EVROPSKI SUD ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA
VELIKO VIJEĆE
PREDMET STRAND LOBBEN I DRUGI protiv NORVEŠKE
(Zahtjev br. 37283/13)
PRESUDA
STRASBOURG
10. rujna 2019.
Ova je presuda konačna, no može biti podvrgnuta uredničkim izmjenama.
U predmetu Strand Lobben i drugi protiv Norveške, Europski sud za ljudska prava, zasjedajući u Velikom vijeću u sastavu:
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, predsjednik,
Guido Raimondi,
Robert Spano,
Vincent A. De Gaetano,
Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,
Ganna Yudkivska,
Egidijus Kūris,
Carlo Ranzoni,
Armen Harutyunyan,
Georges Ravarani,
Pere Pastor Vilanova,
Alena Poláčková,
Pauliine Koskelo,
Péter Paczolay,
Lado Chanturia,
Gilberto Felici, suci,
Dag Bugge Nordén,ad hoc sudac,
i Søren Prebensen, zamjenik tajnika Velikog vijeća,
nakon vijećanja zatvorenog za javnost 17. listopada 2018. i 27. svibnja 2019. godine donosi sljedeću presudu koja je usvojena na posljednje navedeni datum:
POSTUPAK
Pred Sudom su se pojavili:
(a) za tuženu Vladu
g.F. SEJERSTED, državni odvjetnik, Ured državnog odvjetnika,
g. M. EMBERLAND, zastupnik, Ured državnog odvjetnika,
gđa H. LUND BUSCH, zastupnica, Ured državnog odvjetnika, zastupnici,
gđa A. SYDNES EGELAND, odvjetnica, Ured državnog odvjetnika,
g. H. VAALER, odvjetnik, Ured državnog odvjetnika,
g. D.T. GISHOLT, glavni tajnik, Ministarstvo za djecu i jednakost,
gđa C. FIVE BERG, viša savjetnica, Ministarstvo za djecu i jednakost,
gđa H. BAUTZ-HOLTER GEVING, Ministarstvo za djecu i jednakost,
gđa L. WIDTH, općinska odvjetnica, savjetnici;
(b) za podnositelje zahtjeva
g.G. THUAN DIT DIEUDONNÉ, odvjetnik, punomoćnik,
gđa T. STRAND LOBBEN, prva podnositeljica zahtjeva.
Sud je saslušao izlaganja g. Thuana Dita Dieudonnéa i g. Sejersteda te njihove odgovore na pitanja sudaca.
ČINJENICE
I. OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA
A. Pozadina
B. Postupak za žurno udomljavanje dječaka X
„Majka se ne skrbi za dijete na zadovoljavajući način. Tijekom boravka majke i djeteta [u obiteljskom centru] …, osoblje centra … bilo je vrlo zabrinuto jer se nisu ispunjavale djetetove potrebe. Kako bi osiguralo da se ispune primarne djetetove potrebe za skrbi i hranom, osoblje je interveniralo i pažljivo pratilo dijete dan i noć.
Majka nije bila sposobna ispuniti djetetove praktične potrebe za skrbi. Nije preuzela odgovornost za skrb za dječaka na zadovoljavajući način. Majka je trebala smjernice za vrlo osnovne stvari, a savjete joj je trebalo ponavljati nekoliko puta.
Tijekom svog boravka majka je izrekla određene stvari koje smatramo vrlo zabrinjavajućima. Pokazala je znatan nedostatak empatije prema svom sinu i nekoliko je puta rekla da joj se dijete gadi. Majka je pokazala da vrlo slabo razumije što dječak može razumjeti i koja ponašanja može kontrolirati.
Majčino mentalno funkcioniranje nije dosljedno i ona ima znatnih poteškoća u nekoliko područja koja su ključna za sposobnost pružanja skrbi. Njezina sposobnost pružanja praktične skrbi mora se sagledati s obzirom na prethodno navedeno. Majčino mentalno zdravlje obilježeno je zamršenim i bolnim osjećajima o tome tko je ona i kako doživljava druge ljude. Čini se da i samoj majci uvelike nije ispunjena potreba za skrbi.
Naša je ocjena da majka nije sposobna djetetu pružiti skrb. Također smatramo da je majci potrebna podrška i redovite kontrole. Kao što smo već usmeno priopćili službi za zaštitu djece, smatramo da je važno posebno pažljivo promatrati majku u razdoblju nakon žurnog smještaja.
Majka je ranjiva. Treba joj ponuditi psihološku procjenu i liječenje, a vjerojatno joj je potrebna i pomoć u pronalasku motivacije za prethodno navedeno. Za majku treba sastaviti poseban plan kako bi se osigurale redovite kontrole u nekoliko područja.
Majka ima resurse (vidjeti testove sposobnosti) za čije joj je iskorištavanje potrebna pomoć.”
„Dječak je 17. listopada žurno smješten u udomiteljsku obitelj, micao je vrlo malo rukama i nogama te se vrlo malo glasao. Nije mogao otvoriti oči jer su bile crvene, otečene i s puno iscjetka. Bio je pothranjen, blijed i slab [(slapp)]. Nakon nekoliko dana počeo se kretati i glasati i vratila mu se boja. Dobro je jeo za svaki obrok i uživao u tjelesnom kontaktu. Nakon uzimanja ispravnih lijekova otvorio je oči i polako počeo kontaktirati sa svojim okruženjem. Uspostavljene su dobre rutine te se pažljivo redovito kontrolirala njegova ishrana i razvoj.
Dječak se vrlo dobro razvio u svim područjima tijekom pet tjedana žurnog smještaja u udomiteljskoj obitelji. Liječnik i patronažne sestre bili su zadovoljni dječakovim razvojem i pažljivo su ga promatrali. BUP [(Barne- og ungdomspsykiatrisk poliklinikk – Psihijatrijska ambulantna poliklinika za djecu i mlade)] također je redovito kontrolirao dječaka i izvijestio o mogućim simptomima stresa u dječaka koji su se razvili tijekom trudnoće ili prvih tjedana njegova života. Udomitelji koji su pružili žurni smještaj osigurali su povoljne uvjete za rad na dječakovom razvoju i to se pokazalo uspješnim. Dječaku su potrebne stabilne odrasle osobe koje mu mogu pružiti odgovarajuću skrb primjerenu njegovoj dobi [(aldersadekvat omsorg)] te u budućnosti ispunjavati njegove potrebe.”
„[Dječak X] bio je dijete sa znatnim zaostacima u razvoju kada nam je poslan na procjenu i promatranje. Danas funkcionira kao normalno dvomjesečno dijete i ima mogućnost za dobar normalan razvoj. Prema našim opažanjima on je bio u velikoj opasnosti. U ranjive djece izostanak reakcije i potvrde ili druge smetnje u interakciji mogu dovesti do težih ili lakših psiholoških i razvojnih poremećaja ako se tu djecu na vrijeme ne izloži drugim odnosima kojima se ispravljaju ti nedostaci. Kvaliteta interakcije djeteta i najbližeg skrbnika u njegovoj najranijoj dobi stoga je vrlo značajna za psihološki i kognitivni razvoj. [Dječak X] sada pokazuje znakove dobrog psihosocijalnog i kognitivnog razvoja.”
C. Postupak za donošenje odluke o skrbi
1. Postupak pred Županijskim odborom za socijalnu skrb
2. Postupak pred Okružnim sudom
„Služba za zaštitu djece želi osigurati da vam se pomogne da se nosite s onime što ste prošli u vezi s udomljavanjem itd. Služba za zaštitu djece i dalje vam nudi da pokrije troškove psihologa ako to želite.”
3. Postupak pred Žalbenim sudom
„Pregledom različitih dokumenata utvrdile smo da [obiteljski centar] opisuje ozbiljni nedostatak sposobnosti nužnih za majčinsku ulogu, što je slično obrascu ponašanja koji je opažen tijekom susreta i druženja više od godinu dana kasnije. Na primjer, majka je tijekom susreta i druženja pokazala da je nesposobna za osnovnu roditeljsku skrb, kao što smo prethodno opisale. Nadalje, neosjetljiva je u postupanju s djetetom tijekom susreta i druženja. Čini se da ima velikih poteškoća u prepoznavanju osjećaja dječaka X kada treba podijeliti s njime veselje i pružiti mu osjećaj sigurnosti, voditi ga s pomoću potvrda i imenovati stvari. To je vrlo ozbiljno.
Utvrdile smo da majka ima velikih poteškoća tijekom svih susreta i druženja i da se teško može reći da se te poteškoće neće odraziti i na njezinu opću sposobnost pružanja skrbi. U izvješću od 19. veljače 2008., tj. od prije dvije godine, [H.B.], Dr. philos., specijalist kliničke neurologije, navodi sljedeće:
‚Nema znatnih razlika u rezultatima testova inteligencije provedenih prije operacije i na kontrolnom pregledu dvije godine nakon operacije. Njezini rezultati testova inteligencije vrlo su slični od kad je imala 10,5 godina, tj. njezina je inteligencija bila stabilna svih tih godina.’
Naveo je da je njezino kognitivno funkcioniranje otprilike dvije standardne devijacije ispod osoba njezine dobi i da ima poteškoća s dugoročnim pamćenjem, kao i s primjenom informacija iz jedne situacije na drugu.
Smatramo da su zbog majčinih kognitivnih poteškoća njezini susreti i druženje pod nadzorom problematičniji nego što bi inače bili jer ona s vremena na vrijeme [(fra gang til gang)] ne zna što da učini s dječakom i iznimno je impulzivna. U izvješću [H.B.-a] navedeno je i da ima poteškoća u razumijevanju teksta kojeg čita, a mi smo utvrdile da ne može protumačiti i razumjeti situaciju kada je sa svojim djetetom. Smatramo da je to važno i temeljno pitanje u utvrđivanju majčine sposobnosti tijekom susreta i druženja i njezine sposobnosti pružanja skrbi. Kad je riječ o majčinoj sposobnosti pružanja skrbi u kontekstu njezinih kognitivnih vještina, pretpostavljamo da će to dodatno razjasniti [M.S.], vještakinja psihologinja koju je imenovao Žalbeni sud. Smatramo da to ima ulogu u majčinom ponašanju prema dječaku X tijekom susreta i druženja, kao i u njezinim poteškoćama s emocionalnom osjetljivosti na njegove potrebe tijekom njegova rasta.
Na petoj stranici izvješća [(presude)] iz 2009. godine Okružni sud sažima [situaciju] na sljedeći način:
‚Opće je poznato da mnoge žene, osobito prvorotkinje, mogu imati psihološku reakciju nakon rođenja koja se u svom najtežem obliku može razviti u tešku postporođajnu depresiju. Osjećaj otuđenosti i nesigurnosti u odnosu na novorođenče uobičajene su reakcije.’
Smatramo da se majčine poteškoće tijekom susreta i druženja ne mogu smatrati teškom postporođajnom depresijom s obzirom na to da obrazac sličan majčinim poteškoćama tijekom susreta i druženja postoji više od 1,5 godina. To je znak neprikladnih osnovnih roditeljskih vještina i nije povezano samo s postporođajnom depresijom. Smatramo da je od presudne važnosti [(avgjørende viktig)] da se majčine poteškoće tijekom susreta i druženja i općenito njezina sposobnost pružanja skrbi sagledaju u kontekstu složenijih psiholoških eksplanatornih modela koji se istodobno odnose na kognitivne poteškoće i teška traumatična iskustva u vrlo ranoj dobi i u odrasloj dobi za koje iz istraživanja znamo da utječu na roditeljske sposobnosti osobe ako se ne ulože znatni pojedinačni napori i podvrgne liječenju. Pretpostavljamo da će vještakinja psihologinja to detaljnije opisati.”
„Tijekom godina SSE [(Nacionalni centar za epilepsiju) (Statens senter for epilepsi)] redovito je provodio procjene [prve podnositeljice zahtjeva] s pomoću testova koji mjere tijek njezine bolesti i testova koji su usmjereniji na opisivanje njezina funkcioniranja. U ovom je predmetu poseban naglasak stavljen na test WISCR koji je proveden prije operacije i nakon operacije. Rezultati tog testa iskazuju se u obliku kvocijenta inteligencije o kojem se raspravljalo u ovom predmetu zaštite djeteta, čiji je dio i ovo izvješće. Stoga je važno osvrnuti se i na rezultate tih testova.
WISC-R je vrlo poznat test koji se često upotrebljava za mjerenje intelektualnih sposobnosti djece. Te sposobnosti povezane su sa školskim uspjehom. Rezultati testa služe kao korisne informacije o sposobnosti djeteta da uči i iskoristi naučeno. Profil funkcioniranja dobiven na temelju testa WISC-R temelj je za ciljane posebne obrazovne mjere u školi i može pomoći u pripremi obrazovnih modela posebno prilagođenih svakom djetetu s posebnim potrebama.
Krajnji rezultat testa inteligencije jest kvocijent inteligencije, odnosno operativna definicija inteligencije kojom se u brojčanom obliku iskazuje razdioba sposobnosti definiranih kao inteligencija među pojedincima u određenoj populaciji. Test je standardiziran, tj. utvrđena je statistička normalna razdioba uz srednje odstupanje s obje strane. Prosječna vrijednost testa WISC-R iznosi 100 uz standardnu devijaciju od ±15. Rezultat u rasponu razdiobe 85 – 115 potpada u normalni raspon, pri čemu se 68 % referentne populacije nalazi u tom rasponu, dok se 98 % nalazi unutar dvije standardne devijacije, tj. ostvaruju rezultat 70 – 130. Prilikom dijagnostičke procjene kvocijenta inteligencije osobe s kvocijentom inteligencije između 50 i 69 svrstavaju se u kategoriju blage duševne zaostalosti. Rezultati na testu inteligencije mogu se poboljšati tijekom razvoja predmetne osobe ako ona ima temeljne kognitivne resurse. U ovom predmetu dobivene su informacije o tome da je kvocijent inteligencije [prve podnositeljice zahtjeva] bio stabilan tijekom njezina djetinjstva i adolescencije, što znači da se intelektualno nije oporavila nakon operacije mozga.
1.3. Sažetak
Anamnezni podaci dobiveni od škole, specijalističke zdravstvene službe i obitelji ukazuju na povijest slabe sposobnosti učenja i socijalnog funkcioniranja od ranog djetinjstva do odrasle dobi. [Prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] ostvarila je loš školski uspjeh unatoč dobrim okvirnim uvjetima, znatnim dodatnim resursima i znatnim naporima koje je uložila i njezinoj motivaciji. Stoga je teško pronaći drugo objašnjenje za njezine rezultate osim općih poteškoća u učenju uzrokovanih bitnim kognitivnim oštećenjem. To dodatno potkrepljuje njezin dosljedno niski kvocijent inteligencije prije i nakon operacije zbog epilepsije.
Imala je i problema sa socijalno-emocionalnim funkcioniranjem, koje se redovito spominjalo u svim dokumentima koji se odnose na djetinjstvo i adolescenciju [prve podnositeljice zahtjeva]. Opažen je nedostatak socijalnih vještina i socijalne prilagodbe, prvenstveno povezan sa socijalnim ponašanjem koje nije bilo primjereno njezinoj dobi [(ikke-aldersadekvat sosial fremtreden)] (‚djetinjasto’) i lošom kontrolom impulzivnosti. Navedeno je i da je [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] bila vrlo suzdržana i imala nisko samopouzdanje, što se mora sagledati u kontekstu njezinih poteškoća.”
U poglavlju izvješća pod naslovom „Ocjena roditeljskih sposobnosti, sposobnosti tijekom susreta i druženja i učinka mjera pomoći” navedeno je sljedeće:
„5.1. Sposobnost pružanja skrbi
Kao što je jasno iz prethodno navedenog, poseban naglasak stavila sam na posljedice stanja [prve podnositeljice zahtjeva] na njezino opće funkcioniranje i na pitanje je li sposobna skrbiti se za dijete. Važno je napomenuti da ni [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] ni njezini roditelji ne smatraju da postoji veza između njezine povijesti bolesti, njezina funkcioniranja u odrasloj dobi i njezine sposobnosti pružanja skrbi.
Epilepsija kao takva ne lišava osobu sposobnosti pružanja skrbi, baš kao što ni niski kvocijent inteligencije ne znači da se dijete mora udomiti. No rezultati testa mogu pomoći u razjašnjavanju je li sposobnost funkcioniranja određene osobe oštećena, osobito ako se to sagleda zajedno s drugim opažanjima i nalazima.
[Prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] boluje od teške refraktorne epilepsije od djetinjstva. Riječ je nestabilnom obliku epilepsije koji uzrokuje promjene na mozgu i utječe na opći razvoj osobnosti. Osim toga, ne smiju se zaboraviti ni nuspojave jakih lijekova koje je uzimala u djetinjstvu. Liječnik [R.B.L.] iz SSE-a, koji je dobro upoznat s povijesti [prve podnositeljice zahtjeva], govori o ‚teretu epilepsije’, tj. socijalnoemocionalnim poteškoćama koje mogu nastati uslijed smanjene sposobnosti učenja i socijalne neprilagođenosti. Stoga je potpuno razumno pretpostaviti da joj je već sam teret bolesti u određenoj mjeri odmogao. To potkrepljuju objektivna mjerenja njezina funkcioniranja provedena u različitim razdobljima njezina odrastanja. Ako ih se sagleda zajedno s kliničkim opažanjima, stvara se dojam da je [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] mlada žena sa znatnim kognitivnim oštećenjem. Smatram da je to utvrdila javna zdravstvena služba kada joj se [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] obratila zbog trudnoće i da je to bio razlog za zabrinutost. Pojmovi kao što je ‚nezrela’ i ‚djetinjasta’ često se pojavljuju u opisima njezina ponašanja tijekom njezina odrastanja te se upotrebljavaju i sada kada ima 24 godine. Izgled i ponašanje [prve podnositeljice zahtjeva] uvelike pridonose upotrebi tih pridjeva: mala je i sitna te izgleda znatno mlađe od svoje kronološke dobi. Živi kod kuće sa svojim roditeljima, a soba joj je ukrašena tapetama s likovima iz serijala Moomins i popunjena predmetima koje bi se očekivalo naći u sobi tinejdžera.
Zabrinuta sam za sposobnost [prve podnositeljice zahtjeva] da se brine sama za sebe. Doima se mladom, nesigurnom i djelomično bespomoćnom. Ima zamršen odnos s muškarcima. Bila je u romantičnoj vezi s muškarcem s kojim je kratko živjela, no veza je bila turbulentna s epizodama seksualnog nasilja. Zatrudnjela je dok je još bila sa svojim dečkom, no [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] nije mogla objasniti kako to da njezin dečko nije otac dječaka X. Bila je zbunjena po tom pitanju i pričala je različite priče. Oboljela je i od spolno prenosive bolesti (klamidija), no nije znala izvor upale. [Prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] htjela je dijete, no to je prepustila slučaju, a da pritom nije razmišljala o posljedicama i obvezama koje donosi činjenica da bi sama morala preuzeti odgovornost za dijete. Dana 7. studenoga 2007. godine rekla je doktoru u SSE-u da ne upotrebljava kontracepciju i da misli da je trudna. Isti je dan izjavila da želi zatrudnjeti. U studenome 2007. godine u [bolnici R.] obavljen je pobačaj fetusa u 18. tjednu trudnoće zbog socijalnih pokazatelja. [Prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] uslikala je fetus, što bi se moglo činiti neuobičajenim. Dobila je i otisak ruke i stopala fetusa. [Osoblje bolnice R.] opisalo je [prvu podnositeljicu zahtjeva] kao nezrelu s ograničenom mrežom.
Okolnosti u kojima su se dogodile obje trudnoće dodatno ukazuju na to koliko je [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] svjesna svojih izbora i njihovih posljedica. To je važno u ocjeni njezine sposobnosti pružanja skrbi za dijete.
Nadalje, [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] nije završila svoje obrazovanje i nije imala stalan posao. Većinu svog života proživjela je u kući u svojoj staroj sobi i ima vrlo malo iskustva sa samostalnim životom odrasle osobe koja je odgovorna za stvaranje određene strukture u svom životu, osiguranje prihoda i odlučivanje o financijskim prioritetima. Njezin odnos s njezinim roditeljima trenutačno je dobar, no u prošlosti je bilo sukoba. Smatram da je taj odnos ranjiv. [Prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] pokazala je podvojene osjećaje prema majci jer s jedne strane smatra da se njezina majka previše upleće u njezin život, dok je s druge strane vrlo ovisna o njoj, njezina mišljenja iznosi kao svoja mišljenja i vjeruje joj da je usmjerava u životu. Istodobno joj smeta što njezina majka odlučuje o mnogo stvari umjesto nje i želi da si njezina majka ‚utuvi u tu svoju glupu glavu’ da joj je potrebno više privatnosti nego što je ima sada. Prema njezinoj majci [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] samo je sjedila u svojoj sobi nakon što joj je sin udomljen. Njezina je majka vrlo zabrinuta i izjavila je da ‚jedva podnosi’ što mora gledati da joj je kćer takva.
Smatra da [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] ima poteškoća s kontroliranjem svojih osjećaja, što drugim ljudima otežava interakciju s njom. Od udomljavanja djeteta [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] bila je uvrijeđena, povrijeđena i ljuta. Ti su osjećaji sasvim razumljivi kada se osjećate kao da je netko nepošteno postupio prema vama, no u ovom su slučaju oni izraženi bez ikakve cenzure do te mjere da se čine napadni. Opisivanje Županijskog odbora za socijalnu skrb kao ‚skupine pokvarenih žena koje je potkupila služba za zaštitu djece’ i osoblja u [obiteljskom centru] kao ‚onih psihotičnih osoba’ ne pomaže u stvaranju dojma da je riječ o odrasloj osobi koja je sposobna za interakciju s drugim osobama na društveno prihvatljiv način. Iznenadno grčevito plakanje [prve podnositeljice zahtjeva], kako kod kuće s njezinim roditeljima tijekom razgovora o predmetu tako i tijekom susreta i druženja, također je neuobičajeno ponašanje za odraslu osobu. Nadalje, jecanje u očevom ili majčinom krilu (kao što se opisano da se dogodilo tijekom susreta i druženja) nije znak da osoba može kontrolirati svoje emocije na način koji je primjeren njezinoj dobi. Osim toga, [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] nije zrelo prihvatila ponašanje svoga sina, nego ga je shvatila osobno kao odbijanje i postupila u skladu s time. Teško je držati se jedne teme u razgovoru s [prvom podnositeljicom zahtjeva].
Njezino kognitivno funkcioniranje obilježeno je nesposobnošću da vidi veze i generalizira. Pokazuje egocentrično razmišljanje stalnim spominjanjem zle službe za zaštitu djece i upućivanjem na to da ni njezinim roditeljima ni nikome drugome nije jasno zašto je dijete udomljeno. Upućujem na izjavu psihologa [obiteljskog centra] o tome da je ‚teško pronaći smisao u majčinim izjavama’. Dojam koji sam stekla o [prvoj podnositeljici zahtjeva] tijekom naših razgovora jest da ona fragmentirano poima cijelu situaciju, odnosno da različite epizode sagledava kao zasebne epizode koje nisu međusobno povezane. U skladu s time smjernice shvaća kao kritike, a dobre savjete kao ukore itd. Ta nesposobnost generaliziranja obilježje je razmišljanja [prve podnositeljice zahtjeva]. Također nema sposobnost apstraktnog razmišljanja i formalnog mišljenja. Teško joj je razmišljati o budućnosti i prošlosti. Stoga je teško od nje dobiti odgovor o tome što misli o mogućem povratku djeteta. Daje opće izjave, na primjer da mora saznati što voli jesti i gleda li dječje televizijske programe, no istodobno ne razmišlja o tome koje bi se posebne mjere za djetetov emocionalni stres trebale poduzeti da se dijete preseli. Kada sam je pitala što bi udomiteljica trebala napraviti da pomogne u procesu povratka djeteta, [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] nije imala nikakvih konstruktivnih prijedloga. Ono što želi jest da se ‚ona (udomiteljica) osjeća onako usrano kao što sam se ja osjećala proteklih godinu dana’. Takva izjava u kombinaciji s naglašenim neprijateljstvom (uttalt fiendtlighet) tijekom susreta i druženja nije dobar znak za suradnju ni s udomiteljskom obitelji ni sa službom za zaštitu djece u slučaju povratka dječaka.
[Prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] troši veliku količinu energije na agresiju i stvaranje neprijateljskih mišljenja. To je pridonijelo formiranju čvrstog stereotipnog uvjerenja da su služba za zaštitu djece i sve druge osobe koje žele pomoći njezini protivnici. Jedno od obilježja razmišljanja [prve podnositeljice zahtjeva] jest stav ‚ “ako nisi sa mnom, onda si protiv mene“ te nesposobnost uočavanja suptilnih razlika. Takvo crnobijelo razmišljanje obilježje je osoba s ograničenom kognitivnom sposobnosti. Nadalje, smatram da [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] pati od depresije. Smatram da je njezina jaka agresija način na koji se ona pokušava održati psihološki stabilnom.
Nema nikakvog razloga za sumnju da [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] iznimno želi postati dobra majka. U tu se svrhu sama obratila službama za podršku. No nije jasno kakve je ideje i očekivanja imala u tom pogledu. Njezina je majka ukazala na to da su oni mislili da je [obiteljski centar] neka vrsta hotela u kojem možete dobiti praktičnu pomoć sa skrbi za dijete. Unatoč svom pripremnom radu i unaprijed pruženim detaljnim informacijama oni nisu shvatili da boravak radi procjene podrazumijeva da roditelj treba pokazati svoje kvalitete, da će ga se promatrati i staviti u situaciju učenja. Zbog toga se [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] osjeća izdanom i obmanutom, što iskazuje pogrdnim riječima i prijetnjama.
Boravak u [obiteljskom centru] ukazuje na to da [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] ima poteškoća u primanju informacija i njihovu zadržavanju kako bi ih kasnije iskoristila za usmjeravanje svog ponašanja. Nije riječ o nedostatku spremnosti, nego o neodgovarajućoj sposobnosti planiranja, organiziranja i strukturiranja. Takve manifestacije kognitivnog oštećenja proširit će se i na skrb za dijete i mogli bi dovesti do zanemarivanja.
5.2. Učinak mjera pomoći
Važnom se smatra činjenica da [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] sada živi s roditeljima i može živjeti s njima koliko god je potrebno. To je neka vrsta mjere pomoći. No to bi moglo postati problematičnije nego što se čini: [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] ima 24 godine i želi se osamostaliti, a to je želja koja bi mogla biti u suprotnosti sa željom njezine majke da joj pomogne. Ni njezini roditelji ni nitko drugi neće moći određivati kako bi [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] trebala organizirati svoj život i život svog djeteta. Da se [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] želi iseliti, mogla bi to učiniti kad god to zaželi. Njezine roditelje to ne brine. Stoga se u svakoj odluci mora uzeti u obzir činjenica da – kada bi se dijete vratilo – ne može se s dovoljno sigurnosti znati gdje će se u budućnosti skrbiti za dijete. Stoga odluku prvenstveno treba temeljiti na sposobnosti pružanja skrbi [prve podnositeljice zahtjeva], a ne sposobnosti pružanja skrbi njezine mreže.
Boravak u obiteljskom centru bio je snažna mjera pomoći koja nije imala nikakav učinak. Redovite kontrole službe za zaštitu djece tijekom susreta i druženja negativno je utjecala na suradnju obitelji [podnositeljice zahtjeva] i službe za zaštitu djece. I obitelj i [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] rekli su da ne žele ni redovite kontrole ni pomoć s povratkom djeteta.
5.3. Zaključci
Moja je ocjena da postoje osnove za tvrdnje da su postojali ozbiljni nedostaci u majčinoj skrbi za dijete te ozbiljni nedostaci u pogledu osobnog kontakta i sigurnosti koja mu je potrebna s obzirom na njegovu dob i razvoj. Kognitivno oštećenje, osobnost, način funkcioniranja i nesposobnost mentalizacije [prve podnositeljice zahtjeva] onemogućuju vođenje normalnog razgovora s njom o fizičkim i psihološkim potrebama male djece. Njezina ocjena posljedica povratka djeteta u njezinu skrb i roditeljskih obveza koje će ona posljedično imati vrlo je ograničena i djetinjasta te ona i dalje u prvi plan stavlja svoje neposredne potrebe. Stoga utvrđujem da postoji opasnost da bi ti nedostaci (kako su prethodno navedeni) i dalje bili prisutni kada bi dijete živjelo sa svojom majkom.
Također utvrđujem da se zadovoljavajući uvjeti za život djeteta s majkom ne mogu stvoriti s pomoću mjera pomoći iz članka 4-4. Zakona o zaštiti djece (npr. mjere pomoći u kući ili druge mjere podrške za roditelje) zbog nepovjerenja i nespremnosti da se prihvati miješanje tijela vlasti – uzimajući u obzir dosadašnji tijek predmeta.”
„Upravo su se nakon tog razdoblja povećale bojazni povezane s praktičnom skrbi za dijete. Bilo je dogovoreno da [prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] obavijesti osoblje o svakoj promjeni pelena itd. i obrocima, no ona to nije činila. Dijete je spavalo više nego što je uobičajeno. [Obiteljska savjetnica] pozvana je zbog načina na koji je dijete disalo i spavanja tijekom obroka. Zbog gubitka na težini trebalo ga je hraniti svakih tri sata tijekom cijelog dana i noći. Osoblje je ponekad trebalo siliti majku da nahrani svog sina.”
„Nije riječ o nedostatku spremnosti, nego o neodgovarajućoj sposobnosti planiranja, organiziranja i strukturiranja. Takve manifestacije kognitivnog oštećenja proširit će se i na skrb za dijete i mogli bi dovesti do zanemarivanja.” (ibid.)
„Kad je riječ o učestalosti susreta i druženja, Žalbeni sud podijeljen je na većinu i manjinu.
Većina … je utvrdila da bi primjerena količina susreta i druženja bila četiri posjeta godišnje od dva sata.
Većina smatra da je važno naglasiti da samo majka ima pravo na susrete i druženje. Činjenica da je rijetko sama posjećivala [dječaka X] imala je određene nepoželjne posljedice. Povećana je napetost među prisutnim odraslim osobama. Mora se pretpostaviti i da je dijete pod većim stresom u prisustvu više osoba. Manji broj sudionika doveo bi do mirnije atmosfere. To je dosljedno opažanjima psihologinje
[M.S.]. Napetost među odraslim osobama dodatno bi se mogla smanjiti nakon što se predmet pravno riješi i prođe određeno vrijeme. Stres za dijete dodatno će smanjiti činjenica da će susreti i druženje biti rjeđi nego u prethodnom modelu. Mora se pretpostaviti da će se tada umanjiti i naknadne djetetove reakcije na njih. Međutim, najvažniji će čimbenik biti pitanje hoće li majka i, ako je relevantno, bilo koji drugi član obitelji bolje surađivati i po mogućnosti zauzeti pozitivan stav prema udomiteljici, osobito tijekom susreta i druženja.
Zaključak većine da susreti i druženje ne mogu biti češći od četiri puta godišnje potkrepljuju prethodno navedeni elementi. Osim toga, smještaj će vjerojatno biti dugoročno rješenje. Susreti i druženje stoga mogu poslužiti za održavanje kontakta između majke i sina tako da se on upozna sa svojim korijenima. Smatra se da je to važno za razvoj identiteta. Svrha susreta i druženja nije uspostavljanje odnosa radi budućeg povratka djeteta pod skrb biološke majke.
Služba za zaštitu djece mora biti ovlaštena za nadzor ostvarivanja prava na susrete i druženje. To je nužno iz nekoliko razloga, među ostalim, radi ograničavanja broja sudionika susreta i druženja.”
Manjina u Žalbenom sudu – jedan od profesionalnih sudaca – smatrala je da bi prava na susrete i druženje trebala biti ograničena na dva puta godišnje.
D. Pritužba prve podnositeljice zahtjeva upućena županu
E. Postupak za ukidanje odluke o skrbi ili lišenje prve podnositeljice zahtjeva prava na roditeljsku skrb za dječaka X i odobrenje posvojenja
1. Postupak pred Županijskim odborom za socijalnu skrb
(a) Uvod
„Na Wechslerovoj ljestvici inteligencije za odrasle III (WAIS-III) zabilježen je kvocijent inteligencije 86. Standardne pogreške u mjerenjima ukazuju s 95%-nom vjerojatnošću na to da je njezin kvocijent inteligencije između 82 i 90. Normalan raspon kreće se između 85 i 115. Kad je riječ o njezinim sposobnostima, [podnositeljica zahtjeva] nalazi se na donjem dijelu normalnog raspona. Osim toga, ima znatne poteškoće u učenju koje su … [veće] od onih koje bi se očekivale s obzirom na njezin kvocijent inteligencije [(betydelige lærevansker som er svakere enn hva hennes IQ skulle tilsi)]. Smatra se da su te poteškoće povezane s kognitivnim oštećenjem.”
U odgovoru na zahtjev za dodatno objašnjenje od 27. listopada 2011. godine napisao je punomoćniku prve podnositeljice zahtjeva sljedeće:
„Opći kvocijent inteligencije između 82 i 90 sam po sebi ne ukazuje na to da osoba nije sposobna skrbiti se za djecu. Sposobnosti skrbi trebale bi se dodatno ispitati promatranjem skrbnika i djeteta te pregledom anamneznih podataka o drugim okolnostima. Budući da nisam stručnjak u tom području, mislim da bi se ocjenom ključnih čimbenika obuhvatila, među ostalim, sposobnost skrbnika za empatiju i posjećivanje djeteta, razumijevanje djetetovih potreba, sposobnost tumačenja djetetovih znakova te sposobnost stavljanja po strani [(utsette)] vlastitih želja u korist djetetovih potreba.
Tu bi ocjenu trebao provesti kvalificirani psiholog s iskustvom u tom području.”
(b) Odluka Odbora
„U svom iskazu pred Županijskim odborom za socijalnu skrb majka je ustrajala na tome da je odluka o skrbi urota službe za zaštitu djece, [obiteljskog centra] i udomitelja kako bi se ‚pomoglo ženi koja ne može imati djecu’. Prema njezinim riječima ovdje je bila riječ o ‚predbilježbi za dijete’. Majka nije bila svjesna da je zanemarivala [dječaka X] i izjavila je da većinu svog vremena i energije troši na ‚predmet’.
U izvješćima o susretima i druženju majke s [dječakom X] stalno [(gjennomgående)] se ukazuje na to da se ona i dalje ne može usredotočiti na [dječaka X] i ono što je najbolje za njega, nego da na nju izrazito utječe njezino vrlo negativno mišljenje o udomiteljici i službi za zaštitu djece.
[Prva podnositeljica zahtjeva] udala se i rodila još jedno dijete na jesen. Psiholog [K.M.] izjavio je pred Odborom da je opazio dobru interakciju majke i djeteta te da se majka dobro skrbi za dijete. Odbor uzima u obzir tu informaciju. Županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb smatra da se na temelju tog opažanja nikako ne može zaključiti da je majka sposobna skrbiti se za [dječaka X].
Županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb smatra da je razumno pretpostaviti da je [dječak X] osobito ranjivo dijete. Iskusio je ozbiljno i po život opasno i zanemarivanje u prvih tri tjedna svog života. Upućuje se i na činjenicu da su održani brojni susreti i druženje s majkom, od kojih su neki bili vrlo stresni za [dječaka X]. Sve u svemu, proživio je mnogo toga. Živi u udomiteljskoj obitelji tri godine i ne poznaje svoju biološku majku. Da se [dječak X] vrati pod skrb svoje majke, preduvjet za to bila bi, među ostalim, velika sposobnost empatije s [dječakom X] te razumijevanja [dječaka X] i problema s kojima bi se susreo, osobito činjenice da bi žalio za svojim udomiteljima i da bi mu nedostajali. Majka i obitelj ne pokazuju nimalo takve empatije i razumijevanja. I majka i baka izjavile su da to neće biti problem, da ‚mu se samo malo treba odvratiti pažnja’, čime su ostavile dojam da ne suosjećaju s dječakom i stoga da nisu sposobne pružiti mu psihološku skrb koja će mu biti potrebna u slučaju povratka.”
„[Dječak X] živi tri godine kao punopravni član udomiteljske obitelji. Te tri godine zapravo su dječakov cijeli život. Smatramo da je potkrijepljeno da je njegova udomiteljska obitelj njegov primarni izvor sigurnosti i osjećaja pripadnosti. On udomitelje smatra svojim psihološkim roditeljima. Osim u udomiteljskoj obitelji, [dječaka X] redovito kontroliraju u vrtiću, kao i ostali članovi obitelji udomitelja. Nemamo nikakve sumnje da bi izdvajanje [dječaka X] iz tog okruženja i povratak biološkoj majci doveo do znatnih i ozbiljnih problema. Upućuje se na činjenicu da je već nakon jedne godine razvio znatne probleme kada se količina susreta i druženja znatno povećala. Ocjenjujemo da je ključno za razvoj i dobrobit dječaka da nastavi živjeti u udomiteljskoj obitelji.
Na temelju toga Županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb mora odlučiti o pitanju lišenja prava na roditeljsku skrb i, prema potrebi, odobrenju posvojenja.
U prvom i drugom stavku članka 4-20. Zakona o zaštiti djece utvrđeno je da se odluka o lišenju roditeljâ prava na roditeljsku skrb može donijeti te da je ona preduvjet za odobrenje posvojenja. Prije toga Županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb mora donijeti odluku o skrbi za dijete.
Odbor svoju odluku temelji na utvrđenoj sudskoj praksi kojom je predviđeno da se biološke roditelje mora lišiti prava na roditeljsku skrb da bi se omogućilo posvajanje. To je primarni cilj prijedloga službe za zaštitu djece o lišenju majke prava na roditeljsku skrb u ovom predmetu.
Člankom 4-20. Zakona o zaštiti djece predviđaju se znatno stroži uvjeti za odobrenje posvojenja nego za lišenje roditeljâ prava na roditeljsku skrb. No, kada je svrha odluke donesene na temelju prvog stavka omogućavanje posvojenja, osnove za posvojenje ujedno su i osnove za lišenje prava na roditeljsku skrb.
Stoga se u ovom predmetu treba utvrditi jesu li ispunjeni uvjeti za odobrenje posvojenja. Treći stavak članka 4-20. Zakona o zaštiti djece glasi kako slijedi:
„Odobrenje se može dati
(a) kada se smatra vjerojatnim da roditelji trajno neće biti sposobni djetetu pružiti odgovarajuću skrb ili da se dijete toliko povezalo s osobama i okruženjem u kojem živi da bi, na temelju opće procjene, izdvajanje djeteta moglo dovesti do ozbiljnih problema za dijete i
(b) kada je posvojenje u najboljem interesu djeteta i
(c) kada su osobe koje su podnijele prijavu namjere posvojenja bile djetetovi udomitelji i pokazale da su podobne da dijete odgajaju kao vlastito dijete te
(d) kada su ispunjeni uvjeti za odobrenje posvojenja iz Zakona o posvojenju.” Županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb prvo primjećuje da postoje valjane osnove za lišenje majke prava na roditeljsku skrb za [dječaka X] neovisno o pitanju posvojenja.
Upućuje se na činjenicu da [dječak X] živi u udomiteljskoj obitelji gotovo cijeli svoj život i da je stoga najnormalnije da udomitelji donose odluke u njegovo ime, što je dio roditeljskih obveza. Majčino neosjetljivo ponašanje, među ostalima i na internetu, također ukazuje na to da bi mu ona mogla prouzročiti mnoge probleme [(ramme ham hardt)] kada dođe u dob u kojoj će ih moći razumjeti.
Županijski sud za socijalni odbor smatra [(legger til grunn)] da majka trajno neće biti sposobna pružati [dječaku X] odgovarajuću skrb i da se [dječak X] toliko povezao sa svojim udomiteljima, udomiteljskim bratom i ostatkom obitelji da bi mu izdvajanje prouzročilo ozbiljne probleme. Upućuje se na prethodno navedeno razlaganje. Ispunjen je uvjet iz točke (a) [trećeg stavka] članka 4-20. Zakona o zaštiti djece.
Posvojenje je posebno invazivna mjera u odnosu na biološke roditelje i dijete. Stoga su potrebni posebno uvjerljivi razlozi za to. U skladu sa sudskom praskom Vrhovnog suda odluka se mora temeljiti na konkretnoj procjeni, no mora se osloniti i na opće iskustvo iz dječje psihologije ili dječje psihijatrije. Konkretno se upućuje na odluku Vrhovnog suda objavljenu u listu Rt. 2007, str. 561 ff., koja se odnosi na predmet u kojem je vještak kojeg je imenovao sud izjavio da opće iskustvo ukazuje na to da udomljavanje nije poželjno rješenje u slučaju dugotrajnog smještaja djece koja su u udomiteljsku obitelj došla prije nego što su se povezala sa svojim biološkim roditeljima. U takvim slučajevima posvojenje bi bilo najpodobnije za djetetov razvoj. U presudi je navedeno da se veliki značaj mora pridati takvom općem, no složenom iskustvu.
Županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb temelji svoju odluku [(legger til grunn)] na činjenici da majka ne pristaje na posvojenje [dječaka X]. Kao što je prethodno pokazano, njezina predanost tome da se on vrati u njezinu skrb snažna je iako neprimjerena [(uhensiktsmessig)].
Županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb ocijenio je da bi odobrenje posvojenja očito bilo u najboljem interesu [dječaka X]. Županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb ne smatra da je povratak [dječaka X] u majčinu skrb moguć. Smatra se da je njegov smještaj u udomiteljsku obitelj trajan. [Dječak X] smatra udomitelje svojim psihološkim roditeljima i oni su jedini roditelji koje poznaje. Posvojenje bi [dječaku X] bila dodatna potvrda da je sin svojih udomitelja.”
„Odlukom o tome da mora ostati udomljeno dijete govori mu se da bi osobe s kojima je oduvijek živio i koje su njegovi roditelji i s kojima se povezao u najranijoj dobi i stekao osjećaj pripadnosti trebale ostati pod nadzorom službe za zaštitu djece – tijela javne vlasti – i da ih društvo ne smatra njegovim pravim roditeljima nego udomiteljima na temelju ugovora koji se može raskinuti. …”
Odbor je smatrao da su ta opća razmatranja točan opis situacije dječaka X. Posvojenje bi bilo u najboljem interesu dječaka X. Smatralo se da je ispunjen uvjet iz točke (b) trećeg stavka članka 4-20. Zakona o zaštiti djece (vidi u nastavku stavak 122.).
2. Postupak pred Okružnim sudom
(a) Uvod
(b) Obrazloženje Okružnog suda o tome treba li ukinuti javno skrbništvo nad dječakom X
(c) Obrazloženje Okružnog suda o tome treba li lišiti prava na roditeljsku skrb za dječaka X i odobriti posvojenje
3. Postupak pred Žalbenim sudom i Vrhovnim sudom
II. MJERODAVNO DOMAĆE PRAVO I PRAKSA
A. Zakon o zaštiti djece
Članak 4-1. Vođenje računa o najboljim interesima djeteta
„Pri primjeni odredbi ove glave od ključnog je značaja utvrđivanje mjera koje su u najboljem interesu djeteta.
To uključuje i pridavanje značaja osiguranju stabilnog i odgovarajućeg kontakta između djeteta i odraslih osoba te stalnost u pružanju skrbi.”
Članak 4-6. Privremena rješenja u hitnim slučajevima
„Ako se za dijete ne skrbi jer su roditelji bolesni ili iz drugih razloga, služba za zaštitu djece pruža pomoć koja je neposredno nužna. Te mjere ne provode se protiv volje roditelja.
Ako postoji opasnost od nanošenja značajne štete djetetu ako ono stane u svom domu, voditelj tijela vlasti za zaštitu djece ili tijela kaznenog progona može odmah donijeti privremenu odluku o skrbi bez suglasnosti roditelja.
U tom slučaju voditelj tijela vlasti za zaštitu djece može donijeti i privremenu odluku na temelju članka 4-19.
Ako je odluka donesena na temelju drugog stavka, zahtjev za provedbu mjera iz članka 7-11. šalje se županijskom odboru za socijalnu skrb što prije, a najkasnije u roku od šest tjedana odnosno dva tjedna ako je riječ o mjerama iz članka 4-24.
Ako se zahtjev županijskom odboru za socijalnu skrb ne pošalje u rokovima iz četvrtog stavka, odluka postaje ništavna.”
Članak 4-12. Odluke o skrbi
„Odluka o skrbi može se donijeti
(a) ako postoje ozbiljni nedostaci u svakodnevnoj skrbi za dijete ili ozbiljni nedostaci u osiguranju osobnog kontakta i sigurnosti koja je djetetu potrebna s obzirom na njegovu dob i razvoj,
(b) ako roditelji ne mogu osigurati da dijete koje je bolesno, s invaliditetom ili mu je potrebna posebna pomoć primi potrebno liječenje i vježbanje,
(c) ako je dijete maltretirano ili izloženo drugom ozbiljnom zlostavljanju u svom domu, ili
(d) ako je vrlo vjerojatno da bi djetetovo zdravlje ili razvoj mogli biti ozbiljno narušeni jer roditelji nisu sposobni preuzeti odgovarajuću odgovornost za dijete.
Odluka se može donijeti na temelju prvog stavka kada je to nužno zbog trenutačne situacije u kojoj se dijete nalazi. Stoga se ta odluka ne može donijeti ako su stvoreni zadovoljavajući uvjeti za dijete provedbom mjera pomoći iz članka 4-4. ili mjera iz članka 4-10. ili članka 4-11.
Oduku na temelju prvog stavka donosi županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb u skladu s odredbama glave 7.”
Članak 4-19. Prava na susrete i druženje. Tajna adresa
„Osim ako nije drugačije utvrđeno, djeca i roditelji imaju pravo na međusobne susrete i druženje.
U slučaju donošenja odluke o skrbi županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb mora utvrditi opseg tih susreta i druženja, no može za dobrobit djeteta odlučiti da se susreti i druženje ne bi trebali održavati. Županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb može i odlučiti da roditelji nemaju pravo znati gdje se dijete nalazi.
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Privatne stranke ne mogu zatražiti da županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb rješava predmet koji se odnosi na susrete i druženje ako je županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb ili sud već riješio predmet u proteklih dvanaest mjeseci.
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Članak 4-20. Lišenje prava na roditeljsku skrb. Posvojenje
„Ako je donio odluku o skrbi za dijete, županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb može i odlučiti da se roditelje mora lišiti svih prava na roditeljsku skrb. Ako zbog lišenja roditeljâ prava na roditeljsku skrb dijete ostane bez skrbnika, županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb što prije poduzima korake kako bi se imenovao novi skrbnik djeteta. U slučaju donošenja rješenja o lišenju prava na roditeljsku skrb županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb može odobriti da dijete posvoje osobe koje nisu njegovi roditelji.
Odobrenje se može dati
(a) kada se smatra vjerojatnim da roditelji trajno neće biti sposobni pružiti djetetu odgovarajuću skrbili da se dijete toliko povezalo s osobama i okruženjem u kojem živi da bi, na temelju opće procjene, izdvajanje djeteta moglo dovesti do ozbiljnih problema za dijete i
(b) kada je posvojenje u najboljem interesu djeteta i
(c) kada su osobe koje su podnijele prijavu namjere posvojenja bile djetetovi udomitelji i pokazale da su podobne da dijete odgajaju kao vlastito dijete te
(d) kada su ispunjeni uvjeti za odobrenje posvojenja iz Zakona o posvojenju. Kada županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb odobri posvojenje, Ministarstvo [za djecu i jednakost] izdaje rješenje o posvojenju.”
Članak 4-20.a Susreti i druženje djeteta i njegovih bioloških roditelja nakon posvojenja [dodano 2010. godine]
„Kada donese rješenje o posvojenju iz članka 4-20., županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb mora istodobno razmotriti, ako je to zatražila neka od stranaka, hoće li se nakon provedbe posvojenja održavati susreti i druženje djeteta i njegovih bioloških roditelja. Ako su u tim slučajevima ograničeni susreti i druženje nakon posvojenja u najboljem interesu djeteta, a osobe koje su podnijele prijavu namjere posvojenja suglasne su s takvim susretima i druženjem, županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb donosi rješenje o održavanju susreta i druženja. U tom slučaju županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb mora istodobno odrediti količinu susreta i druženja.
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Rješenje o održavanju susreta i druženja može se samo preispitati ako postoje posebni opravdani razlozi. Posebni razlozi mogu uključivati djetetovo protivljenje tim susretima i druženju ili propust bioloških roditelja u poštovanju rješenja o održavanju susreta i druženja.
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Članak 4-21. Ukidanje odluka o skrbi
„Županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb ukida odluku o skrbi kada je vrlo vjerojatno da će roditelji moći djetetu pružiti odgovarajuću skrb. Odluka se unatoč tome ne ukida ako se dijete toliko povezalo s osobama i okruženjem u kojem živi da bi, na temelju opće procjene, izdvajanje djeteta moglo dovesti do ozbiljnih problema za dijete. Prije ukidanja odluke o skrbi udomitelji djeteta imaju pravo iznijeti svoje mišljenje.
Stranke ne mogu zatražiti da županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb rješava predmet koji se odnosi na ukidanje odluke o skrbi ako je županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb ili sud već riješio predmet u proteklih dvanaest mjeseci. Ako zahtjev za ukidanje prethodne odluke ili presude nije prihvaćen na temelju druge rečenice prvog stavka članka 4-21., pokretanje novog postupka može se samo zatražiti ako se dostave pisani dokazi koji ukazuju na to da je došlo do značajnih promjena u situaciji djeteta.”
Članak 7-5. Sastav odbora u pojedinačnim predmetima
„U pojedinačnim predmetima županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb sastoji se od predsjednika, člana redovnog vijeća i člana stručnog vijeća. Kada je to potrebno zbog složenosti predmeta, predsjednik može odlučiti da će se odbor uz predsjednika sastojati od dva člana redovnog vijeća i dva člana stručnog vijeća.
Ako stranke pristanu na to, predsjednik može sam odlučivati o predmetima na način opisan u prvom stavku osim ako to nije moguće zbog potrebe za održavanjem zadovoljavajuće rasprave o predmetu.
Kada se predmet odnosi na zahtjev za izmjenu prethodne odluke/rješenja ili presude, predsjednik može sam odlučiti o predmetu osim ako to nije moguće zbog stvari na koju se odnosi predmet, njegove složenosti, potrebe za stručnim znanjem i održavanjem odgovarajuće rasprave o predmetu.
Kada se predmet odnosi na produljenje rješenja o smještaju koje je donio županijski odbor za socijalnu skrb na temelju članka 4-29., predsjednik o predmetu odlučuje sam.”
B. Sudska praksa na temelju Zakona o zaštiti djece
„U djece koja su dugotrajno udomljena i posvojena uočen je bolji psihosocijalni razvoj nego u djece u sličnoj situaciji koja nisu posvojena. Čini se da je trajnost djetetova osjećaja pripadnosti ključna.”
C. Zakon o posvojenju
Članak 2.
„Rješenje o posvojenju mora se donijeti samo kada se može pretpostaviti da će posvojenje biti u korist djeteta [(til gagn for barnet)]. Usto je potrebno da osoba koja je podnijela prijavu namjere posvojenja iskaže želju da udomi ili je već udomila dijete ili da postoji neki drugi poseban razlog za posvojenje.”
Članak 12.
„Posvojitelji moraju, čim je to preporučljivo, reći posvojenom djetetu da je posvojeno.
Kada navrši 18 godina, dijete ima pravo saznati identitet svojih bioloških roditelja od Ministarstva [za djecu i jednakost].”
Članak 13.
„Od trenutka posvojenja posvojeno dijete i njegovi nasljednici imaju pravni status istovjetan statusu biološke djece posvojitelja, osim ako nije drugačije utvrđeno u članku 14. ili drugom propisu. Istodobno prestaje pravni odnos djeteta s njegovom prvobitnom obitelji, osim ako nije drugačije utvrđeno posebnim propisom.
Kada jedan bračni drug posvoji dijete svog bračnog ili izvanbračnog druga, to dijete ima pravni status istovjetan statusu zajedničke djece tih bračnih drugova. To se primjenjuje i na djecu posvojenu u skladu s drugim, trećim i četvrtim stavkom članka 5.b.”
Članak 14.a Susreti i druženje nakon posvojenja
„Kada se posvojenje provodi na temelju odluka donesenih na temelju članka 4-20. Zakona o zaštiti djece, učinci posvojenja koji proizlaze iz članka 13. ovog Zakona primjenjuju se u skladu s ograničenjima koja se mogu odrediti u odluci donesenoj na temelju članka 4-20.a Zakona o zaštiti djece koji se odnosi na susrete i druženje djeteta i njegovih bioloških roditelja.”
D. Zakon o sporovima
Članak 36-4. Sastav suda. Stručno vijeće
„(1) Okružni sud zasjeda u sastavu dva suca porotnika, pri čemu je jedan redovni sudac porotnik, a drugi stručni sudac porotnik. U posebnim slučajevima sud može zasjedati u sastavu dva profesionalna suca i tri suca porotnika, pri čemu su jedan ili dvoje stručni suci porotnici.”
Članak 36-10. Žalba
„(3) Žalbeni sud mora dopustiti podnošenje žalbe protiv presude okružnog suda u predmetima koji se odnose na odluke županijskog odbora donesene na temelju Zakona o zaštiti djece.
Podnošenje se može dopustiti samo ako
a) žalba se odnosi na pitanja čiji je značaj širi od opsega dotičnog predmeta,
b) postoje osnove za obnovu rasprave o predmetu zbog novootkrivenih informacija,
c) postoje ozbiljni nedostaci u rješenju okružnog suda ili postupku pred okružnim sudom [(vesentlige svakheter ved tingrettens avgjørelse eller saksbehandling)], ili
d) presudom su predviđene prisilne mjere koje nije odobrio županijski odbor.”
III. MJERODAVNO MEĐUNARODNO PRAVO
A. Ujedinjeni narodi
Članak 3.
„1. U svim akcijama koje u svezi s djecom poduzimaju javne ili privatne ustanove socijalne skrbi, sudovi, državna uprava ili zakonodavna tijela, mora se prvenstveno voditi računa o [najboljim] interesima djeteta.”
Članak 9.
„1. Države stranke osigurat će da se dijete ne odvaja od svojih roditelja protiv njihove volje, osim kada nadležne vlasti pod sudbenim nadzorom odluče, u skladu s važećim zakonima i postupcima, da je odvajanje potrebno radi [najboljih interesa] djeteta. Takva odluka može biti naročito potrebna u posebnim slučajevima, kao što su zloporaba roditeljskog položaja ili zanemarivanje djeteta, ili pak kad roditelji žive odvojeno, a mora se donijeti odluka o mjestu djetetova prebivališta.
2. U svakom postupku koji se vodi u skladu sa stavkom 1. ovog članka, svim zainteresiranim stranama mora se omogućiti sudjelovanje i izjašnjavanje.
3. Države stranke poštivat će pravo djeteta koje je odvojeno od jednoga ili oba roditelja da redovito održava osobne i neposredne odnose s oba roditelja ako se time ne ugrožava njegove [najbolje interese].
4. Ako je odvajanje posljedica bilo kojega postupka što ga je pokrenula država stranka, primjerice pritvora, zatvora, progona, izručenja ili smrti jednog ili oba roditelja (uključujući i smrt koja je uslijedila iz bilo kojega razloga dok je osoba pod nadzorom države), država stranka će na podnesen zahtjev pružiti roditeljima, djetetu ili, ako je potrebno, drugom članu obitelji, potrebne obavijesti o boravištu odsutnog člana(ova) obitelji, osim kad bi pružanje takve obavijesti moglo štetiti dobrobiti djeteta. Države stranke osigurat će nadalje da podnošenje takvog zahtjeva samo po sebi nema štetne posljedice po zainteresiranu osobu ili osobe.”
Članak 18.
„1. Države stranke učinit će sve što je u njihovoj moći u primjeni načela zajedničke roditeljske odgovornosti za odgoj i razvoj djeteta. Roditelji ili zakonski skrbnici snose najveću odgovornost za odgoj i razvoj djeteta. [Najbolji interesi] djeteta moraju biti njihova temeljna briga.
2. U cilju jamčenja i promicanja prava utvrđenih u ovoj Konvenciji, države stranke pružit će odgovarajuću pomoć roditeljima i zakonskim skrbnicima kako bi oni mogli ispuniti svoju dužnost prema djetetu, te jačati ustanove i službe za dječju zaštitu i skrb.
3. Države stranke iskoristit će sve odgovarajuće mjere da djeca zaposlenih roditelja mogu uživati zaštitu i skrb ustanova i službi koje im u tom smislu stoje na raspolaganju.”
Članak 20.
„1. Dijete kojemu je privremeno ili trajno uskraćena obiteljska sredina, ili koje zbog svojih [najboljih interesa] u njoj ne smije ostati, ima pravo na posebnu zaštitu i pomoć države.
2. Države stranke će u skladu sa svojim nacionalnim zakonodavstvom takvom djetetu osigurati zamjensku zaštitu.
3. Takva zaštita može, inter alia, uključivati smještaj kod udomitelja, kafalu po islamskom zakonu, posvojenje ili, po potrebi, smještaj u odgovarajuće ustanove za skrb o djeci. Pri donošenju rješenja, osobita pozornost mora se posvetiti osiguranju kontinuiteta u djetetovu odgoju, kao i njegovu etničkom, vjerskom, kulturnom ili jezičnom podrijetlu.”
Članak 21.
„Države stranke koje priznaju i/ili dopuštaju posvojenje, vodit će računa da se pri tome najveća moguća pozornost posveti [najboljim interesima] djeteta te će:
a) osigurati da posvojenje službeno odobrava samo stručna služba koja će temeljem odgovarajućih zakona i postupka, kao i svih bitnih i pouzdanih informacija, donijeti odluku o ispravnosti posvojenja s obzirom na situaciju u kojoj se dijete nalazi glede roditelja, rodbine i zakonskih skrbnika, i utvrditi jesu li zainteresirane strane svjesno pristale na posvojenje nakon što su bile ispravno savjetovane ako savjetovanje bude potrebno;
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„13. U članku 3. utvrđeno je načelo da se u svim akcijama koje se odnose na djecu mora prvenstveno voditi računa o najboljim interesima djeteta. S obzirom na njihovu relativnu nezrelost mala djeca moraju se osloniti na to da će odgovorna tijela vlasti procijeniti i zastupati njihova prava i najbolje interese pri donošenju odluka i provedbi akcija koje utječu na njihovu dobrobit te istodobno uzeti u obzir njihova mišljenja i sposobnosti razvoja. Načelo najboljeg interesa opetovano se pojavljuje u Konvenciji (uključujući u člancima 9., 18., 20. i 21., koji su najvažniji za rano djetinjstvo). Načelo najboljeg interesa primjenjuje se na sve akcije koje se odnose na djecu i podrazumijeva poduzimanje aktivnih mjera za zaštitu njihovih prava i promicanje njihova preživljavanja, rasta i dobrobiti, kao i mjera za pružanje podrške i pomoći roditeljima i drugim osobama koje su svakodnevno odgovorne za ostvarivanje prava djece:
(a) Najbolji interesi pojedinačnog djeteta. Pri donošenju svih odluka o djetetovoj skrbi, zdravlju, obrazovanju itd., među ostalim odluka koje donose roditelji, stručnjaci i druge osobe odgovorne za djecu, mora se uzeti u obzir načelo najboljeg interesa. Potiče se države stranke da donesu propise kojima se osigurava da malu djecu u svim pravnim postupcima zastupa neovisna osoba koja djeluje u interesu djeteta te da se u svim predmetima sasluša djecu kada su ona sposobna izraziti svoja mišljenja ili želje.”
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(b) djetetov identitet
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(c) očuvanje obiteljskog okruženja i održavanje odnosa
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(d) skrb za dijete, njegova zaštita i sigurnost
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(e) situacija ranjivosti
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(f) djetetovo pravo na zdravlje
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(g) djetetovo pravo na obrazovanje
...”
U poglavlju naslovljenom „Uravnoteženje elemenata u procjeni najboljih interesa” i „Postupovna jamstva za osiguranje ostvarivanja najboljih interesa djeteta” navedeno je, među ostalim, sljedeće:
„84. U procjeni najboljih interesa treba uzeti u obzir da će se sposobnosti djeteta razviti. Donositelji odluka stoga bi trebali razmotriti mjere koje se mogu primjereno revidirati ili prilagoditi umjesto donositi konačne i nepovratne odluke. Da bi to učinili, trebali bi procijeniti fizičke, emocionalne, obrazovne i druge potrebe u trenutku donošenja odluke, ali i razmotriti moguće scenarije djetetova razvoja te analizirati njihov kratkoročni i dugoročni učinak. U tom bi kontekstu pri donošenju odluka trebalo ocijeniti trajnost i stabilnost trenutačne i buduće situacije u kojoj se dijete nalazi odnosno će se nalaziti.
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85. Kako bi se osiguralo ispravno ostvarivanje prava djeteta na vođenje računa prvenstveno o njegovim najboljim interesima, moraju se utvrditi i poštovati određena postupovna jamstva pogodna za djecu. Kao takav, koncept najboljeg interesa djeteta jest pravilo postupka … .
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87. Države moraju uspostaviti formalne postupke sa strogim postupovnim jamstvima koji su osmišljeni za procjenu i utvrđivanje najboljih interesa djeteta u slučaju odluka koje utječu na dijete, uključujući mehanizme za ocjenjivanje rezultata. Države moraju razviti transparentne i objektivne postupke za sve odluke koje donose zakonodavci, suci ili upravna tijela, osobito u područjima koja izravno utječu na dijete ili djecu.”
B. Vijeće Europe
Članak 3. – Valjanost posvojenja
„Posvojenje je valjano samo ako ga odobri sud ili upravno tijelo (u daljnjem tekstu: ‚nadležno tijelo vlasti’).”
Članak 4. – Odobrenje posvojenja
„1. Nadležno tijelo vlasti ne odobrava posvojenje osim ako nije uvjereno da će posvojenje biti u najboljem interesu djeteta.
2. Nadležno tijelo vlasti u svakom predmetu posebnu pozornost posvećuje važnom pitanju o tome osigurava li se posvojenjem stabilan i skladan dom za dijete.”
Članak 5. – Suglasnost za posvojenje
„1. Ako se to ne protivi stavcima od 2. do 5. ovog članka, posvojenje se ne odobrava osim ako su pribavljene i nisu povučene sljedeće suglasnosti za posvojenje:
a. suglasnost majke i oca ili, ako ni otac ni majka nisu dostupni za davanje suglasnosti, suglasnost osobe ili tijela koji su ovlašteni dati suglasnost umjesto njih; b suglasnost djeteta za koje se zakonski smatra da ima dostatnu moć rasuđivanja, pri čemu se smatra da dijete ima dostatnu moć rasuđivanja u trenutku kada navrši dob koja se zakonski propisuje i neće biti viša od 14 godina;
c. suglasnost bračnog druga ili registriranog partnera posvojitelja.
2. Osobe čija je suglasnost potrebna za posvojenje mora se savjetovati, ako je savjetovanje potrebno, i propisno informirati o učincima njihove suglasnosti, osobito o tome hoće li posvojenje dovesti do prekida pravnog odnosa između djeteta i njegove biološke obitelji. Suglasnost se mora dati dobrovoljno na propisanom zakonskom obrascu i iskazati ili dokazati u pisanom obliku.
3. Nadležno tijelo vlasti nije ovlašteno ukinuti suglasnost ni poništiti odbijanje davanja suglasnosti bilo koje osobe ili tijela iz stavka 1., osim u slučaju izvanrednih osnova propisanih zakonom. No može ukinuti suglasnost djeteta s invaliditetom koji mu onemogućuje iskazivanje valjane suglasnosti.
4. Ako otac ili majka nemaju prava na roditeljsku skrb za dijete ili barem pravo na davanje suglasnosti za posvojenje, zakonom se može predvidjeti da nije nužno pribaviti njihovu suglasnost.
5. Suglasnost majke za posvojenje njezina djeteta valjana je samo ako je dana nakon isteka zakonski propisanog razdoblja poslije rođenja djeteta koje nije kraće od šest tjedana ili, ako to razdoblje nije propisano, nakon isteka razdoblja tijekom kojeg će se prema mišljenju nadležnog tijela vlasti ona uspjeti dovoljno oporaviti od posljedica rođenja djeteta.
6. Za potrebe ove Konvencije ‚otac’ i ‚majka’ znači osobe koje su prema zakonu roditelji djeteta.”
„5. Financijsko i imovinsko siromaštvo nikada ne bi trebali biti jedino opravdanje za izdvajanje djeteta iz roditeljske skrbi, no trebali bi biti naznaka da obitelji treba pružiti odgovarajuću podršku. Nadalje, dokazivanje da bi se dijete moglo smjestiti u okruženje pogodnije za njegov odgoj nije dovoljno za odvajanje djeteta od njegovih roditelja, a još manje razlog za potpuni prekid obiteljskih veza.
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8. Skupština stoga preporučuje da države članice:
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8.2. donesu zakone, propise i postupke kojima će se osigurati da je najbolji interes djeteta doista najvažniji čimbenik u donošenju odluka o izdvajanju, smještaju i spajanju;
8.3. nastave i ojačaju svoj rad na osiguranju da se svi relevantni postupci provode na način pogodan za djecu te da se uzimaju u obzir mišljenja djece na koje se oni odnose u skladu s njihovom dobi i stupnjem zrelosti;
8.4. povećaju vidljivost utjecaja predrasuda i diskriminacije na odluke o izdvajanju te ga iskorijene, među ostalim, odgovarajućim osposobljavanjem svih uključenih stručnjaka;
8.5. obiteljima pružaju podršku odgovarajućim sredstvima (uključujući financijsku, imovinsku, socijalnu i psihološku podršku) kako bi se unaprijed izbjegle neopravdane odluke o izdvajanju i kako bi se povećao postotak uspješnih spajanja obitelji nakon stavljanja pod skrbništvo;
8.6. osiguraju da je (privremeno) stavljanje djeteta pod alternativno skrbništvo, kada je došlo do situacije u kojoj je ta posljednja moguća mjera nužna, popraćen mjerama usmjerenima na kasnije ponovno uključivanje djeteta u obitelj, uključujući omogućavanje odgovarajućih susreta i druženja djeteta i njegove obitelji, te da je podložan redovitim kontrolama;
8.7. izbjegavaju, osim u izvanrednim okolnostima predviđenima zakonom i podložnima djelotvornom (pravodobnom i sveobuhvatnom) sudskom preispitivanju, potpuni prekid obiteljskih veza, izdvajanje djeteta iz roditeljske skrbi po rođenju, temeljenje odluka o smještaju na proteku vremena i pribjegavanje posvojenju bez roditeljske suglasnosti;
8.8. osiguraju da se osoblje uključeno u donošenje odluka o izdvajanju i smještaju vodi odgovarajućim kriterijima i standardima (po mogućnosti na multidisciplinarni način), da je kvalificirano i redovito pohađa osposobljavanje, da ima dovoljno resursa za pravodobno donošenje odluka i da nije preopterećeno prevelikim brojem predmeta;
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8.10. osiguraju da se, osim u hitnim slučajevima, prvobitne odluke o izdvajanju temelje samo na sudskim rješenjima kako bi se izbjegle neopravdane odluke o izdvajanju i spriječile pristrane procjene.”
„4. Skupština ponovno potvrđuje da bi se u svim akcijama koje se odnose na djecu moralo prvenstveno voditi računa o najboljem interesu djeteta u skladu s Konvencijom Ujedinjenih naroda o pravima djeteta. No primjena tog načela u praksi ovisi o kontekstu i konkretnim okolnostima. Ponekad je jednostavnije utvrditi što nije u najboljem interesu djece: nanošenje značajne štete od strane roditeljâ ili izdvajanje iz obitelji bez opravdanog razloga.
5. Imajući na umu to upozorenje, Skupština ostaje pri svojim preporukama iz Rezolucije 2049 (2015.) i preporučuje da se države članice Vijeća Europe usredotoče na taj postupak kako bi se postigli najbolji rezultati kako za djecu tako i za njihove obitelji. Države članice trebale bi:
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5.2. pravodobno i pozitivno pružiti potrebnu podršku obiteljima kako bi se unaprijed izbjegla potreba za odlukama o izdvajanju i kako bi se omogućilo spajanje obitelji kada je to moguće i u najboljem interesu djeteta: to uključuje potrebu za izgradnjom bolje suradnje s roditeljima radi izbjegavanja mogućih pogrešaka uzrokovanih nesporazumima, stereotipiziranjem i diskriminacijom, što su pogreške čije ispravljanje u budućnosti može biti otežano nakon gubitka povjerenja;
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5.5. nastojati smanjiti na što manju mjeru primjenu praksi izdvajanja djeteta iz roditeljske skrbi po rođenju, temeljenje odluka o smještaju na proteku vremena i pribjegavanje posvojenju bez roditeljske suglasnosti, i to samo u ekstremnim slučajevima. Kada je to u najboljem interesu djeteta, trebalo bi nastojati održati obiteljske veze;
5.6. kada je donesena odluka o izdvajanju djeteta iz njegove obitelji, osigurati:
5.6.1. da su te odluke razmjeran odgovor na vjerodostojnu i provjerenu procjenu nadležnih tijela vlasti, koja je podložna sudskom preispitivanju, da postoji stvarna opasnost od nanošenja stvarne i ozbiljne štete tom djetetu;
5.6.2. da se detaljno obrazložena odluka dostavi roditeljima i sačuva jedan primjerak odluke, da se odluka obrazloži na način koji je primjeren dobi djeteta ili da se djetetu omogući pristup odluci na neki drugi način te da su u obrazloženju navedene okolnosti na temelju kojih je donesena odluka, kao i razlozi za izdvajanje;
5.6.3. da je izdvajanje djece posljednja moguća mjera i da bi je trebalo primjenjivati samo onoliko dugo koliko je nužno;
5.6.4. da su braća i sestre zajedno smješteni pod skrbništvo u svim predmetima u kojima to nije protivno najboljem interesu djeteta;
5.6.5. da, dok god je to u najboljem interesu djeteta, za djecu skrbi šira obitelj kako bi se smanjilo remećenje obiteljskih veza uključene djece;
5.6.6. da se redovito razmatra mogućnost spajanja obitelji i/ili susreta i druženja s obitelji ovisno o tome što je primjereno s obzirom na najbolje interese i mišljenja djeteta;
5.6.7. da modeli za posjećivanje i susrete i druženje omogućavaju održavanje obiteljske veze i pridonose spajanju, osim ako nisu očigledno neprimjereni;”
PRAVO
I. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANKA 8. KONVENCIJE
„1. Svatko ima pravo na poštovanje svoga privatnog i obiteljskog života, doma i dopisivanja.
2. Javna se vlast neće miješati u ostvarivanje tog prava, osim u skladu sa zakonom i ako je u demokratskom društvu nužno radi interesa državne sigurnosti, javnog reda i mira, ili gospodarske dobrobiti zemlje, te radi sprječavanja nereda ili zločina, radi zaštite zdravlja ili morala kao i radi zaštite prava i sloboda drugih.”
A. Prethodna pitanja pred Velikim vijećem
1. Opseg predmeta pred Velikim vijećem
(a) Vremenski opseg
(i) Tvrdnje stranaka
(ii) Razmatranja Suda
(b) Materijalni opseg
2. Pravo prve podnositeljice zahtjeva da podnese prigovor u ime drugog podnositelja zahtjeva
(a) Presuda Vijeća
(b) Tvrdnje stranaka
(c) Razmatranja suda
„... Uvjeti koji se primjenjuju na pojedinačne zahtjeve prema Konvenciji nisu nužno isti kao i nacionalna mjerila koja se odnose na locus standi. Svrha nacionalnih pravila u tom pogledu može biti različita od one predviđene člankom 34., te iako te svrhe ponekad mogu biti slične, ne mora uvijek biti tako (vidi, mutatis mutandis, Norris protiv Irske, 26. listopada 1988., stavak 31., Serija A br. 142).
47. Sud želi svratiti pozornost na načelo prema kojem predmet i svrha Konvencije kao instrumenta za zaštitu pojedinačnih ljudskih bića zahtijeva da njezine odredbe, i postupovne i materijalne, budu tumačene i primjenjivane tako da jamstva koja ona pružaju budu i praktična i učinkovita (vidi, između drugih izvora, predmet Loizidou protiv Turske (prethodni prigovori), 23. ožujka 1995., stavci 70. – 72., Serija A br. 310). Članak 34. zahtijeva pažljivo razmatranje položaja djece, budući da se djeca općenito moraju pouzdati u druge osobe, da one podnesu njihove zahtjeve i zastupaju njihove interese, te možda nisu takve dobi ili sposobnosti da bi mogli dati ovlaštenje za poduzimanje bilo kakvih koraka u njihovo ime u bilo kakvom stvarnom smislu (P.C. i S. protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (odl.), br. 56547/00, 11. studenog 2001.). Sud smatra kako u ovom području treba izbjegavati ograničavajuć ili tehnički pristup.” (ibid., stavci 46. – 47.)
B. Osnovanost
1. Presuda Vijeća
2. Tvrdnje stranaka
(a) Podnositelji zahtjeva
(b) Vlada
3. Primjedbe trećih strana
(a) Belgijska Vlada
(b) Bugarska Vlada
(c) Vlada Češke Republike
(d) Danska Vlada
(e) Talijanska Vlada
(f) Slovačka Vlada
(g) Vlada Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva
(h) ADF International
(i) AIMMF
(j) AIRE Centre
(k) Posvojitelji
4. Razmatranja Suda
(a) Opća načela
(b) Primjena navedenih načela na ovaj predmet
II. PRIMJENA ČLANKA 41. KONVENCIJE
227. Članak 41. Konvencije glasi:
„Ako Sud utvrdi da je došlo do povrede Konvencije i dodatnih protokola, a unutarnje pravo zainteresirane visoke ugovorne stranke omogućava samo djelomičnu odštetu, Sud će, prema potrebi, dodijeliti pravednu naknadu povrijeđenoj stranci.”
A. Naknada štete
TB. roškovi i izdaci
C. Zatezna kamata
IZ TIH RAZLOGA SUD
(a) da tužena država treba isplatiti prvoj podnositeljici zahtjeva, u roku od tri mjeseca od datuma kada presuda postane konačna u skladu s člankom 44. stavkom 2. Konvencije, sljedeće iznose koje je potrebno preračunati u norveške krune (NOK) po tečajnoj stopi važećoj na dan namirenja:
(i) 25.000,00 eura (EUR) (dvadeset pet tisuća eura) na ime naknade nematerijalne štete uvećano za sve poreze koji bi se mogli
zaračunati;
(ii) 9.350,00 eura (EUR) (devet tisuća tristo pedeset eura) na ime naknade troškova i izdataka uvećano za sve poreze koji bi se mogli zaračunati;
(b) da se od proteka prethodno navedena tri mjeseca do namirenja plaća obična kamata koja je jednaka najnižoj kreditnoj stopi Europske središnje banke tijekom razdoblja neplaćanja, uvećanoj za tri postotna boda;
5. Jednoglasno odbija preostali dio zahtjeva prve podnositeljice zahtjeva za pravednu naknadu.
Sastavljeno na engleskom i francuskom jeziku i doneseno na javnoj raspravi u zgradi Suda u Strasbourgu 10. rujna 2019. godine.
Søren Prebensen |
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos |
Zamjenik tajnika |
Predsjednik |
U skladu s člankom 45. stavkom 2. Konvencije i pravilom 74. stavkom 2. Poslovnika Suda ovoj se presudi prilažu sljedeća izdvojena mišljenja:
(a) suglasno mišljenje suca Ranzonija kojem su se priključili suci Yudkivska, Kūris, Harutyunyan, Paczolay i Chanturia;
(b) suglasno mišljenje suca Kūrisa;
(c) zajedničko suprotstavljeno mišljenje sudaca Kjølbroa, Poláčková, Koskele i Nordén;
(c) zajedničko suprotstavljeno mišljenje sutkinja Koskele i Nordén.
L.A.S.
S.C.P.
SUGLASNO MIŠLJENJE SUCA RANZONIJA KOJEM SU SE PRIKLJUČILI SUCI YUDKIVSKA, KŪRIS, HARUTYUNYAN, PACZOLAY I CHANTURIA
I. Uvod
1. Zajedno s većinom glasao sam da je došlo do povrede članka 8. Konvencije. No djelomično se ne slažem s obrazloženjem u kojem, prema mom mišljenju, nisu dostatno razmotrena glavna pitanja koja su dovela do upućivanja predmeta Velikom vijeću. U tom se pogledu većina priklonila prekomjerno uskom pristupu koji je podrazumijevao vrlo ograničenu „postupovnu” povredu.
2. Ovaj se predmet može sažeti kako slijedi. Dana 25. rujna 2008. godine prva podnositeljica zahtjeva rodila je sina, drugog podnositelja zahtjeva. Zatim je s njima boravila u obiteljskom centru. Dana 17. listopada 2008. godine vlasti su odlučile dijete žurno udomiti, pri čemu je majci bilo dopušteno da sina posjećuje jednom tjedno na najviše jedan sat i trideset minuta. Odlukom Županijskog odbora za socijalnu skrb od 2. ožujka 2009. dječak je redovno udomljen i određeno je da ga majka može posjetiti šest puta godišnje na dva sata. Tu je odluku ukinuo Okružni sud, no u svojoj presudi od 22. travnja 2010. Žalbeni sud potvrdio je odluku Županijskog odbora za socijalnu skrb o prisilnom smještaju i smanjio prava na susrete i druženje na četiri posjeta godišnje od dva sata. Dijete je ostalo u udomiteljskoj obitelji do odluke Odbora od 8. prosinca 2011. o lišenju majčinih prava na roditeljsku skrb i odobrenju njegova posvojenja njegovim udomiteljima. Povodom žalbe prve podnositeljice zahtjeva Okružni sud potvrdio je 22. veljače 2012. godine tu odluku, koja je postala pravomoćna po donošenju odluke Odbora za žalbe Vrhovnog suda od 15. listopada 2012.
3. Dok se većina u obrazloženju usredotočila na postupak povezan s odlukom Odbora od 8. prosinca 2011. i osobito na presudu Okružnog suda od 22. veljače 2012., ja smatram da su se „prava” pitanja koja je trebalo razmotriti odnosila na postupak vođen prije tih odluka i na konkretnu pravnu situaciju u Norveškoj.
II. Nedostaci u razdoblju prije prosinca 2011. godine
4. Prema sudskoj praksi Suda odluka o skrbi treba se smatrati privremenom mjerom i u načelu biti u skladu s krajnjim ciljem spajanja bioloških roditelja i djeteta (vidi stavke 207. – 208. ove presude). No u ovom predmetu taj je krajnji cilj izostao od samog početka domaćeg postupka. Dana 21. studenoga 2008. godine – dva mjeseca nakon rođenja djeteta i jedan mjesec nakon donošenja odluke o skrbi – Ured za djecu, mlade i obitelj istaknuo je da će dječak trebati „stabilne odrasle osobe koje mu mogu pružiti odgovarajuću skrb” (vidi stavak 30.). Sedam dana nakon toga u zahtjevu za odluku o skrbi Odbor za socijalnu skrb pretpostavio je „da će doći do dugotrajnog smještaja i da je vjerojatno da će dječak X odrasti u udomiteljskoj obitelji”, kao i da su majčinske sposobnosti podnositeljice zahtjeva „ograničene” (vidi stavak 31.).
5. Odbor već u toj ranoj fazi nije nastojao ostvariti cilj spajanja djeteta s majkom. U odluci od 2. ožujka 2009. – četiri i pol mjeseca nakon donošenja odluke o skrbi – Odbor je ponovno predvidio da će dijete odrasti u udomiteljskoj obitelji. Istaknuo je da to znači „da bi udomitelji postali psihološki roditelji dječaka X i da bi trebalo odrediti količinu susreta i druženja koja ne bi ometala taj proces povezivanja [udomitelja i djeteta] koji je već uvelike bio u tijeku” (vidi stavak 43.). Dana 22. travnja 2010. godine – osamnaest mjeseci nakon donošenja odluke o skrbi – većina u Žalbenom sudu potvrdila je da svrha susreta i druženja nije bila uspostavljanje odnosa radi budućeg povratka djeteta pod skrb biološke majke (vidi stavak 75.).
6. Nadalje, vlasti nisu ni na koji način omogućile razvoj dobrog odnosa između majke i sina. Upravo suprotno, trajanje susreta i druženja bilo je vrlo ograničeno – dva sata četiri odnosno šest puta godišnje – i oni su održani pod nadzorom i u prisustvu udomiteljice, ponekad čak i u domu udomiteljske obitelji. U takvim okolnostima na tim se susretima i druženju očito nije mogla stvoriti pozitivna atmosfera kao ni omogućiti bilo kakvo zbližavanje majke i djeteta. Tvrdnja vlasti da bi se djetetove reakcije ublažile i razina kontakta poboljšala da su susreti i druženje rjeđi (vidi stavak 75.) može se smatrati jedino ciničnom.
7. Domaće vlasti nikada nisu smatrale udomljavanje djeteta privremenom mjerom s krajnjim ciljem spajanja majke i djeteta te nisu ozbiljno nastojale pružiti podršku majci s ciljem da se poboljšaju njezine majčinske sposobnosti. U tom su pogledu zanemarile sudsku praksu Suda i svoje, s njom povezane obveze.
8. Stav vlasti sukladan je s domaćim pravom kojim je utvrđen vrlo niski prag za stavljanje djeteta pod javno skrbništvo, no vrlo visoki prag za prekid javnog skrbništva (vidi, osobito, članak 4-21. Zakon o zaštiti djece, na koji se upućuje u stavku 122.). Da bi se ukinulo rješenje o udomljavanju, roditelji moraju dokazati da je „vrlo vjerojatno” da mogu pružiti odgovarajuću skrb za dijete. Takva je pretpostavka problematična s obzirom na sudsku praksu Suda i dužnost države da poduzme mjere za omogućavanje spajanja obitelji čim je to razumno izvedivo (vidi stavak 208.). Zakonom o zaštiti djece vlastima je dodijeljeno neograničeno diskrecijsko pravo. Nadalje, čak i ako u određenom predmetu roditelji uspiju dokazati prethodno navedeno, njihova bi nastojanja bila uzaludna „ako se dijete toliko povezalo s osobama i okruženjem u kojem živi da bi … izdvajanje djeteta moglo dovesti do ozbiljnih problema za dijete” (vidi, ponovno, članak 4-21. Zakona). Drugim riječima, zbog pukog proteka vremena vrlo je malo vjerojatno da će se odluka o skrbi ikada ukinuti.
III. Pristup većine i moje mišljenje o predmetu
9. Većina se u obrazloženju usredotočila na ocjenu postupka koji se vodio 2011. – 2012., a odnosio se na lišenje prve podnositeljice zahtjeva prava na roditeljsku skrb za sina i odobrenje njegova posvojenja. Točnije, većina se u svom ispitivanju usredotočila na preispitivanje Okružnog suda iz njegove odluke od 22. veljače 2012. (vidi stavak 215.). No u presudi se ne govori o nedostacima u razdoblju od donošenja odluke o skrbi u listopadu 2008. godine do odluke Odbora u studenome 2011. godine. Ti se nedostaci ukratko spominju u stavcima 220. i 221., no samo kako bi se objasnili nedostaci u postupku pred Okružnim sudom 2012. godine, osobito činjenica da se iz malog broja susreta i druženja koji su održani između podnositeljâ zahtjeva dobio samo ograničen broj dokaza na temelju kojih bi se donosili jasni zaključci o majčinim vještinama skrbi. Taj je aspekt u kombinaciji s izostankom ažuriranih izvješća vještaka naveo većinu da zaključi da su postojali nedostaci u procesu donošenja odluka koji je doveo do odluke Okružnog suda od 22. veljače 2012. i da je došlo do „postupovne” povrede članka 8. Konvencije.
10. Smatram da se utvrđenje povrede članka 8. ne može tako jednostavno uskladiti s tako uskim pristupom i da bi bilo poželjnije šire ocijeniti predmet i sagledati „cjelovitu sliku”.
11. U presudi se samo ispituje proces donošenja odluka pred Okružnim sudom, koji je 22. veljače 2012. godine potvrdio odluku Odbora o lišenju podnositeljice zahtjeva prava na roditeljsku skrb i odobrenju posvojenja. No, iako su u tom procesu donošenja odluka pred Okružnim sudom postojali određeni nedostaci, treba prepoznati da u tom trenutku – do kojeg je dijete s udomiteljima živjelo već tri godine i četiri mjeseca – nacionalni sud u određenoj mjeri nije imao drugog izbora zbog prethodnih događaja i postupaka, kao i zbog pukog proteka vremena. Sud je stavljen pred neku vrstu gotovog čina. U toj bi fazi pokušaj uravnoteženja interesa djeteta i interesa njegove biološke obitelji gotovo nedvojbeno doveo do ostanka djeteta u udomiteljskoj obitelji. Kao što su potvrdili vještači i prihvatio sud, dijete se toliko povezalo sa svojim udomiteljima, udomiteljskim bratom i općim okruženjem udomiteljske obitelji da bi izdvajanje iz tog okruženja prouzročilo ozbiljne probleme s obzirom na to da mu primarnu sigurnost i osjećaj pripadnosti daje udomiteljska obitelj i on udomitelje smatra svojim psihološkim roditeljima (vidi, osobito, stavak 106. ove presude).
12. Sud ne bi trebao zanemariti stvarnost života i ne bi trebao ulaziti u formalističku ocjenu odluke Okružnog suda od 22. veljače 2012., kao ni prenaglašavati osobito izostanak ažuriranih izvješća vještaka. Više je nego upitno bi li bilo kakvo novo izvješće o majčinim sposobnostima u tom trenutku imalo prednost pred najboljim interesima djeteta da ostane s udomiteljima. Glavni nedostaci, za koje su bile odgovorne vlasti, nisu se pojavili u postupku koji je vođen 2011. – 2012., nego su postojali u ranijim fazama.
13. U presudi se ne razmatraju izravno ti glavni nedostaci zbog nenadležnosti (vidi stavak 147.). Iako je, strogo govoreći, istina da Sud nije nadležan preispitati kao takvu sukladnost s člankom 8. Konvencije odluka koje su prethodile ili su preispitane u presudi Žalbenog suda od 22. travnja 2010., to ne isključuje mogućnost izravnog razmatranja prethodnih nedostataka usprkos tome.
14. Većina je (upućujući na predmet Jovanovic protiv Švedske, br. 10592/12, stavak 73., 22. listopada 2015., i Mohamed Hasan protiv Norverške, br. 27496/15, stavak 121., 26. travnja 2018.) priznala u stavku 148. da, pri ispitivanju postupka koji je povezan s odlukama donesenima 2011. – 2012., Sud mora taj postupak i odluke staviti u kontekst, što neizbježno znači da u nekoj mjeri mora uzeti u obzir prethodni postupak i odluke. Iako prihvaćam tu izjavu kao takvu, ne slažem se s uskim tumačenjem „povezanog” postupka koji nudi većina, kao ni s njezinim ograničenim tumačenjem „mjere” uzimanja u obzir.
15. U presudi se ispituje samo proces donošenja odluka izravno povezan s odlukom Okružnog suda od 22. veljače 2012. Smatram da Sud treba ocijeniti cijeli međusobno povezani proces koji je u konačnici doveo do osporavane odluke. Taj „proces” trebao bi se, osobito u predmetu poput ovoga, tumačiti u širem kontekstu. On se ne odnosi samo na konačni postupak pred sudovima, nego obuhvaća i prethodni postupak pred upravnim tijelima koji je neodvojivo povezan s kasnijim postupkom koji je doveo do osporavane odluke. Stoga bi „povezani postupak” trebao uključivati sve relevantne radnje, propuste i odluke vlasti koji su utrli put za pravomoćne sudske odluke, stvorili njihov neodvojivi činjenični i/ili pravni temelj i u velikoj mjeri unaprijed odredile njihov ishod.
16. U tom je pogledu Sud u prethodnim predmetima naveo da se nužnost miješanja mora ocijeniti u svjetlu predmeta u cjelini (vidi, na primjer, Paradiso i Campanelli [VV], br. 25358/12, stavak 179., 24. siječnja 2017.). Sud se stoga ne može ograničiti na to da osporavane odluke razmatra izdvojeno (vidi Olsson protiv Švedske (br. 1), presuda od 24. ožujka 1988., Serija A br. 130, stavak 68.). Odluke o lišenju prve podnositeljice zahtjeva prava na roditeljsku skrb i odobrenju posvojenja stoga se moraju staviti u kontekst, što po meni znači da se moraju staviti u izravni kontekst prethodnog postupka i s njime povezanih činjenica. Čini mi se da bi izraz „predmet u cjelini” trebao, barem u ovim okolnostima, imati šire tumačenje, odnosno da se ne bi smio ograničiti na konačni sudski postupak već proširiti na cjeloviti proces povezan s danim predmetom i stvarne posljedice odluka donesenih u tom procesu.
17. Takav pristup potkrepljuje i određena sudska praksa Suda. Stoga ćemo razmotriti u kojoj je mjeri Sud u drugim predmetima uzeo u obzir „povezani postupak”.
18. U predmetu Gnahoré protiv Francuske (br. 40031/98, ECHR 2000IX) zahtjev je podnesen 1997. godine i odnosio se, među ostalim, na prigovor oca na odluku donesenu 1996. godine o odbijanju njegova zahtjeva za ukidanje odluke o skrbi. No ocjena Suda nije bila ograničena na taj postupak, nego je izrijekom obuhvatila i prvobitnu odluku o skrbi iz 1992. godine, kasnije mjere i nekoliko produljenja važenja odluke o skrbi (ibid., stavci 56. – 58.).
19. U predmetu K. i T. protiv Finske ([VV], br. 25702/94, ECHR 2001VII) dvoje djece žurno je udomljeno u lipnju 1993. godine, a mjesec dana kasnije stavljeno je pod „redovno” javno skrbništvo. Iako su kasnije odluke potvrđene u sudskom postupku, protiv prethodnih odluka nisu podnesene žalbe. Sud je uvažio da je potvrda odluka o žurnoj skrbi „zapravo” potvrđena odlukama o redovnoj skrbi i da su podnositelji zahtjeva time oslobođeni podnošenja posebne žalbe (ibid., stavak 145.). Stoga je ocijenio i odluke o žurnoj skrbi iako je zahtjev podnesen Sudu više od godinu dana nakon donošenja tih odluka i iako je Sud utvrdio da su postojale materijalne i postupovne razlike između dvaju postupaka te da su odluke iz tih postupaka bile različite vrste.
20. U predmetu Zhou protiv Italije (br. 33773/11, 21. siječnja 2014.) podnositeljica zahtjeva prigovorila je na posvojenje njezina djeteta o kojem je odlučeno u sudskim odlukama iz 2010. No Sud je smatrao da je odlučujuće pitanje jesu li domaće vlasti, prije prekida pravnog odnosa majke i djeteta, poduzele sve potrebne i primjerene mjere koje bi razumno bile potrebne da bi dijete živjelo normalan život s vlastitom obitelji (ibid., stavak 49.). Stoga je ocijenio sve prethodne odluke vlasti koje se odnose na smještaj djeteta u udomiteljsku obitelj i na majčina prava na susrete i druženje.
21. U predmetu Jovanovic (prethodno citirano) Sud je prvo proglasio prigovore na odluku o stavljanju djeteta pod javno skrbništvo nedopuštenima. No u svojoj ocjeni prigovora o kasnijoj odluci o neukidanju javnog skrbništva Sud je ipak u određenoj mjeri ispitao postupak koji je doveo do prvobitne odluke o skrbi i utvrdio da je odluka nacionalnih vlasti o smještaju djeteta pod prisilno javno skrbništvo bila „očito opravdana” (ibid., stavak 78.). Stoga se Sud nije ograničio na stavljanje kasnijih odluka naprosto u kontekst tog prethodnog postupka, nego je izrijekom iznio mišljenje o opravdanosti prethodnih odluka iako je proglasio da su s time povezani prigovori nedopušteni.
22. Naposljetku, u novijem predmetu Mohamed Hasan (prethodno citirano) Sud je počeo ograničavati svoje ispitivanje na postupak koji se odnosi na lišenje prava na roditeljsku skrb i posvojenje, pri čemu je proglasio da je raniji postupak za udomljavanje relevantan samo utoliko što ga Sud mora uzeti u obzir pri svom ispitivanju kasnijeg postupka. No u nekoj vrsti obiter dictum Sud je naveo da ne postoje osnove za pretpostavku da su postupovna pitanja iz prethodnog postupka za skrbništvo imala posljedice za kasniji postupak za posvojenje „ili [za] predmet u cjelini u toj mjeri da bi ga Sud trebao dodatno ispitati prilikom ocjene prigovora podnositelja zahtjeva na lišenje prava na roditeljsku skrb i posvojenje” (ibid., stavak 151.).
23. Za razliku od toga u ovom su predmetu ispunjene te pretpostavke. Prethodni postupak za skrbništvo vođen od 2008. do 2011. godine zapravo je imao odlučujuće posljedice za odluke donesene u kasnijem postupku vođenom 2011. – 2012. i stoga ga je Sud trebao dodatno ispitati prilikom ocjene prigovora podnositeljâ zahtjeva na lišenje prava na roditeljsku skrb i posvojenje.
24. U takvoj je situaciji Sud prisiljen pažljivo ispitati, kako je utvrđeno inter alia u prethodno citiranom predmetu Zhou, jesu li domaće vlasti, prije prekida pravnog odnosa roditelja i djeteta, poduzele sve potrebne i primjerene mjere koje bi razumno bile potrebne da bi dijete živjelo normalan život s vlastitom obitelji. Pritom treba uzeti u obzir sve prethodne postupke koji su neodvojivo povezani s tom pravomoćnom odlukom, neovisno o tome jesu li prethodne odluke službeno donesene u okviru istog formalnog postupka za posvojenje ili u zasebnom postupku koji je prethodio postupku za posvojenje.
25. Kao što je već prethodno navedeno, vlasti u ovom predmetu od samog početka nisu nastojale ostvariti cilj spajanja djeteta s njegovom majkom, nego su odmah predvidjele da će on odrasti u udomiteljskoj obitelji. Ta osnovna pretpostavka provlači se kao motiv u svim fazama postupka, počevši od odluke o skrbi. Odluka Okružnog suda od 22. veljače 2012. – donesena kada je dijete s udomiteljima živjelo već tri godine i četiri mjeseca – bila je tek „automatska” i „neizbježna” posljedica svih prethodnih događaja i odluka. Drugim riječima, nedostaci koji su postojali u listopadu 2008. godine i nakon toga doveli su do de facto utvrđenja u 2011. – 2012. da je odnos podnositeljâ zahtjeva narušen.
26. Taj je aspekt ujedno bio i ključni element u suprotstavljenom mišljenju uz presudu Vijeća. Manjina je istaknula da su odluke o udomljavanju djeteta „neizbježno utjecale na odluke koje su dovele do posvojenja, dovele do proteka vremena toliko štetnog za spajanje obitelji, utjecale na ocjenu najboljih interesa djeteta tijekom vremena i, ključno, stavile prvu podnositeljicu zahtjeva u neizbježan sukob s vlastima koje su naložile i produljivale smještaj i s udomiteljima, čiji je interes bilo poticanje odnosa s djetetom s krajnjim ciljem njegova posvojenja”. Iako nije dovela u pitanje odluke domaćih vlasti o smještaju, manjina je smatrala da „ne mogu se zanemariti posljedice događaja koji su prethodili posvojenju i doveli do njega” (vidi stavak 18. izdvojenog mišljenja). U potpunosti se slažem s tim razmatranjima.
27. Osim toga, treba naglasiti da ocjena „procesa” na nacionalnoj razini i razloga koje su iznijele domaće vlasti ne podrazumijeva, kao što je utvrdila većina u Vijeću i u određenoj mjeri većina u Velikom vijeću, da se treba isključivo usredotočiti na poduzete postupovne korake. Postupovne pretpostavke same po sebi nemaju nikakvu svrhu, nego su sredstvo zaštite pojedinca od proizvoljnih radnji javnih vlasti. Stoga se mora sagledati situacija i izvan formalnosti postupka. Treba ispitati i stajališta i ciljeve vlasti. Postupovna ocjena ne može se svesti isključivo na ocjenu oblika u kojem su donesene pravomoćne odluke. Ako su na nacionalnoj razini, kao što je slučaj u ovom predmetu, vlasti provodile od samog početka samo „formalističku” ocjenu, a da pritom nisu poduzele nikakva stvarna nastojanja da uzmu u obzir sve uključene interese i da uravnoteže te interese u svjetlu sudske prakse Suda o članku 8. Konvencije, postupak „u cjelini”, uključujući relevantne prethodne odluke i radnje, nije proveden na zadovoljavajući način i nije popraćen zaštitnim mjerama koje su bile primjerene težini miješanja i ozbiljnosti predmetnih interesa.
IV. Zaključak
28. Iznimno bih oklijevao da glasam za utvrđenje povrede članka 8. Konvencije da sam se trebao pridržavati pristupa većine i formalno ocijeniti samo postupak preispitivanja koji je doveo do odluke Okružnog suda od 22. veljače 2012. – u vrijeme kada je dijete s udomiteljima živjelo već tri godine i četiri mjeseca. No zbog šireg ispitivanja predmeta iznesenog pred Sudom i razmatranja „pravih” pitanja povezanih s postupkom koji je prethodio toj odluci, a koji je bio stvarni izvor problema, nije mi bio problem složiti se s većinom o ishodu ovog zahtjeva i utvrđivanju povrede članka 8. u odnosu na oba podnositelja zahtjeva.
SUGLASNO MIŠLJENJE SUCA KŪRISA
1. Ja sam se (zajedno s nekim drugim kolegama) priključio suglasnom mišljenju suca Ranzonija. Ovdje ću samo dodati nekoliko primjedbi.
2. Mnogi su primijetili da sudska praksa općenito (ne samo sudska praksa Suda u Strasbourgu) postaje sve više „analitička” u negativnom smislu te riječi jer se činjenice na koje prigovaraju stranke, a samim time i primjena prava na te činjenice, obično razdvajaju na manje dijelove koje se potom razmatra odvojeno. U novijem predmetu pred velikim vijećem (o drugoj stvari) dvoje mojih kolega i ja izrazili smo neslaganje s odlukom većine o umjetnoj i vrlo formalističkoj podjeli razmatranog razdoblja na dva dijela i ocjeni samo drugog djela kao zasebnog razdoblja bez obzira na činjenicu da su uzroci događaja iz kasnijeg „razdoblja” pripadali razdoblju koje mu je prethodi (upućujem na izdvojeno mišljenje sudaca Yudkivske, Vehabovića i mene u predmetu Radomilja i drugi protiv Hrvatske [VV], br. 37685/10 i 22768/12, 20. ožujka 2018.). U ovom je predmetu stvoren sličan strukturni problem.
3. Iz koje je god perspektive sagledali stvarnost je cjelina. To je činjenica – i načelo. Iako je u ovoj presudi priznato da „pri ispitivanju postupka koji je povezan s odlukom Županijskog odbora za socijalnu skrb od 8. prosinca 2011. i odlukama donesenima povodom žalbe protiv te odluke, točnije presudom Okružnog suda od 22. veljače 2012., Sud će morati taj postupak i odluke staviti u kontekst, što neizbježno znači da će u nekoj mjeri morati uzeti u obzir prethodni postupak i odluke” (vidi stavak 148.; isticanje dodano), nije jasno koja je to „mjera” i što točno podrazumijeva „uzeti u obzir”.
Sudovi ne bi smjeli biti nejasni u svojim presudama. U ovom je slučaju namjerno stvorena nejasnoća.
4. Pretpostavljam da je ta nejasnoća imala veze s formulacijom koja se ponavlja i upotrebljava u velikom broju predmeta, a odnosi se na to „da je sadržaj i opseg ‚predmeta’ upućenog Velikom vijeću ograničen odlukom Vijeća o dopuštenosti” (vidi stavak 144. ove presude). Iako u mnogim slučajevima neslaganje Vijeća i Velikog vijeća u pogledu – vremenskog ili materijalnog – opsega određenog predmeta ne stvara probleme, to nije uvijek tako (upućujem na svoje izdvojeno mišljenje o toj temi u predmetu Grkokatolička župa Lupeni i drugi protiv Rumunjske, [VV], br. 76943/11, 29. studenoga 2016.). Takva „racionalizacija” prigovora podnositeljâ zahtjeva previše je mehanička. Provodi se, a da pritom samo veliko vijeće nije razmotrilo stvar. Štoviše, presuda vijeća kojom je utvrđeno da je dio prigovora podnositelja zahtjeva nedopušten nikada ne postaje konačna. Stoga zapravo nikada ne nastane pravna osnova za „racionalizaciju”.
Iako je utvrđenje Suda da mora „[u nekoj neodređenoj mjeri] uzeti u obzir prethodni postupak i odluke” (čija se sukladnost s člankom 8. Konvencije barem formalno ne ispituje) pomoglo u nadilaženju strogosti ograničenja koje je velikom vijeću nametnulo vijeće (svojom presudom koja nikada nije postala konačna), ne bi li bilo racionalno i pošteno u određenom trenutku razmotriti jesu li ta ograničenja kao takva opravdana? Dok se to pitanje ne razmotri i preispita na odgovarajući način, veliko vijeće stalno će morati osmišljati domišljate formulacije kako bi zaobišlo prepreku koju je samo postavilo. U takvim je predmetima u pitanju sveobuhvatnost ispitivanja predmeta od strane Suda.
Možda je sretna okolnost činjenica da je u ovom predmetu ishod prihvatljiv (utvrđenje povrede članka 8.) unatoč tome što je proces, koji je trebao biti ispitan u cjelini, bio podijeljen na dva dijela: jedan koji se formalno ispitivao i drugi koji se samo trebao „uzeti u obzir”.
5. Da je predmetni proces ispitan u cjelini (odnosno da se prvobitno razdoblje nije samo „uzelo u obzir”), bilo bi očitije da glavni problem u ovom predmetu nisu samo i ne toliko konkretne okolnosti predmeta podnositeljice zahtjeva, koliko su to zapravo blago rečeno određene posebnosti norveške politike na kojem se temelje osporavane odluke i proces u cjelini.
Nije samo puka slučajnost da se toliko umješača pridružilo ovom predmetu. Među ostalim to su bile i države čije su se vlasti morale nositi s posljedicama koje su odluke koje je Norveška donijela u predmetu Barnevernet imale na njihove malodobne građene.
Sapienti sat.
ZAJEDNIČKO SUPROTSTAVLJENO MIŠLJENJE SUDACA KJØLBROA, POLÁČKOVÁ, KOSKELE I NORDÉN O OSNOVANOSTI PREDMETA
1. Nažalost se ne možemo složiti s većinom da je došlo do povrede članka 8. u ovom predmetu.
2. Međusobno se nismo mogli složiti o pitanju dopuštenosti zahtjeva u pogledu prava prve podnositeljice zahtjeva da podnese zahtjev u ime drugog podnositelja zahtjeva. Međutim, slažemo se o pitanju osnovanosti predmeta kako ga je većina proglasila dopuštenim.
3. U načelu se slažemo s većinom u Vijeću, čiju presudu smatramo da je dobro razmotrena i dobro obrazložena te u skladu s odgovarajućom ulogom ovog Suda (vidi stavke 111. – 130. presude Vijeća).
4. No u sljedećim razmatranjima htjeli bismo navesti nekoliko primjedbi koje proizlaze iz stvari iz ovog predmeta i pristupa koji je primijenila većina.
Nekoliko primjedbi o općim načelima Suda
5. Na samom početku napominjemo da se ovaj predmet odnosi na pitanja o kojima je Sud razvio opća načela u svojoj sudskoj praksi i koja imaju prilično dugu povijest, koja je obilježena promjenama u društvenom i pravnom okruženju koje Sud uzima u obzir u pristupu koji primjenjuje na prava osoba kao pojedinaca, članova obitelji i djece. Složenost tih pitanja, dinamika činjeničnih i pravnih promjena na kojima se ona temelje i raznolikost vrijednosti i kontekstualnih uvjeta koji prevladavaju u tim stvarima pridonijeli su stvaranju današnje situacije u kojoj su opća načela koja je Sud utvrdio puna ne samo neizbježnih nejasnoća nego i nepobitne nespojivosti i izravnih proturječja, kako „interno” tako i u odnosu na specijalizirane pravne instrumente, osobito Međunarodnu konvenciju o pravima djeteta (CRC).
6. Jedno važno pitanje povezano s tom nespojivosti i proturječjima odnosi se na to kako uskladiti „nepovredivost” biološke obitelji s najboljim interesima djeteta – pri čemu je posljednje navedeno ugrađeno u CRC, kao i u mnoge druge kasnije ustavne odredbe na nacionalnoj razini i u Povelji EU-a o temeljnim pravima. Doista nema nikakve sumnje da se odvajanje djeteta od njegovih bioloških roditelja ne može opravdati utvrđenjem da bi takva mjera omogućila smještaj djeteta u okruženje pogodnije za njegov odgoj. Nesporno je načelo prema kojem izdvajanje djeteta iz skrbi njegova biološkog (bioloških) roditelja mora proći test nužnosti u smislu da je ono u najboljem interesu djeteta i da je dostupno samo kao posljednja moguća mjera. Isto vrijedi i za stajalište da domaće vlasti moraju imati široku slobodu procjene pri utvrđivanju je li u najboljem interesu djeteta da se ono stavi pod javno skrbništvo. Glavno pitanje koje dovodi do poteškoća i nespojivosti javlja se u situacijama u kojima se ispituju dugoročne mjere.
7. U općim načelima utvrđenima u presudi Vijeća ponovljeno je da je jedno „vodeće načelo” da se odluka o skrbi treba smatrati privremenom mjerom koju je potrebno ukinuti čim okolnosti to dopuste, a sve mjere privremenog skrbništva trebaju biti u skladu s krajnjim ciljem spajanja bioloških roditelja i djeteta. Pozitivna obveza poduzimanja mjera kako bi se omogućilo spajanje obitelji čim je to razumno izvedivo sve se intenzivnije nameće nadležnim tijelima od početka razdoblja skrbništva, pri čemu se uvijek mora uspostaviti ravnoteža između te obveze i obveze razmatranja najboljih interesa djeteta (vidi stavak 105. presude Vijeća). Slično tome, prema ovoj presudi „obiteljsko jedinstvo i spajanje obitelji … neizbježno [se] moraju uzeti u obzir pri razmatranju prava na poštovanje obiteljskog života iz članka 8.”, a „kada je određeno javno skrbništvo koje ograničava obiteljski život, vlasti imaju pozitivnu obvezu poduzimanja mjera za omogućavanje spajanja obitelji čim je to razumno izvedivo” (vidi stavak 205.).
8. Dilema je dobro prikazana u prethodnom opisu stajališta iz presude Vijeća. Prema tom pristupu spajanje biološkog (bioloških) roditelja i djeteta „neizbježan” je i „krajnji” cilj te „vodeće načelo” kojeg se treba pridržavati. „To vodeće načelo „podložno je“ uvjetu da se „krajnji cilj“ (spajanja biološke obitelji) mora „uravnotežiti“ s obvezom da se „razmotri“ najbolji interes djeteta. . To ostavlja dojam da bi „krajnji cilj” spajanja biološke obitelji mogao imati prednost pred najboljim interesima djeteta. No, prema CRC-u i sličnim ustavnim ili drugim odredbama u mnogim domaćim pravnim porecima, to se stajalište razvilo u načelo kojim je prepoznato da se mora voditi računa prvenstveno o najboljim interesima djeteta odnosno da su ti interesi od najveće važnosti – na temelju posebne potrebe da se djecu zaštiti kao ranjiva ljudska bića. To pak podrazumijeva da najbolji interesi djeteta, kada to zahtijevaju okolnosti, mogu imati prednost pred ciljem spajanja djeteta s biološkim roditeljem (roditeljima).
9. Okolnosti koje su dovele do ta dva pristupa mogu se nesumnjivo pronaći u povijesti i kontekstu svakog od tih pravnih instrumenata. Rad ESLJP-a temelji se na zaštiti i uravnoteženju prava svih osoba u nadležnosti države, uključujući osobe koje su stvorile obitelji, dok je CRC usmjeren na jačanje i zaštitu djece kao nositelja konkretnih prava pojedinaca. Prethodno navedena nespojivost ne bi se trebala previše naglašavati, kao ni zanemarivati. Uvijek treba nastojati uskladiti prava svakog uključenog pojedinca. No postoje neizbježna ograničenja u broju mogućnosti dostupnih za to usklađenje. Stoga će u konačnici možda trebati odlučiti o tome koje od tih razmatranja ima prednost. U tom smislu nije bitno je li odlučujuće načelo to da spajanje obitelji može imati prednost pred najboljim interesima djeteta odnosno je li odlučujuće načelo to da najbolji interesi djeteta mogu imati prednost čak i kada to znači odricanje od mogućnosti spajanja djeteta s biološkim roditeljem (roditeljima).
10. Čini se neosporivo da je to i dalje načelno pitanje koje muči Sud. Zbog toga Sud ima poteškoće u formuliranju općih načela na potpuno jasan i usklađen način.
11. Još jedan od načina na koje se manifestira prethodno navedena nespojivost činjenica je da se Sud s jedne strane – s punim pravom – bavi utjecajem vremena na izglede za uspješno spajanje obitelji. Stoga je smatrao da će se pozitivna obveza poduzimanja mjera kako bi se omogućilo spajanje obitelji čim je to razumno izvedivo sve intenzivnije nametati od početka razdoblja skrbništva, pri čemu se uvijek mora uspostaviti ravnoteža između te obveze i obveze razmatranja najboljih interesa djeteta (vidi stavak 209. ove presude). Sud je s druge strane također prihvatio da bi utjecaj vremena mogao biti štetan za to spajanje. Stoga je smatrao da bi, kada je protekla znatna količina vremena od prvobitnog stavljanja djeteta pod javno skrbništvo, interes djeteta da se njegova de facto obiteljska situacija ponovno ne mijenja mogao nadilaziti interese roditelja da se obitelj spoji (vidi K. i T. protiv Finske [VV], br. 25702/94, stavak 155., ECHR 2001VII). U tom je kontekstu Sud stoga jasno ukazao na to da najbolji interesi djeteta mogu u konačnici imati prednost pred „krajnjim ciljem” spajanja.
12. Još jedan od načina na koje se manifestira prethodno navedena nespojivost činjenica je da je Sud smatrao da je „u načelu u interesu djeteta da sačuva obiteljske veze, osim kad postoje uvjerljivi razlozi koji opravdavaju prekid tih veza” (vidi stavak 157. ove presude). Međutim, posebno u situacijama u kojima je trebalo poduzeti mjere udomljavanja djeteta i produljiti smještaj u udomiteljskoj obitelji na dulje razdoblje, djetetov de facto obiteljski život i obiteljske veze mogli bi biti gotovo isključivo povezani s udomiteljskom obitelji umjesto s biološkim roditeljem (roditeljima). U tom bi smislu također krajnje pitanje bilo koja bi perspektiva, konkretno perspektiva djeteta ili biološkog (bioloških) roditelja, a (time) i koji obiteljski život, trebala imati prednost.
13. Ta nespojivost u općim načelima sigurno je izvor određenih stvarnih poteškoća s kojima se suočavaju domaće vlasti u nekoliko država ugovornica, i to ne samo one čijim je ustavnim odredbama utvrđeno da su najbolji interesi djeteta od ključne važnosti.
Pristup većine
14. U ovom predmetu većina je zauzela stajalište da će se usredotočiti na proces donošenja odluka na domaćoj razini. Ključni stavak (stavak 220.) međutim ukazuje na to da većina smatra da je osnovni problem zapravo materijalni, odnosno da su se domaće vlasti „usredotočile na interese djeteta” i da nisu „ozbiljno razmotrile” spajanje djeteta s njegovom biološkom obitelji. Taj ključni odlomak sažima i otkriva prethodno razmatranu nespojivost te ukazuje na stajalište koje je zauzela većina u ovom predmetu o pitanju načela.
15. Smatramo problematičnim mogućnost da Sud nastavi raditi na taj način jer time zapravo vlastitim izborom zamjenjuje ocjenu domaćih vlasti unatoč činjenici da su domaće vlasti provele detaljno ispitivanje predmeta u postupku koji je uključivao sudove koji su bili sastavljeni od sudskih i drugih stručnjaka s iskustvom u predmetnom području te na temelju opsežnih dokaza. Problem nije samo u tome da je Sud u iznimno neprikladnom položaju da preuzme ulogu „suda četvrtog stupnja” u ovakvim situacijama. Ozbiljniji je problem to što davanjem prednosti svojem izboru pred načinom na koji bi trebalo odvagati i uravnotežiti suprotstavljene interese Sud zapravo onemogućuje slobodu procjene koju je važno očuvati, osobito u situacijama u kojima domaće vlasti moraju razmotriti pojedinačna prava i interese koji bi mogli biti proturječni i u situacijama u kojima bi se stajališta mogla razlikovati o tome koji je najbolji način za usklađivanje relevantnih vrijednosti, načela i suprotstavljenih mišljenja u danim okolnostima. To je još važnije u kontekstu poput ovoga, u kojem domaće vlasti imaju dužnost ispuniti svoju pozitivne obveze u odnosu na ranjivo dijete.
16. U ovom predmetu jasno se vidi da način na koji je većina utvrdila „postupovne nedostatke” zapravo proizlazi iz primijenjenog materijalnog stajališta, što je dovelo do toga da se domaće vlasti krivi jer su se „usredotočile na interese djeteta” umjesto na njegovo spajanje s biološkom obitelji. Većina stoga smatra da može zaključiti da „je izostanak novog vještačenja znatno ograničio činjeničnu procjenu” (vidi stavak 223. ove presude) i da je broj dokaza koji bi se mogli dobiti iz održanih susreta i druženja „ograničen” (vidi stavak 225.).
17. Nadalje, većina čak dovodi u pitanje zaključke domaćih vlasti o (konkretnoj) ranjivosti dječaka X(djeteta). U tom pogledu upućujemo na stavak 224. ove presude u kojem većina naprosto sumnja u to „kako bi se on i dalje mogao smatrati ranjivim iako živi u udomiteljskoj obitelji od kada je imao tri tjedna”, što treba usporediti sa stavkom 90. u kojem se u tom pogledu citira zaključak Odbora za socijalnu skrb o tome da je „[dijete] iskusi[lo] ozbiljno zanemarivanje opasno po život u prvih tri tjedna svog života”. U ovom pitanju naše rezerve nadilaze puki problem preuzimanja uloge „suda četvrtog stupnja” od strane Suda. Ne može se očekivati da su članovi Suda upoznati općenito s dječjom psihologijom niti konkretno s istraživanjima o dugoročnim učincima ranog zanemarivanja novorođenčeta. Nadalje, smatramo iznimno problematičnim činjenicu da Sud dovodi u pitanje domaće zaključke o konkretnoj ranjivosti predmetnog djeteta – do kojeg su došla tijela pred kojima su izneseni dokazi o toj stvari i koja imaju stručna znanja koja Sud očito nema – a da pritom nije postavio to isto pitanje tijekom postupka pred Sudom i time propustio pružiti mogućnost strankama da razjasne „narav ranjivosti” (djeteta) X, koju Sud očito nije mogao razumjeti kao ni povjerovati u nju. Sud bi trebao osigurati da se pitanja za koja se utvrdi da su od posebne važnosti stave na raspravu suprotstavljenim strankama.
18. Zaključno, u ovom je predmetu teško izbjeći zaključak da većini nije odgovarao ishod predmeta na domaćoj razini i da je većina nastojala razmotriti materijalne prigovore ili bojazni pod krinkom postupovnih nedostataka. O vrijednosnim sudovima i izborima na kojima se on temelji ipak se vrijedi raspraviti na transparentniji način.
Naše stajalište
19. Prvo, ograničavajući se sada na konkretni kontekst osporavanih odluka (odbijanje ukidanja odluke o skrbi, lišenje prava na roditeljsku skrb, dopuštenje udomiteljima da posvoje dijete), slažemo se sa sudskom praksom Suda da bi se mjere kojima se u potpunosti roditelju uskrati njegov obiteljski život s njegovim djetetom i stoga se napušta cilj njihova spajanja trebale „primjenjivati samo u izvanrednim okolnostima i mogu se opravdati jedino ako su motivirane prioritetnom pretpostavkom da je to u najboljem interesu djeteta” (vidi, na primjer, Jansen protiv Norveške, br. 2822/16, 6. rujna 2018., stavak 93., i Aune protiv Norveške, br. 52502/07, stavak 66., 28. listopada 2010.).
20. Smatramo da Sud nema nikakav temelj za zaključak da osporavane odluke ne ispunjavaju prethodno navedene pretpostavke, kao ni za tvrdnju da su postojali bilo kakvi nedostaci u domaćem procesu donošenja odluka.
21. Iako je Sud razmatrao samo najnovije odluke, one donesene 2012. godine, ne smije se previdjeti da predmet ima dugu povijest, počevši od mjera podrške poduzete čak i prije rođenja (djeteta) X nakon kojih su uslijedile ustrajne mjere podrške nakon njegova rođenja, a sve s ciljem da se majci pomogne da nauči kako preuzeti odgovornost i skrb za svoje dijete. Ne može se previdjeti ni činjenica da su mjere udomljavanja poduzete jer se pružena pomoć, iako intenzivna, pokazala neuspješnom. Upravo suprotno, nastale su iznimno ozbiljne okolnosti zbog kojih su mjere udomljavanja postale potrebne da bi se zaštitio život i zdravlje djeteta. Činjenično stanje predmeta, kako je navedeno u ovoj presudi, daje popriličan uvid u probleme s kojima su se suočile domaće vlasti. Konkretno, treba napomenuti da, iako prva podnositeljica zahtjeva nije osporavala odluku o skrbi Žalbenog suda iz 2010. godine, čini se da nije bila svjesna zašto bi bilo koja od poduzetih mjera bila potrebna i nastavila je vjerovati da su radnje vlasti „urota” protiv nje (vidi stavke 77., 90. i 101. ove presude). Nadalje, čini se da su se iste poteškoće pojavljivale i tijekom susreta i druženja s obzirom na to da je antagonizam prve podnositeljice zahtjeva naspram tijela za socijalnu skrb i udomiteljice prevladavao nad njezinom brigom za dijete (vidi stavke 90., 101. – 103.).
22. Kad je riječ o činjenici da nisu zatražena nova izvješća vještaka o navodnim novijim promjenama u majčinoj situaciji i vještinama skrbi (vidi stavak 223. ove presude), ne smatramo da činjenično stanje predmeta opravdava odstupanje od standardnog pristupa prema kojem je na nacionalnim sudovima da ocjenjuju dokaze koji su im podneseni, uključujući sredstva za utvrđivanje relevantnih činjenica (vidi, konkretno, Sommerfeld protiv Njemačke [VV], br. 31871/96, stavak 71., ECHR 2003VIII (izvadci)). Smatramo da je nategnuto kritizirati Okružni, kao što to čini većina, jer nije naložio novo vještačenje. Domaći sud bio je obaviješten o pozitivnim promjenama u majčinoj situaciji i nije bilo sporno da je zajedno sa suprugom i uz pomoć socijalnog radnika bila sposobna skrbiti za svoju kćer. No, s obzirom na iste zaključke Županijskog odbora i Okružnog suda o izrazitom nedostatku empatije i razumijevanja majke u pogledu dječaka X i poteškoćama s kojima bi se dječak susreo da ga se vrati u njezinu skrb (vidi stavke 90. i 101. ove presude), u kombinaciji s njegovom snažnom socijalnom i psihološkom povezanosti s udomiteljima, ne možemo se složiti sa zaključkom da bi se u okolnostima ovog predmeta izostanak novog vještačenja mogao smatrati značajnim nedostatkom u domaćem procesu donošenja odluka.
23. S obzirom na činjenično stanje predmeta, kako je navedeno u ovoj presudi, jasno je da su domaće vlasti bile suočene sa situacijom koja se odnosila na ozbiljna pitanja povezana s djetetom i njegovim najboljim interesima. Ovaj Sud smatra da bi bilo pogrešno podcijeniti složenost i poteškoće koje proizlaze iz takvih okolnosti. U tom kontekstu smatramo da se domaće vlasti ne bi trebalo kritizirati jer su se „usredotočile na najbolje interese djeteta”. Ne možemo zamisliti koji bi temelj bio dostatan da bi Sud zaključio da su, u konkretnim okolnostima ovog predmeta, njihova nastojanja bila pogrešna ili da ih treba smatrati neopravdanim propustom da se dijete spoji sa svojom biološkom obitelji (majkom). Iako je istina da se osporavane mjere temelje na procjeni o tome što je potrebno da bi se zajamčili najbolji interesi djeteta, možemo prihvatiti da su u ovom predmetu, u svjetlu činjeničnog stanja predmeta i njegova detaljnog ispitivanja u domaćem postupku, postojale izvanredne okolnosti koje opravdavaju poduzete drastične mjere, a iz razloga koji se odnose na prioritetnu pretpostavku da je to u najboljem interesu djeteta (vidi prethodnu točku 19.).
ZAJEDNIČKO SUPROTSTAVLJENO MIŠLJENJE SUTKINJA KOSKELE I NORDÉN O PITANJU PRAVA PRVE PODNOSITELJICE ZAHTJEVA DA ZASTUPA DRUGOG PODNOSITELJA ZAHTJEVA
1. Glasale smo protiv 1. točke izreke ove presude u kojoj je većina odbila prethodni prigovor Vlade koji se odnosi na pravo prve podnositeljice zahtjeva (tj. majke) da pred Sudom postupa i u ime drugog podnositelja zahtjeva (tj. djeteta). Smatramo da, u okolnostima ovog predmeta, postoji sukob interesa između majke i djeteta koji je takav da onemogućuje majci da zastupa svoje dijete u postupku pred Sudom. U tom je pogledu ovaj predmet primjer pitanjâ u vezi s kojima se, prema nama, treba izmijeniti praksa koje se dosada pridržavao Sud.
Opće napomene
2. Kao nositelji konvencijskih prava, djeca su poseban izazov kad je riječ o postupovnoj zaštiti tih prava s obzirom na to da ne mogu postupati pred Sudom kao samostalni podnositelji zahtjeva jer su malodobni. U sudskoj praksi uvaženo je da članak 34. Konvencije zahtijeva pažljivo razmatranje položaja djece, budući da se djeca općenito moraju pouzdati u druge osobe, da one podnesu njihove zahtjeve i zastupaju njihove interese, te možda nisu takve dobi ili sposobnosti da bi mogli dati ovlaštenje za poduzimanje bilo kakvih koraka u njihovo ime u bilo kakvom stvarnom smislu (vidi A.K. i L. protiv Hrvatske, br. 37956/11, stavak 47., 8. siječnja 2013., i P., C. i S. protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (odl.), br. 56547/00, 11. studenoga 2001.). Sud je utvrdio da treba izbjegavati restriktivni i isključivo tehnički pristup u ovom području, točnije moraju se razmotriti veze između predmetnog djeteta i njegovih „zastupnika”, predmet i svrha zahtjeva te mogućnost sukoba interesa (vidi S.P., D.P. i A.T. protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, br. 23715/94, odluka Komisije od 20. svibnja 1996., neobjavljena, Giusto, Bornacin i V. protiv Italije (odl.), br. 38972/06, ECHR 2007-V, i Moretti i Benedetti protiv Italije,br. 16318/07, stavak 32., 27. travnja 2010.). Jedan primjer predmeta u kojem se smatralo da situacija maloljetnikâ opravdava dodjelu locus standi srodnici koja je zahtjev podnijela samo u ime maoljetnikâ, a ne u svoje ime, jest predmet N.TS. i drugi protiv Gruzije, br. 71776/12, stavci 55. – 59., 2. veljače 2016.).
3. U situacijama koje uključuju mjere stavljanja pod javno skrbništvo Sud bi se trebao usredotočiti na opasnost da se Sudu možda neće skrenuti pozornost na djetetove interese i da će se stoga djetetu uskratiti učinkovita zaštita njegovih prava iz Konvencije. U slučaju da dođe do sukoba između biološkog roditelja i države o interesu maloljetnika kad je u pitanju oduzimanje skrbništva, ne može se smatrati da država kao nositelj prava skrbništva mora osigurati djetetova konvencijska prava zbog čega je prepoznat locus standi biološkog roditelja da zastupa svoje dijete pred Sudom iako roditelj možda više nema prava na roditeljsku skrb na temelju domaćeg prava (vidi Lambert i drugi protiv Francuske [VV], br. 46043/14, stavak 94., ECHR 2015, Scozzari i Giunta protiv Italije [VV], br. 39221/98 i 41963/98, stavak 138., ECHR 2000-VIII, i Sahin protiv Njemačke (odl.), br. 30943/96, 12. prosinca 2000.).
4. Iako se taj pristup može razumjeti i opravdati u svjetlu osnovnog pitanja koje se odnosi na pristup maloljetnika Sudu, ipak iz njega proizlaze problemi u situacijama u kojima je biološki roditelj koji želi postupati u ime djeteta sam dio činjeničnog stanja predmeta na takav način da interesi roditelja i interesi djeteta nisu usklađeni nego sukobljeni.
5. To nas dovodi do biti ovog pitanja. Potreba za osiguranjem učinkovite zaštite konvencijskih prava maloljetnika podrazumijeva dvije ključne pretpostavke: prva je da mora biti moguće podnijeti pred Sud prigovore na povredu djetetovih konvencijskih prava, a druga je da se djetetovi interesi moraju propisno zastupati u postupku pokrenutom u ime djeteta. Usredotočenost na prvi aspekt nije dostatno za učinkovitu zaštitu prava djece. Drugi aspekt postaje iznimno važan upravo u situacijama u kojima okolnosti predmeta ukazuju na to da bi mogao postojati sukob između interesa osobe koja postupa u ime djeteta, neovisno o tome je li riječ o biološkom roditelju ili nekome drugome, i interesa samog djeteta.
6. Potrebu za razlikovanjem između položaja roditelja i položaja djeteta, osobito u situacijama koje uključuju mjere koje su poduzela domaća tijela za zaštitu djecu, posebno naglašava činjenica da se njihove perspektive mogu razlikovati. Iz perspektive roditelja sve poduzete mjere – osobito kada su poduzete protiv njegove volje – predstavljaju miješanje u obiteljski život roditelja i djeteta, dok iz perspektive djeteta te mjere predstavljaju ispunjenje pozitivnih obveza zaštite prava i ključnih interesa djeteta koje su preuzele državne vlasti, ali su istodobno i miješanje u postojeći obiteljski život djeteta. Sam kontekst i njegova složenost stoga ukazuju na to da te dvije perspektive, odnosno perspektiva roditelja i perspektiva djeteta, možda nisu usklađene kad je riječ o nužnosti i opravdanosti osporavanih mjera.
7. Osiguranje propisnog zastupanja djeteta u postupku pred Sudom još je važnije kada, kao što je često slučaj, pitanja koja se moraju riješiti ovise o ocjeni jesu li najbolji interesi djeteta bili primjereno zaštićeni na domaćoj razini. Koncept najboljeg interesa djeteta širok je, višeslojan i složen. Sastoji se od različitih elemenata koji, u konkretnim okolnostima pojedinačnog predmeta, mogu biti međusobno nespojivi ili u međusobnom sukobu. Dojam o tome gdje se mogu ostvariti najbolji interesi djeteta u konkretnim situacijama može ovisiti o odabranoj perspektivi, osobito u slučaju osoba koje su osobno uključene, i ispreplesti se s vlastitim interesima pojedinca. Kada nastane ozbiljan sukob između biološkog roditelja i državnih tijela za zaštitu djece o pitanju interesa djeteta, činjenica je da se ne može smatrati da su bilo ta tijela bilo roditelj o čijim je radnjama ili propustima riječ nepristrani u tom sukobu. Da bi se djetetova prava i najbolji interesi ozbiljno uzeli u obzir, dijete mora zastupati neovisna osoba koja nije uključena u osnovni sukob i koja je sposobna predstavljati perspektivu djeteta u predmetnoj stvari.
8. U Međunarodnoj konvenciji o pravima djeteta, donesenoj prije tri desetljeća i na snazi gotovo isti broj godina, utvrđeno je da dijete ima konkretna pojedinačna prava. Kao što je navedeno u Preambuli, „djetetu, zbog njegove tjelesne i mentalne nezrelosti, potrebni [su] posebna zaštita i skrb, uključujući odgovarajuću pravnu zaštitu” (citat iz Deklaracije o pravima djeteta koju je Opća skupština UN-a donijela 20. studenoga 1959.). Stoga ključni standard najboljeg interesa djeteta ima važnu postupovnu komponentu, što je utvrđeno i u Općoj napomeni br. 14 (2013.) o pravu djeteta na vođenje računa prvenstveno o njegovim najboljim interesima. U tom dokumentu Odbor UN-a za prava djeteta navodi, među ostalim: „Dijete treba biti primjereno pravno zastupljeno kada se njegovi najbolji interesi formalno procjenjuju i o njima odlučuju sudovi i istovjetna tijela. Konkretno, u slučajevima kada dijete sudjeluje u upravnom ili sudskom postupku koji uključuje utvrđivanje njegovih najboljih interesa, djetetu treba uz skrbnika ili zastupnika njegovih mišljenja osigurati i pravnog zastupnika kada postoji mogući sukob između stranaka u odluci.”
9. Potrebi za zasebnim i neovisnim zastupanjem djeteta u situacijama u kojima postoji sukob interesa između djeteta i roditelja koji navodno postupa u vlastito ime i u ime djeteta, ovaj Sud do sada nije pridao pozornost koju ona zaslužuje. U predmetu X, Y i Z protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (br. 21830/93, 22. travnja 1997., Izvješća o presudama i odlukama 1997-II) prvi je put, u kontekstu drugačijem od ovoga, sudac Pettiti u svojem suglasnom mišljenju uputio na sukob interesa između roditeljâ i djece te napomeno da bi u sličnim situacijama u budućnosti „bilo bez sumnje poželjno da [Komisija i] Sud predlože strankama da se imenuje punomoćnik koji bi zastupao samo interese djeteta”. No taj prijedlog nije imao nikakav utjecaj na praksu Suda.
10. Nama se čini jasno da su potrebne promjene u tom pogledu, no i da postojeći pravni okvir kojim su uređeni postupci pred Sudom nije primjeren za ispunjavanje potrebe da se djeci osigura da imaju pristup Sudu, kao i primjereno zastupanje bez sukoba u postupcima pred Sudom. U tom kontekstu čini se potrebnim razlikovati dopuštenost zahtjeva koje u ime djeteta podnese biološki roditelj (ili druga osoba) od prava na zastupanje djeteta za potrebe podnesaka o osnovanosti navodnih povreda konvencijskih prava tog djeteta.
11. Sud i države ugovornice trebali bi razmotriti to pitanje kako bi se razvila odgovarajuća rješenja i prakse, pri čemu moraju uzeti u obzir potrebu da se ostane unutar ograničenja iz članka 35. stavka 1. Konvencije (vidi, u tom pogledu, nedavno zajedničko suglasno mišljenje sudaca Koskelo, Eickea i Ilijevskog u predmetu A i B protiv Hrvatske, br. 7144/15, 20. lipnja 2019.).
Ocjena u ovom predmetu
12. Vraćajući se ovom predmetu, većina „utvrđuje da u ovom predmetu ne postoji sukob interesa zbog kojeg bi trebalo odbiti [majčin] zahtjev koji je ona podnijela u ime [djeteta]” (vidi stavak 159. ove presude). Ne možemo se složiti s tom ocjenom, koja osim toga nije ni objašnjena ni obrazložena.
13. Upravo suprotno, smatramo da je postojanje sukoba interesa očito u svjetlu činjeničnog stanja predmeta. Pri ocjeni određenog pitanja – i ne dovodeći u pitanje zaključak Suda o opsegu ispitivanja osnovanosti (s kojim se slažemo), točnije da ispitivanje mora biti ograničeno na postupak koji je doveo do presude Okružnog suda od 22. veljače 2012., koja je potom postala pravomoćna – također je važno uzeti u obzir kontekst u kojem su tijela za zaštitu djece poduzela mjere u pogledu drugog podnositelja zahtjeva. Činjenično stanje predmeta, kako su ga utvrdili domaći sudovi, pokazuje da je tijekom prve trudnoće prve podnositeljice zahtjeva utvrđeno da će joj biti potrebne pomoć i podrška nakon rođenja djeteta. Nakon poroda smještena je u specijalističku ustanovu radi dobivanja te pomoći i podrške, a predviđeno je da tamo boravi tri mjeseca. Već u prvim danima njezinog boravka u ustanovi stručnjaci nadležni za rad ustanove postajali su sve zabrinutiji za majčinu sposobnost da skrbi za novorođenče i zadovolji njegove osnovne potrebe, uključujući hranjenje i higijenu. Situacija je bila ozbiljna jer je dijete dramatično gubilo na težini. Osoblje je bilo prisiljeno uvesti cjelodnevno promatranje kako bi ga zaštitilo, uključujući buđenje majke tijekom noći kako bi se osiguralo da će nahraniti svoje novorođenče (vidi stavak 20. ove presude). No nakon manje od tri tjedna boravka koji je trebao trajati tri mjeseca majka je rekla da namjerava napustiti ustanovu zajedno s djetetom te su tada zbog toga poduzete prvobitne mjere žurnog udomljavanja (ibid.).
14. Stoga činjenice iz kojih proizlazi ovaj predmet temelje se na situaciji u kojoj su se pomoć i podrška pružene majci morale zamijeniti mjerama žurnog udomljavanja jer su majčino ponašanje i namjera da se odrekne pomoći i podrške koje su joj se pružale stvorilo stvarnu opasnost od zanemarivanja novorođenčeta opasno po život. Unatoč tome, činjenice koje proizlaze iz predmeta također pokazuju da majka nije bila sposobna razumjeti, čak i u vrijeme osporavanog postupka pred Okružnim sudom, zašto su mjere poduzete te nije bila svjesna da je na bilo koji način zanemarivala dijete (vidi stavke 101. i 220. ove presude). Umjesto toga, smatrala je da se poduzete mjere temelje na lažima (kao što se vidi iz njezina prigovora upućenog županu; vidi stavak 77. ove presude) i da predstavljaju urotu protiv nje (što je izjavila Županijskom odboru za socijalnu skrb 2011. godine; vidi stavak 90. ove presude).
15. Ako takve okolnosti ne ukazuju na sukob koji je dostatan da se na temelju njega može isključiti mogućnost majke da pred Sudom zastupa ne samo sebe nego i interese svoga djeteta, teško je reći na temelju čega bi se to onda moglo. Predmetni interesi ne mogu se izjednačiti i, dapače, iznimno su nespojivi. Ni činjenica da se pitanje izneseno pred Sud odnosi na domaću odluku o prekidu pravnih veza između majke i djeteta, ni sudska praksa Suda prema kojoj je u najboljem interesu djeteta da se sačuvaju obiteljske veze, kao ni činjenica da je domaći postupak proveden dok je majka imala pravo na roditeljsku skrb za dijete (vidi stavke 156. – 157.) ne može imati prednost pred postojanjem sukoba interesa koji proizlazi iz konkretnih okolnosti predmeta. Smatramo da se takav sukob ne može zanemariti kada se odlučuje može li roditelj postupati u ime djeteta u postupku pred ovim Sudom.
Zaključak
16. Smatramo da činjenice pokazuju da je postojao jasan i ozbiljan sukob interesa. U takvim okolnostima prvoj podnositeljici zahtjeva nije trebalo biti dopušteno da zastupa svoje dijete pred ovim Sudom.
17. Krajnje je vrijeme da Sud preispita svoj pristup i prakse kad je riječ o dopuštanju biološkom roditelju da postupa u ime svog djeteta čak i kada okolnosti predmeta ukazuju na stvaran ili moguć sukob interesa među njima. Da bi Sud zaista prihvatio, u skladu s Konvencijom o pravima djeteta, ideju da su djeca nositelji konkretnih pojedinačnih prava i potrebu da se prvenstveno mora voditi računa o najboljim interesima djeteta, čini se da treba promijeniti i postupovne prakse.
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Prevod presude preuzet sa stranice Zastupnika Republike Hrvatske pred Evropskim sudom za ljudska prava
https://uredzastupnika.gov.hr/
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GRAND CHAMBER
CASE OF STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY
(Application no. 37283/13)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10 September 2019
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, President,
Guido Raimondi,
Robert Spano,
Vincent A. De Gaetano,
Jon FridrikKjølbro,
Ganna Yudkivska,
Egidijus Kūris,
Carlo Ranzoni,
Armen Harutyunyan,
Georges Ravarani,
Pere Pastor Vilanova,
Alena Poláčková,
PauliineKoskelo,
PéterPaczolay,
LadoChanturia,
Gilberto Felici, judges,
Dag BuggeNordén,ad hoc judge,
and Søren Prebensen, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 17 October 2018 and 27 May 2019, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last‑mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 37283/13) against the Kingdom of Norway lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by five Norwegian nationals, Ms TrudeStrand Lobben,her children, X and Y, and her parents, Ms Sissel and Mr Leif Lobben, on 12 April 2013.
2. The first applicant, Ms TrudeStrand Lobben, and the second applicant, X (“the applicants”), who had been granted legal aid, were ultimately represented by Mr G. ThuanDitDieudonné, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg. The Norwegian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents,Mr M. Emberland and Ms H.L. Busch,of the Attorney General’s Office (Civil Matters).
3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that the domestic authorities’ decisions not to lift the care order for X and instead withdraw the first applicant’s parental responsibilities for him and authorise his adoption by his foster parents, violated their rights to respect for family life under Article 8 of the Convention.
4. The application was allocated to the Fifth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 1 December 2015 the President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the applicants’ complaint to the Government. On 30 November 2017 a Chamber of that Section, composed of Angelika Nußberger, Erik Møse, André Potocki, Yonko Grozev, Síofra O’Leary, Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, LәtifHüseynov, judges, and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar, gave judgment. The Chamber unanimously declared the application by the first and second applicants admissible and the remainder inadmissible. It held, by a majority, that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The joint dissenting opinion of Judges Grozev, O’Leary and Hüseynov was annexed to the judgment.
5. On 30 January 2018 the applicants requested the referral of the case to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention. On 9 April 2018 the panel of the Grand Chamber granted that request.
6. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. At the final deliberations, Jon FridrikKjølbro, substitute judge, replaced AlešPejchal, who was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rule 24 § 3).
7. The applicants and the Government each filed observations (Rule 59 § 1) on the merits of the case.
8. The President of the Grand Chamber granted leave to the Governments of Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Slovakia and the United Kingdom, and Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) International, the AssociazioneItalianadeiMagistrati per iMinorenni e per la Famiglia (AIMMF), the Aire Centre and X’s adoptive parents, to intervene in the written procedure, in accordance with Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3 of the Rules.
9. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 17 October 2018.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the respondent Government
MrF.Sejersted, Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office,
MrM.Emberland,Agent, Attorney General’s Office,
MsH.Lund Busch,Agent, Attorney General’s OfficeAgents,
MsA.SydnesEgeland, Attorney, Attorney General’s Office,
MrH.Vaaler,Attorney, Attorney General’s Office,
MrD.T. Gisholt, Director, Ministry of Children and Equality,
MsC.Five Berg,Senior Adviser, Ministry of Children
and Equality,
MsH.Bautz-HolterGeving,Ministry of Children
and Equality,
MsL. Width,Municipal Attorney,Advisers;
(b) for the applicants
MrG.ThuanDitDieudonné, Lawyer,Counsel,
MsT. Strand Lobben, First applicant.
The Court heard addresses by Mr ThuanDitDieudonné and Mr Sejersted and their replies to questions put by the judges.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. Background
10. In May 2008 the first applicant turned to the child welfare services because she was pregnant and was in a difficult situation: she did not have a permanent home and was temporarily staying with her parents.
11. On 10 June 2008 the first applicant and the putative future father, Z, visited a gynaecological polyclinic at the regional hospital. According to the medical notes recorded that day, the doctor was informed that the first applicant had had a late abortion in October 2007 and that she also wanted to abort this time. A chlamydia test and an ultrasonography were carried out, and the first applicant and Z informed that an abortion would not be possible.
12. On 23 June 2008 the hospital confirmed that the result of the chlamydia test taken on 10 June 2008 was positive. As one of the measures taken by the birth clinic to monitor the first applicant and her situation, the doctor noted that a social worker would make contact with the child welfare services, in agreement with the first applicant. A social worker, J.T., at the hospital noted the following day that the first applicant had expressed a strong wish for a place at a parent-child institution on the grounds that she was limited on account of a brain injury (begrensninger på grunnavhjerneskade) sustained following an epileptic seizure; she had no home, and a difficult relationship with the child’s putative father and other family members; and that she wanted help to become as good a mother as possible. It was noted by the hospital that any stay at a parent-child institution would be voluntary and that the first applicant and her child could leave whenever they wished.
13. On 1 July 2008 the hospital notified the child welfare services that the first applicant was in need of guidance concerning the unborn child and monitoring with regard to motherhood. The hospital also indicated that she needed to stay at a parent-child institution. The child welfare services took on the case, with the first applicant’s consent. She agreed to stay at a parent‑child institution for three months after the child was born, so that her ability to give the child adequate care could be assessed.
14. On 16 July 2008 a meeting with the child welfare services took place. A psychologist, I.K.A., from the Office for Children, Youth and Family Affairs attended the meeting. According to the notes from the meeting, it was agreed that the first applicant should receive psychological counselling on a weekly basis in the social worker’s absence during the summer, and that the psychologist would give subsequent reports to the child welfare services.
15. On 16 September 2008 a formal decision was taken to offer the first applicant and her child a place at a parent-child institution for three months. The decision stated that the child welfare services were concerned about the first applicant’s mental health and her ability to understand the seriousness of taking responsibility for a child and the consequences.
16. Some days earlier, on 9 September 2008, the child welfare services and the first applicant had agreed on a plan for the stay. In the plan it was stated that the main purpose of the stay would be to examine, observe and guide the first applicant in order to equip her with sufficient childcare skills. A number of more specific aims were also included, involving observation of the mother and child and examination of the mother’s mental health (psyke) and maturity, her ability to receive, understand and avail herself of advice in relation to her role as a mother, and her developmental possibilities. Working with the first applicant’s network was also included as an aim in the plan.
17. On 25 September 2008 the first applicant gave birth to a son, X, the second applicant. The first applicant then refused to provide the name of X’s father. Four days later, on 29 September 2008, the first applicant and X moved to the parent-child institution. For the first five days X’s maternal grandmother also stayed there with them.
18. On 10 October 2008 the parent-child institution called the child welfare services and expressed concern on the part of their staff. According to the child welfare services’ records, the staff at the institution stated that X was not gaining sufficient weight and lacked energy. With regard to nappy changes, the staff had to repeatedly (gang på gang) tell the first applicant that there were still traces of excrement, while she continued to focus on herself.
19. On 14 October 2008 the staff at the parent-child institution said that they were very concerned about X and the first applicant’s caring skills. It had turned out that the first applicant had given an incorrect weight for the baby and that X had, accordingly, lost more weight than previously assumed. Moreover, sheshowednounderstandingof theboy’s feelings (viser ingen forståelse av gutten sine følelser) and seemedunable to empathisewiththe baby (sette seg inn i hvordan babyen har det). The staff had decided to move the first applicant into an apartment on the main floor in order to get a better overview and to monitor her even more closely. The next meeting between the first applicant, the staff at the parent-child institution and the child welfare services had been scheduled for 24 October 2008, but the staff at the institution wanted to bring the meeting forward as they were of the view that the matter could not wait that long.
B. Proceedings to place X in emergency foster care
20. On 17 October 2008 a meeting between the parent-child institution, the first applicant and the child welfare services was held. The first applicant stated at the meeting that she wanted to move out of the institution together with her child, as she no longer wanted guidance. The staff at the institution stated that they were very concerned about the first applicant’s caring skills. She did not wake up at night, and the boy had lost a lot of weight, lacked energy and appeared dehydrated. The health visitor was also very concerned, whereas the first applicant was not. The institution had established close 24-hour monitoring. Staff had stayed awake at night in order to wake the first applicant up to feed the child. They had monitored the first applicant every three hours round the clock in order to ensure that the boy received nourishment. They expressed the fear that the child would not have survived had they not established that close monitoring pattern. The child welfare services considered that it would create a risk if the first applicant removed the child from the institution. X was below critical normal weight (kritisknormalvekt) and in need of nutrition and monitoring.
21. In the decision taken on the same date it was also stated that the first applicant had given information about the child’s father to the child welfare services, but that she had refused him permission to take a paternity test and to sign as father at the hospital. It was stated that the father wanted to take responsibility for the child, but that he did not yet have any rights as a party to the case.
22. It was decided to place X in an emergency foster home and that the first applicant and her mother should visit him for up to one and a half hours weekly. As to the boy’s needs, it was stated that he had lost a lot of weight and accordingly needed close and proper monitoring. It was emphasised as very important that good feeding routines be developed. Further, according to the plan, the placement was to be continuously assessed by the first applicant, the emergency foster parents, a specialist team (fagteam) and the child welfare services. The municipality was to stay in contact with the emergency foster parents and be responsible for being in contact with and following up on the first applicant. Preliminary approval of the decision was given by the chair of the County Social Welfare Board (fylkesnemnda for barnevernogsosialesaker) on 21 October 2008.
23. On 22 October 2008 the first applicant appealed to the County Social Welfare Board against the emergency decision. She claimed that she and X could live together at her parents’ house, arguing that her mother stayed at home and was willing to help care for X and that she and her mother were also willing to accept help from the child welfare services.
24. On 23 October 2008 a family consultant and a psychologist from the parent-child institution drew up a report of the first applicant’s and her mother’s stay there. The report referred to an intelligence test that had been carried out in which the first applicant had obtained a higher score than 67% of persons of her age on perceptual organisation (meaning organisation of visual material) and below 93% of persons her age on verbal understanding. On tasks that required working memory – the ability to take into account and process complex information – the first applicant had scored below 99% of persons her age. According to the report, the tests confirmed the clinical impression of the first applicant. Furthermore, the report stated that the institution’s guidance had focused on teaching the first applicant how to meet the child’s basic needs in terms of food, hygiene (stell) and safety. The first applicant had received verbal and hands-on guidance and had consistently (gjennomgående) needed repeated instructions and demonstration. In the staff’s experience, the first applicant often did not understand what was told or explained to her, and rapidly forgot. In the conclusion the report stated, inter alia:
“The mother does not care for her child in a satisfactory manner. During the time the mother and child have stayed [at the parent-child institution] ..., the staff here ... have been very concerned that the child’s needs are not being met. In order to ensure that the child’s primary needs for care and food are met, the staff have intervened and closely monitored the child day and night.
The mother is not able to meet the boy’s practical care needs. She has not taken responsibility for caring for the boy in a satisfactory manner. The mother has needed guidance at a very basic level, and she has needed advice to be repeated to her several times.
Throughout the stay, the mother has made statements that we find very worrying. She has expressed a significant lack of empathy for her son, and has several times expressed disgust with the child. The mother has demonstrated very little understanding of what the boy understands and what behaviours he can control.
The mother’s mental functioning is inconsistent and she struggles considerably in several areas that are crucial to the ability to provide care. Her ability to provide practical care must be seen in the light of this. The mother’s mental health is marked by difficult and painful feelings about who she herself is and how she perceives other people. The mother herself seems to have a considerable unmet care need.
Our assessment is that the mother is incapable of providing care for the child. We are also of the opinion that the mother needs support and follow-up. As we have verbally communicated to the child welfare services, we believe it to be important that especially close care is taken ofthe mother during the period following the emergency placement.
The mother is vulnerable. She should be offered a psychological assessment and treatment, and probably needs help in finding motivation for this. The mother should have an individual plan to ensure follow-up in several areas. The mother has resources (see the abilities tests) that she needs help to make good use of.”
25. On 27 October 2008 the Board heard the appeal against the emergency placement decision (see paragraphs 22 and 23 above). The first applicant attended with her legal-aid counsel and gave evidence. Three witnesses were heard.
26. In a decision of the same day, signed by the Board’s chairperson, the Board concluded that it had to rely on the descriptions given by the psychologist at the parent-child institution, who had drafted the institution’s report, and the representative from the municipal child welfare services. According to those descriptions, the first applicant had been unable to care for X properly (betryggende) in entirely essential and crucial respects (heltvesentligeogsentraleområder). Furthermore, she had said that she wanted to leave the institution. It had been obvious that she could not be given care of X without creating a risk that he would suffer material harm. Afterwards, the first applicant’s parents had said that they would be capable of ensuring that X was adequately looked after. However, the Board concluded that this would not provide X with sufficient security. The first applicant’s mother had given evidence before the Board and had stated that during her stay at the parent-child institution she had not experienced anything that gave rise to concern with respect to the first applicant’s care for X. This was in stark contrast to what had been reported by the psychologist. The Board also concluded that it was the first applicant who would be responsible for the daily care of X, not her mother.
27. On the same day, 27 October 2008, X was sent to a child psychiatry clinic for an assessment.
28. On 30 October 2008 the first applicant appealed against the Board’s decision of 27 October 2008 (see paragraphs 25-26 above) to the City Court (tingrett).
29. On 13 November 2008 the first applicant visited X in the foster home; according to the notes taken by the supervisor, Z had received the result of a paternity test the day before which had shown that he was not the father. The first applicant stated that she did not know who the father could be. She could not remember having been with anyone else. The first applicant and the adviser from the child welfare services agreed that the first applicant would contact her doctor and ask for a referral to a psychologist.
30. On 21 November 2008 an adviser working with emergency placements (beredskapshjemskonsulent) at the Office for Children, Youth and Family Affairs produced a report on the implementation of the emergency measure. In the conclusion she stated:
“The boy arrived at the emergency foster home on 17/10 with little movement in his arms and legs, and making few sounds. He could not open his eyes because they were red, swollen and had a lot of discharge. He was undernourished, pale and weak [(slapp)]. After a few days he started to move, make sounds and develop skin colour. He ate well at all meals, and enjoyed bodily contact. He opened his eyes upon receiving the correct medication and gradually started to be in contact with his surroundings. Good routines were put in place and he was closely followed up with respect to nourishment and development.
The boy has developed very well in all areas in the five weeks he has been living in the emergency foster home. The doctor and health visitors were satisfied with the boy’s development and have monitored him closely. Bup [(Barne- ogungdomspsykiatriskpoliklinikk – the Children’s and Young People’s Psychiatric Out-Patient Clinic)] has also followed up on the boy and reported possible stress symptoms developed by the boy during the pregnancy or the first weeks of his life. The emergency foster parents have provided favourable conditions for the boy to work on his development, and this has worked well. The boy needs stable adults who can give him good care, appropriate to his age [(aldersadekvatomsorg)], and satisfy his needs in future.”
31. On 28 November 2008 the municipality applied to the County Social Welfare Board for a care order, submitting that the first applicant lacked caring skills with respect to a child’s various needs. They considered that X would rapidly end up in a situation in which he would be subjected to serious neglect if he were returned to the first applicant. As to contact rights, the municipality submitted that they assumed that it would be a matter of a long-term placement and that X would probably grow up in foster care. They stated that the first applicant was young, but that it was assumed that her capacity as a mother would be limited, at least in relation to X ([m]or erung, men detantas at henneskapasitetsommorvilværebegrenset, ihvert fall iforholdtildettebarnet).
32. On 5 December 2008 the team at the child psychiatry clinic, who had carried out six different observations between 3 and 24 November 2008, in accordance with the instructions of 27 October 2008 (see paragraph 27 above), set out their results in a report, which read, inter alia, as follows:
“[X] was a child with significantly delayed development when he was sent to us for assessment and observation. Today he is functioning as a normal two-month-old baby, and has the possibility of a good normal development. He has, from what can be observed, been a child at high risk. For vulnerable children the lack of response and confirmation, or other interferences in interaction, can lead to more or less serious psychological and developmental disturbances if they do not receive other corrective relationship experiences. The quality of the earliest interaction between a child and the closest caregiver is therefore of great importance for psychosocial and cognitive development. [X] bears the mark of good psychosocial and cognitive development now.”
33. The City Court, composed of one professional judge, one psychologist and one lay person, pursuant to section 36-4 of the Dispute Act (see paragraph 133 below), heard the appeal against the Board’s decision in the emergency case (see paragraphs 25-26 and 28 above) on 12 January 2009. In its judgment of 26 January 2009 it stated first that an interim decision pursuant to the second paragraph of section 4-6 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below) could only be made if the risk of harm was acute and the child would suffer material harm if not moved immediately. It went on to state that the case concerned a child who had been practically newborn when the interim care order had been made, and that the placement had since been reconsidered several times following appeals on the part of the mother.
34. In its conclusion the City Court stated that it was in no doubt that X’ssituation had been serious when the interim care order had been issued. He had shown clear signs of neglect, both psychologically and physically. The City Court found that the “material” harm requirement (vesentlighetskravet) in the second paragraph of section 4-6 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below) had been met. X was at the time of its judgment in better health and showed normal development. This was due to the emergency foster parents’ efforts and follow-up. The City Court did not consider that the first applicant’s ability to provide care had changed and feared that X would suffer material harm if he were now returned to her. This was still the case even if the first applicant lived with her parents and they supported her. It was her ability to provide care that was the matter of assessment.
35. Based on the above, the City Court did not find grounds to revoke the emergency care order pending a decision by the County Social Welfare Board on the question of permanent care.
36. The first applicant did not appeal to the High Court (lagmannsrett).
C. Proceedings for a care order
1. Proceedings before the County Social Welfare Board
37. The Board, composed of an administrator qualified to act as a professional judge, a psychologist and a lay person, in accordance with section 7-5 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below), held a hearing on the child welfare services’ request for a care order (see paragraph 31 above) on 17 and 18 February 2009. The first applicant attended and gave evidence. Seven witnesses were heard, including experts and the first applicant’s parents, their neighbour and a friend of the family. At the hearing the child welfare services requested that X be taken into local authority care, placed in a foster home and that the first applicant be granted contact rights for two hours, four times per year, under supervision. The first applicant sought to have the request for a care order rejected and X returned to her. In the alternative, she asked for contact rights of a minimum of once per month, or according to the Board’s discretion.
38. In a decision of 2 March 2009 the Board stated at the outset that, independently of the parties’ arguments and claims, its task was to decide whether X was to be taken into care by the child welfare services. If a care order were issued, the Board would also choose a suitable placement and determine the contact arrangements.
39. The Board concluded that the fundamental condition set out in letter (a) of the first paragraph of section 4-12 of the Child Welfare Act had been met (see paragraph 122 below). In its opinion, a situation involving serious deficiencies in both psychological and practical care would arise if X were returned to live with the first applicant.
40. The Board emphasised that it had assessed the first applicant’s ability as a caregiver and changes in her approach, not her condition or personality traits. However, the Board noted that the parent-child institution had considered the first applicant’s inability to benefit from guidance to be linked to her cognitive limitations. Reference was made to conclusions drawn by the institution to the effect that the relevant test results were consistent with their daily observations (see paragraph 24 above). The tests carried out at the institution were also largely consistent with previous assessments of the first applicant, and also with the concerns reported by, inter alia, the psychologist at the Office for Children, Youth and Family Affairs in the summer of 2008 (see paragraph 14 above). In the Board’s view, the above factors suggested that the first applicant’s problems were of a fundamental nature and that her potential for change was limited (siernoeom at morsproblematikkerav en grunnleggendekarakterog at endringspotensialeterbegrenset).
41. The Board stated that it had to conclude that a care order was necessary and in the best interests of X. As to a suitable placement, the Board stated that, having regard to his age and care needs, a foster home placement was clearly the best solution for X at the time. It issued a care order to that effect. Based on X’s age and vulnerability, the Board also decided that he should be placed in enhanced foster care – an arrangement whereby the foster home was given extra assistance and support – at least for the first year.
42. Turning to the question of contact rights, the Board went on to state that, under section 4-19 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below), children and parents were entitled to contact with each other unless otherwise decided. When a care order was issued, the Board would determine the amount of contact and decisions regarding contact had to be in the child’s best interests, as provided for by section 4-1 of the Child Welfare Act (ibid.). The purpose and duration of the placement also had to be taken into consideration when the amount of contact was determined.
43. On the grounds of the information available at the time of the Board’s decision, the Board envisaged that X would grow up in the foster home. This was on account of (harsammenheng med) the first applicant’s fundamental problems and limited potential for change (morsgrunnleggendeproblematikkogbegrensedeendringspotensial) (see paragraph 40 above). This meant that the foster parents would become X’s psychological parents, and that the amount of contact had to be determined in such a way as to ensure that the attachment process, which was already well under way, was not disrupted. X had to be given peace and stability in his everyday life, and he was assumed (detleggestilgrunn) to have special needs in that respect. In the Board’s opinion, the purpose of contact had to be to ensure that he had knowledge of his mother.
44. Based on an overall assessment, including of the above factors, the amount of contact was set at two hours, six times per year. The Board stated that it had some misgivings as to whether this was too frequent, particularly considering X’s reactions. However, it believed that contact could be somewhat improved by the child welfare services providing more guidance and adaptation and by a considerable reduction in the frequency of contact.
45. In the Board’s opinion, it was necessary for the child welfare services to be authorised to supervise contact in order to ensure that X was properly cared for.
46. The Board’s decision concluded with a statement to the effect that it would be for the child welfare services to decide on the time and place of the contact sessions.
2. Proceedings before the City Court
47. On 15 April 2009 the first applicant appealed to the City Court against the Board’s decision that X should be taken into public care (see paragraphs 38-46 above). She submitted, in particular, that adequate conditions in the home could be achieved through the implementation of assistance measures and that the care order had been decided without sufficient assistance measures having first been implemented.
48. On 6 May 2009 the child welfare services sent the first applicant a letter in which she was invited to a meeting to discuss what sort of help they could offer her. The letter stated as follows:
“The child welfare services are concerned that you receive help to process what you have been through in relation to the taking into care, etc. It is still an offer that the Child Welfare Service cover the costs of a psychologist, if you so wish.”
49. On 14 May 2009 the first applicant attended a contact session together with two acquaintances. According to the report, a situation arose in which the supervisor from the child welfare services stated that the first applicant would have a calmer time with X if she were alone with him. The first applicant said that the supervisor had to understand that she wanted to bring people with her because she was being badly treated. It was ultimately agreed that one of the acquaintances would accompany the first applicant. During the session the first applicant stated that she had received an unpleasant (ukoselig) letter from the child welfare services offering her an appointment to discuss any help that she might need (see paragraph 48 above). The first applicant stated that she did not want any help and that she certainly did not need psychological counselling.
50. On 19 August 2009 the City Court gave judgment on the question of the care order (see paragraph 47 above). At the outset the City Court stated that the case concerned judicial review of a care order issued pursuant to section 4-12 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below), which was to be considered pursuant to the rules in chapter 36 of the Dispute Act. When undertaking a judicial review of the County Social Welfare Board’s decision, the court had power to review all aspects of the decision, both legal and factual, as well as the administrative discretion. It was well established in law that its review of the Board’s decision should not be based on the circumstances at the time of the Board’s decision, but on the circumstances at the time of its judgment. The court would not therefore normally go into more detail regarding the Board’s assessment of the grounds for issuing a care order. However, the City Court went on to state that it nonetheless found that special reasons made it necessary to do so in the instant case.
51. Based on the evidence presented to it, the City Court ultimately concluded that it had not, either at the time of its judgment or previously, been sufficiently substantiated that there existed such deficiencies in the first applicant’s ability to provide care that the conditions for the child welfare services maintaining care and control of X were met. It found, inter alia, that X’s problems with weight gain could have been due to an eye infection. The Board’s decision should therefore be revoked.
52. X was therefore to be returned to the first applicant and the City Court found that the parties understood that this had to be done in a way that would prevent X from facing further trauma. X had lived with his foster parents for ten months and had formed an attachment to them. Based on what had emerged during the proceedings, the City Court assumed that the child welfare services would give the first applicant and the foster parents the assistance they needed. The first applicant had said that she was willing to cooperate and, given that willingness, the City Court believed that it must be possible to establish the cooperative environment necessary for the child welfare services to be able to provide the help she might need.
53. In the days following the City Court’s judgment there were a number of email exchanges between the first applicant’s counsel and the child welfare services, and a meeting was held on 26 August 2009. The following day the first applicant, through her counsel, requested an appointment so that she could immediately (omgående) pick X up from the foster home and bring him home with her. She also requested that this be on Saturday 29 August 2009. She stated that the foster mother could deliver X and stay as long as she wanted. The foster mother was also welcome to visit X when she wished, upon agreement with the first applicant. Representatives from the child welfare services were not welcome.
54. The applicant’s request to have X immediately returned to her was not met by the child welfare services, but the amount of contact was increased. On 1, 3, 4 and 7 September 2009 contact sessions were held at the house of the first applicant’s parents. The supervisor took detailed notes from each session as well as from conversations with the foster mother, and made a summary report of all the sessions. She noted, inter alia, that the foster mother had stated that the session on 1 September 2009 had “gone well [(gikkgreit)] in many ways”, but that X had become very tired afterwards. He had been uneasy and difficult to put to bed. At the end of the session on 3 September, the supervisor noted that X appeared completely exhausted and pale. X’s apparent tiredness was noted also in relation to the sessions on 4 and 7 September. Furthermore, it emerges from the notes that the supervisor found it strange (underlig) that X had not been offered food, even though the family had been informed that it was his meal time. The supervisor had noted that the first applicant had taken note of this information on the first day, but then forgotten it again by the next day. The report stated that the supervisor was uncertain as to whether this had to do with the first applicant’s insecurity and fear of asking. The report also contained details about X’s reactions to the sessions, with respect to crying, sleeping, digestion and other behaviour.
3. Proceedings before the High Court
55. On 4 September 2009 the municipality sought leave to appeal against the City Court’s judgment (see paragraphs50-52 above), requested that the Board’s decision of 2 March 2009 be upheld (see paragraphs 38-46 above),and concurrently applied for implementation of the City Court’s judgment to be suspended. The municipality argued, firstly, that the City Court’s judgment was seriously flawed. They claimed that it was unlikely that the eye infection could have been the reason for X’s slow weight gain. Moreover, the first applicant had had visits with X, but they had not worked well even though she had been given advice on how to improve them. X had had strong reactions after those visits. Secondly, the municipality submitted that the case raised a question of general interest, namely relating to the first applicant’s intellectual functioning (kognitiveferdigheter). They stated that she had general learning difficulties and that tests had shown that she had specific difficulties, with consequences for her daily functioning. Her abilities in verbal reasoning, relating to complex information and analysing and acting in situations that arose, were matters relevant to the provision of adequate care for a child. In that context the municipality referred to a number of questions that, in their view, had to be answered, relating, inter alia, to what the first applicant was or was not capable of doing – and whether it was appropriate to leave a small child with her – and whether there were realistic assistance measures that could compensate for her shortcomings.
56. On 8 September 2009 the City Court decided to stay enforcement of its judgmentuntil the High Court had adjudicated the case.
57. In her response of 11 September 2009 to the municipality’s appeal, the first applicant, through her counsel, stated that the municipality had proceeded on the grounds that she was almost retarded (nærmestertilbakestående) and therefore incapable of taking care of a child, which she found to be an insulting allegation (grovbeskyldning). Nor were there, in her view, any flaws in the City Court’s judgment.
58. On 9 October 2009 the child welfare services decided to appoint two experts – a psychologist, B.S., and a family therapist, E.W.A. – to assess X in relation to his strong reactions after the period in which there had been frequent contact sessions at the home of the first applicant’s parents (see paragraph 54 above). In addition to examining the reasons for X’s reactions, the experts were asked to provide advice and guidance to the foster mother as to how to handle the reactions and to the first applicant, if she agreed, with respect to the contact sessions.
59. On 12 October 2009 the High Court granted leave to appeal on the ground that the ruling of, or procedure in, the City Court had been seriously flawed (see paragraph 55 above and paragraph133 below). It also upheld the City Court’s decision to stay enforcement of the judgment (see paragraph 56 above).
60. On 4 November 2009 the first applicant’s counsel asked the child welfare services whether the offer of counselling to the first applicant (see paragraph 48 above) was still valid. In their response, of 12 November 2009, the child welfare services stated that they were worried about the first applicant and that it was important that she obtained help. They confirmed that they would cover the costs of a psychologist or other counsellor of the first applicant’s choice and that they would not ask the person chosen for any information or to act as a witness in the child welfare case.
61. On 15 November 2009 the High Court appointed an expert psychologist, M.S., to assess the case.
62. On 20 February 2010 the two experts appointed by the child welfare services to examine the contact sessions and the effects on X (see paragraph 58 above) delivered their report, which was over 18 pages long. In the report they stated that they had not observed any contact sessions, “as this [had been] done by the expert appointed by the High Court”. They further stated that the first applicant had refused guidance with respect to the contact sessions. In the chapter entitled “Is it possible to hypothesise on parents’ competence in contact situations based on their competence as caregivers?”, the following was stated:
“When reviewing the various documents we find that [the parent-child institution] describes a severe lack of the abilities that are required in the mothering role, which is similar to the pattern we see during the contact sessions more than one year later. For example, the mother demonstrates a lack of ability in basic parental care during the contact sessions, as we have described above. Furthermore, her parental regulation during the contact sessions is insensitive. She seems to have significant problems with identifying X’s affects by sharing joy and making him feel secure and guiding him through confirmation and putting names on things. This is very serious.
We find that the mother has significant problems in all the contact sessions and that it is difficult not to say that these problems will also extend to her general competence as a caregiver. In a report dated 19 February 2008, i.e. two years ago, Dr Philos. [H.B.], a specialist in clinical neurology, states the following:
‘There are no significant changes in the results of intelligence tests conducted before the operation and at the check-up two years after the operation. Her results in the intelligence tests have been very similar since she was 10.5 years old, i.e. her intelligence has been stable throughout all these years.’
He says that her intellectual functioning is approximately two standard deviations below her peers and that she has problems with her long-term memory and with transferring information from one thing to another.
We find that it is more problematic than usual for the mother to have supervised contact sessions because of her cognitive issues, because from time to time [(fra gang til gang)] she does not know what to do in relation to the boy and because she is very driven by impulses. [H.B.]’s report also states that she has problems understanding the content of what she is reading, and we also find that she cannot read and understand the situation when she is with her child. We find this to be an important and fundamental issue in shedding light on the mother’s competence in contact situations and her competence as a caregiver. As regards the mother’s competence as a caregiver in relation to the mother’s cognitive skills, we assume that this will be further elucidated by [M.S.], the expert psychologist appointed by the Court of Appeal. This is considered to play a role in relation to the mother’s behaviour vis-à-vis X during the contact sessions and her struggle to become emotionally attuned to his needs at different ages.
On page 5 of its report [(judgment)] from 2009, the City Court summarises [the situation]as follows:
‘It is generally known that many women, especially women who are giving birth for the first time, can have a psychological reaction after the birth which, in extreme situations, can take the form of serious postnatal depression. All reactions in the form of feelings of alienation and insecurity in relation to the newborn are within the normal range.’
We find that the mother’s difficulties during the contact sessions cannot be regarded as serious postnatal depression since the mother’s difficulties during the contact sessions have shown a similar pattern for more than 1.5 years. This is more a sign of inadequate basic parenting skills and is not related to postnatal depression alone. We consider it crucial [(avgjørendeviktig)] that the mother’s difficulties during the contact sessions and her competence as a caregiver in general be understood in the light of more complex psychological explanatory models relating to both cognitive issues and serious traumatic experiences both early in life and as an adult, which we know, based on research, affect a person’s ability to function as a parent without considerable individual efforts and treatment. We assume that the expert psychologist will describe this in more detail.”
63. On 3 March 2010 the expert psychologist appointed by the High Court, M.S. (see paragraph 61 above), delivered her report. She had observed two contact sessions, one attended by the first applicant alone and the other attended by the first applicant together with her mother and sister. The chapter entitled “Social and academic functioning” contained, inter alia, the following:
“Throughout the years SSE [(Statenssenter for epilepsi)] has carried out repeated assessments of [the first applicant] using tests that measure the course of her illness and tests that focus more on describing her functioning. In this case, there has been a particular focus on the WISC-R test, which has been conducted both pre- and postoperatively. The results from this test are expressed as an IQ score which has been a topic of discussion in the child welfare case of which the present report is also a part. It is therefore relevant to make some comments on these test scores.
The WISC-R is a very well-known and frequently used test to measure intellectual abilities in children. Such abilities are associated with school performance. The test result provides useful information about a child’s ability to learn and make use of learning. A functioning profile from a WISC-R test therefore forms the basis for targeted special education measures in school and can help when preparing individually adapted educational arrangements for children with special needs.
The end-product of an intelligence test is an IQ score, which is an operational definition of intelligence that provides a numeric expression of how abilities defined as intelligence are distributed among individuals in a population. The test is standardised, i.e. there is a statistical normal distribution with an average deviation on both sides. The WISC-R has a defined average of 100 with a standard deviation of +-15. A score within the range of distribution 85-115 is said to be within the normal range, where 68% of the population of comparison are situated, whereas 98% are within two standard deviations, i.e. 70-130 points. When conducting a diagnostic assessment of an IQ score, persons with IQ scores between 50 and 69 are defined as slightly mentally retarded. Intelligence test performance can be improved in the course of a person’s developmental history if the fundamental cognitive resources are there. In this case, there is information that [the first applicant]’s IQ score has been stable throughout her childhood and adolescence, which means that she has not caught up intellectually after her brain surgery.
1.3. Summary
Anamnestic information from the school, the specialist health service and the family provides an overall picture of weak learning capacity and social functioning from early childhood into adulthood. [The first applicant] performed poorly at school despite good framework conditions, considerable extra resources and good efforts and motivation on her own part. It is therefore difficult to see any other explanation for her performance than general learning difficulties caused by a fundamental cognitive impairment. This is underlined by her consistently low IQ score – regardless of the epilepsy surgery.
She also had problems with socio-emotional functioning, which has also been a recurring topic in all the documents that deal with [the first applicant’s] childhood and adolescence. A lack of social skills and social adaptation is reported, primarily related to social behaviour that is not commensurate with her age [(ikke-aldersadekvatsosialfremtreden)] (‘childish’) and poor impulse control. It is also stated that [the first applicant] has been very reserved and had low self-confidence, which must be seen in conjunction with her problems.”
In the chapter entitled “Assessment of care functioning, competence in contact situations and the effect of assistance measures”, the report contained the following:
“5.1. Competence as a caregiver
As is clear from the above, I have placed particular emphasis on the consequences of [the first applicant’s] condition in relation to her general functioning and whether she has what it takes to care for a child. It is important to note that neither [the first applicant] herself nor her parents believe that there is a connection between her history of illness, her adult functioning and her ability to provide care.
It is not the case that epilepsy deprives people of their ability to provide care, just as a low IQ score in itself is not a reason to take a child into care. However, a test result can help to elucidate why someone’s functioning capacity is impaired, particularly if this is seen in conjunction with other observations and descriptions.
[The first applicant] has had serious refractory epilepsy since she was an infant. This is an unstable form of epilepsy that changes the brain and affects the entire personality development. There is also the matter of the side effects of the strong medication she took throughout her childhood. Dr [R.B.L.] at SSE, who knows [the first applicant]’s history very well, talks about ‘the burden of epilepsy’, i.e. the socio-emotional problems that can be generated through a reduced ability to learn and social maladjustment. It is therefore completely reasonable to assume that the burden of the disease in itself has set her back somewhat. Objective measurements of her functioning made at different times during her upbringing confirm this. Seen in conjunction with clinical observations, an impression is formed of [the first applicant] as a young woman with significant cognitive impairment. In my opinion, this is what the public health services identified when [the first applicant] reported her pregnancy and that gave cause for concern. Terms such as ‘immature’ and ‘childish’ frequently occur in descriptions of her behaviour throughout her upbringing and are still used now that she is 24 years old. [The first applicant]’s appearance and behaviour largely qualify her for the use of such adjectives: she is small, delicate and looks much younger than her chronological age. She lives at home with her parents where her room has Moominswallpaper and is filled with objects you would expect to see in a teenager’s room.
I am concerned about [the first applicant]’s self-care. She seems young, insecure and partly helpless. Her relationship with men seems unclear. She had a romantic relationship with a man whom she also lived with for a short time, but the relationship was characterised by turbulence with episodes of sexual violence. She became pregnant with X while she was still together with her boyfriend, without [the first applicant] having been able to explain how it came about that her boyfriend is not the child’s father. She has seemed confused about this and has told different stories. She has also contracted a sexually transmitted disease (chlamydia) without knowing the source of the infection. [The first applicant] has wanted a child, but has left things up to chance without considering the consequences of having sole responsibility for the child and what this requires. On 7 November 2007 she told the doctor at SSE that she was not using birth control and thought that she might be pregnant at that time. Later that same day she said that she wanted to become pregnant. An abortion was carried out on the basis of social indications at [R. hospital] in November 2007 of a foetus in the 18th week of the pregnancy. [The first applicant] took a photograph of the foetus, which may seem like a bizarre action. She also received a hand and footprint of the foetus. [R. hospital] described [the first applicant] as immature with a limited network.
The circumstances surrounding both pregnancies say something about [the first applicant]’s awareness of her own choices and their consequences. This is important in the assessment of her ability to care for a child.
Furthermore, [the first applicant] has not completed an education and has not been in permanent employment. She has for the most part lived at home in her old room and has little experience of living as an independent adult with responsibility for creating structure in her life, ensuring an income and deciding on financial priorities. Her relationship with her parents is described as good at the moment, but there have been conflicts in the past. I perceive their relationship to be vulnerable. [The first applicant] herself expresses a great deal of ambivalence towards her mother, because, on the one hand, she thinks that her mother interferes too much with her life, while, on the other hand, she is very dependent on her, takes her opinions as her own and trusts her to be her guide. At the same time she is annoyed that her mother defines many things for her and wishes that her mother ‘would get it into her thick head’ that she needs a bit more privacy than at present. According to her mother, [the first applicant] just sat in her room after her son was taken into care. Her mother is very worried and says that she ‘can hardly stand’ seeing her daughter like that.
In my opinion, [the first applicant] has problems with emotional regulation, which makes interaction with other people difficult for her. Since the child was taken into care, [the first applicant] has been offended, hurt and angry. These emotions are fully understandable when you feel that you have been treated unfairly, but in this case they are expressed without censorship to such an extent that it seems conspicuous. Describing the County Social Welfare Board as ‘a bunch of rotten women who are bought off by the child welfare services’ and the staff at [the parent-child institution] as ‘those psychotic people’ does not help to create an impression of an adult person who is capable of socialising with other adults in a socially appropriate manner. [The first applicant]’s intense outbursts of crying, both at home with her parents when we are discussing the case and during contact sessions, is also unusual behaviour for an adult. Nor is sobbing into the lap of one’s father or mother (as described in connection with the contact sessions) a sign that one is able to control one’s emotions in a manner that is commensurate with one’s age. Nor has [the first applicant] handled her son’s behaviour very maturely, but has rather felt personally rejected and acted accordingly.
It is difficult to stick to the matter at hand with [the first applicant]. Her cognitive style is characterised by an inability to see connections, or to generalise. She demonstrates egocentric thinking when she keeps bringing up the evil child welfare services and when referring to how her parents and everyone else find it incomprehensible that the child was taken into care. I refer to the statement by the psychologist from[the parent-child institution] that ‘the mother makes statements that are difficult to attach any meaning to.’ The view that I have formed of [the first applicant] during our conversations is that she has a fragmented view of situations, meaning that different episodes are understood as individual episodes that have no connection. Accordingly, guidance is perceived as criticism, good advice as scolding etc. This inability to generalise is characteristic of [the first applicant]’s thinking. She also lacks the capability of abstract thinking and formal thought operations. It is difficult for her to think forwards and backwards in time. Hence, it is not easy to get an answer as to what ideas she has regarding a possible return of the child. She makes some general statements, for example that she must ask what he likes to eat and whether he watches children’s TV, whereas she does not offer any reflections on what special measures should be taken relating to the child’s emotional stress if he were to be moved. When I ask what the foster mother should do to help during the process of returning the child, [the first applicant] has no constructive suggestions. What she wants, however, is ‘that she (the foster mother) should feel as shitty as I have for the past year’. Such a statement, combined with the manifest hostility (uttaltfiendtlighet) during the contact sessions, does not bode well for co-operation with either the foster home or the child welfare services should the boy be returned.
[The first applicant] has used a lot of energy on her aggression and developing hostile opinions. This has contributed to cementing the stereotypes about the child welfare services and all other helpers as adversaries. [The first applicant]’s thinking is characterised by an‘if you’re not with me, you’re against me’ attitude, and she is unable to see nuances. Such black-and-white thinking is characteristic of individuals with limited cognitive capacity. Furthermore, I perceive [the first applicant] as being depressed. I consider her intense aggression as a strategy for holding it together psychologically.
There is no reason to doubt [the first applicant]’s intense wish to become a good mother. She contacted the support services herself for this purpose. What ideas and expectations she had in that regard remain unclear, however. Her mother has indicated that they thought [the parent child-institution] was a sort of hotel where you could get practical help with child care. Despite all the preparatory work and thorough information provided beforehand, they did not understand that an assessment stay requires the parent to show their qualities, be observed and be placed in a learning situation. Consequently, [the first applicant] feels very betrayed and deceived – which is expressed as abusive language and threats.
The stay at [the parent-child institution] illustrates that [the first applicant] had problems handling and retaining information in such a manner that it could be used to guide her behaviour. It is not a question of a lack of willingness but of an inadequate ability to plan, organise and structure. Such manifestations of cognitive impairment will be invasive in relation to caring for the child and could result in neglect.
5.2. The effect of assistance measures
Weight is attributed to the fact that [the first applicant] is now living with her parents and can continue to do so for as long as is necessary. This is an assistance measure of sorts. This may become more problematic than it would seem, however: [the first applicant] is 24 years old and wishes to become autonomous, a desire which may conflict with her mother’s desire to help. Neither her parents nor anyone else will be able to dictate how [the first applicant] should organise her life and her child’s life. If [the first applicant] wants to move out, she can do this whenever she wishes. Her parents are not concerned about this. A decision must therefore be based on the fact that – should the child be returned – one cannot with a sufficient degree of certainty know where the child’s care base will be in future. It must therefore primarily be based on [the first applicant]’s ability to provide care, not her network’s ability to provide care.
The stay at the family centre was a strong assistance measure which had no effect. The child welfare services’ follow-up of contact sessions has had a negative impact on the cooperation between the [applicant’s] family and the child welfare services. Both the family and [the first applicant] have stated that they do not want follow-up or assistance in connection with returning the child.
5.3. Conclusions
In my assessment, there are grounds for claiming that there were serious deficiencies in the care the child received from the mother, and also serious deficiencies in terms of the personal contact and security he needed according to his age and development. [The first applicant]’s cognitive impairment, personality functioning and inadequate capacity for mentalisation make it impossible to have a normal conversation with her about the physical and psychological needs of small children. Her assessments of the consequences of having the child returned to her care and what it will demand of her as a parent are very limited and infantile, with her own immediate needs, there and then, as the most predominant feature. It is therefore found that there is a risk of such deficiencies (as mentioned above) continuing if the child were to live with his mother.
It is also found that satisfactory conditions for the child cannot be created with the mother by means of assistance measures pursuant to section 4-4 of the Child Welfare Act (e.g. relief measures in the home or other parental support measures) due to a lack of trust and a reluctance to accept interference from the authorities – taking the case history into consideration.”
64. The High Court held a hearing from 23 to 25 March 2010. The first applicant attended with her legal-aid counsel. Eleven witnesses were heard and the court-appointed expert, psychologist M.S. (see paragraph 61 above), made a statement. The municipal child welfare services submitted, principally, that there should be no contact between the applicants. In the alternative, contact should take place only twice a year. The child welfare services maintained that it was a matter of a “long-term placement” (langvarigplasseringavbarnet).
65. In a judgment of 22 April 2010 the High Court upheld the Board’s decision that X should be taken into compulsory care (see paragraphs 38-46 above). It also reduced the first applicant’s contact rights to four two-hour visits per year.
66. The High Court had regard to the information in the report produced by the parent-child institution on 23 October 2008 (see paragraph 24 above). It also took account of the family consultant’s testimony before the court, in which it had been stated that the first applicant’s mother had lived with her at the institution for the first four nights (see, also, paragraph 17 above). It went on to state:
“It was particularly after this time that concerns grew about the practical care of the child. The agreement was that [the first applicant] was to report all nappy changes etc. and meals, but she did not. The child slept more than they were used to. [The family consultant] reacted to the child’s breathing and that he was sleeping through meals. Due to weight loss, he was to be fed every three hours around the clock. Sometimes, the staff had to pressure the mother into feeding her son.”
67. The High Court found that the parent-child institution had made a correct assessment and – contrary to the City Court (see paragraph 51 above) – considered it very unlikely that the assessment would have been different if X had not had an eye infection.
68. Furthermore, the High Court referred to the report of 5 December 2008 from the child psychiatry clinic (see paragraph 32 above). It also took into account the report of the court-appointed expert, M.S. (see paragraph 63 above).
69. As the stay at the parent-child institution had been short, the High Court found it appropriate to consider the first applicant’s behaviour (fungering) during the contact sessions that had been organised subsequent to X’s placement in foster care. Two people had been entrusted with the task of supervising the sessions, and both had written reports, neither of which had been positive. The High Court stated that one of the supervisors had given an “overall negative description of the contact sessions”.
70. The High Court also referred to the report of the psychologist and the family therapist appointed by the child welfare services, who had assessed X in relation to the reactions that he had shown after visits from the first applicant (see paragraphs 58 and 62 above).
71. Furthermore, the High Court noted that the court-appointed psychologist, M.S. (see paragraphs 61 and 63 above), had stated in court that the contact sessions had appeared to be so negative that she was of the opinion that the mother should not have a right of contact with her son. The contact sessions were, in her view, “not constructive for the child”. In conclusion to the question of the first applicant’s competence as a carer, she stated in her report (see paragraph 63 above) that the stay at the parent-child institution had illustrated that the first applicant “had problems handling and retaining information in such a manner that it could be used to guide her behaviour”. She went on to state:
“It is not a question of a lack of willingness, but of an inadequate ability to plan, organise and structure. Such manifestations of cognitive impairment will be invasive in relation to caring for the child and could result in neglect” (ibid.).
72. The High Court agreed with the expert M.S.’s conclusion before proceeding to the question whether assistance measures could sufficiently remedy the shortcomings in the first applicant’s parenting skills. In that respect, it noted that the reasons for the deficiencies in competence as a carer were crucial. The High Court referred at this point to the expert’s description of the first applicant’s medical history, namely how she had suffered from serious epilepsy since childhood and until brain surgery had been carried out in 2005, when the first applicant had been 19 years old.
73. The High Court noted that M.S. had also pointed out that the first applicant’s medical history must necessarily have affected her childhood in several ways. It based its assessment on the description by M.S. of the first applicant’s health problems and the impact they had had on her social skills and development. It further noted that placement at a parent-child institution had been attempted as an assistance measure (see paragraph 17 above). The stay had been supposed to last for three months, but had been interrupted after just under three weeks. As a condition for staying longer, the first applicant had demanded a guarantee that she be allowed to take her son home with her after the stay. The child welfare services had been unable to give such a guarantee, and the first applicant had therefore returned home on 17 October 2008.
74. The High Court noted that relevant assistance measures were assumed to consist of a supervisor and further help and training in how to care for children. However, the High Court found that it would take so long to provide the first applicant with sufficient training that it was not a real alternative to continued foster-home placement. Furthermore, the result of such training was uncertain. In that connection the High Court attached weight to the fact that both the first applicant and her immediate family had said that they did not want follow-up or assistance if X were returned to them. It agreed with the conclusions of the court-appointed expert, M.S. (see paragraph 63 above).
75. The High Court’s conclusion in its judgment of 22 April 2010 was that a care order was necessary and that assistance measures for the mother would not be sufficient to allow her son to stay with her. The conditions for issuing a care order under the second paragraph of section 4-12 of the Child Welfare Act were thus met (see paragraph 122 below). In that connection the High Court also gave weight to the attachment that X had formed to his foster parents, particularly the foster mother. As to contact rights, the High Court stated that exceptional and strong reasons were required to deprive a parent of the right of contact after a child had been taken into care, since contact was normally considered to be in the child’s best interests, particularly in a long-term assessment. In the instant case, despite the negative information about the contact sessions and the expert psychologist M.S.’s recommendation that the first applicant should not be given any contact rights, the High Court found that exceptional and strong reasons for denying contact did not exist, but that contact sessions should not take place at too short intervals. It went on to state:
“As regards the frequency of the contact sessions, the High Court is split into a majority and a minority.
The majority ... have found that an appropriate amount of contact would be two hours four times a year.
The majority find reason to emphasise that only the mother has a right of contact. The fact that she has rarely met with [X] alone has had some unfortunate consequences. The tense atmosphere between the adults present has intensified. The stress for the child must be assumed to increase when more people are present. Fewer participants will lead to a calmer atmosphere. This is also in line with the psychologist [M.S.]’s observations. The atmosphere between the adults may also become less tense when the case has been legally resolved and some time has passed. The fact that the contact sessions will become less frequent than under the previous arrangement will also reduce the stress for the child. It must be assumed that the child’s subsequent reactions will then decrease. However, the most important factor will be whether the mother and, if relevant, any other family members manage to cooperate better and preferably convey a positive attitude towards the foster mother, in particular during the contact sessions.
The majority’s conclusion that the contact sessions cannot be more frequent than four times a year is related to what is discussed above. In addition, the placement will most likely be a long-term arrangement. The contact sessions may thus serve as a way of maintaining contact between the mother and son so that he is familiar with his roots. This is believed to be important to the development of identity. The purpose of the contact sessions is not to establish a relationship with a view to a future return of the child to the care of his biological mother.
The child welfare services must be authorised to supervise the exercise of the right of contact. This is necessary for several reasons, including to limit the number of participants during the sessions.”
The minority of the High Court – one of the professional judges – was of the opinion that the contact rights should be fixed at twice a year.
76. The first applicant did not lodge an appeal against the judgment, which thus became legally binding.
D. The first applicant’s complaint to the County Governor
77. In an undated letter the first applicant complained about the child welfare services to the County Governor (fylkesmannen). She alleged that the child welfare services had lied and said that she was retarded; the psychologist appointed by the High Court (see paragraph 61 above) had been partial and should never have been allowed to come into her home; in contact sessions, the first applicant was bullied and harassed by the supervisor and the foster mother if she came alone, and she was not allowed to bring her own parents any more. She stated that one could only wonder how retarded they were, or how low an IQ they had. The whole case, she maintained, had been based on lies. She also alleged that the child welfare services removed a person’s capacities (umyndiggjør) and gladly made people retarded (gjørgjerne folk evneveike) in order to procure children for themselves or their friends.
78. The director (barnevernleder) of the municipal child welfare services replied on 22 July 2010 saying that the first applicant and her family were more interested in conflict with the child welfare services than in establishing good and positive contact with X. The first applicant had complained early on about the staff from the child welfare services, who, in return, had met her wish to be assigned a new supervisor, but nothing had changed in the first applicant’s attitude. The amount of contact had been increased to three times a week in accordance with the City Court’s judgment (see paragraph 54 above), and X had had strong reactions to this. The director of the child welfare services further stated that they understood that the situation was difficult for the first applicant and had offered her help (see, inter alia, paragraph 48 above). With respect to the contact sessions, they had tried several alternatives. They had at first carried out the sessions in a meeting room at their offices, where the supervisor and foster mother could sit at a table some distance away from the first applicant and X, though in a manner that enabled them to intervene if supervision were necessary. The first applicant had complained about this solution. There had then been some sessions in the foster home, but the foster mother had found this difficult because the atmosphere was very bad and they wanted the foster home to be a secure environment for X. Thereafter they had borrowed an apartment designated for purposes such as contact sessions. This had also not suited the first applicant, who had again complained. They had then gone back to having visits at the child welfare services’ offices, where a new room for such purposes had since been made available.
79. The director of the child welfare services also stated that the foster mother was still present during contact sessions. This had been considered as entirely necessary, as she was the secure carer for X. It had also been considered necessary to have a supervisor present to guide the first applicant. The supervisor’s task was also to stop the contact sessions if the first applicant refused guidance. So far, sessions had not been stopped, but the supervisor had tried to tell the first applicant that it was important to focus on X and enjoy being with him, instead of yelling at the child welfare services and the foster mother.
80. In a letter to the first applicant, dated 26 July 2010, the County Governor, following the child welfare services’ response to their inquiry, informed her that they had no objections to the work of the child welfare services in the case.
E. Proceedingsto lift the care order or withdraw the first applicant’s parental responsibilities for X and authorise his adoption
1. Proceedings before the County Social Welfare Board
(a) Introduction
81. On 29 April 2011 the first applicant applied to the child welfare services for termination of the care order or, in the alternative, extended contact rights with X.
82. On 13 July 2011 the municipal child welfare services forwarded the request to the County Social Welfare Board. The municipality proposed that it be rejected; that the first applicant’s parental responsibilities for X be withdrawn (transferred to the authorities), and that X’s foster parents, with whom he had resided since he was taken into care (see paragraph 22 above), be granted permission to adopt him. The identity of X’s biological father was still unknown to the authorities. In the alternative, the municipality proposed that the first applicant’s contact rights be removed.
83. During a contact session on 6 September 2011 the supervisor noticed that the first applicant was pregnant and asked when the baby was due, to which the first applicant, according to the supervision notes, answered that she thought it was around New Year’s Eve. According to the notes, the contact session went well.
84. On 13 September 2011 the first applicant’s counsel engaged a specialist in clinical neurology to test her abilities and to map her cognitive capacities.
85. In letters of 14 September and 28 October 2011, in the course of the proceedings before the Board, the municipality asked for further information about the first applicant’s husband, in order to be able to make contact with him and talk to him about his future role in the first applicant’s life.
86. Meanwhile, on 18 October 2011, the first applicant gave birth to Y. She had married the father of Y in the summer of that year. The new family had moved to a different municipality. When the child welfare services in the first applicant’s former municipality became aware that she had given birth to another child, they sent a letter expressing concern to the new municipality, which started an investigation into her parenting abilities.
87. Also on 18 October 2011, the specialist in clinical neurology engaged by the first applicant’s counsel (see paragraph 84 above) produced his report. His conclusion read as follows:
“Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (WAIS-III) shows an IQ of 86. Standard errors in measurements indicate that, with a 95% probability, she has an IQ of between 82 and 90. The normal range is between 85 and 115. Ability-wise, [the applicant] is within the lower part of the normal range. In addition she shows considerable learning difficulties that are ... [greater] than what her IQ should indicate [(betydeligelærevanskersomersvakereennhvahennes IQ skulletilsi)]. These difficulties are considered to be consistent with a cognitive impairment.”
In response to a request for follow-up, he wrote to the first applicant’s counsel on 27 October 2011stating as follows:
“A general IQ of between 82 and 90 is not in itself a disqualifying factor with respect to having care for children. Care abilities should to a greater extent be examined through observation of the care person and the child, and anamnestic information about other circumstances. Not being an expert in this field, I think that an assessment of crucial factors would include, among other things, the care person’s ability for empathy and meeting the child, understanding of the child’s needs, ability to interpret signals from the child, and ability to set aside [(utsette)] their own wishes for the benefit of the child’s needs.
Such an assessment should be made by a qualified psychologist with experience in the field.”
88. On 8 November 2011 the first applicant’s counsel sent a copy of a medical journal dated 2 November 2011 to the Board. It appeared from the copy that a doctor had agreed to give evidence by telephone during the upcoming case and that the doctor could not see that there was anything connected with the first applicant’s epilepsy or cognition that would indicate that she was not capable of taking care of her child.
89. On 28, 29 and 30 November 2011 the County Social Welfare Board, composed of a lawyer, a psychologist and a lay person, held a hearing at which the first applicant was present together with her legal representative. Twenty-one witnesses were heard.
(b) The Board’s decision
90. On 8 December 2011 the Board decided that the first applicant’s parental responsibilities for X should be withdrawn and that X’s foster parents should be allowed to adopt him. The Board found that there was nothing in the case to indicate that the first applicant’s parenting abilities had improved since the High Court’s judgment of 22 April 2010 (see paragraphs 65-75 above). Therefore she was still considered incapable of giving X adequate care. Moreover, the Board stated:
“In her statement before the County Social Welfare Board, the mother maintained her view that the care order was a conspiracy between the child welfare services, [the parent-child institution] and the foster parents for the purpose of ‘helping a woman who is unable to have children’. In the mother’s words, it was a question of ‘an advance order for a child’. The mother had not realised that she had neglected [X], and stated that she spent most of her time and energy on ‘the case’.
The reports from the contact sessions between the mother and [X] consistently [(gjennomgående)] show that she is still unable to focus on [X] and what is best for him, but is influenced by her very negative view of the foster mother and of the child welfare services.
[The first applicant] has married and had another child this autumn. The psychologist [K.M.] has stated before the Board that he observed good interaction between the mother and child and that the mother takes good care of the child. The Board takes note of this information. In the County Social Welfare Board’s opinion, this observation cannot in any case be used as a basis for concluding that the mother has competence as a caregiver for [X].
The County Social Welfare Board finds it reasonable to assume that [X] is a particularly vulnerable child. He experienced serious and life-threatening neglect during the first three weeks of his life. Reference is also made to the fact that there have been many contact sessions with the mother, some of which have been very stressful for [X]. All in all, he has been through a lot. He has lived in the foster home for three years and does not know his biological mother. If [X] were to be returned to the care of his mother, this would require, among other things, a great capacity to empathise with and understand [X] and the problems he would experience, not least in the form of mourning and missing his foster parents. The mother and her family appeared to be completely devoid of any such empathy and understanding. Both the mother and grandmother stated that it would not be a problem, ‘he just had to be distracted’, and thus gave the impression of not having sympathy with the boy and therefore also being incapable of providing the psychological care he would need in the event of a return.”
91. In addition, the Board had especially noted the conclusions of the expert M.S. (see paragraph 63 above). They had been quoted by the High Court in its judgment of 22 April 2010 (see paragraphs65-75 above). The Board found that this description of the first applicant was still accurate. In any event, it was decisive that X had established such a connection to his foster family that removing him would result in serious and permanent problems for him.
92. The Board further stated:
“[X] has lived in the foster home as an equal member of the family for three years. These three years are the boy’s whole life. We find it to be substantiated that his primary source of security and sense of belonging is his foster family. He sees the foster parents as his psychological parents. In addition to his foster family, [X] receives good follow-up in kindergarten and from the rest of the foster parents’ family. We have no doubt that removing [X] from this environment and returning him to his biological mother would lead to considerable and serious problems. Reference is made to the fact that he had already developed considerable problems after one year, when the amount of contact was increased significantly. In our assessment, it is of crucial importance to the boy’s development and welfare that he continue to live in the foster home.
On this basis the County Social Welfare Board must determine the question of withdrawal of parental responsibilities and, if relevant, consent to adoption.
The first and second paragraphs of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act state that a decision to withdraw parental responsibilities from the parents can be made, and is a precondition for granting consent to adoption. The condition is that the County Social Welfare Board has made a care order for the child.
The Board bases its decision on established case-law allowing for parental responsibilities to be withdrawn from biological parents in order to make an adoption possible. This is the primary objective of the child welfare services’ proposal to withdraw the mother’s parental responsibilities in the present case.
The wording of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act specifies far stricter conditions for granting consent to adoption than for withdrawing the parents’ parental responsibilities. However, when the purpose of a decision pursuant to the first paragraph is to open up the possibility for adoption, the grounds that indicate adoption will also constitute the grounds for withdrawal of parental responsibilities.
The matter to be determined in this case is thus whether the conditions for granting consent to adoption are met. The third paragraph of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act reads as follows:
‘Consent may be given if
(a) it must be regarded as probable that the parents will be permanently unable to provide the child with proper care or the child has become so attached to persons and the environment in which he or she is living that, on the basis of an overall assessment, removing the child may lead to serious problems for him or her, and
(b) adoption would be in the child’s best interests, and
(c) the persons applying for adoption have been the child’s foster parents and have shown themselves to be fit to bring up the child as their own, and
(d) the conditions for granting an adoption under the Adoption Act are satisfied.’
The County Social Welfare Board will start by observing that there are good grounds for withdrawing the mother’s parental responsibilities for [X], regardless of the issue of adoption. Reference is made to the fact that [X] has lived in the foster home for practically his whole life, and it is therefore most natural that the foster parents make the decisions on his behalf that come with parental responsibilities. The mother’s insensitive behaviour, not least online, also indicates that she could cause many problems for him [(ramme ham hardt)] when he becomes old enough to understand.
The County Social Welfare Board considers [(leggertilgrunn)] that the mother will be permanently unable to provide [X] with proper care, and that [X] has become so attached to his foster parents, foster brother and the rest of the family that moving him would lead to serious problems for him. Reference is made to the above discussion. The condition in letter (a) of [the third paragraph of] section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act is met.
Adoption is a particularly invasive measure in relation to the biological parents and the child. Therefore, particularly weighty reasons are required. Pursuant to Supreme Court case-law, the decision must be based on a concrete assessment, but must also build on general experience from child psychology or child psychiatry. Reference is made in particular to the Supreme Court decision in Rt. 2007 page 561 ff., which refers to a court-appointed expert who had stated that general experience indicated that a foster-home relationship was not the preferable option for long-term placement of children who had come to the foster home before establishing an attachment to their biological parents. In such cases, adoption would be most conducive to the child’s development. The judgment stated that considerable importance must be attached to such general, but nuanced experience.
The County Social Welfare Board bases its decision [(leggertilgrunn)] on the mother not consenting to [X] being adopted. As shown above, she has a strong, if inappropriate [(uhensiktsmessig)], commitment to having him returned to her care.
In the County Social Welfare Board’s assessment, consent to an adoption will clearly be in [X]’s best interests. The County Social Welfare Board does not believe that returning [X] to his mother’s care is an option. This foster-home placement is considered permanent. [X] sees his foster parents as his psychological parents, and they are the only parents he knows. An adoption would give [X] further assurance that he is his foster parents’ son.”
93. The Board went on to make another reference to the Supreme Court’s (Høyesteretts) decision in NorskRetstidende (Rt.) 2007, page 561 (see, also, paragraph 125 below) and found that the reasoning underlying the following passage from that judgment – reiterated in Aune v. Norway (no. 52502/07, § 37, 28 October 2010) – was also pertinent in the present case:
“A decision that he should remain a foster child would tell him that the people with whom he has always lived and who are his parents and with whom he established his earliest ties and sense of belonging should remain under the control of the child welfare services – the public authorities – and that they are not viewed by society as his true parents but rather as foster parents under an agreement that can be terminated. ...”
The Board considered these generalreflections to be an accurate description of X’s situation as well. An adoption would be in X’s best interests. The condition in letter (b) of the third paragraph of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below) was deemed to be met.
94. Furthermore, the foster parents had been X’s emergency foster parents and later his foster parents since his emergency placement when he was three weeks old. The Board stated that it had been documented that they had provided X with excellent care and that the attachment between them and X was good and close. The foster parents had a strong wish to adopt X. In the Board’s opinion, the foster parents had demonstrated that they were suited to raise X as their own child. The conditions set out in letter (c) of the third paragraph of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act Section 4-20 (see paragraph 122 below) were deemed to be met.
95. In conclusion, the adoption would be in X’s best interests. The Board took Article 8 of the Convention into consideration when making its decision.
2. Proceedings before the City Court
(a) Introduction
96. On 19 December 2011 the first applicant appealed against the decision, claiming that the Board had made an incorrect evaluation of the evidence when deciding that she was unable to give X adequate care. She considered that it would be in X’s best interests to be returned to her and argued that her situation and her caring skills had changed. She was now married and the couple had a baby. She submitted that the child welfare services in their new municipality assisted them in taking care of the baby. Moreover, in her view, removing X from the foster home would cause him problems only in the short term; no long-term problems could be expected. X had only stayed in the foster home for a short time, and it had not been the foster parents who had expressed a wish to adopt the child but the child welfare services who had taken that initiative. The first applicant also claimed that the visits between her and X had worked satisfactorily; if the child welfare services considered the contact sessions to be inadequate it was for them, as the stronger party, to take action to ensure that they be made satisfactory.
97. The municipality opposed the appeal and submitted in their response that X, who was then three years and four months old and had lived in the foster home since he was three weeks old, had become attached to the foster home. They maintained that it would cause serious and long-lasting problems for him if he were returned at the present time. He had no recollection of the period when he had been in his mother’s care. In the municipality’s view, the first applicant’s ability to care for X had not changed since the High Court’s judgment of 22 April 2010. The visits between X and the first applicant had not worked well. She had had outbursts during the visits and had left before the time was up. Afterwards X had reacted negatively. The first applicant and her mother had manifested a very negative attitude towards the child welfare services. The first applicant had claimed that the child welfare services assisted them in taking care of the baby, whereas the truth was that they had denied the child welfare services access to their home and, accordingly, no assistance measures had been implemented. It had, admittedly, been the child welfare services that had taken the initiative to petition for adoption, but this was their duty in a case such as the present. It was better for X to be offered the firm attachment to the foster home that an adoption would give him. The municipality stressed that it was not the first applicant’s epilepsy or her IQ that gave reason to take measures, but her immaturity and actual lack of caring skills. The psychologist,K.M.,engaged by the first applicant (see paragraph 98 below) should not be allowed to give evidence. He had videotaped a contact session without the parties’ agreement; refused to send the video to the child welfare services; had never provided anything in writing, nor anything that had been quality-checked such as was the ordinary procedure for expert reports; the municipality had already reported him to the health supervision authorities and the Ethics Council of the Psychologists’ Association.
98. On 22 February 2012 the City Court, composed of one professional judge, one psychologist and one lay person, in accordance with section 36-4 of the Dispute Act (see paragraph 133 below), upheld the decision after having held a hearing which lasted from 13 to 15 February 2012 and during which twenty-one witnesses were heard. Among the witnesses called by the child welfare services were the persons responsible for supervision of the foster home and the contact sessions, S.H. from the Children’s and Young People’s Psychiatric Out-Patient Clinic, expert psychologists B.S. and M.S. (see, inter alia, paragraphs 58, 61, 62 and 63 above) and the family consultant from the parent-child institution (see, for example, paragraph 24 above). Among the witnesses called by the first applicant were members of her family, her husband and members of his family, the medical director at the hospital where the first applicant had undergone surgery in 2005 (see paragraph 72 above) and specialist in psychology K.M. (see paragraph 97 above). The first applicant was present together with her legal aid counsel.
(b) The City Court’s reasoning regarding whether X’s public care could be discontinued
99. As a preliminary point in its judgment the City Court stated that during the hearing some time had been spent shedding light on the circumstances existing prior to the decision ordering X to be taken into care. The City Court stated that it would only examine the situation prior to the placement decision in so far as necessary to assess the situation at the time of its judgment appropriately.
100. The City Court went on to note that the first applicant’s situation in some areas had improved during the last year. She had married in August 2011, her husband had a permanent job and they had a daughter, Y. It also noted that the child welfare services in the couple’s current municipality were conducting an ongoing inquiry concerning the mother’s ability to care for Y. A staff member of the child welfare services in that new municipality had testified at the oral hearing, stating that they had not received any reports of concern other than the one from the child welfare services in the first applicant’s former municipality. As part of their inquiry they had made observations at the first applicant’s home. They had observed many good aspects but also that the parents might need some help with routines and structure. The City Court found that this indicated that the child welfare services in the municipality to which the first applicant had moved considered that the parents could give Y adequate care if assisted by the child welfare services. Y was not a child with any special care needs.
101. However, on the basis of the evidence the situation was different with regard to X, whom several experts had described as a vulnerable child. The City Court referred in particular to a statement from a professional at the Children’s and Young People’s Psychiatric Out-Patient Clinic explaining that, as late as December 2011, X was easily stressed and needed a lot of quiet, security and support. If his emotional development in the future were to be sound, the carer would have to be aware of that and take it into account. When the first applicant gave evidence in court, she had clearly shown that she did not realise what challenges she would face if X were to be moved from the foster home. She could not see his vulnerability, her primary concern being that he should grow up “where he belonged”. The first applicant believed that returning him would be unproblematic and still did not understand why the child welfare services had had to intervene when he was placed in the emergency foster home. She had not wished to say anything about how she thought X was developing in the foster home. In the City Court’s view, the first applicant would not be sufficiently able to see or understand X’s special care needs, and if those needs were not met, there would be a considerable risk of abnormal development.
102. The City Court also took account of how the foster parents and supervisor had described X’s emotional reactions after contact sessions with his mother, namely, his inconsolable crying and need for a lot of sleep. During the contact sessions X had repeatedly resisted contact with the first applicant and, as the sessions had progressed, reacted with what had been described as resignation. The City Court considered that a possible reason for that was that the boy was vulnerable to inexpedient interaction and information that was not adapted to his age and functioning. The first applicant’s emotional outbursts in situations during the contact sessions, for example when X had sought out his foster mother and called her “Mummy”, were seen as potentially frightening (skremmende) and not conducive to X’s sound development.
103. The City Court held that the presentation of evidence had “clearly shown” that the “fundamental limitations” (grunnleggendebegrensningene) that had existed at the time of the High Court’s judgment still existed. Nothing had emerged during the City Court’s consideration of the case to indicate that the first applicant had developed a more positive attitude to the child welfare services or to the foster mother, beyond a statement made by her to the extent that she was willing to cooperate. She had snubbed the foster mother when she had said hello during the contact sessions and had never asked for information about X. The first applicant had left in frustration forty minutes before the last visit had been scheduled to end. Everyone who had been present during the contact sessions had described the atmosphere as unpleasant. The City Court considered that one possible reason why the first applicant’s competence at contact sessions had not improved was that she struggled so much with her own feelings and with missing X that it made her incapable of considering the child’s perspective and protecting him from her own emotional outbursts. An improvement was contingent upon her understanding X and his needs and on her being willing to work on herself and her own weaknesses. The first applicant had not shown any positive developments in her competence in contact situations throughout the three years she had had rights of contact. The fact that her parents had a remarkably negative attitude to the municipal child welfare services did not make it any easier for her.
104. The first applicant had claimed in court that she was a victim of injustice and that she would fight until X was returned to her. To shed light on her own situation, she had chosen to post her story on the Internet in June 2011 with a photograph of herself and X. In that article and several comments posted during the autumn of 2011, she had made serious accusations against the child welfare services and the foster parents – accusations which she had admitted in court were untrue. The first applicant did not consider that public exposure and repeated legal proceedings could be harmful for the child in the long term.
105. The City Court noted that the psychologist K.M. (seeparagraphs 97-98 above), who had examined and treated the first applicant, had testified that she did not meet the criteria for any psychiatric diagnosis. He had counselled her in connection with the trauma inflicted on her by having her child taken away. The goal of the treatment had been to make the first applicant feel like a good mother. He believed that the previous assessments of the first applicant’s ability to provide care had at that time been incorrect, and argued before the City Court that the best outcome for X would be to be returned to his biological mother. However, the City Court stated that the psychologist K.M.’s arguments had been based on research conducted in the 1960s, and found them to be incompatible with recent infant research. It noted that the other experts who had testified in court, including the psychologists B.S. and M.S., had advised against returning X to his mother, as this would be very harmful for him.
106. In conclusion thus far, the City Court agreed with the County Social Welfare Board that the first applicant had not changed in such a way as to indicate that it was highly probable that she would be able to provide X with proper care. It endorsed the Board’s grounds, holding that the first applicant’s clear limitations as a carer could not be mitigated by an adapted transitional scheme, assistance measures or support from her network. It did not find reason to consider other arguments regarding her ability to provide care in more detail, as returning X to her was in any case not an option owing to the serious problems it would cause him to be moved from the foster home. The City Court agreed at this point with the Board in its finding that X had developed such an attachment to his foster parents, his foster brother and the general foster home environment that it would lead to serious problems if he had to move. X’s primary security and sense of belonging were in the foster home and he perceived the foster parents as his psychological parents. On those grounds the care order could not be revoked.
(c) The City Court’s reasoning regarding whether parental responsibilities for X should be withdrawn and consent to his adoption given
107. Turning to the issues of withdrawal of parental responsibilities and consent to adoption, the City Court stated at the outset that where a care order had been issued, it was in principle sufficient for removal of parental responsibilities that this be in the child’s best interests. At the same time, it had been emphasised in several Supreme Court judgments that removal of parental responsibilities was a very invasive decision and that therefore strong reasons were required for making such a decision (see, inter alia, paragraph 125 below). The requirements in respect of adoption were even more stringent. However, the questions of withdrawal of parental responsibilities and consent to adoption had to be seen in conjunction, since the primary reason for withdrawing parental responsibilities would be to facilitate adoption. The court also took into consideration that if the first applicant retained her parental responsibilities, she might engage in conflicts in the future about the rights that such responsibility entailed, such as exposing the child on the Internet.
108. The City Court went on to declare that adoption could only be granted if the four conditions in the third paragraph of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act were met (see paragraph 122 below), and endorsed the Board’s grounds for finding that such was the case regarding the criteria in letters (a), namely that it had to be regarded as probable that the first applicant would be permanently unable to provide X with proper care or that X had become so attached to his foster home and the environment there that, on the basis of an overall assessment, removing him could lead to serious problems for him; (c), namely that the persons applying for adoption had been X’s foster parents and had shown themselves fit to bring him up as their own child; and (d), namely that the conditions for granting an adoption under the Adoption Act (see paragraph 132 below) were satisfied; as to letter (d), further documents had also been submitted to the court. In the present case the decisive factor was therefore whether adoption was in X’s best interests under letter (b), and whether consent for adoption should be given on the basis of an overall assessment. Regarding that assessment, several Supreme Court judgments had stated that strong reasons must exist for consenting to adoption against the will of a biological parent. There must be a high degree of certainty that adoption would be in the child’s best interests. It was also clear that the decision must be based not only on a concrete assessment, but also on general experience from child-psychology research. Reference was made to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Rt. 2007, page 561 (see paragraph 125 below).
109. Applying the general principles to the instant case, the City Court first noted that X was at that time three and a half years old and had lived in his foster home since he was three weeks old. His fundamental attachment in the social and psychological sense was to his foster parents, and it would in any event be a long-term placement. X was moreover a vulnerable child, and adoption would help to strengthen his sense of belonging with his foster parents, whom he regarded as his parents. It was particularly important to a child’s development to experience a secure and sound attachment to its psychological parents. Adoption would give X a sense of belonging and security in the years ahead for longer than the period a foster-home relationship would last. Practical considerations also indicated that persons who had care and control of a child and who in reality functioned as its parents should carry out the functions that derived from parental responsibilities.
110. The City Court noted that adoption meant that the legal ties to the biological family were severed. In its opinion, X, despite spending the first three weeks of his life with his mother and having many contact sessions, had not bonded psychologically with her. That had remained the case even though he had been told at a later stage that the first applicant had given birth to him.
111. Furthermore, the court took account of the fact that even if no further contact sessions were organised, the foster parents had taken a positive view of letting X contact his biological parent if he so wished.
112. Based on an overall assessment, the City Court found that it would be in X’s best interests for the first applicant’s parental responsibilities to be withdrawn and for the foster parents to be allowed to adopt him. The court believed that particularly weighty reasons existed for consenting to adoption in the present case.
113. The City Court stated, lastly, that since it had decided that X should be adopted, it was unable to decide on contact rights for the first applicant, since that question would be up to the foster parents to decide. It mentioned that section 4-20a of the Child Welfare Act provided a legal basis for determining rights to contact subsequent to adoption (see paragraph 122 below, where that provision is reiterated, and paragraph 128 below, on the “open adoption” system). The City Court was not competent, however, to examine or determine such rights since its competence was dependent on a party to the case having made a request to that effect. In the instant case, neither of the parties had done so.
3. Proceedings before the High Court and the Supreme Court
114. On 14 March 2012 the first applicant, through her counsel, appealed against the judgment, claiming that the City Court had evaluated the evidence incorrectly when concluding that the first applicant was permanently unable to care for X. Counsel stated that the High Court should appoint an expert to assess the first applicant’s husband’s help to mother and child, and the first applicant’s caring skills at the time. In response to a letter from the High Court, dated 16 March 2012, counsel also argued that the City Court should have obtained an assessment by an expert witness concerning her and her husband’s ability to provide adequate care.
115. In their response, dated 26 April 2012, to the first applicant’s arguments that an expert assessment was necessary in the light of her new situation, the municipality stated, inter alia, that they had made several requests to be allowed to get to know the first applicant’s husband (see, for example, paragraph 85 above), and that the first applicant had consistently chosen to disregard those requests. Since the child welfare services responsible for X did not have any insights into the family’s situation in their new municipality, they could only rely on the information they had received from the child welfare services in that municipality, from which they could not infer that the first applicant could take care of X.
116. On 12 June 2012 the first applicant, who had then instructed new counsel, submitted to the High Court a statement from the child welfare services in her new municipality. It emerged from the statement, dated 21 March 2012, that those child welfare services had visited the family five times, each time for one and a half hours. They considered that the family needed assistance in the form of guidance with respect to interaction with their baby, which they could obtain from the local “baby team” (spedbarnsteamet) as well as a social worker (miljøterapeut) in the home, who could help with routines, structure and cleanliness. The first applicant’s counsel also argued that the foster mother’s presence during the contact sessions had disturbed (virketforstyrrendepå) their implementation.
117. On 23 August 2012 counsel for the first applicant submitted a report from the child welfare services in the first applicant’s new municipality, dated 5 June 2012. In the report it was stated, inter alia, that the parents had stated early on that they would accept advice and guidance if the child welfare services so recommended. The mother had stated that she had had a bad experience with the “baby team”, but that she could accept help from them if another person on the team was appointed to be her contact. In the report it was further stated that the child welfare services considered that it had observed two parents who showed that they wanted the best for their child. The first applicant played with the child, talked to her and engaged actively with her. On the basis of all the information contained in the observations, the child welfare services considered that the parents had to work on routines, cleanliness and involvement with the child. The parents accepted that a social worker be assigned to help them in the home.
118. In the meantime, on 22 August 2012, the High Court had decided not to grant leave to appeal because the conditions in section 36-10 of the Dispute Act (see paragraph 133 below) had not been met. The High Court stated that the case did not raise any new legal issues of importance for the uniform application of the law. With regard to whether new information had emerged, the court noted that the assessment dated 21 March 2012 had been made by, inter alia, a person who had testified before the City Court and that the document would not change the outcome of the case. The first applicant’s caring skills had been thoroughly examined in connection with the Board’s processing of the case and no new information had emerged that indicated changes in that respect. Moreover, the City Court’s reasons were convincing and the High Court observed that the first applicant had not asked for an expert witness to be heard in the City Court and had not given any reasons as to why it was necessary to appoint an expert before the High Court. As had just been mentioned, there was no new information that indicated any changes in her caring skills. Thus there were no serious flaws in the City Court’s judgment or procedure and no reasons for granting leave to appeal.
119. On 24 September 2012 the first applicant appealed against the decision to the Supreme Court. She submitted an assessment concerning the experience of the social worker in respect of her work with the family and their care for Y (see paragraph 117 above), dated 14 August 2012. In that document it was concluded that a positive development had started and that the social worker should continue to assist the family. The first applicant argued that the City Court had relied more on older documents than on the circumstances at the time of its judgment and had disregarded the fact that its judgment would have the effect of depriving Y of contact with X. She further repeated her argument that the foster mother’s presence had disturbed the contact sessions (see paragraph 116 above) and maintained that the child welfare services had not properly organised the sessions.
120. In its reply of 4 October 2012 the municipality stated, inter alia, that it was positive that the first applicant and her husband had managed to avail themselves of the guidance received from the social worker, but that X was a vulnerable child whereas Y did not face similar challenges. As to the first applicant’s argument that the City Court had not based its decision on the circumstances at the time of its judgment, the municipality pointed to the fact that five out of the eight witnesses they had called, and all the witnesses called by the first applicant, had given evidence before the City Court on the circumstances as they were at that time. They further stated that Y would not be deprived of contact with X as long as the first applicant accepted X’s foster home and contributed to making it a good experience for the children. As to Y’s father, it was argued that it had emerged from his testimony before the Board and City Court that he knew little about X’s placement in care and about the challenges surrounding the contact sessions. The municipality also submitted that they would argue before the Supreme Court that X’s right to respect for his family life was also protected by Article 8 of the Convention and that his need for stability in the foster home and good care would be best ensured if he were adopted.
121. On 15 October 2012 the Supreme Court Appeals Board (Høyesterettsankeutvalg) dismissed the first applicant’s appeal against the High Court’s decision.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. The Child Welfare Act
122. The relevant sections of the Child Welfare Act of 17 July 1992 (barnevernloven) provide:
Section 4-1. Consideration of the child’s best interests
“When applying the provisions of this chapter, decisive importance shall be attached to finding measures which are in the child’s best interests.
This includes attaching importance to giving the child stable and good contact with adults and continuity in the care provided.”
Section 4-6. Interim orders in emergencies
“If a child is without care because the parents are ill or for other reasons, the child welfare services shall implement such assistance as is immediately required. Such measures shall not be maintained against the will of the parents.
If there is a risk that a child will suffer material harm by remaining at home, the head of the child welfare administration or the prosecuting authority may immediately make an interim care order without the consent of the parents.
In such a case the head of the child welfare administration may also make an interim order under section 4-19.
If an order has been made under the second paragraph, an application for measures as mentioned in section 7-11 shall be sent to the county social welfare board as soon as possible, and within six weeks at the latest, but within two weeks if it is a matter of measures under section 4-24.
If the matter has not been sent to the county social welfare board within the time-limits mentioned in the fourth paragraph, the order shall lapse.”
Section 4-12. Care orders
“A care order may be issued
(a) if there are serious deficiencies in the daily care received by the child, or serious deficiencies in terms of the personal contact and security needed by a child of his or her age and development,
(b) if the parents fail to ensure that a child who is ill, disabled or in special need of assistance receives the treatment and training required,
(c) if the child is mistreated or subjected to other serious abuse at home, or
(d) if it is highly probable that the child’s health or development may be seriously harmed because the parents are unable to take adequate responsibility for the child.
An order may only be made under the first paragraph when necessary due to the child’s current situation. Hence, such an order may not be made if satisfactory conditions can be created for the child by assistance measures under section 4-4 or by measures under section 4-10 or section 4-11.
An order under the first paragraph shall be made by the county social welfare board under the provisions of Chapter 7.”
Section 4-19. Contact rights.Secret address
“Unless otherwise provided, children and parents are entitled to have contact with each other.
When a care order has been made, the county social welfare board shall determine the extent of contact, but may, for the sake of the child, also decide that there should be no contact. The county social welfare board may also decide that the parents should not be entitled to know the child’s whereabouts.
...
The private parties cannot request that a case regarding contact be dealt with by the county social welfare board if the case has been dealt with by the county social welfare board or a court of law in the preceding twelve months.
...”
Section 4-20.Withdrawal of parental responsibilities.Adoption
“If the county social welfare board has made a care order for a child, it may also decide that the parents must be stripped of all parental responsibilities. If, as a result of the parents being stripped of parental responsibilities, the child is left without a guardian, the county social welfare board shall as soon as possible take steps to have a new guardian appointed for the child.
Where an order has been made withdrawing parental responsibilities, the county social welfare board may give its consent for a child to be adopted by persons other than the parents.
Consent may be given if
(a) it must be regarded as probable that the parents will be permanently unable to provide the child with proper care or the child has become so attached to persons and the environment where he or she is living that, on the basis of an overall assessment, removing the child may lead to serious problems for him or her, and
(b) adoption would be in the child’s best interests, and
(c) the persons applying for adoption have been the child’s foster parents and have shown themselves fit to bring up the child as their own, and
(d) the conditions for granting an adoption under the Adoption Act are satisfied.
Where the county social welfare board consents to adoption, the Ministry [of Children and Equality] shall issue an adoption order.”
Section 4-20a. Contact between the child and his or her biological parents after adoption [added in 2010]
“Where the county social welfare board issues an adoption order under section 4-20, it shall, if any of the parties have requested it, at the same time consider whether there shall be contact between the child and his or her biological parents after the adoption has been carried out. If limited contact after adoption in such cases is in the child’s best interests, and the persons applying for adoption consent to such contact, the county social welfare board shall make an order for such contact. In such case, the county social welfare board must at the same time determine the amount of contact.
...
A contact order may only be reviewed if special reasons justify doing so. Special reasons may include the child’s opposition to contact or the biological parents’ failure to comply with the contact order.
...”
Section 4-21. Revocation of care orders
“The county social welfare board shall revoke a care order where it is highly probable that the parents will be able to provide the child with proper care. The decision shall nonetheless not be revoked if the child has become so attached to persons and the environment where he or she is living that, on the basis of an overall assessment, removing the child may lead to serious problems for him or her. Before a care order is revoked, the child’s foster parents shall be entitled to state their opinion.
The parties may not request that a case concerning revocation of a care order be dealt with by the county social welfare board if the case has been dealt with by the county social welfare board or a court of law in the preceding twelve months. If a request for revocation of the previous order or judgment was not upheld with reference to section 4-21, first paragraph, second sentence, new proceedings may only be requested where documentary evidence is provided to show that significant changes have taken place in the child’s situation.”
Section 7-5. The board’s composition in individual cases
“In individual cases, the county social welfare board shall consist of a chairman/chairwoman, one member of the ordinary committee and one member of the expert committee. When necessary due to the complexity of the case, the chairman/chairwoman may decide that the board, in addition to the chairman/chairwoman, shall consist of two members of the ordinary committee and two members of the expert committee.
If the parties consent thereto, the chairman/chairwoman may decide cases as mentioned in the first paragraph alone unless this is precluded by due regard for the satisfactory hearing of the case.
Where the case concerns a request for an alteration in a previous decision/order or judgment, the chairman/chairwoman may decide the case alone if this is unobjectionable with due regard for the subject of the case, its complexity, the need for professional expertise, and a proper hearing of the case.
Where the case concerns an extension of a placement order made by the county social welfare board under section 4-29, the chairman/chairwoman shall decide the case alone.”
B. Case-law under the Child Welfare Act
123. The Supreme Court has delivered several judgments on the Child Welfare Act. Of relevance in the present context is its judgment of 23 May 1991 (Rt.1991, page 557), in which the Supreme Court stated that since withdrawal of parental responsibilitieswith a view to adoption involves permanently severing the legal ties between the child and its biological parents and other relatives, strong reasons have to be present in order for a decision of that sort to be taken. It emphasised, moreover, that a decision to withdraw parental responsibilitiesmust not be taken without first having carried out a thorough examination and consideration of the long-term consequences of alternative measures, based on the concrete circumstances of each case.
124. In a later judgment, of 10 January 2001 (Rt. 2001, page 14), the Supreme Court considered that the legal criterion “strong reasons” in this context should be interpreted in line with the Court’s case-law, in particular Johansen v. Norway, no. 17383/90, § 78, 7 August 1996. This meant, according to the Supreme Court, that consent to adoption contrary to the wish of the biological parents could only be given in “extraordinary circumstances”.
125. The above case-law was developed further, inter alia, in the Supreme Court’s judgment of 20 April 2007 (Rt. 2007, page 561), after the Court had declared a second application by the applicant in the above‑mentioned case of Johansen v. Norway inadmissible (see Johansen v. Norway (dec.), 12750/02, 10 October 2002). The Supreme Court reiterated that the requirement that adoption be in the child’s best interests, as set out in section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 above), meant that “strong reasons” (sterkegrunner) must be present in order for consent to adoption to be given contrary to the wish of the biological parents. In addition, the Supreme Court emphasised that a decision of this kind had to be based on the concrete circumstances of each case, but also take account of general experience, including experience from research into child psychology or child psychiatry. The Supreme Court examined the general principles in the case-law of the Strasbourg Court and concluded that the domestic law was in conformity with those principles: an adoption could only be authorised where “particularly weighty reasons” were present. That case was subsequently brought before the Court, which found no violation of Article 8 of the Convention (see Aune, cited above, § 37, for a recapitulation of the Supreme Court’s analysis of the general principles developed in the case-law of the Supreme Court and the Court).
126. The Supreme Court again set out the general principles applicable to adoption cases in a judgment of 30 January 2015 (Rt. 2015, page 110). It reiterated that forced adoptions had a severe impact and generally inflicted profound emotional pain on the parents. Family ties were protected by Article 8 of the Convention and Article 102 of the Constitution. Adoption was also an intrusive measure for the child and could, under Article 21 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 134 below), accordingly only be decided when in his or her best interests. However, where there were decisive factors from the child’s point of view in favour of adoption, the parents’ interests would have to yield, as had been provided for in Article 104 of the Constitution and Article 3 § 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (ibid.). Reference was made to Aune, cited above, § 66, where the Court had stated that an adoption could only be authorised where justified by “an overriding requirement pertaining to the child’s best interests”, which corresponded to the standard of “particularly weighty reasons” as established by the Supreme Court in the judgment that had been scrutinised by the European Court of Human Rights in Aune (see paragraph 125 above).
127. Parliament had examined, and a majority had supported, a proposal from the Government (Ot.prp. no. 69 (2008-2009)) discussing the issue of a considerable decline in adoptions in Norway. In the proposal it had been suggested that the child welfare services had developed a reluctance to propose adoptions in the aftermath of the Court’s finding of a violation in Johansen, cited above, even though research had shown that it was in a child’s best interests to be adopted rather than experience a continuous life in foster care until reaching their majority. The Supreme Court interpreted the proposal as emphasising that the child welfare services should ensure that adoption would actually be proposed where appropriate, but that the proposal did not imply that the legal threshold, under Article 8 of the Convention, had changed. The Supreme Court added that the general information obtained from research on adoption was relevant to the concrete assessment of whether an adoption should be authorised in an individual case.
128. The Supreme Court also examined the implication of amendments of the rules concerning contact between the child and the biological parents, which had been coined as an “open adoption” in the above proposal. The rules had been incorporated into section 4-20a of the Child Welfare Act, which had been in force since 2010. They required that an “open adoption” be in the child’s best interests and that the adoptive parents consent (see paragraph 122 above). It observed that the legislature’s reasons for introducing the system of “open adoptions” had been to secure the child stable and predictable surroundings in which to grow up, while at the same time ensuring some contact with its biological parents where this would be in the child’s best interests. The child would thus have all the benefits of the adoption, while still having contact with its biological parents. The Supreme Court found that the introduction of the system of “open adoptions” had not meant that the legal threshold for authorising adoptions had been lowered. However, in some cases further contact between the child and the biological parents could mitigate some of the arguments against adoption. Reference was made to Aune, cited above, § 78.
129. The Supreme Court considered anew the general principles concerning adoption in a judgment of 11 September 2018. The Supreme Court observed, inter alia, that the European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Mohamed Hasan v. Norway, no. 27496/15, § 148, 26 April 2018, had stressed the strict proceduralrequirements that must be met by the domestic decision-making authorities in cases concerning adoption. When summarising the subject of its review, the Supreme Court stated that the best interests of the child were the most important and weighty concerns when decidingthe adoption issue. As adoption was such a radical and irreversible measure, it could only be justified – from the child’s point of view – by particularly weighty reasons. These grounds had to be balanced against the consequences of adoption for the child’s contact with itsbiological parents in the individual case. Where there had been little or no contactbetween the parents and the child, the concern for protection of their family life would begiven less weight than in cases where a more normal family life had existed.
130. The current position in respect of knowledge and research on adopted children had been studied by a court-appointed expertand presented in an appendix to his statement to the Supreme Court. The expert believed that the summary in the Supreme Court’s judgment of 20 April 2007 (Rt. 2007, page 561; see paragraph 125 above) was still accurate. Based on an updated study of relevant research and professional experienceas a psychologist, the expert had stated the following in the case at hand:
“Children in long-term foster care who are adopted undergo better psychosocialdevelopment than children in a similar situation who are not adopted. It is the durability ofthe child’s sense of belonging that seems to be essential.”
131. The expert had specified in his statement before the Supreme Court that this was a difficult areaof research, one of the reasons being that few forced adoptions were carried out annually inNorway. And, as had been emphasised in the Supreme Court’s judgment of 20 April 2007 (Rt. 2007 page 561; see paragraph 125 above), aspecific, individual assessment had to be made in each case. But, as emphasised in thesame judgment, such a research- and experienced-based perception of what was generallybest for the child, had to be given particular weight. Also, the abovementioned (see paragraph 127) proposal from the Government (Ot.prp. no. 69 (2008-2009)) had stressed that research showed that “... for some children, adoptionmay give a safer and more predictable upbringing than long-term foster care”.
C. The Adoption Act
132. The Adoption Act of 28 February 1986, in force at the relevant time, contained the following relevant provisions:
Section 2
“An adoption order must only be issued where it can be assumed that the adoption will be to the benefit of the child [(tilgagn for barnet)]. It is further required that the person applying for adoption either wishes to foster or has fostered the child, or that there is another special reason for the adoption.”
Section 12
“Adoptive parents shall, as soon as is advisable, tell the adopted child that he or she is adopted.
When the child has reached 18 years of age, he or she is entitled to be informed by the Ministry [of Children and Equality] of the identity of his or her biological parents.”
Section 13
“On adoption, the adopted child and his or her heirs shall have the same legal status as if the adopted child had been the adoptive parents’ biological child, unless otherwise provided by section 14 or another statute. At the same time, the child’s legal relationship to his or her original family shall cease, unless otherwise provided by special statute.
Where one spouse has adopted a child of the other spouse or cohabitant, the said child shall have the same legal status in relation to both spouses as if he or she were their joint child. The same applies to children adopted pursuant to section 5 b, second, third and fourth paragraphs.”
Section 14 a. Contact after adoption
“In the case of adoptions carried out as a result of decisions pursuant to section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act, the effects of the adoption that follow from section 13 of the present Act shall apply, subject to any limitations that may have been imposed by a decision pursuant to section 4-20 a of the Child Welfare Act regarding contact between the child and his or her biological parents.”
D. The Dispute Act
133. The first paragraph of section 36-4 and the third paragraph of section 36-10 of the Dispute Act of 17 June 2005 (tvisteloven) read:
Section 36-4 The composition of the court. Expert panel
“(1) The district court shall sit with two lay judges, one of whom shall be an ordinary lay judge and the other an expert. In special cases, the court may sit with two professional judges and three lay judges, one or two of whom shall be experts.”
Section 36-10 Appeal
“(3) An appeal against the judgment of the district court in cases concerning the County Board’s decisions pursuant to the Child Welfare Act requires the leave of the court of appeal.
Leave can only be granted if
a) the appeal concerns issues whose significance extends beyond the scope of the current case,
b) there are grounds to rehear the case because new information has emerged,
c) the ruling of the district court or the procedure in the district court is seriously flawed [(vesentligesvakhetervedtingrettensavgjørelseellersaksbehandling)], or
d) the judgment provides for coercive measures that were not approved by the County Board.”
III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW MATERIALS
A. The United Nations
134. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, concluded in New York on 20 November 1989, contains, inter alia, the following provisions:
Article 3
“1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
Article 9
“1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the child’s place of residence.
2. In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all interested parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their views known.
3. States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests.
4. Where such separation results from any action initiated by a State Party, such as the detention, imprisonment, exile, deportation or death (including death arising from any cause while the person is in the custody of the State) of one or both parents or of the child, that State Party shall, upon request, provide the parents, the child or, if appropriate, another member of the family with the essential information concerning the whereabouts of the absent member(s) of the family unless the provision of the information would be detrimental to the well-being of the child. States Parties shall further ensure that the submission of such a request shall of itself entail no adverse consequences for the person(s) concerned.”
Article 18
“1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern.
2. For the purpose of guaranteeing and promoting the rights set forth in the present Convention, States Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure the development of institutions, facilities and services for the care of children.
3. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that children of working parents have the right to benefit from child-care services and facilities for which they are eligible.”
Article 20
“1. A child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled to special protection and assistance provided by the State.
2. States Parties shall in accordance with their national laws ensure alternative care for such a child.
3. Such care could include, inter alia, foster placement, kafalah of Islamic law, adoption or if necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of children. When considering solutions, due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background.”
Article 21
“States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall:
(a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is authorized only by competent authorities who determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures and on the basis of all pertinent and reliable information, that the adoption is permissible in view of the child’s status concerning parents, relatives and legal guardians and that, if required, the persons concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption on the basis of such counselling as may be necessary;
...”
135. In its General Comment no. 7 (2005) on implementing child rights in early childhood, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child sought to encourage the States Parties to recognise that young children were holders of all rights enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and that early childhood was a critical period for the realisation of those rights. In particular, the Committee referred to the best interests of the child:
“13. Article 3 sets out the principle that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration in all actions concerning children. By virtue of their relative immaturity, young children are reliant on responsible authorities to assess and represent their rights and best interests in relation to decisions and actions that affect their well-being, while taking account of their views and evolving capacities. The principle of best interests appears repeatedly within the Convention (including in articles 9, 18, 20 and 21, which are most relevant to early childhood). The principle of best interests applies to all actions concerning children and requires active measures to protect their rights and promote their survival, growth, and well-being, as well as measures to support and assist parents and others who have day-to-day responsibility for realizing children’s rights:
(a) Best interests of individual children. All decision-making concerning a child’s care, health, education, etc. must take account of the best interests principle, including decisions by parents, professionals and others responsible for children. States parties are urged to make provisions for young children to be represented independently in all legal proceedings by someone who acts for the child’s interests, and for children to be heard in all cases where they are capable of expressing their opinions or preferences.”
136. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1), 29 May 2013, mentions the following as elements “to be taken into account when assessing the child’s best interests”:
“(a) The child’s views
...
(b) The child’s identity
...
(c) Preservation of the family environment and maintaining relations
...
(d) Care, protection and safety of the child
...
(e) Situation of vulnerability
...
(f) The child’s right to health
...
(g) The child’s right to education
...”
Under the headings “Balancing the elements in the best-interests assessment” and “Procedural safeguards to guarantee the implementation of the child’s best interests”, inter alia, the following is included:
“84. In the best-interests assessment, one has to consider that the capacities of the child will evolve. Decision-makers should therefore consider measures that can be revised or adjusted accordingly, instead of making definitive and irreversible decisions. To do this, they should not only assess the physical, emotional, educational and other needs at the specific moment of the decision, but should also consider the possible scenarios of the child’s development, and analyse them in the short and long term. In this context, decisions should assess continuity and stability of the child’s present and future situation.
...
85. To ensure the correct implementation of the child’s right to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration, some child-friendly procedural safeguards must be put in place and followed. As such, the concept of the child’s best interests is a rule of procedure ... .
...
87. States must put in place formal processes, with strict procedural safeguards, designed to assess and determine the child’s best interests for decisions affecting the child, including mechanisms for evaluating the results. States must develop transparent and objective processes for all decisions made by legislators, judges or administrative authorities, especially in areas which directly affect the child or children.”
B. The Council of Europe
137. The Council of Europe’s Revised Convention on the Adoption of Children of 27 November 2008 contains, inter alia, the following provisions:
Article 3 – Validity of an adoption
“An adoption shall be valid only if it is granted by a court or an administrative authority (hereinafter the ‘competent authority’).”
Article 4 – Granting of an adoption
“1. The competent authority shall not grant an adoption unless it is satisfied that the adoption will be in the best interests of the child.
2. In each case the competent authority shall pay particular attention to the importance of the adoption providing the child with a stable and harmonious home.”
Article 5 – Consents to an adoption
“1. Subject to paragraphs 2 to 5 of this article, an adoption shall not be granted unless at least the following consents to the adoption have been given and not withdrawn:
a the consent of the mother and the father; or if there is neither father nor mother to consent, the consent of any person or body who is entitled to consent in their place;
b the consent of the child considered by law as having sufficient understanding; a child shall be considered as having sufficient understanding on attaining an age which shall be prescribed by law and shall not be more than 14 years;
c the consent of the spouse or registered partner of the adopter.
2. The persons whose consent is required for adoption must have been counselled as may be necessary and duly informed of the effects of their consent, in particular whether or not an adoption will result in the termination of the legal relationship between the child and his or her family of origin. The consent must have been given freely, in the required legal form, and expressed or evidenced in writing.
3. The competent authority shall not dispense with the consent or overrule the refusal to consent of any person or body mentioned in paragraph 1 save on exceptional grounds determined by law. However, the consent of a child who suffers from a disability preventing the expression of a valid consent may be dispensed with.
4. If the father or mother is not a holder of parental responsibility in respect of the child, or at least of the right to consent to an adoption, the law may provide that it shall not be necessary to obtain his or her consent.
5. A mother’s consent to the adoption of her child shall be valid when it is given at such time after the birth of the child, not being less than six weeks, as may be prescribed by law, or, if no such time has been prescribed, at such time as, in the opinion of the competent authority, will have enabled her to recover sufficiently from the effects of giving birth to the child.
6. For the purposes of this Convention ‘father’ and ‘mother’ mean the persons who according to law are the parents of the child.”
138. The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 2049 on 22 April 2015. The Resolution includes, inter alia, the following:
“5. Financial and material poverty should never be the only justification for the removal of a child from parental care, but should be seen as a sign for the need to provide appropriate support to the family. Moreover, showing that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his or her upbringing is not enough to remove a child from his or her parents, and even less of a reason to sever family ties completely.
...
8. The Assembly thus recommends that member States:
...
8.2. put into place laws, regulations and procedures which truly put the best interest of the child first in removal, placement and reunification decisions;
8.3. continue and strengthen their efforts to ensure that all relevant procedures are conducted in a child-friendly manner, and that the children concerned have their views taken into account according to their age and level of maturity;
8.4. make visible and root out the influence of prejudice and discrimination in removal decisions, including by appropriately training all professionals involved;
8.5. support families with the necessary means (including financially, materially, socially and psychologically) in order to avoid unwarranted removal decisions in the first place, and in order to increase the percentage of successful family reunifications after care;
8.6. ensure that any (temporary) placement of a child in alternative care, where it has become necessary as a measure of last resort, be accompanied by measures aimed at the child’s subsequent reintegration into the family, including the facilitation of appropriate contact between the child and his or her family, and be subject to periodic review;
8.7. avoid, except in exceptional circumstances provided for in law and subject to effective (timely and comprehensive) judicial review, severing family ties completely, removing children from parental care at birth, basing placement decisions on the effluxion of time, and having recourse to adoptions without parental consent;
8.8. ensure that the personnel involved in removal and placement decisions are guided by appropriate criteria and standards (if possible in a multidisciplinary way), are suitably qualified and regularly trained, have sufficient resources to take decisions in an appropriate time frame, and are not overburdened with too great a caseload;
...
8.10. ensure that, except in urgent cases, initial removal decisions are based only on court orders, in order to avoid unwarranted removal decisions and to prevent biased assessments.”
139. The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 2232 (“Striking a balance between the best interest of the child and the need to keep families together”) on 28 June 2018. The Resolution states, inter alia:
“4. The Assembly reaffirms that the best interest of the child should be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, the implementation of this principle in practice depends on the context and the specific circumstances. It is sometimes easier to say what is not in the best interests of children: coming to serious harm at the hands of their parents, or being removed from a family without good cause.
5. It is with this caveat in mind that the Assembly reiterates the recommendations it made in Resolution 2049 (2015) and recommends that Council of Europe member States focus on the process in order to achieve the best results for children and their families alike. Member States should:
...
5.2. give the necessary support to families in a timely and positive manner with a view to avoiding the necessity for removal decisions in the first place, and to facilitating family reunification when possible and in the child’s best interest: this includes the need to build better collaboration with parents, with a view to avoiding possible mistakes based on misunderstandings, stereotyping and discrimination, mistakes which can be difficult to correct later on once the trust has gone;
...
5.5. seek to keep at a minimum the practices of removing children from parental care at birth, basing placement decisions on the effluxion of time, and adoptions without parental consent, and only in extreme cases. Where in the child’s best interests, efforts should be made to maintain family ties;
5.6. where the decision to remove a child from their family has been made, ensure that:
5.6.1. such decisions are a proportionate response to a credible and verified assessment by competent authorities subject to judicial review that there is a real risk of actual and serious harm to the children involved;
5.6.2. a detailed decision is provided to the parents and a copy of the decision is also retained, that the decision is explained in an age-appropriate way to the child or that the child is otherwise granted access to the decision, and that the determination outlines the circumstances that led to the decision and provides reasons for the removal;
5.6.3. removing children is a last resort and should be done only for the necessary period of time;
5.6.4. siblings are kept together in care in all cases where it is not against the best interest of the child;
5.6.5. as long as it is in the best interest of the child, children are cared for within the wider family unit so as to minimise the disruption of family bonds for the children involved;
5.6.6. regular consideration is given to family reunification and/or family access as is appropriate taking into account the best interests and views of the child;
5.6.7. visitation and contact arrangements facilitate the maintenance of the family bond and work towards reunification unless manifestly inappropriate;”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
140. The applicants complained that the refusal to discontinue the public care of X and the deprivation ofthe first applicant’sparental responsibilities for him andthe authorisation granted to his foster parents to adopt himhad violated their right to respect for family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, which reads:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
141. The Government contested that submission.
A. Preliminary issues before the Grand Chamber
1. Scope of the case before the Grand Chamber
(a) Temporal scope
(i) The parties’ submissions
142. The Government maintained that it fell outside the Grand Chamber’s jurisdiction to consider whether the domestic proceedings relating to the taking into care of X and the first applicant’s contact rights –prior to those relating to the authorisation of adoption – had complied with Article 8 of the Convention. Contrary to the requirements in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies and to comply with the six-month time-limit with respect to the emergency care order of 17 October 2008, the care order of 2 March 2009 and the decisions on contact rights. In any event, the application to the Court of 12 April 2013 had been directed only at the measures upheld by the Supreme Court decision of 15 October 2012, that is, the removal of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption. The Chamber minority had overstepped the Court’s competence and disregarded the scope of the applicants’ application in order to voice abstract criticism against an entire child welfare system.It was not open to the applicants to expand the case through their referral request to the Grand Chamber. While the latter could have regard to prior proceedings, this was only to the extent that they had been referred to and relied upon in the decision relating to the removal of parental responsibilities and the authorisation of adoption.
143. Disagreeing with the Government’s position, the applicants submitted that the Grand Chamber had competence to examine not only the removal of parental responsibilities and the authorisation of adoption but also the initial emergency decisions, the decisions relating to X’s being taken into public care and those relating to the first applicant’s contact rights. Its jurisdiction comprised the entirety of the domestic proceedings – even if it were ultimately to finda violation only in respect of a part of these. The consent to adoption had to be considered as the final decision in a sequence of events that had started with the emergency decision. The decision to remove parental responsibilities and to authorise adoption had been a consequence of the lack of attachment between X and the first applicant, which in turn had been a direct result of the decisions of 2 March 2009 and 22 April 2010 on long-term public care, in which the first applicant’s contact rights had been considerably and unjustifiably reduced.
(ii) The Court’s considerations
144. The Court reiterates that the content and scope of the “case” referred to the Grand Chamber are delimited by the Chamber’s decision on admissibility. This means that the Grand Chamber cannot examine those parts of the application which have been declared inadmissible by the Chamber (see, for example, Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], nos. 10211/12 and 27505/14, § 100, 4 December 2018). In the present case, the Grand Chamber notes that the Chamber declared admissible the complaint lodged by the applicants (see paragraph 2 above), which concerned the deprivation of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption first decided by the County Social Welfare Board on 8 December 2011 and then upheld on appeal (see, inter alia, paragraphs 3, 76, 93, 94 and 111 of the Chamber’s judgment).
145. The Grand Chamber observes that X was taken into emergency foster care in 2008 (see paragraphs 20-22 above) and into ordinary foster care following the decision of the County Social Welfare Board of 2 March 2009 (see paragraphs 38-46 above). In the same decision the first applicant was granted limited contact rights (see paragraphs 42-46 above). She appealed against that decision,which was ultimately upheld by the High Court in its judgment of 22 April 2010 (see paragraphs 65-75 above),again granting the first applicant limited contact rights (see paragraph 75 above). As the applicant did not avail herself of the possibility of lodging an appeal, the High Court’s judgment became final on the expiry of the time‑limit for doing so.
146. In their request for referral to the Grand Chamber, the applicants sought to expand their complaints to encompass also the above proceedings from 2008 to 2010.These grievances did not, however, form part of their application as it was declared admissible by the Chamber. They were in any event filed for the first time before the Grand Chamber more than six months after the last domestic decisions taken in the proceedings in question and, as mentioned above (see paragraph 145), without domestic remedies having been exhausted in the most recent of these.
147. Consequently, the Court does not have jurisdiction to review the compatibility with Article 8 of the Convention of the proceedings, including those relating to the restrictions on contact rights, thatpredated or ended with the High Court’s judgment of 22 April 2010 (see paragraph 76 above).
148. Nonetheless, in its review of the proceedings relating to the County Social Welfare Board’s decision of 8 December 2011 and the decisions taken on appeal against that decision, notably the City Court’s judgment of 22 February 2012,the Court will have to put those proceedings and decisions in context, which inevitably means that it must to some degree have regard to the former proceedings and decisions (see, similarly, for example, Jovanovic v. Sweden, no. 10592/12, § 73, 22 October 2015, and Mohamed Hasan, cited above, § 151).
(b) Material scope
149. The Court observes that the applicants’application lodged with the Court on 12 April 2013 expressly targeted only the decision to withdraw the first applicant’s parental responsibilities in respect of X and to authorise the latter’s adoption by his foster parents (see the City Court’s decision in paragraphs 107-12 above), not the concurrentconclusion reached on the same occasion that the conditions for lifting the care order concerning X had not been met (see paragraphs 99-106 above).
150. The Chamberconsidered that the decision not to lift the care order was nonetheless intrinsically related to the decision to deprive the first applicant of her parental responsibilities for X and to authorise the latter’s adoption, and accordingly reviewed the former decision on the merits (see paragraphs 113-17 of the Chamber’s judgment)regardless of the applicants’ having focused expressly on the latter decision in their application and submissions before the Chamber.
151. The Grand Chamber notes that, whilethe respondent Government did not express disagreement with the Chamber’s approach in this regard, the applicants made submissions before it indicating that their complaint also encompassed the decision not to lift the care order taken in the same proceedings.
152. The Grand Chamberobserves that the refusal to lift the public care order is so closely related to and intertwined with the decision to remove the first applicant’s parental responsibilities and to authorise adoption that it must be considered to be an aspect of her initial complaint to the Court. Indeed, as follows from the terms of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 above), it was a prerequisite for application of that provision that public care continued to be justified. The Grand Chamber will therefore, as was done by the Chamber,include the decision not to lift the care order in its examination of whether the applicants’Article 8 rights have been violated.
2. The first applicant’s standing to lodge a complaint on behalf of the second applicant
(a) The Chamber’s judgment
153. The Chamber, emphasising that the complaint concerned the decision to deprive the first applicant of her parental responsibilitiesfor X and to authorise his adoption – which resulted in the former losing legal guardianship over X – rather than facts subsequent to that decision, concluded that the first applicant was competent to lodge a complaint on behalf of the second applicant, X.
(b) The parties’ submissions
154. By way of preliminary objection before the Grand Chamber, the Government argued that the first applicant did not have standing to lodge an application on behalf of X. His adoptive parents would have had standing, but had not done so. The Court’s acceptance of the mother’s lodging of an application on her child’s behalf in Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 138, ECHR 2000‑VIII, had been due to the particular circumstances of that case. In the instant case X’s interests were also represented by his adoptive parents, who had intervened before the Court.
155. The applicants submitted that,according to the Court’s established case law, a biological parent whose parental responsibilities had been withdrawn could submit a complaint against that withdrawal on behalf of the child in question. The first applicant accordinglyhad an unquestionable right to represent X in the instant case.
(c) The Court’s considerations
156. The Court observes that the disputed deprivation of parental responsibilities and the authorisation of adoption decided by theCounty Social Welfare Board on8 December 2011 and upheld by the City Court on 22 February 2012, against which leave to appeal was refused by the appellate courts, undoubtedly led to the severance of the legal ties between the first and second applicants. The Court has held that this factor is not decisive for whether aparent may havelocus standi to lodge an application on behalf of the child before the Court (see, for example, A.K. and L. v. Croatia, no. 37956/11, § 46, 8 January 2013). In that judgment, the Court further stated:
“...The conditions governing the individual applications under the Convention are not necessarily the same as national criteria relating to locus standi. National rules in this respect may serve purposes different from those contemplated by Article 34 and, while those purposes may sometimes be analogous, they need not always be so (see, mutatis mutandis, Norris v. Ireland, 26 October 1988, § 31, Series A no. 142).
47. The Court would draw attention to the principle that the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its provisions, both procedural and substantive, be interpreted and applied so as to render its safeguards both practical and effective (see amongst other authorities, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, §§ 70-72, Series A no. 310). The position of children under Article 34 calls for careful consideration, as children must generally rely on other persons to present their claims and represent their interests, and may not be of an age or capacity to authorise any steps to be taken on their behalf in any real sense (P.C. and S. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 56547/00, 11 November 2001). The Court considers that a restrictive or technical approach in this area is to be avoided” (ibid., § 46-47).
157. Since X was adopted, his only representatives under national law in respect of any issues concerning facts that occurred after the adoption had become final would be his adoptive parents. However,in respect of the adoption proceedings, conducted at a time when the first applicant still had full responsibilities for X, according to the Court’s case-law, it isin principle in a child’s interests to preserve family ties, save where weighty reasons exist to justify severing those ties (see, for example, A.K. and L. v. Croatia, cited above, § 49).In addition, on several occasions the Courthas accepted in the context of Article 8 of the Convention that parents who did not have parental rights could apply to it on behalf of their minor children (seeScozzari and Giunta, cited above, §§ 138‑39), the key criterion for the Court in these cases being the risk that some of the children’s interests might not be brought to its attention and that they would be denied effective protection of their Convention rights (see mutatis mutandis,Lambert and Others v. France [GC], no. 46043/14, § 94, ECHR 2015 (extracts)).
158. Where an application has been lodged before it by a biological parent on behalf of his or her child, the situation maynonetheless be that the Court identifies conflicting interests between parent and child. A conflict of interest is relevant to the question of whether an application lodged by one personon behalf of another is admissible (see, for example, Kruškić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 10140/13, §§ 101-02, 25 November 2014). The Government have objected on such grounds in the instant case.
159. The Court considers that the question of a possible conflict of interest between the first and second applicants overlaps andis closely intertwined with those which it is called upon toexamine when dealing with the complaint, formulated by the first applicant on her own behalf and on behalf of the second applicant,of violations of their right to respect for family life under Article 8.Itdiscerns no such conflict of interest in the present case as would require it to dismiss the first applicant’s application on behalf of the second applicant. Accordingly, the Government’s objection must be dismissed.
B. Merits
1. The Chamber’s judgment
160. The Chamber was satisfied that the domestic proceedings complained of were in accordance with 1992 Child Welfare Act and pursued the legitimate aims of “the protection of health or morals” and the “rights and freedoms” of X in accordance with Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. As to the further question whether the disputed interference was also “necessary”, the Chamber considered that the first applicant had been fully involved in the domestic proceedings, seen as a whole, and that the domestic decision-making process had been fair and capable of safeguarding the applicants’ rights under Article 8. The majority of the Chamber further observed that the City Court had been faced with the difficult and sensitive task of striking a fair balance between the relevant competing interests in a complex case. In the majority’s view, the City Court had clearly been guided by the interests of X, notably his particular need for security in his foster-home environment, given his psychological vulnerability. Also taking into account the City Court’s conclusion that there had been no positive development in the first applicant’s competence in contact situations throughout the three years in which she had had contact rights and the fact that the domestic authorities had had the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned, the majority of the Chamber found that there were such exceptional circumstances in the present case as could justify the measures in question and that the domestic authorities had been motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to X’s best interests.
2. The parties’ submissions
(a) The applicants
161. The applicants submitted that in its judgment the Chamberhad failed to takeaccount of the particular context concerning Norway, namely that there was widespread criticism both nationally and internationally of the Norwegian child welfare system, indicating a serious systemic problem.
162. Under the Court’s case-law, the margin-of-appreciationconcept was, in the applicants’ opinion, characterised by its casuistic nature. The margin to be accorded to the competent national authorities would vary in the light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake. It was well established that in cases relating to placement of children in public care and adoption, the domestic authorities enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation. However, the Court tended to hide behind the margin-of-appreciation concept in a way which could to some extent undermine its control and functions.
163. Given the nature and seriousness of the interference at stake, the margin of appreciation ought to have been particularly narrow even in regard to the first child-welfare measures that had been taken. The Chamber majority had, moreover, not addressed the grounds for the extremely limited contact rights that had been granted from the beginning.
164. It was clearly established in the Court’s case-law that the protection of the biological family was a priority. The instant case concerned a very young child; in such cases the authorities could act only on extraordinarily compelling grounds. X’s particular vulnerability referred to by the domestic authorities in their decisions had never been supported by concrete and tangible evidence. Nor had his special care needs ever been explained, as pointed out by the minority in the Chamber.
165. Contact rights in Norway were notably restrictive and had been denounced by the Court in several cases. Considering that limited contact rights had a particularly detrimental impact in the first weeks, months and years of an infant’s life, the facts of the instant case were particularly shocking. The first applicant’s contact rights had been drastically limited without objective reasons and over a very short space of time. The imposition of extremely restricted access rights had destroyed any chance of family reunification and had made it impossible for X to forge natural bonds with the first applicant. Since the domestic authorities were directly responsible for the family breakdown, the argument that X had had no psychological bonds with his mother was unacceptable.
166. There had been a conflict between the first applicant, the foster mother and the child welfare services; a conflict of that nature was hardly exceptional and was readily understandable. The authorities had done absolutely nothing to pacify the first applicant’s relations with the authorities and the foster mother. On the contrary, the foster mother had been present during all contact sessions, even though this had not been ordered or permitted by any of the domestic decisions. The positive obligation incumbent on the authorities under Article 8 of the Convention required that they proposed altering the terms of the contact rights or took decisions to that effect. The County Social Welfare Board and the City Court had focused only on the short-term consequences of a separation of X from his foster parents and had failed to consider the long-term impact on him of a permanent separation from his biological mother. The domestic authorities should have resorted to less intrusive measures.
167. The domestic authorities had not dealt with the case in good faith, quite the contrary. The alleged lack of caring skills on the part of the first applicant was firmly contradicted by the case-material. She could not be blamed for having asked the same questions several times when at the parent-child institution, and the institution’s staff had threatened her with taking X into public care. While the expert reports contained global formulas such as “a severe lack of the abilities that are required in the mothering role”, “problems with emotional regulation” and “inadequate basic parent skills”, these had not been substantiated. There had been no concrete and tangible evidence to justify the alleged fundamental limitations of the first applicant and her caring skills.
168. Old and new research on infant attachment suggested that the domestic authorities had failed to abide by basic and fundamental attachment principles to support reunification. They had not proved that returning X to the first applicant would cause him serious problems.
(b) The Government
169. Overall, the Government invited the Grand Chamber to follow the approach of the Chamber majority, which had been correct and exemplary both in interpretation and application of Convention law. In contrast, theycautioned against the Chamber minority’s attempt to carry out a “forensic examination of the facts”: reassessing facts that had been established by the national courts many years ago risked making the review arbitrary and was contrary to the Court’s fourth-instance doctrine.
170. The Government argued that the domestic decision-making process had been fair and capable of safeguarding the applicants’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention. The casehad been reviewed independently and impartially by several levels of court.
171. The child’s best interests, which had changed over time, were paramount. The first applicant sought to assert her right to family life, but although she had submitted a claim that had to be assessed under Article 8 of the Convention, it was in essence not so much a claim for the protection of existing “family life”, as an assertion of a biological right even under circumstances involving little or no actual attachment. The second applicant, X, also had a right under Article 8 to have his family life protected. The question therefore arose as to whether his “family life” consisted of his biological ties to the first applicant or of the only family life that he had known, namely with the persons who had assumed care for him since he was three weeks old and who,in his mind, were his actual parents.
172. The case involved competing interests,but there was no consensus among the Contracting States as to the extent to which public authorities could interfere with family life in the interests of the well-being of a child, which suggested that they should be accorded a wider margin of appreciation. In the case under consideration, the reasons given by the domestic authorities for the impugned decisions had been relevant and sufficient. X had been subjected to very serious neglect during the first weeks of his life. The first applicant had subsequently failed to show any development with regard to her approach to him. X was vulnerable to a repetition of the same pattern of disturbances and reactions. If his care needs were not met, there was a risk of retraumatisation and a reversal of positive development with regard to his functioning. The first applicant had continued to appear “completely devoid of any such empathy and understanding” that would be called for should X be returned to her.
173. The domestic authorities had complied with their positive obligations. The first applicant had not accepted help from the child welfare services. The authorities had also taken note of her recent marriage and second child, but those developments had not been sufficient to outweigh the necessity of the impugned measures. The Chamber minority had erroneously assumed that the inquiry made by the child welfare services in the municipality to which the first applicant had moved had disclosed “no shortcomings”.
174. The Chamber minority had disregarded Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and had “reopened” earlier cases. In doing so, the minority had wrongfully applied the standard of a “stricter scrutiny”, not merely to the adoption decision, but also to the prior decisions relating to the taking into care of X. In addition, the minority had erred with respect to the facts. There had been a previous order awarding the minimum legal contact rights; further contact had not been precluded had this been in X’s best interest. However, three experts had concluded that there had been no positive development whatsoever in the relationship between X and the first applicant. Rather than availing herself of the supportive measures, the first applicant had continued to use the contact sessions as an arena for cultivating her opinion that she had been a victim of injustice, instead of focusing on X. It had been primarily in the first applicant’s and her family’s view that there had been a “conflict” between the first applicant, the child welfare services and the foster mother.
175. In short, the circumstances had been exceptional and the impugned decisions had clearly been motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to X’s best interests. The City Court had succeeded in its difficult and sensitive task of striking a fair balance between the relevant competing interests in a complex case.
3. Third-party comments
(a) The Government of Belgium
176. The Government of Belgium stated that, while perceptions varied as to what manner of intervention with respect to child welfare was appropriate, Belgian legislation did not allowfor adoption contrary to the biological parents’ wishes. They further submitted that domestic authorities in cases such as the present one had to balance the best interests of the child against the interests of the biological parents. The Belgian Government went on to express a number of considerations as to the facts as they had been restated in the Chamber judgment, and highlighted that these differed from those in the case of Aune, cited above.
(b) The Government of Bulgaria
177. The Government of Bulgaria submitted that the child welfare case should be reviewed in its entirety because earlier decisions such as on placement in care and contact rights were intrinsically linked to the adoption proceedings. The Contracting Parties had a wide margin of appreciation when deciding on placement in public care, but a stricter scrutiny was called for in respect of any further limitations. When further limitations were involved, the Court was called upon not only to examine the procedural aspects of the decision-making process, but to go beyond the form, if necessary, and assess the substance of the case. Furthermore, the Bulgarian Government emphasised the positive duty to make concrete efforts to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible and stressed that it was not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing.
(c) The Government of the Czech Republic
178. The Government of the Czech Republic focused mainly on the approach of the respective authorities after emergency or permanent placements of children in foster care, since, they submitted, immediate active work with the biological families after the placement as well as the frequency of contact between the children and their biological parents appeared to be crucial factors in maintaining original family ties.
179. They further stressed that when assessing the compliance of authorities with their obligations under Article 8 of the Convention, the situation of all members of the family must be taken into account. There was a broad consensus, including in international law, that in all decisions concerning children, their best interests must be paramount. However, the “best interests”principle was not designed to be a kind of “trumpcard”. Article 8 covered both the best interests of the child and the right of the parents to be assisted by the State in staying or being reunited with their children. The child welfare systems should not disregard the existence of the biological parents’ rights, which should be duly taken into account and balanced against the best interests of the child, rather than minimised to the point of being ignored.
180. In addition, the Government of the Czech Republic emphasised the importance of contact between biological parents and their child in public care and other measures to reunite the family, inter alia, in order to ensure that a taking into care remained a temporary measure: restrictions on contact could be the starting point of the child’s alienation from his or her biological family and, thus, of the impossibility for the family to reunite. In order for the effort to reunite the family to be serious, contact would have to occur several times a week, even under supervision or with assistance, and increase in time up to daily visits. If that were the case, it would be possible to talk about a slow establishment of a bond between the child and their biological parents. Speedy procedures were also required.
181. As to adoption, they maintained that the Court must strike a balance between the rights of the biological and the adoptive parents. The best interests of the child had to be assessed on an ad hoc basis that sometimes conflicted with other interests involved: there were other rights that had to be taken into account when determining whether or not a child should be considered adoptable.
(d) The Government of Denmark
182. The Government of Denmark argued that the domestic authorities had made a comprehensive and thorough evaluation of the matter, and the Court’s assessment should be limited to an assessment of the decision-making process. The Court should not, as had the Chamber minority, carry out a “forensic examination of the facts” and substitute its own assessment for that of the domestic courts, who had undertaken a balancing exercise in conformity with the criteria laid down in Article 8 of the Convention and the Court’s jurisprudence.
183. The Chamber majority had made a correct assessment of the matter and there were no strong reasons why the Court should reassess the facts of the case as a fourth-instance tribunal several years after the incidents and based on documentary evidence presented to the Court. Reference was made to paragraph 28(c) of the Copenhagen Declaration. By expressing a dissenting opinion implying an entirely new assessment, the Chamber minority had attempted to don the mantle of a fourth-instance tribunal. The domestic authorities had clearly demonstrated that they had made a thorough assessment of the matter comprising a comprehensive balancing of opposing interests and had shown an understanding of the fact that the case concerned far-reaching intrusions into family and private life, and had also taken into account Article 8 of the Convention and loyally applied the criteria laid down in the Court’s jurisprudence.
(e) The Government of Italy
184. The Government of Italy submitted that the first applicant’s interests did not necessarily align with those of X. If the Court wanted to ensure that X’s interests were looked after, it could indicate to the respondent Government that counsel should be appointed for him. Moreover, the Italian Government argued that the decisions taken prior to that concerning X’s adoption had become final and if the Court were to re‑examine them now in connection with the complaint against the adoption decision, this would run counter to Article 35 of the Convention. Those prior decisions were only facts and ought to be treated as such.
185. In addition, the Italian Government emphasised that there was no European consensus on the topic of protecting parents and children’s rights to respect for their family life; the Contracting Parties had a wide margin of appreciation. There were examples in the Court’s jurisprudence of cases that had been approached in contradiction to the general principles usually set out by the Court, cases where the Court had taken on a fourth-instance role and examined whether there existed circumstances justifying the removal of the child – which was linked to the idea of a “forensic examination of the facts” mentioned in the dissenting opinion in the Chamber judgment – as well as cases in which the Court had assumed that the best interests of the child coincided with those of his or her biological parents.
186. As to the best interests of the child, the Italian Government emphasised that in the relevant international materials a child was considered to be neglected when the parents did not maintain the necessary relations for his or her upbringing or development, or providepsychological and material assistance. In that connection the Italian Government raised issues with long-term care; children in care lived in limbo between biological parents and substitute carers, with resulting problems such as loyalty conflicts. References were made to Barnea and Caldararu v. Italy, no. 37931/15, 22 June 2017 and Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], no. 25358/12, 24 January 2017. Specialists and experts had emphasised that it was not a rule that biological family ties should be preserved,and that should only be the case where it represented a benefit to the child in the specific case. Only the national decision-makers could carry out the necessary assessment of that individual question. The Court did not have the necessary tools to be a fourth-instance tribunal and carry out a “forensic examination of the facts”.
(f) The Government of Slovakia
187. The Government of Slovakia submitted that the Court’s case-law was perfectly clear in that it primarily protected the biological family. Placing a child in foster care was an extreme measure and domestic authorities were required to adopt other measures if such were able to achieve the pursued aim. In particular, where a decision had been explained in terms of a need to protect the child from danger, the existence of such a danger should be actually established. Simultaneously, taking a child into care should be regarded as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permitted, and any measure of implementation should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parent with his or her child.
188. The Slovakian Government made further comments on a case in which Slovak citizens had been affected by child welfare measures and on international concern about child welfare measures adopted in the respondent State.
(g) The Government of the United Kingdom
189. The Government of the United Kingdom submitted that in cases such as the present the Court ought in principle to focus on the adequacy of the procedures and sufficiency of the reasons adopted by the domestic authorities, rather than undertake a de novo analysis of the facts.
190. The Court had enumerated a number of identifiable factors that were likely to be relevant in a case such as the present. The UK Government noted, in particular, that permanency was an inherent part of any adoption decision, and that a balancing of interests was required, but guided by the paramountcy of the best interests of the child. The child’s bonds to his or her de facto family were therefore to be considered, and Article 8 of the Convention did not require that domestic authorities make endless attempts at family reunification.
191. With respect to subsidiarity, the UK Government pointed to paragraph 28 of the Copenhagen Declaration. In cases such as the present, account should be taken of the relative expertise and involvement of the domestic authorities compared with the Court, the level of participation of the parties affected by the domestic process, and the level of consensus amongst Contracting States. The seriousness of the intervention at issue was also relevant, but a closer scrutiny could not entail a fresh assessment of the facts and particularly not if considerable time had elapsed since the decision under review. The Chamber minority could be understood as seeking to establish that the Court should undertake its own assessment of the underlying facts, rather than reviewing the decisions, particularly by its reference to the need for “a forensic examination of the facts” and by indications that the dissenting judges envisaged that the Court itself should render a “substantive” decision. The Grand Chamber was invited to reject this approach; as had been stated by the Chamber majority, the Court was required to consider whether the domestic authorities had adduced relevant and sufficient reasons for their decisions, but only the domestic authorities were in a position to determine what was in the child’s best interests.
(h) ADF International
192. ADF International submitted that family was internationally recognised as the fundamental group of society and of particular importance to children. According to the Court’s case-law, the Contracting Parties were required to organise their child welfare services in a manner aimed at facilitating family reunification, unless there was clear evidence of danger to the child’s welfare. Furthermore, ADF International emphasised the duty to maintain contact between parents and children and to provide practical assistance to families.
(i) The AIMMF
193. The AIMMF emphasised the importance of personal participation of the natural parent, with legal assistance, before the domestic authorities, as had been the case for the first applicant. In addition to making some comments on the emergency decision, the organisation also highlighted the need for the child to have legal assistance in order to ensure that his or her best interests be protected.
194. Furthermore, the AIMMF submitted that the multi-disciplinary composition of the County Social Welfare Board and the City Court was a particularly important aspect that had also been highlighted by the Court in Paradiso and Campanelli, cited above, § 212. Decision-makers with multi‑disciplinary competences formed a crucial aspect of a justice system adapted for children.
195. Moreover, the organisation emphasised the importance of bearing in mind that this case concerned X specifically, and solutions had to be found for him in the light of his vulnerability and history, including the experiences with contact sessions and his ties to the foster parents. Based on the Chamber judgment, the Chamber majority had shown a greater understanding of X’s needs than what was reflected in the dissenting opinion. It was precisely on the basis of X’s individual circumstances and history that the domestic authorities had arrived at the conclusion that it was in his best interests to strengthen his relations with the foster parents.
(j) The AIRE Centre
196. The AIRE Centre invited the Court to reiterate that the Convention was a “living instrument” and that the evolving nature of children’s rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child had to be taken into account.
197. As to the assessment of the child’s best interests, the organisation emphasised the importance of family unity and the child’s right to be heard, as protected by Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. With respect to the thresholds for removal and adoption of a child, the organisation reiterated the principles relevant to the questions of necessity and proportionality. It further pointed to the need for both legal certainty and flexibility, and highlighted “adoption simple”or long-term fostering as alternatives to a “closed” adoption. While it could be that in very exceptional circumstances it would not be in a child’s best interests to retain contact with the birth parents (for example, when those parents had been operating a paedophile ring or engaging in child trafficking or serial child abuse), this conclusion should not flow automatically from the decision that the child needed a stable, permanent home that was not with the birth parents.
198. The AIRE Centre further submitted that children of parents with intellectual disabilities were commonly taken away as infants, with neglect such as slow weight gain, general failure to thrive, and lack of understanding of children’s needs, as the primary concern. Parents with intellectual disabilities had the right to support and, inter alia, General Comment No. 14 (2013) to the Convention on the Rights of the Child stressed this positive obligation.
(k) The adoptive parents
199. X’s adoptive parents submitted that his representation before the Court raised a crucial question in the case. The principle of the best interests of the child had also to be applied to the procedural rules of representation. Under the Court’s case-law, the rules relating to representation of children had been flexible and applied so as to ensure that all relevant interests would be brought to the Court’s attention. Allowing the natural parents to represent a child who had a protected family life with foster or adoptive parents did not ensure an effective protection of the child’s rights under the Convention.
200. According to the Court’s case-law, “family life” was essentially a question of fact. Striking a fair balance between the public interest and the many different private interests at play had been emphasised by the Court as particularly important in a case where the child had developed family ties with two different families. Reference was made to,inter alia, Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy, no. 16318/07, 27 April 2010. Due regard also had to be given to other ties that had formed, for instance with siblings.
201. Furthermore, the Court’s case-law had established the principle of the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration and the decisive factor in cases relating to the placement in public care and adoption of children. The Grand Chamber should seek to combine the case-law concerning family life between the child and the foster parents and that concerning the paramountcy of the best interests of the child in the instant case.
4. The Court’s considerations
(a) General principles
202. The first paragraph of Article 8 of the Convention guarantees to everyone the right to respect for his or her family life. As is well established in the Court’s case-law, the mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life, and domestic measures hindering such enjoyment amount to an interference with the right protected by this provision. Any such interference constitutes a violation of this Article unless it is “in accordance with the law”, pursues an aim or aims that is or are legitimate under its second paragraph and can be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society” (see, among other authorities, K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 151, ECHR 2001‑VII; and Johansen, cited above, § 52).
203. In determining whether the latter condition was fulfilled, the Court will consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify that measure were relevant and sufficient for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (see, among many other authorities, Paradiso and Campanelli, cited above, § 179). The notion of necessity further implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, regard being had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the relevant competing interests(ibid., § 181).
204. In so far as the family life of a child is concerned,the Court reiterates that there is a broad consensus, including in international law, in support of the idea that in all decisions concerning children, their best interests are of paramount importance (see, among other authorities, Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, § 135, ECHR 2010).Indeed, the Court has emphasised that in cases involving the care of children and contact restrictions, the child’s interests must come before all other considerations (see Jovanovic, cited above,§ 77, and Gnahoré v. France, no. 40031/98, § 59, ECHR 2000‑IX).
205. At the same time, it should be noted that regard for family unity and for family reunification in the event of separation are inherent considerations inthe right to respect for family life under Article 8. Accordingly, in thecase of imposition ofpublic care restricting family life, a positive duty lies on the authorities to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible (K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 178).
206. In instances where the respective interests of a child and those of the parents come into conflict, Article 8 requires that the domestic authorities should strike a fair balance between those interests and that, in the balancing process, particular importance should be attached to the best interests of the child which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may override those of the parents (see, for instance, Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC],no. 31871/96, § 64, ECHR 2003‑VIII (extracts)), and the references therein).
207. Generally, the best interests of the child dictate, on the one hand, that the child’s ties with its family must be maintained, except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit, since severing those ties means cutting a child off from its roots. It follows that family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, if and when appropriate, to “rebuild” the family (see Gnahoré, cited above, § 59). On the other hand, it is clearly also in the child’s interest to ensure its development in a sound environment, and a parent cannot be entitled under Article 8 to have such measures taken as would harm the child’s health and development (see, among many other authorities, Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 136; Elsholz v. Germany [GC], no. 25735/94, § 50, ECHR 2000-VIII; and Maršálek v. the Czech Republic, no. 8153/04, § 71, 4 April 2006).An important international consensus exists to the effect that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child (see Article 9 § 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, recited in paragraph 134 above). In addition, it is incumbent on the Contracting States to put in place practical and effective procedural safeguards for the protection of the best interests of the child and to ensure their implementation(see the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration, paragraphs 85 and 87, quoted at paragraph 136 above).
208. Another guiding principle is that a care order should be regarded as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit, and that any measures implementing temporary care should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child (see, for instance, Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 24 March 1988, § 81, Series A no. 130). The above-mentioned positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible will begin to weigh on the competent authorities with progressively increasing force as from the commencement of the period of care, subject always to its being balanced against the duty to consider the best interests of the child (see, for example, K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 178).In this type of case the adequacy of a measure is to be judged by the swiftness of its implementation, as the passage of time can have irremediable consequences for relations between the child and the parent with whom it does not live (see, inter alia, S.H.v. Italy, no. 52557/14, § 42, 13 October 2015). Thus, where the authoritiesare responsible for a situation of family breakdown because they have failed in their above-mentioned obligation,they may not base a decision to authorise adoption on the grounds of the absence of bonds between the parents and the child (see Pontes v. Portugal, no. 19554/09, §§ 92 and 99, 10 April 2012). Furthermore, the ties between members of a family and the prospects of their successful reunification will perforce be weakened if impediments are placed in the way of their having easy and regular access to each other(see Scozzari and Giunta, cited above, § 174; and Olsson (No. 1), cited above, § 81). However, when a considerable period of time has passed since the child was originally taken into public care, the interest of a child not to have his or her de facto family situation changed again may override the interests of the parents to have their family reunited (see K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 155).
209. As regards replacing a foster home arrangement with a more far-reaching measure such as deprivation of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption, with the consequence that the applicants’ legal ties with the child are definitively severed, it is to be reiterated that “such measures should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and could only be justified if they were motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child’s best interests” (see, for example, Johansen, cited above, § 78, and Aune, cited above, § 66). It is in the very nature of adoption that no real prospects for rehabilitation or family reunification exist and that it is instead in the child’s best interests that he or she be placed permanently in a new family (see R. and H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 35348/06, § 88, 31 May 2011).
210. In determining whether the reasons for the impugned measures were relevant and sufficient for the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court will have regard to the fact that perceptions as to the appropriateness of intervention by public authorities in the care of children vary from one Contracting State to another, depending on such factors as traditions relating to the role of the family and to State intervention in family affairs and the availability of resources for public measures in this particular area. However, consideration of what is in the best interests of the child is in every case of crucial importance. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the national authorities have the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned, often at the very stage when care measures are being envisaged or immediately after their implementation. It follows from these considerations that the Court’s task is not to substitute itself for the domestic authorities in the exercise of their responsibilities for the regulation of the care of children and the rights of parents whose children have been taken into public care, but rather to review under the Convention the decisions taken by those authorities in the exercise of their power of appreciation (see, for example, K. and T. v. Finland,cited above, § 154; and Johansen, cited above, § 64).
211. The margin of appreciation to be accorded to the competent national authorities will vary in the light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake, such as, on the one hand, the importance of protecting a child in a situation which is assessed as seriously threatening his or her health or development and, on the other hand, the aim to reunite the family as soon as circumstances permit. The Court thus recognises that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child into care (see, for example, K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 155; and Johansen, cited above, § 64). However, this margin is not unfettered. For example, the Court has in certain instances attached weight to whether the authorities, before taking a child into public care, had first attempted to take less drastic measures, such as supportive or preventive ones,and whether these had proved unsuccessful (see, for example, Olsson (no. 1), cited above, §§ 72-74; R.M.S. v. Spain, no. 28775/12, § 86, 18 June 2013, § 86; and Kutzner v. Germany, no. 46544/99, § 75, ECHR 2002‑I). A stricter scrutiny is called for in respect of any further limitations, such as restrictions placed by the authorities on parental rights of access, and of any legal safeguards designed to secure an effective protection of the right of parents and children to respect for their family life. Such further limitations entail the danger that the family relations between the parents and a young child are effectively curtailed (see K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, ibid., and Johansen, cited above, ibid.).
212. In cases relating to public-caremeasures, the Court will further have regard to the authorities’ decision-making process, to determine whether it has been conducted such as to secure that the views and interests of the natural parents are made known to and duly taken into account by the authorities and that they are able to exercise in due time any remedies available to them (see, for instance,W. v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1987, § 63, Series A no. 121,and Elsholz, cited above, § 52). What has to be determined is whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and notably the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, the parents have been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interests and have been able fully to present their case (see, for example, W. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 64; T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28945/95, § 72, ECHR 2001‑V (extracts); Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 139; and Y.C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 4547/10, § 138, 13 March 2012).From the foregoing considerations it follows that natural parents’exercise of judicial remedies with a view to obtaining family reunification withtheir child cannot as such be held against them. In addition, in cases of this kind there is always the danger that any procedural delay will result in the de facto determination of the issue submitted to the court before it has held its hearing. Equally, effective respect for family life requires that future relations between parent and child be determined solely in the light of all relevant considerations and not by the mere effluxion of time (see W. v. the United Kingdom., cited above, § 65).
213. Whether the decision-making process sufficiently protected a parent’s interests depends on the particular circumstances of each case (see, for example,Sommerfeld, cited above, § 68).With a view to its examination of the present instance, the Court observes that in the aforementioned caseitwas called upon to examine the issue of ordering a psychological report on the possibilities of establishing contact between the child and the applicant. It observed that as a general rule it was for the national courts to assess the evidence before them, including the means to ascertain the relevant facts (see Vidal v. Belgium, 22 April 1992, § 33, Series A no. 235‑B). It would be going too far to say that domestic courts are always required to involve a psychological expert on the issue of awarding contact to a parent not having custody, but this issue depends on the specific circumstances of each case, having due regard to the age and maturity of the child concerned (see Sommerfeld, cited above, § 71).
(b) Application of those principles to the present case
214. It is common ground between the parties, and the Court finds it unequivocally established, that the impugned decisions taken in the proceedings instituted by the first applicant on 29 April 2011 (see paragraph 81 above), starting with the Board’s decision of 8 December 2011 and ending with the Supreme Court Appeals Board’s decision of 15 October 2012, entailed an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life under the first paragraph of Article 8. It is further undisputed that they were taken in accordance with the law, namely the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 above), and pursued legitimate aims, namely the “protection of health or morals” and “rights and freedoms” of X. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. The interference thus fulfilled two of the three conditions of justification envisaged by the second paragraph of Article 8. The dispute in the present case relates to the third condition: whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”.
215. Bearing in mind the limitations on the scope of its examination as described in paragraphs 147 to 148 above, the Court will centre its examination on the City Court’s review as reflected in its judgment of 22 February 2012, which ultimately gained legal force on 15 October 2012 when the Supreme Court Appeals Board dismissed the first applicant’s appeal (see paragraphs 98-113, 118 and 121 above).
216. At the outset the Court notes that the City Court’s benchwas composed of a professional judge, a lay person and a psychologist. It held a three-day hearing that the first applicant attended together with her legal-aid counsel and in which twenty-one witnesses, including experts, gave testimony (see paragraph 98 above). In addition, the Court notes that the City Court acted as an appeal instance and that proceedings similar to those before that courthad previously been conducted, and similarly extensive reasons given, by the County Social Welfare Board, which had also had a composition similar to that of the City Court (see paragraphs 89-95 above). The City Court’s judgment was subject to review in leave-to-appealproceedings before the High Court (see paragraphs 114-18 above), which were in turn examined by the Supreme Court Appeals Board (see paragraphs 119-21 above).
217. In its judgment the City Court decided not to lift the care order for X, to deprive the first applicant of her parental responsibilities for him and to authorise his adoption by his foster parents, in accordance with sections 4-21 and 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act respectively (see paragraph 122 above). While observing that the City Court relied on several grounds in order to justify its decisions, the Court notes that under the aforementionedprovisionsa central condition for the imposition of the impugned measures related to the natural parent’s ability to assume care.Thus, pursuant to section 4-21,a precondition for revoking the care order was the high probability that the parent would be able to provide the child with proper care. Under section 4-20, consent to adoption could be given if it had to be regarded as probable that the parent would be permanently unable to provide the child with proper care.
218. The City Court assessed that issue primarily in the part of its reasoning devoted to the applicant’s request to have the care order lifted, which can be summarised as follows.Her situation had improved in some areas (see paragraph 100 above). However, X was a vulnerable child who had shown emotional reactions in connection with the contact sessions (see paragraphs101-02 above). The evidence adduced had clearly shown that thefirst applicant’s fundamental limitations at the time of the High Court’s judgment in the previous set of proceedings still persisted. She had not improved her ability to handlecontact situations; she had affirmedthat she would fight until the child was returned to her; and she had stated that she did not consider that public exposure and repeated legal proceedings could be harmful for the child in the long term (see paragraphs103-04 above). Moreover, the experts who had testified in court, other than K.M., had advised against returning X to his mother (see paragraph 105 above). There wasno reason to consider in further detail any other arguments regarding the first applicant’s ability to provide care, since returning X to her was in any event not an option owing to the serious problems it would cause him to be moved from the foster home (see paragraph 106 above).
219. In deciding on the child welfare services’ application for removal of the first applicant’s parental responsibilities in respect of X and authorisation of the latter’s adoption, the City Court endorsed the Board’s reasoningregarding the alternative criteria in letter (a) of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act, namely that it had to be regarded as probable that the first applicant would be permanently unable to provide X with proper care or that X had become so attached to his foster home and the environment there that, on the basis of an overall assessment, removing him could cause him serious problems(see paragraph 108 above).In so far as the question of caring skills is concerned, the following findings of the Board are noteworthy in this context. There was nothing to indicate that the first applicant’s caring skills had improved since the High Court’s judgment of 22 April 2010. She had not realised that she had neglected X and was unable to focus on the child and what was best for him. Whilst note had been taken of the information that the first applicant had married and had had a second child, this was not decisive in respect of her capacity to care for X. He was a particularly vulnerable child and had experienced serious and life-threatening neglect during the first three weeks of his life. The Board had also taken account of the experience during the contact sessions. Moreover, since X had lived in the foster home for three years and did not know the first applicant, returning him to herwould require a great capacity to empathise with and understand him and the problems that he would experience. Yet the first applicantand her family were completely devoid of any such empathy and understanding (see paragraph 90 above).
220. The Court is fully conscious of the primordial interest of the child in the decision-making process. However, the process leading to the withdrawal of parental responsibilities and consent to adoption shows that the domestic authorities did not attempt to perform a genuine balancing exercise between the interests of the child and his biological family (see paragraphs 207 and 208 above), but focused on the child’s interests instead of trying to combine both sets of interests, and moreover did not seriously contemplate any possibility of the child’s reunification with his biological family. In this context, the Court, in particular, is notpersuaded that the competent domestic authorities duly considered the potential significance of the fact that at the time when the first applicant applied to have the care order lifted or, in the alternative, to be granted extended contact rights she was going through substantial changes in her life: in the same summer and autumn as the impugned proceedings commenced she married and had a second child. In this regard, as the City Court’s decision was largely premised on an assessment of the first applicant’s lack of capacity to provide care, the factual basis on which it relied in making that assessment appears to disclose several shortcomings inthe decision-making process.
221. The Court notesthat the decisions under consideration had been taken in a context where there had only been very limited contact between the first applicant and X. The Board, in its decision of 2 March 2009, and the High Court, in its judgment of 22 April 2010 (overturning the City Court’s judgment of 19 August 2009), had relied on the consideration that it was most likely that the foster care arrangement would be a long-term one, and that X would grow up in the foster home (see paragraphs 31, 43 and 75 above). The High Court stated that contact sessions could thus serve as a means of maintaining contact between the mother and son, so that he would be familiar with his roots. The purpose was not to establish a relationship with a view to the child’s future return to the care of his biological mother (ibid.).As regards the implementation of the contact arrangements, the Court also notes that these had not been particularly conducive to letting the first applicant freely bond with X, for example with regard to where the sessions had been held and who had been present.Although the contact sessions had often not worked well, it appears that little was done to try out alternative arrangements for implementing contact. In short, the Court considers that the sparse contact that had taken place between the applicants since X was taken into foster care had provided limited evidence from which to draw clear conclusions with respect to the first applicant’s caring skills.
222. Furthermore, the Court regards it as significant that there were no updated expert reports since those that had been ordered during the previous proceedingsbetween 2009 and 2010 relating to the taking into public care. Those were the report by psychologist B.S. and family therapist E.W.A, ordered by the child welfare services and concerning X’s reactions to the contact sessions in the beginning of September 2009 (see paragraph 58 above), and the report by psychologist M.S., who had been appointed by the High Court on 15 November 2009 (see paragraph 61 above). The former dated back to 20 February 2010 and the latter to3 March 2010 (see paragraphs 62 and 63 above respectively). When the City Courtdelivered its judgment on 22 February 2012,both reports were two years old. Indeed, alongside other witnesses such as family members, psychologists B.S. and M.S. also gave evidence during the hearing held by the City Court in 2012 (see paragraph 98 above). However, the two psychologists had not carried out any examinations since those prior to their reports dating back to early 2010 andonly one of the reports, the oneby psychologist M.S., had been based onobservations of the interplay between the applicants,and then only on two occasions (see paragraph 63 above).
223. The Court does not overlook the fact that the child welfare services had sought informationfrom the first applicant concerning her new family that she apparently refused to provide (see paragraphs 85 and 115 above). At the same timeit notes that counsel for the first applicant had expresslyrequested that a new expert assessment be made but thatthe High Court dismissed the request (see paragraphs 114 and 118 above). Nor had the City Court ordereda new expert examinationpropriomotu in the course of the proceedings before it. While it would generally be for the domestic authorities to decide whether expert reports were needed (see, for example, Sommerfeld, cited above, § 71),the Court considersthat the lack of a fresh expert examination substantiallylimitedthe factual assessment of the first applicant’s new situation and her caring skills at the material time. In those circumstances, contrary to what the City Court seems to suggest,it could notreasonably be held against herthat she had failed toappreciate that repeated legal proceedings could be harmful for the child in the long run (see paragraphs 104 and 218 above).
224. In addition, from the City Court’s reasoning it transpires that in assessing the first applicant’s caring skills it had paid particular regard to X’s special care needs, seen in the light of his vulnerability. However, whereas X’s vulnerability had formed a central reason for the initial decision to place him in foster care (see, for instance, paragraphs 31 and 42 above), the City Court’s judgment contained no information on how that vulnerability could have continued despite the fact that he had lived in foster care since the age of three weeks. It also contained barely any analysis of the nature of his vulnerability, beyond a brief description by experts that X was easily stressed and needed a lot of quiet, security and support, and stating his resistance to and resignation toward having contact with the first applicant, notably when faced with her emotional outbursts (see paragraphs 101 to 102 above). In the view of the Court, having regard to the seriousness of the interests at stake, it was incumbent on the competent authorities to assess X’s vulnerability in more detail in the proceedings under review.
225. Against this background, taking particular account of the limited evidence that could be drawn from the contact sessions that had been implemented (see paragraph 221 above),in conjunction with the failure – notwithstanding the first applicant’s new family situation – to order a fresh expert examination into her capacity to provide proper care and the central importance of this factor in the City Court’s assessment(see paragraphs 222-3 above) and also ofthe lack of reasoning with regard to X’s continued vulnerability (see paragraph 224 above),the Court does not consider that the decision-making process leading to the impugneddecision of 22 February 2012was conducted so as to ensure that all views and interests of the applicants were duly taken into account. It is thus not satisfied that the said procedure was accompanied by safeguards that were commensurate with the gravity of the interference and the seriousness of the interests at stake.
226. In the light of the above factors, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of both applicants.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
227. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
228. The applicantseach claimed 25,000euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
229. The Government asked the Court, in the event of a finding of a violation, to afford just satisfaction within the limits of Article 41 of the Convention.
230. The Court considers that awarding damages to the first applicant is appropriate in this case, having regard to the anguish and distress that she must have experienced as a result of the proceduresrelating to her claim to have X returned and the child welfare services’application to have her parental responsibilities for X withdrawn and his adoption authorised. It awards the first applicant EUR 25,000 under this head. In respect of X, having regard to his age at the relevant time and to the fact that he did not experience the procedures in questionin the same way as the first applicant, the Court finds that a finding of violation can be regarded as sufficient just satisfaction.
B. Costs and expenses
231. The applicants also claimed EUR 50,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic authorities and the Chamber and EUR 9,564 for those incurred before the Grand Chamber.
232. The Government asked the Court, in the event of a violation, to afford just satisfaction within the limits of Article 41 of the Convention.
233. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum.
234. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and before the Chamber, since the applicants have not shown that these expenses were actually incurred. As to the costs and expenses before the Grand Chamber, the Court observes that apart from travel expenses, the claim is submitted with reference to a contingency (no-win no-fee) arrangement, according to which the first applicant is obliged to pay counsel EUR 9,000 in the event of “success before the European Court of Human Rights”. Agreements of this nature – giving rise to obligations solely between lawyer and client – cannot bind the Court, which must assess the level of costs and expenses to be awarded with reference not only to whether the costs are actually incurred but also to whether they have been reasonably incurred (see, for example, Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, § 55, ECHR 2000‑XI). Accordingly, the Court must as a basis for its assessment examine the other information provided by the applicants in support of their claim. In accordance with Rule 60 § 2 of the Rules of Court, itemised particulars of all claims must be submitted, failing which the Court may reject the claim in whole or in part (see, inter alia,A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], no. 25579/05, § 281, ECHR 2010). In the instant case, the Court, taking into account that the claim has not been contested, considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 9,350 for the proceedings before the Grand Chamber. In the circumstances, it is appropriate to award this compensation to the first applicant only.
C. Default interest
235. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT,
1. Dismisses, by fifteen votes to two, the Government’s preliminary objection;
2. Holds, by thirteen votes to four, that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of both applicants;
3. Holds, by sixteen votes to one, that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the second applicant;
4. Holds, by thirteen votes to four,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the first applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts,to be converted into Norwegian kroner (NOK)at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 25,000 (twenty-five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 9,350 (nine thousand threehundredandfifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses, unanimously,the remainder of the first applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English and French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 10 September 2019.
Søren Prebensen Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos
Deputy to the Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) concurring opinion of Judge Ranzoni, joined by Judges Yudkivska, Kūris, Harutyunyan, Paczolay and Chanturia;
(b) concurring opinion of Judge Kūris;
(c) joint dissenting opinion of Judges Kjølbro, Poláčková, Koskelo and Nordén;
(d) joint dissenting opinion of Judges Koskelo and Nordén.
L.A.S.
S.C.P.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE RANZONI,JOINED BY JUDGES YUDKIVSKA, KŪRIS, HARUTYUNYAN, PACZOLAY AND CHANTURIA
I. Introduction
1. I have voted with the majority in finding a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. However, I partly disagree with the reasoning which, to my mind, does not sufficiently address the main issues which led to the case being referred to the Grand Chamber. In this respect, the majority opted for an excessively narrow approach, entailing a very limited “procedural” violation.
2. The present case can be summarised as follows. On 25 September 2008 the first applicant gave birth to her son, the second applicant. Subsequently, she stayed with him at a family centre. On 17 October 2008 the authorities decided to place the baby in a foster home on an emergency basis, allowing the mother to visit her son for up to one and a half hours per week. By decision of the County Social Welfare Board of 2 March 2009 he was taken into ordinary foster care, and the duration of the mother’s contact was set at two hours, six times per year. This decision was revoked by the City Court, but the High Court, in a judgment of 22 April 2010, upheld the Board’s decision on compulsory care and reduced the mother’s contact rights to four two-hour visits per year. The child remained in foster care until the Board decided on 8 December 2011 to remove the mother’s parental authority and to authorise the foster parents to adopt him. Upon an appeal by the first applicant, the City Court on 22 February 2012 upheld that decision, which became final with the Supreme Court Appeals Board’s decision of 15 October 2012.
3. Whereas the majority’s reasoning focused on the proceedings surrounding the Board’s decision of 8 December 2011 and, in particular, the City Court’s judgment of 22 February 2012, in my view the “real” issues to be addressed related to the proceedings prior to these decisions and to the specific legal situation in Norway.
II. Shortcomings in the period before December 2011
4. According to the Court’s case-law, a care order should be regarded as a temporary measure and, in principle, be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child (see paragraphs 207-208 of the judgment). In the present case, however, this ultimate aim was absent from the outset of the domestic proceedings. On 21 November 2008 – two months after the child’s birth and one month after issuing the care order – the Office for Children, Youth and Family Affairs stated that the boy would need “stable adults who can give him good care” (see paragraph 30). Seven days later the Social Welfare Board, in the application for a care order, assumed “that it would be a matter of a long-term placement and that X would probably grow up in foster care” and that the applicant’s capacity as a mother would be “limited” (see paragraph 31).
5. Even at this early stage the Board did not pursue the aim of reuniting the child with his mother. In its decision of 2 March 2009 – four and a half months after the care order – the Board again envisaged that the child would grow up in the foster home. It emphasised that this would mean “that the foster parents would become X’s psychological parents, and that the amount of contact had to be determined in such a way as to ensure that the attachment process [between the foster parents and the child], which was already well under way, was not disrupted” (see paragraph 43). On 22 April 2010 – eighteen months after the care order – the majority of the High Court confirmed that the purpose of the contact sessions was not to establish a relationship with a view to the child’s future return to the care of his biological mother (see paragraph 75).
6. Furthermore, the authorities in no way facilitated the development of a good relationship between the mother and her son. On the contrary, the contact sessions were extremely limited – two hours, respectively four and six times a year – and had to take place under supervision and in the presence of the foster mother, sometimes even in the foster home. Under such circumstances these sessions were obviously unable to create a positive atmosphere and to facilitate any rapprochement between mother and child. The authorities’ argument that the child’s reactions would decrease and the degree of contact could be improved if the sessions became less frequent (see paragraph 75) cannot be considered as anything other than cynical.
7. The domestic authorities never considered the foster care of the child as a temporary measure with the ultimate aim of reuniting the mother and her child, and they did not seriously engage in supporting the mother with a view to improving her capacity as a mother. In this respect, they disregarded the Court’s case-law and their respective obligations.
8. The authorities’ attitude concurs with the domestic law, setting a very low threshold for taking a child into public care, but an extremely high threshold for discontinuing this public care (see, in particular, section 4-21 of the Child Welfare Act, referred to in paragraph 122). In order for the foster care order to be revoked, the parents have to show that it is “highly probable” that they would be able to provide the child with proper care. Such a requirement is problematic in the light of the Court’s case-law and the State’s duty to take measures in order to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible (see paragraph 208). The Child Welfare Act also seems to grant the authorities unfettered discretion. Moreover, even if in a specific case the parents succeeded in this regard, their attempts would be futile if “the child has become so attached to persons and the environment where he or she is living that ... removing the child may lead to serious problems for him or her” (see, again, section 4-21 of the Act). In other words, the simple passage of time makes it most unlikely that a care order will ever be revoked.
III. The majority’s approach and my own view of the case
9. The focus of the majority’s reasoning lay in the assessment of the proceedings of 2011-12, entailing the withdrawal of the first applicant’s parental responsibilities for her son and the consent to his adoption. More precisely, the majority centred their examination on the City Court’s review as reflected in its decision of 22 February 2012 (see paragraph 215). However, the judgment does not as such deal with the shortcomings in the period from the issuing of the care order in October 2008 until the Board’s decision of November 2011. These flaws are briefly mentioned in paragraphs 220 and 221, but solely in order to explain the shortcomings that occurred in the proceedings before the City Court in 2012, particularly the fact that the sparse contact which occurred between the applicants had provided only limited evidence from which to draw clear conclusions with regard to the mother’s caring skills. This aspect, together with the lack of updated expert reports, led the majority to conclude that the decision-making process leading to the City Court’s decision of 22 February 2012 was flawed and in “procedural” violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
10. I am of the opinion that the finding of a violation of Article 8 is not easily reconcilable with such a narrow approach, and I would have preferred to assess the case more broadly and to look at the “full picture”.
11. The judgment only examines the decision-making process before the City Court, which on 22 February 2012 upheld the Board’s decision to withdraw the applicant’s parental responsibilities and consent to adoption. However, although some shortcomings in this decision-making process before the City Court may have occurred, it should also be recognised that at that point – by which time the child had already lived for three years and four months with the foster parents – the national court had to some extent its hands tied, on account of the previous events and proceedings as well as the simple passage of time. It was confronted with a kind of fait accomplis. At that stage the balancing exercise between the interests of the child and those of his biological family would almost inevitably have led to the result of the child remaining with his foster family. As confirmed by the experts and accepted by the court, the child had developed such an attachment to his foster parents, his foster brother and the general foster home environment that it would entail serious problems if he had to move, since his primary security and sense of belonging were in the foster home and he perceived the foster parents as his psychological parents (see, in particular, paragraph 106 of the judgment).
12. The Court should not disregard the reality of life, and it should not engage in a formalistic assessment of the City Court’s decision of 22 February 2012 and overemphasise, in particular, the lack of updated expert reports. It seems more than questionable whether any new report on the mother’s abilities could at that point in time have overruled the child’s best interests in staying with the foster parents. The main shortcomings, for which the authorities were responsible, did not occur in the proceedings of 2011-12, but rather had occurred at the earlier stages.
13. The judgment does not directly address these main shortcomings, due to the lack of jurisdiction (see paragraph 147). While, strictly speaking, it is correct that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review as such the compatibility of the decisions that predated or were reviewed by the High Court’s judgment of 22 April 2010 with Article 8 of the Convention, this does not exclude the possibility that the previous flaws can, nevertheless, be addressed directly.
14. The majority (referring to Jovanovic v. Sweden, no. 10592/12, § 73, 22 October 2015, and Mohamed Hasan v. Norway, no. 27496/15, § 121, 26 April 2018) conceded in paragraph 148 that, in its review of the proceedings relating to the decisions taken in 2011-12, the Court was required to put these proceedings and decisions in context, which inevitably meant that it had to some degree to have regard to the former proceedings and decisions. While I accept that statement as such, I disagree with the majority’s narrow understanding of the “related” proceedings, as well as with their restricted interpretation of the “degree” of regard.
15. The judgment examines only the decision-making process directly surrounding the City Court’s decision of 22 February 2012. To my mind, the Court should have assessed the entire inter-connected process which ultimately led to the impugned decision. This “process” should, particularly in a case such as the instant one, be understood in a broader context. It concernsnot only the final proceedings before the courts, but extends to the previous proceedings before the administrative authorities, which were intrinsically linked to the later proceedings resulting in the impugned decision. Therefore, “related proceedings” should include all relevant actions, omissions and decisions by the authorities which paved the way for the final court decisions, built their inseparable factual and/or legal basis and predetermined their outcome to a large extent.
16. In this respect, the Court has stated in previous cases that the necessity of the interference needs to be assessed in the light of the case as a whole (see, for example, Paradiso and Campanelli [GC], no. 25358/12, § 179, 24 January 2017). The Court cannot confine itself to considering the impugned decisions in isolation (see Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no 130, § 68). The decisions relating to the withdrawal of the first applicant’s parental responsibilities and the authorisation of the adoption have thus to be placed in context, which means in my understanding to be put in direct context with the preceding proceedings and the respective facts. It seems to me that the term “case as a whole” should, at least in the present circumstances, be understood in this broader sense, that is, not limited to the final court proceedings, but extended to the full process surrounding a given case and the actual consequences of the decisions taken within that process.
17. Such an approach finds some support in the Court’s case-law. Therefore, let us examine to what degree the Court had regard in other cases to the “related proceedings”.
18. In Gnahoré v. France (no. 40031/98, ECHR 2000‑IX) the application was lodged in 1997 and concerned, inter alia, a father’s complaint against a decision taken in 1996 dismissing his request to have a care order lifted. However, the Court’s assessment was not restricted to these proceedings, but also explicitly included the original care order of 1992, the subsequent measures and the several renewals of the care order (ibid., §§ 56-58).
19. In K. and T. v. Finland ([GC], no. 25702/94, ECHR 2001‑VII) two children were taken into emergency care in June 1993 and one month later were placed in “normal” public care. Whereas the latter decisions were upheld in court proceedings, the former decisions were not appealed against. The Court accepted that the ratification of the emergency care orders had “in effect” been confirmed by the normal care orders and had dispensed the applicants from filing a separate appeal (ibid., § 145). It therefore assessed also the emergency care orders, although the application had been lodged with the Court more than one year after these orders had been issued, and although the Court found that there existed substantive and procedural differences between the two sets of proceedings and that the respective decisions were of different kind.
20. In Zhou v. Italy (no. 33773/11, 21 January 2014) the applicant complained about the adoption of her child, decided by court decisions in 2010. However, the Court considered that the decisive point consisted in establishing whether the domestic authorities, before extinguishing the legal relationship between mother and child, had taken all necessary and adequate measures that could reasonably be required in order for the child to live a normal family life within his own family (ibid., § 49). It therefore assessed all of the authorities’ previous decisions relating to the placement of the child in a foster family and the mother’s contact rights.
21. In Jovanovic (cited above) the Court first declared inadmissible the complaints concerning the decision to take the child into public care. However, in its assessment of the complaints concerning the subsequent decision not to terminate the public care, the Court nevertheless examined in some detail the proceedings which had resulted in the first care order and found that the national authorities’ decision to place the child in compulsory public care was “clearly justified” (ibid., § 78). Therefore, the Court did not limit itself to placing the later decisions in the simple context of these preceding proceedings, but took an explicit stand on the justification of the previous decisions, even though it had declared the respective complaints inadmissible.
22. Finally, in the recent case ofMohamed Hasan (cited above), the Court began by limiting its examination to the proceedings concerning the removal of parental responsibility and adoption, declaring the earlier proceedings on placement in care to be relevant only in so far as it was necessary for the Court to have regard when carrying out its examination of the later proceedings. However, in a kind of obiter dictum the Court stated that there were no grounds to assume that the procedural issues in the previous care proceedings had consequences for the later adoption proceedings “or [for] the case overall in such a manner that they require further examination by the Court when assessing the applicant’s complaints against the removal of parental authority and adoption” (ibid., § 151).
23. In contrast, these requirements are fulfilled in the present case. The preceding care proceedings between 2008 and 2011 actually had decisive consequences for the decisions taken in the subsequent 2011-12 proceedings and thus did require such further examination by the Court when assessing the applicants’ complaints against the removal of parental responsibility and the adoption.
24. In such a situation the Court is compelled to scrutinise, as set out, inter alia, in the above-cited Zhou case, whether the domestic authorities, before extinguishing the legal relationship between parent and child, had taken all necessary and adequate measures that could reasonably be required in order for the child to live a normal family life within his own family. In so doing, it needs to take into account all previous proceedings that were intrinsically linked to this final decision, irrespective of whether or not the previous decisions were officially taken within the same formal framework of adoption proceedings or in separate proceedings preceding the adoption proceedings.
25. As already mentioned above, the authorities in the present case failed from the outset to pursue the aim of reuniting the child with his mother, but rather immediately envisaged that he would grow up in the foster home. This underlying assumption runs like a thread through all stages of the proceedings, starting with the care order. The City Court’s decision of 22 February 2012 – taken when the child had already lived with the foster parents for three years and four months – seems to have been merely the “automatic” and “unavoidable” consequence of all the previous events and decisions. In other words, the shortcomings from October 2008 onwards led to the de facto determination in 2011-12 that the relationship between the applicants had broken down.
26. This aspect also formed an essential element of the dissenting opinion to the Chamber judgment. The minority underlined that the decisions to place the child in care “fed inexorably into the decisions leading to adoption, created the passage of time so detrimental to the reunification of a family unit, influenced the assessment over time of the child’s best interests and, crucially, placed the first applicant in a position which was inevitably in conflict with that of the authorities which had ordered and maintained the placement and with the foster parents, whose interest lay in promoting the relationship with the child with a view ultimately to adopting him.” While not calling into question the decisions of the domestic authorities regarding placement, the minority held that it was “not possible to ignore the sequence of events which preceded and led to the adoption” (see paragraph 18 of the separate opinion). I fully agree with these considerations.
27. Furthermore, it must be emphasised that assessing the “process” at national level and the reasons given by the domestic authorities does not mean, as the Chamber majority did and, to an extent, the Grand Chamber majority have also done, exclusively focussing on the procedural steps taken. Procedural requirements have no end in themselves, but they rather provide a means for protecting an individual against arbitrary action by public authorities. Therefore, one must look beyond and behind the formalities of a procedure. The authorities’ attitudes and objectives have likewise to be examined. Procedural assessment cannot be reduced exclusively to an assessment of the form taken by the final decisions. If at national level, as in the present case, the authorities performed only a “formalistic” assessment from the outset, without a real and substantive engagement in taking account of all interests involved and without balancing these interests in the light of the Court’s case-law on Article 8 of the Convention, the proceedings seen “as a whole”, including the relevant previous decisions and actions, were not conducted in a satisfactory manner and were not accompanied by safeguards commensurate with the gravity of the interferences and the seriousness of the interests at stake.
IV. Conclusion
28. I would very much have hesitated to vote in favour of finding a violation of Article 8 of the Convention had I been required to follow the majority’s approach and formally to assess only the review proceedings leading to the City Court’s decision of 22 February 2012 – at a time when the child had already lived with the foster parents for three years and four months. However, by examining the case as brought before the Court in a broader manner and addressing the “real” issues related to the proceedings prior to the said decision, which were the actual source of the problem, I had no difficulties in joining the majority with regard to the outcome of this application and in finding that there has been a violation of Article 8 in respect of both applicants.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KŪRIS
1. I (together with some other colleagues) have joined the Concurring opinion of Judge Ranzoni. Here I add only a few remarks.
2. It has been observed by many that case-law in general (not only that of the Strasbourg Court) has become increasingly “analytical” in the disruptive sense of the word, in that the facts which are complained of by litigants and, accordingly, the application of law to these facts tend to be severed into small parts, which are then dealt with separately. In a recent Grand Chamber case (with a different subject matter) my two colleagues and I expressed our disagreement with the majority’s decision to split, artificially and very formalistically, the period under consideration into two parts and to assess only the later part of it as a separate period, notwithstanding the fact that whatever took place during that latter “period” had its roots in the preceding one (I refer to the separate opinion of judges Yudkivska, Vehabović and myself in Radomilja and Others v. Croatia, [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, 20 March 2018). In the present case a similar structural problem has been created.
3. From whichever angle we consider it, reality is a whole. This is a matter of fact – and of principle. While it has been admitted in the present judgment that “in its review of the proceedings relating to the County Social Welfare Board’s decision of 8 December 2011 and the decisions taken on appeal against that decision, notably the City Court’s judgment of 22 February 2012, the Court will have to put those proceedings and decisions in context, which inevitably means that it must to some degree have regard to the former proceedings and decisions” (see paragraph 148; emphasis added), it is unclear what that “degree” is and what is meant by “having regard”.
Courts must not leave ambiguities in their judgments. Here, an ambiguity has been deliberately created.
4. I surmise that the ambiguity in question has something to do with the formula that has been repeated and made use of in so many cases, to the effect that “the content and scope of the ‘case’ referred to the Grand Chamber are delimited by the Chamber’s decision on admissibility” (see paragraph 144 of the present judgment). While in many instances the concurrence of the Chamber’s and the Grand Chamber’s views on the scope – temporal or material – of a given case does not raise problems, this is not always so (on this point, I refer to my separate opinion in Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania, [GC], no. 76943/11, 29 November 2016). Such “pruning” of the applicants’ complaint is overly mechanical. It is undertaken without the Grand Chamber having itself considered the matter. What is more, the Chamber judgment whereby part of an applicant’s complaint is found inadmissible never becomes final. Thus, no legal basis for the “pruning” ever in fact comes into existence.
Although the Court’s determination to “have regard [to some unspecified degree] to the former proceedings and decisions” (which, at least formally, are not under examination from the perspective of their compliance with Article 8 of the Convention) has helped to bypass the rigidity of the limits imposed on the Grand Chamber by the Chamber (through its never-finalised judgment), would it not be rational and fair, at some point in time, to look into whether these limits themselves are justified? For until this matter is properly addressed and reviewed, the Grand Chamber will constantly find itself obliged to invent ingenuous formulas in order to circumvent the obstacle which it has itself erected. What is at stake in such cases is the comprehensiveness of the Court’s examination of the case.
Perhaps it is a fortunate coincidence that in the present case an acceptable outcome (a finding of a violation of Article 8) has been reached, despite the fact that a process which ought to have been examined as a whole was divided into two parts: the one formally under consideration, and the other only being “had regard” to.
5. Had the process in question been examined as a whole (that is, the initial period not merely been given “regard” to), it would have been even more obvious that the fundamental problem dealt with in this case lies not only and not so much in the concrete circumstances of the applicant’s case, but rather, to put it very mildly, in certain specificities of the Norwegian policy which underlies the impugned decisions and the process as a whole.
It is hardly a coincidence that so many third-party interveners have joined the present case. They include those States whose authorities have had to deal with the consequences for their under-age citizens of the decisions taken by Norway’s Barnevernet.
Sapienti sat.
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES KJØLBRO, POLÁČKOVÁ, KOSKELO AND NORDÉN ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE
1. We have regrettably been unable to agree with the majority in its finding that there has been a violation of Article 8 in the present case.
2. Amongst ourselves we have taken different positions on the admissibility of the application in so far as the first applicant’s right to pursue the complaint on behalf of the second applicant is concerned. As regards the merits of the case as declared admissible by the majority, however, our views are shared.
3. Essentially, we concur with the position taken by the majority in the Chamber, the judgment of which we find both well-considered and well‑reasoned, and consonant with the proper role of this Court (see paragraphs 111-30 of the Chamber judgment).
4. In the following considerations, however, we would like to make some further observations arising from the subject matter of the present case and the approach taken by the majority.
Some remarks on the Court’s general principles
5. We note at the outset that the present case concerns issues in relation to which the general principles developed in the Court’s case-law have a rather long history, marked in part by changes in the societal and legal environment which informs the Court’s approach to the rights of persons as individuals, family members and children. The complexity of the issues, the dynamics of the underlying factual and legal developments and the diversity of the values and contextual conditions prevailing in these matters have all contributed to a situation where, at present, the general principles as set out by the Court are riddled not only with some inevitable ambiguities but also with some undeniable tensions and outright contradictions, “internally” as well as in relation to the relevant specialised legal instruments, particularly the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
6. One notable point of such tensions and contradictions concerns the question of how to reconcile the “sanctity” of the biological family with the best interests of the child – the latter as enshrined in the CRC, as well as in many subsequent constitutional provisions at national levels and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. There is indeed no doubt that the removal of a child from his or her natural parents cannot be justified by a finding that such a measure would enable the child to be placed in a more beneficial environment for his or her upbringing. The principle according to which the removal of a child from the care of his or her natural parent(s) is subject to a test of necessity in terms of the child’s best interests and is available only as a measure of last resort is uncontroversial. The same is true for the position that the domestic authorities must be allowed a wide margin of appreciation in determining whether the best interests of the child do require that he or she should be taken into public care. The main point of difficulty and tension arises in situations where long-term measures come under consideration.
7. In the general principles as set out in the Chamber judgment, it was reiterated as “the guiding principle” that a care order should be regarded as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit, and that any measures implementing temporary care should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child. The positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible will begin to weigh on the competent authorities with progressively increasing force as from the commencement of the period of care, subject always to its being balanced against the duty to consider the best interests of the child (see paragraph 105 of the Chamber judgment). Similarly, according to the present judgment, “regard for family unity and reunification... are inherent considerations in the right to respect for family life under Article 8” and, “in the case of an imposition of public care restricting family life, a positive duty lies on the authorities to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible” (see paragraph 205).
8. The dilemma is well illustrated by the above rendition of the position in the Chamber judgment. Under this approach, reuniting the natural parent(s) and the child is the “inherent” and “ultimate” aim and the “guiding principle” to be followed. This guiding principle is “subject to” the proviso that the “ultimate aim” (of reuniting the biological family) must be “balanced against” the duty to “consider” the best interests of the child. This gives the impression that the “ultimate aim” of reuniting the biological family might override the best interests of the child. Under the CRC, and similar constitutional or other provisions in many domestic legal orders, however, the position has evolved to one where the best interests of the child are recognized as a primary, or paramount, consideration – based on children’s particular need for protection as dependent and vulnerable human beings. This in turn implies that the best interests of the child may, where the circumstances so demand, override the aim of reuniting the child with the biological parent(s).
9. The background of these two approaches can no doubt be traced back to the history and context of each legal instrument. The ECHR is rooted in the protection, and balancing, of the rights of everyone within a State’s jurisdiction, including those who have formed a family, whereas the CRC is focused on strengthening and protecting children as holders of distinct individual rights. The tension referred to above should be neither over‑emphasised nor ignored. It is always the case that efforts must be made to reconcile the rights of each of the individuals concerned. There are, however, inevitable limits to the possibilities available for such reconciliation. Consequently, it may ultimately be necessary to decide which consideration takes precedence. In this sense, it does make a difference whether the determinative precept is that reuniting the biological family can take precedence over the best interests of the child, or whether the determinative precept is that the best interests of the child may take precedence even where this entails renouncing the child’s reunification with his or her biological parent(s).
10. It appears undeniable that this remains a point of principle on which the Court is struggling. As a result, it has difficulty formulating general principles with all the desirable clarity and coherence.
11. Another manifestation of the tension referred to above is the fact that on the one hand, the Court has – quite rightly – been concerned about the impact of time on the prospects of successful family reunification. Thus, it has held that the positive obligation to take measures toward family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible will weigh on the authorities with progressively increasing force as from the commencement of the period of care, subject always to its being balanced against the duty to consider the best interests of the child (see § 209 of the present judgment). On the other hand, the Court has also accepted that the impact of time may weigh against such reunification. Thus, it has held that when a considerable period of time has passed since the child was originally taken into public care, the interest of a child not to have his or her de facto family situation changed again may override the interests of the parents to have their family reunited (see K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 155, ECHR 2001 VII). In this context, the Court has thus made it clear that the best interests of the child may ultimately take precedence over the “ultimate aim” of reunification.
12. Yet another manifestation of the tensions mentioned above is the fact that the Court has held that it is “in principle in a child’s interests to preserve family ties, save where weighty reasons exist to justify severing those ties” (see paragraph 157 of the present judgment). However, especially in situations where it has been necessary to adopt care measures in respect of an infant and to maintain placement with a foster family for a long period, the child’s de facto family life and family ties may be almost exclusively with the foster family rather than the biological parent(s). In this sense, too, the ultimate question may be which perspective, namely that of the child or that of the biological parent(s), and (accordingly) which family life, should take precedence.
13. These tensions in the general principles are bound to be a source of some real difficulties for the domestic authorities in several Contracting States, not least those where constitutional provisions entail that the best interests of the child be regarded as a pivotal consideration.
The majority’s approach
14. In the present case, the position taken by the majority is presented as being concerned with the decision-making process at the domestic level. The key paragraph (§ 220) reveals, however, that the actual underlying problem as perceived by the majority is a substantive one, namely that the domestic authorities “focused on the interests of the child” and did not “seriously contemplate” the child’s reunification with his biological family. This key passage recaptures and reveals the tension discussed above, and reflects the view taken by the present majority on the question of principles.
15. We find it problematic that the Court should proceed in this manner, effectively substituting its own preferences for the assessment made by the domestic authorities, despite the fact that the latter have carried out a thorough examination of the case in proceedings involving courts composed of both judicial and other professionals with expertise in the field, and on the basis of extensive evidence. The problem is not only that the Court is extremely ill-placed to take on a “fourth-instance” role in these kinds of situations. The more profound problem is that by giving priority to its own preferences as to how the competing interests should be weighted and balanced, the Court in effect curtails the margin of appreciation that it is important to preserve, especially in situations where the domestic authorities must consider individual rights and interests that may well be contradictory and where views may differ as to how the relevant values, principles and competing considerations should best be reconciled in the given circumstances. This is all the more so in a context such as the present one, where the domestic authorities are under a duty to fulfil positive obligations toward a vulnerable child.
16. In the present case, it clearly appears that the manner in which the majority have identified “procedural shortcomings” in fact arises from the substantive view taken, as a result of which the domestic authorities are faulted for “focusing on the interests on the child” instead of his reunification with the biological family. The majority thus consider that they are in a position to conclude that the “lack of a fresh expert examination substantially limited the factual assessment” (see paragraph 223 of the present judgment) and that any evidence that could be drawn from the contact sessions was “limited” (see paragraph 225).
17. Moreover, the majority even question the domestic court’s findings concerning the (particular) vulnerability of X (the child). On this point, we refer to paragraph 224 of the judgment, where the majority imply doubts as to “how the vulnerability could have continued despite the fact that the child had lived in foster care since the age of three weeks”, which is to be contrasted with paragraph 90, citing the Social Welfare Board’s conclusion in this regard concerning the “serious and life-threatening neglect suffered by the child during the three first weeks of his life”). In this matter, our reservations go beyond the problem of the Court adopting a “fourth-instance” mode. Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with child psychology in general, or with research concerning the long-term effects of early neglect of an infant in particular. Furthermore, we find it highly problematic that the Court should question the domestic findings on the particular vulnerability of the individual child – which were reached by instances having taken evidence on this matter and possessing the professional expertise which this Court is clearly lacking – without having raised this particular question in the course of the proceedings before the Court, and thus without providing the parties with the opportunity to shed light on the “nature of the vulnerability” ofX (the child), which the Court is apparently unable to comprehend or attach much credence to. The Court should ensure that issues identified as being of particular significance are subjected to adversarial debate.
18. In sum, this is a case where it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the majority dislike the outcome of the case at the domestic level and have sought to address the substantive objections or misgivings under the guise of procedural shortcomings. Yet the underlying value judgments and preferences deserve to be ventilated with greater transparency.
Our position
19. First of all, and limiting our attention now to the specific context of the impugned decisions (refusal to discontinue the care order, deprivation of parental rights, permission for the foster parents to adopt the child), we subscribe to the Court’s case-law to the effect that measures which totally deprive a parent of his or her family life with his or her child and which thus abandon the aim of reuniting them should “only be applied in exceptional circumstances and could only be justified if they were motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child’s best interests” (see, for instance, Jansen v. Norway, no. 2822/16, 6 September 2918, § 93, and Aune v. Norway, no. 52502/07, § 66, 28 October 2010).
20. In our view, there is no basis for the Court to conclude that the impugned decisions failed to comply with the above requirements, or to hold that there were any significant deficiencies in the domestic decision‑making process.
21. Although the Court is concerned only with the most recent set of decisions, taken in 2012, it should not be overlooked that the case has a long history, starting with support measures put in place even before X (the child) was born, followed by assiduous support measures after his birth, with a view to assisting the mother in learning to take responsibility and care for her baby. Nor can it be overlooked that the care measures were triggered because the assistance provided, although intensive, proved to be unsuccessful. Instead, extremely serious circumstances arose which rendered the care measures necessary for the protection of the child’s life and health. The facts of the case as recounted in the present judgment provide plenty of insight into the challenges faced by the domestic authorities. In particular, it is to be noted that although the first applicant did not contest the High Court’s care order of 2010, she appears not to have realised why any of the imposed measures had been deemed necessary, and continued to perceive the authorities’ actions as a “conspiracy” against her (see paragraphs 77, 90 and 101 of the present judgment). Furthermore, it appears that the contact sessions were also affected by these difficulties, in that the first applicant’s antagonism toward the welfare authorities and foster mother tended to prevail over her attention to the child (see paragraphs 90, 101-03).
22. As regards the particular point that no fresh expert report was requested on the alleged recent improvements in the mother’s situation and caring skills (see paragraph 223 of the present judgment), we do not consider that the facts of the case justify departing from the usual approach under which it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them, including the means to ascertain the relevant facts (see, in particular, Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC],no. 31871/96, § 71, ECHR 2003‑VIII (extracts)). We find it rather far-fetched to criticise the City Court, as the majority do, for not having commissioned a new expert examination. The domestic court was informed of the positive developments in the mother’s situation, and it was not in dispute that, together with her husband and assisted by a social worker, she was capable of taking care of her daughter. However, given the concurrent findings by the County Board and the City Court regarding the mother’s striking lack of empathy and understanding with regard to X and the challenges entailed for the latter if he were to be returned to her care (see paragraphs 90 and 101 of the present judgment), together with his strong social and psychological attachment to his foster parents, we are unable to share the conclusion that the lack of a new expert examination could, in the circumstances of the present case, be considered a significant shortcoming in the domestic decision-making process.
23. In view of the facts of the case as recorded in the present judgment, it is clear that the domestic authorities were faced with a situation where serious issues were at stake in terms of the child and his best interests. It would be wrong, from the perspective of this Court, to underestimate the complexity and difficulty arising from such circumstances. Against this background, the domestic authorities should not, in our view, be criticised for having “focused on the best interests of the child”. We are unable to perceive a sufficient basis for this Court to conclude that, in the particular circumstances of the case, their efforts were misguided or are to be regarded as an unjustified failure to reunify the child with his biological family (mother). Whilst it is true that the impugned measures were based on an assessment of what was required to secure the best interests of the child, we can accept that in the present case, in the light of the facts of the case and the thorough examination given to them in the domestic proceedings, there were exceptional circumstances which justified the drastic measures taken, for reasons pertaining to the overriding requirement to protect the child’s best interests (see point 19 above).
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES KOSKELO AND NORDÉN ON THE QUESTION OF THE FIRST APPLICANT’S RIGHT TO REPRESENT THE SECOND APPLICANT
1. We have voted against point 1 of the operative part of the present judgment, whereby the majority dismiss the Government’s preliminary objection concerning the first applicant’s (i.e. the mother’s) capacity to act before the Court also on behalf of the second applicant (i.e. the child). We consider that there is, in the circumstances of the present case, a conflict of interests between the mother and the child which is of such a nature as to preclude the mother from representing her child in the proceedings before the Court. In this respect, the present case exemplifies issues which, in our view, require changes to be made in the practice followed by the Court to date.
General remarks
2. As holders of rights under the Convention, children give rise to particular challenges in terms of the procedural safeguarding of those rights, in that, as minors, they are unable to act on their own as applicants before the Court. It has been acknowledged in the case-law that the position of children under Article 34 of the Convention calls for careful consideration, since children must generally rely on other individuals to present their claims and represent their interests, and may not be of an age or capacity to authorise any steps to be taken on their behalf in any real sense (see A.K. and L. v. Croatia, no. 37956/11, § 47, 8 January 2013, and P., C. and S. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 56547/00, 11 November 2001). The Court has found it necessary to avoid a restrictive and purely technical approach in this area; in particular, consideration must be given to the links between the child in question and his or her “representatives”, to the subject-matter and the purpose of the application and to the possibility of a conflict of interests (see S.P., D.P. and A.T. v. the United Kingdom, no. 23715/94, Commission decision of 20 May 1996, unreported; Giusto, Bornacin and V. v. Italy (dec.), no. 38972/06, ECHR 2007-V; and Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy (no. 16318/07, § 32, 27 April 2010). One example of a case where the situation of minors was considered to justify granting locus standi to a relative who had lodged an application only on behalf of the minors and not on her own behalf is that of N.TS. and Others v. Georgia, no. 71776/12, §§ 55-59, 2 February 2016).
3. In situations involving public care measures, the Court’s concern has been the danger that the child’s interest may not be brought to the Court’s attention and that the child will therefore be deprived of effective protection of his or her rights under the Convention. In the event of a conflict between a natural parent and the State over a minor’s interests with regard to the question of deprivation of custody, the State as holder of custodial rights cannot be deemed to ensure the child’s Convention rights, which is why the natural parent has been recognised as having locus standi on behalf of his or her child before the Court, even though the parent may no longer be vested with parental rights as a matter of domestic law (see Lambert and Others v. France ([GC], no. 46043/14, § 94, ECHR 2015; Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 138, ECHR 2000 VIII; and Sahin v. Germany (dec.), no. 30943/96, 12 December 2000).
4. While this approach is understandable and justifiable in the light of the underlying concern relating to minors’ access to the Court, it nevertheless gives rise to problems in situations where the natural parent who wishes to act on behalf of the child is himself or herself involved in the facts of the case in such a way that the parent’s and the child’s interests are not aligned but are instead in conflict.
5. This brings us to the crux of the issue. The need to ensure effective protection of the rights of minors under the Convention entails two key requirements: firstly, it must be possible to bring before the Court complaints alleging the violation of a child’s Convention rights; secondly, the child’s interests must be properly represented in proceedings brought on behalf of a child. Focusing on the first aspect is not sufficient for the effective protection of the rights of children. The second aspect becomes acute precisely in situations where the circumstances of the case indicate that there may be a conflict between the interests of the person acting on behalf of the child, be this a natural parent or anyone else, and the child himself/herself.
6. The need to distinguish between the positions of the parent and the child, particularly in situations involving measures taken by the domestic child-welfare authorities, is accentuated by the fact that their perspectives may differ. From the perspective of the parent any measures taken – notably where they are imposed against his or her will – constitute interference in family life between the parent and the child, whereas from the perspective of the child such measures represent fulfilment of the positive obligations incumbent on the State authorities vis-à-vis the child in order to protect the his or her rights and vital interests, while simultaneously entailing an interference in the child’s existing family life. The very context and its complex nature thus indicate that the two perspectives, that of the parent and that of the child, may not be aligned on the question of the necessity and justification of the impugned measures.
7. Ensuring the proper representation of the child in proceedings before the Court is all the more important when, as is often the case, the issues to be resolved depend on an assessment of whether the best interests of the child have been adequately safeguarded at the domestic level. The concept of the child’s best interests is a broad, multifaceted and complex one. It comprises various elements which, in the specific circumstances of a given case, may be in a relationship of tension or conflict with each other. The perception of where a child’s best interests lie in specific situations may depend on the perspective taken, especially for those personally involved, and become intertwined with the individual’s own interests. When a serious conflict has arisen between a natural parent and the State’s child-welfare authorities over the child’s interests, the reality is that neither those authorities nor the parent whose acts or omissions are at issue can be regarded as detached from that conflict. If the child’s rights and best interests are to be taken seriously, the child needs independent representation by a person who is not involved in the underlying conflict and is capable of taking the child’s perspective in the matter.
8. The International Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted already three decades ago and in force for nearly as long, established the position of a child as a subject of distinct individual rights.As stated in its Preamble “the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection” (citing the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 November 1959). Accordingly, the key standard of the child’s best interests has an important procedural component, also set out in the General comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration. In this document, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child states, inter alia: “The child will need appropriate legal representation when his or her best interests are to be formally assessed and determined by courts and equivalent bodies. In particular, in cases where a child is referred to an administrative or judicial procedure involving the determination of his or her best interests, he or she should be provided with a legal representative, in addition to a guardian or representative of his or her views, when there is a potential conflict between the parties in the decision.”
9. In this Court, the need for a child to be separately and independently represented in situations of a conflict of interest between the child and the parent purporting to act on both his or her own and the child’s behalf has so far not been given the attention it requires. The case of X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom (no. 21830/93, 22 April 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑II) appears to have been the first occasion where, in a context different from the present one, Judge Pettiti in his concurring opinion referred to the conflict of interests between parents and children and observed that in similar situations arising in the future, “it would no doubt be desirable for [the Commission and] the Court to suggest to the parties that a lawyer be instructed specifically to represent the interests of the child alone”. This suggestion, however, has remained without impact on the Court’s practices.
10. It appears clear to us that changes are required in this respect, but also that the present legal framework governing proceedings before the Court is not adequate to meet the needs of ensuring that children are able to have both access to and appropriate, non-conflicted representation in proceedings before the Court. In this context, it seems necessary to make a distinction between the admissibility of an application lodged on behalf of a child by a natural parent (or other person) and the right to represent the child for the purposes of submissions relating to the merits of alleged violations of that child’s rights under the Convention.
11. This issue merits consideration by the Court and the Contracting Parties in order to develop adequate solutions and practices, taking into account also the need to comply with the constraints set out in Article 35(1) of the Convention (see, in this respect, the recent joint concurring opinion by Judges Koskelo, Eicke and Ilievski in the case of A and B v. Croatia, no. 7144/15, 20 June 2019).
Assessment in the present case
12. Turning to the present case, the majority “discern no such conflict of interest in the present case as would require it to dismiss the [mother’s] application on behalf of the [child]” (see paragraph 159 of the judgment). We are unable to agree with this assessment, which furthermore is devoid of any explanation or reasoning.
13. On the contrary, the existence of a conflict of interests is in our view obvious in the light of the facts of the case. When assessing this particular issue – and notwithstanding the position taken on the scope of the Court’s examination on the merits (with which we are in agreement), namely that the latter must be limited to the proceedings which resulted in the domestic judgment by the City Court on 22 February 2012, which subsequently became final – it is also pertinent to take into account the background to the measures taken by the child-welfare authorities in respect of the second applicant. The facts of the case as established by the domestic courts show that during her first pregnancy the first applicant was identified as requiring assistance and support once the child would be born. Having given birth, she was accommodated in a specialised facility with a view to receiving such assistance and support, foreseen as lasting for three months. Even in the early days of this stay, the professionals in charge of the facility grew increasingly concerned about the mother’s ability to care for the infant and satisfy his basic needs, including feeding and hygiene. The situation was serious, as baby was suffering from dramatic weight loss. The staff were forced to introduce round-the-clock monitoring in order to safeguard him, including measures to wake the mother up at night-time to ensure she would feed her newborn (see paragraph 20 of the present judgment). However, less than three weeks into a stay scheduled to last three months, the mother announced her intention to leave the facility with the baby, which is when and why the initial emergency care measure was imposed (ibid.).
14. Thus, the facts from which the present case originate lie in a situation where the assistance and support given to the mother had to be replaced by emergency care measures, because the mother’s behaviour and her intention to abandon the support and assistance put in place gave rise to a real risk of life-threatening maltreatment of the newborn child. Yet the facts as they transpire from the case file also show that the mother was unable to understand, even at the time of the impugned proceedings before the City Court, why the measures had been taken, and was unaware that there had been any neglect of the baby on her part (see paragraphs 101 and 220 of the present judgment). Instead, she perceived the imposed measures as being based on lies (as per her complaint to the County Governor; see paragraph 77 of the judgment) and characterised them as a conspiracy against herself (statement to the County Social Welfare Board in 2011; see paragraph 90 of the judgment).
15. If such circumstances do not make for a conflict sufficing to preclude the mother from acting before the Court to represent not only her own position but also the interests of her child, it is difficult to see what would. The interests at stake cannot be assimilated with each other; there is a stark tension between them. Neither the fact that the issue raised before the Court concerns a domestic decision to sever the legal ties between the mother and the child, nor the Court’s case-law according to which it is in principle in a child’s interests to preserve family ties, nor the fact that the domestic proceedings were conducted while the mother was vested with parental rights over the child (see paragraphs 156-57) are capable of overriding the existence of a conflict of interests arising from the specific circumstances of the case. In our opinion, such a conflict cannot be disregarded when determining whether the parent may act on behalf of the child throughout the proceedings before this Court.
Conclusion
16. In our opinion, the facts show the existence of a clear and serious conflict of interests. Under such circumstances, the first applicant should not have been allowed to represent her child before this Court.
17. It is high time for the Court to reconsider its approach and practices regarding the issue of permitting a natural parent to act on behalf of his or her child even where the circumstances of the case indicate an actual or potential conflict of interests between them. If the Court is genuinely to embrace, in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the idea of children as subjects of distinct individual rights and the need to regard the best interests of the child as a primary consideration, it appears necessary to make changes also in the procedural practices.