sektor za azil razmotrio je izvještaje Ministarstva vanjskih poslova SAD, Amnesty International-a i Human Rights Watch-a o Tunisu, koji spominju mnoge slučajeve mučenja osumnjičenih terorista. Takvo mučenje uključuje vješanje za noge, prijetnje silovanjem, podrvrgavanje elektro-šokovima, uranjanje glave u vodu, batinanje i prženje cigaretom. Prema ovim izvještajima, tuniske vlasti nisu istraživale navode o ovim mučenjima.
14. Dana 7. avgusta 2009. Sektor za azil odbio je aplikantov zahtjev za azil. Utvrđeno je da aplikant nije ničim dokazao da bi ga u Tunisu tretirali kao osumnjičenog teroristu i da, stoga, on nije suočen s realnim rizikom od nehumanog postupanja. Izjava koja se odnosi na slučaj gosp. Badredine Ferchichi nije prihvaćena jer je aplikant propustio da dostavi prevod dokumenta na neki od službenih jezika Bosne i Hercegovine. Dana 10. novembra 2009. Državni sud je potvrdio ovu odluku. Apelacija protiv ove odluke još uvijek je u postupku pred Ustavnim sudom.
15. Dana 3. decembra 2009. aplikant je podnio Ustavnom sudu zahtjev za izdavanje privremene mjere da se njegova deportacija odloži do donošenja odluke Ustavnog suda o meritumu slučaja.
16. Zaključak o dozvoli izvršenja rješenja o protjerivanju koje je zakazano za 10. decembar 2009. oko 14 h, donesen je 8. decembra, a uručen je aplikantu 10. decembra oko 10 h prije podne. Aplikant je odmah podnio Sudu zahtjev za izdavanje privremene mjere, i predsjednik Četvrtog odjela Suda je izdao privremenu mjeru istog dana oko 13 h (vidi tačke 4-6. gore u tekstu).
17. Dana 17. januara 2010. Ustavni sud je odbio zahtjev aplikanta za izdavanje privremene mjere. Aplikant je o ovoj odluci obaviješten 1. februara 2010.
18. Aplikant se još nalazi u Imigracionom centru u Istočnom Sarajevu.
II. RELEVANTNO DOMAĆE PRAVO
A. Zakon o zaštiti tajnih podataka iz 2005. godine
19. Zakon o zaštiti tajnih podataka iz 2005. godine („Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine“, br. 54/05 i 12/09) stupio je na snagu 17. avgusta 2005. godine. Poglavlje 5 tog Zakona propisuje da sudije Državnog suda i Ustavnog suda imaju pristup tajnim podacima svih nivoa tajnosti bez bilo kakvih formalnosti (kao što su sigurnosne provjere ili specijalna ovlaštenja), ako je takav pristup potreban za izvršavanje njihovih dužnosti.
B. Zakon o kretanju i boravku stranaca i azilu iz 2008. godine
1. Uslovi za sticanje međunarodne zaštite (status izbjeglice i supsidijarna zaštita) i dozvole boravka iz humanitarnih razloga
20. Zakon o kretanju i boravku stranaca i azilu iz 2008. godine („Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine“, broj 36/08) stupio je na snagu 14. maja 2008. godine. Član 105. tog zakona predviđa da je izbjeglica stranac koji se zbog osnovanog straha od proganjanja zbog svoje rase, vjere, nacionalnosti, pripadnosti određenoj društvenoj grupi ili zbog političkog mišljenja nalazi izvan zemlje svog državljanstva a ne može se, ili se zbog takvog straha ne želi staviti pod zaštitu te zemlje, kao i lice bez državljanstva koje se nalazi izvan zemlje svog prethodnog uobičajenog mjesta boravka a ne može se ili se zbog takvog straha ne želi vratiti u tu državu. Ista odredba daje definiciju osobe koja ispunjava uslove za supsidijarnu zaštitu kao stranca koji ne ispunjava uslove za status izbjeglice ali u vezi s kojim postoje ozbiljni razlozi za vjerovanje da bi se suočio sa stvarnim rizikom da bude izložen smrtnoj kazni, odnosno pogubljenju, mučenju ili nečovječnom ili ponižavajućem postupanju ili kažnjavanju u zemlji porijekla ili u zemlji uobičajenog mjesta boravka, ili postoji ozbiljna individualna prijetnja po život ili lice zbog neselektivnog nasilja u situacijama međunarodnog ili unutrašnjeg oružanog sukoba, a koji ne može ili zbog straha ne želi da se stavi pod zaštitu te zemlje.
Princip zabrane vraćanja („non-refoulement“) je ugrađen u član 91. ovog Zakona i glasi:
„Stranac neće, ni na koji način, biti protjeran ili vraćen ("refoulement") na granicu teritorije gdje bi mu život ili sloboda bili ugroženi zbog njegove rase, vjere, nacionalnosti, pripadnosti određenoj društvenoj grupi ili zbog političkog mišljenja, bez obzira da li mu je zvanično odobrena međunarodna zaštita. Zabrana vraćanja ili protjerivanja ("non-refoulement") odnosi se i na lica za koja postoji osnovana sumnja da bi bila u opasnosti da budu podvrgnuta mučenju ili drugom nehumanom ili ponižavajućem postupanju ili kažnjavanju. Stranac, također, ne može biti ni protjeran ni vraćen u zemlju u kojoj nije zaštićen od slanja na takvu teritoriju.“
Prema članu 118. ovog zakona, strancu čiji je zahtjev za međunarodnu zaštitu odbijen, će se bez obzira na to izdati odobrenje za privremeni boravak iz humanitarnih razloga i ako bi njegovo protjerivanje značilo kršenje principa zabrane vraćanje („non-refoulement“). Međutim, stranac mora biti lišen slobode ukoliko je utvrđeno da on predstavlja prijetnju za javni poredak ili sigurnost Bosne i Hercegovine.
2. Rješenje o deportaciji i zaključak o dozvoli izvršenja rješenje o protjerivanju
21. Žalba protiv odluke o deportaciji obustavlja deportaciju (član 87. Zakona). Zahtjev za međunarodnu zaštitu i zahtjev za sudsko preispitivanje odluke kojom je ovaj zahtjev odbijen isto tako obustavlja postupak deportacije (članovi 92., 109(9) i 117 Zakona). Prema članu 93. Zakona, kada odluka o protjerivanju postane izvršna, zaključak o dozvoli izvršenja donosi se u roku od 7 dana. Žalba protiv zaključka o dozvoli izvršenja ne odlaže deportaciju.
3. Pritvor radi protjerivanja
22. Prema članu 99(2)(b) ovog Zakona, stranac mora biti stavljen u pritvor ako se utvrdi da takva osoba predstavlja prijetnju za javni red i mir ili nacionalnu sigurnost. Članovi 100. (3) i 102. Zakona predviđaju da se stranac može zadržati pod nadzorom 30 dana, ali se rješenje o nadzoru može produžavati više puta, svaki put najviše do 30 dana. Ukupno trajanje pritvora, ipak može u izuzetnim situacijama, trajati duže od 180 dana, ako stranac onemogućava svoje udaljenje ili ako je nemoguće u roku od 180 dana udaljiti stranca iz drugih razloga.
III. MEĐUNARODNI DOKUMENTI
A. U odnosu na Bosnu i Hercegovinu
23. Opšti okvirni sporazum za mir, kojim je okončan rat 1992-1995. u Bosni i Hercegovini, parafiran je u vojnoj bazi u blizini Dejtona, SAD, 21. novembra 1995., a potpisan u Parizu, u Francuskoj, 14. decembra 1995. Stupio je na snagu slijedećeg dana od dana potpisivanja.
24. Prema članu III Aneksa 1A uz Sporazum, sve strane snage, uključujući i pojedinačne savjetnike, borce za slobodu, trenere, dobrovoljce i osoblje susjednih i drugih zemalja, bez obzira da li su pravno ili vojno podređeni bilo kojoj od lokalnih snaga, morali su se povući iz Bosne i Hercegovine do 13. januara 1996. godine.
B. U odnosu na državu Tunis
25. Što se tiče situacije u Tunisu prije skorije promjene režima, vidjeti Saadi v. Italija [GC], br. 37201/06, tačke 65-93., od 28. februara 2008.
26. Parlamentarna skupština Vijeća Evrope nedavno se bavila situacijom u Tunisu nakon promjene režima (dokument br. 12624 od 1. juna 2011). Relevantni dio memoranduma glasi:
„12. Nekoliko sedmica nakon revolucije od 14. januara 2011. politička situacija u Tunisu bila je veoma nestabilna. Prva prelazna vlada koju je formirao premijer Ghannouchi 17. januara uz sudjelovanje predstavnika „legalne“ opozicije (nekoliko političkih formacija koje su postojale pod prijašnjim režimom) i neovisnih stranaka, uspjeli su da donesu jedan broj odluka koje vodi ka demokratizaciji. Ali, ta vlada se uskoro našla pod pritiskom demonstanata koji su zahtijevali povlačenje ministara koji su bili u službi pod Ben Alijem.
13. U isto vrijeme, političke sile bliske ranijem režimu, iz Ben Alijeve RCD stranke i sigurnosnih službi, pokušale su da još uzburkaju situaciju u zemlji kako bi pomjerili proces tranzicije ka novoj vrsti autoritarnosti pod maskom „kontrolisanog“ političkog liberalizma.
14. Suočeni sa ovakvim pokušajima, elementi skloni demokratskim promjenama, posebno savezi i aktivni članovi civilnog drštva, nastavili su sa pritiskom na prelaznu vladu putem demonstracija. Oni su također započeli formiranje Nacionalnog vijeća za odbranu revolucije, što je zahtijevalo sazivanje ustavotvorne skupštine i raspad svih institucija nastalih u vrijeme Ben Ali-a, tj. Parlamenta, stranke RCD i političke policije.
15. Početkom februara, oba Doma Parlamenta donijela su zakon koji omogućuje prelaznom predsjedniku, Fouad Mebazaa, da vlada po zakonskom dekretu. Parlament je potom suspendiran i raspušten. Privremeni predsjednik je 19. februara čak izdao dekret kojim su amnestirani svi politički zatvorenici.
16. Među najvažnijim odlukama koje je donijela vlada Ghannouchi-a treba pomenuti zabranu rada stare vladajuće strane, RCD, kao i formiranje komisije za reformu dokumenata i institucija koje su trebale pripremiti demokratsku transformaciju države.
17. Ovdje takođe treba napomenuti raspuštanje Ministarstva komunikacija (koje bi bilo adekvatnije nazvati ministarstvo propagande i cenzure) i stepen liberizacije medija. Ipak, tek uvijek treba izvršiti reformu štampe. I zaista, imamo informacije da su nevladine organizacije nailazile na probleme kada su pokušale dobiti radio frekvencije.
18. Dana 27. februara, druga vlada kojom je predsjedavao premijer Ghannouchi bila je prisiljena da se povuče zbog pritiska od strane demonstranata. Nova prelazna vlada, na čelu sa gosp. Beji Caïd Essebsi, nije u svojim redovima imala članova koji su bili bliski režimu Ben Ali-a, i predstavljala je kabinet tehnokrata čiji cilj je bio da garantira mir i stabilnost tokom perioda tranzicije.
19. Dana 3. marta, privremeni predsjednik odredio je 24. juli 2011. kao datum izbora za Ustavotvornu skupštinu direktnim, općim glasanjem u skladu sa novim izbornim zakonom. Formirano je posebno tijelo pod nazivom Visoka ustanova za realizaciju ciljeva Revolucije, političke reforme i demokratsku tranziciju, da pripremi izbore za Ustavotvornu skupštinu. Gospodin Yadh Ben Achour, bivši dekan Fakulteta za pravne, političke i društvene nauke u Tunisu, koji je dao ostavku u Ustavnom vijeću 1992. godine i bio oponent Ben Ali režima, bio je izabran za predsjednika ovog novog tijela.
20. Visoko tijelo, koje se sastojalo od 161 člana, od kojih su većina predstavnici političkog i građanskog društva, kao i profesionalnih pravnika, su sredinom aprila pripremili i dostavili vladi nacrte zakona o organizaciji izbora i izbornoj komisiji.
21. Pored toga, formirane su i dvije nezavisne komisije za istraživanje koje treba da rasvijetle djela korupcije, pogrešne raspodjele fondova u vrijeme ranijeg režima i zloupotrebe koje su počinile snage sigurnosti tokom dešavanja u decembru 2010. i januaru 2011.
22. Dana 7. marta 2011. Ministar unutrašnjih poslova objavio je ukidanje Državne Sigurnosne Službe i političke policije.
23. Sada se čini važnim da krhka politička i institucionalna stabilnost u Tunisu omogući privremenim tijelima da budu dovoljno optimistični u vezi s pripremama za izbore. Međutim, vlasti su već dale do znanja da izbori mogu biti odloženi ako ne budu ispunjeni svi uslovi za glasanje u skladu sa demokratskim standardima.
24. Krhka stabilnost pokazala se tokom događaja od 5. maja, koji su bili provocirani izjavama bivšeg tuniskog ministra unutrašnjih poslova, Farhat Rajhi, koji je objavio da se priprema „vojni puč“ u slučaju da islamisti dobiju na izborima. Vlada je osudila ovakve izjave nazivajući ih atakom na javni red. Demonstracije koje su uslijedile nakon ovog incidenta, pretvorile su se u nerede, u kojima su mladi Tunižani tražili ostavku prelazne vlade i „novu revoluciju“. Policija je morala koristiti suzavac i oružje da uguši nerede. Opljačano je nekoliko radnji i kuće. Dana 7. maja, vlasti su uvele policijski sat u Tunisu. Uhapšeno je oko 600 ljudi. Policijski sat ukinut je dana 18. maja 2011.“
27. Dana 21. maja 2011., po okončanju svoje posjete Tunisu, gdje je bio na poziv Vlade, Juan Mendez, specijalni izvjestilac UN-a za mučenja i druge oblike surovog, nehumanog i ponižavajućeg postupanja ili kažnjavanja, dao je slijedeću izjavu:
„ .....
Prelazna vlada je poduzela niz ozbiljnih koraka, uključujući i reformu aparata za državnu sigurnost i raspuštanje tzv. političke policije, započinjanje reformi u oblasti sigurnosti, reviziju domaćeg zakonodavstva u skladu s međunarodnim standardima, uključujući, inter alia, otklanjanje zakonskih prepreka da se ponovo otvore slučajevi ubistava i mučenje koja su se desila u prošlosti, otpuštanja velikog broja visoko i srednje pozicioniranih dužnosnika u Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova i Ministarstvu pravde. Također sam ohrabren diskusijom o formiranju prelaznih pravosudnih mehanizama koji bi se bavili zakonitošću zlostavljanja u prethodnom periodu. Ohrabrujuće je da je Vlada osnovala tri savjetodavne komisije.
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Dobio sam informacije da je obim mučenja i maltretiranja smanjen nakon instrukcija koje su izdali zvaničnici sigurnosnih službi. Ovo je zaista istina kada je riječ o zloglasnim i endemičnim mučenjima u vrijeme režima Ben Ali-a. Međutim, čuo sam i istinita svjedočenja u vezi sa batinanjem pritvorenika nakon hapšenja ili tokom prvih sati istražnog pritvora (garde a vue), kao i tokom ispitivanja. Takve epizode pokazuju da se stare navike policijskih agenata ne mogu lako iskorijeniti. Bez obzira da li se dešava rijetko ili često, batinanje kao oblik kažnjavanja ili zastrašivanja reflektuje potpuno nepoštovanje prezumpcije nevinosti i digniteta osoba osumnjičenih za zločin. Iz tog razloga, nijedan čin torture se ne može tolerisati i povlači obavezu države u skladu sa međunarodnim pravom da istraži, procesuira i kazni odgovorne za takvo djelo. Čuo sam svjedočenja prema kojim se zaštitni mehanizmi koje treba osigurati tokom hapšenja i pritvaranja, kao što su pravila koja se odnose na sudski nalog, obavezne medicinske pretrage nakon hapšenja i transporta, obavještavanje porodice, dostupnost advokatske pomoći, ispitivanje u prisustvu svjedoka, kao i pravo protiv optuživanja samog sebe, ne poštuju u praksi. Nažalost, neka od ovih svjedočenja su se odnosila na događaje koji su se desili nakon Revolucije od 14. januara.
Na primjer, čuo sam da je policija početkom maja mjeseca reagovala uz upotrebu sile protiv mnoštva mladih ljudi koji su demonstrirali. Policijske snage za sprečavanje nereda sukobile su se sa protestantima i predstavnicima medija. Čuo sam i optužbe na račun nezakonitog hapšenja i premlaćivanja grupe mladih ljudi među kojima je bilo više od 20 maloljetnika. Oni su uhapšeni i stavljeni u pritvor zajedno sa 46 odraslih demonstranata bez omogućavanja pristupa advokatu ili obavještavanja njihovih porodica i pored jasnih zakonskih odredbi u vezi sa maloljetničkim kriminalom i postupcima i pušteni su u 4:00 h ujutro u jednoj od najopasnijih dijelova grada. Tokom 12-satnog pritvora bili su prisiljeni da kleče i ostanu u neudobnim položajima. Pozdravljam inicijativu Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova da izda saopštenje u kojem se izvinjava „novinarima i građanima koji su slučajno povrijeđeni“, i da će otvoriti istragu o ovim incidentima. Ovo dalje sugeriše da policija i druga tijela za provođenje zakona primjenjuju prekomjernu silu radi držanja situacije pod kontrolom.
S obzirom na nedostatak efisasnih mehanizama zaštite tokom hapšenja, osobe lišene slobode su naročito izložene mučenju i lošem postupanju, štaviše, s obzirom na navike zlostavljanja koje su vršili agenti organa za sprovođenje zakona u prošlosti, kao i nedostatak dovoljno brze istrage o takvim događanjima i izostanak procesuiranja javnih zvaničnika, ne može se tvrditi da više ne postoji praksa nekažnjavanja, iako su se sadašnji organi vlasti nedvojbeno i iskreno obavezali na poštivanje zakona. Čuo sam mnoge navode o udaranju nogama, premlaćivanju i opekotinama od cigareta. U mnogim ovim slučajevima postoje dokazi forenzičara.
Saznao sam od Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova da je u periodu od 1999. do 2009. bilo samo sedam krivičnih presuda protiv zatvorskih službenika i službenika agencija za provođenje zakona za počinjena djela mučenja i nehumanog postupanja od ukupno 246 pokrenutih postupaka. Prema zakonima Tunisa, svako ko tvrdi da je bio podvrgnut mučenju može uložiti žalbu kod Police Judiciare (sudska policija) ili tužioca. Ovi mehanizmi nisu dovoljni pošto su žalbe obično adresirane na isti organ za kojeg se navodi da je vršio zlostavljanja. Pored toga, prema zakonodavstvu Tunisa, sudije nisu u obavezi da isključe bilo koji dokaz ili izjavu koji su dati pod prisilom, usprkos činjenici da Tunis, kao članica CAT-a, ima međunarodnu obavezu da isključi takva priznanja. Ovo sve neizbježno stvara jedno okruženje nekažnjivosti.
Sudijama je ostavljeno na diskreciju da odluče da li će prihvatiti priznanje, prema članovima 150. i 152. Zakona o krivičnom postupku. Pozdravljam inicijativu Ministarstva pravde da se izmijeni definicija mučenja sadržana u Krivičnom zakonu i tako dovede u sklad sa definicijom iz člana 1. CAT-a i da se kazna propiše u odnosu na težinu učinjenog prekršaja. Također, podržavam inicijativu za izmjenu zakona po kojoj se nijedna izjava dobivena silom neće uzimati kao dokaz u sudskom postupku protiv optuženog, osim u slučajevima mučenja i da se dokaže da je izjava data.
Zaključio sam da nekoliko agenata sigurnosnih snaga koji su ranije radili pri Predsjedništvu i Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova nije otpušteno, iako se smatralo da su bili u samom središtu ozbiljnih kršenja ljudskih prava koja su se dešavala u prošlom režimu.
Uslovi u zatvorima i pritvoreničkim centrima koje smo posjetili kreću se od onih adekvatnih do nezadovoljavajućih u pogledu higijenskih uslova, dostupnosti medicinske pomoći, pristupa telefonu i dužini posjeta članova porodice. Medicinski centri, iako dostupni, nisu uvijek i adekvatno opremljeni. U pritvorskim centrima koje smo posjetili nije bilo službe za stomatološke i psihijatrijske usluge.
Što se tiče istrage o navodima mučenja i zlostavljanja u ranijem periodu, pozdravljam formiranje Komisije za istraživanje činjenica, iako je funkcija te komisije komplementarna sa pravosudnim organima i trebalo bi je pojasniti. Čuo sam jedno objašnjenje o temeljnom i sveobuhvatnom načinu na koji je komisija pristupila svom mandatu. Ipak, zaključio sam da je broj sudskih postupaka i početnih istraga koje se odnose na mučenja i prekomjernu upotrebu sile i dalje mali, usprkos činjenici da rad Komisije ne mijenja ulogu tužioca i sudija. Spora istraga i generalno pomanjkanje nagovještaja da se ovi slučajevi ozbiljno razmatraju izaziva frustracije i bijes kod žrtava i javnosti. Ohrabruje činjenica da su žrtvama i porodicama žrtava događaja iz decembra i januara ponuđene novčane naknade. Ostalo je nejasno kako se došlo do visine adekvatne kompenzacije i da li su poduzete neke mjere da se žrtvama i njihovim porodicama pruže usluge rehabilitacije.
Pozdravljam inicijativu prelazne vlade da oslobodi političke zatvorenike i osuđenike za verbalni delikt, kao i da uslovno pusti na slobodu jednog po jednog osuđenika u slučajevima krivičnih djela vezanih za bezbjednost. Mnogi od njih, ako ne i svi, osuđeni su u nepravičnim postupcima, tako da su amnestije i pomilovanja djelimična nagrada za kršenja prava koje su pretrpjeli.
Takođe želim da pozdravim obavezu koja je izražena na svim nivoima Vlade u vezi sa osudama tortura i odlučnošću da se one iskorijene ...“
28. Dana 26. maja 2011., po okončanju svoje službene posjete Tunisu, specijalni izvjestilac za ljudska prava i anti-terorizam pri UN, gosp. Martin Scheinin, dao je sljedeću izjavu:
„ ...
Od moje zadnje posjete Tunisu početkom 2010. godine, cijeli svijet je vidio kako negiranje ljudskih prava od strane opresivnih režima, čak i kada se radi pod izgovorom suzbijanja terorizma, može ujediniti kritičnu masu ljudi iz različitih sfera života da se bore za jedno slobodno i demokratsko društvo i vladu koja će poštivati ljudska prava. Tunis je postao simbol takve lekcije.
Moj mandat je fokusiran na zaštitu ljudskih prava pri suzbijanju terorizma. U tom kontekstu, uočio sam početne korake koji u Tunisu ukazuju na prekid s prošlošću. Bilo mi je drago čuti da mnogi od mojih sagovornika potvrđuju da zakon za suzbijanje terorizma iz 2003. godine nije bio primijenjen nakon događaja od 14. januara kao ni protiv Tunižana koji traže promjene. Međutim, u zatvoru Al Mornaguia sam saznao da pojedine sudije još uvijek ponekad izdaju rješenje o pritvoru po Zakonu iz 2003. Ovaj, sada uglavnom neaktivan zakon, nije postigao ono što se očekivalo od njega. On nije obezbijedio više sigurnosti narodu Tunisa, nego je bio oruđe za obračun sa svakom vrstom političkog ili nekog drugog neslaganja. Prelazna vlada je ovo potvrdila donošenjem zakona o amnestiji za one koji su osuđeni ili držani u zatvoru po gore pomenutom zakonu. Da bi narod Tunisa dobio sigurnost koju zaslužuje, ja nudim svoju pomoć u donošenju odgovarajućeg zakonskog okvira umjesto zakona iz 2003., koji bi regulisao napore Tunisa u borbi protiv terorizma a koji bi bio usklađen sa međunardonim konvencijama i protokolima za suzbijanje terorizma uz potpuno uvažavanje ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda. Globalna prijetnja terorizma je stvarna i protiv nje se može boriti samo ciljanim zakonskim mjerama, umjesto da se pojam terorizma koristi za borbu protiv onih koji drugačije misle.
U svom ranijem izvještaju izrazio sam veliku zabrinutost zbog aktivnosti različitih dijelova sigurnosnog aparata države, zbog uslova tajnosti pod kojima rade, kao i zbog njihove nekažnjivosti. U mom izvještaju izdvojena je direkcija za državnu sigurnost kao najvažnije jezgro koje je odgovorno za akcije mučenja, proizvoljnog i tajnog pritvaranja. Stoga, pohvaljujem ukidanje ove direkcije od strane Prelazne Vlade. Ipak, u svom ranijem izvještaju, istakao sam nedostatak informacija dostupnih javnosti u pogledu nekoliko sigurnosnih organa u državi Tunis. Ovakav nedostatak informacija veoma je bio važan u prikrivanju i zaštiti nekažnjivosti onih koji su provodili zlostavljanja. Rad i ovlasti svih organa sigurnosti moraju biti regulisani javno dostupnim zakonima. Takvom transparentnošću se ne samo izbjegava stvaranje mitova o djelovanju ovih agencija, nego se i osigurava njihova odgovornost ako počine nezakonita djela. U tom kontekstu, naglasio sam da je ukinuta politička policija u Tunisu. Takva vrsta „policije“ nije zakonski postojala, nego je tako nazvana u javnosti, a kasnije i od strane zvaničnika, da bi se opisali oni elementi u organima sigurnosti povezani sa Ministarstvom unutrašnjih poslova koji su bili odgovorni za vršenje pritiska na političke aktiviste, aktiviste za ljudska prava i ostale disidente.
Promjene u radu tuniskih organa sigurnosti ne smiju biti ograničene samo na slogane nego moraju donijeti konkretne mjere. Učinjeni su prvi koraci za utvrđivanje odgovornosti za one koji su napali demonstrante u januaru ove godine. Pozdravljam ovaj pozitivni razvoj dođađaja, ali želim da naglasim da je prvo potrebno suočenje sa ostacima mračne prošlosti, da bi se moglo gledati u novu budućnost Tunisa. Tokom moje prve posjete Tunisu 2010. godine, negirano je postojanje tajnih objekata u prostorijama Ministarstva za unutrašnje poslove. Prilikom ove posjete, službena lica Ministarstva pristala su da mi pokažu tajne pritvorske objekte iz ranijeg perioda. Međutim, neki zvaničnici još uvijek poriču da su se prostorije Ministarstva koristile kao sobe za ispitivanja i mučenja. Saznao sam da je do sada 60 dužnosnika za bezbjednost uhapšeno, 7 najviše rangiranih dužnosnika je procesuirano, a 42 dužnosnika primorana da se povuku sa položaja ili dobrovoljno ode u penziju. Država Tunis treba da po službenoj dužnosti nastavi istragu navoda o počinjenim torturama i ilegalnim pritvorima često počinjenim pod izgovorom borbe protiv terorizma. Istraga, podizanje optužnica i suđenje onima koji su odgovorni za krivična djela takođe može pomoći u izgradnji povjerenja između naroda i snaga sigurnosti u zemlji.
Iako imam sve pohvale za odluku države Tunisa da ratifikuje Međunarodnu konvenciju o zaštiti osoba od nestanka, Opcione protokole uz Konvenciju protiv mučenja i Sporazum o građanskim i političkim pravima i Rimski statut Međunarodnog krivičnog suda, moram naglasiti da ova obećanja postaju stvarnost samo kada se primijene deponovanjem međunarodnog dokumenta o pristupanju. Nadalje, pozivam na hitne mjere za jačanje neovisnosti sudstva koje do dana današnjeg nije ispunilo svoj zadatak da osigura poštivanje zakona uključujući i ljudska prava. Bio sam razočaran saznanjem da najvažniji zaštitni mehanizam protiv zlostavljanja u policijskom pritvoru, efikasan pristup advokatu po svom izboru od momenta hapšenja, uključujući i njegovo prisustvo svakom saslušanju, još uvijek nije uveden.
Ovo su preliminarni nalazi moje misije. Cijeli izvještaj će biti prezentiran 2012. godine Vijeću za ljudska prava UN-a ...“
PRAVO
I. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 3. KONVENCIJE
29. Aplikant je naveo da bi protjerivanjem u Tunis bio izložen realnom riziku od postupanja suprotnog članu 3. koji glasi:
“Niko neće biti podvrgnut mučenju, neljudskom ili ponižavajućem postupanju ili kažnjavanju”.
A. Dopustivost
30. Vlada je tvrdila da aplikaciju treba odbaciti kao preuranjenu jer se još uvijek vodio postupak pred Ustavnim sudom.
31. Aplikant je odgovorio da žalba Ustavnom sudu ne predstavlja efikasan domaći pravni lijek u svrhu člana 35. stav 1. Konvencije pošto nema automatski suspenzivni efekat. On se pozvao na slučaj Čonka v. Belgija, br. 51564/99, ECHR 2002-I; Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. Francuska, br. 25389/05, ECHR 2007-II; i Abdolkhani i Karimnia v. Turska, br. 30471/08, ECHR 2009-...
32. Sud ponavlja da, iako je zabrana mučenja ili nečovječnog ili ponižavajućeg postupanja ili kažnjavanja sadržana u članu 3. Konvencije apsolutna, aplikanti koji se pozivaju na taj član nisu automatski oslobođeni obaveze iscrpljivanja domaćih pravnih lijekova koji su dostupni i efikasni (vidi Bahaddar v. Nizozemska, od 19. februara 1998, stav 45, Izvještaji o presudama i odlukama 1998-I, i Jabari v. Turska (dec), br. 40035/98 of 28. oktobra 1999). To bi bilo ne samo u suprotnosti sa supsidijarnošću Konvencije, nego bi narušilo samu svrhu pravila navedenog u članu 35. stav 1., ako bi se državama članicama osporila mogućnost da stvari isprave kroz vlastiti pravni sistem. Kad to pominjemo, a vezano za važnost koju Sud pridaje članu 3. Konvencije i nepopravljivu štetu do koje može doći ako se rizik nehumanog postupanja ostvari, efikasnost nekog pravnog lijeka u svrhu člana 35. stav 1. odlučno zahtijeva da se dotičnoj osobi omogući pristup pravnom lijeku koji ima suspenzivni efekat (vidi M.S.S. v. Belgije i Grčke [GC], br. 30696/09, tačka 293., od 21. januara 2011., kao i slučajeve citirane u njima).
33. U predmetnom slučaju očigledno je da apelacija Ustavnom sudu nema efekat automatske suspenzije. Iako je Sud svjestan činjenice da Ustavni sud može odložiti deportaciju, kao privremenu mjeru, zahtjev za izdavanje privremene mjere sam po sebi nije suspenzivan. Uz to, Ustavni sud nije obavezan da svoju odluku po zahtjevu donese prije stvarne deportacije predmetne osobe kao što se i vidi iz ovog slučaja (aplikant je uložio Ustavnom sudu zahtjev za izdavanje privremene mjere 3. decembra 2009, dok je njegova deportacija bila planirana za 10. decembar 2009, a Ustavni sud je donio odluku po zahtjevu dana 12. januara 2010). Prema tome, kada aplikant traži da se spriječi njegovo ili njeno protjerivanje iz Bosne i Hercegovine na teritoriju gdje će navodno on ili ona biti izloženi riziku od maltretiranja što je u suprotnosti sa članom 3., apelacija Ustavnom sudu ne može se smatrati efikasnim pravnim lijekom u svrhu sprečavanja protjerivanja do donošenja konačne odluke tog suda. Stoga, prigovor Vlade se mora odbiti.
34. Sud ukazuje da ova žalba nije očigledno neosnovana u smislu člana 35. stav 3(a) Konvencije, niti je neprihvatljiva po bi kojem drugom osnovu. Stoga se proglašava dopustivom.
B. Meritum
35. U svojoj aplikaciji kao i u izjašnjenjima od jula 2010. aplikant je tvrdio da bi u Tunisu bio tretiran kao islamist i osumnjičeni terorist zbog svoje povezanosti sa stranim mudžahedinima u Bosni i Hercegovini i činjenice da je u Bosni i Hercegovini proglašen kao prijetnju po nacionalnu sigurnost, kao i zbog njegove duge brade. On je ukazivao da su islamisti i osumnjičeni teroristi, kao grupa, u Tunisu bili sistematski izlagani ozbiljnim kršenjima ljudskih prava, uključujući i mučenja. On se pozivao na izvještaje State Departmenta SAD, organizacije Human Rights Watch i Amnesty International o stanju u Tunisu, kao što je navedeno u tački 25. ranije u tekstu. Aplikant je također dostavio i izjavu gosp. Anouar Kousri-a koja je navedena u tački 12. gore u tekstu, kao i izjavu jedne francuske aktivistice za ljudska prava, gđe Luize Toscane koja tvrdi da su svi državljani Tunisa koji su se borili u ratu 1992-95. u Bosni i Hercegovini, odmah po povratku u Tunis hapšeni i mučeni. Izjava se specijalno odnosila na slučajeve gosp. Bouhouche, gosp. Selmi, gosp. Hajjam, gosp. Ferchichi i gosp. Mouelhi. Na kraju, aplikant je tvrdio da je njegov slučaj sigurno poznat tuniskim vlastima pošto su bili obaviješteni o njegovom protjerivanju, a najvjerovatnije i o tome da je proglašen kao prijetnja po nacionalnu sigurnost u Bosni i Hercegovini. Njegovo ime se pojavljivalo u mnogim medijskim izvještajima, od kojih su ga neki povezivali sa terorističkim grupama.
36. U svojim izjašnjenima od maja i septembra 2010. Vlada je tvrdila da su aplikantovi navodi neodređeni, bez dokaza i u nekim dijelovima kontradiktorni. Iako je prihvatala da su se osumnjičenici, a pogotovo osuđeni teroristi suočavali sa realnom opasnošću da bi mogli biti podvrgnuti lošem postupanju u Tunisu, Vlada je ukazivala da aplikant nije uspio dokazati da bi se i prema njemu tako postupalo. Stoga se predmetni slučaj mora tretirati drukčije nego slučaj Sellem v. Italija, br. 12584/08 od 5. maja 2009, i slučaj Saadi v. Italija, gore pomenut, koji su se odnosili na osuđene teroriste. Vlada je tvrdila da su domaći organi podrobno razmotrili aplikantov slučaj: uzeli su u obzir relevantne izvještaje i procijenili tajne dokaze protiv aplikanta. Vlada je takođe potvrdila da su vlasti Tunisa dana 26. novembra 2009. bile obaviještene o planiranom skorom protjerivanju aplikanta.
37. U svojim dodatnim zapažanjima od marta 2011. aplikant je tvrdio da zbog političke nestabilnosti, neizmijenjenog zakona za borbu protiv terorizma, ukorijenjenih navika u pogledu nasilja i nekažnjivosti unutar snaga sigurnosti i sudstva protiv islamista kao i užasnih zatvorskih uslova, i pored nedavnih promjena, i dalje postoji rizik od mučenja islamista koji se deportuju u Tunis.
38. U svom dodatnom izjašnjenju iz marta 2011. Vlada je navela da se situacija u Tunisu radikalno poboljšala nakon nedavne promjene režima i da aplikant više nije suočen s bilo kakvim rizikom od podvrgavanja mučenju u toj zemlji.
39. Praksa Suda pokazuje da prema dobro utvrđenom međunarodnom pravu i ugovornim obavezama, kao i prema obavezama koje proizlaze iz Konvencije, ugovorna država ima pravo da kontroliše ulazak, boravak i protjerivanje stranaca (vidi, među ostalim izvorima, Uner v. Nizozemska [GC], br. 46410/99, tačka 54., ECHR 2006-XII). Pravo na azil nije sadržano u Konvenciji, niti u njenim Protokolima (Salah Sheekh v. Nizozemska, br. 1948/04, tačka 135., od 11. januara 2007). Međutim, protjerivanje stranca od strane ugovorne države može povući pitanja po članu 3. tako da se ugovorna država može smatrati odgovornom po Konvenciji, ukoliko su postojali osnovani razlozi za vjerovanje da bi se određena osoba, ako bude protjerana, mogla suočiti sa realnim rizikom da će biti podvrgnuta nehumanom postupanju. U takvom slučaju, član 3. podrazumijeva obavezu ugovorne države da ovu osobu ne protjeruje u takvu državu (vidi Saadi v. Italija, citirano ranije u tekstu, tačka 125). Imajući u vidu da je zabrana mučenja ili nehumanog ili ponižavajućeg postupanja ili kažnjavanja apsolutna, ponašanje aplikanata, koliko god bilo nepoželjno ili opasno, ne može se uzeti u razmatranje (ibid., tačka 127. i 138).
40. Procjena postojanja stvarnog rizika mora biti rigorozna (vidi Chahal v. Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, 15. novembar 1996, tačka 96., Izvještaji 1996-V). U pravilu, na aplikantima je da predoče dokaze da postoje stvarne osnove za vjerovanje da bi aplikanti, u slučaju provođenja mjere na koju se žale, mogli biti izloženi riziku da će biti podvrgnuti postupanju suprotnom članu 3. (N. v. Finska, br. 38885/02, tačka 167., od 26. jula 2005). Ukoliko se takvi dokazi prezentirani, Vlada je odgovorna da otkloni bilo kakve sumnje u vezi s tim. Sud uzima kao polaznu osnovu cjelokupan materijal koji mu se dostavi ili, po potrebi, materijal koji je dobio proprio motu. Sud će tako postupiti posebno u slučajevima kada aplikant ili treća strana u smislu člana 36. Konvencije, dostavi obrazložene navode koji bacaju sumnju na tačnost informacija na koje oslanjala tužena država. Sud mora biti ubijeđen da je procjena koju su izvršile vlasti ugovorne države odgovarajuća i dovoljno potkrijepljena domaćom dokumentacijom kao i materijalima iz drugih pouzdanih i objektivnih izvora, kao npr., od drugih država ugovornica ili država koje nisu ugovornice, agencija Ujedinjenih Nacija i renomiranih nevladinih organizacija (NA. v. Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, br. 25904/07, tačka 119., 17. juli 2008).
41. Ukoliko aplikant nije bio protjeran u vrijeme kada je Sud razmatrao predmet, kao relevantno vrijeme uzima se vrijeme kada je postupak vođen pred Sudom (Saadi v. Italija, gore citiran, tačka 133). Neophodna je potpuna i ex nunc procjena jer se situacija u zemlji destinacije tokom vremena može promijeniti. Iako je istorijska pozadina interesantna u mjeri u kojoj može rasvijetliti trenutnu situaciju i mogući razvoj te situacije, trenutno stanje je ono koje je odlučujuće, stoga je potrebno uzeti u obzir informacije do kojih se došlo nakon što su domaće vlasti donijele konačnu odluku (vidi Salah Sheekh, gore citiran, tačka 136).
42. Prema tome, u predmetnom slučaju Sud mora ispitati da li bi aplikant, u slučaju protjerivanja u Tunis, i pored nedavnih promjena u toj zemlji, bio izložen realnom riziku od podvrgavanja tretmanu suprotnom članu 3. Konvencije.
43. Kako je i zapaženo od strane Parlamentarne skupštine Vijeća Evrope i specijalnih izvještača Ujedinjenih nacija, u Tunisu se odvija proces demokratske tranzicije i već su poduzeti koraci na uklanjanju tiranskih struktura iz ranijeg režima i uspostavljanju demokratskog sistema: rasformirane su snage sigurnosti koje su posebno optuživane za kršenje ljudskih prava u ranijem režimu, uključujući Službu državne bezbjednosti; svi politički zatvorenici su amnestirani uključujući i one koji su bili zatvoreni na osnovu kontroverznog zakona za borbu protiv terorizma; te je jedan broj visoko pozicioniranih i niže pozicioniranih zvaničnika u Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova i Ministarstvu pravde smijenjen i/ili procesuiran za ranija zlostavljanja (vidjeti tačke 26-28. gore u tekstu).
44. Iako je istina da još uvijek ima prijavljivanja slučajeva zlostavljanja, oni su sporadični (vidi tačku 27. gore); ne postoje nikakve naznake, a pogotovo ne dokazi, da se islamisti, kao grupa, posebno proganjaju nakon promjene režima. Upravno suprotno, svi glavni mediji su objavili da se gosp. Rachid Ghannouchi, vođa glavnog islamističkog pokreta (Ennahda) u Tunisu, vratio u Tunis nakon 20 godina egzila i da je dana 1. marta 2011. godine tom pokretu omogućeno da se registruje kao politička partija. Također, treba naglasiti da je Tunis 29. juna 2011. pristupio Opcionom Protokolu uz Konvenciju protiv mučenja i drugih surovih, nehumanih ili ponižavajućih postupanja ili kažnjavanja, i tako uspostavio preventivni sistem redovnih posjeta zatvoru, kao i Opcionom protokolu uz Međunarodni sporazum o građanskim i političkim pravima kojim se Komitetu za ljudska prava priznaje nadležnost da razmatra pojedinačne slučajeve. Ovo pokazuje odlučnost organa vlasti Tunisa da jednom zauvijek iskorijeni nasilje i nekažnjivost koji su vladali u ranijem režimu.
45. Imajući u vidu sve ranije navedeno, Sud smatra da ne postoji realan rizik da aplikant u slučaju deportacije u Tunis, bude podvrgnut nehumanom postupanju. Prema tome, njegova deportacija u Tunis ne bi predstavljala povredu člana 3. Konvencije.
II. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 5. STAV 1. KONVENCIJE
46. Aplikant je takođe osporavao zakonitost svog pritvora u toku postupka protjerivanja, zbog dužine trajanja pritvora. U tom smislu, on se pozvao na član 5. stav 1. Konvencije, čiji relevantni dio glasi:
„1. Svako ima pravo na slobodu i sigurnost ličnosti. Niko ne smije biti lišen slobode izuzev u niže navedenim slučajevima i u skladu sa zakonom propisanim postupkom:
(f) zakonitog hapšenja ili lišenja slobode osobe u cilju sprječavanja ilegalnog ulaska u zemlju ili osobe protiv koje je u toku postupak deportacije ili ekstradicije”.
47. Vlada je osporila ovaj argument.
48. Sud ponavlja da član 5. stav 1 (f) Konvencije ne traži da se lišavanje slobode osobe protiv koje je u toku postupak deportacije realno smatra potrebnim, na primjer, da se spriječi da takva osoba napravi neki prekršaj ili pobjegne. U tom smislu član 5. stav 1(f) pruža drugačiji nivo zaštite od člana 5. stav 1(c). Sve što se prema ovoj odredbi traži je da je postupak deportacije u toku i da se pažljivo vodi (vidi Chahal, gore citiran, tačke 112-13., i Saadi protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [GC], br. 13229/03, tačka 72., ECHR 2008-...).
49. Vraćajući se napredmetni slučaj,period koji je razmatran počeo je od 24. aprila 2009. kada je aplikant stavljen u pritvor u imigracionom centru u cilju protjerivanja. U periodu koji je trajao manje of osam mjeseci, domaći organi vlasti su donijeli rješenje o deportaciji, razmotrile aplikantov zahtjev za azil na dvije relevantne instance i donijele zaključak o dozvoli izvršenja rješenja o protjerivanju. Sud ovaj period ne smatra pretjerano dugim. Iako se aplikant još uvijek nalazi u pritvoru, period nakon 10. decembra 2009. mora se posmatrati drugačije jer je Vlada u tom periodu odustala od protjerivanja aplikanta u skladu sa zahtjevom Suda prema pravilu 39. Poslovnika Suda (vidi Chahal, gore citiran, tačka 114). Sud ponavlja da su zemlje ugovornice prema članu 34. Konvencije, obavezne da postupe u skladu sa privremenom mjerom predviđenom u Pravilu 39. (vidi Mamatkulov i Askarov v. Turske [GC], br. 46827/99 i 46951/99, tačke 99-129., ECHR 2005-I).
50. Kao što je rečeno, implementacija privremene mjere po nalogu Suda upućenog tuženoj državi da bi bilo poželjno da pojedinca ne protjeruje u određenu državu, sama po sebi nema uticaja na pitanje da li je lišavanje slobode tog lica u skladu s članom 5. stav 1. (vidi Gebremedhin, gore citiran, tačka 74). Drugim riječima, domaći organi ipak moraju postupati striktno u skladu sa domaćim propisima (ibid., tačka 75). Sud napominje da su domaći organi ustanovili da aplikant predstavlja opasnost za nacionalnu sigurnost (vidi tačku 11. gore u tekstu). Prema tome, njegovo lišavanje slobode bilo je odobreno i propisano kao obavezno po članu 99(2)(b) Zakona o kretanju i boravku stranaca i azilu iz 2008. godine (vidi tačku 22. gore u tekstu). Pored toga, prvobitno određeni period pritvora redovno je produžavan svakog mjeseca kako je i propisano domaćim zakonom.
51. S obzirom na gore navedeno, Sud zaključuje da je postupak protjerivanja, iako privremeno odložen na zahtjev Suda, ipak bio u toku i u potpunosti u skladu sa domaćim zakonom (uporediti S.P. v. Belgija (dec.), br. 12572/08, 14. juni 2011.; suprotan primjer Ryabikin v. Rusija, br. 8320/04, tačka 132., od 19. juna 2008. i Abdolkhani i Karimnia v. Turska, br. 30471/08, tačka 134., ECHR 2009-...). Pošto ne postoje naznake da su organi vlasti postupali nepravično, da je aplikant bio zatvoren u neodgovarajućim uvjetima ili da je njegovo pritvaranje bilo nezakonito iz bilo kojeg razloga (vidi Saadi v. Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, gore citirano, tačke 67-74.), ova pritužba je očigledno neosnovana i treba je odbaciti u skladu s članom 35. stav 3(a) i stav 4. Konvencije.
III. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 6. STAV 1. KONVENCIJE
52. Aplikant se dalje žalio na nepravičnost postupka protjerivanja. On se pozvao na član 6. stav 1. Konvencije, čiji relevantni dio glasi:
„1. Prilikom utvrđivanja građanskih prava i obaveza ili osnovanosti bilo kakve krivične optužbe protiv njega, svako ima pravo na pravično suđenje i javnu raspravu u razumnom roku pred nezavisnim i nepristrasnim, zakonom ustanovljenim sudom...“
53. Sud ponavlja da odluke koje se odnose na ulazak, boravak i deportaciju stranaca ne uključuju i utvrđivanje aplikantovih građanskih prava ili obaveza, ili osnovanost neke krivične optužbe protiv njega u smislu člana 6. stav 1. (vidi Maaouia v. Francuska [GC], br. 39652/98, tačke 36-40., ECHR 2000-X). Prema tome, ova pritužba je inkompatibilna ratione materiae i mora se odbaciti u skladu s članom 35. stav 3(a) i stav 4. Konvencije.
IV. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 8. KONVENCIJE
54. Aplikant se dalje žalio da je odluka o njegovom protjerivanju i zabrani ponovnog ulaska u zemlju na period od 5 godina, dovela do povrede prava na poštivanje njegovog porodičnog života. On se pozvao na član 8. Konvencije, koji predviđa:
“1. Svako ima pravo na poštivanje svog privatnog i porodičnog života, doma i prepiske.
2. Javna vlast se ne miješa u vršenje ovog prava, osim ako je takvo miješanje predviđeno zakonom i ako je to neophodna mjera u demokratskom društvu u interesu nacionalne sigurnosti, javne sigurnosti, ekonomske dobrobiti zemlje, sprječavanja nereda ili sprječavanja zločina, zaštite zdravlja i morala ili zaštite prava i sloboda drugih.”
55. Sud zapaža da ova pritužba nije bila sadržana u prvobitnoj aplikaciji, ali se pominje u aplikantovim izjašnjenima od jula 2010. ( aplikant je u svojoj aplikaciji iznio žalbu po članu 8. Konvencije, ali samo u odnosu na pritvor određen u toku trajanja postupka protjerivanja). Stoga, ova pritužba se nije pojavila dovoljno rano da bi se izvršila razmjena komentara između strana u postupku (vidi Melnik v. Ukrajina, br. 72286/01, tačke 61-63., od 28. marta 2006; Maznyak v. Ukrajina, br. 27640/02, tačka 22., od 31. januara 2008; Kuncheva v. Bugarska, br. 9161/02, tačka 18., 3. jula 2008.; Lisev v. Bugarska, br. 30380/03, tačka 33., od 26. februara 2009.; i Tsonyo Tsonev v. Bugarska, br. 33726/03, tačka 24., od 1. oktobra 2009.). Međutim, Sud ne mora odlučivati da li je adekvatno sada posebno razmatrati ovo pitanje jer je pritužba svakako nedopustiva iz slijedećih razloga.
56. Sud je ranije ustanovio da apelacija Ustavnom sudu, u principu, predstavlja efikasan pravni lijek u svrhu člana 35. stav 1. Konvencije (vidi Mirazović v. Bosna i Hercegovina (dec), br. 13628/03 od 16. maja 2006., Alibašić v. Bosna i Hercegovina (dec), br. 18478/08 od 29. marta 2011). Pošto je pritužba još uvijek u postupku pred Ustavnim sudom, a Konvencija ne predviđa da aplikant koji se žali na deportaciju po članu 8., mora imati pristup pravnom lijeku sa efektom automatske odgode (suprotno takvim pritužbama po članu 3., vidi tačke 32-33. gore u tekstu), pritužba se smatra preuranjenom. Stoga se odbacuje u skladu s članom 35. stav 1. i stav 4. Konvencije.
V. OSTALE NAVODNE POVREDE KONVENCIJE
57. I na kraju, Sud je razmotrio i druge pritužbe koje je aplikant iznio. Međutim, s obzirom na dokumentaciju koju je imao na raspolaganju i u mjeri u kojoj pritužbe spadaju pod njegovu nadležnost, Sud smatra da one ne otkrivaju povredu prava i sloboda iz Konvencije i njenih Protokola. Prema tome, ovaj dio aplikacije se odbija kao očigledno neosnovan u skladu s članom 35. stav 3.(a) i stav 4. Konvencije.
VI. PRAVILO 39. POSLOVNIKA SUDA
58. U skladu s članom 44. stav 2. Konvencije, predmetna presuda postaje konačna (a) kada stranke izjave da neće zahtijevati da se predmet iznese pred Veliko Vijeće; ili (b) tri mjeseca poslije donošenja presude, ako se ne zatraži da se predmet iznese pred Veliko Vijeće; ili (c) kada panel sudaca Velikog Vijeća odbije zahtjev za razmatranje na osnovu člana 43. Konvencije.
59. Sud smatra da uputa data Vladi u skladu s Pravilom 39. (vidi tačke 4-6. gore u tekstu) mora ostati na snazi sve dok predmetna presuda ne postane konačna ili dok panel sudaca Velikog Vijeća Suda ne prihvati zahtjev jedne ili obje strane da se predmet iznese pred Veliko Vijeće u skladu s članom 43. Konvencije.
U SKLADU SA GORE IZNESENIM RAZLOZIMA, SUD JEDNOGLASNO
Proglašava žalbu po članu 3. Konvencije dopustivom, a preostali dio aplikacije nedopustivim;
Presuđuje da ne bi došlo do povrede člana 3. Konvencije u slučaju protjerivanja aplikanta u Tunis;
Odlučuje da nastavi sa uputom Vladi, u skladu sa Pravilom 39. Poslovnika Suda, da je u interesu pravilnog vođenja postupka, poželjno ne protjerivati aplikanta dok predmetna presuda ne postane konačna ili do davanja daljnjih naloga.
Sastavljeno na engleskom jeziku i objavljeno u pismenoj formi dana 15. novembra 2011. godine, u skladu sa Pravilom 77. stav 2. i 3. Poslovika Suda.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar Predsjednik
Prevod presude preuzet sa http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/
FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF AL HANCHI v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
(Application no. 48205/09)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
15 November 2011
FINAL
04/06/2012
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 (c) of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Al Hanchi v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
Päivi Hirvelä,
George Nicolaou,
Ledi Bianku,
Vincent A. De Gaetano, judges,
and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 18 October 2011,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 48205/09) against Bosnia and Herzegovina lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Tunisian citizen, Mr Ammar Al Hanchi (“the applicant”), on 19 August 2009.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr K. Kolić and Vaša prava, a local non-governmental organisation. The Bosnian-Herzegovinian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Mijić.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that his deportation would expose him to the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention and that his detention amounted to a breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
4. On 10 December 2009 the President of the Fourth Section of the Court decided, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings, to indicate to the Government that the applicant should not be expelled to Tunisia until 15 January 2010 (Rule 39 of the Rules of Court).
5. On 12 January 2010 a Chamber of the Fourth Section of the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1) as well as to extend the interim measure mentioned above pending the Constitutional Court’s decision on the applicant’s application for interim measures and for a period of seven days following notification of that decision to the applicant.
6. On 2 February 2010 the Chamber decided to extend the interim measure of 10 December 2009 until further notice.
7. In the light of the change of regime in Tunisia, on 8 March 2011 the Chamber decided that the parties should be invited to submit further written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application (Rule 54 § 2 (c) of the Rules of Court).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
8. The applicant was born in Tunisia in 1965. He arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1992-95 war and joined the foreign mujahedin. The mujahedin phenomenon is explained by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hadžihasanović and Kuburajudgment,
IT-01-47-T, §§ 411-18, 15 March 2006, as follows:
“411. Witnesses for both the Prosecution and Defence agreed that the foreign mujahedin began to arrive in Zenica and Travnik during 1992, particularly in the second half of the year.
412. At that time, the borders of the RBiH (Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) were controlled by the organs of Republika Srpska or HVO authorities, which made it very difficult for the RBiH legal authorities, more specifically the MUP (Ministry of the Interior), to control the entry and movements of foreigners in the RBiH. Foreign mujahedin reached Bosnia via the Republic of Croatia and via Herzegovina where the HVO had established power. They frequently arrived as members of humanitarian organisations and did not register with the RBiH authorities.
413. Most of the foreign mujahedin came from the countries of North Africa, the Near East and the Middle East, i.e. Algeria, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen. Some also came from European countries, but how many is not known.
414. Foreign mujahedin were easily recognisable by their traditional clothing and dark complexion. They had long beards and wore turbans or hats. Some wore camouflage uniforms or parts of camouflage uniforms, while others wore long white robes. There were also those with scarves around their head and neck. Most of them did not know the Bosnian language and spoke only Arabic. The foreign mujahedin carried automatic rifles and rocket launchers. Some had sabres or long knives. Some witnesses recognised the insignia the foreign mujahedin wore on their shoulders.
415. According to the evidence characterising the position of the foreign mujahedin, the term ‘mujahedin’ refers to Muslims fighting a jihad, or holy war. The foreign mujahedin went to Bosnia in order to help their Muslim brothers defend themselves against the Serbian aggressor and intended to leave the country once peace had been re-established. According to these same sources, the foreign mujahedin also wanted to spread their beliefs, which they felt were the most faithful expression of Islamic texts.
416. Most foreign mujahedin in Central Bosnia seem to have arrived as members of humanitarian organisations. Defence witnesses agreed that during the first phase they were involved in humanitarian activities. They provided quite significant aid to the local Muslim population, particularly food, and organised classes in religious instruction.
417. Starting in the second half of 1992 when conflicts broke out in Central Bosnia, foreign mujahedin became fighters. They furnished the local population with weapons and uniforms and provided military training. As explained below, the foreign mujahedin took part systematically in combat side by side with the ABiH.
418. Given their humanitarian involvement, the foreign mujahedin initially enjoyed a degree of trust and had the support of the local population. Young men, even minors, joined them. ABiH soldiers deserted their own units to join the ranks of the foreign mujahedin, especially in order to benefit from their material support. Some of the mujahedin married girls from the region. Over time, however, the foreign mujahedin tried to promote their view of fundamental Islam. They ordered the Bosnian women to cover their heads, condemned the consumption of alcohol and insisted that the local Muslims practice their religion. The foreign mujahedin burst into cafés and restaurants that served alcohol and if they saw a woman or young girl dressed in what they considered inappropriate fashion, they voiced their strong opposition. As a result of this rigid attitude, relations between the foreigners and the local population deteriorated.”
9. Although he had never been given citizenship or a residence permit in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 28 December 1995 the applicant obtained a national identity card on the basis of a forged decision of 15 February 1992 granting citizenship to a certain Marvon Mufti (that national identity card was revoked in 2002). In 1997 the applicant married a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They have two children, born in 1998 and 2000. It would appear that the applicant never returned to Tunisia after the 1992-95 war.
10. On 24 April 2009, during a random check, the Aliens Service of the Ministry of Security found that the applicant was an illegal immigrant in Bosnia and Herzegovina and placed him in Istočno Sarajevo Immigration Centre for deportation purposes. On 14 May 2009 he lodged an application for judicial review through his counsel, but the application was ultimately rejected as out of time. The initial detention period was extended on a monthly basis. Each of the extension orders was then upheld by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the State Court”) and some of them by the Constitutional Court. Appeals concerning the remaining extension orders are still pending before the Constitutional Court.
11. On 19 May 2009 the Aliens Service established that the applicant was a threat to national security, ordered his deportation and prohibited his re-entry for a period of five years. It relied on secret intelligence reports. On 22 June 2009 the Ministry of Security upheld the decision. On 10 November 2009 the State Court, having assessed the secret evidence, also upheld the deportation order. An appeal is pending before the Constitutional Court.
12. On 24 July 2009 the applicant claimed asylum. He maintained that Tunisian citizens who had joined the foreign mujahedin during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina were treated in Tunisia as suspected terrorists and were subjected to ill-treatment. He added that Tunisian authorities had visited his family and had enquired about him shortly after the opening of his deportation proceedings. The applicant could not explain, however, how those authorities had learned about his activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The applicant submitted a statement by Mr Kousri, a Tunisian human-rights activist, asserting that a certain Badredine Ferchichi had been sentenced by a Tunisian military tribunal to three years’ imprisonment for having fought in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
13. On 27 July 2009 the Asylum Service interviewed the applicant with the help of an interpreter since the applicant did not speak any of the official languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also had regard to reports of the United States Department of State, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch on Tunisia, which mentioned many cases of ill-treatment meted out to suspected terrorists. The practices reported included hanging from the ceiling, threats of rape, administration of electric shocks, immersion of the head in water, beatings and cigarette burns. Allegations of ill-treatment were reportedly not investigated by the Tunisian authorities.
14. On 7 August 2009 the Asylum Service refused the asylum claim. It held that it had not been shown that the applicant would indeed be treated in Tunisia as a suspected terrorist and that he therefore did not face a real risk of being subjected to ill-treatment. The statement concerning the situation of Mr Badredine Ferchichi was not admitted to the file because the applicant had failed to provide a translation into an official language of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 10 November 2009 the State Court upheld that decision. An appeal is pending before the Constitutional Court.
15. On 3 December 2009 the applicant lodged an application for interim measures with the Constitutional Court asking that his deportation be stayed pending the Constitutional Court’s decision on the merits of the case.
16. Removal directions for 10 December 2009 at about 2 p.m., issued on 8 December, were served on the applicant on 10 December at about 10 a.m. The applicant immediately applied for interim measures with the Court and the President of the Fourth Section of the Court granted an interim measure the same day at about 1 p.m. (see paragraphs 4-6 above).
17. On 12 January 2010 the Constitutional Court refused the applicant’s application for interim measures. The decision was notified to the applicant on 1 February 2010.
18. The applicant is still in Istočno Sarajevo Immigration Centre.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Secret Data Act 2005
19. The Secret Data Act 2005 (Zakon o zaštiti tajnih podataka, Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina nos. 54/05 and 12/09) entered into force on 17 August 2005. Section 5 of that Act provides that the judges of the State Court and the Constitutional Court have access to all levels of secret data without any formalities (such as security clearance or special authorisation), if such access is required for exercising their duties.
B. Aliens Act 2008
1. Eligibility for international protection (refugee status and subsidiary protection) and for leave to remain on humanitarian grounds
20. The Aliens Act 2008 (Zakon o kretanju i boravku stranaca i azilu, Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina no. 36/08) entered into force on 14 May 2008. Section 105 thereof provides that a refugee is an alien who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside his or her country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or a stateless person, who, being outside the country of former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. The same provision defines a person eligible for subsidiary protection as an alien who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he or she would face a real risk of the death penalty or execution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country of origin or in the country of habitual residence, or there is a serious, individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict, and who is unable, or, owing to fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.
The principle of non-refoulement is incorporated in section 91 of the Act, which reads as follows:
“An alien shall not be returned or expelled in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, regardless of whether or not the person concerned has been granted international protection. The prohibition of return or expulsion (non-refoulement) shall also apply to persons in respect of whom there is a reasonable suspicion for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. An alien may not be returned or expelled to a country where he or she is not protected from being sent to such a territory either.”
Pursuant to section 118 of the Act, an alien whose claim for international protection has been refused will nevertheless be granted leave to remain on humanitarian grounds, if his or her removal would breach the principle of non-refoulement. However, the alien concerned must be placed in detention if it has been established that he or she constitutes a threat to public order or national security.
2. Deportation order and removal directions
21. An appeal against a deportation order suspends deportation (section 87 of that Act). A claim for international protection and an application for judicial review against a refusal of such a claim equally suspend deportation (sections 92, 109(9) and 117 of that Act). Pursuant to section 93 of that Act, once an alien has become expellable, removal directions are issued within seven days. An appeal against removal directions does not suspend deportation.
3. Detention for deportation purposes
22. Pursuant to section 99(2)(b) of that Act, an alien must be detained if it has been established that he or she constitutes a threat to public order or national security. Sections 100(3) and 102 of that Act provide that an initial detention order is valid for thirty days, but it may be extended any number of times for up to thirty days at a time. The total period of detention, however, may exceed 180 days only in exceptional circumstances, such as if an alien prevents his or her removal or if it is impossible to remove an alien within 180 days for other reasons.
III. INTERNATIONAL TEXTS
A. Concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina
23. The General Framework Agreement for Peace, which put an end to the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was initialled at a military base near Dayton, the United States, on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris, France, on 14 December 1995. It entered into force on the latter date.
24. Pursuant to Article III of Annex 1A to that Agreement, all foreign forces, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighbouring and other States, irrespective of whether they were legally and militarily subordinated to any of the local forces, had to be withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina by 13 January 1996.
B. Concerning Tunisia
25. As to the situation in Tunisia before the recent change of regime, see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, §§ 65-93, 28 February 2008.
26. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has recently looked at the situation in Tunisia after the change of regime (document no.12624 of 1 June 2011). The pertinent part of the explanatory memorandum reads as follows:
“12. For several weeks after the revolution of 14 January 2011, the political situation in Tunisia remained very unstable. The first provisional government, formed by the former Prime Minister Ghannouchi on 17 January with the participation of representatives of the ‘legal’ opposition parties (the few political formations that existed under the former regime) and independents, succeeded in making a number of decisions tending towards democratisation. But that government soon found itself under pressure from the demonstrators, who demanded the resignation of ministers who had served under Ben Ali.
13. At the same time, the political forces close to the former regime, from Ben Ali’s RCD party (Constitutional Democratic Rally) and the security services, tried to stir up trouble in the country in order to shift the transition process towards a new authoritarianism under the guise of ‘controlled’ political liberalisation.
14. Faced with these attempts, the elements in favour of democratic change, particularly the unions and the active members of civil society, continued to exert pressure on the provisional government through demonstrations. They also began to form a National Council to Defend the Revolution, which demanded the calling of a constituent assembly and the dissolution of all institutions inherited from the Ben Ali era, namely Parliament, the RCD and the political police.
15. At the beginning of February, the two Chambers of Parliament passed a law allowing the Interim President, Fouad Mebazaa, to govern by legislative decree. Parliament was then suspended and dissolved. Moreover, on 19 February the Interim President issued a legislative decree declaring an amnesty for all political prisoners.
16. Among the main decisions of the Ghannouchi government should be noted the banning of the old ruling party, the RCD, as well as the establishment of a commission to reform texts and institutions which was supposed to prepare the democratic transformation of the country.
17. Mention should also be made of the dissolution of the Ministry of Communication (which it would be more accurate to call the ministry of propaganda and censorship) and a degree of liberalisation of the media. Reform of the press still remains to be carried out, however. Indeed, we have been informed that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) encounter problems if they want to obtain radio frequencies.
18. On 27 February, the second government presided over by former Prime Minister Ghannouchi was forced to resign as a result of pressure from the protesters. The new transition government, headed by Mr Beji Caïd Essebsi, had no members who had been close to the Ben Ali regime and positioned itself as a cabinet of technocrats whose objective was to guarantee calm and stability during the transition period.
19. On 3 March, the Interim President set 24 July 2011 as the date for elections to a Constituent Assembly by direct universal suffrage according to a new electoral code. A specific body called the Higher Authority for Realisation of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition was set up to prepare the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Mr Yadh Ben Achour, former Dean of the Tunis Faculty of Legal, Political and Social Sciences, who had resigned from the Constitutional Council in 1992 and was an opponent of the Ben Ali regime, was appointed president of the new body.
20. The Higher Authority, which is composed of 161 members, many of whom are representatives of the political world and civil society, as well as professional lawyers, prepared and submitted to the government in mid-April draft laws on the organisation of the elections and on the electoral commission.
21. In addition, two other independent commissions of inquiry were set up in order to shed light on corruption, the misappropriation of funds by the former regime and abuses committed by the security forces during the events of December 2010-January 2011.
22. On 7 March 2011, the Minister for the Interior announced the dissolution of the State Security Service and the political police.
23. There now seems to be relative, if fragile, political and institutional stability in Tunisia, enabling the provisional authorities to be fairly optimistic about the possibility of preparing the elections. The authorities have, however, let it be known that they may be postponed if all the conditions for a ballot that complies with democratic standards are not met.
24. The fragile nature of the stability was demonstrated by the events of 5 May, which were provoked by statements by the former Tunisian Minister of the Interior, Farhat Rajhi, who announced a ‘military coup d’état’ was being prepared in the event of the Islamists’ winning the elections. The government condemned these statements, calling them an attack on public order. The demonstrations that followed this incident turned into a riot, with young Tunisians demanding the resignation of the transitional government and ‘a new revolution’. The police had to use teargas and then weapons in order to quell the riot. Several shops and houses were looted. On 7 May, the authorities introduced a curfew in Tunis. Some 600 people were arrested. The curfew was lifted on 18 May 2011.”
27. On 21 May 2011, in conclusion of his visit to Tunisia undertaken on invitation of the Government, Juan Mendez, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment, delivered the following statement:
“...
The interim Government has undertaken a series of positive steps, including, considering reforming the State security apparatus and dismantling the so-called political police, initiating security sector reforms, reviewing the national legislation in line with international standards, including inter alia removing legal obstacles to reopening the cases of homicide and torture of the past, dismissing a number of high- and mid-ranking officials from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice. I am also heartened by the discussions about the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms to address the legacy of past abuses. Encouragingly, the Government has established three advisory commissions.
...
I was told by officials that the practice of torture and ill-treatment has decreased following respective instructions issued by the officials of the security services. This I realised is true as far as the notorious and endemic practice of torture committed during the Ben Ali regime is concerned. However, I have heard credible testimonies regarding beatings of detainees upon arrest or within the first hours of pre-trial detention (garde a vue) as well as during interrogation. Such episodes reflect the fact that old habits of police agents are not easily eradicated. Whether they are isolated or more frequent, beatings inflicted as a form of punishment or intimidation reflects complete disrespect for the presumption of innocence and the dignity of persons suspected of crimes. For that reason, every single act of torture is intolerable and elicits the obligation of the State under international law to investigate, prosecute and punish it. I heard testimonies according to which the safeguards during arrest and detention, such as rules governing warrant, compulsory medical examination upon arrest and transfer, notification to the family, access to a lawyer, interrogation in the presence of witnesses, as well as the right against self-incrimination were not respected in practice. Sadly, some of those testimonies were about events that have taken place after the January 14 Revolution.
For example, I learned that in early May the police reacted heavy-handedly to a demonstration by scores of youths. Riot police clashed with protesters and representatives of the media. I heard allegations of arbitrary arrest, and beating, of a group of young people that included more than 20 minors. Together with about 46 adults, they were arbitrarily detained and taken to a detention centre without any access to a lawyer or notification to their families despite clear provisions in the Tunisian law regarding juvenile criminal law and procedure they were set free at 4:00 a.m. in one of the most dangerous areas in Tunis. During about 12 hours of detention they were forced to kneel and remain in uncomfortable positions. I welcome the initiative of the Ministry of Interior to issue a statement apologising to ‘journalists and citizens involuntarily assaulted’ and to open an inquiry into these incidents. This goes on to suggest that riot police and law-enforcement bodies engage in ill-treatment and excessive use of force to hold situations under control.
Given the lack of effective safeguards during arrest, persons deprived of their liberty are extremely vulnerable to torture and ill-treatment, moreover, given the legacy of abusive treatment by law-enforcement agents in the past, the lack of sufficiently speedy investigations into allegations of torture and ill-treatment, as well as the use of prosecutions affecting public officials, it can not be said that the culture of impunity no longer prevails, even though the current authorities have undoubtedly and sincerely pledged to respect the law. I have received several allegations of being kicked, beaten and burned with cigarettes. Many of these cases were supported by forensic medical evidence.
I learned from the Ministry of Interior that from 1999 to 2009, there were only seven criminal convictions against law-enforcement and prison officials for acts of torture and ill-treatment out of 246 prosecutions initiated. According to Tunisian law, anyone who claims to have been subjected to torture can file a complaint either with officers of the Police Judiciaire or the Prosecutor. These mechanisms are inadequate as the complaint is essentially addressed to the same body that is alleged to have perpetrated the ill-treatment. Moreover, under Tunisian legislation, judges are not obliged to exclude any evidence or statements obtained under torture, despite the fact that, as a party to the CAT, Tunisia is internationally obliged to exclude such evidence. This inevitably creates an environment conducive to impunity.
Admissibility of confessions is left to the discretion and appraisal of the judge in accordance with Articles 150 and 152 of the Criminal Procedure Code. I welcome the initiative of the Ministry of Justice to amend the definition of torture contained in the Criminal Code in order to bring it in full conformity with the definition of Article 1 of the CAT and to provide for penalties reflecting the severity of the offense. I also support an initiative to amend the laws to ensure that no statement obtained through torture shall be admitted as evidence in judicial proceedings against the defendant, except in a case presenting torture and to show that the statement was made.
It is my understanding that several agents of security forces attached in the past to the Presidency and to the Ministry of the Interior have not been removed even though they are thought to be at the heart of the serious violations of human rights that took place in the past.
The conditions of prisons and detention centres visited vary from being adequate to unsatisfactory as far as hygienic conditions, availability of medical assistance, access to telephone, and the length of family visits are concerned. Medical centres although available, do not seem to be always and adequately equipped. Dental and psychiatric assistance do not presently exist in the detention centres visited.
As far as the investigation launched into the past allegations of torture and recent abuses are concerned, I welcome the establishment of the fact-finding Commission, while recognising that its function is complementary to judiciary and should be clarified. I heard an explanation about the thorough and comprehensive way in which it has approached its mandate. However, I have learned that the number of prosecutions and initial judicial inquiries related to torture and disproportionate use of force remain low, despite the fact that the Commission’s work does not substitute the role of prosecutors and judges. The slow pace of investigation and general lack of clear signals that these cases are seriously considered provokes frustration and anger among victims and general public. It is encouraging to learn that preliminary monetary compensation has been offered to victims and their families of December and January events. It remains unclear how the amount of compensation was defined as adequate and whether any measures are undertaken to provide the victims and their families with rehabilitation services.
I welcome the initiative of the interim Government to release political prisoners and prisoners of conscience; and to grant conditional release on a case by case basis to those convicted for security related offenses. Many, if not most, of these were convicted in unfair trials, so amnesties and pardons are a partial remedy to the violations they have suffered.
I would like to welcome the commitment expressed by all levels of the Government regarding the abhorrence of torture and its determination to eradicate it...”
28. On 26 May 2011, at the conclusion of his official follow-up visit to Tunisia, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Martin Scheinin, gave the following statement:
“...
Since my last visit to Tunisia in early 2010, the world has witnessed how the negation of human rights by oppressive regimes, including under the pretext of countering terrorism, can bring together a critical mass of people from very different walks of life to pursue their aspirations for a free and democratic society and a Government that respects human rights. Tunisia has become a symbol of this lesson.
My mandate focuses on the protection of human rights while countering terrorism. In this context I have seen initial steps that indicate a break with Tunisia’s past. I was pleased to hear that many of my interlocutors confirm that the abusive anti-terrorism law of 2003 has not been used since the events of 14 January, including against the Tunisian people that demanded change. However, in Al Mornaguia Prison I learned that individual judges sometimes still order persons detained under the 2003 law. This now mostly dormant law did not do what it was supposed to do. It did not provide more security to the Tunisian people, but was used as a tool of oppression against any form of political or other dissent. The Transitional Government has acknowledged this by adopting an amnesty law covering those who were convicted or held under this law. In order to provide the Tunisian people with the security they deserve, I offer the assistance of my mandate to replace the 2003 law with a proper legislative framework which regulates Tunisia’s anti-terrorism efforts in line with international conventions and protocols on countering terrorism, while fully respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. The global threat of terrorism is real and can only be responded to through properly targeted and lawful measures, instead of using the notion of terrorism to suppress dissent.
In my previous report I expressed grave concern about the activities of various entities of the security apparatus, and the secrecy and impunity in which they operated. My report singled out the Directorate for State Security as a crucial entity that was responsible for activities of torture and arbitrary and even secret detention. I commend therefore the abolishment of this entity by the Transitional Government. However, in my previous report I also highlighted the lack of publicly available information on several security organs of the Tunisian State. This secrecy was an important element that contributed to the shield of impunity under which these actors could operate. All security organs’ functions and powers must be regulated by publicly available laws. Such transparency avoids not only the creation of myths about what these agencies do, but also ensures accountability of these agencies if they commit illegal acts. In this context I have noted statements that the ‘political police’ in Tunisia has been abolished. Such a ‘police’ did not exist in the law, but it was used as term by the public, and now also by officials, to describe those elements in the security organs related to the Ministry of the Interior that were responsible for cracking down on political and human rights activists and other dissent.
Changes in the way Tunisia’s security organs operate should not be limited to slogans, but should result in concrete measures. The first steps have been taken to establish accountability for those who attacked the demonstrators in January of this year. I welcome this positive development, but want to stress that in order to look truly forward towards a new Tunisia, it has to come to terms with dark remnants of its past. During my first visit in 2010 the existence of secret facilities in the premises of the Ministry of the Interior was flatly denied. This time officials at the Ministry of the Interior agreed to show me the former secret detention facilities. However, some officials still denied the use of Ministry offices as interrogation and torture rooms. I learned that until now 60 security officials have been arrested, 7 persons in the highest ranks prosecuted, and 42 officials forced to retire, or went into retirement voluntarily. Tunisia should continue to investigate ex officio allegations of torture and illegal detention, often committed under the pretext of the fight against terrorism. Investigating, prosecuting and trying those responsible for the crimes in question can also help rebuilding trust between the population and the security forces in the country.
While I commend Tunisia’s decision to ratify the International Convention against Disappearances, the Optional Protocols to the Convention against Torture and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, I must emphasise that these promises turn into real rights only when implemented by depositing the international instrument of accession. Further, I call for rapid measures to strengthen the independence of the judiciary which as of today has not lived up to its task to secure compliance with the law, including human rights. I was also disappointed to learn that the most important safeguard against abuse in police custody, effective access to a lawyer of one’s own choice from the moment of arrest, including presence in every interrogation, is not yet in place.
These are the preliminary findings of my follow-up mission. A full report will be presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2012...”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
29. The applicant alleged that his deportation to Tunisia would expose him to the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
30. The Government maintained that the application should be rejected as premature as the case was still pending before the Constitutional Court.
31. The applicant replied that an appeal to the Constitutional Court was not an effective domestic remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention as it lacked automatic suspensive effect. He referred to Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, ECHR 2002‑I; Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, no. 25389/05, ECHR 2007‑II; and Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, no. 30471/08, ECHR 2009‑....
32. The Court reiterates that, although the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contained in Article 3 of the Convention is absolute, applicants invoking that Article are not for that reason dispensed as a matter of course from exhausting domestic remedies that are available and effective (see Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, 19 February 1998, § 45, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I, and Jabari v. Turkey (dec.), no. 40035/98, 28 October 1999). It would not only run counter to the subsidiary character of the Convention but also undermine the very purpose of the rule set out in Article 35 § 1 if the Contracting States were to be denied the opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system. That being said, in view of the importance which the Court attaches to Article 3 of the Convention and the irreversible nature of the damage which may result if the risk of ill-treatment materialises, the effectiveness of a remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 imperatively requires that the person concerned should have access to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, § 293, 21 January 2011, and the cases cited therein).
33. In the present case, it is obvious that an appeal to the Constitutional Court does not have automatic suspensive effect. While the Court is mindful of the fact that the Constitutional Court may stay deportation, as an interim measure, an application for interim measures is not of itself suspensive. In addition, the Constitutional Court is not required to decide such applications before the actual deportation of the person concerned, as evidenced in this case (the applicant lodged an application for interim measures with the Constitutional Court on 3 December 2009, his deportation was scheduled for 10 December 2009 and the Constitutional Court decided that application on 12 January 2010). Accordingly, where an applicant seeks to prevent his or her removal from Bosnia and Herzegovina to a territory where he or she allegedly faces a risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3, an appeal to the Constitutional Court cannot be considered to be an effective remedy in preventing removal before a final decision of that court. The Government’s objection must therefore be dismissed.
34. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
35. In his application and his observations of July 2010, the applicant claimed that he would be treated in Tunisia as an Islamist and a suspected terrorist because of his association with the foreign mujahedin in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the fact that he had been declared a threat to national security in Bosnia and Herzegovina and his long beard. He submitted that Islamists and suspected terrorists were, as a group, systematically exposed to serious violations of fundamental human rights, including ill-treatment, in Tunisia. He relied on reports of the United States Department of State, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International on Tunisia which were along the lines of those referred to in paragraph 25 above. He also submitted the statement by Mr Anouar Kousri mentioned in paragraph 12 above and a statement by a French human-rights activist, Ms Luiza Toscane, claiming that all Tunisian citizens who had fought in the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been arrested and some of them tortured immediately upon their return to Tunisia. It specifically named the cases of Mr Bouhouche, Mr Selmi, Mr Hajjam, Mr Ferchichi and Mr Mouelhi. Lastly, the applicant argued that his case was surely known to Tunisian authorities since they had been notified of his deportation and most likely of the fact that he was regarded as a threat to national security in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His name had appeared in many media reports, some of them linking the applicant to terrorist groups.
36. In their observations of May and September 2010, the Government stated that the applicant’s allegations were vague, unsubstantiated and on occasion contradictory. While accepting that suspected and, even more so, convicted terrorists faced a real risk of being subjected to ill-treatment in Tunisia, the Government submitted that the applicant had failed to establish that he would indeed be treated as one. The present case should therefore be distinguished from the cases of Sellem v. Italy, no. 12584/08, 5 May 2009, and Saadi v. Italy, cited above, which concerned convicted terrorists. The Government argued that the domestic authorities had rigorously examined the applicant’s case: they had taken into account relevant reports and had assessed the secret evidence against the applicant. The Government also confirmed that the Tunisian authorities had been notified on 26 November 2009 of the plan to deport the applicant in the near future.
37. In his further observations of March 2011, the applicant argued that owing to political instability, the unchanged anti-terrorism law, the ingrained culture of violence and impunity within the security forces and the judiciary directed at Islamists, and the dire prison conditions, a real risk of ill-treatment remained for Islamists who were deported to Tunisia, despite the recent changes in that country.
38. In their further observations of March 2011, the Government stated that the situation in Tunisia had radically improved since the recent change of regime and that the applicant no longer faced any risk of being subjected to ill-treatment in that country.
39. It is the Court’s settled case-law that as a matter of well-established international law and subject to its treaty obligations, including those arising from the Convention, a Contracting State has the right to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens (see, among many other authorities, Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410/99, § 54, ECHR 2006‑XII). The right to asylum is also not contained in either the Convention or its Protocols (Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no. 1948/04, § 135, 11 January 2007). Expulsion by a Contracting State may, however, give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if expelled, faces a real risk of being subjected to ill-treatment. In such a case, Article 3 implies an obligation not to expel the person in question to that country (see Saadi v. Italy, cited above, § 125). Given that the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute, the conduct of applicants, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be taken into account (ibid., §§ 127 and 138).
40. The assessment of the existence of a real risk must be rigorous (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 96, Reports 1996‑V). As a rule, it is for applicants to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, they would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (N. v. Finland, no. 38885/02, § 167, 26 July 2005). Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the Government to dispel any doubts about it. The Court will take as its basis all the material placed before it or, if necessary material obtained proprio motu. It will do so, particularly when an applicant – or a third party within the meaning of Article 36 of the Convention – provides reasoned grounds which cast doubt on the accuracy of the information relied on by the respondent Government. The Court must be satisfied that the assessment made by the authorities of the Contracting State is adequate and sufficiently supported by domestic materials as well as by materials originating from other reliable and objective sources such as, for instance, other Contracting or non-Contracting States, agencies of the United Nations and reputable non-governmental organisations (NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904/07, § 119, 17 July 2008).
41. If an applicant has not yet been deported when the Court examines the case, the relevant time will be that of the proceedings before the Court (Saadi v. Italy, cited above, § 133). A full and ex nunc assessment is called for as the situation in a country of destination may change in the course of time. While the historical position is of interest in so far as it may shed light on the current situation and its likely evolution, it is the present conditions which are decisive and it is hence necessary to take into account information that has come to light after the final decision taken by domestic authorities (see Salah Sheekh, cited above, § 136).
42. Accordingly, in the present case the Court must examine whether the applicant, if deported to Tunisia, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3, despite the recent changes in that country.
43. As noted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and UN Special Rapporteurs, the process of democratic transition in Tunisia is in progress and steps have already been taken to dismantle the oppressive structures of the former regime and put in place elements of a democratic system: notably, security forces widely accused of human-rights abuses during the former regime, including the State Security Service, were dissolved; an amnesty was granted to all political prisoners, including those who had been held under the controversial anti-terrorism law; and a number of high- and mid-ranking officials from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice were dismissed and/or prosecuted for past abuses (see paragraphs 26-28 above).
44. While it is true that cases of ill-treatment are still reported, those are sporadic incidents (see paragraph 27 above); there is no indication, let alone proof, that Islamists, as a group, have been systematically targeted after the change of regime. On the contrary, all the main media have reported that Mr Rachid Ghannouchi, a leader of the principal Tunisian Islamist movement (Ennahda), was able to return to Tunisia after twenty or so years in exile and that on 1 March 2011 the movement in question was allowed to register as a political party. It should also be emphasised that on 29 June 2011 Tunisia acceded to the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, setting up a preventive system of regular visits to places of detention, as well as to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, recognising the competence of the Human Rights Committee to consider individual cases. This shows the determination of the Tunisian authorities to once and for all eradicate the culture of violence and impunity which prevailed during the former regime.
45. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that there is no real risk that the applicant, if deported to Tunisia, would be subjected to ill-treatment. Therefore, his deportation to Tunisia would not violate Article 3 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
46. The applicant also contested the lawfulness of his detention pending deportation on account of its duration. He relied in that regard on Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.”
47. The Government contested that argument.
48. The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention does not demand that the detention of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing. In this respect Article 5 § 1 (f) provides a different level of protection from Article 5 § 1 (c). All that is required under this provision is that deportation proceedings are in progress and prosecuted with due diligence (see Chahal, cited above, §§ 112-13, and Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03, § 72, ECHR 2008‑...).
49. Turning to the present case, the period under consideration started on 24 April 2009 when the applicant was placed in an immigration centre with a view to deportation. In a period of less than eight months, the domestic authorities then issued a deportation order, examined the applicant’s asylum claim at two levels of jurisdiction and issued removal directions. The Court does not consider this period to be excessive. Although the applicant has remained in custody until the present day, the period since 10 December 2009 must be distinguished because during this time the Government have refrained from deporting the applicant in compliance with the request made by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see Chahal, cited above, § 114). The Court reiterates in that regard that the Contracting States are obliged under Article 34 of the Convention to comply with interim measures indicated under Rule 39 (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, §§ 99-129, ECHR 2005‑I).
50. That being said, the implementation of an interim measure following an indication by the Court to a State Party that it would be desirable not to return an individual to a particular country does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 (see Gebremedhin, cited above, § 74). In other words, the domestic authorities must still act in strict compliance with domestic law (ibid., § 75). The Court notes that it has been established by the domestic authorities that the present applicant constitutes a threat to national security (see paragraph 11 above). His detention has accordingly been authorised and is indeed mandatory pursuant to section 99(2)(b) of the Aliens Act 2008 (see paragraph 22 above). Furthermore, the initial detention period has been extended on a monthly basis, as envisaged by domestic law.
51. Having regard to the above, the Court concludes that the deportation proceedings, although temporarily suspended pursuant to the request made by the Court, have nevertheless been in progress and in strict compliance with domestic law (compare S.P. v. Belgium (dec.), no. 12572/08, 14 June 2011; contrast Ryabikin v. Russia, no. 8320/04, § 132, 19 June 2008, and Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, no. 30471/08, § 134, ECHR 2009‑...). Since there is no indication that the authorities have acted in bad faith, that the applicant has been detained in unsuitable conditions or that his detention has been arbitrary for any other reason (see Saadi v. the United Kingdom, cited above, §§ 67-74), this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
52. The applicant further complained of the unfairness of the deportation proceedings. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law...”
53. The Court reiterates that decisions concerning the entry, stay and deportation of aliens do not involve the determination of an applicant’s civil rights or obligations or of a criminal charge against him for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 (see Maaouia v. France [GC], no. 39652/98, §§ 36-40, ECHR 2000‑X). This complaint is accordingly incompatible ratione materiae and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
54. The applicant further complained that the decision to expel him and to prohibit his re-entry for five years amounted to a breach of his right to respect for his family life. He relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
55. The Court observes that this complaint was not included in the initial application, but was raised in the applicant’s observations of July 2010 (in his initial application, the applicant raised a complaint under Article 8 of the Convention only with regard to his detention pending deportation). It was thus not raised early enough to allow an exchange of observations between the parties (see Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286/01, §§ 61‑63, 28 March 2006; Maznyak v. Ukraine, no. 27640/02, § 22, 31 January 2008; Kuncheva v. Bulgaria, no. 9161/02, § 18, 3 July 2008; Lisev v. Bulgaria, no. 30380/03, § 33, 26 February 2009; and Tsonyo Tsonev v. Bulgaria, no. 33726/03, § 24, 1 October 2009). Nevertheless, the Court does not have to decide whether it is appropriate to take this matter up separately at this stage as the complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.
56. The Court has earlier established that an appeal to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is, in principle, an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (Mirazović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), no. 13628/03, 16 May 2006, and Alibašić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), no. 18478/08, 29 March 2011). Since this complaint is still pending before that court and the Convention does not require that an applicant complaining about his or her deportation under Article 8 should have access to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect (in contrast to such complaints under Article 3, see paragraphs 32-33 above), the complaint is premature. It must therefore be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
V. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
57. Lastly, the Court has examined the other complaints submitted by the applicant. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within the Court’s jurisdiction, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
VI. RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT
58. In accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention.
59. The Court considers that the indication made to the Government under Rule 39 (see paragraphs 4-6 above) must continue in force until the present judgment becomes final or until the Panel of the Grand Chamber of the Court accepts any request by one or both of the parties to refer the case to the Grand Chamber under Article 43 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there would be no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in the event of the applicant’s deportation to Tunisia;
3. Decides to continue to indicate to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that it is desirable in the interests of the proper conduct of the proceedings not to expel the applicant until such time as the present judgment becomes final or further order.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 November 2011, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
U presudi se ESLJP poziva na presudu M.S.S. v. Belgije i Grčke [GC], br. 30696/09, tačka 293., od 21. januara 2011