Analiza slučaja pred Evropskim sudom za ljudska prava
Evropska Konvencija o ljudskim pravima
Praktični vodič za primenu Evropske konvencije o ljudskim pravima
Priručnici i vodiči kroz praksu Evropskog suda za ljudska prava
Evropski sud za ljudska prava u 50 pitanja
Glosar Evropske Konvencije o ljudskim pravima
Nacionalna mreža sudija i tužilaca za primenu standarda Evropskog suda za ljudska prava
Preuzmite presudu u pdf formatu
EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
SUD (VEĆE)
PREDMET RAIMONDO protiv ITALIJE
(Predstavke br. 12954/87)
PRESUDA
STRAZBUR
22. februar 1994. godine
Presuda prevedena na srpski jezik u okviru zajedničkog projekta Evropske unije i Saveta Evrope „Oduzimanje imovinske koristi stečene krivičnim delom u Srbiji ”.
U predmetu Raimondo protiv Italije[1], Evropski sud za ljudska prava, zasedajući, u skladu sa članom 43 (čl. 43) Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: „Konvencija”) i relevantnim odredbama Poslovnika Suda, u Veću u čijem sastavu su bili:
g. R. RISDAL (RYSSDAL), Predsednik,
g. R. BERNARD (BERNHARDT),
g. F. MATŠER (MATSCHER),
g. K. RUSO (RUSSO),
gđa E. PALM,
g. I. FOJGEL (FOIGHEL),
g. F. BIĐI (BIGI),
g. L. VILDHABER (WILDHABER),
g. D. GOČEV (GOTCHEV),
g. M-A. AJSEN (EISSEN), Sekretar i
g. H. PECOLD (PETZOLD), Zamenik Sekretara,
Posle razmatranja predmeta na sednicama zatvorenim za javnost 23. septembra 1993. godine i 24. januara 1994. godine, Izriče sledeću presudu koja je usvojena poslednjeg pomenutog dana
POSTUPAK
U odgovoru na upit postavljen shodno stavu 3 (d) pravila 33 Poslovnika Suda, gđa Piteli (Pitelli), supruga g. Raimonda i njihova tri sina su 7. juna 1993. godine obavestili Sekretara Suda o smrti svog supruga i oca. Izjavili su da žele da nastave sa postupkom, da u njemu učestvuju i da ih zastupa advokat koga su oni imenovali (pravilo 30). Iz praktičnih razloga g. Raimondo će se i dalje pominjati kao „podnosilac predstavke” iako njegova udovica i tri sina sada imaju taj status (vidi između ostalog presudu u predmetu Pandolfelli and Palumbo v. Italy od 27. februara 1992. godine, Series A 231-B, str. 16, stav 2). Gđa Piteli i njeni sinovi su se složili da otkriju identitet g. Raimonda koji se u početku pominjao pod inicijalima G.R.
U sudsko veće su po službenoj dužnosti bili uključeni g. K. Ruso, izabrani italijanski sudija (član 43 Konvencije) i g. R. Risdal, Predsednik Suda (pravilo 21 stav 3 (b)). Potpredsednik Suda je 27. februara 1993. godine u prisustvu Sekretara Suda, žrebom odredio imena preostale sedmorice sudija, i to: g. R. Bernarda, g. F. Matšera, gđe. E. Palm, g. I. Fojgela, g. F. Biđija, g. L. Vildhabera i g. D. Gočeva (član 43 in fine Konvencije i stav 4 pravila 21).
Kao Predsednik sudskog veća (stav 5 pravila 21), g. Risdal, je preko Sekretara, konsultovao zastupnika Države Italije (u daljem tekstu: „Država”), advokata podnosioca predstavke i delegata Komisije o organizaciji postupka (stav 1 člana 37 i član 38). Shodno nalogu koji je posle toga izdat, Sekretar je 12. jula 1993. godine primio podnesak podnosioca predstavke, kao i podnesak Države – 30. jula. Delegat Komisije nije podneo primedbe u pisanom obliku.
Komisija je 6. septembra 1993. godine dostavila spise o postupku koji se pred njom vodi, na osnovu zahteva Sekretara, shodno uputstvima dobijenim od Predsednika Suda.
Shodno odluci Predsednika – koji je podnosiocu predstavke dao odobrenje da koristi italijanski jezik (stav 3 pravilo 27) – javna rasprava je održana 20. septembra 1993. godine u Sudu u Strazburu. Neposredno pred početak rasprave, Sud je održao pripremnu sednicu.
Pred Sudom su nastupali:
(a) u ime Države
g. G. RAIMONDI, sudija, na privremenoj službi u Diplomatskoj pravnoj službi, Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova, u svojstvu kozastupnika,
g. E. Selvađi (SELVAGGI), načelnik Odeljenja za ljudska prava, Generalni Direktorat za krivčnopravna pitanja pri Ministarstvu pravde, u svojstvu advokata;
(b) u ime Komisije
g. E. BUSUTIL (BUSUTTIL), u svojstvu delegata;
(c) u ime podnosioca predstavke
g. M. MELINI (MELLINI), u svojstvu advokata.
Sudu su se obratili gore pomenuti predstavnici, koji su i odgovarali na pitanja.
Država je 14. oktobra 1993. godine pružila dodatne informacije. Komisija je o tome 11. decembra podnela komentare u pisanom obliku.
ČINJENICE
I. POSEBNE OKOLNOSTI SLUČAJA
A. Krivični postupak
Javni tužilac Katancare je 24. jula 1984. godine izdao nalog za hapšenje sedamnaest osoba, uključujući i podnosioca predstavke. Pošto je u početku izbegavao hapšenje po osnovu ovog naloga, podnosilac predstavke se 7. novembra 1984. godine predao vlastima i odmah je zadržan u pritvoru.
Istraga je okončana 24. jula 1985. godine i g. Raimondo je predat Okružnom sudu u Katancaru, zajedno sa još četrnaest suoptuženih radi suđenja. Pritvor mu je zamenjen kućnim pritvorom (arresti domiciliari).
Na prvoj raspravi održanoj 8. oktobra 1985. godine Okružni sud je naložio spajanje ovog sa još dva predmeta i naložio da određeni dokumenti budu priloženi spisima. Zatim je odložio postupak do 16. januara 1986. godine. Okružni sud je 30. januara oslobodio g. Raimonda optužbe zbog nedostatka dokaza (assoluzione per insufficienza di prove) i povukao nalog za kućni pritvor.
Prilikom donošenja presude 16. januara 1987. godine, po žalbi javnog tužioca i g. Raimonda, Apelacioni sud Katancara je podnosioca predstavke oslobodio optužbi zbog toga što materijalne činjenice krivičnog dela nisu utvrđene (perchè il fatto non sussiste). Kasacionom sudu nije podneta bilo kakva žalba.
B. Postupak u vezi s preventivnim merama
1. Postupak pred Okružnim sudom u Katancaru
Javni tužilac Katancara se 16. januara 1985. godine obratio Okružnom sudu sa zahtevom za izdavanje naloga da g. Raimondo bude stavljen pod posebnu prismotru policije kao i da mu se preventivno zapleni određena imovina, s mogućnošću da ona kasnije bude i oduzeta (Zakon br 1423 od 27. decembra 1956. godine i Zakon br. 575 od 31. maja 1965. godine, izmenjen i dopunjen Zakonom br. 646 od 13. septembra 1982. godine – vidi stavove 16-18 dole u tekstu). On je svoj zahtev podneo na osnovu izveštaja karabinjera iz Soverata, od 27. decembra 1984. godine.
Okružni sud je 13. maja 1985. godine naložio zaplenu šesnaest nepokretnosti (deset zemljišnih parcela i šest zgrada) i šest vozila, za koja se činilo da su podnosiocu predstavke na raspolaganju. Ova mera je uneta u relevantni javni registar 15. maja 1985. godine. Okružni sud je 16. oktobra povukao nalog u vezi sa zaplenom određene imovine koja pripada trećim licima; s druge strane, sud je naložio zaplenu nekih zgrada čiji su vlasnici bili podnosilac predstavke i njegova supruga kao i četiri vozila, iz razloga što nije dokazano da su data imovinska sredstva stečena na „zakonit način”. Oduzimanje je uneto u registar 9. novembra 1985. godine. Gospodin Raimondo je istom tom odlukom stavljen pod poseban policijski nadzor, koja međutim nije stupila na snagu sve do 30. januara 1986. godine, istog onog dana kada ga je Okružni sud oslobodio optužbi (vidi stav 10 gore u tekstu); on je takođe morao da položi jemstvo u iznosu od 2.000.000 lira, kao garanciju poštovanja ograničenja predviđenih ovom merom, tačnije, zabrane napuštanja kuće bez prethodnog obaveštavanja policije, obaveze javljanja policiji danima koji su za to određeni, obaveze da se kući vraća do devet sati uveče a da od kuće ne odlazi pre sedam sati ujutru osim ako za to ima valjan razlog i pošto je relevantne organe vlasti o toj svojoj nameri prethodno obavestio.
2. Postupak pred Apelacionim sudom u Katancaru
Apelacioni sud Katancara je po žalbi podnosioca predstavke 4. jula 1986. godine doneo presudu, na raspravi zatvorenoj za javnost. Sud je ukinuo meru specijalnog nadzora i naložio povraćaj jemstva kao i zaplenjene i oduzete imovine. Ta odluka suda (decreto) se odnosila na „zbunjujuće nonšalantan način na koji su sporne preventivne mere, koje su primenjene prema ličnosti i imovini g. Raimonda, usvojene i na taj način praktično odlučile o njegovoj građanskoj i finansijskoj smrti.” Odluka je zavedena u sekretarijatu 2. decembra 1986. godine i potpisana je od strane relevantnih odgovornih lica u tužilaštvu, 10. decembra. Sekretarijat Apelacionog suda je o toj odluci ponovo 2. decembra obavestio nadležne policijske vlasti (questura), koje su 5. decembra o istoj obavestile lokalne karabinjere. Karabinjeri su podnosioca predstavke o tome obavestili 20. decembra. Odluka je postala pravnosnažna 31. decembra 1986. godine.
Povlačenje naloga za zaplenu nekretnina i oduzimanje vozila je zavedeno u relevantne registre 2. februara (za nepokretnost), 10. februara (za dva automobila i jedan kombi) a 10. jula 1987. godine (za kamion). Novčano jemstvo vraćeno je podnosiocu predstavke 24. aprila 1987. godine. Kada je reč o oduzetim nepokretnostima, zahtev za ukidanje mera u registar nosi datum 9. avgust 1991. godine.
II. RELEVANTNO DOMAĆE PRAVO
A. Važeći zakonski propisi u dato vreme
1. Zakon od 27. decembra 1956. godine
„46. Shodno članu 1, Zakon se primenjuje na, između ostalog, (…) pojedince za koje se, na osnovu njihovog ponašanja i načina života (tenore di vita), smatra da uobičajeno, ili samo delom, žive od imovinske koristi stečene kriminalnim aktivnostima ili od naknade za saučesništvo u tim aktivnostima (con il favoreggiamento), ili čije ponašanje u javnosti daje povoda da se o njima misli kao o nekome ko je sklon kriminalnom ponašanju (che, per le manifestazioni cui abbiano dato luogo, diano fondato motivo di ritenere che siano proclivi a delinquere).
Načelnik policije [(questore)] može takvim osobama izdati upozorenje (diffida) ...
47.…
48 … [takve osobe] mogu, shodno članu 3, da budu stavljene pod specijalni policijski nadzor (sorveglianza speciale della pubblica sicurezza); ako se ukaže potreba, ta se mera može kombinovati bilo sa zabranom boravka u jednom ili više krajeva ili provincija, ili kada se radi o posebno opasnim osobama (particolare pericolosità), sa nalogom kojim se određuje obavezno boravište (obbligo del soggiorno in un determinato comune).
Samo Okružni sud glavnog grada neke provincije ima ovlašćenje da izda nalog za ove mere; sud to čini na osnovu obrazloženog zahteva koji je [questore] uputio predsedniku nadležnog suda (član 4, prvi stav). Okružni sud mora doneti obrazloženu odluku (provvedimento) u [sudskom] veću u roku od trideset dana. Sud će najpre saslušati odeljenje javnog tužioca i lice u pitanju koje ima pravo da podnese pismenu odbranu i ima pravo na pomoć advokata (član 4, drugi stav).
Organi tužilaštva i lice u pitanju mogu u roku od deset dana da podnesu žalbu koja nema odložno dejstvo; Apelacioni sud mora doneti obrazloženu odluku (decreto) u [sudskom] veću u roku od trideset dana (član 4, peti i šesti stav). Na tu odluku se, takođe, pod istim uslovima može uložiti žalba Kasacionom sudu, koji svoju presudu mora doneti u [sudskom] veću u roku od trideset dana (član 4, sedmi stav).
49. Prilikom donošenja jedne od mera navedenih u članu 3, Okružni sud mora navesti koliko dugo ta mera ostaje na snazi – ne kraće od godinu dana a ne duže od pet godina (član 4, četvrti stav) – i mora izdati naloge koje dotična osoba mora poštovati (član 5, prvi stav).
…”
2. Zakon od 31. maja 1965. godine
Zakon br. 575 od 31. maja 1965. godine (u daljem tekstu: Zakon iz 1965. godine) dopunjuje Zakon iz 1956. godine, dodavanjem odredbi koje su direktno uperene protiv mafije (disposizioni contro la mafia). Član 1 navodi da se on primenjuje na osobe – kao što je g. Raimondo – za koje postoje dokazi koji pokazuju da pripadaju „mafijaškim” grupama (indiziati di appartenere ad associazioni mafiose).
Gore navedeni zakonski propisi su osnaženi Zakonom br. 646 od 13. septembra 1982. godine (u daljem tekstu: Zakon iz 1982. godine), kojim je u Zakon iz 1965. godine ubačen, između ostalog, i član 2 ter. On predviđa različite mere koje stoje na raspolaganju tokom postupka u vezi s primenom preventivnih mera koje su predviđene Zakonom iz 1956. godine, u vezi sa licem za koje se sumnja da pripada takvoj vrsti organizacije:
„ … Okružni sud može doneti obrazloženu odluku, čak i na sopstvenu inicijativu, kojom se nalaže zaplena imovine koja je bila direktno ili indirektno na raspolaganju osobi protiv koje je pokrenut postupak, kada postoji dovoljno posrednih dokaza, kao što su veliki raskorak između njegovog načina života i očiglednog ili prijavljenog prihoda, koji pokazuju da data imovina predstavlja imovinsku korist od nezakonitih aktivnosti ili njenu reinvesticiju.
Uz primenu preventivnih mera, Okružni sud naređuje oduzimanje dobara koja su zaplenjena i za koja nije dokazano da su stečena na zakonit način. U slučajevima u kojima je ispitivanje dokaza složeno, ta se mera može naložiti i kasnije, ali ne nakon proteka godinu dana od dana zaplene.
Okružni sud će naložiti povlačenje naloga za zaplenu kada dođe do odbacivanja zahteva za određivanje preventivnih mera ili kada se dokaže da je data imovina stečena na zakonit način.”
B. Sudska praksa u vezi s primenom preventivnih mera, naročito mera usmerenih na imovinska sredstva
„ … Postojanje preventivnih mera samo po sebi nije u suprotnosti sa italijanskim Ustavom. Ustavni sud je propisao da osnovu za ove mere predstavlja potreba da se garantuje uređen i miran tok društvenih odnosa, ne samo putem zakonskih odredbi koje kažnjavaju nezakonito delo, već i putem odredbi koje za cilj imaju sprečavanje izvršavanja takvih dela (Ustavni sud, presuda br. 27 iz 1959. godine i presuda br. 23 iz 1964. godine).
Zbog posebne svrhe koju imaju, preventivne mere se ne odnose na izvršenje pojedinačnih krivičnih dela već na obrazac ponašanja koje zakon definiše kao onu vrstu ponašanja koje ukazuje na postojanje moguće opasnosti po društvo (Ustavni sud, presuda br. 23 iz 1964. godine).
Shodno tome, u italijanskom pravnom sistemu postoji osnovna razlika između krivičnih kazni i preventivnih mera. Prve predstavljaju odgovor na krivično delo i njegove posledice, a druge su sredstvo za sprečavanje izvršenja takvog dela. Drugim rečima, krivična sankcija se odnosi na krivično delo koje je već počinjeno, dok je cilj preventivnih mera da smanje opasnost od budućeg izvršenja krivičnih dela (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Ustavni sud, presuda br. 53 iz 1968. godine, u vezi s merama bezbednosti).
…
Usled toga što su krivične kazne i preventivne mere u suštini različite, na preventivne mere se ne moraju nužno primenjivati sva ustavna načela koja bi trebalo da se nalaze u osnovi krivičnih sankcija. Na primer, pretpostavka nevinosti koja je naglašena u članu 27 Ustava ne odnosi se na preventivne mere, koje se ne zasnivaju na krivičnoj odgovornosti ili krivici date osobe (Ustavni sud, presuda br. 23 iz 1964. godine).
Slično tome, takve mere ne spadaju u delokrug stava 2 člana 25 Ustava, koji zabranjuje retroaktivnu primenu krivičnih odredbi. U nizu slučajeva pred Kasacionim sudom tvrdilo se da je došlo do povrede ovog načela u rešenju o oduzimanju, shodno članu 2 ter Zakona iz 1965. godine. Kasacioni sud je odlučio, pre svega, da se gore navedeno načelo ne može primenjivati na preventivne mere (vidi, na primer, Kasacioni sud, presuda u predmetu Piraino od 30. januara 1985. godine). Drugo, Kasacioni sud je istakao da sporna odredba nije zapravo retroaktivna, budući da se odnosi na imovinu koja je bila u posedu dotične osobe u vreme donošenja rešenja o oduzimanju imovine (Kasacioni sud, presuda u predmetu Olivieri od 12. maja 1986. godine) i na nezakonito korišćenje te imovine posle njegovog stupanja na snagu (Kasacioni sud, presuda u predmetu Pipitone od 4. janura 1985. godine).
Uprkos ovim ograničenjima, preventivne mere su i dalje podložne detaljnom preispitivanju u pogledu njihove ustavnosti.
Još davne 1956. godine Ustavni sud je doneo odluku da se ni u kom slučaju ne sme ograničiti pravo na slobodu osim u onim slučajevima u kojima je takvo ograničenje propisano zakonom, u slučaju kada je zakonski postupak u tu svrhu pokrenut i kada su razlozi za to izneti u sudskoj odluci (Ustavni sud, presuda br. 11 iz 1956. godine).
Sud je kasnije ustanovio da se preventivne mere ne mogu usvojiti samo na osnovu puke sumnje i da su opravdane samo onda kada su zasnovane na objektivno utvrđenim i procenjenim činjenicama koje otkrivaju ponašanje i način života dotične osobe (Ustavni sud, presuda br. 23 iz 1964. godine).
Nedavno je Ustavni sud potvrdio da ustavnost preventivnih mera i dalje zavisi od poštovanja vladavine prava i od mogućnosti obraćanja sudu u smislu korišćenja pravnog leka. Osim toga, gore pomenuta dva uslova su u tesnoj međusobnoj vezi. Stoga nije dovoljno da zakon naznači nejasne kriterijume na osnovu kojih se procenjuje opasnost; zakon ih mora precizno definisati kako bi pravo na pristup sudu i akuzatorski postupak imali smisla (Ustavni sud, presuda br. 177 iz 1980. godine).
Sudska praksa Kasacionog suda je u ovom pogledu u potpunosti dosledna sudskoj praksi Ustavnog suda; ona sasvim jasno potvrđuje da postupak za primenu preventivnih mera mora biti akuzatorski i sproveden tako da poštuje prava odbrane, kao i da svako kršenje tih prava za sobom povlači ukidanje takvih mera (vidi, na primer, Kasacioni sud, presuda br. 1255 od 29. juna 1984. godine u predmetu Santoro).
Kasacioni sud je odbacio niz pritužbi protiv navodne neustavnosti mera zaplene i oduzimanja koje su predviđene članom 2 ter zakona iz 1965. godine. Naročito u tom smislu što je Sud doneo odluku da pretpostavka u vezi s nezakonitim poreklom imovine osoba za koje se sumnja da pripadaju mafijaškim organizacijama nije u suprotnosti sa članom 24 Ustava, koji garantuje pravo odbrane, budući da oduzimanje može da se izvrši samo onda kada postoji dovoljno posrednih dokaza u vezi s nezakonitim poreklom date imovine i u odsustvu pobijanja istih (Kasacioni sud, iz prethodno citirane presude u predmetu Pipitone).
…
Kada je reč o usklađenosti mera zaplene i oduzimanja sa pravom na slobodno obavljanje privatnih ekonomskih aktivnosti i sa pravom na neometano uživanje privatne imovine (članovi 41 i 42 Ustava), Kasacioni sud je presudio da ova prava nisu apsolutna i da mogu biti ograničena u skladu sa opštim interesom. Ovo se odnosi na imovinska sredstva nezakonitog porekla ili na njihovo korišćenje (Kasacioni sud, iz prethodno citiranih presuda u predmetima Oliveri i Pipitone).
…”
POSTUPAK PRED KOMISIJOM
Gospodin Raimondo se obratio Komisiji 23. aprila 1987. godine. Žalio se na sledeće: (a) nezakonitost i dužinu trajanja pritvora (stavovi 1 i 3 člana 5 Konvencije); (b) dužinu različitih postupaka koji su se vodili protiv njega a naročito na krivični postupak (stav 1 člana 6); (c) nepoštovanje prava da bude smatran nevinim budući da su preventivne mere primenjene prema njemu (stav 2 člana 6); (d) obavezu da položi jemstvo kako bi obezbedio poštovanje gore pomenutih mera (član 1 Protokola br. 4); (e) mešanje u njegovo pravo svojine koje je proisteklo iz zaplene i oduzimanja određene njegove imovine (član 1 Protokola br. 1); i (f) činjenicu da je bio lišen prava na slobodu kretanja (član 2 Protokola br. 4).
Komisija je 6. decembra 1991. godine proglasila predstavku (br. 12954/87) prihvatljivom u pogledu pritužbi u vezi s pravom podnosioca predstavke na neometano uživanje imovine, pravo na slobodu kretanja i odluku o primeni preventivnih mera u razumnom roku; Komisija je zaključila da je ostatak predstavke neprihvatljiv. U svom izveštaju od 21. oktobra 1992. godine (koji je sastavljen shodno članu 31) (čl. 31), Komisija je izrazila sledeće mišljenje:
(a) da nije došlo do povrede člana 1 Protokola br. 1 u pogledu zaplene (osamnaest glasova za i jedan glas protiv) i oduzimanja (šesnaest glasova za i tri glasa protiv) imovine podnosioca predstavke do 31. decembra 1986. godine i po pitanju štete prouzrokovane upravljanjem zaplenjenom i konfiskovanom imovinom do tog datuma (osamnaest glasova za i jedan glas protiv);
(b) da je došlo do povrede člana 1 Protokola br. 1 zato što je oduzimanje devet nekretnina i jednog kamiona i dalje bila važeća i posle 31. decembra 1986. godine (jednoglasno);
(c) da je došlo do povrede člana 2 Protokola br. 4, budući da je podnosilac predstavke od 4. jula do 20. decembra 1986. godine bio lišen prava na slobodu kretanja (jednoglasno);
(d) da nije došlo do povrede stava 1 člana 6 u pogledu dužine trajanja postupka u vezi sa zaplenom i oduzimanjem (jednoglasno).
Ceo tekst mišljenja Komisije kao i izdvojeno mišljenje koji su sadržani u izveštaju, nalaze se u prilogu ovoj presudi[2]
KONAČNI PODNESCI DRŽAVE SUDU
PRAVO
I. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 1 PROTOKOLA BR. 1
Gospodin Raimondo se žalio na zaplenu šesnaest nekretnina i šest vozila koja je izvršena 13. maja 1985. godine, kao i na oduzimanje neke od ove imovine za koju je nalog izdat 16. oktobra 1985. godine (vidi stav 13 gore u tekstu). On se pozvao na član 1 Protokola br. 1, koji predviđa sledeće:
„Svako fizičko i pravno lice ima pravo na neometano uživanje svoje imovine. Niko ne može biti lišen svoje imovine, osim u javnom interesu i pod uslovima predviđenim zakonom i opštim načelima međunarodnog prava.
Prethodne odredbe, međutim, ni na koji način ne utiču na pravo države da primenjuje zakone koje smatra potrebnim da bi regulisala korišćenje imovine u skladu s opštim interesima ili da bi obezbedila naplatu poreza ili drugih dažbina ili kazni.”
Da bi utvrdio da li sporne mere predstavljaju kontrolu „korišćenja imovine” u smislu drugog stava ili predstavljaju lišavanje imovine shodno prvom stavu, Sud najpre mora razmotriti primenu ovih mera zaključno s 31. decembrom 1986. godine kada je odluka Apelacionog suda u Katancaru postala pravnosnažna (vidi stav 14 gore u tekstu). Sud će zatim razmotriti zašto je ta imovina i nakon tog datuma bila zavedena u javni registar (vidi stav 15 gore u tekstu).
A. Primena preventivnih mera u vezi s imovinom do 31. decembra 1986. godine
1. Zaplena
Shodno tome, nije utvrđeno da je došlo do povrede člana 1 Protokola br. 1 u vezi sa ovim pitanjem.
2. Oduzimanje
Prema tvrdnjama podnosioca predstavke, čak i kada bi se prihvatilo to da ga oduzimanje nije lišilo vlasništva nad njegovom imovinom, upisivanje u javni registar jeste predstavljalo oblik sprovođenja mere pre donošenja bilo kakve odluke po njegovoj žalbi.
Iako obuhvata lišavanje imovine, oduzimanje imovine ne mora nužno spadati u delokrug druge rečenice prvog stava člana 1 Protokola br. 1 (vidi presudu u predmetu Handyside v. the United Kingdom od 7. decembra 1976. godine, Series A br. 24, str. 30, stav 63 i presudu u predmetu AGOSI v. the United Kingdom od 24. oktobra 1986. godine, Series A br. 108, str. 17, stav 51). Prema italijanskoj sudskoj praksi, oblik oduzimanja koji je primenjen u ovom predmetu nije mogao da dovede do prenošenja vlasništva na Državu dok se ne donese neopoziva odluka (vidi stav 20 gore u tekstu). U ovom predmetu takva odluka nije doneta, budući da je g. Raimondo osporio nalog koji je izdao Okružni sud Katancara, 16. oktobra 1985. godine (vidi stav 13 gore u tekstu). Stoga se i ovde može primeniti drugi stav člana 1.
Sud je, kao i Država i Komisija, primetio da je oduzimanje – koje je takođe predviđeno članom 2 ter Zakona iz 1965. godine – težilo ostvarenju cilja koji je bio u opštem interesu, naime konfiskacijom se teži da se obezbedi da korišćenje date imovine ne stvori dobit podnosiocu predstavke ili kriminalnoj organizaciji za koju se sumnja da joj pripada, koja bi bila na štetu društvene zajednice.
Sud je u potpunosti svestan teškoća sa kojima se suočava italijanska država u borbi protiv mafije. Kao rezultat nezakonitih aktivnosti, naročito trgovine opojnim drogama i međunarodne povezanosti, ta „organizacija” ima ogroman obrt koji se kasnije investira, između ostalog, i u nekretnine. Oduzimanje imovine koja je osmišljena tako da blokira ovaj protok sumnjivog kapitala, jeste delotvorno i potrebno oružje u borbi protiv ove opake bolesti. Stoga se čini da je oduzimanje imovine mera srazmerna cilju koji se želi ostvariti, utoliko pre što zapravo ne nameće dodatna ograničenja u pogledu zaplene.
Konačno, preventivna svrha oduzimanja imovine opravdava njenu neposrednu primenu, bez obzira na mogućnost ulaganja žalbe.
U zaključku, tužena Država nije prekoračila polje slobodne procene, koje joj je dato na osnovu drugog stava člana 1.
3. Nadzor nad zaplenjenom ili oduzetom imovinom
Ponovo se pozivajući na član 1 Protokola br. 1, g. Raimondo je tvrdio da je, budući da opštinska uprava policije nije na odgovarajući način vršila nadzor imovine na koju su primenjene preventivne mere, ona postala meta vandala.
Država ovo poriče. Imajući u vidu zvanični status onih koji su bili zaduženi za čuvanje imovine – a to su službenici opštinske uprave policije koje su odredili sudski organi – protiv istih se ne može podići optužba za nemar. Osim toga, zakonski propisi iz 1989. godine su doneti u cilju regulisanja ovog pitanja, prvo zaštitom interesa osoba kojima je imovina vraćena nakon zaplene i drugo, određivanjem namene od javnog značaja zaplenjenoj a kasnije i trajno oduzetoj imovini.
Sud kao i Komisija primećuje da svaka zaplena ili oduzimanje neizbežno podrazumeva štetu. Komisija je zaključila da navodi podnosioca predstavke ne predstavljaju dovoljno jasnu osnovu za ispitivanje toga da li stvarna šteta koja je u datom slučaju pretrpljena premašuje neizbežnu štetu. Podnosilac predstavke nije pred Sudom izneo neke određene podatke. Sud stoga ne može a da ne usvoji pristup Komisije i da zaključi da ni po ovom pitanju nije došlo do povrede člana 1 Protokola br. 1.
B. Činjenica da sporne mere nisu bile brisane iz javnog registra posle 31. decembra 1986. godine
Prema podnosiocu predstavke, nadležni organi vlasti su odlagali sprovođenje odluke Apelacionog suda Katancara od 4. jula 1986. godine.
Država je tvrdila da je nepokretna i pokretna imovina vraćena 2. februara 1987. godine, tek dva meseca pošto je gore pomenuta odluka zavedena u registar. Priznali su da su formalnosti u vezi sa upisivanjem naloga za povlačenje spornih mera u javni registar potrajale neko vreme, ali g. Raimondo je mogao, a i trebalo je, da kontaktira odgovarajuće odeljenje i prosledi im kopiju odluke kojom se mere ukidaju. Član 619 prethodnog Zakonika o krivičnom postupku, koji je njegov advokat citirao tokom rasprave, nije mogao da bude primenjen zato što se on odnosi isključivo na brisanje hipoteka ili jemstava od strane tužilaštva, koje su bile naložene u cilju obezbeđivanja isplate dugova optuženog posle donošenja osuđujuće presude (sudski troškovi, novčana kazna i zatvorski troškovi).
Sud pre svega primećuje da su data imovinska sredstva vraćena podnosiocu predstavke 2. februara 1987. godine, dva meseca pošto je odluka Apelacionog suda zavedena u sekretarijatu. Bez obzira na to, Sud mora da razmotri da li činjenica da su stavke i dalje ostale upisane u relevantnim registrima, predstavlja mešanje u pravo koje je garantovano članom 1 Protokola br. 1 .
Kada je reč o imovini koja je zaplenjena 13. maja 1985. godine i tri vozila koja su oduzeta 16. oktobra 1985. godine, takvog mešanja nije bilo, budući da je potrebno upisivanje u registar obavljeno brzo, 2. i 10. februara 1987. godine (vidi stav 15 gore u tekstu). S druge strane, došlo je do mešanja u vezi s kamionom i devet drugih nekretnina koje su oduzete 16. oktobra 1985. godine, zato što upisivanje u registar u vezi s kamionom nije obavljeno sve do 10. jula 1987. godine, a u vezi sa nepokretnostima to nije obavljeno sve do 9. avgusta 1991. godine (vidi stav 15 gore u tekstu).
Nije na Sudu da utvrdi ko je trebalo da preduzme odgovarajuće korake u ovom slučaju. Međutim, i bez obzira na razloge koje je dala Država, odgovornost organa javnih vlasti je postojala. Sudu je teško da shvati zašto je bilo potrebno čekati više od sedam meseci u prvom slučaju (2. decembar 1986. godine – 10. jula 1987. godine) i četiri godine i osam meseci u drugom slučaju (2. decembar 1986. godine – 9. avgust 1991. godine) pre nego što je regulisan pravni status dela imovine g. Raimonda, kada je Apelacioni sud Katancara naložio da se sva imovina ima vratiti vlasnicima „pošto su upisane stavke brisane iz registara” (previa cancellazione delle formalita concernenti le eseguite trascrizioni).
Osim toga, ovo mešanje nije „predviđeno zakonom” niti je bilo potrebno „da bi se kontrolisalo korišćenje imovine u skladu sa opštim interesom”, u smislu člana 1 Protokola br. 1.
Shodno tome, došlo je do kršenja te odredbe.
II. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 2 PROTOKOLA BR. 4
Podnosilac predstavke se žalio na to da specijalni nadzor policije, koji mu je određen predstavlja povredu člana 2 Protokola br. 4, shodno kome:
„1. Svako ko se zakonito nalazi na teritoriji jedne države ima, na toj teritoriji, pravo na slobodu kretanja i slobodu izbora boravišta.
…
3. Nikakva ograničenja ne mogu se postaviti u odnosu na vršenje ovih prava sem onih koja su u skladu sa zakonom i koja su neophodna u demokratskom društvu u interesu nacionalne bezbednosti ili javne sigurnosti, radi očuvanja javnog poretka, za sprečavanje kriminala, za zaštitu zdravlja ili morala ili radi zaštite prava i sloboda drugih.
…”
Država je osporila ovaj stav. Odluka, koja je doneta na sednici zatvorenoj za javnost, kojom se ukida specijalni nadzor nije dobila zakonsku snagu, shodno relevantnim odredbama, sve do dana kada je bila zavedena u sekretarijatu, tačnije 2. decembra 1986. godine. Sve do tada, ona je bila čisto „interna stvar”. Ne može se kritikovati Apelacioni sud Katancara zato što nije doneo odluku u roku od trideset dana kao što predviđa član 4 Zakona iz 1956.godine, budući da taj vremenski rok nije obavezujući.
Sud smatra da bez obzira na suprotne tvrdnje podnosioca predstavke, data mera nije predstavljala lišavanje slobode u smislu člana 5 stav 1 Konvencije. Samo ograničavanje slobode kretanja koje je proisteklo iz specijalnog nadzora treba razmatrati shodno članu 2 Protokola br. 4 (vidi presudu u predmetu Guzzardi v. Italy, str. 33, stav 92). Uzimajući u obzir opasnost koju mafija predstavlja po „demokratsko društvo”, ta mera je dodatno bila potrebna zarad „održavanja javnog reda i mira” i „sprečavanja kriminala”. Ona je naročito bila srazmerna cilju kome se teži, sve do onog trenutka kada je Apelacioni sud u Katancaru odlučio, a to je bilo 4. jula 1986. godine, da je ukine (vidi stav 14 gore u tekstu). Ostaje da se razmotri period između 4. jula i 20. decembra 1986. godine kada je o toj odluci obavešten i podnosilac predstavke (vidi isti stav). Čak i ako se prihvati da ova odluka, doneta na sednici zatvorenoj za javnost, nije mogla da dobije pravnu snagu sve dok ne bude zavedena u sekretarijatu, Sud ne razume zašto je došlo do odlaganja od skoro pet meseci da bi se formulisalo obrazloženje odluke koja se odmah mogla izvršiti i ticala se osnovnog prava, naime prava podnosioca predstavke da se kreće po slobodnom nahođenju; šta više, podnosilac predstavke osamnaest dana nije bio obavešten o ukidanju.
Sud zaključuje da barem u periodu između 2. i 20. decembra 1986. godine dato mešanje nije bilo predviđeno zakonom niti je bilo potrebno. Shodno tome, došlo je do povrede člana 2 Protokola br. 4.
III. NAVODNA POVREDA STAVA 1 ČLANA 6 KONVENCIJE
Gospodin Raimondo je na kraju kritikovao i dužinu trajanja postupka u vezi sa žalbom koju je uložio protiv naloga za oduzimanje i specijalnog nadzora. Pozvao se na stav 1 člana 6 Konvencije koji predviđa sledeće:
„Svako, tokom odlučivanja o njegovim građanskim pravima i obavezama ili o krivičnoj optužbi protiv njega, ima pravo na (...) raspravu u razumnom roku pred (...) sudom (...)”
Vremenski period koji bi trebalo uzeti u obzir počeo je 16. oktobra 1985. godine, to jest dana kada je Okružni sud u Katancaru naložio date mere (vidi stav 13 gore u tekstu). Taj period se završio 31. decembra 1986. godine kada je presuda Apelacionog suda postala pravnosnažna. Dakle, taj vremenski period je trajao godinu dana, dva meseca i dve nedelje.
Sud se slaže sa mišljenjem Države i Komisije o tome da se specijalni nadzor ne može uporediti sa krivičnom sankcijom zato što je osmišljen da bi sprečio izvršenje krivičnih dela. Iz toga sledi da u postupak koji se na njega odnosio ne spada „odlučivanje (...) o krivičnoj optužbi” (vidi presudu u predmetu Guzzardi, str. 40, stav 108). Kada je reč o pitanju oduzimanja, treba imati u vidu da se član 6 (čl. 6) odnosi na svaki postupak čiji je predmet „imovinske” prirode i koji je zasnovan na navodnom kršenju prava koja su isto tako imovinske prirode (vidi presudu u predmetu Editions Périscope v. France od 26. marta 1992. godine, Series A br. 234-B, str. 66, stav 40). Takav stav je zauzet i u ovom predmetu.
Međutim, imajući u vidu činjenicu da je predmet ispitivan pred dva domaća suda, Sud ne smatra da je ukupna dužina trajanja procesa bila nerazumna (vidi, mutatis mutandis, presudu u predmetu Salerno v. Italy od 12. oktobra 1992. godine, Series A br. 245-D, str. 56, stav 21).
Iz toga sledi da nije došlo do povrede stava 1 člana 6 (čl. 6-1).
IV. PRIMENA ČLANA 50 KONVENCIJE
„Kada Sud utvrdi da su odluka ili mera koju je preduzeo organ vlasti ili bilo koji drugi organ Visoke strane ugovornice u potpunosti ili delimično u suprotnosti sa obavezama koje proističu iz (...) Konvencije, i ako unutrašnje pravo date Strane omogućava samo delimičnu odštetu na ime posledica te odluke ili mere, Sud će svojom presudom, ako je to potrebno, pružiti oštećenoj stranci pravično zadovoljenje.”
A. Šteta
Gospodin Raimondo je zahtevao odštetu na ime materijalne i nematerijalne štete a da pri tome nije naveo bilo kakav iznos. Činjenica da je on morao da obustavi svoje građevinarske poslove posle oduzimanja imovine kao i da su uslovi u kojima je ta imovina čuvana, bili nezadovoljavajući, dovelo je do značajnog propadanja zgrada i vozila. Izricanje mere specijalnog nadzora mu je otežalo kretanje i onemogućilo ga da vodi svoje poslove. Osim toga, odlaganje upisivanja rešenja o ukidanju mera oduzimanja značilo je da je svaki pokušaj da raspolaže datom imovinom bio osuđen na propast, što je dovelo do uvećavanja ionako velikih dugova.
Prema tvrdnjama Države, podnosilac predstavke nije uspeo da dokaže da su navodne povrede rezultirale materijalnom štetom. Kada je reč o nematerijalnoj šteti, Država smatra da ako bi se povreda utvrdila, to bi samo po sebi predstavljalo pravično zadovoljenje.
Delegat Komisije smatra da je podnosilac predstavke nesumnjivo pretrpeo i materijalnu i nematerijalnu štetu. Međutim, u nedostatku bilo kakvog određenog zahteva, on nije siguran kako bi tome trebalo pristupiti.
Sud odbacuje zahtev za nadoknadu materijalne štete, budući da je način na koji je on formulisan prilično neodređen a informacije u predmetu nisu od pomoći u smislu pojašnjavanja stvari. S druge strane, Sud smatra da je g. Raimondo pretrpeo izvesnu nematerijalnu štetu i po tom osnovu mu Sud dosuđuje iznos od 10.000.000 italijanskih lira.
B. Sudski i ostali troškovi
Advokat podnosioca predstavke je na raspravi tražio nadoknadu u iznosu od 10.552.325 italijanskih lira (tu je uključen i porez na dodatu vrednost), na ime sudskih i drugih troškova koji su nastali u postupku pred institucijama Konvencije.
Država je ovu stvar ostavila Sudu na diskreciono odlučivanje, ali je istovremeno istakla da bi dosuđeni iznos trebalo da bude srazmeran uspehu predstavke g. Raimonda, ako ga uopšte bude.
Delegat Komisije nije izrazio svoj stav po ovom pitanju.
Imajući u vidu neuspeh nekih pritužbi g. Raimonda, te uzimajući u obzir dostupne dokaze i svoju relevantnu sudsku praksu, Sud podnosiocu predstavke dosuđuje 5.000.000 italijanskih lira.
IZ OVIH RAZLOGA SUD JEDNOGLASNO
Utvrđuje da nije došlo povreda člana 1 Protokola br. 1, ni u pogledu zaplene i oduzimanja imovine podnosioca predstavke do 31. decembra1986. godine, niti u pogledu štete učinjene primenom tih mera;
Utvrđuje da je došlo do kršenja istoga tog člana 1 zato što je oduzimanje kamiona i devet nekretnina, koja je izvršena 16. oktobra 1985. godine, i dalje ostala upisana u relevantne registre i nakon 31. decembra 1986. godine, kao i da neka druga povreda te odredbe nije ustanovljena;
Utvrđuje da je došlo do povrede člana 2 Protokola br. 4, u najmanju ruku jer se nastavilo sa sprovođenjem specijalnog policijskog nadzora nad podnosiocem predstavke i posle 2. decembra 1986. godine;
Utvrđuje da se član 6 Konvencije ne odnosi na pomenuti specijalni nadzor;
Utvrđuje da nije došlo do povrede te odredbe u pogledu dužine trajanja postupka za oduzimanja;
Utvrđuje da tužena Država treba g. Raimondu u roku od tri meseca da plati iznos od 10.000.000 (deset miliona) italijanskih lira na ime nematerijalne štete i 5.000.000 (pet miliona) italijanskih lira na ime sudskih i ostalih troškova;
Odbacuje ostatak zahteva podnosioca predstavke za pravično zadovoljenje.
Sačinjeno na engleskom i francuskom jeziku i izrečeno na javnoj raspravi u zgradi Suda u Strazburu, 22. februara 1994. godine.
Mark-Andre AJSEN Rolv RISDAL
Sekretar Predsednik
***
[1] Napomena Sekretarijata Suda: Broj predmeta je 1/1993/396/474. Prvi broj označava poziciju ovog predmeta na spisku predmeta koji su Sudu upućeni u relevantnoj godini (drugi broj). Poslednja dva broja označavaju poziciju predmeta na spisku predmeta podnetih Sudu otkako je osnovan i na spisku odgovarajućih podnesaka upućenih Komisiji.
[2] Napomena Sekretarijata: iz praktičnih razloga ovaj dodatak je dat samo u štampanoj verziji presude (tom 281-A Series A Publications of the Court), ali primerak izveštaja Komisije se može dobiti u Sekretarijatu.
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Presuda prevedena na srpski jezik u okviru zajedničkog projektaEvropske unije i Saveta Evrope „Oduzimanje imovinske koristi stečene krivičnim delom u Srbiji”.
COURT (CHAMBER)
CASE OF RAIMONDO v. ITALY
(Application no. 12954/87)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22 February 1994
In the case of Raimondo v. Italy[*],
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed of the following judges:
Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr R. Bernhardt,
Mr F. Matscher,
Mr C. Russo,
Mrs E. Palm,
Mr I. Foighel,
Mr F. Bigi,
Mr L. Wildhaber,
Mr D. Gotchev,
and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr H. Petzold, Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 23 September 1993 and 24 January 1994,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 18 January 1993, within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated in an application (no. 12954/87) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by an Italian national, Mr Giuseppe Raimondo, on 23 April 1987.
The Commission’s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Italy recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-2).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33 para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, Mrs Pittelli, Mr Raimondo’s wife, and their three sons informed the Registrar on 7 June 1993 of the death of their husband and father. They stated that they wished to continue the proceedings and to take part in them and be represented by the lawyer whom they had appointed (Rule 30). For reasons of convenience Mr Raimondo will continue to be referred to as the "applicant", although it is now his widow and his three sons who are to be regarded as having that status (see, inter alia, the Pandolfelli and Palumbo v. Italy judgment of 27 February 1992, Series A no. 231-B, p. 16, para. 2).
Mrs Pittelli and her sons also consented to the disclosure of the identity of Mr Raimondo, who had at first been designated by the initials G. R.
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr C. Russo, the elected judge of Italian nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On 27 February 1993 Mr R. Bernhardt, the Vice-President of the Court, drew by lot, in the presence of the Registrar, the names of the other seven members, namely Mr Bernhardt, Mr F. Matscher, Mrs E. Palm, Mr I. Foighel, Mr F. Bigi, Mr L. Wildhaber and Mr D. Gotchev (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43).
4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), Mr Ryssdal, acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Italian Government ("the Government"), the applicant’s lawyer and the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the Registrar received the applicant’s memorial on 12 July 1993 and the Government’s memorial on 30 July. The Delegate of the Commission did not submit observations in writing.
5. On 6 September 1993 the Commission produced the file on the proceedings before it, as requested by the Registrar on the President’s instructions.
6. In accordance with the decision of the President - who had given the applicant leave to use the Italian language (Rule 27 para. 3) -, the hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 20 September 1993. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
- for the Government
Mr G. Raimondi, magistrato,
on secondment to the Diplomatic Legal Service of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Co-Agent,
Mr E. Selvaggi, Head of the Human Rights Department,
Directorate General of Criminal Affairs, Ministry of
Justice, Counsel;
- for the Commission
Mr E. Busuttil, Delegate;
- for the applicant
Mr M. Mellini, avvocato, Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by the above-mentioned representatives, who also replied to its questions.
On 14 October 1993 the Government provided additional information. The Commission submitted its written comments thereon on 11 December.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
7. Mr Giuseppe Raimondo, a building entrepreneur, lived in Davoli (Catanzaro) until his death on 11 July 1992.
Criminal proceedings were brought against him as he was suspected of belonging to a mafia-type organisation operating in the Soverato region. At the same time various preventive measures were taken concerning him.
A. The criminal proceedings
8. On 24 July 1984 the Catanzaro Public Prosecutor issued a warrant for the arrest of seventeen persons including the applicant. After initially evading arrest under this warrant, the applicant gave himself up to the authorities on 7 November 1984 and was immediately remanded in custody.
9. The investigation was closed on 24 July 1985 and Mr Raimondo was committed for trial in the Catanzaro District Court with fourteen co-defendants. His detention on remand was replaced by house arrest (arresti domiciliari).
10. On 8 October 1985, at the first hearing, the District Court ordered the joinder of the case with two others and directed that certain documents be included in the file. It then adjourned the proceedings to 16 January 1986.
On 30 January 1986 the District Court acquitted Mr Raimondo on the ground of insufficient evidence (assoluzione per insufficienza di prove) and revoked the order placing him under house arrest.
11. Giving judgment on 16 January 1987 on the appeals of the public prosecutor and Mr Raimondo, the Catanzaro Court of Appeal acquitted the latter on the ground that the material facts of the offence had not been established (perchè il fatto non sussiste). No appeal was filed in the Court of Cassation.
B. The proceedings concerning the preventive measures
1. In the Catanzaro District Court
12. On 16 January 1985 the Catanzaro Public Prosecutor applied to the District Court for an order placing Mr Raimondo under special police supervision and for the preventive seizure of a number of assets with a view to their possible confiscation (Act no. 1423 of 27 December 1956 and Act no. 575 of 31 May 1965, as amended by Act no. 646 of 13 September 1982 - see paragraphs 16-18 below). He based his application on a report by the Soverato carabinieri dated 27 December 1984.
13. On 13 May 1985 the District Court ordered the seizure of sixteen items of real property (ten plots of land and six buildings) and of six vehicles, all of which appeared to be at the applicant’s disposal. The measure was entered in the relevant public registers on 15 May 1985.
On 16 October the District Court revoked the seizure of certain property belonging to third parties; on the other hand, it ordered the confiscation of some of the buildings seized of which the applicant and his wife were the owners and four vehicles, on the ground that it had not been proved that the assets in question had been "lawfully acquired". The confiscation was recorded in the register on 9 November 1985.
By the same decision Mr Raimondo was placed under special police supervision, which however did not become effective until 30 January 1986, the day on which he was acquitted by the District Court (see paragraph 10 above); he was also required to lodge a security of 2,000,000 lire as a guarantee to ensure that he complied with the constraints attaching to this measure, namely a prohibition on leaving his home without informing the police; an obligation to report to the police on the days indicated to that effect; an obligation to return to his house by 9 p.m. and not to leave it before 7 a.m. unless he had valid reasons for doing so and had first informed the relevant authorities of his intention.
2. In the Catanzaro Court of Appeal
14. On an appeal by the applicant, the Catanzaro Court of Appeal gave judgment at a private hearing on 4 July 1986. It annulled the special supervision measure and ordered the restitution of the security and the property seized and confiscated. Its decision (decreto) referred to the "disconcertingly casual way in which the contested preventive measures concerning the person and property of Mr Raimondo had been adopted thereby effectively decreeing his civil and economic death".
The decision was filed with the registry on 2 December 1986 and signed by the relevant official of the prosecuting authority on 10 December. Again on 2 December the Court of Appeal registry notified it to the competent police authorities (questura) who, on 5 December, advised the local carabinieri of the decision. The latter informed the applicant on 20 December.
The decision became final on 31 December 1986.
15. The revocation of the seizure of the real property and of the confiscation of the vehicles was entered in the relevant registers on 2 February (real property), 10 February (two cars and a van) and 10 July 1987 (a lorry).
The security was returned to the applicant on 24 April 1987.
As regards the real property that had been confiscated, the applications for the entry in the register of the revocation of the measure are dated 9 August 1991.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. The legislation in force at the material time
1. The Act of 27 December 1956
16. Act no. 1423 of 27 December 1956 ("the 1956 Act") provides for various preventive measures in respect of "persons presenting a danger for security and public morality". The relevant provisions are summarised in the Guzzardi v. Italy judgment of 6 November 1980 (Series A no. 39, pp. 17-19, §§ 46-49):
"46. Under section 1, the Act applies to, amongst others, ... individuals who, by reason of their behaviour and style of life (tenore di vita), must be considered as habitually living, even in part, on the proceeds of crime or on the rewards of complicity therein (con il favoreggiamento), or whose outward conduct gives good reason to believe that they have criminal tendencies (che, per le manifestazioni cui abbiano dato luogo, diano fondato motivo di ritenere che siano proclivi a delinquere).
The Chief of Police [(questore)] may send such persons a warning (diffida) ...
...
47. ...
48. ... [such a person] may, under section 3, be placed under special police supervision (sorveglianza speciale della pubblica sicurezza); if need be, this may be combined either with a prohibition on residence in one or more given districts or provinces or, in the case of a particularly dangerous person (particolare pericolosità), with an order for compulsory residence in a specified district (obbligo del soggiorno in un determinato comune).
Only the District Court of the chief town of the province has power to order these measures; it will do so on the basis of a reasoned application by the [questore] to its president (section 4, first paragraph). The District Court must give a reasoned decision (provvedimento) in chambers within thirty days. It will first hear the Public Prosecutor’s department and the person concerned, the latter being entitled to submit written pleadings and to be assisted by a lawyer (section 4, second paragraph).
The prosecuting authorities and the person concerned may, within ten days, lodge an appeal which does not have suspensive effect; the Court of Appeal has to give a reasoned decision (decreto) in chambers within thirty days (section 4, fifth and sixth paragraphs). That decision may in turn and on the same conditions be the subject of a further appeal to the Court of Cassation, which must give its ruling in chambers within thirty days (section 4, seventh paragraph).
49. When adopting one of the measures listed in section 3, the District Court will specify for how long it is to remain in force - not less than one and not more than five years (section 4, fourth paragraph) - and will give directives with which the person in question must comply (section 5, first paragraph).
..."
2. The Act of 31 May 1965
17. Act no. 575 of 31 May 1965 ("the 1965 Act") supplements the 1956 Act by adding clauses directed against the Mafia (disposizioni contro la mafia). Section 1 states that it is applicable to persons - such as Mr Raimondo - against whom there is evidence showing that they belong to "mafia-type" groups (indiziati di appartenere ad associazioni mafiose).
18. The above legislation was strengthened by Act no. 646 of 13 September 1982 ("the 1982 Act") which inserted, inter alia, a section 2 ter in the 1965 Act. It makes provision for various measures to be used in the course of proceedings relating to the application of the preventive measures available under the 1956 Act in respect of a person suspected of belonging to such an organisation:
"... the District Court may issue a reasoned decision, even of its own motion, ordering the seizure of property at the direct or indirect disposal of the person against whom the proceedings have been instituted, when there is sufficientcircumstantial evidence, such as a considerable discrepancy between his lifestyle and his apparent or declared income, to show that the property concerned forms the proceeds from unlawful activities or their reinvestment.
Together with the implementation of the preventive measure the District Court shall order the confiscation of any of the goods seized in respect of which it has not been shown that they were lawfully acquired. Where the inquiries are complex, this measure may also be taken at a later date, but not more than one year after the date of the seizure.
The District Court shall revoke the seizure order when the application for preventive measures is dismissed or when it has been shown that the property in question was lawfully acquired."
B. The case-law concerning the application of preventive measures, particularly of a pecuniary nature
19. In its report (paragraph 43), the Commission sets out a summary of the case-law in this area:
" ... The existence of preventive measures is not in itself contrary to the Italian Constitution. The Constitutional Court has ruled that the basis for these measures is the need to guarantee the orderly and peaceful course of social relations, not only through a body of legislation penalising unlawful acts, but also through provisions intended to prevent the commission of such acts (Constitutional Court, judgment no. 27 of 1959 and judgment no. 23 of 1964).
Because of their particular object, preventive measures do not relate to the commission of a specific unlawful act but to a pattern of behaviour defined by law as conduct indicating the existence of danger to society (Constitutional Court, judgment no. 23 of 1964).
Consequently, in the Italian legal system, there is a fundamental difference between criminal penalties and preventive measures. The former constitute the response to an unlawful act and the consequences of that act; the latter are a means of preventing the commission of such an act.
In other words, a criminal penalty relates to an offence already committed, whereas a preventive measure is intended to reduce the risk of future offences (see, mutatis mutandis, Constitutional Court, judgment no. 53 of 1968, concerning security measures).
...
Because criminal penalties and preventive measures are essentially different, not all the constitutional principles which should underpin the former necessarily apply to the latter. For example, the presumption of innocence enunciated in Article 27 of the Constitution does not concern preventive measures, which are not based on the criminal liability or guilt of the person concerned (Constitutional Court, judgment no. 23 of 1964).
Similarly, such measures do not fall within the scope of Article 25 para. 2 of the Constitution, which prohibits the retroactive application of criminal provisions. The violation of this principle has been alleged on a number of occasions in the Court of Cassation with regard to confiscation orders under section 2 ter of the 1965 Act. The Court of Cassation has ruled, firstly, that the above principle is not applicable to preventive measures (see, for example, Court of Cassation, Piraino judgment of 30 January 1985). Secondly, the Court of Cassation has pointed out that the impugned provision is not in fact retroactive, as it relates to the property in the possession of the person concerned at the time when confiscation is ordered (Court of Cassation, Oliveri judgment of 12 May 1986) and to the unlawful use of that property after its entry into force (Court of Cassation, Pipitone judgment of 4 January 1985).
In spite of these limitations, preventive measures remain open to thorough scrutiny of their compatibility with the Constitution.
As far back as 1956 the Constitutional Court ruled that in no case could the right to liberty be restricted except where such restriction was prescribed by law, where lawful proceedings had been instituted to that end and where the reasons therefor had been set out in a judicial decision (Constitutional Court, judgment no. 11 of 1956).
It subsequently ruled that preventive measures could not be adopted on the basis of mere suspicion and are justified only when based on the objective establishment and assessment of facts which reveal the behaviour and lifestyle of the person concerned (Constitutional Court, judgment no. 23 of 1964).
More recently it confirmed that the constitutionality of preventive measures still depends on respect of the rule of law and the possibility of applying to the courts for a remedy. Furthermore, the above two conditions are closely linked. Thus it is not enough for the law to indicate vague criteria for the assessment of danger; it must set them forth with sufficient precision to make the right of access to a court and adversarial proceedings a meaningful one (Constitutional Court, judgment no. 177 of 1980).
The case-law of the Court of Cassation is in this respect entirely consistent with that of the Constitutional Court; it affirms quite clearly that proceedings for the application of preventive measures must be adversarial and conducted with respect for the rights of the defence, any violation of those rights entailing their nullity (see, for example, Court of Cassation, judgment no. 1255 of 29 June 1984 in the Santoro case).
The Court of Cassation has dismissed a number of complaints alleging the unconstitutionality of the seizure and confiscation measures provided for in section 2 ter of the 1965 Act. In particular, it has ruled that the presumption concerning the unlawful origin of the property of persons suspected of belonging to organisations of the mafia type is not incompatible with Article 24 of the Constitution, which guarantees the rights of the defence, since confiscation can only take place when there is sufficient circumstantial evidence concerning the unlawful origin of the property in question and in the absence of a rebuttal (Court of Cassation, previously cited Pipitone judgment).
...
With regard to the compatibility of seizure and confiscation measures with the right to free exercise of private economic activities and the right to peaceful enjoyment of private property (Articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution), the Court of Cassation has ruled that these rights are not absolute and may be limited in accordance with the general interest. This applies in connection with possessions of unlawful origin or their use (Court of Cassation, previously cited Oliveri and Pipitone judgments).
..."
20. In its opinion no. 1489/86 of 18 November 1986 the Consiglio di Stato stated that "although confiscation by definition enables the State to acquire the item of property in question ..., it does not in itself have the effect of transferring ownership to the public authorities ...". It will only have such effect if in addition the decision ordering it is irrevocable (Palermo District Court, order of 19 April 1989).
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
21. Mr Raimondo applied to the Commission on 23 April 1987. He complained of the following: (a) the unlawfulness and the length of his detention (Article 5 paras. 1 and 3 of the Convention) (art. 5-1, art. 5-3); (b) the length of various proceedings concerning him and in particular the criminal proceedings (Article 6 para. 1) (art. 6-1); (c) the failure to respect the right to be presumed innocent inasmuch as preventive measures were applied to him (Article 6 para. 2) (art. 6-2); (d) the obligation to lodge a security in order to ensure compliance with the above measures (Article 1 of Protocol No. 4) (P4-1); (e) an interference with his property resulting from the seizure and confiscation of certain of his possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1) (P1-1); and (f) the fact that he had been deprived of his right to freedom of movement (Article 2 of Protocol No. 4) (P4-2).
22. On 6 December 1991 the Commission declared the application (no. 12954/87) admissible as regards the complaints based on the applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, to the freedom of movement and to a decision on the application of preventive measures within a reasonable time; it found the rest of the application inadmissible. In its report of 21 October 1992 (made under Article 31) (art. 31), it expressed the following opinion:
(a) that there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) with regard to the seizure (eighteen votes to one) and the confiscation (sixteen votes to three) of the applicant’s property up to 31 December 1986 and on account of the damage occasioned by the administration of the seized and confiscated assets until that date (eighteen votes to one);
(b) that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) in so far as the confiscation of nine items of real property and one lorry had continued to take effect after 31 December 1986 (unanimously);
(c) that there had been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-2) inasmuch as the applicant had been deprived of his right to freedom of movement from 4 July to 20 December 1986 (unanimously);
(d) that there had been no violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) as regards the length of the proceedings relating to the seizure and confiscation (unanimously).
The full text of the Commission’s opinion and of the dissenting opinion contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to the present judgment[*].
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT
23. In their memorial, the Government asked the Court "to hold and adjudicate that there had been no infringement either of the Convention or of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4".
AS TO THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 (P1-1)
24. Mr Raimondo complained of the seizure on 13 May 1985 of sixteen items of real property and six vehicles, and the confiscation of several of these assets ordered on 16 October 1985 (see paragraph 13 above). He relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), which provides as follows:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."
25. In order to determine whether the contested measures amounted to controlling the "use of property" within the meaning of the second paragraph or constituted deprivation of possessions under the first paragraph, the Court will first examine their application up to 31 December 1986, when the decision of the Catanzaro Court of Appeal became final (see paragraph 14 above). It will then consider the matter of their remaining entered in the public registers subsequent to that date (see paragraph 15 above).
A. The application of the preventive measures concerning property up to 31 December 1986
26. The Government did not deny that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. They contended, however, that the seizure and confiscation was justified on the basis of the exceptions allowed under Article 1 (P1-1) to the principle set forth in the first sentence of that provision.
1. The seizure
27. Like the Commission, the Court finds that the seizure was provided for in section 2 ter of the 1965 Act (see paragraph 18 above) and did not purport to deprive the applicant of his possessions but only to prevent him from using them. It is therefore the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which is relevant here.
In addition, the applicant did not contend that on 13 May 1985 it was unreasonable for the District Court to hold that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to show that the possessions seized represented the proceeds from unlawful activities or their reinvestment. What he complained about is, rather, that such a drastic measure was taken at this stage of the proceedings. However, seizure under section 2 ter of the 1965 Act is clearly a provisional measure intended to ensure that property which appears to be the fruit of unlawful activities carried out to the detriment of the community can subsequently be confiscated if necessary. The measure as such was therefore justified by the general interest and, in view of the extremely dangerous economic power of an "organisation" like the Mafia, it cannot be said that taking it at this stage of the proceedings was disproportionate to the aim pursued.
Accordingly, on this point no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) has been established.
2. The confiscation
28. In the applicant’s submission, even if it was accepted that the confiscation had not deprived him of the ownership of his possessions, the entry in the public registers represented a form of enforcement of the measure before any decision had been given on his appeal.
29. Although it involves a deprivation of possessions, confiscation of property does not necessarily come within the scope of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) (see the Handyside v. the United Kingdom judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 30, para. 63, and the AGOSI v. the United Kingdom judgment of 24 October 1986, Series A no. 108, p. 17, para. 51).
According to Italian case-law, confiscation of the kind which is in issue in this case could not moreover have the effect of transferring ownership to the State until there had been an irrevocable decision (see paragraph 20 above). There was no such decision in this instance because Mr Raimondo had challenged the order of the Catanzaro District Court of 16 October 1985 (see paragraph 13 above). Here too therefore it is the second paragraph of Article 1 (P1-1) which applies.
30. Like the Government and the Commission, the Court observes that the confiscation - also provided for in section 2 ter of the 1965 Act -pursued an aim that was in the general interest, namely it sought to ensure that the use of the property in question did not procure for the applicant, or the criminal organisation to which he was suspected of belonging, advantages to the detriment of the community.
The Court is fully aware of the difficulties encountered by the Italian State in the fight against the Mafia. As a result of its unlawful activities, in particular drug-trafficking, and its international connections, this "organisation" has an enormous turnover that is subsequently invested, inter alia, in the real property sector. Confiscation, which is designed to block these movements of suspect capital, is an effective and necessary weapon in the combat against this cancer. It therefore appears proportionate to the aim pursued, all the more so because it in fact entails no additional restriction in relation to seizure.
Finally, the preventive purpose of confiscation justifies its immediate application notwithstanding any appeal.
In conclusion, the respondent State did not overstep the margin of appreciation left to it under the second paragraph of Article 1 (P1-1).
3. The surveillance of the property seized or confiscated
31. Again relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), Mr Raimondo alleged that, as the municipal police had failed to carry out any proper surveillance, the property subject to the preventive measures had been the target of extensive vandalism.
32. The Government denied this. In view of the official status of those responsible for guarding the property - officers of the municipal police designated by the judicial authorities - no accusation of negligence against them was warranted. Furthermore in 1989 legislation had been enacted to regulate this question, firstly by protecting the interests of persons whose property was returned to them after seizure and secondly by indicating a public-interest use for property which had been seized and then confiscated on a permanent basis.
33. Like the Commission, the Court observes that any seizure or confiscation inevitably entails damage. The Commission found that the applicant’s allegations did not provide a sufficiently clear basis for examining whether the actual damage sustained in the present case exceeded such inevitable damage. Before the Court the applicant did not furnish any more specific information. The Court therefore cannot but adopt the Commission’s approach and hold that on this point too no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) has been established.
B. The fact that the contested measures remained entered in the public registers after 31 December 1986
34. According to the applicant the competent authorities delayed giving effect to the decision of the Catanzaro Court of Appeal of 4 July 1986.
35. The Government maintained that the real property and the movable goods had been returned on 2 February 1987, only two months after the above-mentioned decision had been filed with the registry. They conceded that the formalities for entering in the public registers the revocation of the contested measures had taken some time, but Mr Raimondo could and should have contacted the appropriate department with a copy of the decision revoking the measures. Article 619 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure, cited by his lawyer at the hearing, was not applicable because it concerned exclusively the cancellation by the prosecuting authorities of mortgages or seizures ordered to secure the payment of the debts of a defendant after his conviction (court costs, fine and prison expenses).
36. The Court notes in the first place that the possessions in question were returned to the applicant on 2 February 1987, two months after the Court of Appeal’s decision was filed with the registry. It must nevertheless consider whether the fact that the entries remained in the relevant registers constituted an interference with the right guaranteed under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).
No such interference occurred in relation to the real property seized on 13 May 1985 and three of the vehicles confiscated on 16 October 1985, because the requisite entries were made rapidly, on 2 and 10 February 1987 (see paragraph 15 above). On the other hand, there was an interference as regards the lorry and the nine items of real property confiscated on 16 October 1985 inasmuch as the entry concerning the lorry was not made until 10 July 1987 and that concerning the real property not until after 9 August 1991 (see paragraph 15 above).
It is not for the Court to determine who should have taken the appropriate steps in this case. However, and notwithstanding the reasons advanced by the Government, the responsibility of the public authorities was engaged. The Court finds it hard to see why it was necessary to wait respectively more than seven months (2 December 1986 - 10 July 1987) and four years and eight months (2 December 1986 - 9 August 1991) before regularising the legal status of some of Mr Raimondo’s possessions, when the Catanzaro Court of Appeal had ordered that all the property be returned to the owners "after the entries had been removed from the registers" (previa cancellazione delle formalità concernenti le eseguite trascrizioni).
In addition, this interference was neither "provided for by law" nor necessary "to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).
Accordingly, there has been a violation of that provision.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF PROTOCOL No. 4 (P4-2)
37. The applicant complained that the special police supervision under which he had been placed had constituted a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-2), according to which:
"1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
...
3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the maintenance of ordre public, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
..."
38. The Government disputed this view. The decision, adopted in private session, revoking the special supervision had not acquired legal force, according to the relevant provisions, until the day on which it had been filed with the registry, namely 2 December 1986. Up to that point it had remained "a purely internal event". The Catanzaro Court of Appeal could not be criticised for failing to give its decision within thirty days, as provided for in section 4 of the 1956 Act, because that time-limit was not a mandatory one.
39. The Court considers in the first place that, notwithstanding the applicant’s assertion to the contrary, the measure in issue did not amount to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) of the Convention. The mere restrictions on the liberty of movement resulting from special supervision fall to be dealt with under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-2) (see the Guzzardi v. Italy judgment, cited above, p. 33, para. 92).
In view of the threat posed by the Mafia to "democratic society", the measure was in addition necessary "for the maintenance of ordre public" and "for the prevention of crime". It was in particular proportionate to the aim pursued, up to the moment at which the Catanzaro Court of Appeal decided, on 4 July 1986, to revoke it (see paragraph 14 above).
It remains to consider the period between 4 July and 20 December 1986, when the decision was notified to the applicant (see the same paragraph). Even if it is accepted that this decision, taken in private session, could not acquire legal force until it was filed with the registry, the Court finds it hard to understand why there should have been a delay of nearly five months in drafting the grounds for a decision which was immediately enforceable and concerned a fundamental right, namely the applicant’s freedom to come and go as he pleased; the latter was moreover not informed of the revocation for eighteen days.
40. The Court concludes that at least from 2 to 20 December 1986 the interference in issue was neither provided for by law nor necessary. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-2).
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 PARA. 1 OF THE CONVENTION (art. 6-1)
41. Mr Raimondo finally criticised the length of the proceedings relating to his appeal against the confiscation and the special supervision. He relied on Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention, which provides as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ..."
42. The period to be taken into consideration began on 16 October 1985, the date on which the Catanzaro District Court ordered the measures in question (see paragraph 13 above). It ended on 31 December 1986, when the decision of the Court of Appeal became final. It therefore lasted one year, two months and two weeks.
43. The Court shares the view taken by the Government and the Commission that special supervision is not comparable to a criminal sanction because it is designed to prevent the commission of offences. It follows that proceedings concerning it did not involve "the determination ... of a criminal charge" (see the Guzzardi judgment cited above, p. 40, para. 108).
On the matter of confiscation, it should be noted that Article 6 (art. 6) applies to any action whose subject matter is "pecuniary" in nature and which is founded on an alleged infringement of rights that were likewise of a pecuniary character (see the Editions Périscope v. France judgment of 26 March 1992, Series A no. 234-B, p. 66, para. 40). That was the position in the instant case.
44. However, having regard to the fact that the case came before two domestic courts, the Court does not consider the total length of the proceedings to have been unreasonable (see, mutatis mutandis, the Salerno v. Italy judgment of 12 October 1992, Series A no. 245-D, p. 56, para. 21).
It follows that there has been no violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50 (art. 50) OF THE CONVENTION
45. Under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention,
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."
A. Damage
46. Mr Raimondo claimed compensation for pecuniary and non- pecuniary damage without giving any figures. The fact that he had to halt his construction work following the confiscation of his property and the unsatisfactory conditions in which it had been kept had resulted in substantial deterioration of the buildings and the vehicles. The imposition of the special supervision had made it difficult for him to move around and impossible for him to conduct his business. In addition, the delay in entering the revocation of the confiscation had meant that any attempt to dispose of the property in question had been bound to fail, which had led to an increase in his already heavy debts.
47. According to the Government, the applicant failed to show that the alleged violations had resulted in pecuniary damage. As regards any non-pecuniary damage, they were of the opinion that, if a violation were to be found, the finding would in itself afford sufficient just satisfaction.
48. The Delegate of the Commission considered that the applicant had undoubtedly sustained pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. However, in the absence of any specific claim, he was uncertain of the approach to be adopted.
49. The Court dismisses the claims for pecuniary damage as the terms in which they are formulated are too vague and the information contained in the file does not help to clarify the matter. On the other hand, it takes the view that Mr Raimondo suffered some non- pecuniary damage for which it awards him 10,000,000 Italian lire.
B. Costs and expenses
50. At the hearing the applicant’s lawyer sought the reimbursement of 10,552,325 lire (inclusive of value added tax) in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the Convention institutions.
51. The Government left this matter to the discretion of the Court, but pointed out that the sum awarded should be proportionate to the degree of success, if any, of Mr Raimondo’s application.
The Delegate of the Commission did not express an opinion on the question.
52. In view of the failure of some of Mr Raimondo’s complaints, the Court, having regard to the available evidence and to its relevant case-law, awards him 5,000,000 lire.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds that no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) has been established either in respect of the seizure and the confiscation of the applicant’s property up to 31 December 1986 or in respect of the damage occasioned by those measures;
2. Holds that there has been a breach of that same Article (P1-1) inasmuch as the confiscation, on 16 October 1985, of a lorry and nine items of real property remained entered in the relevant registers after 31 December 1986 and that no other violation of that provision has been established;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-2) at least in so far as the special police supervision of the applicant continued after 2 December 1986;
4. Holds that Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention does not apply to the said special supervision;
5. Holds that there has been no violation of that provision as regards the length of the confiscation proceedings;
6. Holds that the respondent State is to pay to Mr Raimondo, within three months, 10,000,000 (ten million) Italian lire for non-pecuniary damage and 5,000,000 (five million) lire for costs and expenses;
7. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claims for just satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 22 February 1994.
Rolv RYSSDAL , President
Marc-André EISSEN, Registrar
[*] Note by the Registrar: The case is numbered 1/1993/396/474. The first number is the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.
[*] Note by the Registrar: for practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (volume 281-A of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of the Commission's report is available from the registry.
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